The Pending EU-Myanmar Investment Protection Agreement: RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES

Photo: Mikkel Østergaard

ACT Myanmar Forum

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ThePendingEU-MyanmarInvestmentProtection

Agreement:Risks&Opportunities

StudycarriedoutforACTAlliance

January-February2017

ReportDisclaimer

This report was commissioned by DanChurchAid, ICCO Cooperation (as lead of the CivicEngagementAllianceMyanmar),ACTAllianceEU,andtheACTForuminMyanmar.ThereporthasbeenwrittenbyEmilieRöell,asanindependentassignment,andthecontentdoesnotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoropinionsofthecommissioningorganisations.April,2017.Nocopyright.Weencouragetheuseandspreadofthepaperanditscontentsandrecommendations.

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ExecutiveSummaryIn March 2014, the European Union (EU) and Myanmar began negotiating a bilateralinvestmentprotectionagreement (IPA).AnEU-Myanmar IPAwouldofferEU investorskeyguaranteesintheirrelationship,andcreatealevelplayingfieldwithinvestorsfromcountriesthatalreadyhavesuchanagreement.ForMyanmar,creatinglegalcertaintyandpredictabilityforcompaniesmayhelptoattractforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)tounderpinthecountry’sdevelopment.However,suchatreatycouldalsocomewithrisksforMyanmar.Legacyissuesrelatedto landandoverallweakhumanrightsprotectionsmeanthat it is likely thatmoreinvestmentwill negatively impact people’s livelihoods and human rights. Particularly landrightsandtherewiththerighttofoodanditsfairdistribution,therighttoadequatehousing,andtherighttoself-determinationincludingtherightsofindigenouspeople.Assuch,anIPAthatencouragesmoreinvestmentandthatprotectsinvestors’interestsmayaffectMyanmar’sobligationtoupholdhumanrights,particularlytheobligationtoprotectpeople’srightsfromviolationsbyotherpeople.Theobligationtopasslawsandactionsthatensurethatpeopleareabletoenjoytheirhumanrightsmayalsobeviolated.ThisisbecausetheIPAmaydeprivetheGovernmentofMyanmarofthepolicyspacenecessarytoharnessinvestmenttoservethecountry’sgoalsofdemocraticdevelopmentandsustainablepeace.In the draft agreement1, there are a number of provisions that could have these effects,particularly the following.NationalTreatmentprovisions limit theuseofpreferential lawsandpoliciestofavournationallyownedinvestments.TheseareallpoliciesthatadevelopingcountrylikeMyanmarmaywellwishtoimplement(temporarily).AMostFavouredNationclauselimitsahoststate’sabilitytoimplementlawsandpoliciesthattreatforeigninvestorsfromonecountrylessfavourablythanforeigninvestorsfromanothercountry.Italsoallowsforeign investors coveredbyone investment treaty to rely onmore favourableprovisionscontainedinthehoststate’sotherinvestmenttreaties.InMyanmarthereare12intotal,allwithlesshumanrightsprotection.2FairandEquitableTreatmentseekstoprotecttherighttoa“stableandpredictable”businessandregulatoryenvironment,allowinginvestorstoseekcompensation for “unexpected” changes in tax and regulatory standards. Particularly thementioningof “legitimateexpectations” in theMyanmardraft agreement isopen towideinterpretation. Globally, claims under Fair and Equitable Treatment are the most ofteninvoked provision in investor-state arbitrationwith which investors have the best rate ofsuccess. Provisions forExpropriation are also difficult for a country likeMyanmar. This isbecausetheremightbedirectexpropriationsinthefuturewhereMyanmarlawhasearlierfailedtoadequatelyprotectcitizens,andmaybecompelledtoallowlandredistributioninthefuture.ProvisionsstatingthatCompensationmustbeatmarketvalue,mayexacerbatecosts.GiventheverylowratesatwhichtheGovernmentofMyanmarhandsoutlandconcessions,itislikelytherewillbeasubstantialgapbetweenthecircumstancesinwhichaconcessionisacquired,andinwhichitwouldlaterhavetobecompensated.One of the, if not the most, controversial provision in the draft EU-Myanmar IPA is theprovision for Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) as an alternative toMyanmar’snationaljudicialsystem.SuchanISDSclause,whichformsastandardpartofmanyinvestmentagreements,enablesforeigninvestorstobypassnationalcourtsandtakeacomplainttoaninternational tribunal consisting of three commercial investment lawyers. If the investor’sclaimissuccessful,thetribunalwillmakeabindingmonetaryawardagainstthestate.ISDShasbeencriticised forwhatare seenas inconsistenciesandunintended interpretationsof1Theleakeddrafttextfrom29May2015followingthesecondroundofnegotiations.2Israel,Korea,USA,Indonesia,Japan,India,Thailand,Kuwait,Laos,China,Vietnam,andPhilippines(12total)

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clauses by investors. They include challenges against policymeasures taken in the publicinterest,andcostlyandlengthyprocedureswithlimitedornotransparency.Moreover,thesecourts are only accessible to investors, while communities often have to rely onunderdeveloped national legal systems that do not provide adequate access to justice.Evidenceshowsthatmanyofthe608arbitrationawardsthathavebecomeknownglobally,haveoverriddennationallawandhinderedcountriesinthesovereigndeterminationoffiscaland budgetary policy, labour, health and environmental regulations. They also have hadadversehumanrightsimpacts,alsoonthirdparties,includinga“chillingeffect”withregardtotheexerciseofdemocraticgovernance.3WhiletheEUhasreplacedISDSbyan‘investmentcourt’andhas limitedclaimsrelatedto investmentprotectionandnon-discrimination, thecritique of introducing a separate dispute settlement with lack of rights for redress foraffectedcommunities,remainsvalid.Withregardstoland,atpresenttherearealmostnoconcessionsinMyanmarthatarenotinsome way contested. Even today, amongst others under the Land Acquisition Act, theFarmlandLaw,andtheVacant,Fallow&VirginLaw,thegovernmentisabletore-possessandre-dedicate landon thebasis of unclear criteria and for ambiguously defined reasons (forexample“useful to thepublic”).More investment in thecontextofweak land tenurealsoleadstorisksforland-relatedhumanrights.Lossofland,aswellasaninvestment’snegativeimpact on the environment, threatens people’s right to food. At the same time, moreprotectionforinternationalinvestmentsinagriculturefavourscommercialseedsatthelossoflocalseedvarieties,threatingpeople’sfoodsovereignty.Landgrabbingandenvironmentalimpactalsoleadtoevictionandlackofadequatehousingforpeople.Overall,themostseriousconcernsaroundtheIPArelatetotherightsofindigenousorethnicpeoples,andfutureplansfortheirgovernance.WhileMyanmarhasadoptedanewNationalLandUsePolicyspellingoutmore recognitionofcustomary land tenure,overall such recognition is still veryweak.Moreover,inthecontextofthepeaceprocess,itisunclearwhointhefuturewillgovernanddecideoninvestmentsinMyanmar’sethnicstates,andwhatrevenue-sharingmodelsmaybeimplementedthere.Atpresent,Myanmarlacksanoverarchingpieceoflegislationgoverningland ownership and land use. Since last year,Myanmar is at the beginning ofwhat couldpotentiallybealargeoverhaulofitslandgovernancesystem.Ifthiswillhappenindeed,thegovernmentwillneedalotofpolicyspace.ItappearsthatwiththenewMyanmarInvestmentLaw and the forthcoming Investment Rules, Myanmar is making steps towards betterregulationofresponsiblebusinessconductinitsnationallaws4.Thisiswhileseveralconcernsalsoremain,particularlyinrelationtolandrightsandenvironmentalconcerns.Thesearealsonot being solved with the EU-Myanmar IPA. However, no further large legal reforms areexpectedafterthepassingoftheInvestmentRulesaswellasthenewCompaniesAct.ThereisnoevidencethatanIPAwillhavedirectpositiveconsequences.Theassumptionthatinvestmentswill lead tomore investments is globally contested. Especially in the case ofMyanmar,prospectinginvestorscitemultiplemoreurgentbarrierstoinvestment,includingcorruption, the lackof infrastructureandunavailabilityofskilled local labour.Moreover, itcannot be assumed that an agreement will lead to better investments, from the EU orelsewhere.Noneoftheprovisionsinthechapteronsustainabilityactuallybindcompaniestogoodbehavior.Whileanumberofinternationalstandardsarename-checked,theyonlystateacommitment.Overall,forlocalcivilsocietyitisdifficulttoacceptthepromisethattheEUwillindeedfollowbettersocialandenvironmentalstandards,whilebeingunwillingtoinclude

3StatementofMr.Alfred-MauricedeZayas,IndependentExpertonthepromotionofademocraticandequitableinternationalorderattheHumanRightsCouncil30thSession,Geneva,16September20154Duringinterviews,aCSOrepresentativenotedthatthenewMILaffordsenoughprotectiontoforeigninvestors,includingtheEU.

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bindingstandardsandcompliancemechanismsintheagreement.AnIPAisnotlikelytoleadtobetterdomesticregulatoryframeworks,asittakesawayincentivestoimprovedomesticregulatoryframeworkssuchasreformofthejudicialsystem.Inadditiontotheneedforprotectionofland-relatedhumanrights,andtheneedforpolicyspace,Myanmarhaslimitedinstitutionalcapacitytoimplementstringentcommitments,duetowhich itmayfail toeffectivelyenforce IPAmeasures.There is limited intra-governmentinformation sharing and coordination, which could unintentionally expose the country toexpensivelitigationrisks.Combinedwiththe‘umbrellaclause’includedintheagreement,thismayincreasethevulnerabilityofhoststatestolitigationunderinvestmenttreaties.GiventheNLD’sEconomicPolicyvisionofthegovernmentissupposedly“people-centred,andaimstoachieve inclusive and continuous development, and that it aims to establish an economicframeworkthatsupportsnationalreconciliation,basedonthejustbalancingofsustainablenatural resourcemobilizationandallocationacross theStatesandRegions”, theremaybeissueswithspecific IPAprovisions in the future, forwhich intensified lobbyat this stage iswarranted.

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Chapter1:Introduction................................................................................................................61.1.Background..................................................................................................................................................61.2.Objectivesofthisstudy............................................................................................................................71.3.Methodology................................................................................................................................................71.4.Thisreport....................................................................................................................................................8

Chapter2:KeyProvisionsoftheDraftEU-MyanmarIPA.................................................9Chapter3:ImplicationsforHumanRights,specificallyLandRights..........................183.1.HumanrightscommitmentsinMyanmar....................................................................................183.2.Actualhumanrightssituation..........................................................................................................233.3.TheIPA’spotentialimpactonlandrights,particularlytherighttofoodanditsfair

distribution,therighttoadequatehousingandtherighttoself-determinationincluding

rightsofindigenouspeople.........................................................................................................................263.4.ExpecteddirectionsofEUinvestmentandrelatedimpacts.................................................30

Chapter4:ImplicationsforFutureLegalReform..............................................................324.1.Landgovernancereform.....................................................................................................................334.2.Investmentlawreform.........................................................................................................................364.3.Otherreformprocesses........................................................................................................................384.4.Therighttoregulate.............................................................................................................................39

Chapter5:PotentialPositiveImplications..........................................................................405.1.WillanIPAleadtomoreinvestment?............................................................................................405.2.WillanIPAleadtobetterinvestment?..........................................................................................415.3.WillanEU-MyanmarIPAleadtobetterregulatoryframeworks?...................................42

Chapter6:ConclusionsandRecommendationsforLobbyandAdvocacy.................446.1.Conclusions................................................................................................................................................446.2.Recommendations..................................................................................................................................446.2.1.Lobby&advocacytowardsnationallevel......................................................................456.2.2.LobbyandadvocacytowardstheEU...............................................................................466.2.3.Otherpossibleactions............................................................................................................47

Annex1:ListofRespondents...................................................................................................48

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Chapter1:Introduction1.1.BackgroundTheEuropeanUnion(EU)andMyanmarbegannegotiatingabilateralinvestmentprotectionagreement(IPA)inMarch2014.TheproposedEU-MyanmarIPArepresentsanambitiousstepforbothparties,astherearecurrentlynobilateralinvestmenttreaties(BIT)betweenanyEUmemberstateandMyanmar,norbetweentheEUandanyleastdevelopedcountry(LDC).An EU-Myanmar IPA would offer EU investors key guarantees in their relationship withMyanmarsuchas:• Protectionagainstdiscrimination;• Protectionagainstexpropriationwithoutcompensation;• Protectionagainstunfairandinequitabletreatment;• Protectionforthepossibilitytotransfercapital.

These provisions are intended to provide guarantees to European companies that theirinvestmentswillbetreatedfairlyandonanequalfootingtootherinvestors.ForMyanmar,creating legalcertaintyandpredictability forcompaniesmayhelptoattractandmaintainforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)tounderpinMyanmar’sdevelopmentandhelpittoachievetherealisationoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoals/GlobalGoals.However,suchatreatycouldalsocomewithrisksforMyanmar.MyanmarhasbecomeoneofAsia’slastfrontiersforplantationagricultureandnaturalresourceextraction.Itsstrategiclocationmakesforevenmoreinvestmentinterestsatatimewhentherightsofcommunitiesarenotyetwellprotected.PoorandmarginalizedpeopleandcommunitiesinMyanmararealreadyexperiencinglandgrabbingrelatedtoforeigninvestments.5Sincethefirstsetofmajorforeigninvestorsenteredthecountryunderthenewlegalregime,demandforlandhasinfactbecomeamajor factor in conflict. There is a fear that an investmentagreementbetweenMyanmarandEUwillescalatetheseproblems.Inaddition,theagreementmayalsodeprivetheGovernmentofMyanmarofthepolicyspacenecessarytoharnessinvestmenttoservethecountry’sgoalsofdemocraticdevelopmentandsustainablepeace.6EarlyDecember2016,thefourthandlatestroundofnegotiationswereheldbetweentheEUandMyanmar.Afterwards,on14December2016aconsultationmeetingwasalsoorganisedfor local civil society organisations (CSOs) and Myanmar staff of international non-governmentalorganisations(INGOs),whichabout8representativesattended.Atpresent,thestatusofthenegotiationsisunclear,althoughitisgenerallyexpectedthatthenegotiationswill takeat leastanother6months tobe concluded.7Sincea leakedversion following thesecondroundofnegotiationsinMay2015,therehasbeennoaccesstomorerecentdrafts.Overall,INGOsandlocalCSOslamentthelackoftransparencyaroundtheprocess.Anumber

5Forexample,landissuesaroundthecountry’snewlySpecialEconomicZonesatThilawa,DaweiandKyaukPhyuhavebeenwelldocumented.6SeetheNLD’s12-pointeconomicpolicyfrom2016,http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/21664-nld-12-point-economic-policy-announcement.html7ItisgenerallyexpectedthatthenewMyanmarInvestmentRuleswillbecompletedfirst(April2017)

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ofINGOsandasignificantnumberoflocalCSOsareactivelyadvocatingagainstthesigningofanEU-MyanmarIPA.8

1.2.ObjectivesofthisstudyThisstudywascommissionedtoexploreinmoredetailtherisksthatanEU-MyanmarIPAmaypose to local communities, particularly in relation to land. The study takes a rights basedapproachand focuses firstofallon implicationsof theagreement for land relatedhumanrights,particularlytherighttofoodanditsfairdistribution,therighttoadequatehousing,andtherighttoself-determinationincludingtherightsofindigenouspeople.Secondly, the reportseeks toanswerwhether thereareanyelements in thecurrentdraftagreementthatcould limit thepossibilities forreformofnational lawsrelatedto landandinvestmentinMyanmar.Thirdly,thereportlooksintopossiblepositiveoutcomesofanIPA.Fourthand last, thereportreflectson investmentprotectiononamoreabstract levelandoffersrecommendationsonstrategicentrypointsfordoinglobbyandadvocacy-bothatthenationalandEUlevel-toinfluencetheprocess.WhiletheprocessofCSOconsultationanddraftingoftheSustainabilityImpactAssessmentitselfhavealsoledtoextensivecriticism,thisreportprimarilyfocusesonthecontentofthedraftagreementanditsimplications.Intheconclusionsandrecommendationschaptersomeproceduralcommentswillalsobeshared.1.3.MethodologyTheinformationandanalysesinthisreportarebasedonthefollowing:

• Desk-analysisofthedraftagreementaspertheleakedversionfromMay2015;• Analysisofthepossibleeffectsofanagreement,onMyanmar,withspecialfocuson

localcommunitieshostingforeigninvestments;• Reviewofexistingrelevantevidence-based,peer-reviewed,researchandanalysison

investmentprotectiongloballyandinMyanmar;• Consultations and interviews with a number of CSOs, INGOs and private sector

representativesfromMyanmar(seeAnnex1).

