Contested sovereignty, contested borders:

The Saudi occupation of Hamasah, and related conflicts in 1950s Oman

Daniel Brockett

5/7/2013

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From 1952 to 1955, Saudi Arabia occupied an Omani village in the Buraimi oasis called

Hamasah as part of an ongoing border dispute in which Saudi Arabia lay claim to much of the

Dhahirah – Southern and Eastern Abu Dhabi and Northwest Oman. The “Buraimi crisis,” as it

has been so frequently called, has been a preoccupation of the writers of this time period, and

together with the “Imamate Revolt,” was one of the most important political crises of the decade

in Southeast Arabia. This paper examines the Buraimi Crisis from a different angle than past

scholarship, seeing it as a moment in which fundamental change occurred, which can illuminate

the political culture of Southeast Arabia before the tidal changes brought about by oil revenues

from the second half of the 1960s, and which serves as an example of the way political

modernization begins. It was a moment of translation from a politics predicated on periodically

renewed consent that had been the norm in Eastern Arabia, to the first stages of a ‘modern’

system of fixed borders, permanent sovereignties, and national identities and loyalties.1 I will

show that personal politics – the operation of politics through personal relationships and the

establishment of legitimacy through exemplary performance and behavior – often exercised

through a system of tribal loyalties, played a central role in the establishment of fixed borders

and assumed consent in Oman and Abu Dhabi, in the very process that sought to overwrite

them.2 Through this lens, we can see the dialog between economic, cultural and political

processes, as the possibility of a new economic base spurred rulers to adopt and enforce new

models of rule and belonging, while at the same time seeking to manipulate this transition.

1 The focus of the paper, however, is on the Saudi occupation of Hamasah, as the author lacks the ability to conduct the oral interviews necessary to fully understand the civil war between the Sultan and Imam. Situations from the latter conflict that are comprehensible and inform a discussion of the occupation of Hamasah by illuminating the operation of sovereignty in the region are discussed later in the text.2 This is not to say that power and the desire for control were absent, nor to deny that imperialism and the relative capacity for violence of the state and local groups were important factors in politics in Southeast Arabia. In fact, the development of a British-trained and -equipped military with modern transport that could move in ways camels could not was the decisive factor in ending the occupation of Buraimi. And this occupation might have ended sooner, without these modern troops, if not for British diplomatic efforts and great-power politics. Rather, the argument is that the personal politics described here allowed the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi to accomplish the same ends as those achieved by the Sultan while avoiding occupation and warfare. The weakness of the personal politics of the Sultan’s representatives provided the opening for the Saudi occupation of Hamasah.

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Before such an argument may be advanced, however, it is necessary to discuss the sources relied

upon in constructing this narrative, define terms which may be unfamiliar to the reader, or which

may be misinterpreted, discuss the limitations of the source material upon which this argument is

based, and establish the geographical, economic, and imperial context in which this took place.

Geography, long-dureé social structures, and terminology

The geographical entity known as Oman has been defined in different ways over time in

different contexts. The region encompassed today by the United Arab Emirates has been

included and excluded in various times and contexts, as has Dhofar. Even the current capital,

Muscat, is excluded from the narrowest usages of the term, which include only select regions of

the interior of the contemporary state. For the purposes of this study, Oman refers to the political

entity under the rule of the Bu Said dynasty from the 18th century to the present. This territory

includes most of Southeast Arabia, stretching from the Hajar mountains and Musandam

Peninsula in the Northwest, down the coast of the Gulf of Oman to the Southeastern corner of

Arabia, along its Indian Ocean coast up to Hadhramaut, and inland to the edges of the Rubʿ al

Khali. Likewise, the area of the Persian Gulf coast stretching southeast from Khor al-Udaid, at

the base of the Qatar peninsula and up the Northwest coast of the Musandam peninsula – what is

today known as the United Arab Emirates – will be here referred to as the Trucial States. This

region was historically composed of five independent Sheikhdoms: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras al-

Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qawain. Fujairah and Ajman were later additions to the system.3

The appellation ‘Trucial States’, refers to a series of treaties signed by rulers of these

independent emirates with Great Britain in the 19th Century, guaranteeing maritime peace,

3 Fujairah and Ajman became independent from Oman and Dubai, respectively, long after these treaties were signed and joined the Trucial system at that point, but as this paper focuses on border disputes between the 1930’s and 1950’s anything more than a cursory discussion of this process would be out of place.

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ensuring that they would not expropriate land to any foreign power, and granting Britain control

of their respective foreign policies.

Based on archeological evidence from settlements in the Buraimi Oasis and other areas of

Oman and Abu Dhabi, Oman and the area here referred to as the Trucial States have been settled

since at least the 3rd millennium B.C.E. Some of the earliest evidence from these sites shows that

these settlements were already trading with India, East Africa, and Egypt at the time.4 This was

still very much the case in the 19th and 20th centuries, when the largest cities in Oman and the

Trucial States were almost exclusively arrayed along the coast and geared toward either the

Indian Ocean trade or the regional trade along the Persian Gulf. Along with access to pearl

fisheries and these cities’ role as endpoints for the date harvests, these systems of trade were the

basis for the Gulf economy at the coast. In the desert regions that make up most of the Dhahirah,

the economy was based on the raising of camels for milk, in addition to meat and wool. There

were also several oases in the Dhahirah, which relied on underground aqueducts known as aflaj

(s. falaj) to irrigate date gardens, and to grow row crops and other fruit trees between date palms.

These economies, of course, were connected. Camel pastoralists traded at oases and coastal cities

for guns, ammunition, dates, flour and clothing, and it was typical for tribes like the Duruʿ that

lived more or less nomadically on the desert steppe to own date palms in one or another oasis.5

Individuals, as well, might own camels or date palms, might be extremely mobile or more

sedentary at different points in their lives. These trends hold for most of the desert regions of

4 Robert Geran Landen, Oman since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 12; Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, (London: Longman Group Ltd, 1982), 19-20.5 I use the terms nomadic and nomadically throughout this paper to distinguish degrees of mobility among camel pastoralists. Many groups raised camels and some were relatively sedentary, or moved seasonally between only a couple pastures (proper transhumance), while other groups moved over long distances, between many pastures, and/or seasonally dispersed from a primary grazing land to take advantage of scattered grazing. This should not be taken to imply aimless wandering – which would be lethal in the most barren areas in this region – or a lack of sophistication of any kind. Nor should these labels be seen to be permanent or to have a discrete meaning. Practices varied widely between and among groups, and from year-to-year, as dictated by rainfall. These terms are solely used to describe tendencies to greater mobility between groups.

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Southeast Arabia. Economically, the small settlements in the well-watered valleys of the

mountainous regions of Oman grew many of the same crops as oasis villages and relied on

similar methods of irrigation. However, this region was more fertile overall and supported larger,

walled cities.

These geographical and economic realities had important political ramifications. In the

Trucial States, coastal cities were controlled by their respective rulers. In Oman, coastal cities

were either controlled directly by the Sultan – or Imam, in periods in which an Imam ruled – as

was the case for Muscat and Matrah in the period under study, or by governors appointed by the

Sultan. Inland from the coast, however, small towns were more independent and economically

self-sufficient. A few walled cities, which were sometimes controlled by centrally appointed

governors, were the exception. Smaller settlements predominated and they were administered by

the sheikhs of the most prominent local tribes, whose relations with the Sultan varied tribe-to-

tribe and changed over time. In the desert regions, especially among more nomadic groups, the

authority of the sheikhs at various levels of tribal organization was even more important, as the

power of the state weakened progressively in more arid regions, quite literally disappearing

entirely in the Rubʿ al Khali. These desert sheikhs were proverbially independent, and this

independence was very real. Specially-bred camels and detailed knowledge not only of the

location and status of wells, but of rain sightings going back several years was necessary to

penetrate the most arid regions of the desert. The loyalty of the more nomadic tribes, or the

nomadic sections of tribes, was therefore more tenuous than that of their settled counterparts. 6

At the same time, individual autonomy from local sheikhs and heads of families seems to have

increased across this spectrum of settlement types and relations to state power, as sheikhs were

6 For example, the Mazariʿ section of the normally settled Bani Yas, was more nomadic and at times more open to Saudi influence, though they never rejected Bu Falah leadership.

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expected to seek consensus – a point which will be discussed in more detail below – and as more

dispersed grazing led to more distance from sheikhly authority, physically and conceptually.

As the majority of the population of Southeast Arabia lived in these smaller settlements

or in desert areas – though only a small number lived in the Rubʿ al-Khali – and as the rulers

themselves and much of the urban population were tribespeople, the primary basis for social and

political organization was the tribe and the real power of Southeast Arabia was vested in the

hands of tribal sheikhs.7 These men regulated daily life in the region. They settled almost all

disputes within tribes and between members of different tribes, deciding whether to make peace

or war, whether to allow another tribe to graze alongside their own if they were suffering from

drought, and whether to allow a traveler to use the tribe’s wells. All of these decisions, however,

were made in consultation with whoever was present, in open discussion. In addition, a tribal

sheikh was elected, generally from a senior branch of the tribe, by leaders of the various sections

of the tribe. This worked at many levels of tribal organization, from the tamimah (paramount

sheikh) of one of the two great factions of tribes, to the sheikh of one of the small sub-sections of

tribes which might be fairly autonomous, or not.

At the largest level of organization, the tribes of Southeast Arabia belonged to one of two

large factions, the Hinawi and Ghafari – though this distinction has been lost since the formation

of nation-states. The terms for each group are said to date to a period of upheaval in the 18th 7 I use the term tribe here to refer to institutions of political, social, and economic organization organized according to real or fictive kinship ties. Though the term has been used by other authors to imply political backwardness in the past, I use the term in rejection of these connotations, and I hope that this paper will show some of the political and social complexity of this institution. Nevertheless, the term presents practical difficulties due to its lack of specificity, as it has been used – and will be used in this paper – to describe organizations which vary greatly in size, in political organization, and in the degree of perceived kinship ties. For example, I might refer to the al-Rashid as a tribe, even as I use the term for the al-Kathir, of which al-Rashid is a branch. I do so because the transliteration of the Arabic terms (qabilah or tribe, fakhithah, a clan or section, and a’ilah, or family) would be confounding to most readers; because the source material in most cases does not distinguish between tribes and sections of tribes, rendering it exceedingly difficult to determine which Arabic term would apply; because in many cases the Arabic terms themselves are applied inconsistently or there is disagreement about which term would apply to which group; and most of all because this level of specificity is not necessary for the purposes of this paper. Likewise, I might use other English terms, but these do not properly convey the structural imagery that tribe conveys, one which is equal parts political and familial, even in the acknowledged absence of shared genealogical origins, and which embraces a broad concept of social and political life.

