EU-CIVCAP › 2017 › 05 › eu-civcap... · 2017-05-24 · DL 7.4 Institutional Learning and...

EU-CIVCAPPreventingandRespondingtoConflict:DevelopingEU

CIVilianCAPabilitiesforasustainablepeace

InstitutionalLearningandLessonsIdentifiedin

EUCivilianConflictPrevention:Aframeworkforanalysis

Deliverable7.4

(Version1.6;8May2017)

This project has received funding from the EuropeanUnion’s Horizon 2020 researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementNo653227.

DL7.4InstitutionalLearningandLessonsIdentifiedinEU

CivilianConflictPrevention:Aframeworkforanalysis

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SummaryoftheDocumentTitle DL 7.4 Institutional Learning and Lessons

Identified in EU Civilian Conflict Prevention: AFrameworkforAnalysis

LastmodificationState

8May2017Final

Version

1.6

LeadingPartnerOtherParticipantPartnersAuthor

UABDNUBRISMichaelE.Smith

Audience ■Public☐Restricted☐Internal

Abstract This document contains the analyticalframeworktobeusedto identifyandorganiselessonsintheEU-CIVCAPproject.

Keywords • Institutionallearning• Lessonsidentified• Conflictprevention• Peacebuilding• Crisisresponse



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TABLEOFCONTENTS

Executivesummary................................................................................................................................4

1.Introduction.......................................................................................................................................5

2.Generalpointsontheconcept...........................................................................................................6

3.Defininglearning................................................................................................................................8

4.LearningandtheEUpolicyprocess..................................................................................................13

5.Policyphasesandtheconflictcycle.................................................................................................17

6.CatalogueofLessonsIdentified.......................................................................................................20

7.Conclusion........................................................................................................................................24

8.Timetableformainlearningandbestpracticeactivities.................................................................25

9.Bibliography.....................................................................................................................................26

LISTOFTABLES

Table1:ExamplesofkeylessonslearnedundertheAMM.................................................................19



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EXECUTIVESUMMARYThe purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual and analytical framework to helprelevant EU-CIVCAP partners operationalise learning-related activities associated with EUConflictPrevention/Peacebuildingpolicies.This involves identifying,organising,evaluating,and disseminating a range of learning-related findings regarding EU conflict preventionefforts,withaviewtoimprovingtheEU’sperformanceinthisarea.Thegeneralframeworkand initialexamplesof learning foundwithinthisdocumentaretheproductofapreviousEU-fundedproject(EUCONRES)thatranunderMichaelE.Smith’sdirectionfrom2008-13.1

For theEU-CIVCAPproject, the restof thispaper attempts to first provideadefinitionoflearning, focusing on its experiential/institutional dimensions. It then turns to themeasurement of EU learning-focused efforts in the domain of conflict prevention andpeacebuilding. Inthethirdsection, thepaperpresentsa frameworkfororganisingvariouslessons identified as a result of EU conflict resolution efforts. Finally, the paper suggestsseveral parameters for inputting lessons into our online catalogue/database of lessonsidentified.Thisentireapproachwillbeadaptedthroughoutthecourseoftheprojectinlightofinputsandfindingsbytheprojectmembers,andwillcontributetotheproductionofkeyEU-CIVCAPdeliverablesattheendof2018.

1 EUCONRES,‘AEuropeanApproachtoConflictResolution?InstitutionalLearningandtheESDP’,FP7-IDEAS-ERC,ProjectID:203613,seehttp://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/87402_en.html[accessed8May2017].



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1.INTRODUCTIONPolicylearningisacentralconceptintheEU-CIVCAPproject,andalsoanareaofincreasedEUactivity in the realmof foreign/securitypolicy andmanyotherpolicydomains.Withinforeign/security policy in particular, in the past decade the EU has devoted far moreattentiontoformalprocessesof institutional learningand‘bestpractices’thanithadeverattemptedbetweenthe1970sand1990s.Muchof this learning-focusedactivityhasbeendrivenbyaclearneedtoadaptEUinstitutionstotakeonawiderrangeofsecurity-relatedtasks,suchasconflictresolution,crisismanagement,andpeacekeeping,usingtheCommonForeignSecurityPolicy(CFSP),theCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP),andotherpolicy tools. There are two basic reasons for this: 1) foreign/security policy cannot be‘managed’likeothersocio-economicEUpolicydomains,byforward-lookingregulationsanddirectives; and 2) EU member states still resist extensive delegation of certainresponsibilities to centralisedEUorganisations suchas theCommissionand theEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS).Thesefactsareunlikelytochangeintheforeseeablefuture,which is why the EU continues to invest time and effort in social/networking/learning2mechanisms and ‘informal’ (as well as formal/legal) institution-building to improve itsperformance in this realm,whilemaintaining itasadecentralisedpolicysectorstillunderthedirectcontrolofEUmemberstates(i.e.,intergovernmentalratherthansupranational).3ThepurposeofthispaperistoinitiateaninternaldialoguewithintheEU-CIVCAPprojectinordertohelprelevantpartnersoperationaliselearning-relatedactivitiesassociatedwithEUConflict Prevention/Peacebuilding (CPP) policies. This involves identifying, organising,evaluating, and disseminating a range of learning-related findings regarding EU conflictpreventionefforts,withaviewtoimprovingtheEU’sperformanceinthisarea.Thegeneralframeworkandinitialexamplesoflearningfoundwithinthisdocumentaretheproductofaprevious EU-funded project (EUCONRES) that ran under my direction from 2008-13.4 Amonographbasedonthisprojecthasrecentlybeencompleted;muchofwhat followshasbeenadaptedfromthatwork.

For theEU-CIVCAPproject, the restof thispaper attempts to first provideadefinitionoflearning, focusing on its experiential/institutional dimensions. It then turns to themeasurement of EU learning-focused efforts in the domain of CPP. In the third section I

2Briefly,‘social’mechanismsinvolvesharedunderstandings,norms,habits,and‘rulesofthumbamongasetofpolicyexperts;‘networking’mechanismsinvolveregularlinkagesamongpolicyexpertswhoshareresponsibilitiesforaproblem;and‘learning’mechanismsinvolveinformalandformalproceduresforimprovingpolicyperformanceasdescribedlaterinthispaper.3Thisapproachhasrecentlybeentermed‘newintergovernmentalism’(seeBickertonetal.2015).4 EUCONRES,‘AEuropeanApproachtoConflictResolution?InstitutionalLearningandtheESDP’,FP7-IDEAS-ERC,ProjectID:203613,seehttp://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/87402_en.html[accessed8May2017].



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present a framework for organising various lessons identified as a result of EU conflictresolutionefforts.Finally,Isuggestseveralparametersforinputtinglessonsintoouronlinecatalogue/database of CPP-related learning. This entire approach will be adaptedthroughout the course of the project in light of inputs and findings by other projectmembers,andwillhopefullycontributetotheproductionofourkeydeliverablesattheendof2018.

