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European identity: a never-ending contested phenomenon

Much has been written on European identity and yet there remain not only differences

of opinion about its existence, but also certain conceptual ambiguities that hinder the debate.

Still, it is no wonder that literature reveals opposing claims, confusion and disagreement about

the core characteristics of a European identity, since the concepts Europe and identity

themselves remain vague and really difficult to define and circumscribe. As Europe is usuallyconceived as both, the continent as a whole and the politicoeconomic structure !nown as the

E", very often when as!ed things related to their identity, the Europeans don#t !now whether

to identify mainly with the continent as such $perceived in geographical, historical or cultural

terms% or with the E"institutions.

&hile the notion of European $cultural or'and political% identity has been largely

discussed in several recent boo!s $(ruter, )**+ -obyn, )**+ hec!el / 0at1enstein, )**2

-isse, )*3* &intle, )*33 4race5rancis, )*36%, and evidence supporting its existence in

everyday life have been presented elsewhere $(ruter, )**+ "drea, )*3) "drea et al. )*36%, it

is important to define the concept as it applies to the present wor!. And in order to do that, it

is necessary to start by briefly discussing the concepts of identity and collective identity.

Identity: a multilayered construction that defines who I am in relation to who are they

7he concept of identity 8 both individual and collective 8 has recently become

extensively studied by scholars from different disciplines and speciali1ations. 9owever, in

spite of the increased interest shown by sociologists, historians, political scientists and others

in understanding and defining this complex phenomenon, the common point in research

regarding identity is that the concept is vague, ambiguous, enigmatic $5earon, 3222:

3%, and made to do a great deal of wor! $(ruba!er / ooper, )***: ;%.

7he multiple and diverse approaches to identity have been presented and described

in more detail in previous articles $"drea, )*33: 33;3)*%. Among them, the social

constructionist perspective on identity $(erger / ue or integral, but products of social action and interaction $Smith, )*33:

))?%. 7hey are not stable and unchangeable things, nor fixed entities that are tangible and

visible, but processes that are constantly shaped, reshaped and negotiated with those around

us $4elanty, )**+: 3)2 @en!ins, )**;: +%. dentities are constructed according to individuals#

social cultural and geopolitical environment $&intle, )**+%, and they always involve

processes of classification, of inclusion to and exclusion from human groups and subgroups

$Mummendey / &ald1us, )**B (ruter, )**+%. 7hus, identities are seen as perceptions ofself

in relation to significant others$Shore, 3226 7ing7oomey, )**+ 5ligstein, )**2% who will

always play an important part in how people define themselves and why they define

themselves as they do.Another important aspect concerning identity reflects its multiple nature. n

other words, as already indicated above, identity is not uni>ue, nor integral on the contrary, it

represents a multilayered construction, a fu11y set of roles $Montgomery, )***% depending

on people#s lifestyle and activities. Since identity is cocreated as people come into contact

with one another and the environment $@ac!son, 3222%, these different selfconstruals may

coexist within the same individual, available to be activated at different times or in different

situations $(rewer / Cardner, 322=: ;6%. n this sense, we may say that European identity

can be seen as one of the multiple identities that Europeans hold simultaneously. 7his means

that Europeans may display loyalties and attachments towards their nations as well as towards

Europe and the European community in general $(ruter, )**+ -isse, )*3*%.

&ith respect to collective identities, definitions, controversies and approaches are, atbest, multiple. 4efined usually as general interpretations or beliefs relating to a certain

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national community, to national subgroups or transnational social units $Deters, )**+: 2)%,

authors agree that they involve both an individual and collective part $Smith, 322)%, are

constructed, socially shaped $(er!ing, )**6 Aguilar / 5rancisco, )**2 -isse, )*3*%, and

multiple in nature $(rewer / Cardner, 322= 0uhn, )*3)%. 5urthermore, collective identity is

a multidimensional phenomenon, involving cognitive and affective categori1ation processes