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Century which broke the Yaʿaribah dynasty and polarized pre-existing tensions amongst the

tribes to the point that each tribe in the region joined one faction or the other. These tensions,

moreover, are said to go back to the earliest days of settlement in Southeast Arabia, possibly

thousands of years, to the settlement of Oman itself from two distinct waves of migration. The

first putative wave came from Yemen and the tribes involved are referred to as Azdi or Qahtani,

in reference to the name of the tribe (Azd) and the name of the founding figure (Qahtan) – these

later became Hinawis. The second migration is said to have come from the North and the

associated tribes are referred to as ʿAdnani, after their founding figure (ʿAdnan) – these became

Ghafaris. The tension between the groups, then, is supposed to have roots in the invasion of

Oman by the ʿAdnanis, a few centuries before the advent of Islam.8 The terms Ghafari-Hinawi

and ʿAdnawi-Qahtani, however, did not map perfectly to individual tribes; nor were the Ghafari

and Hinawi labels necessarily static; nor was the division between the groups so significant as to

prevent infighting or to preclude good relations with tribes from the other side. I will not dwell

on the prehistory or minutiae of the designations. Rather, for the purposes of this paper, it is

important to note that these factions tended to come down on opposite sides of the various

conflicts between the Sultan and his subjects and that they often had recognized leaders.9 The

tamimah of al-Harth generally led the Hinawi faction and the tamimah of the Bani Riyam led the

Ghafaris. The degree to which various tribes would follow their lead varied considerably, and

their leadership was fairly weak by the mid 20th Century.10 But identification as Hinawi or

8 Landen, Oman since 1856, 34-35.9 Landen, Oman since 1856, 300-307. Hinawi tribes supported ʿAzzan bin Qays, but not Ghafiri; when Hinawi support waned due to taxes, economic woes, they got rid of him. 332-334, Attempts to compromise between Hinawi and Ghafari leads to war between groups. 337-339, The Sultan’s half-brother, backed by Hinawis, assaulted Muscat.10 Landen, Oman since 1856, 394-413. This dates to the early 20th century, when the split between the interior and coastal areas became more prominent following the Imamate revolt of 1913, which was supported by both the Bani Riyam and al-Harth. From this time, the leaders of these factions formed a sort of triumvirate with the Imam in the interior of ‘Oman.

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Ghafiri remained a dominant factor in tribes’ relations with the Sultan, in relations between

tribes, and between individuals belonging to tribes from either faction.

Though the exercise of authority was limited by geography, settlement patterns, and

political relationships that changed over time, sovereignty in Southeast Arabia was very durable.

A member of the Al-Nahyan family in the Bu Falah section of the Bani Yas has governed Abu

Dhabi, both the region and its eponymous city, since at least the late 18th Century.11 Likewise, the

leadership of Oman has fallen to a member of the Bu Said since 1749.12 Loyalties in Southeast

Arabia before political modernization are often characterized as flexible, but this is misleading.

The politics of this region are more accurately portrayed in terms of negotiated consent, varying

degrees of control and pragmatic shifts in apparent loyalty. In a number of circumstances, some

of which will be examined later, a tribe recognized the Sultan as its ruler but did not comply with

his instructions. Likewise certain tribes and towns were not required to pay taxes, or were not

administered directly. They might withhold recognition or compliance to gain some concession –

a gift from the Sultan, remission of taxes, etc.13 Tribes or members of tribes might even

acknowledge another ruler when it became expedient with every intention of remaining the

subject of the Sultan. These relationships were a reflection of a tribe or sheikh’s affinity for a

ruler and of its power, its leverage relative to the Sultan. All of these might change over time,

and the terms of subordination were frequently renegotiated. Personal politics, including gift-

giving, entertaining, socializing and a number of other practices – discussed in more detail below

11 John Barrett Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), 20. The Bani Yas were established in Liwa in the early 18th century, colonized Abu Dhabi sometimes near mid-century, and the Bu Falah made it their base of operations by late century. Their presence in Buraimi dates to the 1820s.12 Landen, Oman since 1856, 58. Ahmed Ibn Saʿid, the first Bu Said ruler (an elected Imam), took power in 1749 after expelling Persian occupiers who had dominated much of the Omani coast since an invasion led by Nadir Shah in the 1830s. 13 J.R. Wellsted, Travels in Arabia, (Graz: Akademische Druck - u. Verlagsanstalt, 1978), 44, 192, 232-233. Sur was not taxed directly, even under Said the Great. Wellsted details a scenario in which a revolt was put down by exempting Sheikhs supporting a rebel Sheikh from taxes, provided they withdrew their support and another where the semi-autonomous Sheikh of Sohar wrested control of Rustaq by remitting half the city’s taxes.

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– were employed by political actors at every level and were essential to successfully maintaining

and renegotiating these relationships. A more popular, richer or more powerful ruler was

therefore able to administer and tax more areas, and was able to raise a larger army – which

would allow him to distribute more gifts and add coercive force to his demands. For most of the

19th and 20th centuries, the qualities of the ruler and the health of the export economy in Muscat

and Matrah – or the pearl trade, in the case of Abu Dhabi – were therefore essential to control of

the interior.

Explorers and oil men

This paper examines the cultural expectations of leadership, the practice of sovereignty,

and of the role economic change played in their transformation in Southeast Arabia through the

lens of a border conflict between Oman and Abu Dhabi, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia on the

other, as it escalated into the Saudi occupation of a village named Hamasah from 1952-1955.

The narrative constructed here relies to a great degree on the accounts of European travelers in

Oman, the Trucial Coast, and Arabia in drawing an outline of the political organization of

Southeast Arabia. This is unavoidable, due to the dearth of material written by locals about daily

life, travel, relationships between tribes, and politics below the national scale and due to my own

limited familiarity with Arabic.14

The use of European travelers’ and bureaucrats’ accounts as a source of information

about Arabia, of course, raises some issues. These men often spent years in the region and

provide some great information, but the accounts they left behind concern their travels in the

14 Hilal al-Hijri, British Travel-Writing on Oman: Orientalism Reappraised, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2006).

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region. To the extent that they lived in one place for any extended period, it was in one of the

coastal cities. Villages and towns of the interior then figure as subjects of description, as

destinations or stopping points, but there is not a single example of one of these writers living for

an extended period of time in interior Oman. Moreover, in any settled areas they visited, these

men were guests of the ruler or the most powerful of the local sheikhs. Their accounts of orality

are then skewed toward the Bedu and the male world of the desert, on the one hand, and the male

elite of the major coastal cities, on the other. Their experiences also reflect genres appropriate to

travel and the entertainment of guests. Furthermore, the limitations of the authors’ experiences

extend to constrain almost any topic of interest to the historian – save, perhaps, an account of

Western travelers in the region.

In addition, each of these explorers experienced the oral culture of the Bedu they

interacted with in a specific context, and with specific individual motivations. Bertram Thomas,

the first European to cross the Rubʿ al Khali, travelled as wazir, or minister, of Sultan Taimur bin

Faisal of Oman, his top advisor. He would have been perceived not only as a Christian, but as a

representative of the Sultan’s government. He made efforts, moreover, to maintain a distance

from his travelling companions, preferring to sleep apart from them. He also used the heavier

saddle common to northern Arabia, to the consternation of his companions who were constantly

concerned with their camels’ burdens “for the camel is her master’s dearest dear, and he will

cease fighting her battles only with his latest breath.”15 By implication, he maintained himself as

not only apart, but somewhat above his companions. Likewise, Abdullah Philby was an advisor

to King Ibn Saud, the most powerful figure in Arabia at the time, and travelled with his blessing

15 Bertram Thomas, Arabia Felix: Across the “Empty Quarter” of Arabia (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), xxiv-xxvii, 116, 193.

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and under his protection.16 The two of them travelled with personal servants, slept apart from

their companions, and Thomas even slept with a pillow. He knew enough to leave his tent

behind.17 Wilfred Thesiger is also the exception in this respect, and his account is all the more

valuable for the fact that he travelled without official sanction. He was not associated with any

ruler and he took pains to travel as his companions did, adopting the light southern saddle,

though he was unfamiliar with it, and sleeping on the bare sand.18

Additionally, Thomas, Thesiger and Philby paid their companions generously to

accompany them across the desert and, universally, the Bedu did most or all of the essential work

of the journey – packing, gathering firewood, grazing the camels, gathering the camels in the

morning, making a fire, cooking the food, grinding the coffee. A recurring theme, especially

early in each explorer’s journey, is their companions making excuses to stop after a few hours’

march to allow the camels to graze. Each explorer would later learn the necessity of these short

marches, due to the scarce grazing in the Sands and the necessity of the camels’ well-being

entering them.19 Nevertheless, the very fact that these Bedu, expert as they were in desert travel

and engaged specifically for their expertise, felt the need to justify the early halts indicates their

consciousness of distance and a power dynamic between themselves and these explorers. This

had an impact on their experiences of oral culture.20 Moreover, each of the travelers describes his

16 H. St. John B. Philby, The Empty Quarter: being a description of the Great South Desert of Arabia known as Rubʿ al Khali, (New York: Henry Holt and company, 1933), xviii-xxiv.17 Thomas, Arabia Felix, 119-120; Philby, The Empty Quarter, 5-6, 10, 13, 17. Philby traveled with a sizeable baggage train and his entire party slept in tents. He seems to have had his own.18 Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian Sands. London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co Ltd, 1959, 36, 38-39, 106-107. Thesiger also compares the journeys of Thomas and Philby – Philby took the more difficult route, but Thomas was the first and Thesiger credits him with gaining personal acceptance from the al Rashid tribe.19 Thomas, Arabia Felix, 118-119; Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 50.20 Philby, The Empty Quarter, 41-42. For example, in the early stages of Philby’s journey, travelling near the Gulf coast, he asked his guide Ali the name of a distinctive depression: “It has no name…it is one of the jiban (depressions) but it has no name.” Not believing that such a prominent feature could possibly be nameless, Philby pressed his companions and loudly questioned the competence of his guide, initiating an argument. When the situation had cooled down, a small group of his companions took him aside and told him the name – Jaub al Hirr. Hirr was a vulgar term for a vagina, and his guide had not wished to offend him. It had seemed inappropriate to his status to mention it.

