escolha racional e participaçao politica - inventario de um debate

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University of Utah

Rational Choice and Political Participation. Evaluating the DebateAuthor(s): Paul F. WhiteleySource: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 211-233Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of UtahStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449128

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FIELD ESSAY

R a t i o n a l C h o i c e a n d P o l i t i c a lParticipation-Evaluating theDebate

PAUL F WHITELEY, COLLEGEFWILLIAM MARY NDUNIVERSITYFSHEFFIELD,NGLANDThis paper evaluates rational choice models of political participation bothat the theoretical and empirical levels. The theoretical discussion is con-cemed with evaluating attempts which have been made to circumvent theparadox fparticipation-thepropositionntroduced yMancurOlsonthatrational ctorswill not getinvolved n collectiveaction in orderto achievecommongoals.Theanalysis uggests hattheparadoxs moreof an intrac-tableproblem or rational hoicetheory han s commonlyrecognized.Theempirical ection of the paperuses data from the first nationalsurveyofConservativeartymembers n Britainomodelthedeterminantsfpoliticalactivism. ttests rational ctormodelsagainstanalternative generalncen-tives"theoryof participationwhich includes variables hat are not consis-tentwith rational hoice heoryThe conclusions thatwhilea rational hoicemodel gives great nsightsinto political participation,t providesan in-completeaccountof participation, ndby implication his maybe trueofsuch models in otherareasof politicalscience.

Muchof theliterature n politicalparticipation as developedoutsidethe rationalchoice framework. his is particularlyrueof Verbaand Nies (1972) work,whichprovides the benchmarkagainstwhich subsequent empiricalworkon politicalparticipation s often evaluated.In the present volume Leighley(1995) refersto the "standard ocioeconomic model"which is the theoreticalfocus of theirwork, and which has influenced much subsequent research on participation(see forexample,Verba,Nie andKim1978;Bames and Kaase1979;Pany,Moyserand Day 1992).At the same time rational choice theory has played an importantrole inthe analysesof politicalparticipationever since Downs' seminalwork on partycompetition (1957). An interesting,if occasionally rancorous, debate existsbetweenadvocatesof rational hoice models of participation eg., Tsebelis1990;Aldrich 1993; Jackman 1993), and opponents of such models (eg., Hindess1988; Lowi 1992; Eckstein 1992).

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However, t is also true that rational choice models of participationhavebeen problematicever since Olsonfs(1965) seminal analysis of the paradoxof participation-the proposition that rational actors will not participateincollective action in order to achieve common goals.In one sense, the work onrationalchoice in the areaof politicalparticipationhas been an extended debatecenteringon Olson'sprovocativetheoreticalargument.The purpose of this study is to evaluaterational actor models of politicalparticipation n both theoreticaland empirical terms. The theoretical discus-sion will focus on attemptswhich have been made to circumventthe paradoxof participationwithin the rational choice framework,and will try to evaluatethe success of this exercise.Theempiricalanalysiswill test a rationalactormodelof politicalactivismagainsta rival model which includes variables hatare in-consistent with the rational choice frameworkof analysis.The empirical analysisuses data from the firstnationalsurveyof Conser-vativepartymembers n Britain(Whiteley,Seydand Richardson1994).In Britain,as in most Europeanpolitical systems, individuals can join a political partyby payinga small subscriptionand agreeingto support some generalpoliticalprinciples espoused by the party.Theyare issued a partycardto identifythemas members. Some of these members pay their dues and do very little else,whereas others arevery activelyinvolved in all types of organizationalmattersand campaigns, ncludingelectioncampaigns.Thuspartymembersarea distinctgroup of individuals,who if only byjoining, participate n politics to a greaterextent than the averagecitizen, which makes them an ideal group to use forexamining high-cost types of political participation.The main preoccupation of researchinto rational choice models of par-ticipationhas been in connection with the analysisof voterturnout(RikerandOrdeshook 1968; Ferejohnand Fiorina 1974, 1975; Silberman and Durden1975; Hinich 1981;Palfrey nd Rosenthal1985; Uhlaner 1989). But as Aldrich(1993) points out, this provides only a relativelyweak test of rationalactortheories of participation,because voting is such a low-cost activity.The focuson party activism avoids this problem.Since any rational actormodel of political participationhas to deal withthe paradoxof participation,we begin by examiningthe attemptswhich havebeen made to cope with this problemin politicalscience, evaluatinghow rele-vant these are to the analysis of political participation.EVADINGTHEPARADOXOF PARTICIPATIONIn politicalscience therehave been four broadapproaches to dealingwith theparadoxof participation.Allattempt o providereasonswhy rational ndividualsshould participaten politics, in situations where theyappearto haveverylittleinfluence over outcomes.

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The firstapproachappeals to thresholdarguments, uggesting hatit is notrationalto calculate the costs and benefits of collective action when these arevery small (Barry1970; Niemi 1976; Aldrich 1993). It is an approach whichapplies to the calculus of voting,which as we mentioned earlier s the singlemost discussedproblemin rationalchoice approachesto politicalparticipation.The difficultywith this approach is that it solves the paradox by aban-doning the framework; f costs and benefits are so triviallysmall that actorsdo not bother to calculate them, then the theoreticalexplanation for votingis no longera rational hoice explanation.A second difficultywith the thresholdargument s thatit cannotexplain high-cost types of participation uch as partyactivism or campaigning.These types of participationdo not involve trivialcosts, and so this explanation is an incomplete one at best.A second approachto the collective actionproblemhas its originsin gametheory,and uses the "folk"heorem to explaincollectiveaction(Rasmusen1989:92-94).1 Hardin (1971) first pointed out that the collective action problemwas reallyan N-personprisoner'sdilemmagame,and the folk theoremaddressesthe problem of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game.2A developing literaturesuggeststhat cooperation can be obtained in theprisoner'sdilemma, and the collective good provided if a number of condi-tions are met (Taylor1976; Palfreyand Rosenthal 1983; Axelrod 1984). Thefirst condition is that participantsshould not discount the future too much,since myopia sharplyreduces the payoffsfromcooperativeaction. The secondcondition is that the game should be repeatedover time, since the dominantstrategy n the one-shot game is always noncooperation; a third and relatedrequirement s that there should be uncertaintyabout when the game ends.In the absence of such uncertainty, process of backwards nduction reinstatesnoncooperationas the dominant strategy.3 inally, he fourthcondition is that