Theanalysisandidentificationofrisksisbasedonprinciplesforbusinessandhumanrightsasoutlined in theUnitedNationsGlobalCompact9, theUnitedNationsGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights10, theVoluntaryGuidelineson theResponsibleGovernanceofTenureofLand,FisheriesandForests11,FreePriorandInformedConsent12,aswellasmore

8See,https://www.tni.org/en/article/more-than-500-civil-society-organisations-from-myanmar-express-their-concerns-about-the(14January2016),andhttps://www.tni.org/en/article/suspend-negotiations-for-an-investment-protection-agreement-between-the-eu-and-myanmar(16November2016)9Seehttps://www.unglobalcompact.org10http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf11Seehttp://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf12Seehttp://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/FreePriorandInformedConsent.pdf

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practical guidance tools like Investing theRightWay13and InterlakenGuideonRespectingLandandForestRights14.1.4.ThisreportInthenextchapter,Chapter2,firstofallanoverviewwillbeprovidedoftheprovisionsintheagreementwiththemostsignificantimplicationsforhumanrightsand/orpolicyspace.Thetablefollowstheorderofthedraftagreement,andliststheprovisionsofmostrelevancetolandissuesandpolicyreformwhilealsoindicatingwhethertheypresentahigh,mediumorlowrisk.Inthethirdchapter,specificrisksparticularlyforlandrightsinMyanmarwillthenbeelaborated and motivated. Chapter 4 looks at whether the IPA may influence regulatoryreformintheareasoflandgovernanceandinvestment.Chapter5goesintopossiblepositiveeffects, and Chapter 6 offers a few more general reflections as well as a set ofrecommendationson strategicentrypoints fordoing lobbyandadvocacyaswell asotherpossibleinterventions.

13Seehttps://www.ihrb.org/pdf/Investing-the-Rights-Way/Investing-the-Rights-Way.pdf14Seehttps://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/31bcdf8049facb229159b3e54d141794/InterlakenGroupGuide_web_final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES

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Chapter2:KeyProvisionsoftheDraftEU-MyanmarIPATable1:KeyProvisionsoftheDraftEU-MyanmarIPA15

Clause Passage Meaning Generalimplicationsforhumanrightsand/orpolicyspace

NationalTreatment(ChapterI,Article2)MediumRisk

“EachPartyshallaccordtoinvestorsoftheotherPartyandtotheircoveredinvestments,asregardstheiroperationinitsterritory,treatmentnolessfavourablethanthetreatmentitaccords,inlikesituations,toitsowninvestorsandtheirinvestments”16

ThisprovisionrequirestheGovernmentofMyanmar to treat foreign investors andinvestmentsat leastaswellastheytreattheir own investors. Assessments of theprovisioncontaintwomajorcomponents:first, it has to be decided whether theforeigninvestorandthedomesticinvestorare placed in a comparable setting.Secondly,ithastobedeterminedwhetherthe treatment accorded to the foreigninvestor is at least as favourable as thetreatment accorded to domesticinvestors.

Behind this seemingly simple clause lie complexissues,suchas:Whichpoliciesofthehostcountrymayjustifydifferentialtreatmentbetweenaforeignerandthenational?Orwhatrole,ifany,willbeattributedtotheintentionswhichagovernmentpursueswiththeact that allegedly discriminates? What evidence isrequired to demonstrate “intention”? Or when theforeign investor is compared with the domesticinvestor,isitnecessarytoidentifyadomesticinvestorwhoisinexactlythesamebusiness,orisitsufficienttopointtoaninvestorwhoisnotinthesamelineofbusinessbut in the sameeconomic sector?Howdowedefine“business”and“sector”inthiscontext?17Overall,nationaltreatmentprovisionslimittheuseofpreferential laws and policies to favour nationallyowned investments, as well as laws and policiesaffirmingethnicityorgender.

15Aspertheleakeddrafttextfrom29May2015followingthesecondroundofnegotiations16EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.1617ProfessorRudolfDolzer,2005,“Makingthemostofinternationalinvestmentagreements:aCommonAgenda.NationalTreatment:ANewAgenda”,asymposiumorganisedbyICSID,OECDANDUNCTAD,p.2.Seehttps://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/36055356.pdf

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IntellectualProperty(Chapter1,Article2(iv)MediumRisk

“Investmentmeanseverykindofassetwhich has the characteristics of aninvestment…Formsthataninvestmentmay take include: … (vii) intellectualproperty rights, as defined in thisarticle, 18 technical processes, know-howandgoodwill.”19

This means that intellectual propertyrights are qualified as coveredinvestments.However,giventheproposalbyMMtodeleteanumberof items, it isunclearwhether the latestdraft includesplantvarietiesunderIPR.

In relation to agriculture, this provisionmeans thatinternationalbreedersareprovidedwitheffectiveIPprotection for new plant varieties. Such provisionscreate more favourable condition for internationalbreeders, at the expense of smallholder farmerswhose farm-saved seed systemshave fedMyanmarforcenturies,andwhichmaybemoreresilientincaseof natural disasters. Many farmers and farmerorganisationsareopposedtosuchpolicyframeworks.

MostFavouredNation (MFN)(Chapter II,Article3)HighRisk

“EachPartyshallaccordtoinvestorsofthe other Party and to their coveredinvestmentsasregardstheiroperationin its territory, treatment no lessfavourable than the treatment itaccords,inlikesituations,toinvestorsandinvestmentsofanynon-Party.”20

The effect of this provisions is that anybenefitextendedtoforeigninvestorsfromonecountryunderoneinvestmenttreatymay need to be extended to foreigninvestors covered by Myanmar’s otherinvestmenttreaties.

Thisprovisionlimitsahoststate’sabilitytoimplementlawsandpoliciesthattreatforeigninvestorsfromonecountry less favourably than foreign investors fromanother country. It also allows foreign investorscovered by one investment treaty to rely on morefavourable provisions contained in the host state’sother investment treaties. 21 As such, this provisionlinksMyanmar’sBITstoeachother.22Forexample,aninvestorprotectedbyatreatywithoutaprohibitionofperformancerequirementsmayusetheMFNclauseto import a prohibition of PRs from another of thehost country’s treaties and benefit from it asmorefavourabletreatment.

Fair andequitabletreatment

“EachPartyshallaccordinitsterritoryto covered investments of the otherParty and investors with respect to

Thisprovisionseekstoprotecttherighttoa “stable and predictable” business andregulatory environment, allowing

The fair and equitable treatment (FET) provision ofinvestment treaties is the provision most ofteninvoked by foreign investors in investor–state

18“meansatleastcopyrightandrelatedrights,trademarkrights,rightsingeographicalindications,rightsinindustrialdesigns,patentrights,”EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.1319EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.13-1420EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.1621Bonnitcha,J./InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment,2014,“Myanmar’sInvestmentTreaties:AReviewofLegalIssuesinLightofRecentTrends”,p.1622MyanmarcurrentlyhasBITswithIsrael,Korea,USA,Indonesia,Japan,India,Thailand,Kuwait,Laos,China,Vietnam,andPhilippines.Seehttp://www.dica.gov.mm/en/printpdf/165

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(FET) (ChapterII,Article5)HighRisk

their covered investments fair andequitabletreatmentandfullprotectionand security in accordance withparagraphs2to5.”(Breaches include amongst others:fundamental breach of due process,including a fundamental breach oftransparency and in judicial andadministrative proceedings;harrassment, coercion, abuse ofpower, corruptive practices or badfaithconduct;orabreachoflegitimateexpectationsofinvestorsarisingfromaParty’s specific representations to aninvestor to induce a coveredinvestment, and upon which theinvestor relied indeciding tomakeormaintain thecovered investment,butthat the Party subsequentlyfrustrated)23

investors to seek compensation forchangesintaxandregulatorystandards.Itisunclearwhetherthelatestversionofthe text adequately protects the state’sright to regulate for legitimate policyobjectives(suchasCETA,Article8.9)andincludes an exhaustive list of elementsthat constitute a breach of FET (such asCETA,Article8.10).

arbitration,andtheclaimwithwhich investorshavethebestrateofsuccess.24Tribunalshavedisagreedaboutthenatureandextentoftheobligationtotreatforeigninvestmentfairlyandequitably, and theOECD recommends governmentswishingtoincludeareferencetothisprincipleintheirinvestmentlegislationto“defineclearlyitsscopeandcontent so as to avoid giving excessive leeway toarbitral interpretationsof its legal provisions and toprotect against potentially costly arbitral awards.”25TheEU-MyanmarIPAcontainsaclosedlist.However,inthislistthedraftprovisionthattheFETstandardisbreached if the government does not respect aninvestor’s “legitimate expectations” is open tointerpretationgivingmuchspacetoinvestorclaims.

Expropriation(Chapter 2,Article 7 and

“Neither Party shall nationalise orexpropriate a covered investmenteither directly or indirectly through

These provisions allow the host state toexpropriate foreign investments ownedby investors of the home state only if

Thequestionofwhethergovernmentmeasuresthatprevent a foreign investment from continuing tooperateprofitablyamountto“indirectexpropriation”

23EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.17-1824SeeUNCTAD,2012,“FairandEquitableTreatment.UNCTADseriesonissuesininternationalinvestmentagreementsII”,p.xiii.Seehttp://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf25OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment,2014,“InvestmentPolicyReviews:Myanmar2014.”Seehttp://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Myanmar-IPR-2014.pdf

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8)HighRisk

measures having an effect equivalentto nationalization or expropriation(hereinafter referred to as‘expropriation’)except:a) forapublicpurpose;b) underdueprocessoflaw;c) in a non-discriminatory manner;

andd) against payment of prompt,

adequate and effectivecompensation.”26

compensationispaidtotheinvestor.Thisprovision deals with two distinctsituations. The first is “directexpropriation,” which occurs when agovernment nationalizes or permanentlytakes over possession of an investment.The second is “measures equivalent toexpropriation,”more commonly referredto as “indirect expropriation.” Indirectexpropriationoccurswhenagovernmenttakesameasureakintoexpropriationthatdoes not involve nationalization or theoustingoftheinvestorfrompossessionoftheinvestment.

for which compensation is required has provencontroversialinpractice.27Also regarding direct expropriation: as the EU’sSustainabilityImpactAssessmentalsonotes,thelawon expropriation poses significant risk especially forpublic initiatives that require the acquisition orredistribution of property potentially owned by EUinvestors.Given theearly stagesofdemocratizationand nation-building inMyanmar, conflictsmay wellarise (as so far Myanmar law has not effectivelyprotected people against expropriation due tooverlap,contradictionandconfusion).28

Compensationat fair marketvalue(Chapter2,Article7)HighRisk

“Such compensation shall amount tothefairmarketvalueoftheinvestmentat the time immediately before theexpropriation or the impendingexpropriation became known,whichever isearlier.Valuationcriteriashallincludegoingconcernvalue,assetvalue includingthedeclaredtaxvalueoftangibleproperty,andothercriteria,as appropriate, to determine fairmarketvalue.”29

Compensationshouldbeequivalenttothefairmarketvalueoftheinvestmentatthetime when the expropriation wasannounced.

As Jonathan Bonnitcha points out in an analysis ofexisting Myanmar BITs: “While this standard ofcompensation iscommonto investment treaties, itsapplicationcanleadtoirregularresultsinpractice.Forexample, if an investor acquires an investment forsignificantly less than its fairmarketvalue—perhapsbecause a competitive tender was not originallyconducted—it would still be entitled to fullcompensationiftheinvestmentwasrenationalized,asituationthatwouldgrantthe investorasubstantialwindfall.”30In the case ofMyanmar, given the very

26EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.18-1927JonathanBonnitcha/InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment,2014,“Myanmar’sInvestmentTreaties:AReviewofLegalIssuesinLightofRecentTrends”,p.1328DevelopmentSolutions,2016,SustainabilityImpactAssessmentinsupportofaninvestmentprotectionagreementbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheRepublicoftheUnionofMyanmar,p.15629EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.1930JonathanBonnitcha/InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment,2014,“Myanmar’sInvestmentTreaties:AReviewofLegalIssuesinLightofRecentTrends”,p.14

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low rates at which the government is currentlyhandingoutlandconcessions,itislikelytherewillbeasubstantialgapbetweenthecircumstancesinwhichaconcessionisacquiredandinwhichitcouldlaterbecompensated.

Transfers(Article9)Lowrisk

“Each Party shall permit all transfersrelatingtoacoveredinvestmenttobemadeinafreelyconvertiblecurrency…“(seeparagraphs1-6)31

ThisprovisionrequiresMyanmartoallowfree inward and outward movement ofcapital atmarket exchange rates, exceptwhen “in circumstances of seriousdifficultiesfortheoperationofmonetaryand exchange rate policy, in the case ofMyanmar, or for the operation of theeconomicandmonetaryunion,inthecaseoftheEuropeanUnion,orthreatthereof,safeguard measures that are strictlynecessarymaybetakenbytheconcernedPartywithregardstotransfersforaperiodnotexceedingsixmonths”

WithArticle4mostriskismitigated,asthisprovisionwill allow Myanmar to restrict cross-border capitalmovementsintimesofeconomiccrisis,actingswiftlyanddecisivelytomaintainitsfinancialreserves.

Observanceofwrittencommitments(“UmbrellaClause”)(Chapter 2,Article10)HighRisk

“WhereaParty,eitheritselforthroughany entity mentioned in Article 2[Definitionof‘measuresbyaParty’or‘treatment by a Party’] of Chapter I[Objectives and definitions]hasenteredintoanywrittencommitmentwith investors of the other Party orwith their covered investments, thatPartyshallnot,eitheritselforthroughthat entity breachthe said

“Umbrellaclauses”elevateanybreachofanobligationtothelevelofabreachofthetreaty.Accordingtothisview,anybreachof a contract with an investor wouldamount to a breach of the investmenttreaty.

Umbrella clauses can radically expand the scope ofhost states’ liability under investment treaties byallowingclaimsforbreachofinvestor–statecontractto be pursued on the level of a breach of a treatythrough investor–state arbitration. This ‘umbrellaclause’wouldallowacompanytosuetheMyanmargovernment if any government authority (e.g.Ministry,sub-nationalgovernmentetc.)hasbreachedanywrittencommitment,regardlessofthereasons.33�

31EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.20-2133MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,December2015,ChallengesoftheproposedEU-MyanmarInvestmentProtectionAgreement

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commitment through the exercise ofgovernmentalauthority.”32

Performancerequirements(Chapter 2,Article12)MediumRisk

“NeitherPartymayimpose,orenforceanyof the following requirements, orenforce any commitment orundertaking, in connection with theoperation of all investments in itsterritoryto:(amongstothers,tohireagiven number or percentage of itsnationals,ortoachieveagivenlevelorvalueofresearchanddevelopment initsterritory).”34

Performance requirements arerequirements concerning the location orthe origin of the inputs, outputs oractivities associated with an investment.Examples of performance requirementsinclude requirements that a foreigninvestor use a certain percentage ofMyanmar-producedinputs,requirementsthat investors export a minimumpercentage of their output andrequirements that investors employ acertainpercentageofMyanmarstaff.

Developing countries often use local content oremploymentrequirementstoencourageFDItobuildskillsandcapacityinthelocaleconomy(e.g.the2012Myanmar Foreign Investment Law required 100%non-skilledemployeestobeMyanmar,25%ofskilledworkerstobeMyanmarwithin2years,30%within4years,and75%withinsixyears).ThisprovisionwoulddisableMyanmarfrommakingsuchrequirements.35ThereisadirectriskhereforinconsistenciesherewithMyanmar domestic law, as currently performancerequirementsmaybeimposedbylineministriesandstate/regionsubnationalgovernmentsasaconditionforapprovalofinvestments.36

Transparency(Chapter 3,Articles1-9)LowRisk

Recognising the impact which theirrespective regulatory environmentmay have on investment betweenthem, the Parties shall pursue anefficient, transparent and predictableregulatory environmentfor economicoperators, including small andmedium-sized enterprises, doingbusinessintheirterritories.”Forother

Theseprovisionsontransparencyrefertolaws applying to investment, and areintendedtoencourageamorepredictableinvestmentclimate

Such a provision could support more transparentbusiness conduct in Myanmar. �However, they arequiteweaklyformulated,andsimilarrequirementsinthe Myanmar/Japan Investment Agreement (Article8) have not resulted in more transparency inMyanmarlaw-making.�

32EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.18-19.DuringthesecondroundofnegotiationsthegovernmentofMyanmarsuggestedtodeletethisprovision34EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.22-2335MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,December2015,ChallengesoftheproposedEU-MyanmarInvestmentProtectionAgreement36SeeJonathanBonnitcha,2016,Trendsininvestmenttreatiesandtheirinteractionwithotherlegalinstruments:ADiscussionPaper,p.9.