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traveling companions as initially somewhat reserved, even mistrustful. As their journeys

progressed, however, these distinctions seem to have broken down. Within a couple weeks,

Philby’s companions were regaling him with tales of his other guide Salih’s impotence, of

circumcision practices, and which tribes had the most beautiful and lustful women.21

In addition to power dynamics and the limited contexts in which these travelers

experienced southern Arabia, we encounter the issue of Arabic proficiency. This was probably

not a major concern for Thomas and Philby.22 Thesiger, however, had been trained in classical

Arabic, his practical experience was limited mostly to his time in the Sudan, and he was

admittedly a poor linguist. He refers in several places to the mental strain from so frequently

communicating in Arabic and he complains on later journeys that his Arabic had improved to the

point that he could no longer tune out his companions’ constant bickering and talk, explaining

that previously it had taken a conscious effort to understand them.23 This is reflected in his book

Arabian Sands, as the content of speech is glossed over on his first couple journeys, where he

would report the fact of their speech, but no details of the subject. He focuses in these passages

on the journey itself, the landscape, and his own state of mind as he struggled to adapt to the

cultural context of a traveling party in Arabia. It is his later journeys that are rich with details of

daily life as he and his companions traveled across the desert or rested after a voyage, and at this

point in the book that it becomes valuable to this discussion.

Thesiger’s attempt to live closely with the Bedu, mentioned earlier, hints at another key

factor in any analysis of the accounts of these explorers. It should be evident, given the

21 Philby, The Empty Quarter, 81-82, 110.22 Thomas, Arabia Felix, xxiv, 47-48; Philby, The Empty Quarter, xix-xxii; Thesiger, Arabian Sands,33. Both Philby and Thomas had lived in Arabia for years prior to their journeys and seem to have been able to communicate effectively. Thomas worked as wazir for the Sultan of Oman and even dabbled in linguistics, while Philby had converted to Islam, following the Wahhabi interpretation of his hosts, and lived closely with the Arabs in Saudi Arabia.23 Thesiger, Arabian Sands,37, 233-234.

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extraordinary difficulty and danger of these journeys, that each of these men was extremely

motivated to undertake this expeditions. Their motivations differ, however, and these differences

affected their attitude toward their companions, their conduct on their journeys, and ultimately

their experience and reporting of Arabian orality. If there is a common denominator for these

three men, it is the challenge – as they saw it – of one of the last unexplored frontiers in the

world at that time. That is to say it was unexplored by Europeans, a blank spot on their maps.

Particularly when Bertram Thomas and Abdullah Philby were planning their trips, many

European scholars of Arabia did not believe the desert could be crossed on land, without the

benefit of machines.24 From this common motivation, however, the three diverged noticeably.

For Thesiger, his time in Arabia seems to have been about escape and self-discovery. He

despised civilization and machines and was a harsh critic of settled life. He saw the Great Desert

as a place where he might escape these annoyances and a place that needed to be explored in full

before it was spoiled by the inevitable advance of civilization. He was not, however, interested in

scientific study, in preserving stories, or in cataloguing the plant and animal life he encountered

– though he did so, as part of his agreement with the Locust Research Center that sponsored his

trip. His account has an intimate literary feel to it. Thomas, in contrast, saw himself as advancing

scientific knowledge and this was a central concern for him in his travels. The same can be said

to some degree of Philby, perhaps to a lesser degree.

Among Thomas’ concerns, for example, was establishing whether the Arabs south of the

desert truly belonged to the same race as northern Arabs. He theorized that they were more

closely linked to Abyssinians and a pastime of his was measuring the heads of people he

encountered in his travels.25 He paid his companions, and anyone else he encountered, to gather

24 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 259-260; Thomas, Arabia Felix, xxiv-xxv; Philby, The Empty Quarter, xviii-xix.25 Thomas, Arabia Felix, 22-27, Appendix I.

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local plant specimens and catch local animals, which he catalogued meticulously, skinned, and

preserved. In addition to the detailed records of the course of the journey recorded by all the

explorers, he very carefully measured the altitude wherever he was, in an attempt to establish the

relative slope of the peninsula as a whole. He alone of the travelers recorded the stories told to

him, and the songs his companions sung as they marched or cleared a well, and translated these

into English in one of several appendices in his book.26 His approach, then, conformed to the

scientific methods of his time and focused primarily on anthropological observation and

geographical concerns. He was the most thorough and systematic of the three in his observations

of the Bedu, but he must have seemed odd and this would have colored his interactions with the

Bedu. For example, one must wonder whether the oral traditions he gathered on the Bani Hillal

would have been normal fodder for a journey.

While Bertram Thomas and Abdullah Philby may have created distance between

themselves and their companions through their positions, by implicitly reinforcing status

differences, Thesiger could be argumentative and irritable. In his very closeness with his

companions, he sometimes made important mistakes. At one point, he placed his hand on his

companion bin Kabina’s neck, his show of affection provoking outrage. Thesiger narrates that he

“asked furiously if I took him for a slave.”27 Nevertheless, over the great distances travelled and

time spent with their Bedu companions, it seems many of these quirks were overcome, or at least

the Bedu were willing to look past them. Thesiger reports that Thomas’ travelling companions,

one of whom travelled with Thesiger, thought him a worthy companion, if a little eccentric.

26 Thomas, Arabia Felix, 59, 105, 146, 226, 293Appendices II-VI. Thomas’ narration of animal catching and plant collecting is too exhaustive to describe point-by-point. One cannot read five pages without some mention of it. Likewise, he was preoccupied with his aneroid (a tool for measuring air pressure; a type of barometer).27 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 147-148.

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Their only complaint was his heavy saddle.28 Likewise, contemporaries of Thesiger confirmed

the remarkable closeness of Thesiger to his companions.

Perhaps the most significant shortcoming in the accounts of these desert explorers is the

almost complete absence of women from the story. They each encounter women occasionally –

as they meet some Bedu living with his wife in a small tent, or see a woman as they water camels

at a well – but there seems to have been very little interaction and these encounters yield no more

than a passing remark. Rather, to the extent that we learn anything of women, it is when the

authors report on the talk of their Bedu companions about women – and if there is one thing

universal to all cultures, it is the unreliability of this sort of talk – or when the authors ask about

some detail of women’s lives. Thus we get Abu Ja’sha explaining, partially as a friendly dig at

Philby’s Manasir guide, that the Manasir “let their women come to puberty with clitoris intact

and…make a feast for her circumcision a month or two before the wedding….Thus their women

grow up more lustful than others, and fine women they are too and that hot! But then they

remove everything to cool their ardour without reducing their desire.”29 Likewise, Thesiger’s

guide al Auf explained how to approach desert women “Next time, Umbarak, you see a girl that

pleases you, sit down next to her in the dark, push your camel-stick through the sand until it is

underneath her, and then turn it over until the crook presses against her. If she gets up, gives you

an indignant look, and marches off, you will know that you are wasting your time. If she stays

where she is, you can meet her next day when she is herding goats.” Of course, this was

uncommon amongst the women of his own tribe.

There is a real issue, a central issue, of access here. These authors had very little access to

women. Thesiger points out that Bedouin women were not secluded, but were expected to herd

28 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 38-39.29 Philby, The Empty Quarter, 81.

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goats, fetch water, and perform other chores – and that the Bedu lived under trees, and in tents

with one side always open. Nevertheless, it was customary for them to eat separately, to sit

somewhat to the side when coffee was being taken and men were speaking.30 In short, it was

customary for men and women to maintain somewhat separate social spheres, and it would have

raised eyebrows for the European explorers to seek out the company of women to gather their

talk. Additionally, Thesiger stated bluntly that he was not especially interested in women.31 To

form a complete picture of Southeast Arabia at midcentury, therefore, oral histories conducted

within the lifetime of living memory are absolutely essential.

There is also a concern about the biases and the perspective of these writers as Europeans

writing about other cultures. We are also limited to the authors’ experiences and to the aspects of

this experience they chose to narrate. Thesiger’s story glorifies the world of the Bedu. It is about

fiercely independent tribespeople, for whom poverty is a small price to pay for the freedom of

the desert. Henderson explicitly chronicles his own part in a triumphant modernization, led by

legitimate, benevolent rulers in both Abu Dhabi and Oman. Would they have omitted stories that

did not fit the narrative they wished, consciously or unconsciously, to construct? In addition, the

simple fact that they were writing from outside the cultures involved certainly affects how we

interpret them. We must always ask, for example, whether they fully understood the processes

they observed, whether their observations can be attributed to confirmation bias, whether they

are truly talking about the cultures they describe at all, or whether the intention is to glorify or

criticize their own society through the lens of an imagined other. I argue that these limitations

30 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 177-178.31 There has been debate about Thesiger’s views on women, and Thesiger’s sexuality. I’ve only scratched the surface of the debate. He has been accused of being a misogynist and some believe he is a homosexual, due to his vivid descriptions of male beauty. I will not delve too deeply into this here, as I have not read his other work, but his expressed views in Arabian Sands are not misogynist, and I find it equally likely that Thesiger was simply not interested in sex and preferred male company (the topics of conversation, their pastimes, etc). He seems to recognize the beauty of women, young men, and landscapes alike in this book. It is plausible that he was attracted to men, but highly implausible that he acted on any such attraction while in the desert, and therefore almost irrelevant.

16

can be overcome, that the men who wrote about Southeast Arabia were distinct enough in

intention and outlook to enable the historian to check them against one another and ultimately

describe with a degree of confidence the structures in place in the mid-20th Century and the

events that so transformed them.32

I am confident that we do gain an understanding of what men expected from their leaders,

how they interacted with them, and the social conventions that shaped these expectations and

interactions – with concrete examples. But there are limitations that are more difficult to

overcome. We do not know how the interests of women influenced these processes. We see little

of family life, less still of the lives of women and their perceptions and expectations of leaders.