2.GENERALPOINTSONTHECONCEPT

Beforeturningtotheissueoflearning,Ithinkweneedtobeclearabouthowthisconceptfitsintotheprojectmoregenerally.AsIseeit,ourultimategoalistoimproveorenhancetheEU’scapabilitiesintherealmofCPP,sooneofourfirsttasksistodefinethefullrangeofexisting resources the EU can deploy in this area.5 As far as resources are concerned, inaddition to technologies, personnel, and procedures, these involve: 1) generalconcepts/doctrinesregardinghowtheEUshouldengageinCPP(suchasthe‘comprehensiveapproach’6); 2) short/medium term policies (such as individual CSDP missions); and 3)longer-term, and often ‘strategic,’ policies/plans devised on a functional/technical basis(suchastheMaritimeSecurityStrategy)and/oronageographicbasis,aswiththeEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy(ENP7)ortheEUStrategyfortheHornofAfrica.Theycanalsoinvolvethe use of various power resources on the part of the EU, such as: 1) diplomacy/goodoffices; 2) economic/financial aid (in trade/development/humanitarian aid policy); 3)economic/financial sanctions; 4) the power of ‘attraction’ (accession/association); 5) lightarmed force (police/gendarmerie/border/customs forces); and 6) heavy armed force(air/land/naval military forces).8 These various tools can also be deployed to provide

5Foradiscussionoftheconceptsofresourceandcapability,pleaseseeEU-CIVCAPDL2.6,‘EUCapabilitiesforConflictPreventionandPeacebuilding:ACapabilities-BasedAssessment’,availablefrom:https://eu-civcap.net/portfolio/deliverables/[accessed8May2017].6Ourunderstandingofthisconceptinparticularwillbethefocusofadeliverabledueinmonth36:DL4.3,‘ReportonEUcomprehensiveapproachtoconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding’.7TheENPmaydeservemoreattentioninourworkeventhoughourtwokeyregionsareoutsideitsscope,astheEUisrevisingthisapproachtostructuringitsrelationswith15states,plusthePalestinianAuthority,onitseasternandsouthernborders.Moreimportantly,nearlyallofthe15statesinitiallyeligibleforinvolvementintheENP(Algeria,Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Egypt,Georgia,Israel,Jordan,Lebanon,Libya,Moldova,Morocco,Syria,Tunisia,andUkraine)currentlysufferfromproblemsrelatedtoconflict.8Theissueof‘force’raisesthequestionofthefunctionalorpracticaldividinglinebetweenEU‘civilian’andEU‘military’capabilities(aswellas‘dual-use’technologies).Ithinkthesimplestapproachistodefine‘militarycapabilities’asthosefallingunderadirectmilitarychainofcommand,which(forthemoment)involvesthecommandbyanEUmemberstate(orcoalitionofsame),astheEU’sownsmallOperationalHeadquarters(OHQ)hasnotyetcommandedanEUmilitaryoperation.Therefore,‘civiliancapabilities’forCPPcouldmakeuseofunarmedmilitaryresourcesand/ordeploylightlyarmedpolice/gendarmerieforceswithexecutiveauthority(andbothapproacheshaveoccurredinthecontextofspecificCSDPoperations).Wemayneedtodiscussthisfurtherastheprojectdevelops.



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executive authority (i.e., powers to investigate, adjudicate, detain/arrest, and defend) ornon-executive authority (training, support, technical assistance, etc.) in a particular hostcountry.9Finally,theycaninvolveconceptualandoperationallinkagestomanyotheractors(providersandstakeholders)intherealmofCPP,suchastheUN,theOSCE,NATO,andtheAfricanUnion(AU).Forthepurposeofsimplicity,Iwillusetheterm‘CPPaction’asagenericterm for all of these types of CPP-related EU decisions/actions/capabilities; thiswill be acoreunitofanalysisforunderstandinglearningprocessesintherestofthispaper.

Second, a large part of our effort will also be devoted to developing clear measures of‘success’or‘effectiveness.’Todothis,however,weneedtobeclearaboutwhattheEUhasalready been doing in this realm, and how the EU itself thinks about, or operationalises,‘effectiveness.’Therefore,onecriticaltask,whichIwillbeundertakingduringthefirstyearof the project, will be to catalogue the EU’s own well-established learning efforts (or‘lessonsidentified’)regardingCPPactions.WedonotwanttomerelyrepeatwhattheEUisalready doing, but we do need a kind of baseline regarding the EU’s thinking todemonstrate: 1) how effective is the EU’s current approach to learning-based policy-making?; and 2) what can our project add to these efforts, once we collate all of theresearch generated by the end of 2018? In otherwords, our reports on learning/lessonsshouldbeveryclearindistinguishingbetweenwhattheEUhasalreadylearnedinthisrealm(‘EUlessonsidentified’forexample)andwhatourprojectdiscoversinthenextthreeyearsthat could enhance the EU’s existing efforts (‘EU-CIVCAP lessons identified’ for example).This nomenclature could change but we need to start somewhere. Similarly, our onlinelessons catalogue is meant to summarise the project findings in this realm from variouswork packages (WPs), yet we need to be cognisant of the fact that the EU itself isconductingitsownworkinthisarea.Moreover,‘identifying’lessons(astheEUitselfputsit)is not the same as actual ‘learning’ (i.e., improving the EU’s capabilities etc.), sowe alsoneed toevaluatewhether theEUhas implemented its own lessons identified, how thoselessonsrelatetoourownfindings,andwhethertheonesweidentifyarefeasible:politically,economically,orwhatever.

A third consideration is thatwe need to be very clear about how to add our EU-CIVCAPlessonsidentifiedtothedatabaseasseveralprojectpartnerswillbeinvolvedinthisprocess.Asnotedabove, theEU’sown lessons identifiedcanbe found invariousEUreports10andreports of other authoritative actors,11 enhanced by personal interviews in some cases.Thesewill be used to populate part of our learningdatabase. For EU-CIVCAP lessons,wemayneedtodiscussamethodology(beyondthegeneralpointsinthispaper)todetermine

9Inusingtheterm‘hostcountry’ratherthan(forexample)‘target’or‘conflictzone’IamassumingthattheEUwillactintherealmofCPPonlyifinvitedbytheparties;itdoesnotintendtobeaninterventionorinvasionforce.10Forexample,seeEuropeanParliament2012.11Forexample,seeUNPeacekeepingBestPracticesUnit2004.



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whethercertain lessonsweidentifyshould ‘qualify’ forthedatabase.This iscriticalasthelearningdatabasewedevelopwill alsobeused toprepare severaldeliverables: individualreports on best practices from various WPs and a final report on best practices. At aminimum,then,wewillneedtodiscussinthecomingmonthssomecriteriaforidentifyingourownlessonsandhowdodealwithpossiblyconflicting informationaboutsuchlessonsafteralltheresearchmaterialiscollated.Ishallreturntothispointattheendofthispaper.

Afourthconsideration,whichIbelievewillbeamajorchallenge,istheneedforEU-CIVCAPto impose some intellectual order onwhat the EU is really attempting to achieve in therealmofinternationalsecurity,andhowthoseeffortsrelatetotheEU’sothermajorpolicygoals (particularly internalones).Manyof the termsused in theEU’sowndocumentsarenotoriously imprecise when not used in a specific context: peacebuilding, peacekeeping,conflict resolution, conflict prevention, crisismanagement, crisis response, security sectorreform, rule of law, and so on.More problematically, CPP is not a clear or coherent EUpolicydomainunderthedirectionofasingleauthority,sowearelikelytoreceiveconflictinginformationaboutitaswegetdeeperintotheproject.ThereisalsoacleargapbetweentheEU’srhetoricanditspolicyactionsinthisrealm,whichthisprojectshouldhelptoaddress.Intermsofpolicy tools inparticular, althoughwearemeant to focuson civilianefforts,wealsoneedtoconsidertherelationshipbetweenthatrealmandtheEU’smilitarycapabilities,especiallyintermsoftheEU’sattempttodevisea‘comprehensiveapproach’toCPP-relatedproblems.The restof thisdocumenthasbeenwrittenwithaview toaddressing someoftheseissues.