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elementsseeChapter337Sustainabledevelopment(Chapter 4,Article1-9)LowRisk

“ThePartiesarecommittedtopursuesustainable development, whosepillars–economicdevelopment,socialdevelopment and environmentalprotection – are inter-dependent andmutually reinforcing. They underlinethebenefitofconsideringinvestment-related labour and environmentalissuesaspartofaglobalapproach tosustainable development.” For otherelementsseeChapter438

The key purpose of this chapter is toensurethathighstandardsforlabourandenvironmentareupheld.Specifically, theproposalreferstocommitmentsmadeaspart of the International LabourOrganisation (ILO) and MultilateralEnvironmental Agreements, to ensurethatbothsides respectacommonsetoffundamental labour standards andenvironmentalrules.Inaddition,thetextincludes an obligation not to relaxdomestic labour or environmentalprotection laws as a means to attracttradeorinvestment.

Theseprovisionsarenotlegallybindingandthereforemerelygoodintentions.39

Right toRegulate(PlaceholderChapter2andArticle 2 inChapter4)HighRisk

“ThePartiesrecognisetherightofeachParty to determine its sustainabledevelopmentpoliciesandpriorities,toestablish its own levels of domesticenvironmental and labour protection,and to adopt or modify its relevantlaws and policies accordingly,consistently with the internationallyrecognisedstandardsandagreementsreferredtoinArticle3and4.”40

This provision is intended to safeguardMyanmar’s regulatory power and guideandlimittheinterpretivepowerofarbitraltribunalsbyreservingMyanmar’srighttopursuespecificpublicpolicyobjectives.

SeveralfacetsofMyanmar’spublicpolicyframeworkare still in the nascent stages of development.Provisions on the right to regulate are thereforeparticularly important. Given the final text is notknown it is unclearwhether the right to regulate issufficientlyprotected.41

37EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.24-2738EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.29-3439Harrison,J.etal(2017)GoverningLabourStandardsthroughFreeTradeAgreements:LimitsoftheEuropeanUnion’sTradeandSustainableDevelopmentChapters.UniversityofWarwick;Draftpaper(forthcomingpublication).40EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.2941MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,December2015,ChallengesoftheproposedEU-MyanmarInvestmentProtectionAgreement

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Investor toState DisputeSettlement(Section2)HighRisk

SeeSection2oftheagreement42 Thisprovisionallows foreign investors tobring claims under the treaty directly toinvestor–state arbitration. In suchdisputes,anarbitraltribunalwilldecideifthe state in which the investment islocated has breached the treaty. If theinvestor’sclaimissuccessful,thetribunalwill make a binding, monetary awardagainstthestate.�

The vast majority of investor–state disputes underinvestmenttreatiesconcernallegationsthatthehoststate has failed to comply with the investmentprotection provisions of the relevant treaty. Smalldifferences in the drafting of investment protectionprovisions can be decisive when a tribunal isdetermining whether particular actions taken by agovernmentbreachthetreaty.

GeneralExceptions(Chapter VII,Article2)MediumRisk

“ThePartiesunderstandthatmeasuresreferredtoinGATT1994ArticleXX(b)also include environmental measuresnecessarytoprotecthuman,animalorplantlifeorhealth.ThePartiesfurtherunderstandthatGATT1994ArticleXX(g) applies to measures for theconservation of living and non-livingexhaustiblenaturalresources.”43

The purpose of such exceptions is toensure that the implementation ofmeasures pursuing specified public-interest objectives do not trigger a hoststate’s liability under an investmenttreaty.

Ifdraftedcarefully,theseprovisionscanaddresssomeoftheconcernsaboutinvestmenttreaties’impactonlegitimate lawsandpoliciesdesigned toprotect thepublic interest. In the EU-Myanmar draft IPA, fewexceptions have been included. In addition theexistenceofexceptionsclausesdoesnot reducetheneed todraft theotherprovisionsofan investmenttreaty carefully, as no exceptions clause can everaddressthefullvarietyofsituationsthatmightresultin investment treaty disputes and because theexceptions clauses themselves may be subject tounexpectedinterpretationsbyarbitraltribunals.

Sunset clause(Chapter VII,Article 13 andArticle14)MediumRisk

“This Agreement shall be validindefinitely”“In the event that the presentAgreement is terminated pursuant toArticle12ofthisChapter[Generalandfinalprovisions], theprovisionsof the

This clause protects authorisedinvestments for a specified period aftertermination.

TheEU-MyanmarIPAlacksanenddate.IfMyanmarwishes to terminate the agreement, Europeaninvestmentswillstillenjoyprotectionforanother10or20years(dependingonthefinaltext).

42EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.43-5643EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.77

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ChapterII[Investmentprotection]andthose of Section 2 of Chapter V[Investor-to-State dispute settlement]shall continue to be effective for afurther period of [EU proposal: 20][MMproposal:10]yearsfromthedateof termination, with respect toinvestmentsmadebefore the date oftermination of the presentAgreement.”44

44EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.80-81

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Chapter3:ImplicationsforHumanRights,specificallyLandRights3.1.HumanrightscommitmentsinMyanmarMyanmar’s current legal framework is theproductof its colonial past, post-independencemilitaryrule,andreformsundertakensince2011.Theframeworkisapatch-workcombinationofcustomaryfamily law,codifiedBritishcommonlaw,andnewlaws.Manykey lawswereenactedandimplementedbytheBritishincolonialIndiabetween1885and1948.45Duringthemilitaryrulethatfollowedindependencein1948,otherlawswereenacted,butmostlyinthe form of martial decrees without public consultation and in breach of internationalstandards.Themainbodyoflawisthe“BurmaCode”,whosegeneralprovisionsapplywhenthereisnolawregulatingaparticularmatter,andwhichhasnotbeenupdatedsince1954.46WhenMyanmarbecameaUnitedNationsmemberstate,itsignedtheCharteroftheUnitedNations,bindingittotheUnitedNationsUniversalDeclarationforHumanRights.Inthelasttwodecades,MyanmarhasalsosignedtheConventionontheEliminationofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW),theConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities(CRPD)andtheConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC).47MyanmarhasalsoagreedtoprotectandpromotehumanrightsundertheASEANCharter.However,Myanmarhasyettobecomea party tomost other international human rights instruments, including the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCCP), the Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(OPCCP),theConventionAgainstTorture(CAT)andfiveoftheeightfundamentalILOConventions(afulloverviewisprovidedinTable2).In2015thegovernment signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESCR)aswellastheOptionalProtocoltotheConventionontheRightsoftheChildontheinvolvementof�childreninarmedconflictbuthasnotyetratifiedthese.48Table2:KeyHumanRightsTreatiesSigned/notSignedbyMyanmar49

Signed NotSigned• UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights• Convention on the Rights of the Child

(CRC)on15July1991• OptionalProtocoltotheConventionon

the Rights of the Child on the sale ofchildren, child prostitution and childpornography(CRC-OP-SC)on16January2012

• Convention for the Elimination of AllFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomen(CEDAW)on22July1997

• Convention on the Rights of Persons

• Convention against Torture and OtherCruelInhumanorDegradingTreatmentorPunishment(CAT)�

• Optional Protocol of the ConventionagainstTorture(CAT-OP)�

• International Covenant on Civil andPoliticalRights(ICCPR)�

• Second Optional Protocol to theInternational Covenant on Civil andPoliticalRightsaimingtothe�abolitionofthedeathpenalty(ICCPR-OP2-DP)�

• International Convention on the45Overall,abouthalfofthe800lawsinMyanmar,includingtheexistingPenalCode,whereenactedundercolonialrule46InternationalTradeUnionConfederation,2015,“ForeignDirectInvestmentinMyanmar:WhatImpactonHumanRights”,p.1147Seehttp://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-myanmar.html48SeeLutheranWorldFederation,UniversalPeriodicReview,secondcycle2012-2016,April2016,p.549Ibid.

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withDisabilities(CRPD)on7December2011

• the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESCR) and the Optional Protocol tothe Convention on the Rights of theChildontheinvolvementof�childreninarmedconflictweresignedin2015butnotyetratified

• Three out of eight fundamental ILOConventions.50

Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination(CERD)�

• International Convention on theProtection of the Rights of AllMigrantWorkers and Members of �TheirFamilies(ICRMW)�

• International Convention for theProtectionofAllPersonsfromEnforcedDisappearance�(ICPPED)�

• OptionalProtocoloftheUNConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities(OP-CRPD)�

• OptionalProtocoloftheUNConventionfor All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen(OP-�CEDAW)�

• Optional Protocol of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social andCulturalRights�(ICESCR)�

• Convention on the Prohibition of theUse, Stockpiling, Production andTransfer of Anti-personnel�Mines andonTheirDestruction�

• Rome Statutes of the InternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)�

• Five of the eight fundamental ILOConventions51

In 2008, the Myanmar government adopted a new constitution, which also providesenforceable guarantees for a number of rights and freedoms. There are however alsolimitationscontrarytointernationalhumanrightsstandards.Forexample,citizenshavetherighttofreedomofexpression,assemblyandassociationifnotcontraryto“lawandorder,communitypeaceandtranquility,orpublicorderandmorality”52.However,whatconstitutesmoralityisnotdefined.Somerightsaregrantedtoallpersons,whileothersto“citizens”only(thus excludingChinese,Nepali and Indian ethnicminorities) – including the right of non-discrimination,freedomofmovement,ofexpression,ofassemblyandassociation,therighttoproperty,health,education,justandfairconditionsofwork,andprivacy.53Sincethereformprocessbeganin2011,therehasbeenanincreaseincallsbyCSOstoprovideredress for human rights abuses, particularly land grabbing, forced relocation, andenvironmental damages. The government’s response has been relatively weak. Thegovernment has formed the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, a number of50Conventionno29onForcedLabour,Conventionno87onFreedomofAssociationandProtectionoftheRighttoOrganise,andConventionNo182ontheWorstFormsofChildLabour51IncludingConvention169onIndigenousandTribalPeoples,Convention138onMinimumAgeandConvention105ontheAbolitionofForcedLabour.SeetheMyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,2015,MyanmarHumanRightsandBusinessGuide,p.1452ConstitutionofMyanmar,2008,article354.“Everycitizenshallbeat liberty in theexerciseof the followingrights,ifnotcontrarytothelaws,enactedforUnionsecurity,prevalenceoflawandorder,communitypeaceandtranquilityorpublicorderandmorality…”53InternationalTradeUnionConfederation,2015,“ForeignDirectInvestmentinMyanmar:WhatImpactonHumanRights”,p.11

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parliamentary committeesand investigativebodies todealwith complaints.Thesebodies,however,havemostlyfailedtoconductcredibleinvestigationsandhaveprovenineffective.The judicialsystemremainsweak,andhumanrightsdefendersarestillbeingarrestedandchargedforpeacefulactivities.LandrightsThereisnorighttolandcodifiedininternationalhumanrightslaw.However,landisacross-cuttingissue,andoftenfundamentalforaccesstoothereconomic,socialandculturalrights.Land rights constitute the basis for access to food, housing and development, and are agatewayformanycivilandpoliticalrights.54Underthe2008Constitution,thestateofMyanmaristheownerofallland,althoughthe2012FarmlandLawallowsforregistrationandsalesofprivateownershiprightsinland.However,the Farmland Law does not have adequate representation of farmers in the FarmlandManagementBodywhichisresponsibleforissuingLUCs(LandUseCertificates).TheLUCscanberevokedbythegovernment,thustenurerightsarenotsecured.Farmlandrightscontinuetobeeasilytransferablewithnoindependentbodytodecidetheamountofcompensationnoristhereapropermechanismtobringthedisputestocourt.

Lawsupuntilnowdonotrecognizerightsintraditionalcollectivelandownershipandshiftingcultivation regimes, which are particularly prevalent in upland areas inhabited by ethnicminoritygroups.Inaddition,theVacant,Fallow&VirginLandsManagementLaw2012leavesopentointerpretationandexploitationthedefinitionsofkeywordslike‘regular’,‘fallow’etc.Atthesametime,lawssuchasthe1994MyanmarMinesLawcontainnoprovisionforpublicparticipation, public disclosure, or socio-impact assessment (SIO)or environmental impactassessment(EIO).The‘interestofthestate’issufficientenoughreasontoconfiscate.55

Another aspect of the legal framework are the multiple categories of land classification(twelve)notedin2009(freehold,grant,agricultural,garden,grazing,cultivable,fallow,waste,town, forest, village, monastery & cantonment) could lead further to confusion. Landclassificationandmappingsdonotreflectthegroundrealityoflandusepatterns.56MyanmarhasendorsedtheVoluntaryGuidelinesonResponsibleGovernanceofTenureofLand,FisheriesandForests inthecontextofNationalFoodSecurity,which iscurrentlythehighestinternationalstandardontenureissuesagreeduponbygovernmentsandadoptedbytheUNCommitteeonWorldFoodSecurity in2012.Civil societyheavily reliedupontheseGuidelinesduringthedraftingprocessoftherelativelynewNationalLandUsePolicy(NLUP,2016), and as a consequence this policy now recognizes traditional land ownership andshiftingcultivationregimes.57However,thepolicyhasnotyetbeentranslatedintolaw.

54In a report of Special RapporteurMiloon Kothari on adequate housing as a component of the right to anadequate standard of living, the Special Rapporteur recognized and emphasized the importance of land as a“critical element” of the right to adequate housing, and called on the Human Rights Council to ensure “therecognitionininternationalhumanrightslawoflandasahumanright.”(A/HRC/4/18,paras.26and31).55OxfordMyanmarBriefonLand,Volume1.1.August201656Ibid57 For a comparison between the TGs and Myanmar’s land policy draft, please see: Jennifer Franco et al.,Transnational Institute, “The Challenge of Democratic and Inclusive Land Policymaking in Myanmar”,https://www.tni.org/files/download/the_challenge_of_democratic_and_inclusive_land_policymaking_in_myanmar.pdf

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RighttoadequatefoodThe right to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or incommunitywithothers,hasthephysicalandeconomicaccessatalltimestoadequatefoodormeans for its procurement.58The right to food is closely linked to the concept of foodsecurity.Foodsecurityhasthree importantparameters: firstly, foodavailability,which isafunctionofdomesticproductionoffoodgrainsandimports/exports.Sustainability,includingenvironmentalsustainability,iscriticaltolong-termfoodavailability.Asecondparameterisfood accessibility, both physical and economic. This parameter includes employmentopportunities,levelsofpoverty,functioningofthepublicdistributionsystemandtherunningofemployment/povertyalleviationschemes.Finally,thethirdparameterisfoodabsorption,whichmeanstheabilitytoassimilatethefoodconsumedforahealthylife.Foodabsorptiondepends uponmultiple factors like the health of the individual, environmental sanitation,hygienicandsafedrinkingwater,abalanceddiet,knowledgeofnutrition,andgooddietarypractices.59About30countriesintheworldhaveanexplicitrecognitionoftherighttoadequatefoodintheir national constitution. Myanmar has directive principles 60 that contribute to therealizationoftherighttoadequatefood.Article26BoftheConstitutionstates:“TheUnionshallenactnecessarylawsforCivilServicespersonneltohavesecurityandsufficiencyoffood,clothing and shelter, to getmaternitybenefits formarriedwomen in service, and toeaselivelihoodforwelfareofretiredServicepersonnel.”Furthermore,therearereferencestotherighttofoodinthefollowinginternationalinstrumentsthatMyanmarhassigned:

• TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(Article25)• InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(Article11)notratified• ConventionontheEliminationofallformsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(Article

12and14)• ConventionontheRightsoftheChild(Article24andArticle27)• ConventionontheRightsofPersonswithDisabilities(Article28)61

FoodSecurityWorkingGroup (FSWG),aCSO inMyanmarworkingon improvinglocal foodsupplies,localfoodaccessandfoodsecurityinMyanmar,notedinDecember2015thattherehas been no national level policy framework or law that specifically addresses foodsovereignty or food security forMyanmar, but that food security and its core issues areincreasinglyaddressedinpolicyandlawacrossarangeofsectorsbeyonditstraditionalfocalpointoftheMinistryofAgriculture,LivestockandIrrigation.62Overall,therearefewactorsinMyanmarworkingonfoodsecurityfromaright-basedperspective.63

RighttoadequatehousingTherighttoadequatehousingisdefinedintheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsofwhichArticle11statesthatStateParties(governments)whosignupmust:“recognisetherightofeveryonetoanadequatestandardoflivingforhimselfandfor