We learn more, in fact, about men’s relationships with their camels than with their sisters and

wives. Tribes and leaders in contested regions figure more prominently in these narratives. Bedu

figure disproportionately as well. Ultimately, the understanding we do have is limited to the

extent that not every tribe is represented in detail, but it is enough to draw parallels and make

interpretations.

Arabian Orality

These travelers’ accounts are valuable, as these men witnessed much of the daily and

political life reconstructed here. But the travelers themselves, like the Arabs with whom they

interacted daily, were drawing on a much larger resource, which I am ill-equipped to access

directly: Arabia in the 1950s was home to a vibrant oral culture that spanned the Rubʿ al-Khali.

One key element of this oral culture was the exchange of news between travelers whenever and

wherever they meet. The ubiquitousness and importance of this practice is reported by Wilfred

32 al-Hijri, British Travel-Writing on Oman. This is, in fact, the subject of al-Hijri’s very interesting book. While an understanding of orientalist tropes is useful for interpreting the documents produced by Europeans in this period, these tropes play differently in this corner of Arabia, and wherever possible, it is more useful to account for authors’ individual approaches and motivations.

17

Thesiger, Bertram Thomas, H. St. John Philby and Edward Henderson, each of whom spent five

or more years in Arabia. Through examples scattered throughout Arabian Sands Thesiger

provides the most complete picture of the practice as an institution that at once ties the desert

together, enforces the social and moral code, protects the traveler from raiders, guides him to

healthy grazing and water, passes the time, and forges bonds between people.

As early as his first journey along the Southern fringes of the desert in 1945, Thesiger

reports with frustration that Bedu, attracted by reports of fresh grazing, were thick along the

northern slopes of the Qarra Mountains and that “everyone had heard that the Christian had great

quantities of food with him.” This attracted visitors to his camp every night, who shared in their

meals, which he had planned meticulously based on the size of his party – Thesiger was not

acclimated to the customs of Arabia at this point.33 Later on the same trip, Thesiger hints at the

connection between orality, the landscape, and the skills of the Bedu themselves, as one of his

traveling companions reads some old tracks – Thesiger was not even sure they were camel tracks

– and theorizes that six Awamir had raided the Junuba in the South. They had come from Sahma,

watered at Mughshin, and passed by that spot ten days ago. “We had seen no Arabs for

seventeen days and we saw none for a further twenty-seven,” Thesiger narrates. But on his

return, they exchanged news with some Bait Kathir who “told us that six Awamir had raided the

Junuba, killed three of them, and taken three of their camels.” He goes on to explain that every

Bedu knew the tracks of his own camel, some “of nearly every camel they had seen,” that the

camels in different regions had different feet, leaving different tracks, and that Bedu likewise

knew the politics of every tribe on the desert inside and out, and could guess who would raid

whom.34 “No Bedu will ever miss the chance of exchanging news with anyone he meets, and he

33 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 49-50.34 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 52.

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will ride far out of his way to get fresh news.” This is the author’s generalization, but it is

confirmed by examples later in the text.

There was a protocol for exchanging news: ‘Your news?’ ‘The news is good.’ ‘Is anyone

dead? Is anyone gone’ ‘No! – don’t say such a thing.’ Thesiger reports that this formula held

whatever the actual news might be.35 They would then sit down to drink coffee and eat dates.

When this was finished, the real news was exchanged. In this case the Dahm had raided the

Manahil; the Manahil had raided the Yam; the Saar had raided the Dawasir. They went into

specifics of who led what party, who had been killed and who wounded, how successful this or

that raid had been. They said there had been good rain in the steppes – North of the Qarra

Mountains (in Dhofar), South of the Rubʿ al Khali – but the seven year drought held in the Jiza.

Then there were specific questions and answers between the groups, a conversation, and it came

to an end, often late at night. This sort of news, moreover, traveled widely. Thesiger relates an

example in which his guide, Al Auf, tells him of some successful Bu Falah raids. He’d received

the news from some kinsmen who had participated, making their way seven hundred miles

across the desert to return to the steppe with three camels and a rifle. He then travelled four

hundred miles to meet Thesiger’s party in Mughshin, where some of the Bait Kathir with

Thesiger would carry the news two hundred miles to the coast, and whoever they met would

likely carry it into Oman.36 Meanwhile, these were certainly not the only vectors for transmission

of the raids, as there would have been other witnesses. Just as the Al Rashid were connected with

the Southern steppe, any Manasir who might have participated would have connections in the

Hasa in eastern Saudi Arabia. Any Manahil or Murra who received the news there would have 35 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 88; Edward Henderson, Arabian destiny: The complete autobiography, (Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 1999); Anita L. P. Burdett and R. W. Bailey. 1992. Records of Oman, 1867-1960. Volume 8: Historical Affairs. [Great Britain]: Archive Editions, 27. Henderson reports something similar “No news. Praise be to God,” before beginning the news. His language skills may have been more limited, however, and this could be an abbreviation of what was said, in the context of the story.36 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 109.

19

transmitted it across Saudi Arabia. This represents informed speculation, but the significance is

that such news would be disseminated to the edges of the desert within months.

The news, however, was not only life or death, raids, wars, rain and grazing. It was also a

social institution and covered topics we might consider gossip. As Thesiger says on exchanging

news with part of his party that had stayed behind before the desert crossing: “They were Bedu,

and no mere outline would suffice either them or my companions; what they wanted was a

detailed account of all that we had seen and done, the people we had spoken to, what they had

said, what we had said to them, what we had eaten and where. My companions seemed to have

forgotten nothing, however trivial.”37 The conduct of daily life was regulated in this way, as

one’s actions, for better or worse, would become public knowledge. They would be known not

only locally, but across the desert. An inhospitable host, a sheikh who hoarded silver instead of

distributing gifts, a man who failed in combat, a flatulent man – these would find their

shortcomings common knowledge. Bin Turkia, one of Thesiger’s companions, told the party of a

circumcision he witnessed among the Mahra, in which “Ali’s son made a fuss when they cut

him. He cried out like a woman.” At the same time, a leader like Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi

could build a reputation for justice and generosity that stretched across the desert. The Bu Falah

as a group could build loyalties with tribes as far afield as the Hadhramaut some thousand miles

away across the Rubʿ al Khali. Individuals who exhibited great military prowess, like the famous

raider Bin Duailan (“the cat”) of the Manahil, would be known across South Arabia. This sort of

publicity of one’s deeds may well underlie the hospitality and generosity that so impressed

visitors to Arabia. Indeed, Thesiger meets a penniless, decrepit old man named Bakhit who was

apparently quite famous and much loved in Hadhramaut – there is no indication of how

37 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 162.

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widespread his reputation might have been – as someone who had been very rich but lost all his

wealth through generosity. Thesiger’s companions were reportedly even a little envious.38

This all raises the question: how did the Bedu remember such trivial details to pass them

along? Apart from the fact of their impressive memories, this is a topic the source material is

entirely silent on. There are some possible explanations, however, in the very examples given by

Thesiger of the impressive memory of the Bedu. At one point, he relates that his companions

would constantly argue as they traveled about some minor thing, and they would tell the same

story to the same person many times over, as a way to pass the time. In one example, Bin Kabina

and Amair argued an entire day about whose grandfather was better, until Bin Kabina said

“anyway, my grandfather never farted in public.” Thesiger chided them when the same argument

began the next day, to which they answered “but it passes the time.” And they had a great deal of

time to pass, with precious few ways to do so, travelling for weeks at a time across a desert. So,

not only were the smallest details repeated, but they remained in the collective memory. And it

may be the very fact that memories were so frequently repeated, talked about, and argued about

that allowed them to be maintained. They were living memories, embodied in an active social

context of exchange.

Britain and the regional context

Over the course of the 19th century, Great Britain slowly became more involved in the

politics of Eastern Arabia. In the broadest terms, this involvement developed initially as a means

of ensuring maritime security – meaning the security of trade routes to India.39 This policy came

about when the navy of the Qawasim – the ruling tribe of Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah – began

38 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 71.39 Landen, Oman since 1856, 166-167

21

attacking British shipping. The British called such attacks piracy, though later historians have

suggested they were a tactic of naval warfare and part of the pattern of competition amongst Gulf

ports. The British naval presence in the region intensified with the signing of successive treaties

intended to end the East African slave trade. The latter was accomplished through diplomacy and

naval power, as Oman and the Trucial Sheikhs signed treaties promising to outlaw the slave trade

and to allow the British to enforce the treaties at sea.40 Robert G. Landen argues convincingly

that protecting the trade routes to India, meanwhile, eventually came to mean underwriting

existing political structures in the region.

In short, the British were called upon to support the Sultan of Muscat with military

intervention in a number of crises after the Sultanate suffered long-term, structural economic

decline beginning in the 1850s. It is worth mentioning that the British contributed to this decline.

They were responsible for the decline in the slave trade, their steamers replaced the Omani

seamen in the Indian Ocean carrying trade and established a near-monopoly by the turn of the

century. It was a British mediator who suggested splitting the Omani and Zanzibari holdings of

the Sultanate after the death of Said the Great in 1856. Successive Sultans, however, were not

passive in this process. Rather, they supported British naval power as a means of ensuring their

rule, and restricted the slave trade as allies of the British. Nor were they entirely unable to resist

in the days of Sayyid Said the Great, when J.R. Wellsted claimed – in what was probably an

exaggeration – that their navy rivaled the British Indian Ocean Fleet.41 Nevertheless, after the

death of Sayyid Said, customs revenues, the primary source of revenue for the Sultan, declined in

absolute terms, often seeing even a nominal decline, despite crisis-level inflation in silver-based

40 Landen, Oman since 1856, 151. This was difficult, incremental, and complicated in its implications. It is, however, a topic for another paper.41 Wellsted, Travels in Arabia, 400-402.

22

currencies in the second half of the 19th century.42 In contrast, Abu Dhabi, as perhaps the only

power in Eastern Arabia not built on the Indian Ocean trade, and with a legendary leader in

Sheikh Zayed ibn Khalifah, flourished in the late 19th century. As the pearl trade boomed with

access to Western markets, and as the power of Muscat declined, Abu Dhabi came to exercise

de-facto control over a large section of the eastern Rubʿ al Khali and parts of northwestern Oman

through the early 20th Century, when Sheikh Zayed bin Khalifah’s death sparked a series of

succession crises in Abu Dhabi and the pearl trade declined in the Gulf, as cultured pearls from

East Asia came to dominate the market. Nevertheless, the relationship between Britain, Oman,

and the Trucial Sheikhdoms was very close and mutually supportive of the political status quo.