3.DEFININGLEARNING

Turningtotheconceptofpolicy-relevantlearning,thisshouldbeseenmostgenerallyasatypeofpolitical change,and shouldbedistinguished fromother related formsof change,such as vague ‘lessons of history’ (i.e., analogical reasoning) ormere ‘adaptation’ to newcircumstances (Levitt andMarch 1988; Levy 1994; Zito 2009; Zito and Schout 2009). Thepurposeofpolicy-relevantlearningonthepartoftheEUistoimprovethe‘fit’betweenitsexisting institutional framework/organisational routines and its stated goals/ambitions, inthis case involving CPP.While analogical reasoning or adaptation do not typically involvechangesincoreinstitutionalvaluesorpurposes,learningcanbeconceptualisedasaprocessofdeliberate,long-term,andhighlyself-reflexiveinstitutional/policyreform(Haas1990).Ataminimum,itconsistsof:1)regularlybenchmarkingorreviewingEUpolicyperformanceinspecificdomains;2)activelygeneratingpossiblelessonsasaresultoftheexperiencegainedin undertakingnewactions (‘lessons identified’); 3) deliberately transforming lessons intopolicy-relevantknowledgethroughfeedback/monitoring/evaluation/trainingprocesses;and



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4)institutionalisingnewknowledge(‘lessonslearned’)forapplicationtofutureoperations,often in the form of (narrow) best practices, concepts, doctrines, and (broader) strategicplans.12 In line with EU terminology, best practice is understood as “an activity whichconventionalwisdomregardsasmoreeffectiveatdeliveringaparticularoutcomethananyothertechnique,procedureormethodology.”(CounciloftheEU,2015:5).

Basedontheseprocesses, Iprefertousetheterm‘experiential institutional learning’anddefinethisaschangesinaninstitution’sfunctions,procedures,andcapabilitiesasaresultofnewinformation,observation,orexperience.Ingeneral,‘changes’mainlyreferstoaclearerconceptualisation of what the EU is attempting to achieve, and how the EU intends toachieveit,intherealmofCPP.However,althoughlearninginthecaseoftheEUinvolvesahighdegreeoftechnical/functionaladaptation(i.e.,adesireto‘improve’performance),itisnotacompletelyneutraloruncontestedspill-overprocessbutratheradeliberateattemptbyEUpolicyelitestouseoperationalexperiencestoevaluateinstitutionalperformanceand,if necessary, facilitate institutional change, in a new EU policy domain.More specifically,such learning can be measured in terms of institutional changes across three majordimensions:responsibilities,rules,andresources.

By responsibilities I refer to the EU’s own conception of its place in the world and thespecifictypesofforeign/securitypolicyactivities(suchasCPP)thatmightreflectoradvanceitsrole.ThisarticulationoftheEU’sresponsibilitiescanbeframedintermsoftreatyarticles(suchasArt.21/2ofLisbon)andgeneralstrategicdocuments(suchastheEuropeanSecurityStrategy and theMaritime Security Strategy), or in farmore specific terms regarding, forexample,aCFSP/CSDPjointaction(i.e.,intermsofa‘mandate’).Changesinresponsibilitiesas a resultof experiential learning canbemeasured in threemainways: 1) anexpansionand/or clarification of the initial mandate during the planning and/or implementationphasesofapolicy;2)achangeinthedurationand/orgeographicscopeofapolicy;and3)thecreationofcomplementaryorfollow-onpolicies inordertofulfil theoriginalmandateand/orrelatedpolicygoals,suchasdevelopmentorhumanitarianassistance.Ahighdegreeof learning of this type, therefore, would involve both general and specific changes toresponsibilities (i.e., treaties, strategies, and mandates) in terms of expanding/clarifyingthem,extendingtheirduration/geographicscope,andcreatingcomplementarypolicies.

12 EUterminologyalsodistinguishesbetweenLessonobservation(LO),lessonidentified(LI)andlessonlearnt(LL).LOrefersto“[a]nyoccurrence(s)orfinding(s)thatcouldhaveanimpactonEUoperationaloutputandhasthepotentialtobecomeaLessonLearned.ItmightrequireanimprovementoritcanconstituteaBestPractice.”LIisa“statement(basedonaverifiedLessonObservation)definingthedetailednatureoftheproblemforwhichremedialactionhastobedeveloped-itistheoutcomeoftheanalysisphase.”LLreferstoa“lessonthathasbeenfullystaffedandtheassociatedimprovementandimplementationaction(s)identifiedandtaken.Alessoncanonlybedeclared‘learned’oncethefullremedialactionhasbeensuccessfullyimplemented”(EUMS2012:6).



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By rules I refer to the institutional structures and policymaking routines that govern aparticular policy domain, in this case those focused on CPP but also the more generalrelationshipbetweenthiscapacityandothermajorEuropeanforeignpolicyinitiatives,suchastheENP.Asnotedabove,CPPisnotadistinctEUpolicydomain(unlike,forexample,theCommonAgriculturalPolicy),butwemayneedtotreatit(orevenhelp‘createit’)assuchfor the purposes of EU-CIVCAP. These rules can be informal (or uncodified) or formal(codified in EU treaties/directives/regulations); also, they can reflect, and then influence,how the EU determines future responsibilities and resources. In addition, a centralcharacteristicofEUpolicymakinginEUforeign/securitypolicyisthe‘maturation’ofinformalnorms/customsintoformalrules/laws(oftenlatercodifiedastreatyreforms),soEU-CIVCAPshouldattempttoidentifytheseprocesseswheneverpossible.Suchchangescaninvolvethemodification of existing rules (including the role of various organisational actors) or thecreationofentirelynewonesinordertoimprovepolicyperformance.AstheEUincreasinglyworkswithotherpartners in this realm,we shouldalsobeon the lookout for changes inrulesregarding(forexample)theEU’srelationswiththeUN,NATO,andtheAfricanUnion(AU). Rules regarding the EU’s relationswith theUN andNATO, in particular, have beencodifiedtosomedegree, intheformof(forexample)anagreementwiththeUNoncrisismanagement13 and one with NATO regarding the EU’s use of NATO resources.14 Theseconsiderationswillalsoinformthreeofourdeliverables.15

Finally,byresourcesIrefertobothmaterialandnon-materialassetstheEUmakesavailableforthepurposeofCPP.Materialresourcesmightincludefinancing,technologies,personnel,and equipment provided by the EU or its member states; non-material resources mightincludetheprovisionofbestpractices,doctrines,concepts,progressreports,datasets,andothersourcesofknowledgerelevanttothecreationandimplementationofcertainpolicies.This also could include the creationof new institutionsor bodiesdirectly involved inCPPactivities (which overlaps with ‘rules’ above). We also might think about distinguishingbetweengeneral changes in resources for theCPPdomain (suchasan increase in theaidbudgetortheprocurementofanewtechnology)andtheprovisionofspecificresourcesforajointactionorsimilarcrisis/conflictresponsemission.Thislattercomponentalsoinvolvesthe provision of resources as determined through contributions by EUmember states aswell as by the EU budget. Our analysis of resources, in particular, along with related

13CounciloftheEU(2008);UNandEU(2003).14Theso-called‘BerlinPlus’agreement,ortheEU-NATO‘AgreedFramework.’Foradetaileddiscussion,seeSmith2013.15DL4.1,‘ReportoncomparingEU,UN,andOSCEconflictpreventionandpeacekeepingcapabilities’(availableonline);DL4.2,‘ReportoninteractionbetweenEU,UN,andOSCEinconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding’(dueinmonth24);andDL6.2,‘Policypaperoncoordinationoflocalcapacity-building’(dueinmonth30)—oncepublished,thesewillbeavailablefrom:https://eu-civcap.net/portfolio/deliverables/[accessed8May2017].