The erm"folk"omes rom he fact hat t is notknownwho firstprovedhistheorem,so literallyt is partof thegame heorist'sfolkore"2 In theoriginaltoryof theprisoner'silemma ame,wosuspects reheld n separatecellsawaitingrial.Each sgiven heopportunityo become state's itnessothecrimetheyareaccused f,in exchangeora lighterentence.foneconfesseswhile heotherkeeps ilent, heformerwillgeta much ighterentence han he latter fneither on-fesses heywillbothgetoffwithalight entence,ince heprosecution illonlybeabletoproveesser harges.fbothconfess,heywillbothendupbeing onvicted,ndwillreceiveongsentences,lthoughotaslonga sentence s theyget f theyremain ilentwhentheirpartneronfesses. hedilemmas that hepayoffrom onfessings greaterthan hepayoffrom eepingilent, egardlessf what heother erson oes.Asa conse-quence herationalourse f action s toconfess.However,f theyhadremainedilent,then heywouldbothreceivedighterentences. hus ndividualational ehaviorro-duceswhat s collectivelyn irrationalutcome.3 Ifbothactorsknow, orexample,hat hegamewillbe repeated 00times, hen t is

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the cooperatorsshould be able to punish defectors,without unduly punishingthemselves;if this is not true,then defection cannot be crediblypunished andcooperation will break down.The folk theorem has been used successfully to analyse the problem ofcooperation in situations where there is no central authority-the classic"Hobbesian"problem (see, forexample,Axelrod 1984). The difficultyarises inapplyingthis to the paradoxof participation.Theproblemis that in most situa-tionsdefection(nonparticipation),annotbe punishedby theactiveparticipants.This makes cooperation (participation),much less likely to occur.

For example,activists in a political party are not in a position to punishinactivemembers ortheir ack of involvementn thepartyorganization. similarpoint can be made about interestgroups;Truman 1951) makes a distinctionbetween active and latent members of a group,but it is hard to see how theformercan motivatethe latter o participateby imposing any type of sanctions,particularlyf the latterbelieve that theirparticipationwill make no differenceto outcomes.

Ifan actorknows thathis orher defectionwill preventthe good frombeingprovided, this clearlyacts as a deterrentto defection. But this is only likelyto happenin smallgroups,a point which Olson developsin his originalanalysis(Olson 1965: 24). However,f it takes a smallgroupforsanctions to be effective,this in turn creates a furtherproblem: a small group is unlikely to be able toprovide the collective good, if the latter is very "lumpy".e., if it requiresa lotof resourcesto provide anythingat all. This is, of courseprecisely the situationfacinga nationalorganizationike a political partyor an interestgroup; chang-ing national policies usually involves a great amount of political resources.On the otherhand, if collectivegoods areprovided in significantamountsat the local level by a relativelysmall number of actors, then the small sizeof the groupwill promote cooperation.In this situation the collectivegood willvery likely be provided, and the actorswill participate.We consider this casemore fully below.A thirdapproachto the collective action problemis to introducealtruisticconcerns into the calculus of participation.Mueller(1989: 362), for example,suggeststhat voters take into account the utility of other voters in deciding ifthey should participate n an election, and this ultimately explains why theyvote.He describes this as a "Jekyll nd Hyde"view of human nature,with partof the motivationforvoting being self-interested,and partbeing altruistic.The

rational or themnot to cooperateon the last playof the game.If this is true, hen it isalso true of the 99th, 98th, etc.,playsof thegame.Thuscertainty bout when the gamewill end reestablishesdefection as the dominantstrategy.214


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suggestion s that if individuals take into account the welfareof other people,this provides an additional incentive for them to vote.Margolis 1982: 82-95) develops a similar argumentthat a "fair hares"

principleoperatesin the calculus ofvoting, whereby participation s motivatedby a mixtureof selfish and altruisticgoals,and these are tradedoff at the marginin decision making.

Argumentsforparticipationbased on altruism are quite compatible withrationalchoice (see Elster1983), but it is importantto note that they do notavoid the paradoxof participation.While altruismimplies that an individualwill accept costs without correspondingbenefits, there is still the question ofwhether or not the individual'sparticipationwill make any differenceto out-comes. It is irrational o incur costs, if the consequences of doing so make noappreciable difference to the provision of the collective good, regardlessofwhether the provision is motivatedby altruismor self-interest.Again,in thissituation cooperationis only likely to be forthcoming n small groups, whichis the same conclusion reached in the discussion of the folk theorem.

Chong (1991: 103-7) argues that if it is assumed that all players actaltruistically,hen the collective action gameceases to be a prisoner'sdilemmaand becomes an assurancegame.In an assurancegame there is no longeranincentive to free-ride,althoughthere is still a problem of coordination. Thusindividualsmaywant to cooperate,but theywill be unsure as to whetherenoughpeople will also cooperate in order that the good will be provided.

Chong (1991: 115) describes this uncertaintyas it applies to members ofa pressure group or political party,as follows:The benefits of cooperationand defection are contingentupon thelikelihoodof differentevelsofparticipation.. notonlywill an individualbe uncertain n his own mind aboutthese parameters, ut he will alsoknow that othersareuncertain boutthemtoo,and thatothersare awareof the uncertainty.