Sheikh Zayed’s preeminence in parts of Oman, for example, was sponsored to some degree by

Muscat, who paid a subsidy to the Bu Falah for maintaining peace there.43

In 1913, shortly after the accession of Taimur bin Faisal to the position of Sultan, a new

Imam – in the Omani context an elected religious and political ruler – named Salim bin Rashid

al-Kharusi was elected in Oman and led a revolt that became a serious threat to the Sultanate.

The timing of the revolt, which raged through much of World War I, limited British interference.

The Sultanate was deep in debt and suffering economic decline and the young Sultan had not yet

established his influence with tribal leaders. The matter was settled in 1920, with British

mediation and military assistance in the form of a small defensive unit at Muscat, when the

Sultan and Imam signed a treaty agreeing to allow the Imam and his successors to administer

42 Landen, Oman since 1856, 64-65. Here, I use the term ‘nominal’ as it is used in economics, meaning that customs revenues declined even without adjusting for the out-of-control inflation of silver-based currencies at the time. Zanzibar contributed twice as much to Said’s revenues as Muscat by 1856. Customs revenues in Muscat declined from $MT 105,000 to $MT 80,000 from 1835-1856. 114-123 Decline in shipping: imports and exports in 1830 estimated at £1,800,000; in 1874 £426,000. This rebounded to £605,000 in 1884-85, but fell back to £475,000 by 1902-3 ($MT 5,711,950) page 125.43 One would be tempted to question this characterization, but the alliance between Abu Dhabi and Muscat dated back to the late 19th century and Abu Dhabi did not collect taxes or in any way impinge the sovereignty of Muscat. Rather, it was Sheikh Zayed’s personal influence with tribespeople that allowed him to put down disruptions through negotiation. It also bears mention that this is a simplification of a situation involving the decline of multiple tribes in the region of Buraimi relative to the Bani Yas and the Dhawahir, who were their subordinates.

23

portions of the interior of the country while leaving questions of sovereignty undefined. In

practice, the Imamate controlled most of the interior of Oman from 1920 until the 1950s, while

the Sultan controlled the coast and some of the larger cities in the interior. Relations between the

Imamate and the Sultan thawed under Sultan Said bin Taimur and Imam Muhammad bin

'Abdallah al-Khalili.44 According to Wendell Phillips, al-Khalili acknowledged the supremacy of

the Sultan, but administered the area under his control autonomously.45 Whether or not the Imam

recognized the Sultan as paramount – for he did not do so publicly – it is a fact that relations

were closer than in the past. In fact, Imam al-Khalili joined forces with the Sultan to repel Saudi

incursions in Buraimi in 1952, but the British persuaded the Sultan to call off the expedition

before it ever reached the oases around Buraimi, as they hoped to avoid open war between Saudi

Arabia and Oman – in which the United States might well have supported the Saudis.46

Beginning in earnest in the 1930s, the British role in Southeast Arabia changed

dramatically, as the region gained new strategic significance as a potential source of crude oil.

While British troops had fought for the Sultan on a handful of occasions since the 19th century,

and British ships had patrolled the Gulf, the British had never maintained a military presence in

ʿOman and only a handful of Europeans ever saw ʿOman outside of Muscat, Matrah, Sur, and

Salalah on the coast. The policies of the British affected life for most ʿOmanis only indirectly

through the decline of the coastal economy and the power of the state in Muscat as a result.

While their influence remained indirect at best, the policy of building a technologically modern

military in ʿOman, and another in the Trucial States would ultimately shift the balance of power

44 Landen, Oman Since 1856. Sultan Said assumed the throne in 1932, when his father, Taimur, resigned his post. Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Khalili succeeded Salim bin Rashid as Imam.45 Wendell Phillips, Oman: A History, (London: Longman’s, 1967). Phillips, however, was a close friend of Sultan Said bin Taimur, wrote after the accession of Imam Ghalib bin ʿAli al-Hinai and the subsequent civil war and propaganda campaign, and after the Sultan granted Phillips personally a large concession to look for oil in Dhofar.46 Henderson, Arabian destiny; Neil McCleod Innes, Minister in Oman: a personal narrative, (Cambridge: Oleander); Phillips, Oman: A History, 168-170.

24

in favor of the state in a way never before seen in the region. For the first time – ever – the

peoples of the desert would be accessible to state power. But this policy was in its infancy in the

period covered here. The Trucial Oman Scouts had only just begun patrolling the Dhahirah in the

early 1950s and the Sultan’s armed forces, under its various appellations, had only just formed in

1954 and would not become a truly effective force for more than a decade. Nevertheless, these

units played a decisive role in ending the occupation of Hamasah, as will be discussed below. In

addition, Britain took on the task of representing Abu Dhabi and Oman in border negotiations,

one of the most important diplomatic tasks in their recent history to that point.

Thus, we have several issues that influenced the events discussed here, but which are

beyond the scope of this paper. The Imamate revolt was contemporaneous to the border dispute

discussed here, and many of the same issues of sovereignty were at stake – but on this issue, it is

evident that the full truth is not reflected in the documents to which I have access. Imam Ghalib

is portrayed as weak, manipulated by his brother Talib, a pawn of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The followers of the Imam are characterized as a hardcore of religious fanatics, supported

materially and trained by a predatory Saudi Arabia, and a number of local populations that

offered support when it was expedient, or when there was little other option. But in the stories

told by Edward Henderson, one senses just below the surface many of the same factors discussed

here in the context of the occupation of Hamasah – personal authority, the characteristics of local

intermediaries of the Sultan and Imam, a desire for local autonomy, and power struggles between

competitors for local authority. Indeed, one wonders how large a role religious ideology truly

played in attracting followers to the cause of the Imamate, or what motivated some to abandon

his cause to follow the Sultan. But the sources necessary to answer these questions are

inaccessible to me.

25

Likewise, there was a complex of regional and global power relations beneath the surface

of the negotiations and maneuverings over the occupation of Hamasah. Oman and the Emirates

were allied with Britain and fell under the umbrella of an imperial zone of influence, in which

direct control was not exercised and any indirect control was weak and unreliable.47 The

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia certainly aspired to regional hegemony and was a relatively new and

uncertain addition to the United States’ zone of influence in Southwest Asia. And, of course,

there were nominally private actors involved in this power struggle – the oil companies. A fading

imperial power in Britain was therefore desirous of fulfilling its historical obligations to long-

term allies from an emerging and aggressive regional power in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were

backed by an emerging superpower, Britain’s ally in the Cold War, asserting itself by

establishing its own sphere of influence, which would come to operate in much the same way,

through local alliances. But at the same time, the two powers were scrambling to secure access to

a vital resource, oil, through ostensibly private enterprise. To fully discuss these issues, however,

would be a paper in itself; and to do so would be to distract the reader from the object of this

paper: the way in which the border dispute between these three countries reshaped the concept

and practice of sovereignty in Southeast Arabia.

Political Expectations

The political expectations of individuals in Southeast Arabia were a decisive factor in the

events considered in this paper, and some understanding of these expectations is necessary

before any analysis of the Saudi occupation of Hamasah may be attempted. In short, leaders were

accountable and this accountability meant that they were required to behave morally, as defined

by the local culture. I discuss this accountability in terms of norms, because that seems to be how

47 Landen, Oman since 1856, 230-233.

26

it was perceived, by both rulers and subjects. I am aware that this could be explained in terms of

power, as well. With few exceptions, sheikhs could not afford to maintain mercenaries or

soldiers – or a bureaucracy. Even the Sultan, until the late 1940s, could not support professional

soldiers in any numbers outside the capital. The Sultan, therefore, relied on the tribes for any

coercive force he could muster; sheikhs relied on their tribespeople. Accountability was a matter

of necessity, and this could be the origin of the norms of accountability, of egalitarianism, of

autonomy in Southeast Arabia. But norms take on their own life, becoming actors in their own

right. People believe in them and this affects behavior. At least as early as the 19th century, it

seems that tribespeople, sheikhs, and at times even the Sultan were acting in line with norms and

expectations more so than any calculation of relative power.48

What then were the expectations of a sheikh? They were expected to rule through

consensus building and consultation; to embody the virtues most prized by tribespeople in both

cities and rural areas of Southeast Arabia; finally, they were held to a standard of competence not

only as decision-makers, but as individuals in their own right within the context of Arabian

culture. They were expected to be generous, to be personally charismatic, to make decisions in

the best interests of the group, to mediate effectively between competing interests, to be able to

ride, fight, and shoot, and to execute social performances such as hospitality. Ideally, and in line

with the requirement for consultation, they did all of this openly and informally. I have adopted

the term personal politics to describe this complex arrangement of responsibilities, for its

48 Though this is not the subject of this paper, the power of these norms, even as the economic, social, and political realities have shifted drastically, can be seen in the functioning of present-day governments in Southeast Arabia. Sheikhs throughout the Emirates still hold majalis at which citizens can ask for assistance. And this is usually granted, for many of the same reasons as before. The practice has even been updated; citizens can now contact their sheikhs for assistance online; anecdotally, they can even text them. Another evolution of these practices is the propensity of these governments to fund public works and masajid in other countries. These are all displays of generosity, as are the free services granted to citizens – though they’re often mischaracterized by outsiders, now as then, as some sort of tacit bribe. And in ʿOman, tribal leaders now fulfill the role of bureaucrats. The trend, then, is to continue to work within the framework of these norms, even as the relations of power behind them continue to change, appealing to modernity and tradition.

27

emphasis on both the characteristics of the leader and its communication of the mode of

performance. To a large extent, I use Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi as an

exemplar of these ideals as he is the most discussed leader in the source material and as he

established an impeccable reputation for leadership.49 But these characteristics are evident in

more diffuse references to other sheikhs throughout the region and seem to have been durable as

desirable characteristics, as they are referenced for leaders at many levels going back to at least

the early 19th century.50 And I will show that a breakdown in this sort of personal politics was a

key factor leading to the Saudi occupation of Hamasah.