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rules/procedures (for staffing and contracting, for example), will inform several keydeliverables.16

Taken together, experience-driven changes in responsibilities, rules, and resourcesregardinghowtheEUundertakesCPPactivitiesalsomayrepresentafundamentalchangeinhowtheEUseesitsroleintheworld,aswellasinvolvethecreationofnewforeign/securitypolicy concepts, a culture/doctrine of CPP (military and civilian), or a strategic culture toimprovetheEU’sabilitytoprojectvariousformsofpowertocopewithcertaininternationalsecurityproblems.ACPP-orientedstrategiccultureinparticularwouldinvolvenotjusttheprovision of adequate material resources for CPP actions, but also robust and reliableprocedures for deployingmultilateral forces, overseeing them, and coordinating their usewithotherEUpolicytoolsinspecificareasofoperation(CornishandEdwards2001;Cornishand Edwards 2005; Meyer 2005).17 One of the best examples of such ‘comprehensive’experiential learning is the expansion of the EU’s maritime security efforts in Africafollowing the launch of the Atalanta naval operation (EUNAVFOR Somalia) in 2008. Thisinitial operation, focusedonlyon counter-piracy at first, grew into amuch larger effort –involving changes in responsibilities, rules, and resources – devoted to broader capacity-building, state-building, and rule of law activities, with other follow-on policies (EUCAPNestor)andanewstrategyfortheentireregion(EUStrategyfortheHornofAfrica).

Experiential institutional learning in the EU context, then, differs frombureaucratic/organisational or individual/cognitive learning, although elements of theseapproachesdooverlap inpractice.Asnotedabove, themost importantdifference is thatthere is no single agency, bureaucracy, or organisation responsible for CPP; instead, thiscapacityissharedacrosstheEU,involvingmainlytheGeneralSecretariatoftheCounciloftheEU,EUmemberstates,theCommission,andtheEEAS.Moreover,theEUalsodevelopedtwodistinctapproachestoactivityinthisrealm,dependingonwhethertheywereprimarilymilitary or civilian in nature. Therefore, a bureaucratic or organisational approach tolearning,whichfocusesonfairlyrigidstandardoperatingproceduresorroutines(LevittandMarch 1988), would be too narrow to explain the development of these two major EUcapabilities(militaryandcivilian).

16Suchasareporton‘capability-basedanalysisoftechnologies,personnel,andprocedures’(DL2.1,availableonline);areporton‘dualuse-technologies’(DL2.4,dueinmonth26);apolicypaperon‘poolingandsharingofcapabilities’(DL2.5,dueinmonth34);areporton‘technicalshortcomingsinearlywarningandconflictanalysis’(DL3.1,availableonline);andareporton‘theEU’scapacitiesforconflictprevention’(D3.2,availableonline)—oncepublished,thesewillbeavailablefrom:https://eu-civcap.net/portfolio/deliverables/[accessed8May2017].17TheESS(p.11)alsomentionstheneedtodevelopaEuropeanstrategicculture“thatfostersearly,rapid,andwherenecessary,robustintervention.”Inmyownwork,Iusearelativelynarroworinstrumentalapproachtostrategicculture,focusingonspecificresourcesandinstitutions/proceduresdevelopedtofosterindividualactions,ratherthanabroader,orconstitutive,approachbasedonsharedbeliefs,emotions,habits,attitudes,history,orotherfactors(althoughtheseapproachescanbelinked).Onthispoint,see:Haglund2011;Norheim-Martinsen2011.



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Conversely,an individual-levelorcognitiveapproachto learningwouldbefartoobroad ifappliedtoCPPasageneralpolicydomain.18MostEUpoliciesinthisrealmareorganisedonacase-by-casebasisandpersonneldonotalwaysserveinmultipleactionsovertime.19ThehighdegreeofrotationamongEUpolicymakersinvolvedinspecificmissions/operationsalsomeans that whatever lessons or knowledge they absorb as individuals may not result inlong-termprocedural changes throughout theEU’s foreign/securitypolicy infrastructure.20Thus, if learning occurs in this domain, given its decentralised bureaucratic structure androtatingoperationalpersonnel, itmust involvechangeswithinandamongthepolicyunitschargedwithconductingspecificpolicies.Inotherwords,experientialinstitutionallearningdepends, above all, on taking on new actions or new tasks that force an institution toevaluate,andpossiblyreform,itsnormalwaysofdoingthings.Therefore,itmakessensetoexaminelearningprimarily,oratleastinitially,intermsofthosenewtasks,suchasthetypeofaction(i.e.,peacemonitoringorruleoflaw)orthegeographicregioninwhichtheywerelaunched.

It isalsopossibletoanalyse institutional learning–asdefinedabove– intermsofseveralotherparameters.Itmaybeworthconsideringthesefurtheroncewemovedeeperintothelessonslearned/bestpracticesphaseoftheproject.Onesuchparameterinvolvesthelevelof analysis where institutional learning takes place. Here we can discern between threemajor levels: strategic (orpolitical-level),operational (orheadquarters-level),and local (orforce/theatre-level) learning. Strategic institutional learning focuses on changes in theresponsibilities, rules, and resources within and among key EU institutions that providepoliticaldirectionandstrategicoversighttospecificpolicies.Operational-level institutionallearninginvolvesspecificdynamicsintermsofresourcing,burden-sharing,mandates,rulesof engagement, and (for some actions) the direct command and control by the EU fromBrussels throughvariousEEASbodies (forcivilianactions)or itsOperationalHeadquarters(OHQ)(for military actions). Finally, local institutional learning focuses on learningbehaviours experienced ‘on the ground’, in terms of the responsibilities, rules, andresourcesrequiredtofullyimplementaCPP-relatedaction.ThislevelwouldalsoincludetheinvolvementoflocalstakeholdersaseitherbeneficiariesofEUpolicyoraspartnersinvolvedintheprovisionofCPPactivities.Ourworkonthelocalortacticallevelalsoinformsseveraldeliverablesdueneartheendoftheproject.21

18Forexample,Tonra(2003)hasappliedsuchanapproachtothecreationoftheCFSP;alsoseeKing2005.19Onesmallexceptiontothistendencyinvolvestheuseof‘follow-on’policiestosupportorextendalreadyexistingones,astheymaymakeuseofexistingpersonnel.20Thisrotation,infact,isoneofthemajorareasofopportunityiftheEUhopestoreformorimprovetheperformanceoftheCPPcapacitymuchfurther,especiallyintermsofitslinkagestothenewEEASsystemdevisedundertheLisbonTreaty.21ThesedeliverablesareDLs6.2–6.6;oncepublished,thesewillbeavailablefrom:https://eu-civcap.net/portfolio/deliverables/[accessed8May2017].