In this case,thereare stilltwo possibleequilibria, ne involvingmutualdefectionand the other mutualcooperation,butcooperation s easierthanin theprisoner'sdilemma game.However, hereis still the problem of the threshold to be over-come before thegood is provided.Altruismeases the collectiveactionproblem,but uncertainty,particularly n situations where high thresholds of provisionexist, means that collective action is still problematic.There is another difficulty with Chongs approach which relates to theunderlying assumption of altruism.As mentioned earlier,cooperation in theassurancegame s contingenton the assumptionthatotherpeoplewill cooperateas well. ButChong'sassumption of altruism s not contingentin the same way,

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i.e.,he assumes that individuals are unconditionallyaltruistic(1991: 11). Theproblemis thatif this assumptionis dropped,and altruismalso becomes con-tingent on the behavior of others, then the game is no longer an assurancegame.In a situation in which individuals will be altruisticonly if others arealtruistic oo, then if one individual behaves selfishly this will stimulateselfishbehavior fromeveryoneelse, and the prisoner'sdilemma will be reinstated nfull force.

Mullerand his associates in a series of papers concerned with modelingunorthodoxpoliticalparticipationntroducea "unityprinciple"r normadheredto by all members of the groupwhich enjoins that all should contributeif thegood is to be provided (Mullerand Opp 1986, 1987; Finkel,Muller,and Opp1989). They describe this as "calculatingKantianism"When faced with thepossibilty that free-ridingwill prevent the good from being provided, actorsparticipatein order to ensure that this does not happen.The basic idea is to extend the notion of rationalityfrom a focus on theindividual'scalculusof the costs and benefits,to a wider "collectiverationality"model which takes account of group factorsin the calculus of participation.In this view individuals calculate the costs and benefits of differentcoursesof action at the level of the group,and since the group cannot be effectiveinthe absence of participationby the members,this motivates their involvement.Thisnotionof "collectiverationality"s not compatiblewith a rational hoicemodel, however,since rationalaction implies methodological individualism.Sen comments on such a notion in his classic textbook on social choice: "Itis, of course, possible to take the view that a society is an entity that is in-dependent of the individuals in it, and that socialpreferenceneed not be basedon the preferenceof the members of the society ... Anyonewho finds fulfill-ment in this assumption is entirely welcome to it"(Sen 1970: 1).Ifcollectiverationalitys interpreted o mean that a collective"mind" xists,it is clearlyinconsistent with rationalchoice theory.Alternatively t might beinterpretedto mean that individuals make decisions focusing at the level ofthe group,rather hanat theirown level.However,his is also problematic, incethe individualhas no controlovergroupoutcomes, and thus cannot rationallymake decisions on behalf of the group.Collectiverationality s an interestingidea, but it lies outside the rationalchoice frameworkof analysis.A fourthand final approach to the collective action problem is perhapsthe most successful, the appeal to selective incentives. This is, of course, thesame solutionas thatadoptedby Olson.Thisapproachhasbeen most commonlyused to explain the paradox of participationapplied to voting. For example,Rikerand Ordeshook (1973: 63) list a series of selective incentives whichindividuals haveforvoting;these include: "Thesatisfactionof complying withthe ethicof voting"; The atisfaction f affirming llegianceo thepolitical ystem";

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and "Thesatisfactionof affirminga partisan preference" ndividuals who donot vote, do not receive these benefits.This is successfulbecause it provides a plausible reason for participationbased on self-interest.However,when applied to high-cost types of participa-tion, it does have some slightlyodd implications;it implies, for example,thatactivists will not be motivatedby policy concerns, when they get involved incampaignsor in partyorganizations,ince such policy goalsarecollectivegoods.It should be noted that the empiricalevidence appearsto contradict this idea;politicalactivistsarevery nterestedn policyconcerns(see Rapoport,Abramovitzand McGlennon 1983; Seyd and Whiteley 1992).With regard o the paradoxof participationapplied to voting, there is ofcourse anotherline of theoreticalresearch which explains participation.Thisis the proposition thatvoters turnout when they aremobilized by local cam-paigns.Leighley 1995) discusses this literaturevery fully.Researchers ave beeninvestigatinghis question since the 1950s, and the evidence shows clearlythatlocal campaignshave a significant impact in mobilizing the vote in state andfederalelections (Cutrightand Rossi 1958; Cutright1963; Kramer1970;Crotty1971; Herrson 1986, Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz 1990); and on the voteshare obtainedby the Democratic and Republicanpartiesin national elections(Katzand Eldersveld1961;Patterson nd Caldeira1984; Huckfeldtand Sprague1992). Thereis also evidence to supportthis idea fromanotherpoliticalsystem(Whiteley and Seyd 1992, 1994).However,t appearsdifficult o reconcileelectoralmobilizationwith a rationalchoice model of participation.In a recent paper Wielhouwer and Lockerbie(1994) introduce the argumentthat partiesare organizations et up to reducetransaction osts associatedwithexchangesbetween thegovernment nd citizens.In other words they reduce the costs side of the equation, in the cost-benefitanalysis of the returnsfrom voting. It is an interestingidea, but againit failsto dealwith the paradoxof participation;partiesmay reduce transactioncosts,but thereis no reasonfor rationalactors to incuranycosts, if they can free-rideon the effortsof others.