58GeneralComment12(CESCR)59Seehttps://teacircleoxford.com/2016/06/15/food-security-in-myanmar-future-rice-bowl-of-asia/60 Directive principles are not enforceable by the courts, but the principles on which they are based arefundamentalguidelinesforgovernancethattheStateisexpectedtoapplyinframingandpassinglaws.61Seehttp://www.fao.org/right-to-food-around-the-globe/countries/mmr/en/62FoodSecurityWorkingGroup,2015,“FoodSecurityRelatedPolicyAnalysis”,p.463InterviewswithCSOrepresentatives,February2017

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hisfamily,includingadequatefood,clothingandhousing,andtothecontinuousimprovementof livingconditions.”The right toadequatehousingcontains freedoms, suchasprotectionagainstforcedevictionsandarbitrarydestructionandfreedomtodeterminewhethertoliveand freedom of movement; entitlements, such as security of tenure, housing,housing/land/propertyrestitution,andparticipationinhousing-relateddecisionmakingatthenationalandcommunity levels,andforhousingtobeadequate itmustmeetanumberofcriteriasuchasaffordabilityandhabitability.64MyanmardidnotratifytheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights.InternationalinstrumentswithreferencetotherighttoadequatehousingthatMyanmarhassignedinclude:

• TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(Article25)• InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(Article11)notratified• ConventionontheEliminationofallformsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(Article

14)• ConventionontheRightsoftheChild(Article16.1,and27.3)

Righttoself-determinationThe right to self-determination is contained in Article 1 of the International Covenant onEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightsandArticle1oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)andin.Article1ofbothCovenantsstatesthatbyvirtueoftherighttoself-determination people freely determine their political status and freely pursue theireconomic,socialandculturaldevelopment.TheprincipleofFree,PriorandInformedConsentisakeyexpressionofself-determination.65MyanmarhassignedbutnotratifiedtheCESCRandhasnotsignedtheICCPR.Myanmarhasalso not signed ILO Convention No 169, aimed at overcoming discriminatory practicesaffectingindigenousandtribalpeoplesandenablingthemtoparticipateindecision-makingthataffectstheirlives.MyanmarisasignatorytotheDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeople(UNDRIP,2007).66However,thegovernmentdoesnotrecognizethetermindigenouspeoplesinlaw,policyorpractice,dismissingtheapplicabilityofUNDRIP,andtheyhavenottakenapositionconcerningwhetherthereareindigenouspeoplesinMyanmar.67The2008Constitutiongrantssomerightstoethnicnationalities.Article22oftheConstitutionprovides for “(i) developmentof language, literature, fine arts and cultureof thenationalraces;and(ii)promotionofsolidarity,mutualamityandrespectandmutualassistanceamongthe national races; and promotion of socio-economic development incuding education,health,economy,transportandcommunication,ofless-developednationalraces.”Article365providesfortheenforceablerightofMyanmarcitizenstofreelydevelopliterature,culture,arts, customsand traditions that arebeing cherished. This also states that “anyparticularactionwhichmightaffecttheinterestsofoneorseveralotherofthenationalracesshallbetaken…afterobtainingthesettlementofthoseaffected.”The2015ProtectionoftheRightsofNationalRacesLawgivesfurthereffecttoArticle22andprovidesabasisforaMinisterfor

64UNHabitat&OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights,FactSheetno21(revision1),“TheRighttoAdequateHousing”,p.3-465Seehttp://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/FreePriorandInformedConsent.pdf66TheMyanmargovernmentnotedthatit“wouldseektoimplementitwithflexibility”67MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,2016,“BriefingPaper:IndigenousPeople’sRightsandBusinessinMyanmar”,p.7

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National Races. Article 5 of this Law states that indigenous “should receive complete andprecise informationaboutextractive industryprojectsandotherbusinessactivities intheirareas before project implementation so that negotiations between the groups and theGovernment/companiescantakeplace.”68However,MyanmarlawdoesnotmentiontheUNDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeopleorFree,PriorandInformedConsent.69

3.2.ActualhumanrightssituationUnderthe internationalhumanrightssystem,governmentshavetheduty,orobligationtoupholdhumanrights.Governmentshavethisobligationinthreeways,namelybynotpassinglawsortakeactionsthatviolatehumanrights,byprotectingpeople’srightsfromviolationsbyotherpeople,andbypassinglawsandtakeactionsensuringthatpeopleareabletoenjoytheirhumanrights.

Human rights and their violations in Myanmar are consistently being documented bynumerousinternationalandlocalorganisations,includingHumanRightsWatch,PhysiciansforHumanRights(PHR),AmnestyInternational(AI),TheLutheranWorldFederation,TheBorderConsortium (TBC), the Network for Human Rights Documentation – Burma (ND-Burma),Burma Environmental Working Group (BEWG), Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), ShanHumanRights Foundation, (SHRF), and the KachinWomen’sAssociation Thailand (KWAT).Since the 1990s, multiple United Nations organs have also documented and condemnedhuman rights abuses committedunder themilitary regime. These include theUNGeneralAssembly, theCommissiononHumanRights, theHumanRightsCouncil,numerousSpecialRapporteursontheSituationofHumanRightsinMyanmar[Burma],theInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO),andtheCommitteeontheEliminationofDiscriminationagainstWomen(CEDAW).Generally,thesewatchdogsobservethatMyanmarhasseensignificantpoliticalandeconomicchange after a quasi-civilian government was introduced in 2011, accompanied withsignificant improvements in the human rights situation. However, in the approach to theelectionsthereformprocessregressed.Alsosinceaftertheelections,restrictionsonfreedomofreligionandfreedomofexpression,association,andassemblypersist.InParliament,MPshave been asked byNLD leadership to stop asking tough questions thatwouldmake thegovernment look bad, and have received instructions tomaintain the official party line.70Arrests under Section 66(d) of the Telecommunications Law, prohibiting certain types ofspeechonlinewithapenaltyofuptothreeyearsinprison,isstillregularlyutilizedtosilencecriticalvoices.Andoverallthespaceforhumanrightsdefenderstooperateeffectivelyandwithoutfearofreprisalremainslimited.71LandissuesInMyanmar,70%ofthepopulationof50+millionlivesinruralareas,wheretheydependon

68MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,2016,“BriefingPaper:IndigenousPeople’sRightsandBusinessinMyanmar”,p.16-1769FPIChasbeenmentionedinthecontextofafewothergovernmentdocuments,oftenthosecopiedordraftedonthebasisofothersourcessuchasthoserelatingtoREDD+andextractives.70 See The Irrawaddy, October 5, 2016, http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/nld-leadership-instructs-lawmakers-to-avoid-questions- that-could-harm-the-govt.html, Myanmar Times, October 7, 2016,http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/22959-don-t-ask-tough- questions-checks-on-power-out-the-window-as-nld-exerts-its-majority.html,71 See https://www.hrw.org/asia/burma and https://www.civilrightsdefenders.org/country-reports/human-rights-in-myanmar/

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landfortheirsurvivalandlivelihood.Themajorityaresmallholderfarmers.Theissueoflandrightshasgainedincreasedprominencesince2011whenthegovernmentinitiatedreformsand started attracting foreign investment in order to expand the economy and reducepoverty.Sincethen,landseizureshavebecomeincreasinglycommon.AnOctober2016reportfoundthatlandconflictsinMyanmarhaveescalatedinrecentyears.72TransnationalInstitute(TNI)hasidentifiedthreetypesofissueswithlandrightsinMyanmar.73Thefirstsituationinvolvespeoplewhopreviouslyhadlandbuthavebeenpushedoffduetocivilwar,armedconflictornaturaldisaster.TheseIDPsandrefugeeswanttoreturntotheiroriginal place,which is their right under international human rights law and internationalhumanitarian law (the Pinheiro Principles). This right to return is also supported by theVoluntaryGuidelinesonResponsibleGovernanceofTenureofLand,FisheriesandForestsinthe context of National Food Security which Myanmar has endorsed, and supported byMyanmar’sNLUPadoptedinJanuary2016.Inpracticehowever,fewIDPsandrefugeesaresuccessfulingettingbacktheirland.Thesecondsituation involvesruralworkingpeoplewhohavebeenabletoholdontotheirlandsofarbutareinaweakpositionandvulnerabletolandgrabbing.Thisvulnerabilityhasbecomeonlymoresobythetwo2012landlaws,namelytheFarmlandLawandtheVacant,Fallow&VirginLandLaw.Whileprovidingforcertificatesofownershipandthesellingofrightsto land, the Farmland Law requires prospective land owners to register at local FarmlandManagement Committees. These committees are appointed by the government with norepresentation from farmers, leaving them vulnerable to corruption and commercialinterests.AlsoSection29oftheFarmlandLawallowsthegovernmenttoconfiscatelandonthebasisofnationalinterest.�TheVacant,Fallow&VirginLandLawallowsthegovernmentto declare land unused and assign it to foreign investors or designate it for other uses.74Anotherproblemisthe lackoffullentitlementandguaranteedrespectfor landownershipregulatedundercustomarytenuresystems.

Thethirdsituationinvolvesruralworkingpeoplewhoforonereasonoranotherhavelittleornolandonwhichtobuildaviableanddignifiedlivelihood.Amongstothers,thisisthesituationoffamilymembersexcludedfromownership/inheritancesuchaswomen,inareaswherelandconcentration75hasbeentakingplace,oramongstmigrants.LandlesshouseholdsinMyanmarcompriseanestimated35to53percentofthenationalruralpopulation(lowlands).Astudyfoundthat44percentofhouseholdswerelandless;thosewithlandhadanaverageholdingof3.6acres,lessthanthe5-acreminimumrequiredtosustainahousehold.76Foodsecurity/foodsovereigntyTherighttofoodiscloselylinkedtotheconceptoffoodsecurity.FoodsecurityinMyanmaris a challenge, both at the household and national level. Hunger, undernourishment and

72LutheranWorldFederation,seehttps://myanmar.lutheranworld.org/content/upr-fuller-report-273Seehttps://www.tni.org/en/article/the-right-to-land-at-crossroads-in-myanmar74Theagricultureministry's30-yearMasterPlan for the country's agriculture sector (2000-01 to2030-31), forexample,aimstoconvert10millionacresof‘wasteland’-atermsignifying'modernity'wheretheonly'good'landis'productive'and'efficient'-forprivatecommercialagriculturalproduction.75Meaningconcentrationoflandinfewer,largerfarms/agribusinesses.762007studyofremoteMASRIS,2004,“AgricultureSectorReviewInvestmentStrategy.”Vol.1.SectorReview.FoodandAgricultureOrganization (FAO). 2007.“IdentificationandAssessmentof thePoor, Food InsecureandVulnerableintheUnionofMyanmar.”GCP/INT/952/EC-MYA.EC/FAOCooperativeProgram.

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malnutritionaffectlargesegmentsoftheMyanmar’spopulationanditisaseriousproblemamong the poor. It is estimated that approximately 15% of Myanmar’s populationwereundernourished in2016.77Foodpoverty is higher in rural areas than inurbanareas. FoodinsecurityisthehighestinChinState.Therearekeynaturalandhuman-inducedreasonsforfoodinsecurityinMyanmar.Unstableclimateconditionshavemadeagriculturalproductiondifficulttosustain,aswellasnaturaldisasters.Onthehumanside,fragmentationoflandholdingsandlandlessnessduetomining,agribusinessandconstructionprojectsmakeitdifficultforpeopletofulfilltheirdailyneeds.Extraction of resources with little concern for ecological impact has caused furtherdevastation.ThepresenceoftheMyanmarmilitary,ethnicmilitiasandlandmineshasalsolimitedbordercommunities’accesstolandandforests.Atpresent,70%ofMyanmar’spopulation relieson smallholder farming. Inmanyways,atpresent a material struggle over land is taking shape to convert subsistence agriculturallandscapes and localized food production into modern, mechanized industrial agro-foodregimes.78 Farmers, meanwhile, suffering from this change, are starting to develop theirvisionsfor foodsovereignty.79However, foodsovereigntyasaword isstillarelativelynewconcept in Myanmar. Few people know of the concepts, and less than a handful oforganisationsapproachfoodsecuritythrougharights-basedlens.80

AdequatehousingThefactthatthegovernmenthasobligationstorealizetherighttoadequatehousingdoesnotmeanthattheyneedtobuildagoodhouseforeveryone.Theirobligationistocreatetheconditions,throughlawandpolicy,sothatinthefutureeveryonewillhaveaccesstoadequatehousing.Particularlyduetoconflict,manypeopleinMyanmarlackadequatehousing.Forcedevictions, due to conflict, militarization, natural resource exploitation, and infrastructuredevelopmentarealsocommon.Incaseofmanyoftheseevictions,governmentdutiesbefore,duringandafterevictionarenotbeingfollowed,suchasadequateinformationsharingabouttheeviction,consultation,andadequatecompensationand/orrelocation.Self-determinationMyanmar’s ethnic minorities make up about 30 to 40 per cent of the population. Asmentioned in the previous section, non-‘indigenous’ ethnic groups, such as the BurmeseChinese,NepaliandIndianethnicminoritiesandMuslimRohingya,holdeitherlimitedornocitizenshipatall.Minorityrights(e.g.the1992UNMinoritiesDeclaration)insituationsofmulti-nationstateswheretherearemultiplenationalminoritiessuchasinMyanmarareincreasinglyinterpretedasrequiringstatestoacttomakeitpossibleforminoritiestomaintaintheirdistinctcultures,languagesandreligions,whichmaybeachievedthroughtheprovisionofautonomyundercertaincircumstances.InMyanmar,thisdesireforself-determinationwaslongseenasanactofrebellion.Inrecent77Seehttps://knoema.com/atlas/Myanmar/Food-deficit-of-undernourished-population78KevinWoods,2015,“FoodSovereignty:aCriticalDialogue.Thepoliticsoftheemergingagro-industrialcomplexinAsia’s‘finalfrontier’:thewaronfoodsovereigntyinBurma”,p.179Foodsovereigntyisalsoexplainedastherightofeveryonetodeterminetheirownagriculturalandfoodpolicyandtoproducefoodecologically,sociallyandlocally.80InterviewswithCSOrepresentatives,February2017

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years,thishasbeenchangingtosomeextent,andparticularlyintheeducationsectorsomereforms have taken place including a degree of decentralisation. It is now largelyacknowledged that peace can only be achieved when ethnic nationalities will havemorecontrol over their territories, and discussions about a more federal constitution are nowopenlyheld.Inthemeantime,ethnicorindigenouspeoplecontinuetofaceproblemsoflandconfiscation in relation to infrastructure projects such as dams, pipelines and mines,displacement,and lackofenvironmental impactassessmentsand free,priorand informedconsent.813.3.TheIPA’spotentialimpactonlandrights,particularlytherighttofoodanditsfairdistribution,therighttoadequatehousingandtherighttoself-determinationincludingrightsofindigenouspeople.Asmentionedatthebeginningoftheprevioussection,governmentshaveanobligationtoprotectpeople’srightsfromviolationsbyotherpeople,includingbybusinessenterprises82,and to regulate under human rights law. However, investment agreements such as thependingEU-MyanmarIPAmayaffecttheexactcontoursoftheStates’abilitytodoso.Thissectionprimarilyfocusesontheobligationtoprotectpeople’srightsfromviolationsbyotherpeople,whilethenextchapterlooksattheobligationtoregulateunderhumanrightslaw.Keywhenanalysingwhether the IPAmay lead tonegative results for land relatedhumanrights,particularlytherighttofoodanditsfairdistribution,therighttoadequatehousing,andtherighttoself-determinationincludingtherightsofindigenouspeopleistolookattheimplicationsofthevariousprovisions.AtthesametimeoneshouldlookatwhethertherearesufficientprovisionsintheIPAtocounteracttheserisks–therebyenablingthegovernmenttomaintainitsdutytorespect,protectandenacthumanrights.Suchprovisionscanincludespecific clauses or remedies for human rights violations and effective enforcement andgrievancemechanismsforaffectedcommunities.

