Ernesto Talvi** Prepared for Presentation at the Session “Responding to Sudden Stops”, XXVI...

Ernesto Talvi**Ernesto Talvi**

Prepared for Presentation at the Session “Responding to Sudden Stops”, Prepared for Presentation at the Session “Responding to Sudden Stops”, XXVI Meeting of the Latin American Network of Central Banks and Finance XXVI Meeting of the Latin American Network of Central Banks and Finance

Ministries, IADB, Washington DCMinistries, IADB, Washington DC

October 17October 17thth, 2007, 2007

Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Sudden Stop: Is Tighter Brighter?

Pablo Ottonello**Pablo Ottonello**

Federico Sturzenegger***Federico Sturzenegger***

Boston University*, CERES**, Harvard University and Universidad Torcuato di Tella***Boston University*, CERES**, Harvard University and Universidad Torcuato di Tella***

Alberto Ortiz*Alberto Ortiz*

MOTIVATION

During the financial crises of the 1990s, there was a lively debate on the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response:

• Should a country facing a sudden stop tighten its fiscal and monetary policies to restore credibility and avoid potentially unstable dynamics ? (the IMF’s view)

Stanley Fischer (1998), in the context of the Asian 1997 crisis, argued that:

• “(…) when they approached the IMF, the reserves of Thailand and Korea were perilously low, and the Indonesian rupiah was excessively depreciated. Thus, the first order of business was, and still is, to restore confidence in the currency.”

• “To achieve this, countries have to make it more attractive to hold domestic currency, which, in turn, requires increasing interest rates temporarily (…)”

• “At the outset of the crisis, countries needed to firm their fiscal positions, both to make room in their budgets for the future costs of financial restructuring, and --depending on the balance of payments situation -- to reduce the current account deficit.”

MOTIVATION

MOTIVATION

• Or conversely, should it relax those policies in order to attenuate the output contraction that typically occurs during these events? (IMF’s critics views)



Joseph Stiglitz (2002, 2003), one of the most vocal critics of the IMF view, argued that:

• “For more than seventy years there has been a standard recipe for a country facing a severe economic downturn. The government must stimulate aggregate demand, either by monetary or fiscal policy – cut taxes, increase expenditures, or loosen monetary policy.(…) The crisis economies of East Asia were clearly threatened with a major downturn and needed stimulation. The IMF pushed exactly the opposite course, with consequences precisely of the kind that one would have predicted.”

• “(…) these procyclical discretionary fiscal policies exacerbated the downturns still further in country after country.”

• “When the Fund entered East Asia, it forced countries to raise interest rates to what, in conventional terms, would be considered astronomical levels. (…) The IMF had engineered a simultaneous contraction in aggregate demand and supply.”

MOTIVATION

MOTIVATION

This paper attempts to contribute to this debate empirically by studying the fiscal and monetary policy response and their effects on output, for a set of external financial crisis episodes occurred since the 1990s.

• Or conversely, should it relax those policies in order to attenuate the output contraction that typically occurs during these events? (IMF’s critics views)



•aggregate-spread window containing a spike in the EMBI spread exceeding two standard deviations from its mean (which starts when the aggregate EMBI spread exceeds one standard deviation, and ends when it is smaller than one standard deviation).

Identification of Systemic Sudden Stop Episodes

SampleSample

Countries that are tracked by JP Morgan to construct its global Emerging Market Bond Index, or global EMBI (31 countries).

1990-2006.