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Obviously, there areoverlapsbetween these levels of action, as there arewith themoregeneral concepts of responsibilities, rules, and resources. Overall, however, we need tostrike a balance between understanding how the EU as awhole adapts itself in order toundertakearangeofCPPpoliciesandhowlocalEUofficialsonthegrounddealwithday-to-dayproblemsincarryingoutthosepoliciesanddeterminingsuccess/effectiveness.Inbothcases,however,weneedtopaycloseattentiontowhethertheEUmakesreferenceto,andthen implements, ‘lessons identified’ fromearlierpolicieswhen it implementsanyneworrecentpoliciesexaminedbyEU-CIVCAP.AstheEU’sownlearningculture(suchasitis)didnotdevelop fullyuntil justbefore theLisbonTreaty (around2008), itmakes sense tousethat period as an initial starting point, or baseline, for documenting various ‘EU lessonsidentified.’

4.LEARNINGANDTHEEUPOLICYPROCESS

In addition to the question of defining andmeasuring central concepts like ‘lessons’ and‘learning’ and (eventually) ‘best practices’, etc., we also need to think clearly about howthoseeffortsrelatetothe‘realworld’ofcontemporaryCPP.Forme,thisinvolvesthinkingaboutthepoliticsofpolicymaking/policy-implementationwithintheEUitselfandbetweenthe EU and the ‘outside world’ (namely the host country). Or in other words, betweenendogenousandexogenousfactors.IftheEU’slessonsdonotenhancethesetwoaspectsofhow theEUactually conductsCPPactivities, then theymustbe treatedas ‘cheap talk’ormere rhetorical reforms rather than as serious attempts to improve the EU’s policyperformanceintherealmofCPP.Hopefully,EU-CIVCAPwillhelptheEUavoidthisoutcome,atleastregardingthefindingsfromourproject,byservingasakindof‘realitycheck’ontheEU’sefforts.

Regarding the internal/endogenous dimension, we need to think about how changes (orpotential changes) in responsibilities, rules, and resources fit within the EU’s existingmachineryforconductingCPPactivities.AssumingthatwearetreatingCPPasanexpressionof EU foreign/security policymore generally,we can conceptualise this activity in a fairlystraightforwardfashioninvolvingseveralpolicyphases,whichcanbejuxtaposedagainstthethree components of learning (rules, responsibilities, and resources) and the two majorlevelsofanalysis(strategicandoperational)notedabove.Thesephasesinvolve:1)agenda-setting/policyplanning,particularly in termsofmandate-creationandpolicy leadershiporresponsibility(i.e., involvingtheCommission,EEAS,orEUmemberstates);2)policymakingto decide the specific details; 3) implementation and initial experiential learning; and 4)evaluation of the action afterwards (including learning and feedback processes). In otherwords, thesephases involveansweringquestionsaboutwhytheEUundertakesanaction,whowillrepresenttheEU,howandwithwhatresourcestheEUwillconducttheaction,and



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how the EU intends to evaluate the action and, if necessary, reform its institutions toimproveitsperformancethenexttime.Thesephasesarenotdiscrete,ofcourse,buteachphaseisdistinguishedbyaprimaryquestiontobeanswered.

Specifically, the planning phase generally involves discussions among EUmember states,typicallyintheCounciloftheEUandthePoliticalandSecurityCommittee,withsomeinputby the Commission. As many actions associated with CPP involve the CFSP/CSDP policydomain,weneedtorememberthisisanintergovernmentalinstrumentlargelygovernedbyconsensus, so the interestsofEUmember statesarea critical componentof theprocess,especiallywhenaCSDPoperationwithexecutiveauthorityisunderconsideration.Althoughexplicitquidproquobargainingistypicallyavoidedduringthesedeliberations,wedoneedto determine whether EU member states (particularly the larger ones that might leadand/or provide resources for a CPP action) are acting on the basis of their own political,economic,orsecurityinterests,and/oronthebasisofaEuropeaninterest,asidentifiedbyshared experiences, evaluations of the situation, EU strategy/policy documents, learningprocesses,orotherfactors.

Once planning moves into the second stage (policymaking), the EU begins to take firmdecisions on questions regarding mandates, command/leadership, and burden-sharing/forcegeneration.Burden-sharing(includingtheproblemofmonitoringtransactionscosts) in particular is a chronic problem in the area of multilateral security/defencecooperation(Lipson1984)andthis isnolesstrueoftheCFSP/CSDPandotherCPPactionsfundedinwholeorinpartbyintergovernmentalcontributions(Nováky2015a;Weiss2012).Since the EU puts together resources on a case-by-case basis for some of these actions,policymakers must regularly consider who will lead and provide the resources in thesecases.Herewecanfocusonwhetherthemandateseemsachievableinlightoftheplannedresourcesandfactorsthoughttobeatworkinthehostcountry.WecanalsoaskwhetherthemandateisdirectlylinkedtootherEUpolicygoals(particularlydevelopment)inthehostcountry or region. These problems require a high degree of coordination, and provideopportunities for learning, between the strategic and operational levels of analysis.Althoughwearenotdirectlyfocusingonthem,anypoliciesinvolvingmilitaryoperationsareespecially problematic, given the need for a strict chain of command involving thespecification of an OHQ in Europe and a Force Headquarters (FHQ) in or near the hostcountry,eachwith theirowncommanders,aswellasagreementonaspecificConceptofOperations(CONOPS)tofulfilthemandate.

The thirdand fourth stages in theanalysis (implementationandevaluation) are themostcriticalforourpurposes:thedynamicsofimplementationandexperientiallearningoncetheEU launches a CPP action. Here we can focus on new experiences, feedback loops, andspecificlessonsidentified,mainlyattheoperationalandtacticallevels,withsomeattentionto strategic level processes. In this sense the feedback loops evolve from a negative-



15

preventative purpose (confidence-building through the communication of informationregarding intentions) toward a more positive-affirmative purpose (common analyses,understandings,andpolicy-relevantknowledge,gearedtowardsproblem-solving).Thus,totheextentthatEUmemberstatesandkeyEUorganisationscanagreeonthepolicy-relevantcontentof informationabout theconductof specificCPPactions regarding thecausesof,andeffectivesolutionsto,conflictresolutionandcrisismanagementinthirdcountries,theprospectsforinstitutionalchange,andmorecooperation,shouldbeenhanced.

Asnotedabove,thesephasesoverlapwitheachotherinthe‘realworld’ofpolicymaking,sothatlessonscanchangeasthepolicyprocessmovesforward.Thisofteninvolvesachangefrom the ‘general’ to the ‘specific’ (or from ‘broad’ to ‘narrow’). Forexample,onecriticalissue is whether the action actually had enough resources to fulfil the mandate, anddeliveredthoseresourcesontime,asspecifiedintheinitialCONOPS(orsimilarplan)foraspecificaction.Herewecandeterminewhetheragapemergedbetweenwhatwasinitiallyexpected (in a general/broad sense) andwhatwas experienced by EU policymakers (in aspecific/narrowsense)betweentheplanningandimplementationphasesofaCPPaction.Inaddition, we can examine whether the mandate expands or even contracts onceimplementation starts, possibly as a result of new information and experience (i.e.,learning).22Wecanalsoexaminepotentiallearningdynamicswhenmultipleactions(suchasfollow-onactions)areundertakeninasinglehostcountryorregion,suchastheBalkansorAfrica. Also, when the EU undertakes both military and civilian CPP actions in a singlecountryorregion,dotheseeffortscomplementorundermineeachother?Finally,hastheEUmanagedto improveitsoverallcivilian-militarycoordinationinsuchsituations,as laterspecifiedby itsclaimsregardingacomprehensiveapproachtosecurity? Inotherwords, iftheEUdoesnotliveuptoitsclaimsregardingthesegoals,towhatextentdoesitattempttoreformits institutionalstructuresandresourcebase inordertoworkmoreeffectivelythenexttime?