Overall, the EU’s Sustainability Impact Assessment suggests there are 5 human rightspotentiallyaffectedbytheEU-Myanmarinvestmentagreement,namelyrighttoproperty83,right todueprocess, freedomofopinionandexpression, indigenouspeopleandadequatestandardofliving.TheIPAisexpectedtohavedefinitivepositivedirectimpactonthefreedomof expression and assembly and the right to due process.84There is little explanation orjustificationofwhytheserightsareprimarilyaffectedandnototherrightssuchastherighttofood.Moreover,theprovidedanalysisprovideslittleinsightinthelikelihoodandseverityoftheriskssuggested.FIDHsuggestsaddingtherighttopeacefulassembly,tonon-discrimination,therighttoequal

81SeethesubmissiontotheUniversalPeriodicReviewbytheCoalitionofIndigenousPeople’sinMyanmar/Burma(CIPM) of 21 July 2015, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/NEED-Coalition_of_IPs_in_Myanmar-2015-03-Submission_to_UPR-en-red.pdf.CIPMisagrouprepresenting24indigenousrightsorganisationsinMyanmar.82AlsoseetheUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissionersGuidingPrinciplesonHumanRightsandBusiness83It shouldbenoted that the right toadequatehousing isnot thesameas the right toproperty.As stated inReferencenote21fromUNHabitatandOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights:“�Therighttoadequatehousingisbroaderthantherighttoownpropertyasitaddressesrightsnotrelatedtoownershipandis�intendedtoensurethateveryonehasasafeandsecureplacetoliveinpeaceanddignity,includingnon-ownersofproperty.Securityoftenure,thecornerstoneoftherighttoadequatehousing,cantakeavarietyofforms, including rental accommodation, cooperative housing, lease, owner-occupation, emergency housing orinformalsettlements.Assuch,itisnotlimitedtotheconferralofformallegaltitles.”84 Development Solutions, 2016, Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of an investment protectionagreementbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheRepublicoftheUnionofMyanmar,p.156

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treatmentbeforelaw,prohibitionofarbitraryarrest,tobeprotectedagainstexcessiveuseofforce, right to health, right to food and the right not to be subjected to forcedresettlement.85�However, FIDH also does not substantiate why these rights ought to beadded.This paper argues that there are significant risks for land rights, including for the relatedhumanrightsoftherighttofoodanditsfairdistribution,therighttoadequatehousing,andtherighttoself-determinationincludingtherightsofindigenouspeople.Landrights

Ingeneral,moreinvestment–whetherfromtheEUoranyotherinvestor-inplaceswithweaklandtenureandfrequentland-grabbingislikelytoleadtofurtherviolationsoflandrelatedhumanrights.

TheLandAcquisitionActentitlesthegovernmenttolandacquisitionsforacompanywhentheacquisition is likelytoproveusefultothepublic.“Usefultothepublic” ishowevernotfurther defined. The law does provide for compensation butwith limited safeguards. TheFarmlandLawallowsthegovernmenttotakeoverfarmlandintheinterestsofthestateorthepublic with no further procedural or substantive restrictions. There is a provision forcompensationbutlittleornocompensationisnormallypaid.86TheVacant,Fallow&VirginLawgivesthegovernmenttherighttorepossesslandsregardedas‘vacant,fallow&virgin’fortheimplementationofinfrastructureprojectsorspecialprojectsrequiredintheinterestof the state.As the InternationalTradeUnionConfederationnotes: “theVacant,Fallow&Virginlawsandrulesmeansthatthegovernmenthaswidediscretiontousethelandintheway itwishes forpublic interests,withoutpossibilityof effectiveadministrativeor judicialreviewoflandconfiscationandresettlement.”87Regardingforeignownershipofland,the1987TransferofImmoveablePropertyRestrictionAct prohibits any sale, transfer or exchange of land to any foreigner or foreign company.OfficiallyNon-Myanmarnationalsandcompaniesareonlyallowedtoleaselandforatermoflessthanoneyear.However,theactallowsexemptionsfromtheseprohibitionsifgrantedbyrelevantgovernmentministrieswhenextendedtoforeigngovernments,diplomaticmissionsorotherorganisations.Forthepurposeofforeigninvestment,suchexemptionsaresecuredthrough a Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC) Permit under the Myanmar ForeignInvestmentLaworthroughaSpecialEconomicZone(SEZ)PermitundertheSEZLaw,bothofwhichallowforeigninvestorstoleaselandforatleast50years.Withtheincreaseinthelevelofeconomicactivity,asforeigncompaniesinvestinginMyanmaraccessmoreland,eitheracquiringorusingit,thetrendoflandgrabshasaccelerated.Evenwhencompaniesattempttofollowdueprocess,theirbusinesspartnersmaybeinvestinginlandthatisaproductof illegal landgrabbingandforcefuleviction.Consequently, issuesoflandownershipmayarise,resultinginasituationofuncertaintywhetherthelandbelongstothe government or the local community. Companies may have to withdraw or vacate.

85FIDH,7December2015,“Openletter;EU-Myanmar/BurmaInvestmentagreementanditssustainabilityimpactassessment–concernsonthewayhumanrightsaretakenintoaccount,p.886International Trade Union Confederation, 2015, “Foreign Direct Investment inMyanmar:What Impacts onHumanRights”,p.2087International Trade Union Confederation, 2015, “Foreign Direct Investment inMyanmar:What Impacts onHumanRights”,p.20

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Particularattentionshouldbepaidtocustomarytenureandcommunallanduse.88Additionalissues arise regarding in land conflict-affected areas not included in national cadastres orconsideredvacant.89TheIPAprovisionsofexpropriation,bothdirectandindirect,andcompensationatfairmarketvalueposedirectrisktolandrights.Suchprovisionsmayencourageinvestors,includingthosewhoareawarethatlandisanissueinMyanmar,toinvestanywayastheriskwillnolongerbetheirs. As noted by several respondents, land is the single big issue that is and shoulddiscourage investors from coming in at thismoment in time.Myanmar’s land governanceframework is archaic and allows for extensive land grabs at the expense of communities,including thosewho have papers.90As noted by one respondent during this research: “Atpresent,therearenolandconcessionsinthiscountrythatarenotambiguous.”91Moreover,inacountrylikeMyanmar,wherealotoflandgiventoinvestorswastakenfromcommunitieswhose rightswerenot (yet)adequatelyprotected, itmaywellbe thatunderpossiblefuturelandgovernancesystemslandwillberedistributedtocommunities.However,the provisions for indirect expropriation may lead to regulatory chill for the Myanmargovernment, if is afraid that redistribution and or reformwill lead to expensive litigationclaimsagainstit(thiswillbefurtherelaboratedinthenextchapter).RighttofoodClaimsthatnewinvestmentwillalleviatepovertyareunderminedbyreportsofwidespreadgrabbing of farmlands and forestlands on which people depend for their livelihoods.92Inaddition toagribusiness,hydropower,extractives,andeconomiczones,activities in theoiland gas sector have impacted livelihoods of populations fishing and farming, particularlysmall-scalesubsistencefisheriesandfarmersexploitingtheseresources.MyanmarCentreforResponsible Business (MCRB) points to a high vulnerability of local rural and coastalpopulationstosocialandenvironmentalimpactsduetotheiroverwhelmingdependenceonland-basedsubsistenceagricultureorlocalfishing.93Mining and extractive industrial activities have also led to deforestation, resulting in soilerosionandlandslides,thusimpactingthequalityofforestandfarmlandandcommunities’accesstofoodandlivelihoods.AccordingtoaDecember2015studybytheFSWG,themostvulnerabletofoodinsecurityarethelandless(estimatedatnearly50%ofruralhouseholdsatthenationallevel),smallholderfarmers,Ethnicminorities,women,children, theelderlyandthedisabled,andthepoorestand the displaced. 94 As argued in the section above, more investment particularly in88Thelackoflegalrecognitionofcustomarylandtenureandthefactthatruralcommunitiesoftenlackedformallandtitles,exposesthosecommunities,especiallyinethnicminorityareas,tolandexpropriation,accordingtoa2013reportbyForestPeoplesProgramme.89ITUCalsoreportsuseofforcebythemilitaryagainstlocalresidentstopromotebusinessprojectsandcautionsthat‘thelevelofcollusion,andtheaccompanyingviolationsoflandtenureandhumanrights,shouldbeofseriousconcerntoinvestors’.SeeInternationalTradeUnionConfederation,2015,“ForeignDirectInvestmentinMyanmar:WhatImpactsonHumanRights”,p.2290Namati.2017,“EvidenceisnotsufficienttosecurelandrightsinMyanmar:ImpartialandTransparentproceduresarecritical.91InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,January201792 In2013,aboutthreequartersofthepopulationdependedonfarmlandandforestsfortheirlivelihood,accordingtotheForestPeoplesProgramme. 93MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,2014,“MyanmaOil&GasSectorWideImpactAssessment”,p.7494FoodSecurityWorkingGroup,2015,“FoodSecurityRelatedPolicyAnalysisMyanmar”,p.12-13

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agribusiness, hydropower, extractives and economic zones is likely to lead to more landgrabbing,increasinglandlessnessandthereforefoodinsecurity.Moreinvestmentintheagriculturalsectorisalsoexpectedtoleadtofurtherpressureonthelivelihoodsofsmallholderfarmers.Inarecentpaper,Oxfamdetailstwopathsofinvestment,namely1)landconcessionsusedforrubberandpalmoilplantations,andtoasmallerextentcorn, sugarcane,biofuels, fruitsandothercrops,and2)contract farmingagreementswithsmallandmediumscale local farmers.Bothofthesepathscarryrisksforsmallholdersandcommunitieswhorelyonlandfortheirlivelihoods.FSWGthereforeemphasizestheneedforinvestmentsthatwilladdvaluetoagriculturalproducts,sayingthatinvestmentsshouldtargetbiodiversity, value addition and food processing rather than food production.95Regardingcontractfarming,whileithastopotentialtoincreasetheincomeofsmallholdersaswellasprovide direct connections to markets, as Oxfam notes “it often fails small-scale farmersbecausethereisinadequatelegislativeandpolicyarchitectureinplacetoensurethattheygeta good deal out of their agreementwith the private investor.”96Although data is limited,contractfarmingisthoughttobeontheriseinMyanmar.97Anotherissueistheseedpolicyandlaw.MyanmarhasenactedaSeedLawin2011,andhasdevelopedaNationalSeedPolicyandaSeedSectorRoadmap2017-2020(stilltobeadoptedby the Parliament).98The Seed Law includes the rules and regulations of the seed sectorrelatedtogovernment,seedlaboratoriesandseedbusinesses.Sincetheincreasedprotectionforcommercialseedbusinesses,thehybridseedindustryisquicklydevelopinginMyanmarledbymaize,withactivityalsoincottonandvegetables,andfutureprospectsforhybridrice.Thisisleadingtoalossoflocalseeds,asgeneticallymodifiedorganisms(GMOs)destroyandcontaminateexistingseedsystems.Nationaland international legal frameworksprotectingintellectualpropertyrights(IPR),includingtheprovisionsforIPRinthedraftIPA,arefurtherthreats topeasant’s seeds. IPRprotection regimes suchas the InternationalUnion for theProtectionofNewVarietiesofPlants(UPOV)werelargelydevisedprotecttheinterestsoftheseedandbreederindustry.TheyseverelyimpairaccesstoseedsoutsideofUPOVbyrestrictingpeasantpracticesandseedmanagementsystems,assuchthreateningtraditionalsystems.Atthe same time, the new Seed Sector Roadmap explicitly respects/promotes the use ofinformal,intermediateandformalseedsystems.The“ProtectingRightsandEnhancingEconomicWelfareofFarmer’sLaw”wasintendedtoaddress some of the challenges to the livelihoods of rural farmers. Provisions include theinclusionoftheprotectionoffarmer’srights,andspecificmentionofmeetingtheneedsofsmall-holdfarmersandtheissueoflandrights.However,concernsremainoverambiguityinthedefinitionoffarmersandinputsamongstotherissues.RighttoadequatehousingLikethreatstotherighttofood,threatstotherighttoadequatehousingarelargelyrelatedtolandgrabbing.MoreinvestmentinthecontextofMyanmar’sweaktenuresituationandfrequent land grabbing is likely to result in more frequent eviction and inadequate

95InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,February201796Oxfam,2016,“WhoseCrops,atWhatPrice.AgriculturalInvestmentinMyanmar”,p.1497Ibid98TheSeedLawwasformulatedbytheMinistryofAgricultureandIrrigation,withnoparticipationfromtheprivatesectorandfromthelocalindividualfarmers.TheNationalSeedPolicywaswrittenwiththeassistanceoftheFAOandhasbeendevelopedthroughaparticipatoryprocess,includingmajorpublicandprivatesectorstakeholdersofMyanmar’sseedindustry.Ideally,theSeedPolicywouldhaveprecededtheSeedlaw.SeeFSWG,2015,“ReportonthePolicyAnalysisoftheMyanmarSeedLawandSeedPolicy”,p.4

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compensation.Governmentsandcompaniesmayneedtoresettlecommunitiesaspartofalandacquisitionprocesstoacquirelandforabusinessproject.Thisinvolvesacquiringtheirland,buildingnewhousingfortheminanewlocation,relocatingthemtothenewlocationandhelpingthemtoreestablish their livelihood activities. Resettlement can be voluntary or involuntary.Involuntary resettlement (also known as forced relocation) of communities can only beconducted by government and in accordance with national law and international humanrightsprotections. Itmustbe forapublicpurpose topromotenational security,economicdevelopment,orprotectthehealthofthepopulation.Itshouldbealastresortandfeasiblealternativesshouldbeexploredwithaffectedcommunities.

In Myanmar however, the Land Acquisition Act provides no provisions concerningresettlement.Forcedevictioniscommon,withoutdueprocessorcompensation.Aswithland-grabbing,anIPAwouldlegitimizelandobtainedfromthegovernmentandprotectinvestorsfrompossiblefuturecorrections.

Righttoself-determinationStakeholdersincludingTNIandACTAlliancehaveraisedconcernsthattheimplementationofthe IPA could negatively impact the rights ofMyanmar’s ethnic nations.Overall, the ITUCrecommends that companies should not invest in large-scale development projects inMyanmar’sconflictareasuntildurablepeaceagreementsareestablished.99Also,theneedtoavoid constraining the policy options of Myanmar’s sub-central levels of government -particularly those in conflict and transitional regions - was underscored. As a respondentnotedduringinterviews,thelargestconcernaroundtheIPArelatestotherightsofindigenouspeoplesandfutureplans/reformsfortheirgovernance.100ApartialremedytotheriskidentifiedbyTNImightbefoundintheformofaprovisionsuchas Article 7 of the Japan-Myanmar BIT that states that non-conforming measures asdesignated in Self-Administered Divisions and Self-Administered Zones in Myanmar areexemptfromthecoverageoftheIPA.ButthiswouldstillexcludemanypartsofMyanmarthatare under mixed or ethnic administration without the designation of Self-AdministeredDivisionorZone.Moreover,unliketheJapan-MyanmarBIT,theEU-MyanmarIPAcoversonlythepost-establishmentphase,meaningthatinvestorswillhavetomeettherequirementsofapplicabledomesticlawwhentheyestablishtheiractivityinthehostcountry.101

3.4.ExpecteddirectionsofEUinvestmentandrelatedimpactsThe severity of some of the risks elaborated above will depend on the direction of EUinvestment in Myanmar. As the EU’s Sustainability Impact Assessment states: “Whileeconomicimpactsarelikelytobepositive,alloftherelatedaspectsofsocial,humanrightsandenvironmentalimpactsaredifficulttopredictastheyverymuchdependonthesectorstowhichEUinvestmentmaybedirected.”10299InternationalTradeUnionConfederation,2015,“ForeignDirectInvestmentinMyanmar:WhatImpactsonHumanRights”,p.20100InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,January2017101PostestablishmentmeanstheIPAonlyreferstoinvestmentsthatarealreadyestablishedoradmitted.PreestablishmentalsoreferstothefreeentryofinvestmentsandinvestorsofaParty.102 Development Solutions, 2016, Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of an investment protectionagreementbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheRepublicoftheUnionofMyanmar,p.

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Insomesectorstherisksofserioushumanrightsconcernsarehigher,duetowhichthechancethatmoreEUinvestment,ifdirectedthere,couldleadtoaworseningofthecurrenthumanrightssituationismuchhigher.

AccordingtodatacollectedbytheEuroChamber,EuropeanCompaniesarecurrentlymostactive in transportation and storage (21.4%), followed by manufacturing (12.5%) andconstruction(10.7%).103

Whentalkingwithprivatesectorrepresentativesaboutthefuture,mostnewinvestmentisanticipatedfortheenergysector, followedbyagribusiness.Asstated inthe2016BusinessConfidenceSurvey,“Untappedpotentialintheenergysector–particularlyhydropower,oilreserves, togetherwith a low electrification rate, provides foreign investorswith an earlymover advantage.”104While agribusiness is a long-term investmentwith slowprofitability,moreinvestmentisalsoexpectedinthissector.Finally,manufacturingandconstructionareexpectedtocontinuetogrow.105Giventheland-intensivenessofboththeenergyandagribusinesssector,negativeimpactsonhumanrightsarethereforeratherlikely.