Moreover, t is not clear why rationalindividuals, who because they arerationalhave already acquiredas much informationas they need in order tomakea decision,shouldchange heirminds in responseto theeffortsof strangersto mobilize them. This is particularly rue when one remembersthat the newinformationprovided by these strangershas to be heavily discounted sinceit is far from being impartial.One plausibleinterpretation f mobilization is thatit is a productof socialnorms, or pressures to conform to the wishes of other people. A key featureof such norms is that other people are important for enforcing them, byexpressingtheirapproval,or often theirdisapproval,with the behavior of the

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individual concerned. Social norms as motives forparticipationcannot easilybe interpretedwithin the frameworkof the the standard rationalactormodel.Koffordand Millerpoint out that such norms: " . . are not rational(i.e., arenot the outcome of some utility calculus); ratherthey depend on previouslyconstructed patterns of behavior" 1991: 23).In other words, behaviorwhich is essentially a conditioned response tothe actions of other people, is not the product of a rationalcalculationof thecosts and benefits of individual action.4For this reason, such behavior is in-consistent with a rational actor model.To review the discussion up to this point, rational actor models of par-ticipation face the key problem of the paradoxof participation.A number ofsolutionsto this have been suggested, nd allof themhave some merit.However,the paradox is a more intractableproblem than is commonly recognized.Thresholdargumentsavoid the problem by moving outside the rationalactorframeworkaltogether;game theoretic solutions only appear to be effectiveinsmall groups, something which is also true of altruistictheories of participa-tion. Finally,selective incentives are the most plausible explanation,but theyhave unattractiveimplications which are contradictedby empiricalevidence.Sinceultimately hese models depend upon theirempiricalvalidityas muchas their theoreticalpower,in the next section we go on to specify and test arational actormodel of participationagainsta rivalmodel. The aim here is toinvestigatehe empiricalvalidityof a rationalchoice model in situationsof high-cost types of political participation.

TESTINGALTERNATIVE ODELSOF PARTICIPATIONDebatesabout the relativemportanceof rationalactormodels in politicalscienceseldom include attemptsto operationalizeand test these theories againstrivalalternatives.This is exemplifiedby the workon voterturout, where a numberof ingenious mechanisms have been suggestedfor dealing with the paradoxof participationFerejohnand Fiorina1974;Niemi 1976;Hinich 1981;Margolis1982). However,as Aldrich (1993) points out, none of them fit the evidencevery well.To test a rationalactormodel in an areaof high-cost participation,we ex-amine the case of partyactivismin Britain(Seydand Whiteley 1992; Whiteley,Seyd,Richardson, nd Bissell1994;Whiteley,Seyd,and Richardson1994). Beingan activememberof a politicalparty s a high-costtype of politicalparticipation,

4 Of course t could be argued hat"pleasing therpeople"s just one additionalvariablein the individual's tility unctionand thuspartof the cost-benefit alculus.Butanykindof behaviorcanbe describedas rationalby meansof this device(e.g.,"rational"uicide,"rational"ddictionetc.).This approachsalvages he theoryat a cost of making t un-falsifiable.218


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which can involve a varietyof differentpolitical activities such as attendingmeetings,public speaking, organizingcampaigns,and runningfor office,bothwithin the party organisationand outside; some party activists spend mostof theirspare time workingon partymatters.Accordingly,partyactivism pro-vides an excellent means of testing a rational actor model of participation.The aim in this section is to test two versions of a rationalactor modelagainstan alternative"generalncentives"model of participation,to determinewhich best explains party activism. The general incentives model includesvariableswhicharenot compatiblewith a rational hoiceanalysisofparticipation.The test uses data from the first national random sample survey of Conser-vative party members.5The general ncentives model of participationwas originallydeveloped toexplainpoliticalactivismin the BritishLabourparty(Seydand Whiteley 1992),and this is an extended and developed version. It is grounded in the assump-tion that political activism can be explained by differentkinds of incentives,but that these incentives include variableswhich lie outside the rationalactortheoretical ramework. he model includessix classes of variableswhich provideincentives forparticipation:selective,collective,process, outcome, ideologicalincentives and social norms. These differentvariables are discussed in detailin the next section.EXPLAININGARTYCTIVISMThe simplest version of a rationalactor model of participationapplied to theanalysis of political activism can be set out as follows:(1) Ai pi * B - Ci

where A, is the level of activism of individual i.pi is the probability that individual i's participationwill bring aboutthe collective good or policy goals of the party.B is the collectivebenefitsorpublic goods resulting rom the implemen-tation of a party program.Ci is the costs to individual i of contributingto the collective good.

The origin of the paradox of participation is the fact that pi appearsvanishinglysmall in most situations,since the individual is unlikely to make

5 The surveywas a two-stagestratifiedrandom sample survey of Conservativepartymembers,which used a mailquestionnaire. he fieldworkwas done in early1992, andthesurveyhad a responserateof 62.9percent, ivingan overall amplesize,afterweightingfornon-response,of 2,467.Furthermethodological etailsof the surveyareprovided nWhiteley,Seydand Richardson1994.219


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any significantcontributionto winning an election or changingnationalpolicyoutcomes. Thus an empiricaltest of such a model which found the weightedbenefits variable to be a significant predictorof activism, would, on the faceof it, undermine a rationalactor interpretationof the results.However,activism within a politicalparty differsfrom many unorthodoxtypes of political participation, n that individual activists can be influentialin obtainingcollectivegoods,somethingwhich is not generally rueforprotestersor revolutionaries. iventhe factthatin some circumstances he collectivegoodsarenot necessarilyvery"lumpy"nd can be providedby relatively mallgroups,activistsmaybejustified n attaching non-zeroweighttopi, makingparticipationrational even in a restricted model like (1).There are two reasons for suggestingwhy this should be the case. Firstly,as members of the "middle-levelelite,'party activists have a direct access topolicymakers within the organizationalstructure of their political party.Panebianco(1988: 22-23) arguesthatwhile the relationshipbetween leadersandmembers n massparties s one of unequalpowerit is nonethelessreciprocal,with grass-rootsmemberscontrolling rganizationalesourceswhich makethemvaluable to the leadership.

