EXPORTING EUROPOLITICS TO THE EASTERN

NEIGHBOURHOOD:

Elections in the post-Soviet area and the regional

activity of Europarties

Angelos-Stylianos Chryssogelos (University of Limerick)

Antonios A. Nestoras (European Parliament)

EUDO Dissemination Conference, 2013

European University Institute, Florence

Introduction: Discussing ‘crisis’ in post-

Soviet states

• A crisis of state and national identities

• A crisis of international orientation

• Party politics in a little-studied region

• Transnational party cooperation as one

(among many) link between Europe and

national politics

• The ‘limited impact of Europe’ on national party systems

a) Format � Consolidation?

b) Mechanics � Polarisation?

• Europarties in the EU political system

a) Transnational actors � Link the supranational with the national

b) Main functions: Bring together likeminded actors from multiple levels of

policymaking � Coordination, exchange of information

c) Interest in establishing contacts in as many national arenas as possible �

non-EU states as well

Some theoretical propositions

• An inverse relationship between the impact of Europarties and a state’s

degree of integration in the EU:

a) Minimum effect on existing EU members

b) Significant effect on programmatic and organizational profile of parties

ahead of country’s EU accession � ‘Shadow accession process’

c) Systemic effects in countries where relationship with Europe is contested

� Europarty affiliation consequential for parties that have a strong

stance on ‘Europe’

The argument: How do Europarties matter

in national politics?

• Weakly institutionalized parties

• Lack of properly structured cleavages (even though there exist social

divisions)

• Elite-oligarchy driven parties (personal agendas)

• Semi-authoritarian political systems

• Programmatic and organizational ‘thinness’

• Party ‘non-systems’ � Main line of competition: Pro/Anti-regime

Party systems in the post-Soviet area:

General characteristics

• Eastern Partnership: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus

• The effect of democratic revolutions:

a) ‘Democracy’ becomes a stake of competition

b) Competition remains elite-driven but…

c) Pro/anti-regime competition � post-

revolutionary/post-authoritarian competition

• Georgia – Rose Revolution (2003), Ukraine – Orange

Revolution (2004), Moldova – Twitter Revolution (2009)

Party systems in the post-Soviet area:

Signs of change

2004

Ukr-Pr

2010

Ukr-

Pr

2012

Ukr-

Parl

2009

Mold-

Parl

2010

Mold-

Parl

2008

Geo-

Pr

2012

Geo-

Parl

2013

Geo-

Pr

Post-

Revolutionaries

52% 45% 49% 52% 54% 55% 40% 22%

Post-

Authoritarians

44% 49% 43% 45% 39% 26% 55% 62%

• In the ‘shadow of Europe’: Eastern enlargement (2004-2007) and Eastern

Partnership (2008-2009)

• ‘Europe’ absorbed and instrumentalized into the post-rev./post-auth. dimension of

competition

• Particularly useful for post-revolutionary elites � Increase of polarization against

post-authoritarians – Overlap of ‘democracy’ with ‘Europe’

• More consistent expression of social divisions through parties

Party systems in the post-Soviet

area: Signs of change

• Vet potential associates

• Encourage cooperation of pro-European or likeminded forces

• Promote programmatic streamlining � Oligarchic parties acquire ideological

credentials

• Effects:

a) Important advantage for associated parties in competition with likeminded

parties � Increase chances of consolidation (format)

b) Signal associates parties’ ‘Europeanism’ � Amplify capacities for polarization

(mechanics)

What Europarties (can) do

• Three degrees of membership (for EaP: observer parties)

• Own historical experience � Encouragement to merge-consolidate / Tempted by strength

• Ukraine: Amplified the process of post-Orange consolidation around Yulia Tymoshenko �

Contributes to polarization by supporting her through her prosecution

• Georgia: Associated with Saakashvili’s UNM � Important support after loss of power �

Improves prospects for survival in opposition

• Moldova: Association with PLDM � Elite-driven party with strong electoral presence. EPP

association increases its ideological credentials and access to resources

The regional activity of Europarties:

The European People’s Party

2002 2006 2007 2012

Yushchenko 24.5% 13.9% 14.2% 1.1%

Tymoshenko 7.5% 22.3% 30.7% 25.6%

UDAR - - - 14.0%

2004 2008 2012

Winning party

(vote % and no. of

seats)

UNM

67%

135/235

UNM

59%

119/150

Georg. Dream

55%

85/150

Main opposition

(vote % and no. of

seats)

Rightists

7.6%

15/235

Untd. Oppos.

17.7%

17/150

UNM

40%

65/150

EPP-close party results in Ukraine – Parliamentary elections

Party-Opposition balance of power in Georgia – Parliamentary elections

• Three degrees of membership (for EaP: observer parties)

• Generally supportive of post-revolutionaries during democratization

• Tempted by the prospect of competing with EPP

• Ukraine: Initial contacts with post-authoritarian Party of the Regions

• Moldova: Association with PDM (pro-European party started by an authoritarian

defector and championed by an oligarch)

• Georgia: Interest in association with post-post-authoritarian Georgian Dream

• May serve as initiator of reform and ‘normalization’ of post-authoritarian parties

The regional activity of Europarties:

The Party of European Socialists

• Support for pro-European coalitions � Contributes to polarization

• One degree of membership � EaP parties full members!

• Attracts more principled ideological partners

• Moldova: PL initial exponent of post-revolutionary tradition, has lost power,

split

• Georgia: Two small parties within the Georgian Dream coalition � ALDE

became the most vocal opponent of Saakashvili � Direct attacks on EPP

The regional activity of Europarties:

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

• Allies: Initially contribute to polarization by uniting behind post-revolutionaries

• Contribute to consolidation (fewer parties) by offering ideological, organizational

and political resources to associates (amplifying > primary influence)

• Competitors: Support of different sides of the post-rev/post-auth divide

(Georgia, almost Ukraine) / Fragmentation of post-rev coalitions (Moldova)

• Consolidation of partisan corporate identities, some ideological streamlining of

elite-oligarchic projects

General conclusions:

The role of Europarties in EaP countries

• Crucial indicator: Strength of parties in opposition (Ukraine yes, Georgia

possibly, Moldova uncertain)

• Polarization-consistency of party competition:

pro/anti-regime < post-rev/post-auth < Europeanist/non-Europeanist

• Evidence of consolidation of partisan labels

• Parties still elite projects. Some programmatic, little organizational progress

• Next electoral cycles (Moldova 2014, Ukraine 2015, Georgia 2016) crucial

General conclusions:

Prospects for EaP party systems