103 Business Confidence Survey 2016, 2016. p. 15 See http://eurocham-myanmar.org/uploads/38a17-eurocham_business-confidence-survey.pdf. For this survey 103 European companies active inMyanmar werecontactedand56responded,givingthesurveyacompletionrateof57.7%.104 Business Confidence Survey 2016, 2016. p. 21 See http://eurocham-myanmar.org/uploads/38a17-eurocham_business-confidence-survey.pdf.105Interviewwithprivatesectorrepresentative,January2017

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Chapter4:ImplicationsforFutureLegalReformOne of the, if not the most controversial provision in the draft EU-Myanmar IPA is theprovision for investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) as an alternative to Myanmar’snationaljudicialsystem.SuchanISDSclause,whichformsastandardpartofmanyinvestmentagreements,enablesforeigninvestorstobypassnationalcourtsandtakeacomplainttoaninternationaltribunalconsistingofthreecommercialinvestmentlawyers.Theselawyersthendecidewhethertheaccusedgovernmentmeasuresarelegitimateorproportionatetotheirobjective.Whiletosomeextent it isunderstandablethatEuropewantstokeepitscompaniesoutofMyanmar’scourts,asMyanmar’s judiciarycontinues tobe ratherunder-resourced,under-resourced,politicallyinfluencedandlackinginindependence106,thealternativeofcommercialinvestment lawyers is problematic too. These for-profit lawyersmay award compensationthatmay run intomany hundreds ofmillions or even billions of dollars. Such awards areenforceableandmustbepaidoutofpublicbudgets,reducingthefundsthatareavailableforpublic policies. 107 Notable cases are the lawsuits of Swedish Energy company VattenfallagainstGermanyforadoptingnuclear-phaseoutlegislationasaresponsetotheFukishumadisaster in Japan, and Canadian oil and gas company Lone Pine suing against a frackingmoratoriumintheStateofQuebec.

ISDS has been criticised due to what are seen as inconsistencies and unintendedinterpretationsofclauses,unanticipatedusesofthesystembyinvestorsincludingchallengesagainstpolicymeasurestakeninthepublicinterest,andcostlyandlengthyprocedureswithlimitedorno transparency.Moreover, these courts areonly accessible to investors,whilecommunitiesoftenhavetorelyonunderdevelopednationallegalsystemsthatdonotprovideadequateaccesstojustice.Evidenceshowsthatmanyofthe608arbitrationawardsthathavebecomeknownglobally,haveoverriddennationallawandhinderedStatesinthesovereigndeterminationof fiscalandbudgetarypolicy, labour,healthandenvironmental regulation,andhavehadadversehumanrightsimpacts,alsoonthirdparties,includinga“chillingeffect”withregardtotheexerciseofdemocraticgovernance.108Assuch,thereisgrowingoppositiontosuchfar-reachinginvestmentprotection.ISDSwasanimportant reason for Europeanoppositionagainst theTransatlantic Tradeand InvestmentPartnership (TTIP), and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) withCanada. InAsia, recently316CSOspresenteda joint lettertotheRegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership(RCEP)109governmentsurgingthemtoexclude(ISDS)provisionsfromthe deal and demanding instead a new trade model that helps to develop sustainablesocieties,bysupportinglocaleconomies,workers’rights,andfoodsovereignty.In response to criticisms, in 2016 the European Commission proposed a new system forresolvingdisputesbetweeninvestorsandstates,namelytheInvestmentCourtSystem.Thenew court systemwould include a First Instance Tribunal and an Appeal Tribunal, wouldconsistofpubliclyappointedjudgescomparabletothoseintheInternationalCourtofJustice

106OECD,2014,InvestmentPolicyReviews:Myanmar,p.27107TNI,2016,“InvestmentprotectiontreatiesendangerdemocraticreformandpeaceinitiativesinMyanmar”108StatementofMr.Alfred-MauricedeZayasIndependentExpertonthepromotionofademocraticandequitableinternationalorderattheHumanRightsCouncil30thSession,Geneva,16September2015109ProposedfreetradeagreementbetweenthetenmemberstatesofASEANandAustralia,China,India,Japan,SouthKoreaandNewZealand

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andtheWTO,andwouldenshrinegovernment’srighttoregulate.110However,INGOssuchasTNIhavecriticisedthatunderthenewsystemsomeoftheoldcontroversialcasescouldstillbelaunched.111Politicians have started to look into the issue more carefully. In the political debatesurroundingthesigningoftheCETAagreementbetweentheEUandCanada,theParliamentof the Belgian region of Wallonia requested and obtained the concession that thecompatibilityofICSwiththeEuropeanTreatiesshouldbejudgedbytheEuropeanCourtofJustice.Subsequently,inNovember2016civilsocietyfromMyanmarandtheEUcalledforthesuspensionofnegotiationsuntiltheEuropeanCourtofJusticehasruledonthecompatibilityofICSwiththeEUTreaties.112Generally,aspartoftheongoingreformprocessinMyanmar,manyoftheexistinglawsandregulationslikelytobeaffectedbytheIPAarecurrentlyunderrevision.PolicyspacefortheMyanmar government and people, meaning freedom to legislate is essential to raisestandards of social, environmental and human rights protection. As such, the agreementneedstoavoidplacingrestraintsonMyanmar’sgovernmentonthebasisofforexamplethethreatof indirectexpropriation.The threatof foreign investorshaving recourse to ISDSorevenICSmightrestrainMyanmar’sgovernmentfromimplementingdomesticpolicymeasuresto promote social inclusion, labour rights or environmental protection, if the domesticmeasures envisaged may pose a risk to the value of a foreign investment and thereforeprovidegroundforlitigation.113

4.1.LandgovernancereformLand-relatedpoliciesandlawsincludingthosecurrentlyunderrevision,pendingapprovalorrecentlypassed• 2008ConstitutionArticle37:“TheGovernmentistheultimateownerofallland”• LandAcquisitionAct(1894–newversionbeingdrafted)• FarmlandLaw(2012)• Vacant,Fallow&VirginLandLaw(2012)• NationalLandUse(2016)• ForestPolicyandForestLaw(awaitingnewversion)• NationalEnvironmentalPolicy(draftfromDecember2016)• ForeignInvestmentLaw(2016,investmentrulespending)

Atpresent,Myanmarlacksanoverarchingpieceoflegislationgoverninglandownershipandlanduse.Instead,thereisapatchworkoflawsrelatedtodifferenttypesofland,fromforest,farmland,fallowlandandindustrialland.Intotalmorethan30lawsgovernlandmanagement,someofthemdatingfromthe19thcenturyBritishcolonialperiod.Sincelastyear,Myanmarisatthebeginningofwhatcouldpotentiallybealargeoverhaulofits land governance system. The new NLUP adopted in January 2016 aims to harmonise

110Seehttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm111SeeTNI,2016,InvestmentCourtSystemputtothetest:NewEUproposalwillperpetuateinvestor’sattacksonhealthandenvironment112Seehttps://www.tni.org/en/article/suspend-negotiations-for-an-investment-protection-agreement-between-the-eu-and-myanmar113AprivatesectorrepresentativestatedthatEuropeancompaniesarenotlikelytosueagovernmentforraisingenvironmentalstandardsbecauseofreputationalrisk.Whilethatmaybetrue,thepossibilitythattheywouldmaystillcauseregulatorychill.

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existinglawsandguidedevelopmentofanewlandlaw.Asstatedbyakeycommentator“TheNLUP uses rights-based language in its basic principles. It refers directly to human rightsstandardsinchaptersrelatedtolandacquisition,thelanduserightsofethnicminoritiesandisframedwithexplicitreferencetotheequalityofmenandwomen.”114Onthebasisoftheserights,theNLUPproposessomechangesforMyanmar’slandgovernancesystem.Someofthekeynewdirectionsinthispolicyinclude:• Recognitionofcustomarylandtenureincludingdecisionmakingpower(discussedincore

sectionsoftheNLUP)• Explicit recognition and protection of land under rotating and shifting cultivation and

customarycultivationpractices.’Itcouldbearguedthattheprovisiononrecognitionandprotectionof‘naturalresourcesandecologicalsystem[s]thatprovidesharedlivelihoodandsocio-economicdevelopmentbenefitstothesurroundingcommunities’(paragraph29e)providesfurtherrecognitionandprotectionofthosesurroundingcommunitiesandtheiraccessandcontrolofsaidnaturalresourcesandlocalecosystems115

• References to a need for participatory, transparent and accountable processes anddisputeresolution

• Itpromisestoavoidthelossoflandusealongwiththeprotectionoftheenvironment.Pledges to develop new procedures and ensure environmental and social impactassessmentsarereallocated

• Whentherelocationofcommunitiesisclaimedtobenecessaryforanoverridingpublicpurpose,theNLUPcalls forpublicconsultation,negotiationandparticipatorydecision-making,withpreferencegiventolocalstakeholders

Fortheseprovisionstobecomeeffective,theywillhavetobeturnedintolaw.Atpresent,itis unclear what shape a potential new Land Lawmight take. In fact, mid November, theCommission for theAssessmentof LegalAffairs andSpecial Issuesheadedby ShweMannwroteamemotoParliamentandthePresident'sOfficeoutliningfivecomponentsofthepolicythatitadvisescancellingandsixcomponentsforrevision.Theelementssuggestedfordeletioninclude;theestablishmentofalandinformationmanagementbody;newspecialcourtsandindependentarbitrationmechanismsforlanddisputes;explicitmentionofethniclandrightsandcustomarylandtenurepractices;andanentiresectionongenderequality.116ThisactionmakesitevenmoreunclearwhatwillhappenwiththenewNLUPandwhetherorhowitwillbetranslatedintolaw. Onechangethat isongoing, isanamendmenttothe1894LandAcquisitionAct,whichhasallowedforalotofbadpracticesoflandacquisition.Ascommented:“Althoughitstipulatesprocedures for preliminary investigations, notification, andobjections –whichwould helpmitigate land-related human rights abuses – in practice they have rarely been followed.Inadequatecompensationisacommoncomplaintaspeoplerarelygetmarketvaluefortheirland. At the same time, the courts have proven reluctant to address politically andeconomicallysensitivecases.”117Whilesomepeoplehaveseenfirstdrafts, theprocesshasnotbeenveryopenandconsultativesofar.

114ArticleinFrontierbyDanielAguirre,19February2016,seehttp://frontiermyanmar.net/en/sound-basis-land-reform115Seehttps://www.tni.org/en/article/the-right-to-land-at-crossroads-in-myanmar116 See http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=364951420&Country=Myanmar&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast#117ArticleinFrontierbyDanielAguirre,19February2016,seehttp://frontiermyanmar.net/en/sound-basis-land-reform

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Therehasbeenanon-goingprocessofgovernmentengagementwithcivilsocietytorevisethe Farmland Law and Vacant, Fallow & Virgin Land Law – particularly with regard toincreasing the representation of these groups in Farmland Administration Bodies andpotentiallyalsootherdecision-makingcommittees.Largely,thedemandforreformsofthetwolandlawshassofarbeensubsumedbyotherpriorities.118Recentlyhowever,therewerenewstrongcallstolookintotheselaws119andthegovernmenthasalsorecentlyindicateditwantstoamendtheselaws.120

Endof2015,theOneMapMyanmarprojectwasinitiated.OneMapMyanmarwillcombineallthespatialdataofgovernmentdepartmentsanddevelopmentorganisationsby2020.Accesstoanduseoflanduseinformationofthewholecountrywillbepublicallyavailablethroughopenwebplatformintransparentmanner.Amongstothers,theworkalsoaimstoleadtodataonaveragepricescompaniesarepayingforconcessions,whichoverallareknowntobeverylow.Itisexpectedthatthegovernment,onceconfrontedwiththeverylowpriceofland,maydecidetocallforamoratorium.121Anumberoforganisationshasalreadycalledforalarge-scalelandconcessionmoratoriumforother reasons, particularly in relation to agribusiness. In May 2016, Fauna & FloraInternational called foroil palmmoratorium toprotectMyanmar’s rainforest.122InAugust2016 Oxfam recommended the Government of Myanmar to cease granting large-scaleconcessionsuntilthenewNLUPisbeingeffectivelyimplementedandaLandLawispassed.123Early2017,FSWG“recommendedtoputaholdonawardingfurtherconcessionsuntilamoretransparent,equitableprocessisputinplace,andthebacklogofconflictsandambiguitiesofexisting contracts has been cleared.” 124 Several (ethnic) groups have also called for amoratorium on hydropower, including TNI 125 and KESAN126 . At present the InternationalFinanceCorporationtogetherwiththeMinistryofElectricPowerandtheMinistryofNaturalResources and Environmental Conservation also launched Myanmar’s first ever StrategicEnvironmentalAssessmentforMyanmar’shydropowersector.Therearealsoothernewupcomingpoliciesandlawsthatwillbeshaped,ostensiblyundertheguidanceofthenewNLUP.ThecurrentForestLawandForestPolicydatefrom1992and1995,andbothareexpectedtobeupdated.127DraftsofthenewForestLawhavealreadycirculatedand changes include more effective and efficient procedures concerned with forestmanagementandconservation.128Therearealsorumorstheenvironmentalconservationlawmightchange.129

118InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,January2017119Seehttp://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/yangon/24585-report-urges-review-of-land-laws-to-protect-small-scale-farmers.html120Seehttp://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/24943-two-laws-to-be-amended-to-solve-land-disputes.html121InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,January2017122Seehttp://www.fauna-flora.org/news/fauna-flora-international-calls-for-oil-palm-moratorium-to-protect-myanmars-rainforest/123Oxfam,2016,“WhoseCrops,atWhatPrice.AgriculturalInvestmentinMyanmar”,p.6124FoodSecurityWorkingGroup,2017,InvestmentsinAgribusiness,p.9125NangShiningfortheTransnationalInstitute,seehttps://www.tni.org/en/article/hydropower-in-myanmar-for-whose-benefit126Seehttp://www.greengrowthdialogue.org/sites/greengrowthdialogue.org/files/publication_docs/KESAN_Hydropower_GreenLotus_Oct18_2014_0.pdf127InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,January2017128KevinWoodsandKerstinCanby,2012,“ForestCertificationinMyanmar”,p.2.Alsoseehttps://news.mongabay.com/2016/09/myanmars-forests-face-myriad-problems-as-logging-ban-continues/129InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,January2017

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Altogether,theneedforlandreformisthekeymotivationforoppositiontotheEU-MyanmarIPA.Even if theright toregulate isstrongly included in theagreement,civil societyarguestherearerisks.Asonerespondentnoted:

“IfMyanmaralreadyhadadecentlandgovernancesysteminplace,anIPAcouldbeokay.Butgiventhefundamentalissueswithlandissues,itissimplynotthetimetoattractmoreinvestmentandprovidetheseinvestorswithprotections.Thecountrymusthaveleewaytodealwithlandconcessions.Itisnotunthinkablethatinthefuturethere will be regulation granting communities more ownership over land in theirvillages.Ifcompaniesarealreadyoperatingonthoselands,thegovernmentwilltheneitherhavetoforcevillagerstoacceptthat,orthegovernmentwouldhavetopaycompensation.”130

4.2.InvestmentlawreformInvestment and related laws currently under revision, pending approval or recentlypassed131• 2016MyanmarInvestmentLawandforthcominginvestmentrules• NationalEnvironmentalPolicy(draftfromDecember2016)• BanksandFinancialInstitutionsLaw(2016)• PesticidesLaw(1990),FertilizerLaw(2002)(underrevision)• FarmerProtectionAct(2013)• CopyrightLaw,PatentLaw,TrademarksLaw,IndustrialDesignLaw(draft)• IntellectualPropertyLaw(draft)• EIArules(2016)• ClimateChangeStrategy(2016-2030)(nearlyfinished)• HotelsandTourismLaw(newdraft)• MyanmarCompaniesAct(hasbeenrevised,expectedtobepassedincomingmonths)• SpecialEconomicZoneLaw(2014)• ArbitrationLaw(2016)• NewPlantVarietiesProtectionLawForeignerscaninvestinMyanmarundertheforeigninvestmentframeworkprovidedunderthe Myanmar Companies Act, the Myanmar Foreign Investment Law and the SEZ Law.Through these laws, foreign investors can establish a foreign branch office in Myanmar,incorporateaprivatelimitedcompany,applyforandsecureaninvestmentpermitfromtheMIC, or apply for and secure an investment permit from the relevant Myanmar SEZManagementCommittee(SEZpermit).Similar to land governance, oneof themost pressing problemsof the current investmentregulatory framework is its complexity, with half a dozen laws regulating the entry ofinvestors,dependingonthesectorandlocationoftheinvestmentandonwhetherornottheinvestorisforeign.Theapprovalprocessisequallycomplex,withforeigninvestorssometimesrequiringoverlappingapprovalsandfacingdetailedandoftenopaquecriteriaforscrutinising

130AlsonotethatthedraftEU-MyanmarIPAgrantsprotectionsto‘investmentsexistingonthedateofentryintoforceofthisAgreement,aswellasinvestmentsmadeoracquiredthereafter,meaningitlimitsthespaceforthegovernmenttoaddressinjusticesofthepreviousmilitarygovernment.131ForamorecompleteoverviewseetheOECD2014MyanmarInvestmentPolicyReview,p.26

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individualprojects.132Atpresent,boththeMyanmarCompaniesActandtheMyanmarInvestmentLaw(MIL)andtherelatedInvestmentRulesarebeingoverhauled.TheseprocesseswilllikelybecompletebeforethepotentialpassingofanEU-MyanmarIPA.TheMILhasalreadybeenpassedandwillcomeintoforcewithfulleffectinApril2017.TheseconddraftoftheMyanmarInvestmentRules were released on 4 February 2017 and are expected to be finalised by the end ofMarch.133ForboththenewMILandrelatedrules,thegovernmenthasbeenworkingcloselywiththeWorldBank’sgroupInternationalFinanceCorporation.Thismeans that some of the risks raised in relation to a potential IPA, are either alreadycreatedbyoraddressedinthenewMIL.Italsomeansthatnofurthermajorlegislativereformsintheareaofinvestmentaretobeexpectedforthecomingyears.TheobjectiveoftheupdatedMILisexplainedinthelaw’spreamble:

This Law replaces and consolidates the Foreign Investment Law (LawNo. PyidaungsuHtluttawLawNo.21,2012,2November2012)andtheMyanmarCitizensInvestmentLaw(LawNo.PyidaungsuHtluttawLawNo.18of29July2013).TheobjectiveoftheLawistopromoteenvironmentallyandsociallysustainableeconomicgrowthanddiversificationoftheproductivesectoroftheUnion.TheLawalsointendstoprovideinvestors,bothdomestic and foreign with a set of fundamental and enforceable legal rights andguarantees.TheLawalsoupholdstheprincipleoftransparency,fairnessandtheruleoflaw,inaccordancewithacceptedinternationalstandardsandpractice.