In the case of the BritishConservativepartythere s clearevidenceto suggestthatpartymembers can be quiteinfluentialn shapingthe policies and opinionsof the politicalleadership,althoughthis influence is rarelyexercisedby formalvotingat partyconferences(Nortonand Aughey1981;Kelly1989). This clearlymakes partyactivistsdifferentfrom say,members of a protest group,who areunlikely to have this direct access or influence. On the other hand, there aremany activists,and so it is hard to arguethat any one of them is likely to bevery influential.However, here are only a relativelyfew highly active individuals in eachof the local constituency party organizations.6Thus a second and perhapsmore importantreason for a party member'ssense of efficacy is that muchcollective action, in the form of policymaking, takes place at the local level.Since collectivegoods in the formof localpolicy outputsare much less "lumpy"than collectivegoods provided nationally,the active contribution of a few in-dividuals can play a decisive role in their provision.

Partyactivists can influencelocal policy outcomes eitherby lobbyinglocalelected representatives,or becoming elected representatives hemselves. This6 Estimatesromthe survey howed hat thereare about750,000Conservativeartymembersn Britain,f whichabout165,000 reminimallyctive n the sensethat heydevote t east ome ime oparty ctivitiesn theaverage onth.However,fwe examinethehighlyactivendividuals,.e., hosewho devotemore han10 hourspermonth oparty ctivity,here s anaveragefabout 5 peoplen eachof the634 Conservativeon-stituency artiesn GreatBritainseeWhiteley, eydandRichardson994).

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argumentwill apply with particular orce in localities where the Conservativepartycontrols the local elected authority.As a consequence, this provides anobjective basis for many members sense of subjective efficacyThe Olson model is an extended version of model (1). Olson does notactuallyexamine partyactivism as such, but discusses incentives forjoininga pressure group (1965: 133). With this in mind model (1) can be extendedto include such selective incentives:(2) Ai = (p, * B)- C, + Oi + Pi + Iiwhere

Ai, pi, B and C, are the same as in model (1) , andOi: Selective outcome incentives for activismPi:Selective process incentives for activismIi: Ideologicalincentives for activism

This extendedmodel of politicalactivismcontains hreemeasuresof selectiveincentives, or privatereturns from collective action, of a type not subject tothe paradoxof participation; heyareoutcome,process, and ideologicalincen-tives for political action.Ithas long been recognizedthatpolitical"entrepreneurs"re exempt fromthe paradoxof participation,because they have private ncentives such as in-teresting,well-paid jobs and elective office (Salisbury1969). Politicalpartiesarevehicles forachievingelected office,something which is not generallytrueof interest groups or protest groups.Electedrepresentativesn the Britishsystemmust serve an "apprenticeship"within theirpartyorganizationbefore they are chosen forelective office. Fromthis perspective party activism can be regardedas an investment in a futurecareer in politics. Thus Oimeasures the private returns from participationassociated with the aim of building a political careeras an elected represen-tativeof the party.This is clearlyan importantselective incentive for activism.The two other types of selective incentive in the Olson model, processP,and ideological ncentives Iiare not rooted in the outcomes of collectiveac-tion,but rather n the process of participation tself. Process incentives forpar-ticipatinghave been discussed by a number of writers, for example,Tullock(1971) who has written about the "entertainment"alue of being involved inrevolution;similarly,Opp (1990) writes about the "catharsis"alue of politicalprotest.Thusindividualscan be motivated o be activebecausethey enjoypartypolitics for its own sake. The Pivariable measures the extent to which partymembers enjoy participation,since it provides an opportunity to meet like-minded people, and to learn about the political process at first hand.

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The ideological incentives variableIi is another type of process motiva-tion which derives from the so-called "lawof curvilineardisparity" f politicalparties (May1973; Kitschelt1989). This is the proposition thatpartyactivistswill be more radical than the party leadershipon the one hand, or the voterson the other.Thisimpliesthata curvilinearrelationship xistsbetweenideologicalradicalism, nd thepositionof the individualwithin the organizationalierarchyof a party. n the case of the Conservativeparty his wouldimplythattheactivistsare to therightof both the votersand inactivemembers,and theparty eadership.This provides an interesting theoretical explanation of party activism;ideologicalradicalism hould motivatepartymembers to become more involvedthan the votersor inactive members, if the rewardfor their involvement is toexpress deeply held beliefs in company with other like-minded individuals.Their participationis prompted by similar motives to those of the religiousbeliever-church attendance allows them to give expression to religiousconvictions.7This is clearlyanother type of process motive for participation.Bothmodels (1) and (2) are rationalactormodels of participation.However,the "generalncentives"model of party incorporatesvariables which are notconsistent with a rationalactor model. It can be set out as follows:(3) A, = (p, * B)- C + Oi + Pi + Ii + Gi + Si + Eiwhere

Ai, Pi, B, Ci, Oi, Pi, Ii are defined as in model (2).In addition there are:G,: Individual i's evaluations of the party's efficacy as a whole ininfluencing politics.Si:Individual i's perceptions of social norms as motives for activism.Ei: Expressive or affectivemotives for participation.

To discuss each of these in turn, the group efficacyvariableis based onthe notion discussed earlier of "collectiverationality'or the idea that partymembersjudgethe costs and benefitsof politicalactionat the level of the group,and not merelyat the level of the individual. Mullerand Opp (1987) have sug-gested that the individuals perception of the probability that the group willsucceed influences the likelihood of her participating in political action.This idea, though interesting, s inconsistent with a rational actor modelof participation,ince as we pointedout earlier,heindividual s not in a positionto influence heefficacyof theConservative artyas a whole If thepartymemberscannot influence group actions, it makes no sense for them to evaluatetheir7 Kitschelt's1989) discussionsuggests hatideologymaynot beentirely processncen-tiveforparticipation, ut it providesan adequateproxymeasureof this for ourpurposes.