Thus, although there are at least four major micro-foundational logics of institutionalchange, or institutionalisation, in international organisations (IOs),23 this approach paysclose attention to the functional and socialisation logics of institutional or normativeevolution.Thefunctionallogicinvolvestheideathatchangesinhowtoperformatask(suchas a CPP action) are necessary to improve the effectiveness of that task (such ascontributingtopeace-keepingorconflictresolution).Thisperceptionofnecessityforchange

22SuchacontractionofthemandatehasoccurredduringtheimplementationofseveralCSDPactions;thiscaninvolvegeographicscopeand/orpolicygoals/tasks.23Theothertwomajorlogicsofinstitutionalisationareapowerlogic(institutionalisationdependsuponactorswithacapacityforleadership,suchaslargeEUmemberstates)andanappropriatenesslogic(institutionalisationresultsfromaneedtoadaptnewwaysofdoingthingsintoanalready-existingframework).Theselogicsarenotmutuallyexclusive,ofcourse,andcanworkwithoragainstthefunctionallogicattheheartofexperientiallearning,astheanalysiswilldemonstrate.



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can be a direct result of experiential learning or learning-by-doing. The socialisation logicinvolvesashareddesiretobelongto,andbuild,acommonsocio-politicalspace(suchasanew EU policy domain). Active learning therefore requires shared perceptions of a gapbetweenexpectationsandtheactualexperienceofCPPactions(framedhereaschangesinresponsibilities,rules,andresources),anddeliberatemeasurestopassthoseperceptionsonto other actors, across time and space, if they are involved in CPP. However, although Ifocusonlearningasaresultofsharedperceptionsofpolicyfailure(orofsimilardifficulties),it can also involve other dynamics, such as: 1) risk-taking innovation during theimplementationofaCPPaction;2)newinformationbeyonddirectexperiencethatconflictswithpreviousbeliefs;3)bureaucraticturnover(i.e.,newstaffwithnewideas);and4)newtechnologiestodeliverpolicy.

These processes can be treated as general causal mechanisms that change EU decision-making from a political process of self-interested bargaining (or politicisation) to amoresocio-technical process of consensual problem-solving (or functional socialisation) thatservesacommoninterest.24Suchprocessesmayalsoresult inthecreationofnetworksofpolicy experts or even so-called ‘epistemic communities’ devoted to certain policyproblems.25Epistemiccommunitiesareboundbytheirpolicy-relevanttechnicalknowledge,professional expertise, and policy goals regarding a specific issue; the Commissionrepresents this kind of technical expertise in many socio-economic EU policy domains.Therefore,we can considerwhether this dynamicmaybe atwork in theCPPdomain, assomehavearguedoftheCSDP,inparticular(Cross2013;Howorth2004).Moreover,wecanalsoexaminethecreationofacommonEU/Europeanknowledgebaseregardingthesetypesof operations,much ofwhich has been increasingly framed in terms of a comprehensiveapproach to security and as a nascent EU global or grand strategy. This ideationalcomponent regarding the EU’s unique contribution to CPP is in fact one of the mostinterestingaspectsoftheEU’sdevelopmentofthiscapability,asitinveststheeffortwithamoredeontological aspect: the idea that EUmember states increasingly share a senseofmoralduty,purpose,orobligationtoprovideeffectivesecurityassistancewhenaskedtodosobythirdcountriesandotherinternationalorganisations.

24Onthispoint,seethe2005specialissueofInternationalOrganization—59(1)—on‘InternationalInstitutionsandSocializationinEurope’.25Forexample,MüllerandvanDassen(1997:68)havemadesuchaclaimintheiranalysisofCFSPeffortsregardingnuclearnon-proliferation;Zito(2001)hasmadeasimilarclaimregardingtheEU’sleadershipinenvironmentalregulation.



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5.POLICYPHASESANDTHECONFLICTCYCLEThe considerations above regarding learning, lessons identified, and policymaking phasescanbejuxtaposedagainstanotherkeyelementofEU-CIVCAP:theconceptofaconflict‘lifecycle’. As described in the proposal, this cycle involves four basic stages: 1) ConflictPrevention(conflictanalysis&earlywarning);2)CrisisResponse(mediation&negotiation);3) Conflict Management & Mitigation (crisis management operations); and 4) ConflictResolutionandPeacebuilding(localcapacitybuilding).Further,eachofthesecomponentsoftheconflictcycleisassociatedwithaspecificworkpackage,asfollows:

• ConflictPrevention:WP3

• CrisisResponse:WP4

• ConflictManagement:WP5• ConflictResolution&Peacebuilding:WP6

Although these aspects of the project are addressed with different WPs, the discussionabove should make it clear that the boundaries between them are not very distinct inpractice, especially when juxtaposed against ‘normal’ EU policymaking dynamics. Forinstance,framingsomeorallCPPactionsasatypeofcrisisresponse(WP4)introducesothercomplicationsintotheanalysis,as(andsimilartoCPPmoregenerally)nosingleauthorityintheEUhassoleresponsibilityfor‘crisisresponse’.VariousEUinstitutionsalsopossesstheirowninternalproceduresfor ‘crisisresponse’,whicharenotalwayseasilycoordinated inarealcrisis.Finally,evidencefromarangeofCSDP‘crisisoperations’clearlyindicatesthattheEUdoesnotnormallyactasquicklyasonemightexpectina‘real’crisissituation.26Devisingpractical measures to solve these problems could be one of the most importantcontributions of EU-CIVCAP. These dynamicswill be evident in terms of investigating thetwoareasofwheremostEUcrisis responseactivityhastakenplace: theWesternBalkansandtheHornofAfrica(ourcasestudiesforWP5andWP6).

Inanyevent, thekeypoint is thatwecantry toorganiseallofourempirical findings inamoresystematicwaytomakethemmoreintelligibletopolicymakersandotherresearchers.Thisexerciseshouldalsobeusefulintermsofpopulatingthelessonsdatabase(DL7.1)andputtingtogetherthefinalbestpracticesreport(DL7.2)(seebelow).Asanexample,Iwilluselearning-related evidence from the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), which the EUimplementedfromSeptember2005toDecember2006inpartnershipwiththeAssociationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This was the first major EU attempt to conduct apeace-monitoringmission,afteritsmorelimitedexperiencewiththeEUMonitoringMissionintheWesternBalkans(EUMM)andtheEUSpecialRepresentative(EUSR)BorderSupport26Forthepurposesofthispaper,a‘crisis’inathirdcountryusuallyinvolves:1)suddenness;2)timepressurestoactquickly;3)theuseofviolence;and4)actual(orthehighlylikelypossibilityof)harmtolargenumbersofcivilians.



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TeaminGeorgiamission(EUBSTGeorgia).TheAMMwasalsothefirstCSDPactioninAsia,anareaoftheworldwheretheEUhaslimitedpoliticalinfluence,andtheEU’sfirstpracticalsecuritycooperationwithASEAN.ThefactthatabouthalfofASEAN’smonitorswereMuslimadded to the novelty of this mission in terms of giving the EU (and ASEAN) practicalexperienceinsecuritycooperationamongdiversepopulations;italsoenhancedtheregionallegitimacy of the mission. This is an important point considering the current challengesinvolvingso-calledIslamicState.Intermsofthespecificmandate,theEUalsohadtotakeastanceonthedifficultquestionofaseparatistmovement;inthiscaseitobviouslysidedwiththenationalgovernmenttosupportterritorialintegrity.Thisapproachpaidoffintheendinthiscase,aspeacehasbeenself-sustainablesincetheAMMcreatedstructurestooutlastitspresenceandtomaintaindirectcontactbetweentheparties.Finally,ithasalsobeencitedastheEU’sfirstCSDPactiontobeconductedwithanotherregionalIOunderthepolicyof“effectivemultilateralism”(BraudandGrive2005:36).