A sheikh was expected to act in the best interest of the tribe, not only in material terms,

but in protecting the reputation of the tribe, its honor. For the Sultan and the Bu Falah alike,

whose hegemony depended on maintaining the loyalty of dozens of tribes, this set the context in

which their actions failed or succeeded. They had to appeal to tribal leaders by making loyalty

the best option for the tribe. The Sultan or the ruling sheikh in Abu Dhabi might reward

consistent loyalty and competence, therefore, with official recognition of regional leadership,

further cementing their dominance of an important tribe in a strategic location.51 He might help a

smaller tribe seek a more equitable relationship with a larger tribe through arbitration. He might

settle a dispute between tribes before it led to war. Another option was to grant a tribe greater

49 Most of this discussion of Sheikh Zayed, moreover, was both written and published long before he came to rule Abu Dhabi, before he became the first president of the newly established UAE, and before he became a legendary political figure in the region.50 Emily Ruete, Memoirs of an Arabian Princess From Zanzibar, (New York: Markus Weiner Publishing, 1989), 26, 175-179. Ms. Ruete (Salme bint Said Al Bu Said), for example, describes many of these same characteristics in her father, Sultan Said the Great of Oman and Zanzibar during his reign from Zanzibar in the 1840s and 1850s. He held a majlis at which people came all the way from ʿOman seeking gifts or other aid. Gifts were given freely “without the numerous questions that a poor applicant in Europe is usually subjected to.”51 Richard N. Schofield and Gerald H. Blake. 1988. Arabian boundaries: primary documents 1853-1960. Farnham Common: Archive Editions. Sheikh Ahmad bin Hilal al-Dhahiri, for example, was Sheikh Zayed’s predecessor in Muwaiqiʿ, becoming the dominant figure in the Buraimi area by serving the Bu Falah sheikhs, and by extension the Sultan, loyally and with great success. They provided the resources for him to take on a leading role, and he provided the personal, local leadership demanded in Southeast Arabia through his personal characteristics; he allowed them to control Buraimi, and his tribe became ascendant in return.

28

autonomy, which carried a certain prestige, improving the standing of tribespeople vis-à-vis

members of other tribes.52 Likewise, gifts from the Sultan or remission from taxes increased the

sheikh’s ability to distribute gifts to important followers, assist poorer members who appealed

problems to him, and properly receive visitors. The importance of this generosity and hospitality

to the success of a sheikh will be discussed more below. For now, suffice it to say that these were

centrally important virtues in Southeast Arabia, reflecting on the prestige of the tribe, as well as

the sheikh. All of these strategies, however, required resources – financial, military, and personal

resources. And in Oman, these had been increasingly unavailable between the 1860s and the

1950s, as Muscat’s role as entrepôt all but disappeared along with the Sultan’s tax revenues and

ability to field an army. Sultan Said inherited a great deal of debt and seemed to avoid personal

diplomacy, perhaps as a way of saving money. He relied on his ministers – particularly Saiyid

Ahmad bin Ibrahim – to establish ties with local sheikhs who could fulfill the requirements of

personal political leadership.53

The success of local sheikhs was therefore centrally important to the success of the

Sultan’s policies. Local sheikhs were able to fulfill the expectation of personal involvement in

local disputes in a way that the Sultan could not, given his resources and the size of his country.

They were better able, essentially, to perform the day-to-day, personal politics that enabled them

to maintain control, at a time and place in which consent was not assumed, and the physical

reach of the ruler was sharply limited by geography. One element of this personal politics, an

52 Thomas, Arabia Felix, 67. In fact, Bertram Thomas encountered a group of people living in the mountains of southern Dhofar known as the Shahara who vividly illustrate the importance of tribal solidarity in the social order of Southeast Arabia. The Shahara as a group were considered daʿif, weak. That is, they were not considered tribespeople and were not capable of the sort of corporate, retaliatory violence of their neighbors. Thomas reports that they could be killed with relative impunity, that they were subject to frequent raids, that no tribespeople would intermarry with them, and that they were seen as little better than slaves – “no better than cattle, under God. They are afraid to shed blood.” The frequency of violence against the Shahara, is unclear, however.

53 Henderson, Arabian destiny, 53-56.

29

institution for mediation of disputes and other business, was the majlis, a kind of public forum

and court at which disputes could be brought to the sheikh. He would hear arguments from both

sides and recommendations on how to settle the matter, and he would come to a decision on the

spot, in public, which satisfied both parties. This was also a forum in which members of his tribe

could bring their problems to him in the hope of some assistance. Sheikh Zayed held majlis

every day, even visiting outlying areas when he went falconing. He found a way to satisfy

followers who came to him for help and deftly brokered compromises when disputes arose. As

Thesiger narrates, he had many “outlaws in his entourage, since it suited him better to have them

with him than in some rival sheikh’s fort.” Nevertheless, complainants would frequently bring

forth cases against these very men: “Perhaps an Arab would get up from the circle, sit down

immediately in front of Zayid, hit the ground a whallop with his stick to attract attention, and

interrupting us as we spoke together, would say: ‘Now Zayid, what about those camels which

were taken from me?’ Zayid, who might be in the middle of a sentence, would stop and listen to

the man’s complaint…. Zayid had no desire to offend the outlaw, nor to lose his reputation for

justice. It was a proof of his skill that he usually satisfied both sides by his judgment.”54 A settled

sheikh might be assisted by a Qadhi, an Islamic legal scholar, who would advise him on certain

issues, or to which the sheikh might refer the matter entirely – the practice varied considerably.

Zayed, based out of Muwaiqi in the Buraimi oasis, had such assistance. Sheikhs of more

nomadic groups would not have such assistance in most cases. In Oman, especially serious cases

might be referred to the Sultan, depending on his reputation and his relationship with the group

or settlement in which it occurred.

54 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 270; Henderson, Arabian destiny, 92-93.

30

Moreover, Zayed is an example of a sheikh with a wide reputation for performance of the

other virtues desirable in Southeast Arabia. Thus, Thesiger’s bedu companions – whose home

range was in Dhofar and Hadhramaut, many weeks of travel away on the opposite side of the

Rubʿ al Khali – could say: “Zayid is a Bedu. He knows about camels, can ride like one of us, can

shoot, and knows how to fight.” He was hospitable and generous. Bedu would sometimes visit,

and sit in while he held court for no other purpose than to ask for a present. This shows that gift-

giving was not simply an exchange of loyalty for material goods, but was a way of displaying

generosity, which reflected on the tribe as a whole. Visitors to the Abu Dhabi side of the oasis

would certainly be feasted at Zayed’s expense as well. Thesiger stayed with Zayed for nearly a

month after his second trip across the Rubʿ al Khali and on telling Zayed, in private, of his plans

to explore the interior of ʿOman, Zayed promised to help him with the tribes – which he did.

When Thesiger was ready to leave for Britain, Zayed offered to lend him his car for the trip and

when Thesiger said he would prefer to take go by camel, he allowed him to borrow Ghazala “the

most renowned camel in Oman.” He also sent some of his men with the party as rabia, knowing

Thesiger’s companions were at war with the Bani Kitab.55 Moreover, returning to a previous

example, Zayed’s majlis was not only about business. Rather, he would sit from breakfast until

after lunch time and talk with people. If at any point something was required of him, it was

received as a welcome interruption, but the institution was one in which people got to know their

sheikh. The state was embodied in men, and institutions like this personalized leadership. That is

how Zayed conducted it, and it’s a perfect example of the personal scale of politics in Southeast

Arabia – as well as an attribute that is easy for a historian to overlook or minimize: Zayed was

likeable, a good listener and conversationalist. He was liked and respected.56

55 Thomas, Arabia Felix, 232; Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 171, 299-300. Rabia was a member of the tribe whose lands one wished to cross, or an allied tribe, who would guarantee one’s safety, swearing to defend his companion against even his family. Moreover, an attack on the companion of a rabia implicated the latter and his tribe in the ensuing “blood-feud.”56 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 252-256.

31

Personal Politics in Buraimi crisis

The Buraimi crisis has roots as far back as the 1930s, when Britain began preliminary

explorations in Oman and Abu Dhabi for oil. Oman and Abu Dhabi therefore sought clearly

defined borders with Saudi Arabia and asked Britain to represent them. In the resulting

negotiations, Saudi Arabia laid claim to large portions of Abu Dhabi and Oman. The negotiations

were inconclusive and the issue was eventually tabled by the Second World War. After this

period, meanwhile, Saudi Arabia sporadically sent representatives to attempt to collect Zakat in

the Liwa Oasis – a region controlled by Abu Dhabi.57 After the war, the Saudis and British

resumed negotiations. The Saudi claim had grown considerably. The dispute grew contentious. It

was referred to international mediation, but these talks broke down amidst accusations of

impropriety against the Saudis and their claim that the British were not respecting a standstill

agreement. Ultimately, a Saudi force was sent to occupy Hamasah, a town in the Buraimi oasis,

in 1952. This began what was known as the Buraimi crisis, but to discuss it, it is necessary first

to back up and examine the situation into which Saudi Arabia had inserted itself.

From the early 20th century to the beginnings of oil exploration in the Dhahirah, the area

around Buraimi received little direct attention from the Bu Said Sultans. Rather, they relied on

the Bu Falah sheikhs and their local intermediaries, like Ahmad bin Hilal al-Dhahiri, to settle any

disputes in the Dhahirah, going so far as to pay the Bu Falah a subsidy for the purpose.58 The

major ʿOmani tribe in the oasis, the al-Naim, had seen their influence decline relative to the

Dhawahir during the pearl boom under Sheikh Zayed the Great in Abu Dhabi. Several tribes that

had historically been subordinate to the al-Naim became independent at this time, subject only to

57 Zakat is a tax, required in Islam for Muslims of a specified level of wealth. Further details are not relevant here.58 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 133.

32

the diplomacy of Ahmad bin Hilal.59 At the same time, the Imam had a great deal of influence in

the Dhahirah south of Buraimi as well. The Sultanate’s sovereignty was recognized, but Bu Said

authority was fractured and indirect.

This caused difficulties when, after the second world war, Petroleum Concessions Ltd.

sought to explore the Dhahirah for oil. They completed a survey of the Abu Dhabi side by 1948

and sought to extend their survey into ʿOman, having signed an agreement with Sultan Said.