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own participation n relation to the performanceof the group.Fundamentallythis "collectiveationality"oes not accordwith the methodologicalndividualismessential to rational choice models.Moreover,ndividual and collectiveefficacyarelogicallyquite independentof each other; if the individualactivist thinks that the partyas a whole is veryeffective, hatmightencourageher to be more active Alternatively,he individual

might reason that the partydoes not need her help to be successful,and thatgives her even more of a justification to free-ride on the efforts of others. Arational actor should disregardcollective efficacy in making a decision aboutwhether or not to participate.Social Norms are another type of motive for participationwhich cannoteasily be interpretedwithin the rationalactor model, as we suggestedearlier.In this case party activists motivatedby social norms are responding to theperceivedopinions of "significantthers"or people whose opinions theyrespectand value.This reaction s not the productof a calculationof costs and benefits,so much as a conditioned response to the actions of other peopleFinally, thirdvariablemeasuresexpressiveor affective valuations,motiveswhich againlie outside the standardcost-benefit model of decision making,with its emphasis on cognitive calculations of costs and returns. These aremotives for involvement based on the strengthof the member'semotional at-tachment to the party.Expressivemotives for voting have been discussed intheliterature n economicvoting(Conoverand Feldman1986),and with respectto voter'sevaluationsof presidential eadership(Marcus1988). A formaltheoryof expressive voting has been developed which postulates that voters aremotivatedby the desire to express support for one outcome over another, n-dependentlyof whetheror not their votehas anyinfluenceon outcomes (Bren-nan and Buchanan 1984; Carterand Guerette 1992).

Again, t mightbe tempting o interpret xpressivemotives asjust one morerationalincentive to participatein politics, the argumentbeing that a morestronglyattached ndividual has a greaterncentive to participateHowever, hisinterpretationdoes not deal with the paradoxof participation.The incentivesto free-rideon the effortsof other people are the same for individuals whoare stronglyattached to a political party as they are for individuals who areweakly attached to that party.In other words, a stronglyattachedindividualcan get the benefits of collectiveaction without payingthe costs, just the sameas a weaklyattached ndividual.Accordingly,n a rationalchoice world,stronglyattached ndividuals hould be no morelikelyto participatehanweaklyattachedindividuals.

Wehypothesizethat activistswill be motivatedby an expressiveattachmentto theirpreferredparty,which is independentof the outcomes which mayresultfromtheirparticipation.The factthat such motives arenot outcome-orientated223


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means thatthey are inconsistent with a rationalactor model. They differ frommotives based on a sense of collective efficacy,or motives which derive frompressures to conform to the wishes of other people. Rather,hey are groundedin a sense of loyalty or affection for the party.Tosummarize he discussion up to thispoint, the general ncentivestheoryis groundedin a rationalactormodel of participation,but it goes beyond sucha model to incorporate ariableswhich lie outside the rational hoice framework.These variables violate various implicit or explicit assumptions underlyingrationalchoice models. The notion of collective rationalityviolates method-ologicalindividualism; ocial normsviolatethe assumptionthat actionis deter-minedby a rational valuation f the costs andbenefits; inally, xpressivemotivesviolate the assumption that goals should be outcome-orientated,and thus ina rationalworld would not be significantin explaining activism.The various operational measures of the variables in the models arediscussed in the Appendix. In the next section we examine estimates of thealternativespecifications.RESULTSTable1 contains descriptiveinformation about the various scales used in theanalysis,and Table2 containsthe estimatesof the multivariatemodels (1) to (3).Table2 containsstandardizedegression oefficients, ogetherwith t statisticsin parentheses,as well as the usual R2statistics. Model (1) is nested in model(2), and both of these arenestedin model (3). This makes it possible to evaluatethe alternativemodels using an encompassing F test.8Model(1), thesimplecost-benefitmodel,shows thatthe interactionbetweenperceptionsof personalinfluence and the collectivebenefits index has a highlysignificantimpact on activism. Perceptionsof costs, while not significantatthe usuallevels,are close to significanceand have the correctsign;hence partymembers are more active if they are more in favor of the party'spolicy goalsand feel a high sense of personal efficacy,and they are less active is they havea strong sense of the costs of participation.As we mentionedearlier,f there were no objectivebasis forthe individual'ssense of personal efficacy,this finding would be inconsistent with a rationalactor model. However,n the case of partyactivists,the objectivebasis for theirfeelingsof personalefficacycomes primarily rom theirabilityto influence theprovision of collective goods at the local level. In that sense these resultsareconsistent with a rational actor model.8 The F test is used to evaluate he statistical ignificanceof addingextravariables o themodel.If F is significant,t implies hat he currentmodelencompasseshepreviousmodel,i.e.,explainssignificantlymore variance han its predecessorSee Pindyckand Rubinfeld1991: 111).

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RationalChoice and PoliticalParticipation-Evaluating he Debate

Table 1MEANS, TANDARDEVIATIONSNDRANGES FVARIABLES

Variable MeansActivismIndex 0(Ai)CollectiveBenefitsIndex 24.1(Bj)Personal nfluenceIndex 0.'(Pi)Party Efficacy Index 6.1(Gi)PerceivedCosts Index 10.:(cj)Outcome Incentives 5.:(oj)Process Incentives 9.1(Pi)Ideological ncentives 6.(Ij)Social Norms 10.(Si)Expressive ndex 3.(Ei)

Table 2MULTIVARIATEODELS FACTIVISMN = 2467)

855086293456147412

CollectiveBenefits(B)*Personalnfluence(pi)PerceivedCosts (Ci)Outcome Incentives(Oi)Process Incentives Pi)IdeologicalProcess Incentives(Ii)PartyEfficacy ndex(Gi)Social Norms (Si)ExpressiveMotives(Ei)

(1)0.34** 0(15.6) (1-0.04 -C(1.7)- C(]- C- - 0

(2) (3)).24** 0.23**.0.7) (9.8)).05* -0.05*:2.5) (2.5)).23** 0.22**L0.5) (10.3)).17** 0.19**(7.7) (8.5)).06** -0.08**(2.6) (3.6)- -0.12**(5.5)- -0.01(0.7)- 0.12**(5.2)

R2 0.12 0.20 0.22EncompassingF test - 63.17** 18.92**Note:StandardizedRegression oefficients,with t statistics n parentheses;** coefficientssignificantp< 0.01 levels

225

(N= 2467)StandardDeviation

1.004.770.191.421.981.792.131.791.760.78

Range-1.4-4.5

1-400.03-1.00

1-101-151-101-151-9

1-151-4


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Model (2) is the operationalversion of the Olson model and contains theindicators of selective incentives.Eachof the selective incentive measures hasa highly significant mpact on activism;clearlypartymembersaremore likelyto be activeif they arepoliticallyambitious,and also if they enjoy the politicalprocess for its own sake. Of the two, outcome incentives areslightlymore im-portant than process incentives.