Ofrelevancetolandrights,isthatthenewLawseekstoreducebarrierstotheleaseoflandfor long term investment uses by both domestic and international group. This has thepotentialtoseverelyaffectthosewhosetenureonthelandtheyareusingisnotrecognised,aswellasthosewhosefinancialsituationisweakening.TherelevantpassagefromtheLawisshownbelow(GovernmentoftheRepublicoftheUnionofMyanmar,2015):

All Investors have the right to lease land either from private land-holders or fromGovernmentEntitiesinthecaseofStateland,basedonthecategoryofusageincludingindustrial,agricultural,livestockbreedingandotherformsofinvestmentforaperiodtobeagreedbetweentheinvestorandthelessor.ForForeignInvestorstherighttoleaselanduptoamaximumperiodof50yearsisguaranteedwithanextensionof10yearsandforafurther10yearsthereafter.134

WhenusedinconjunctionwithotherpiecesoflegislationsuchastheVirgin,Fallow&VacantActof2012orthe1894LandAcquisitionAct,thereisstrongpotentialforthisprovisiontonegativelyaffectlandholdersinfavourofinvestors.Keyprovisionsalsoprovidedby theMIL includeMostFavouredNation,FairandEquitableTreatmentandtheRighttoRegulate.Withregardstotheregulate,theICJhascommentedthattheMILincludeskeyprovisionsprotectingthegovernment’s‘righttoregulate’infavourofhumanrightsandtheenvironment.135132SeeOECD2014MyanmarInvestmentPolicyReview,p.26133seehttp://www.dica.gov.mm/sites/dica.gov.mm/files/document-files/mir_-_draft_rules_tranche_1_to_3_557979_singapore_33378_0.pdf,alsopresentationbyAungNaingOoattheMyanmarSocialImpactForumon28February.134Section13135Seehttps://www.icj.org/myanmar-public-consultation-improves-new-draft-investment-law/

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Tothegovernment’scredit,itorganisedanumberofconsultationmeetingsfortheMILandacceptedextensivecivilsocietyinput.FirstdraftsofthenewInvestmentLawincludedISDS,butfollowingseverecivilsocietycriticism,thiswaseventuallytakenout.ThefinalversionoftheMILrequiresthataseparatearbitrationagreementisalreadyinexistence,whichwillthenbe enforced. 136 Myanmar has recently acceded to the New York Convention on theRecognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which would allow Myanmar’scourtstorecognisearbitralawardsmadeinjurisdictionspartytothesameconvention.Thecountry’s government also recently enacted the 2016 Arbitration Law that is intended toprovide a framework capable of supporting the recognition and enforcement of foreignarbitralawardsbyMyanmarcourts.Somerespondentstothisresearchstatedthatduetocivilsociety’sfocusongettingISDStakenout,lesslobbyeffortscouldbemaderegardingotherelementsofthelaw.137Also,asperacommentaryontheseconddraftMyanmar InvestmentRulesbyEarthRightsInternational,Oxfam,theInternationalCommissionofJurists(ICJ)andMCRB,“theDraftRulesdo not address the problematic timing issue that exists between the MIC process forinvestments that requireaPermitand investors' responsibility toobtainanEnvironmentalComplianceCertificateaspertheEIAProcedures.”138Overall, itappears thatwith thenewMILand investment rules,Myanmarhasmadestepstowardsbetterregulationofresponsiblebusinessconductinitsnationallaws139,whileseveralconcernsalsoremain,particularlyinrelationtolandrightsandenvironmentalconcerns.ThesearealsonotbeingsolvedwiththeEU-MyanmarIPA.4.3.OtherreformprocessesAnother, more general key point of tension between a potential EU-Myanmar IPA anddomesticlegislativereformsitsinrelationtothepeaceprocessMyanmariscurrentlygoingthrough,andwhichaccordingtotheNLD’s12pointeconomicpolicyisanationalpriority.140Giventhediscussionsaboutfederalism,itmaywellbethatinthefutureMyanmarwillchangeforexamplerevenuearrangementsgoverninganinvestment,followingdecisionsonrevenuesharing with States and Regions. Another example is ownership of companies, whichsubnationalgovernmentsmaywanttolimit.Orthatinthefutureethnicstateswillbeallowedtoadopttheirownsubnationalpoliciesandregulations,forexamplearoundlandgovernance,as is well hoped bymost ethnic actors.141Whowill then be responsible for the potentialnegative impactsthesemayhaveon investorswith investments inEthnicStates? TheEU-Myanmar IPA does not require any further scrutiny of investments in conflict and borderareas, or consider the role of other non-government actors, including Ethnic ArmedOrganizations that may be operating in proposed investment areas. This risks allowinginvestmentsinconflictandborderareasthatmayexacerbateandfuelconflictintheseareasandjeopardizethepeaceprocess.AsalsoraisedinrelationtothenewInvestmentRules,thereshouldbemorediscussion about the typeof scrutiny theMIC should give to investments

136Section85(b)137InterviewswithCSOandINGOrepresentatives,January2017138 See Joint submission by EarthRights International, Oxfam, ICJ and MCRB, http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/2017-02-07-Investment-Rules-Commentary-Tranche.pdf139Duringinterviews,arespondentnotedthatthenewMILaffordsenoughprotectiontoforeigninvestors,includingtheEU.140Seehttp://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/21664-nld-12-point-economic-policy-announcement.html141InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,February2017

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undertakeninBorderareas,as“ThisisanareaofdemocraticgovernanceinMyanmarthatisofutmostimportance-andshouldbesubjecttonationaldebateandparticipatoryreformaspartofthecomprehensivepeaceprocesscurrentlyunderway.”1424.4.TherighttoregulateThe“righttoregulate”referstothestate'sabilitytolegislateandadoptadministrativeactswithoutrunningtheriskofhavingtopaydamagesastheresultofadisputebasedonanIPA.Forprovisions in the ‘right to regulate’ clause tobe strongenough toallow theMyanmargovernmenttoenactlegitimatelegislationwithoutfacinglawsuits,theyneedtobestronglyformulated. Overall, the dispute resolution mechanism should be clearly confined toinvestmentprotectionobligations,excludinglegitimatepolicyactions,especiallythosetakenforprotectionofhumanrights,labourrightsorenvironmentalprotection.143Giventhelatesttextisnotpublic,itisunclearwhethertherighttoregulateisdulyformulated.OnthebasisofthedrafttextfromMay2015,FIDHarguestherighttoregulateisnotdulyformulated:

“CETAandTTIP’sinnovationsshowjusthowmuchofaneedthereisforcautionandtoavoidrushingtoconcludeproblematicagreements.Comparedtootherinvestmentagreements,theCETAoffersamorepreciseformulationofsomeprovisions(suchasonexpropriation)andofferssomeinnovationregardingISDS(mainlythepossibilitytoagree later on an appeal mechanism and code of conduct for arbitrators, thepossibilityforthepartiestoagreeonspecificinterpretationandtransparencyrulesinISDS).However,thoseproposals,despitesomepositiveimprovements,onlyprovideapartialanswertohumanrightschallenges. Improvementshavebeenqualifiedaspositive,but largely insufficientandmainlycosmetic.Facingstrongopposition, theCommission suspended the negotiation of TTIP and promised reforms. The newmodelprovidedforTTIPproposesnotablyanewclauseontheright toregulate,aprofessionalised ISDS Court (instead of the ad hoc arbitral tribunals), an appealmechanism, and provides additional elements that may help to preserve theautonomyoftheEUlegalorder.Onceagain,thoseinnovationsareinteresting,butdonot appear to address human rights concerns. In that regard, and noting that thedisproportionateeffectsonhumanrightsshownintable9oftheSIAincentivereportremainunchanged,otheroptionsneedtobeframed.144

However,duringinterviewsarespondentnotedthatitappearsthatinlaterdraftsoftheEU-MyanmarIPAtherighttoregulateisnowadequatelyformulated.145

142SeeJointsubmissionbyEarthRightsInternational,Oxfam,ICJandMCRB,http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/pdf/2017-02-07-Investment-Rules-Commentary-Tranche.pdf,p.2143 Development Solutions, 2016, Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of an investment protectionagreementbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheRepublicoftheUnionofMyanmar,p.154144FIDH,7December2015,“Openletter;EU-Myanmar/BurmaInvestmentagreementanditssustainabilityimpactassessment–concernsonthewayhumanrightsaretakenintoaccount,p.10145InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,January2017

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Chapter5:PotentialPositiveImplications 5.1.WillanIPAleadtomoreinvestment?ThekeyargumentusedbyproponentsoftheIPAisthatMyanmarneedsmoreinvestment,andthatanIPAwillleadtomoreinvestment.BothrepresentativesoftheEuropeanprivatesector as well as the Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA)emphasizedthattheMyanmarneedsmoreinvestmentinordertoreducepovertyandachieveitsdevelopmentgoals.146Lookingatthecontext,therehasbeenadeclineinforeigninvestmentin2016.BetweenAprilandDecember2016,thevalueofapprovedFDIdecreased28%fromthesameperiodin2015to USD 3,5 billion. Total FDI in the last fiscal yearwas downwith USD 1 billion from thepreviousyear.Generally,thisisattributedtoforeignfirmswaitingtoseewhatisbecomingofnewlawsandregulationsbythenewgovernment.ThecomingintoeffectoftheNewMILinAprilthisyearisexpectedtoboostFDI.147Given thatMyanmarhas already concluded12BITs148, and that there are the investmentprotection provisions agreed to in the framework of ASEAN, the EU-Myanmar IPA wouldensurealevelplayingfieldforEUinvestors,andcombinedwithmoreoverallregulatoryclaritythisisexpectedtoboosttheamountofEuropeanFDI.Lookingatinternationalresearch,evidencethatinternationalinvestmentagreementsdeliverontheirstatedpurpose is inconclusive.MostresearchstudiescarriedoutbytheacademiccommunityhavefailedtofindadirectcorrelationbetweenIIAsandattractionforFDI.149Inrelatedvein,thisresearchfoundrelativelylimitedinterestamongstEuropeancompaniesalready present in Myanmar. While respondents said the agreement would probably bewelcomed, they noted there had been little questions about or interest in it from bothcompaniesalreadyoperating150aswellascountriesexploringinvestinginMyanmar.Partially,this may be due to the fact that large operating companies have already negotiatedprotections in Production Sharing Contracts (oil and gas), License Agreements(telecommunications) or can access protection by investing via Singapore and benefittingfromtheASEANComprehensiveInvestmentAgreement.Anotherlikelyreasonisthatthereareothermorepressingconcerns.Discussing keybarriers to investment,oneglobal risk and strategic consulting firm stated:“Clients(companies,NGOs,internationalorganisations)aremainlyconcernedabout:lackof

146Interviewswithprivatesectorrepresentatives.147Seehttp://www.mizzima.com/business-domestic/telecom-sector-attracts-most-foreign-investment-myanmar-2016148WithIsrael,theRepublicofKorea,theUS,Indonesia,Japan,India,Thailand,Kuwait,Laos,China,VietnamandthePhilippines149AsalsoreferredtobyTNI(https://www.tni.org/en/article/suspend-negotiations-for-an-investment-protection-agreement-between-the-eu-and-myanmar),in2010theEuropeanCommissioninterviewed300EuropeanCompaniesabouttherelevanceoftreaties,andfoundoutthatonly10%hadaworkingknowledgeofinvestmenttreaties,40%hadsomegeneralawareness,and50%hadnoknowledgeatall(EuropeanCommission,“2010SurveyoftheAttitudesoftheEuropeanBusinessCommunitytoInternationalInvestmentRules”,TNSofresConsultingonbehalfoftheEuropeanCommissionDGTrade).AlsoseeJ.Yackee,2011,“DoBilateralInvestmentTreatiesPromoteForeignDirectInvestment?”,51VirginiaJournalofInternationalLaw,p.429.150AnumberoflargeEuropeancompanieshavealreadyinvestedinMyanmarintheabsenceofaninvestmenttreaty,e.g.TOTAL,Shell,ENI,BP,Unilever,Carlsberg,Heineken,BAT,DeHeus,Lafarge,Ericsson.

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infrastructure,unavailabilityofskilledlocallabour(bothitemsaddingtooperatingcost)andtheweakregulatorylandscape(weakandunclearlawsandregulations,weakandsometimesselective/erraticenforcement).151

5.2.WillanIPAleadtobetterinvestment?AnotherargumentinfavouroftheIPAisthatanIPAwillleadtobetter,Europeaninvestment.Specifically,investmentfromtheEUissaidtocomewithapositiveimpactonjobs,growthandpovertyalleviation,and raise standardsof responsiblebusiness.EU investmentwouldbring jobs and growth, technology transfer, higher standards of safety, social andenvironmentalprotection.AnIPAcouldintheorysupportMyanmar’spolicyreformprocess.Ongoingreformsonlabourand human rights issues could be supported through the transfer of EU good practices,particularly with regards to CSR and RBC, reforms to protect the environment could besupportedbytechnologyandbestpracticestransferinmultiplesectorsincludingsewageandwaste management, and transparency provisions could support positive developmentsconcerningsustainabilityandresponsiblebusinessconductinMyanmar,particularlythroughimprovementstostakeholders’awarenessofkeyissuesandimprovedaccountability.152However,asFIDHalsonotes,itremainstobeseenhoweffectivethemechanismsinitiatedintheagreementsregardingresponsibleinvestmentandsustainabledevelopmentare.153

ChapterIV,Article6oftheagreementreads:

1. “The Parties recognise that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and responsiblebusinessconductstrengthenthecontributionofinvestmenttoasustainablegrowthaswellastotheachievementandmaintenanceofhighlevelsofenvironmental,socialandlabourprotection,andcontributetotheobjectivesofthisAgreement.ThePartiesfurther recognise that CSR, by its voluntary nature, supplements domestic laws intheseareas.

2. ThePartiesagreetopromoteCSR,responsiblebusinessconductandaccountability,including concerning adherence, implementation, follow-up and dissemination ofinternationallyagreedguidelinesandprinciples.Theyagreetoencouragetheuptakeofresponsiblebusinessconductinlinewithinternationalguidelinesandprinciples,bycompanies, investorsandgovernments, includingthroughexchangeof informationandbestpractices.Inthisregard,thePartiesshallreferandadheretointernationallyrecognisedguidelinesandprinciplesonCSRandresponsiblebusinessconduct,suchastheOECDGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises,theUNGlobalCompact,theUNGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights,ISO26000,andtheILOTripartiteDeclarationofPrinciplesconcerningMultinationalEnterprisesandSocialPolicy.