Their instructions were to deal only with the Sultan, but they were unable to proceed without the

guarantees of local sheikhs, and guides. Sultan Said, therefore, initiated a diplomatic effort to

reassert himself and attain safe passage for the Petroleum Concessions geologists. This took

several years. The Sultan sent his minister of the interior Ahmed bin Ibrahim with Dick Bird of

the oil company to visit the tribes around Buraimi with a note from the Sultan, saying that

negotiations with the oil company would go through him and telling them to allow Bird access to

their territories. The most important political outcome of this effort was the reunification of the

Bani Kaab and the settled and bedu sections of the Bu Shamis under the leadership of the al-

Naim under Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Hamuda in 1948. The Sultan gathered the leaders of these

tribes and they elected Sheikh Saqr as tamimah and acknowledged Said as Sultan.60 At this point,

the Sultan may have begun to pay Sheikh Saqr a larger subsidy in order to facilitate the sort of

personal politics described above. This is speculation, however.61

59 Here it is unclear whether these tribes, which are referred to as sections of the al-Naim, were fakhitah – sections – of al-Naim, or whether these tribes had simply been associated with and subordinated by the al-Naim long enough to be treated as subordinate sections.60 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 140; Burdett, Records of Oman, 1867-1960, 176, 308; Saudi Arabia and Great Britain. 1987.

The Buraimi memorials 1955: the territorial dispute concerning Buraimi, Liwa and Khor al-ʻUdayd: the memorials submitted to arbitration by the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. Gerrards Cross: Archive Editions, Volume I, 41-43.

61 Henderson, Arabian destiny, 176, 188-189. Sheikh Saqr was able to accumulate 175,000 Rs. in silver Maria Theresa dollars by 1955, but the source of this wealth is unclear. The Sultan claimed to be paying him only 42 Rs. per month, in addition to small payments to the sheikhs of other local tribes. The townsmen of Dhank claimed they had payed this money in taxes, and this is Henderson’s claim, but given Sheikh Saqr’s isolation – described below – during these years and the relative poverty of the Dhahirah, this seems an unlikely accumulation. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 175-177. Kelly claims to have examined correspondences recovered after the capture of Hamasah showing that Saudi agents paid him 13,000 rupees, and 3,000 rupees per

33

In his impatience with the Sultan’s diplomacy, meanwhile, Dick Bird entered into

unauthorized negotiations with the local sheikhs and distributed large sums of money,

destabilizing the region in the process. The Sultan implies that by throwing money around, Bird

clued local sheikhs in to the potentially massive revenues that could accrue if oil were found.

Previously, relatively small subsidies and occasional gifts distributed when sheikhs visited

Muscat had been sufficient to maintain their loyalty.62 In his memoir on his time in the region,

Edward Henderson, who took part in these negotiations with Bird, affirms that “small unofficial

douceurs did change hands.” How large a sum could count as a small payment and the extent to

which these tribespeople, the oil company and the Sultan were in agreement on the point is

unclear. What is certain is that local tribes – the Bani Kaab, the al-Naim, the Bu Shamis – felt

they were the true owners of the land and wanted direct payments from the oil company. The

Sultan forbade this, as this would imply that the tribes were independent of his sovereignty. The

tribal leaders were conscious of the importance of the situation as well and were intent on

securing the benefits of any oil. Indeed, Sheikh Saqr himself along with the Sheikhs of the Bani

Kaab and settled Bu Shamis was interested at one point in a system whereby each had a separate

concession for their land.63 This all took place, moreover, at a time when the Sultan’s revenues

were still extremely low relative to the size of his country and by illustrating the potential value

of oil, may have reinforced the common, but inaccurate, belief that the Sultan controlled great

wealth. Thus the Sultan was expected to distribute money he did not have.

month afterward, from November of 1953. I have not found these documents, as they had not been published at the time of Kelly’s account. It may well be that he took many from both sides, in addition to taxes he had hoarded over time.

62 Burdett, Records of Oman, 1867-1960. 176, 188-189. Muhammad bin Salimin got 35 Rs./month, Sheikkh Saqr Al Hamuda got 42 Rs./month and a number of other Sheikhs got similar small subsidies. 63 Burdett, Records of Oman, 1867-1960; Schofield and Blake, Arabian boundaries: primary documents 1853-1960; Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, The Buraimi memorials 1955. This section, describing the lead up to the occupation of Hamasah, is reconstructed from a series of communications from among British bureaucrats, between these and Sultan Saʿid, and from testimony recorded in the Buraimi Memorials. Henderson, Arabian destiny, 37, 44. This would have been extremely difficult to achieve in practice. Their lands overlapped and no clear boundaries had been established, so this system would have required a half-dozen agreements between as many sheikhs over what their precise borders might be. And even one such agreement would have been an accomplishment.

34

Sheikh Saqr proved not to be up to the task – or not committed to the task; it is unclear

which – of managing the tribes of the Dhahirah and strengthening the Sultan’s position there.

While Abu Dhabi’s position in the Dhahirah was equally implicated in the Saudi claims, the

kingdom was never able to manufacture new realities through occupation the way they did in

Hamasah. Sheikh Saqr continued to pay lip-service to the Sultan; documents resurface

throughout this period in which he reassures the Sultan or representatives of the British of his

loyalty to the former. But equally present in the documents are complaints of inactivity on his

part; lacking is any mention of the sorts of personal politics frequently attributed to Sheikh

Zayed and other sheikhs in Southeast Arabia. The large amount of silver recovered after the

expulsion of the Saudis from Hamasah – at which point Sheikh Saqr and the sheikhs of the al-Bu

Shamis and Bani Kaab fled to Dammam – is important as well in several ways.

First, it is clear from the ongoing posturing and negotiation reported in the British

archival documents at the time that tribal leaders were concerned with ensuring they would

benefit directly from oil exploration on their land, particularly after the distribution of funds by

Petroleum Concessions Ltd. On British political agent, for example, reported in 1950 that

Muhammad Salimin bin Rahmah al-Bu Shamis had visited him several times in the previous

weeks, variously confiding that he would prefer to remain loyal to the Sultan if only the latter

would “resume” payment of the unlikely sum of 8,000 Rs./year for himself and 5,000 Rs./year

for his followers; that his upcoming visit to the Saudi province of Hasa – the staging point for the

invasions of the 19th century, the raids on Bu Falah and Manasir in 1926, and the eventual

occupation of Buraimi – was for private business; and that he was independent. In the previous

month he requested that the British mediate between himself and the Sultan, only to return

saying he might prefer to be considered the subject of Zayed bin Sultan of Abu Dhabi and that if

35

something were not arranged soon, he might seek to deal with other companies – implying

dealing with ARAMCO through the Saudis. This pattern repeats itself until the Saudi occupation

of 1952, when Rashid bin Hamad al-Bu Shamis invited the Saudis to occupy Hamasah.64 This

could be seen as mercenary or even duplicitous, but a better perspective might be that these

contradictory statements were an effort at gaining leverage in a negotiation. Efforts by this group

of tribal leaders to bargain for greater recognition and resources from the Sultan spanned four

years. They could, presumably, have turned to the Saudis much sooner.65 They made every

attempt to secure their interests while remaining subjects of the Sultan, only inviting the Saudis

to occupy Hamasah when they became fed up with the Sultan’s representatives.

This situation, then, might well have been avoided had Sheikh Saqr behaved in the

manner expected of a tribal sheikh in this place and time, using the resources available to

distribute gifts and entertain. But Sheikh Saqr was not known as a generous or hospitable man. It

is no accident that throughout the period covered by this paper, the influence of Sheikh Zayed

bin Sultan expanded throughout the Dhahirah at the expense of Sheikh Saqr al Hamuda. The

latter is known to have preferred his own company, to have spent his days alone with servants

inside his fort. Edward Henderson describes him as ‘cold coffee’ and that is exactly what he was

64 Henderson, Arabian destiny, 108; Burdett, Records of Oman, 1867-1960. 176, 188-189; Schofield and Blake, Arabian boundaries: primary documents 1853-1960; Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, The Buraimi memorials 1955.65 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 115-121, 128-130. In fact, Saudi interest in the Dhahirah dates to 1925, when Ibn Jiluwi, the Saudi governor in Hasa – the province of Saudi Arabia nearest to Qatar, though the closest settlement is several hundred miles from either Liwa or Buraimi – was approached by representatives of the ʿAwamir, Duruʿ and Al Bu Shamis who were then at war with the Manasir and Bani Yas. This was not unheard of, as some Manasir and Mazariʿ on the Bani Yas side reached out to the Saudis years before, gaining protection and some gifts from the governor, returning to Liwa after the negotiation of a truce. In any event, Ibn Jiluwi, joined by some Murrah tribespeople, raided the Bani Yas and Manasir in Abu Dhabi, escaped with 150 camels and sent an agent to Buraimi, who managed to collect zakat from some Duruʿ, Bu Shamis and ʿAwamir tribespeople. This was followed up with similar results in 1926, and its implications were clear to Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Saʿid bin Maktum of Dubai, and even Imam Muhammad and Sheikh ʿIsa bin Salih in the interior of ʿOman, amongst whom there was a great deal of clamoring to arrange for mutual defense in case of Saudi aggression – Wahhabis led by the predecessors of ʿAbd al-Aziz bin Saʿud had occupied Buraimi and invaded ʿOman multiple times in the preceding century. While the Saudis continued to collect zakat from members of the Duruʿ, Al Bu Shamis, and ʿAwamir until 1929, no further aggression was displayed, nor did the Saudis lay claim to any territory. Nevertheless, this would form the basis of later Saudi claims in the Buraimi oasis.

36

served on their first meeting.66 Far from the open majlis of Sheikh Zayed, the only examples we

have of Sheikh Saqr entertaining visitors are the closed meetings he hosted with Edward

Henderson and the leaders of the Bu Shams and Bani Kaab, at which his guests were made to

wait outside his fort for hours. Of course, it is possible that Henderson simply chose not to

describe Sheikh Saqr’s more public receptions of visitors, but this seems unlikely. Sheikh Saqr is

consistently portrayed as ineffective, not only by British officials in documents which survive in

the British archives, but by the Sultan as well, who repeatedly expressed his frustration with his

representative.67 Moreover, if he had conducted open sessions like those of Sheikh Zayed,

Henderson would not have had to wait several weeks to see him – as indeed he did – but could

simply have shown up at his majlis.