Finally, delogicalincentives are also significant,but in a way which is in-consistentwith the curvilineardispartythesis.Memberswho assignthemselvesto a left-wingposition on the ideologicalscale aremore likely to be active thanmembers who assign themselves to the right.This findingdoes not, of course,invalidate the interpretationof ideology as a process incentive,but it clearlyworks differentlyfrom the curvilineardisparity thesis. The encompassing Ftest is highly significant,which indicates that the Olson model is a considerableimprovement on model (1).Thegeneral ncentivesmodel (3) has a significant mprovementn goodnessof fitin comparisonwith the Olson model; again, he encompassingF test sup-portsthis conclusion.Twoof theadditionalvariables resignificantn thismodel,perceptionsof partyefficacyandexpressivemotivesfor nvolvement.Interestinglyenough, social norms as they have been operationalized n this model are notsignificant predictorsof activism, a result which is consistent with a rationalactor model.

The sign of the partyefficacyvariable ndicates that members who thinkthat the Conservativeparty is very effective are less likely to be active thanthose who think the opposite.Thus the perception of collectiveefficacymakesmembers morelikelyto free-rideon the effortsof others. Toreiterate he earlierpoint, in a rationalactormodel, the overall effectivenessof the group shouldbe irrelevant or determining f an individual participates;what mattersis theindividual'scontributionto that effectiveness,not some group notion of effi-cacy.In other words this variableshould be non-significantin a rationalactormodel.

The same point can be made about expressive attachments to the partywhich is also very significantn this model. As mentioned earlier he individual'sstrengthof emotionalattachmentso thepartyshould not influenceparticipationin a rational actor world, since expressive attachmentsdo not influence theincentives to free-rideon the efforts of other people. If an individual who isvery stronglyattached to the partyobtains the same payoffsfrom free-ridingas an individualwho is very weakly attached to thatparty, hen both have anequal incentive to avoid participating.In the lightof these resultswe consider theirimplicationsforrationalactormodels of participationin the final section.

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CONCwSIONS ANDIMPLICATIONSTheliterature n rationalactormodels of participation ighlights he importanceof the role of incentives in an individual'sdecision to participate.The absenceof any serious discussion of such incentives is a major flaw in the standardsocioeconomic model. Thus the rational hoice framework rientsthe disciplinetowardexamininga set of importantquestions which have been neglectedbymore traditional ccounts.What the rationalchoice approachdoes not succeedin achieving however,s wholly to replacethese traditional ccountsby a modelwhich gives a complete explanation of participation.

These resultssupportthe conclusion that the variables n a rationalchoicemodel of participationclearly play a very important role in explaining whysome individualsare active when othersarenot. But the results also show thata purely rational actor model provides an incomplete explanationof politicalaction;importantmotives forparticipation xist in high-cost types of activities,which are inconsistent with the standardrational actormodel. It is clear thatactivistsaremotivatedby expressiveconcernsandby a sense of collectiveefficacy,both of which are inconsistent with this model.

It is importantto note that these results do not imply that party ativistsare irrational n the sense of pursuingwholly inconsistent courses of action.There is a clear difference between behaviorthat is inconsistent with narrowrational choice accounts, and behavior which is wholly irrational.The basicproblem here is an old one; it is the fact that rational choice provides onlyan incomplete account of human decision making.The rational choice model generatesa number of well-known problems.These include the fact that it makes demands on the cognitive capacities ofindividuals in situationsof uncertainty,which go farbeyond their capabilities(Simon 1978, 1982; Harsanyi 1986); the fact that the model appears to beempirically inconsistent with a mounting body of evidence from cognitivepsychology (Tverskyand Kahneman1986; Quattroneand Tversky1988), andthirdly, hatin situations of"radicaluncertainty"here is no basis forcalculatingthe probabilitiesrequiredto determine the expected values of the costs andbenefits of decision making (Keynes 1936: 149-50).9These and other anomaliessuggest hata morecomplexnotion of rationalityis requiredto explain human decision makingin situations of uncertainty.Ofcourse the analysis of decision making in generaland political participationin particularcan always be forced into the procrusteanbed of the standard9 Bayesiansould fcourse isagree ithJohnMaynard eynes'siews n thisregard.uttheyare n a minoritymong tatisticiansn believinghat ndividualsanevaluatelltypesofuncertainty,ven ntheabsence frudimentarynformationbout heproblemin hand.

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rationalactor model. Butthis will not help the task of understanding he com-plex processes which motivate some people to become involved in politics,when others remain on the sidelines.

The evidence shows clearlythat individuals are motivatedby considera-tions which should not troublethe rationalactor,when they become involvedin high-cost types of political participation.That rational choice provides anincomplete theoretical account does not mean that one should abandon thetaskof trying o find models which do givea completeaccountof participation.But it does mean that the uncritical use of the rational choice framework slikely to be a barrier o furtherunderstanding,rather than a means of furtherclarifyingthese complex processes.APPENDIX-OPERATIONALIZINGARTICIPATIONThe variousmeasures n the activism models wereoperationalised rom a seriesof indicators in the surveyof Conservativeparty members, and these will bedescribed next.