InTable1below,IsummarisesomeofthemainlessonslearnedfromtheEU’sexperiencewith the AMM. Some of these lessons are derived from the EU’s own lessons identifiedreports;othersarebasedonmyown interpretationofhowthemissionwasplannedandimplemented.

As we can see, every single EU CPP action, such as the AMM, generates multipleopportunities and locales for learning, involving various types of change (responsibilities,rules, and resources) and levels of analysis (strategic/political, operational, andtactical/local). Since the EU has already institutionalised its own learning culture whenundertakingtheseactions,weneedtothinkaboutourreal‘valueadded’intermsofwhatEU-CIVCAPcanbringtotheanalysis.OnewaytodothisistocomparetheEU’sownlearningculturewith itsactualpracticewhenconductingcertainCPPactions; inotherwords,doestheEUfollowitsownrulesregardinglearning?27Anotherwaytodothis,asnotedabove,isfor EU-CIVCAP to serve as a kind of ‘reality check’ on whether the EU’s own ‘lessonsidentified’willrealisticallymeettheneedsoftheconflictlifecycle,aswedefineit.Thus,theconceptofconflictlifecyclewillbehelpfultowardsthisend,aswillaclearerunderstanding(aspresentedabove)ofthepracticalworkingrelationshipbetweenthereal-worlddynamicsofaconflict/crisislifecycleandthepoliticsofhowtheEUactuallybehaveswhenattemptingto manage it. A final reality check is to consider examples of failed EU crisisresponse/conflictmanagement in recent years. The EU’s security agenda (as discussed inthePoliticalandSecurityCommittee) ispackedwithpotentialproblemsforresolution,yettheEUactsonlyundercertainconditions.Therefore,wemaywanttothinkaboutwhethertoconsidersituationswheretheEUbrieflydebatedaresponse(suchasLebanonorrescuinghostagestakenbyBokoHaram),yetfailedtoactintheend.

27Theshortansweris:notalways,inthesensethat:1)theEUdoesnotconsistentlyfollowitsownrulesonthepracticeoflearning;and2)theEUdoesnotconsistentlyapplylessonslearnedtolateractions.



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Table1:ExamplesofkeylessonslearnedundertheAMM

Policyphase(EU)

Conflictcyclestage(EU/hostcountry)

Changesinresponsibilities Changesinrules Changesinresources

1.Planning(firmoptions)

1.Analysis/early-warning

Clearerpracticaldefinitionof‘peacemonitoring’inAceh

InitialagreementwithIndonesiangovernment;initialEU-ASEANdivisionoflabour

Initialplanforburden-sharingbetweenEUbudget,EUmemberstates,28andASEAN29

2.Policymaking(firmdecisions)

2.Crisisresponse

Specificmandateasagreedbyallstakeholders30

EU-ASEANcommand/staffingstructure;rolesofmissionstaff

‘Start-up’fundingprovidedbyFinland

3.Implementation(specificactions)

3.Conflictmanagement/mitigation

4.Conflictresolution/peacebuilding

Extensionofmandatetoincludeelectionperiod

Proactivemeasurestobringpeace,suchasCommissiononSecurityArrangements

Creationof‘districtoffices’anddeploymentofstaff(‘decommissioningteams’);useof‘flankingmeasures’bytheCommission31

Evaluation/feedback(learning)

4.Conflictresolution/peacebuilding

Lessonslearnedreportontheoverallmission,includingtheideaofDisarmament,DemobilisationandReintegration(DDR)32.Butnolessonsreportwasproducedregardingtheplanningphase

LessonsonEU-ASEANcooperation,themedia,humanrights,andgender

Lessonsonfinancing;inspiredtheideaofa‘start-up’fundforsuchactions,whichwasinstitutionalisedastheInstrumentforStability(IFS)from2007forcivilianmissions33

28Plustwonon-EUEuropeanstates(NorwayandSwitzerland).29Thailand,Malaysia,Brunei,Singapore,andthePhilippines.30Specifically:1)demobilisation/decommissioning;2)re-locationofmilitaryforcesandpolicetroops;3)monitoringthereintegrationofrebelforces;4)monitoringhumanrights;5)monitoringlegislativechange;6)rulingondisputedamnestycases;7)dealingwithcomplaintsandallegedviolations;8)maintainingliaisonandcooperationwiththeparties.31Suchassupporttothereintegrationofformerrebelsintocivilsocietyanddemocraticpoliticallife;supporttopersonsdisplacedbytheconflictandtoreturneesfromthirdcountries;EUobservationoflocalelectionsin2006;technicalassistanceandcapacity-buildingtosupportlocalpoliceandtheciviljudicialsystem;andaccesstojustice.32CounciloftheEU2007.33TheIFSwascreatedinNovember2006asaCommissiontooltoenhancesecurityinforeigncountriesfacingacrisis.Viewedasafollow-uptotheRapidReactionMechanismfacility,theIFSwasinitiallyendowedwith€2.062billionoversevenyears(2007–13).SeeEuropeanCommission2006.



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Finally,itmaybeworthconsideringtheextenttowhichanotherfactormightbeintroducedinto the analysis: classifying ‘conflicts’ or ‘crises’ in terms of specific dynamics/problems,whichmayinturninfluencetheconflictlifecycleand/ortheEUpolicyprocess.Forexample,we can think about interstate conflicts (Russia/Ukraine), intrastate conflict (Syria), ethnicconflicts (Balkans), insurgencies (Iraq, IslamicState), resourceconflicts (Nigeria),separatistconflicts(Kosovo),crime-relatedconflicts(piracy,corruption),andsoon.Ifwearefocusingmainly on EU conflict response since the Lisbon Treaty, and mainly on the Balkans andAfrica,thenanalysingthisfactor(typesofconflicts)indetailmightbebeyondthescopeofourempiricalterrain,butitisworththinkingaboutgiventheintellectualresourceswehaveat our command for the next three years. Moreover, this type of analysis could beaddressed in more detail in our report for future research priorities under the H2020securityagenda(DL7.3).

6.CATALOGUEOFLESSONSIDENTIFIED

Theonlinecatalogue(database)oflessonsiscurrentlyliveandhasbeenpopulatedwithtenofourownlessonsidentified.Thesystemallowsuserstobrowsethedatabaseaccordingtothe keywords that have been assigned to each individual lesson. The keywords arecategorisedasfollows:

1. Countries/regions:34a. Online:N/Ab. Forthcoming:Albania,BosniaandHerzegovina,Cambodia,Croatia,Djibouti,

Eritrea, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Kenya, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro,Serbia,Somalia,SouthSudan,Sudan,Uganda,WesternBalkans.

2. Institutions:

a. Online:CMPD,CPCC,EC,EEAS,ESDC,EUSC,EUSR,OSCE,PSC,UN.b. Forthcoming:AfricanUnion,Council of theEU, EUMS, EuropeanUnion, FPI

Service,HR/VP.

3. Policyphases:a. Online:Planning,Policy-making,Implementation.b. Forthcoming:Tobeconfirmed.

4. Conflict-cyclestages:a. Online: Conflict prevention, Crisis response, Conflict management, Conflict

resolution&peacebuilding.b. Forthcoming:Tobeconfirmed.