3. Accordingly,thePartiescommittocooperatingtofosteradherence,implementation,follow-up,anddisseminationofinternationallyrecognisedguidelinesandprinciplesonCSRandresponsiblebusinessconduct.”154

151E-mailexchangewithaprivatesectorrepresentative,February2017152 Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, December 2015, Challenges of the proposed EU-MyanmarInvestmentProtectionAgreement153 SIA p, 44, FIDH, 7 December 2015, “Open letter; EU-Myanmar/Burma Investment agreement and itssustainabilityimpactassessment–concernsonthewayhumanrightsaretakenintoaccount,p.9154EU-MyanmarIPAdrafttext29May2015,p.32

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None of these provisions actually bind companies to good behavior. Some internationalstandardsarenamecheckedinparagraph3oftheabovequotedArticle6,suchastheOECDGuidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding Principles on Business andHumanRights.However,thisreferencedoesnotcreatebindingrequirementsoneitherParty,butmerelyashared‘commitmenttofosteradherence.’155MrDeZayas,IndependentExpertonthepromotionofademocraticandequitableinternationalorderappointedbytheHumanRights Council of the UN, recommends that States shouldwork towards a legally bindingframeworkcoveringcorporatesocialresponsibilities.TheIPAalsocontainsacommitmenttotransparencyinlaw-making(Chapter3andChapter4Article 8). Improvements in transparency would be highly desirable. However similarrequirementsintheMyanmar-JapanInvestmentAgreement(Article8)havenotresultedinmoretransparencyinMyanmarlaw-making.156MCRB reports that the presence of European companies that have already invested inMyanmarsuchasTOTAL,Shell,ENI,BP,Unilever,Carlsberg,Heineken,BAT,DeHeus,LafargeandEricssonhavehadapositiveeffectforMyanmarintermsofeconomicgrowthaswellasbecause the environmental and social standards they follow are higher than companiestraditionallyinvestinginMyanmar.FIDHhoweverarguesthattheEUhasyettogiveeffecttotheirstatementsonupholdingthehigheststandardsofCSRininvestinginMyanmar.157MCRBstates that “Objectives of CSR/RBC for EU companies operating in Myanmar should beincludedinthetextoftheagreement,encouragingcompaniestoadheretosimilarCSR/RBCpracticesasareupheldintheEU,tailoredtolocalconditions.”158Inaddition,theEUshouldconsiderarequirementforgreatertransparencybyEUinvestorsinMyanmar,astheUShavedone. Likewise, the 2014 OECD Myanmar Investment Policy Review recommendedincorporating CSR obligations in investment treaties (e.g. US-Peru).159BothMCRB and theOECDunderlinetheimportanceofamandatoryhumanrightsduediligenceforinvestorsinMyanmar.160Overall,forlocalcivilsocietyitisdifficulttoacceptthepromisethattheEUwillindeedfollowbettersocialandenvironmentalstandards,whilebeingunwillingtoincludebindingstandardsandcompliancemechanismsintheagreement.1615.3.WillanEU-MyanmarIPAleadtobetterregulatoryframeworks?

Myanmar’sinterestinattractingFDIcouldbeanincentiveforMyanmartoimprovedomesticregulatoryframeworksanddisputesettlementsystems.However,thefactthatIPAsinfactcreateparallelagreementsandsystemssuchasISDSmeansthatinpracticelittleneedstobedonetoimprovethese.Indeed,exhaustionoflocalremediesisnotaconditionforaccessingISDS in the EU-Myanmar IPA, taking away incentives for judicial reform. Efforts currently

155AlsoseeJonathanBonnitcha,2016,Trendsininvestmenttreatiesandtheirinteractionwithotherlegalinstruments:ADiscussionPaper,p.9.156 Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, December 2015, Challenges of the proposed EU-MyanmarInvestmentProtectionAgreement157 Development Solutions, 2016, Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of an investment protectionagreementbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheRepublicoftheUnionofMyanmar,p.110158MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,December2015,ChallengesoftheproposedEU-MyanmarInvestmentProtectionAgreement159OECD,2014,InvestmentPolicyReviews:Myanmar,p.77160MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,December2015,ChallengesoftheproposedEU-MyanmarInvestmentProtectionAgreement161InterviewswithCSOrepresentatives,January2017

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underwaytoimprovetheefficiencyandreliabilityofMyanmar’snationalcourtsystemraisequestionsaboutwhetherinvestmenttreatiesshouldrequireforeigninvestorstomakesomeattempt to resolvedisputes innational courtsbefore submitting claims to ISDS.162Overall,IPAs may rather weaken the authority and improvement of domestic law and domesticcourts.163Itisforsuchreasonsthatsomecountries,likeIndia,haveincludedexhaustionofdomesticremediesintheirmodelBIT.

Anotherargumentheard in favourof the IPA is thatanexemplaryEU-Myanmar IPAcouldserveasanexampleforfutureinvestmentagreements.Ifboththeprocessandtheactualfinalagreementitselfsucceedinaddressingallkeyconcernsandsatisfyingallstakeholders,itmaywell set the standard much higher for future other agreements between Myanmar andcountrieswithinvestmentinterests.Atpresent,giventhecurrentcontentisunknown,it isdifficulttomakepredictionsaboutthispossiblepositiveeffect.Moreover,theMostFavouredNationclauseisdirectlycontradictorytothisprovisionasitwouldentitleEUcompaniestoactuallymakeusofthesameprovisionsasIPAsinplacewithothercountries.

162JonathanBonnitcha,2016,Trendsininvestmenttreatiesandtheirinteractionwithotherlegalinstruments:ADiscussionPaper,p.8163Forthisreason,amongstotherstheICJencouragedtheGovernmentofMyanmartoincludeaprovisionfortheexhaustionoflocalremediesintheagreement.TheEUrefusedtheproposal,likelybecauseoftheweakjudicialsysteminMyanmar.

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Chapter6:ConclusionsandRecommendationsforLobbyandAdvocacy6.1.ConclusionsWidespreadlandconflictsandpendinglandgovernancereform,alsoinrelationtothelargerongoingpeaceprocess,formthekeyreasonforoppositiontothependingEU-MyanmarIPA.Aspreviouslyexplained,landrightsarenotwellestablishedandpopulationslivingorworkingonlandacquiredforlarge-scaleinvestmentprojectshaveprotestedoverforcedevictions,lossof livelihoods, inadequate consultation and compensation. Land governance reform isexpectedandwanted,aswellaslargergovernancereforminthecontextofthepeaceprocess,althoughthebreadthanddepthoftheseremainunknown.Inadditiontotheneedforprotectionofland-relatedhumanrights,andtheneedforpolicyspace, Myanmar at present has limited institutional capacity to implement stringentcommitments,duetowhichitmayfailtoeffectivelyenforceIPAmeasures.Thereislimitedintra-governmentinformationsharingandcoordination,whichcouldunintentionallyexposethecountrytoexpensivelitigationrisks.Combinedwiththeumbrellaclauseincludedintheagreement,thismayincreasethevulnerabilityofhoststatestolitigationunderinvestmenttreaties.Ultimately,a lotofthediscussionaround investmentprotectioncomesdowntoapoliticaldiscussionaboutdevelopmenttrajectories.Likeonerespondentalsonoted,“ThisIPAwillbefine forMyanmaras longas itwants tocontinuewhat starts to lookmoreandmoreasaneoliberaldevelopmentpolicy.Iftheystaywithintheneoliberalparadigm,therewillnotbeproblems. But if one day they want to adopt massive land reform, they will run intotrouble.”164Thisalsoexplainsthepositionofsomeoftheprivatestakeholdersconsulted,whoemphasizeMyanmarsimplyneedsmoreinvestmentifitwantstoreducepoverty,andthatthislargerpicturemaysometimeshavetooverrulesmallerissues.Inshort,differentpeoplehavedifferentvisionsforMyanmar’sfuture.However, given theNLDEconomicPolicy visionof the government is supposedly“people-centred, and aims to achieve inclusive and continuous development, and that it aims toestablish an economic framework that supports national reconciliation, based on the justbalancingofsustainablenaturalresourcemobilizationandallocationacrosstheStatesandRegion”165,theremayindeedbeissueswithspecific IPAprovisions inthefuture,forwhichintensifiedlobbyatthisstageiswarranted.6.2.RecommendationsThisstudyrecommendsthefollowingrecommendationsforlobbyandadvocacyactivitiesatthenationalandEUlevel.Whilethereportfocusedonthetextratherthantheprocess,somerecommendationstoinfluencetheprocessarealsobeingmade.

164InterviewwithINGOrepresentative,January2017165Seehttp://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/21664-nld-12-point-economic-policy-announcement.html

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6.2.1.Lobby&advocacytowardsnationallevelFortheserecommendations, INGOscanplayarole inconvening,encouragingandtraininglocalCSOstowardscarryingouttheseactivities,offeringsupportwhereneeded:• LobbyDICAformoretransparencyandconsultation.Theabsenceoftransparencyand

public consultations hasmade it near impossible forMyanmar civil society aswell asinternational commentators to reflect on the agreement and provide suggestions forimprovements.WhiletheEUmayprefertokeepthenegotiationsprivate,Myanmar inthisperiodofcrucialreformcaninsistonanopenprocess.Ingeneral,Myanmarcanbeencouragedtoinitiatefullytransparentandsystematicconsultationonpolicies,lawsandsecondaryregulation,inwhichanyonehastheabilitytocomment.

• LobbytheParliamentforamorenationallyownedprocess.TheIPAprocessisentirelydrivenbyseniorlevelsofDICA,thePresident’sOfficeandStateCouncillorAungSanSuuKyi. 166 Few others in government are aware of the process and understand theconsequences.This is likely to remain thesame,as theagreementwillnothave togothroughParliament,but canbe signed intoeffectby thePresident.MPs canbemademoreawareoftheissue,andtheycaninsistondebatesinParliament.

• LobbyDICA fora slowdownof theprocess,anda full reviewof implicationsbeforesigning.ItappearstheGovernmentofMyanmarisrushingintoanagreementofwhichmanyingovernmenthavelimitedunderstanding.Lobbyactivitiescouldfocusonslowingdownthegovernment,andonencouragingtheundertakeoflargerassessmentsoftheimplications of the IPA and of business and human rights in general.167TheMyanmargovernmentshouldbeencouragedtoundertakeacross-governmentassessmentoftheriskoflitigationandregulatoryposedbyanEU-MyanmarIPA.

• Lobby DICA to develop a common position that can guide all investment treaty

negotiations,ratherthannegotiatingtreatiesonanadhocbasis.• Clarifytheimportanceofothermoreurgentimprovementstotheinvestmentclimate.

ItcanbemadeclearthattherearemanyotherthingsthegovernmentcoulddothataremuchmorelikelytoresultinmoreinvestmentwithouttherisksofanIPA(e.g.labourlawreform, better interdepartmental coordination and speeding up of process acrossgovernment,more consistent law and decisionmaking, and improved communicationandtransparency).168

• Campaignforchangestooneortwokeyprovisionsonly.Giventhedivisionsbetween

Myanmar civil society, and the limited understanding of investment protection, acampaign ismost likelytosucceedif it is focusedononerelativelyeasytounderstandissue.169Suggestionsforrelevantcampaigntargetscouldbe:

166CommentsfromCSOrepresentatives,February2017167AgoodstartingpointcouldbeJonathanBonnitcha,2016,Trendsininvestmenttreatiesandtheirinteractionwithotherlegalinstruments:ADiscussionPaper,p.9.AlsoseetheUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissioner’sGuidingPrinciplesonBusinessandHumanRights168MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness,December2015,ChallengesoftheproposedEU-MyanmarInvestmentProtectionAgreement169InterviewwithCSOrepresentative,January2017

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o RemovaloftheMostFavouredNationclauseallowingforthecompaniestoclaimthat MFN status to use the same provisions as IPAs in place with othercountries.170

o AllowingforPerformanceRequirementso Removal of all agribusiness protection or protection for land-intensive

investmentsingeneralo RemovalofallprotectionforinvestmentsinEthnicStateso Inclusionofexceptionsforallland-relatedreformso Accesstoremedyforhumanrightsviolationso EnforceableCSR/responsiblebusinessrequirements171

6.2.2.LobbyandadvocacytowardstheEU ThroughitschannelsinBrussels,INGOscanalsoengageinthefollowingactivities:• LobbyDGTradeformoretransparencyandconsultation.

• LobbytheEUParliamenttocommittoitsownguidelines.Overthesummerof2015,the

EU adopted new guidelines to enhance the quality of its human rights impactassessments.InOctober2015theEUreleaseditsnewstrategy“tradeforall,towardsamoreresponsibletradeandinvestmentpolicy”.Thisnewstrategycommitsto“enhancetheanalysisoftheimpactoftradepolicyonhumanrightsbothinimpactassessmentsandinexpostevaluationsbasedontherecentlydevelopedguidelines”andtoimplementtheEU2015-2018humanrightsactionplanwhichcommitstheEUto“continuetodeveloparobustandmethodologicallysoundapproachtotheanalysisofhumanrightsimpactsoftradeandinvestmentagreements,inex-anteimpactassessments,sustainabilityimpactassessmentsandex-postevaluations.

• Lobby DG Trade to undertake a more extensive human rights assessment. As

recommendedbySpecialRapporteurontheRighttoFoodOlivierdeSchutter,allStatesshouldpreparehuman rights impactassessmentsprior to the conclusionof tradeandinvestmentagreements,whichwillhelp themfulfill theirobligationsunder thehumanrightstreaties.172

• Lobby DG Trade for a series of changes to the agreement (see the above list undercampaigninginthedomesticspace–towardstheEUlobbyshouldincludeallpoints)

• LobbyDGTradetoinsistonregularmonitoringinrelationtotheagreement,including

assessmentsofhumanrights,healthandenvironmentalimpactsaftertheconclusionoftheagreement.

170AsalsostatedbytheSIA,“theIPAshouldincludeanarticleexpresslyexcludingtherightofcompaniestoclaimthatMostFavouredNation (MFN) statusentitles themtouse the sameprovisionsas IPAs inplacewithothercountries should be included. This is especially important due to the lack of human rights and environmentalprotections included inMyanmar’sBITswithothercountries.Examplesofarticlesaddressing this issuecanbefoundinotheragreementssuchasCETA,Article8.7(4)andtheEU-VietnamFTA,Article4(6).”SeeDevelopmentSolutions,2016,SustainabilityImpactAssessmentinsupportofaninvestmentprotectionagreementbetweentheEuropeanUnionandtheRepublicoftheUnionofMyanmar,p.12171AlsoseetheUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissioner’sGuidingPrinciples,Article15172DeSchutterprovidesextensiveguidance for suchHumanRights ImpactAssessments in the followingnote:http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-59-Add5_en.pdf

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• Lobby DG Trade for the introduction of specific EU reporting requirements for EUinvestmentinMyanmar

6.2.3.OtherpossibleactionsInaddition,afewothermoregeneralactionsarerecommendedforINGOs.• Morein-depthreviewoftheEU-VietnamIPA173• Capacity building for CSOs on investment regulations, including cross-regional

exchangesandcollaborations• CapacitybuildingforCSOsontoolsandguidelinesincludingtheUnitedNationsGlobal

Compact,theGuidelinesonHumanRightsandBusiness,theVoluntaryGuidelinesontheResponsibleGovernanceofTenureofLand,FisheriesandForests,FreePriorandInformedConsent,InvestingtheRightWayandtheInterlakenGuideonRespectingLandandForestRights.

• CapacitybuildingforMPsoninvestmentregulation• Moreresearchontheprivatesectorandtheirpriorities• MoreresearchonperspectivesofEUmemberstates• Moreresearchonpossiblelitigationrisks,forexamplethroughconsultinglawfirmsin

Yangon• More independent research and documentation of investment-related human rights

violations,especiallyinthelandsector

173ThequestionistowhichextenddoestheEU’snewapproachtoinvestmentasillustratedbytheVietnamdealimproveprospectsforhumanrights,especiallylandrights?Andwhatinitialproposalforamoredevelopment-orientatedmodelorprovisionscanbemade.ForthetextoftheInvestmentChapterandtheTradeandSustainableDevelopmentChapter,seehttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154210.pdf;http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154229.pdf.

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Annex1:ListofRespondentsCSOs:

• DaweiDevelopmentAssociation(DDA)• EcoDev/ALARM• FoodSecurityWorkingGroup(FSWG)• KarenEnvironmentalandSocialActionNetwork(KESAN)• KarenHumanRightsGroup(KHRG)• LandCoreGroup(LCG)• MyanmarCentreforResponsibleBusiness(MCRB)• MettaFoundation• MyanmarPeopleAlliance(MPA)• PaungKu

INGOs:• AlternativeAseanNetworkonBurma(ALTSEAN-Burma)• Business&HumanRightsResourceCentre• InternationalFederationforHumanRights(FIDH)• InternationalCommissionforJurists(ICJ)• Oxfam• TransnationalInstitute(TNI)

Privatesector:• EUChamberofCommerce• GermanChamberofCommerce• StrohalLawyers• ControlRisk