Equally significant in this story is what it says about the understanding of sovereignty in

Southeast Arabia and how this contrasts with what came after. Tribal leaders had leverage

because consent was not assumed in Southeast Arabia. Consent, as explained above, was

something to be perpetually renegotiated and reestablished through personal politics – the giving

of gifts, marriage alliances, socializing, etc – or through threat of force. It is clear that not only

tribal leaders, but tribespeople of any standing would pay taxes to a ruler not their own if they

were unable to resist, or if they were offered presents in excess of the taxes.68 Likewise, this may

have been one means at the disposal of tribespeople, especially more mobile ones, of seeking

gifts from rulers. But, significantly, these behaviors did not necessarily mirror loyalties in the

event of conflict, nor did they reflect the day-to-day realities of governance. Nor did past loyalty

and support guarantee future support. This reality, of course, was to the benefit of most of the

66 Henderson, Arabian destiny, 43. In fact, his reputation is such that Henderson was warned not to expect a warm reception.67 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 137-139, 227, 276; Burdett, Records of Oman, 1867-1960; Schofield and Blake, Arabian boundaries: primary documents 1853-1960; Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, The Buraimi memorials 1955.68 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers. This is the case for many of the tax collectors sent by Ibn Jiluwi on behalf of Ibn Saud beginning in the 1920s.

37

people of the region, as leaders at every level were forced to constantly seek the approval of their

subjects. The events described below, however, inaugurated a new reality in which borders were

fixed; subjects were being reimagined as nationals and then citizens; loyalties were permanent;

and the terms of citizenship were subject to change from above, but not renegotiation initiated

locally, from below.69

In early September, 1952, a small Saudi Arabian force – around 40 men – occupied

Hamasah at the invitation of Sheikhs Rashid bin Hamad of the settled Bu Shamis, Manaʿ bin ʿAli

of the bedouin Bu Shamis, and Obaid bin Juma of the Bani Kaab. Sheikh Saqr was not openly in

favor of this arrangement and refused the Saudis entry to Buraimi itself (the eponymous town

within the cluster of oases), but neither did he openly oppose the development. The Sultan of

Oman wasted no time in raising a force to expel the Saudis. Together with Imam Muhammad al

Khalili, in less than three weeks he raised a force of 7,000 men and departed from Sohar to

march on Hamasah, with reinforcements expected to arrive via Ibri. British Consul-General

Chauncey arrived at the last minute, however, with an urgent request from the British

government to stand down and accept arbitration. This the Sultan reluctantly did, requiring

Chauncey to deliver his request publicly so as to minimize the Sultan’s loss of face. A Standstill

Agreement was accepted on 10 October, 1952 to make time for the border dispute to be decided

by an international arbitration panel.70

In effect, this inaugurated three years of intense intrigue in the oasis as the Saudis

violated the intent, if not the letter, of the agreement. To return to the matter of the 175,000 Rs.

recovered from Sheikh Saqr’s fort, there had been a vacuum of sorts on the Omani side of the

69 It is unclear whether this dispute was ever officially settled. Nevertheless, in practice the border has been recognized since the Saudis were expelled from Hamasah in 1955.70 Phillips, Oman: A History, 168-170.

38

oasis for some time. The Abu Dhabi sheikhs and their intermediaries settled disputes on the

Omani side of the oasis and visitors seem to have stayed with them. The Saudis, however,

entertained lavishly and distributed money freely in an attempt to build support, and began to

build fortifications.71 They began to exercise the sort of personal politics described above, and

practiced so effectively by Sheikh Zayed. The authority of local sheikhs, as explained above, was

not absolute, and they could not forbid their followers from accepting or even seeking gifts from

the Saudis.72 Even the Abu Dhabi sheikhs allowed their followers to seek gifts in this way,

although few came to support the Saudi claim. In addition, as the crisis surrounding the Saudi

occupation of Hamasah unfolded, Sheikh Saqr became more isolated and there was much talk of

replacing him. In fact, the tribespeople ceased to follow him outside of the town of Buraimi

itself. He barricaded himself inside his fortress.73

Moreover, as arbitration got under way in 1954, the Saudis were alleged to have

attempted to bribe members of the arbitration commission, and these allegations were substantial

enough that several members of the commission stepped down in protest. It was in 1955, when

the arbitration proceedings ground to a complete halt, that the British allowed detachments from

the Trucial Oman Scouts and the Muscat Field Force to assault Hamasah. They sent Edward

71 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, 164, 176-206. In addition to bribing numerous tribal leaders outright, as much as 50,000 rupees was set aside for miscellaneous purposes, such as those described in this paper, for a relatively short period. In one seven-month period for which there are records, Kelly shows that more than one million riyals were sent to Hamasah. There were also numerous plans to smuggle in rifles and train tribespeople (whose leaders were to have been well-payed) to rebel against the Sultan – which the Saudis did, years later, in Dhofar. In addition, the Saudis used Buraimi as a staging point to fund and arm the Imamate revolt taking place at this time, and paid large sums to the new Imam and Sulaiman bin Himyar. Henderson, Arabian destiny, 235. Amir Turki bin Ataishan, the leader of the Saudi contingent, was captured with a chest containing 175,000 rupees in paper notes for this very purpose (approximately the same amount as was found in Sheikh Saqr’s chests; this is not a typo; Henderson notes the coincidence).72 Thesiger, Arabian Sands, 271. Here, requesting or giving gifts do not have the connotation one might imagine. It was common for Bedu, for example, to travel great distances to the Majlis of a ruler not their own to request a gift – there was no shame attached to asking for a gift in this region – and the ruler would be expected to grant it, not because of any reciprocal arrangement like an exchange of resources for loyalty, but as a show of generosity. And generosity was a treasured virtue. Thesiger’s Rashidi companions, for example, had travelled more than one thousand miles to the courts of Sheikh Zayed, King Ibn Saud and Sultan Said at various points seeking gifts, and these had been granted.73 Henderson, Arabian destiny, 217. Henderson speculates, as well, that under normal conditions, Saqr would have been removed by this point, but the Saudi occupation had frozen tribal politics, to a degree.

39

Henderson – temporarily seconded to the foreign office – to attempt to negotiate a peaceful

Saudi withdrawal, but in the event, the assault had begun and bogged down by the time he

arrived. Nevertheless, with the help of the Bu Falah sheikhs, he was able to negotiate the

surrender of Sheikhs Obaid, Muhamad Salimin, Rashid, and Saqr on the condition of being

airlifted to Dammam, Saudi Arabia. 74 Hamasah was retaken with very few casualties and new

sheikhs, loyal to the Sultan, were elected by each of the concerned tribes.

Thus, the al-Nahyan used personal politics, through the careful management of new, but

initially limited, revenues from oil exploration to begin to transform the theoretical basis of the

ruling arrangement in Abu Dhabi.75 Oman failed to employ this sort of diplomacy effectively,

and was forced, as a result, to rely on the application of force, strengthened by new forms of

military technology and organization. The use of violence to enforce loyalty to the Sultan was, of

course, nothing new; but the technologies of transportation, discipline and armament were

extremely modern and new to Southeast Arabia. The new forces of the Sultan, and the Trucial

Oman Scouts that began to patrol the Trucial States, relied on British officers and training

techniques, mechanical transport that could traverse dry desert regions by transporting their own

water in a way camels never could, transcending age-old limitations on the application of force.

But force alone was not enough to solidify these radical changes to the nature of sovereignty in

Southeast Arabia. This was not accomplished in Oman until the reign of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, 74 Henderson, Arabian destiny, 225, 227; Innes, Minister in Oman, 128-133, 136. This courtesy was offered unilaterally and angered Sultan Said, who had hoped to take them into custody. Henderson had a history of angering the Sultan, having superceded his orders in taking several towns from the Imam a couple years prior (without bloodshed). He would do so again a couple months after the expulsion of the Saudis from Hamasah by retaking Dhank in similar fashion (again, peacefully).75 These personal interactions were political and this could be a fruitful area for further research. I expect to show that the Sultanate continued to struggle with legitimacy until Sultan Qaboos deposed his father in 1970 and began to employ a very similar approach of personal leadership, in addition to coopting the system of tribal leadership. Finally, the effect of this personal politics was not limited to maintaining relations with tribal leaders, but was useful in managing the relationship with Britain as well. One is struck by the overwhelmingly positive tone of explorers, and representatives of the British government and oil companies towards the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, in contrast to their representations of leaders elsewhere, and out of all proportion to any material progress – as many of these British writers saw it – these leaders accomplished at the time. Nor should we expect otherwise. Whatever their function in their respective bureaucracies, these British functionaries were men, operating well outside of their accustomed social context, in relative isolation from European society, and the sheikhs welcomed and befriended them.

40

who would depose his father in 1970. Qaboos defeated a long insurrection in Dhofar, coopted the

system of tribal loyalties and governance by incorporating tribal leaders into every level of the

very modern political infrastructure he built with revenues from oil production that expanded

dramatically in 1974. Likewise, in Abu Dhabi, permanent sovereignty and assumed consent were

probably not solidly established until Sheikh Zayed deposed his brother in 1966, the UAE was

formed from Abu Dhabi and the other six Trucial States in 1972, and a nationalistic discourse

emerged, centered on the figure of Sheikh Zayed and the concepts of modernization and the

maintenance of tradition.

Conclusion

The events at Hamasah between 1948 and 1955, therefore, were a first step towards the

establishment of ‘modern’ states in Southeast Arabia. This shift was motivated by the need for a

new economic basis for legitimacy in ʿOman and Abu Dhabi and was accomplished in the latter

through the employment of modes of personal politics with a long history in the region. Majalis

were held; gifts were given; disputes were mediated deftly, on the spot. Most importantly,

however, the Abu Dhabi sheikhs – particularly Sheikh Zayed – talked to people on their side of

the oasis on a daily basis, addressed their concerns, and managed to keep them in the fold. On

the ʿOmani side of the oasis, meanwhile, a failure of this sort of personal politics led to a loss of

control. Their diplomatic relationship with Britain prolonged this crisis by preventing a timely,

combined effort by the Sultan and Imam to retake the oasis, and bringing the dispute into an

international arena in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was more experienced and better able,

financially, to compete. Finally, however, through this same diplomatic relationship, and the

development and deployment of a technologically modern military, the Sultanate was able to

regain control. Finally, this control, on both sides of the oasis, differed from anything that came

41

before. This was a permanent control, delimited by specific boundaries, and would later come to

be enforced through a plethora of new institutions.

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