PeriodPeriod

Definition of Systemic Sudden Stop (SSS)Definition of Systemic Sudden Stop (SSS)

In similar fashion to Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2005), we define a SSS window as the union of

•a capital-flow window containing a large fall in capital flows for a given country exceeding two standard deviations from its mean (that starts when the fall in capital flows exceeds one standard deviation, and ends when it is smaller than one standard deviation) that overlaps at any point in time with an

0

5

10

15

20

25

ene-

70

ene-

72

ene-

74

ene-

76

ene-

78

ene-

80

ene-

82

ene-

84

ene-

86

ene-

88

ene-

90

ene-

92

ene-

94

ene-

96

ene-

98

ene-

00

ene-

02

ene-

04

Eff

ectiv

e F

eder

al F

unds

Rat

e (%

)

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

EM

BI

Sov

erei

gn S

prea

d (B

ps o

ver

US

Tre

asur

ies)

Tequila Crisis

Asia-Russian Crises

US Monetary Contraction

Capital Market Conditions for EMs

Fed Fund Rate EMBI Spreads

Identification of SSS Episodes

SampleSample

1990-2006

•aggregate-spread window containing a spike in the EMBI spread exceeding two standard deviations from its mean (which starts when the aggregate EMBI spread exceeds one standard deviation, and ends when it is smaller than one standard deviation).

Countries that are tracked by JP Morgan to construct its global Emerging Market Bond Index, or global EMBI (31 countries)

PeriodPeriod

Definition of Systemic Sudden Stop (SSS)Definition of Systemic Sudden Stop (SSS)

In similar fashion to Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2005), we define a SSS window as the union of

•a capital-flow window containing a large fall in capital flows for a given country exceeding two standard deviations from its mean (that starts when the fall in capital flows exceeds one standard deviation, and ends when it is smaller than one standard deviation) that overlaps at any point in time with an

Output Performance during SSSOutput Performance during SSSOutput performance is computed by the peak to trough variation of GDP*.

Identification of Systemic Sudden Stop Episodes

*If either the peak or trough falls within the SSS window, the contraction is classified as belonging to the period of the SSS. If a country experienced a deceleration but not a contraction, the dating was determined using the HP-filtered cyclical component of output.

SSS Episodes and Output

Peak Trough

Argentina 98IndonesiaThailandMoroccoTurkey 93Malaysia RussiaMexicoKoreaTurkey 98EcuadorColombiaCroatiaArgentina 94ChileLebanonBrazil 95PeruPhilippinesBrazil 97PolandDominican Republic

Jun-98Dec-97Sep-96Dec-94Dec-93Dec-97Dec-97Dec-94Sep-97Mar-98Dec-98Jun-98Dec-97Dec-94Jun-98Sep-98Mar-95Dec-97Dec-97Dec-97Dec-97Mar-94

Mar-02Dec-98Sep-98Jun-95Jun-94Sep-98Sep-98Jun-95Jun-98Mar-99Sep-99Jun-99Jun-99Sep-95Mar-99Jun-99Sep-95Dec-98Jun-98Mar-99Mar-99Sep-95

GDP Dates

Country

-20.9%-17.3%-15.1%-13.3%-12.2%-11.0%-10.1%

-9.7%-8.5%-8.1%-7.6%-7.1%-5.9%-5.6%-4.6%-3.3%-2.7%-2.4%-2.2%-1.7%3.2%6.6%

GDP Variation

Peak to trough % change

Average -7.2%

Characterizing Fiscal Policy in SSS: Structural Fiscal Balance

Methodology Methodology

• We estimate the We estimate the Structural Fiscal BalanceStructural Fiscal Balance by adopting the by adopting the Chilean Fiscal Rule.Chilean Fiscal Rule. This rule defines the This rule defines the structural balancestructural balance as the difference between structural fiscal revenues and observed fiscal as the difference between structural fiscal revenues and observed fiscal expenditures. expenditures. Structural fiscal revenuesStructural fiscal revenues are defined as the level of revenues that would have been are defined as the level of revenues that would have been achieved if output were at its potential level and the copper price were at its long run level.achieved if output were at its potential level and the copper price were at its long run level.

• While we cannot directly replicate this rule for other countries we can find a “While we cannot directly replicate this rule for other countries we can find a “statistical equivalentstatistical equivalent” to it. ” to it. To do so we compute the Lagrange multiplier of the Hodrick-Prescott filter for current revenues in Chile To do so we compute the Lagrange multiplier of the Hodrick-Prescott filter for current revenues in Chile in order to estimate by how much the Chilean authorities smooth their income. in order to estimate by how much the Chilean authorities smooth their income.