34Thiscategoryisforthcoming,aspresentlyallthelessonsuploadedaccordtonospecificcountryorregion.



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5. Cross-cuttingissues:a. Online: Civil-military coordination, Local ownership, Short-long term

approaches,Warning-responsegap.b. Forthcoming:Tobeconfirmed.

6. Topics:a. Online:Personnel,Resources,Strategy,Technology.b. Forthcoming: Benchmarking, Budget, Civil-military coordination,

Comprehensive Approach, Dual-use, Impact assessment, Internationalcooperation, Lessons learned system, Mandate, Procurement, Staffing,Sustainability,Training.

Lessonscanalsobelocatedviaafree-textsearchfunction.UsersnavigatingtotheCatalogueofLessonsIdentifiedhomepagearepresentedwithafulllistoflessonsavailable,thevariouscategorieslistedabove,asearchboxforconductingfreetextsearches,andthefollowingintroductorynote:

The EU-CIVCAP catalogue of lessons is an online, searchable and living documentwhich gathers all the lessons identified by the project’s Work Packages andpublished in our Deliverables. The evidence presented in this catalogue will becollected from official documents and reports, secondary sources and interviewswith practitioners. To facilitate search through the archive, lessons identified arecategorised according to the following criteria: relevant actor/institution,region/country, policy phase, conflict stage, cross-cutting issues and topics. ThecataloguewillbecontinuallyupdatedtoreflecttheongoingresearchfindingsoftheprojectuntiltheendofNovember2018.35

35Availablefrom:https://eu-civcap.net/lessons/[accessed8May2017].



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Thisisaninitialsetup,andwilllikelychangeasweproceed.However,itisnotnecessarytolinkeverylessontoanitemineachofthecategories(thenumberofcategoriesmayexpandaswell);also,wetrytobeconsistentintermsofhowthe‘lessons’aredeliveredtotheEU-CIVCAPProjectOfficerforinputtingintothecatalogue,whichwill inturnmakeiteasiertostructureourfinalreportsonthistopic.

Thesystemalsoallowsforashortnarrativeofeachlesson.Withintheshortnarrative,thereisaparagraphgivingcontextandanintroductiontothelesson,followedbyanelaborationon the details of that lesson, as well as the lesson’s overall importance, evidenced byreferences to findings in multiple Deliverables. It concludes with brief recommendationsderivingfromthediscussion.EachlessonalsoincludeshyperlinkstoallrelatedlessonsandrelatedDeliverables,andthecategoriesandtagsitbelongsto.



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Asnotedabove, individual lessonsmay involvemultipledimensionswithin the categories(forexample,involvingimplementation/evaluation,orrules/resources,ormultiplelevelsofactivity). Also, as our basic approach is oriented around two major geographic areas(WesternBalkansandHornofAfrica),theselessonscanbegroupedlaterintocomparativecase studies,whichwill inform one of our deliverables (DL5.1) and could be used as thebasis foranacademicpublication.Wearepresentlydesigningamethodology/concept forturning‘lessons’into‘bestpractices’.

Onefinalconsiderationregardingourresearchisthatwehavelimitedempiricalmaterialtowork with if we are planning to focus on EU CPP activity since the Lisbon Treaty wasimplemented. Therefore, our work should refer to some of the EU’s experiences andlearning fromtheveryactiveperiodprior toLisbon,wheretheEUactuallydevelopedtheidea of ‘civilian crisis management’ and created several institutions to support it, evenbefore the EEAS was established. This applies as well to the twomain geographic areasnotedabove(WesternBalkans,HornofAfrica),wheretheEUwasalreadyengagedbeforeLisbon.



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7.CONCLUSION

Thispaper is intendedonlyasa startingpoint in theworkofEU-CIVCAP,whichobviouslyinvolvesothertasksandWPswherelearningisnotapriority.However,weshouldbearinmindthatmajorinstitutionalreform(i.e.,treatyrevision)intheareaofCPPisnotverylikelyduringthecourseofthisproject,soframingourfindingsaslessons/bestpracticesisoneofthe few ways that we are likely to make a direct and lasting contribution to this topic.Havingworkedonthisapproach(experientiallearning)sincejustbeforetheLisbonTreaty,Iwould just add a few final words of caution regarding the politics of EU foreign/securitypolicy,regardingCPPandothergoals.MostEUpolicymakersandotherinformedobserversalreadyknowexactlywhatneedstobedone inthisrealminorder fortheEUtobemorecoherent andeffective, yet theEUoften fails to act inmany casesbecauseofoppositionfromoneormoreEUmemberstates.Therefore,eventhoughthisproblemisnotbuiltintoEU-CIVCAPasacentralpuzzle,allofoureffortsneedtotakeitintoconsideration.Iwould also recommend thatwe try to consider our research in the context of the EU’sbroaderambitions,especially in thecurrent financial climate.Again,mostEUofficialswillsay that they supportCPPgoalsand that theEU’s isuniquelyequipped todealwith suchproblemsasakindof‘onestopshop’(i.e.,thecomprehensiveorintegratedapproach).YettheEUdoesnothaveunlimitedresourcesanditspoliticalcapital(nottomentioneconomicresources) for CPP must be balanced against other EU priorities, which can changedramatically (e.g., euro ‘crisis’, refugee ‘crisis’, etc.). So our understanding of ‘EUcapabilities’ for CPP must consider the opportunity costs as well, which would includeperceptionsamongEUcitizensabouttheneedforsuchactivity in lightofotherproblems.Similarly, the EU has been extremely lucky in its CPP activities in that EU casualties havebeen very low in this realm (so far). Yetwemust askwhatwouldhappen to theUnion’sambitionsforCPPifitsufferedamajordisasterinvolvingEUcasualtiesand/ormanyciviliancasualties in a host country (because of EU action or inaction)? Our lessons and bestpractices should be framedwith some of these considerations inmind (alongwith thosenotedabove),sothatweavoidmakingrecommendationsthatmight leadtheEUtomakemattersworseinahostcountryby(forexample)claiminggreatereffectivenessasasecurityprovider/peacebuilder than its capabilities – including leadership/resolve – actuallymerit.Allpoliticalactorshavelimits,andourworkshouldconsiderthiselementaswell(i.e.,whatiswellbeyondthecapabilitiesoftheEU,andwhy?),eventhoughwearetryingto‘enhance’theEU’soverallperformanceinthisrealm.



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8.TIMETABLEFORMAINLEARNINGANDBESTPRACTICEACTIVITIES

Activity DL Means TargetAudience

WPLeader

Input Date(s)

Conceptualpaper

Internaldocument(Task7.1)

Sharedrepository

EU-CIVCAPresearchers

UABDN UABDNUBRISUMAASRUCIAIEPLOCEPS

Feb2016

Lessonsidentified/learnedcatalogue

DL7.1 Website/Publication

All UABDN AllConsortiumMembers

FromJan2016;MajorupdateFeb–Mar2017;OngoinguntilNov2018

InstitutionalLearningandLessonsIdentifiedinEUCivilianConflictPrevention:AFrameworkforAnalysis

DL7.4 Publication All UABDN UABDNUBRISUMAASRUCIAIEPLOCEPS

Mar–May2017;Tobecompletednolaterthan31May2017

Futureresearchprioritiesreport

DL7.3 Publication All UABDN UBRIS Nov2017

Reportonbestpractices

DL7.2 Publication All UABDN UABDNUBRISUMAASRUCIAIEPLOCEPS

Nov2018



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