$7afel, 32;3 (rewer / Cardner, 322=%. Fn the cognitive level, individuals tend to simplifythe environment into groups of people according to the perceived similarities related to their

actions, intentions or behavior. Fnce the categories are created, people need to perceive

themselves as members of one or several groups because, as some scholars argue, the fact of

belonging comforts individuals with emotional benefits, such as psychological security, direct

recognition, group certainties etc. $Aguilar / 5rancisco, )**2: +=B%. &ith respect to European

identity, people need to selfcategori1e themselves as Europeans. Fn the affective level,

identity beliefs are accompanied by feelings and emotions in a necessary and constitutive

manner $Smith, 3222%. 5ollowing this line of reasoning, it means that one cannot perceive

oneself as being European, for instance, if one does not hold certain feelings of attachment or

pride towards the group of Europeans. n different words, if we follow the definition that

Deters $)**+% gives to collective identity and apply it to Europe, to have a European$collective% identity implies, among other things, to experience feelings of membership to the

ommunity of Europeans, feelings of solidarity and commitment towards other members of

the same group, common memories and interpretations of the past, even possible collective

proects for the future. 7he author admits that all these elements of collective self

understandings and beliefs may vary a lot in their salience at the same time, different parts of

a national population may support different versions of collective identity. 9owever, to

conclude, it is important to !now that there is a constant interplay between individual and

collective identities. As @en!ins underlines, although identification always involves

individuals G...H, collectivity and history may also be at sta!e $)**;: 6%.

Relations between different collective identities

&hether the various loyalties that people possess in the global here and now

$(er!ing, )**6: )+6% are conflicting or peacefully coexisting represents another area of

research that has given rise to disagreement among experts and ordinary citi1ens as well. 7he

literature analy1ing the ways in which different levels of identification may coexist with each

other has significantly increased when scholars started to analy1e if and to what extent the

European dimension of people#s identity $when experienced% is competing with their national

or local loyalties. 7his happened mainly in the context of the construction and further

enlargement of the European "nion, a process that raised fundamental >uestions about the

ability of people voluntarily to ac>uire new forms of identity with new political institutions

$-obyn, )**+: 3%. n this sense, scholars as!ed themselves if the citi1ens of Europe acceptedEuropean unification because it was favorable to their economic development, without

assuming a new political identity or, because they have progressively ac>uired such a new

European identityI $(ruter, )**+: 3% And, in the latter case, what would be the relationship

between this new identity and the national and local onesI

As expected, the existing findings in this concern are mixed, and a common point in

research is that different collective identities can develop different relations. 9owever, there

are at least two main opposing trends in the literature that reveal two possible scenarios:

collective identities may be conflicting and exclusive $9edetoft, 3222 apud Deters, )**+: 26%,

but they can also be nonrival, indifferent or simply coexisting without threatening or

excluding one another $&intle, )***, )**+ hec!el / 0at1enstein, )**2%. According to the

first scenario, European identity comes in conflict with national and other possibleidentifications, while the second case illustrates a European identity that does not exclude or

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undermine people#s national, local or other loyalties. Fn the other hand, collective identities

are said to be nonrival, and coexisting peacefully. n this case, national unity is not perceived

as being threatened by other subnational or transnational collective identities. Also, in this

situation, national, regional or global attachments are not opposing and we can assume that,

for instance, national identities within the E" member states are not competing directly with

some European collective identity. As recent research shows $(ruter, )**+ -isse, )*3*%, thereare increasing numbers of Europeans who claim to have some !ind of European identity, often

alongside a national identity. 7his is the case when identities do not wax or wane at each

other#s expense $hec!el / 0at1enstein, )**2: 23*%, because people experience some !ind

of balance between various collective identities, which allows them to feel attached to their

native countries and to Europe, at the same time.