The ActivismScale A,. This consists of the factor scores from a factoranalysis of nine indicators of politicalactivism. Respondentswere asked howoften they had taken part in the following political activities during the lastfive years: displayed an election poster in a window; signed a petition sup-ported by the party; donated money to Conservativeparty funds; deliveredleafletsduringan election; attended partymeetings; helped at a Conservativepartyfunction;canvassedvoterson behalfof the party;stood foroffice withinthe party organization;tood for elected office in a localgovernmentor nationalParliamentarylection.Possibleresponseswere"NotatAll, "RarelyTOccasionally'and "Frequently' coring 1 to 4 respectively.10The Valueof the CollectiveGood B. This was an additive measure,whichis based on a batteryof nine questions takenfrom the British Election Study(Heath,Jowell,and Curtice1986) which asked respondents to indicate if theythought that the governmentshould or should not implement various policyobjectives.The policy items were:"Encourage rivateeducation"; Spendmoremoney to get rid of poverty";"Encouragehe growthof privatemedicine";"Putmore money into the National HealthService"; Reducegovernmentspending

10The factoranalysisproduced wosignificantactors, ne describedas an "activism"actorwhichexplained48.5percentof the variancen the indicatorsand is used subsequentlyin thispaper; t loadedsignificantly n all the itemsexceptsigninga petition,displayingan electionposterand donatingmoneyto partyfunds.The second factorexplained13percentof the variance oadedsignificantly n the threeitems,and was describedas a"supporters"actor.Thus one scalemeasuresvarioushigh-costtypesof activism,and theother low-costsupportfor the party.See Whiteley,Seydand Richardson1994: ch. 5.228


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generally";Introducetricter aws to regulate radeunions";"Giveworkersmoresay in the places where they work";"Spend ess on defence";and "Cut ncomeTax"

Responseson a five-point cale("definitelyhould,"probablyhould' "doesn'tmatter""probably hould not' "definitely hould not")were aggregatedo thathighest scores went to those individuals takinga position on that issue whichmost closely accorded with that of the Conservativeparty.Thus individualswho most closely agreewith generalConservativepartyviews on these issuesshould have the greatest incentive to seek the implementation of thosepolicies."Probabilityof PersonalInfluencepi. This was derived from a set of in-dicatorsconstructedusing the same nine items used tobuild the activismscale,except in this case respondentswere asked to indicatethe extentto which theyfelt thattheycouldpersonallynfluencepoliticsby participatingn theseactivities.Possibleresponses designed to measure the extent of perceptions of personalinfluencewere: "alargeextent"; someextent"; small xtent"; notat all"(scoring4 to 1 respectively).The scores weretransformedntoa probability calevaryingfromzero to one, and highest scores went to those who perceived themselvesto have most influence.Costs of ActivismCi. An additive Likert scale ("strongly agree,""agree,""neithe,'"disagree', stronglydisagree")with three indicators:"Attending artymeetingscan be prettytiringaftera harddayswork";"Party ctivityoften takestime awayfrom one'sfamily"; nd "Workingor the partycan be pretty boringat times"Highestscores went to those stronglyagreeingwith these statements.SelectiveOutcomencentivesOi.An additive Likertscale of two indicators,which measured ambitions for political advancementin the party:"Apersonlike me could do a goodjob of being a local Conservative ouncillor"; nd "TheConservativepartywouldbe moresuccessful f morepeoplelikeme were electedto Parliament"Highest scores went to those who strongly agreed with thestatements.

1 Individualswho thought hat the governmenthoulddefinitely ncourage rivateeducation ndprivatemedicine,hould educe overnmentpendingntroducetricterregulationsn trade nions, ndcut ncomeax, cored ive or ach esponsendividualswhothoughthat hegovernmenthoulddefinitelyotspendmoremoneyonpoverty,theNational ealthervice,hould otgiveworkers ore ay n theworkplace,nd houldnotspendessondefence,lso cored ive or ach esponsendividualsith heoppositeprofile fresponsescored neforeachresponseNotallstatementreciselyccordorconflict) ithConservativearty olicies, ut hese odings rebroadlynlinewithpartypositions n these ssues.Again fuller iscussionf thiscanbefoundnWhiteley,eydand Richardson994:ch. 5.229


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SelectiveProcess ncentivesP,.An additive Likertscale of three indicators:"Theonly way to be really educated about politics is to be a party activist";"Being ndactivepartymember s a goodwaytomeetinteresting eople"; Gettinginvolvedin partyactivitiesduringan election can be fun"Highestscores wentto those who strongly agreedwith these statements.

Ideological ncentives i. The respondents self-assigned scores on a nine-point, left-rightscale in response to the following question: "In Conservativeparty politics people often talk about 'the Left'and 'theRight'Comparedwithother Conservativepartymembers,where would you place yourviews on thisscale below?"The most left-wingrespondents scored lowest.PartyEfficacyEvaluationsG,.An additiveLikertscale consisting of two in-dicators: "When Conservativeparty members work togetherthey can reallychange Britain";The ocal Conservativepartyhas reallymade a difference tothe way in which ourcommunityhas developed"Highestscores went to thosestrongly agreeingwith the statements.Social NormsN,. Respondents were asked to "thinkabout those peoplewhose opinionsareespecially mportant o you, forexample, our spouse,friendsor colleagues.Consider the person whose opinions you most respect.Wouldyou say thatthey agreeor disagreewith the followingstatements": On hewholemembers of the local ConservativeAssociationarerespectedfigures n the localcommunity";"ManyConservativeparty activists are extremists";"Peoplecanhave a real influence on politics if they are preparedto get involved"Highestscores went to thoserespondentswho thought hattheir"significantther"wouldstronglyagreewith the firstand third statements,and stronglydisagreewiththe second.

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