9owever, scholars agree that the impact that collective identities have on people#s

everyday life, actions and orientations is very much determined or influenced by specific

contexts and situations. Jery often, in terms of circumstances, one level of loyalty within an

identity may be stronger than another, and this doesn#t mean that the wea!er levels are

entirely eclipsed $&intle, )**+%. t rather means that identity beliefs form complex but open

structures $Aguilar / 5rancisco, )**2: +==% and that they are constantly subect to revisionand reinterpretation. 7hough it is generally considered that national identity has some primacy

over other collective identities $Smith, 3226 Dagden, )**) Deters, )**+%, and that

nationalism is ust too strong a basic force in the world $-obyn, )**+: )%, some people

started to feel attached to supranational institutions, to global regions or continents too $-isse,

)*3*%. 7he loyalties they experience are all very important, and generally people cannot say

that one excludes the others. As scholars argue from decades now, identity is a multilevel

construction, a continuous process that evolves and changes over time and place. 7here are

contexts in which one#s national or local sense of belonging becomes prominent and thus

brought to the fore, as well as contexts when one#s European identity may come into full light.

n conclusion, within this paper, we will not consider national and European identity as being

mutually incompatible, but rather as different levels of identification, that can be nesting with

each other, becoming accentuated or left in shadow according to place, time, situation or the

needs of the moment.

European identity today: civic, cultural or rather instrumental?

Academics who agree that European identity exists beyond theory $(ruter, )**6,

)**+ -isse, )*3* &intle, )*33% remain divided over its significance in daily life. &hile

some authors bring to the fore and define the civic and culturalcomponents of a European

political identity $(ruter, )**+ &intle, )**+ nthorn, )**=%, other scholars argue for the

existence of an instrumental sense of Europeanness alongside the previously mentioned

cultural and civic forms of European identity $-ui1 @imKne1, CLrnia!, 0osic, 0iss /0andulla, )**B "drea, )*3) "drea et al., )*36%.

n what the present chapter is concerned, we build on the aforementioned authors#

conception and conceive European identity in civic, cultural and instrumental terms.

7herefore, we define European civicidentity as referring to citi1ens# sense of belonging to the

E" as an institutional, economic and political framewor!. 7his line of analysis stresses the

development of European identities around agreement over rules for peaceful political co

existence, shared cultural norms, and common beliefs. 7hese ideas are to be found in Mancini

$322;% and &eiler $3222% who argue that the essence of E" membership $and European

identity% lies in people#s commitment to the shared values of the "nion as expressed in its

constituent documents, to their commitment to the duties and rights of a civic society covering

specific areas of public life. Culturalidentity, on the other hand, applies to Europe as a whole,as a continent of shared civili1ation and heritage, being based on ethnocultural factors

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generated through a longterm $historical% process. 5urthermore, the European instrumental

identity is based on a selfinterested calculation involving the potential gains and losses that

might result from membership to the E". n this sense, some authors argue that instrumental

factors may play an important role in defining and strengthening individuals# sense of identity

$innerella, 322?%, while instrumental selfinterest and territorial identities contribute

considerably to explaining support for common foreign affairs and defense policies $Schoen,)**;: +%. n line with these authors we may conclude that the more people consider their

country to lac! sufficient decisionma!ing power within the international context, the more

strongly they identify with Europe $Cabel / Dalmer, 322+ Cabel, 322; -ui1 @imKne1 et al.,

)**B Creen, )**?%. 5rom this instrumental perspective, it means that citi1ens who evaluate

positively the results of the European policies, as compared to the results of policies pursued

by their national government, may develop stronger European identities and wea!er national

identities. Fr, as -ui1 @imKne1 et al. put it, this costbenefit understanding of identities

implies that low welfare spending, poor economic performance, and low>uality national

level democracy would all ma!e citi1ens more li!ely to feel more European $)**B: 6%.

n addition to the above, it is important to underline and explain our main assumption

regarding the way participants in this study understand and experience European identity.7hus, we suggest that our respondents are very li!ely to assume a rather civic and pragmatic

or instrumental sense of Europeanness, which means that they associate the European identity

with several benefits that were available to them in the recent past, especially once -omania

became a member state of the E". Moreover, following the instrumentalist line of reasoning,

we suggest that it is highly possible that respondents from our target group assume a

European identity as an alternative to national identity, mostly since their home state

institutions have been discredited and since economic and social conditions of life in -omania

are perceived as precarious by most people.