• The Lagrange multiplier that delivers a surplus/deficit that best matches the structural balance The Lagrange multiplier that delivers a surplus/deficit that best matches the structural balance reported by the authorities is the one that provides a statistical equivalent to their complex rules. Once reported by the authorities is the one that provides a statistical equivalent to their complex rules. Once the the "smoothing" parameter"smoothing" parameter is chosen, the filter is chosen, the filter is applied to fiscal revenues of the countries included is applied to fiscal revenues of the countries included in our samplein our sample to compute our measure of structural balance. to compute our measure of structural balance.

22

1 11 2

T T

t t t t t tt t

y

The Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter chooses the sequence of that minimizesThe Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter chooses the sequence of that minimizest

where r*where r*tt = adjusted fiscal revenues according to the Chilean Fiscal Rule and = adjusted fiscal revenues according to the Chilean Fiscal Rule and ggtt = total public expenditures, both in percent of GDP. = total public expenditures, both in percent of GDP.

• For each country of our sample the For each country of our sample the Structural Fiscal BalanceStructural Fiscal Balance (sb (sbtt) is defined as:) is defined as:

sbsbtt= r*= r*tt - g - gtt

0, t ty ifif ifif ,, approaches a linear trend.approaches a linear trend.t

ObjectiveObjective

• To capture the discretional components of fiscal policy by extracting the effect of cyclical fluctuations To capture the discretional components of fiscal policy by extracting the effect of cyclical fluctuations on fiscal accounts. on fiscal accounts.

Characterizing Fiscal Policy in a SSS: Computation of Structural Fiscal Balance

Characterization of Fiscal Policy in SSS Characterization of Fiscal Policy in SSS

Structural Fiscal Impulse in SSSStructural Fiscal Impulse in SSS(From Output Peak to Trough)

-5.0% -4.0% -3.0% -2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0%

RUS

ARG 98

IDN

TUR 93

COL

THA

MYS

KOR

MEX

POL

TUR 98

PER

BRA 97

ECU

CHL

HRV

PHL

ARG 94 Average: -1,1%Average: -1,1%

A positive (negative) value indicates an expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy.A positive (negative) value indicates an expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy.

• Structural Fiscal ImpulseStructural Fiscal Impulse throughout the output peak to trough windowthroughout the output peak to trough window:: I*I*tt= - sb= - sbtt

-3.0% -2.0% -1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0%

TUR 93

RUS

ECU

KOR

COL

MEX

BRA 97

POL

IDN

TUR 98

PER

PHL

ARG 94

HRV

MYS

CHL

ARG 98

THA

Average: 0,6%Average: 0,6%

Observed Fiscal Impulse in SSS*Observed Fiscal Impulse in SSS*(From Output Peak to Trough)

* Observed Fiscal Balance is defined as fb* Observed Fiscal Balance is defined as fb tt= r= rtt – g – gt,,t,, where r where rtt = fiscal revenues and g = fiscal revenues and g tt = total public expenditures, = total public expenditures,

both in percent of GDP. Observed Fiscal Impulse is defined as both in percent of GDP. Observed Fiscal Impulse is defined as IItt= - fb= - fbtt

Characterizing Monetary Policy in SSS: Estimation of Central Bank Reaction Function

Methodology Methodology

RttttRtRt syRR 3211 1

• We estimate the pre-SSS We estimate the pre-SSS central bank reaction functioncentral bank reaction function by estimating a dynamic stochastic by estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy using Bayesian methods, following Lubik general equilibrium model of a small open economy using Bayesian methods, following Lubik and Shorfheide (2007). and Shorfheide (2007).

where:where: tR =nominal interest rate,=nominal interest rate, =output,=output,ty ts =nominal exchange rate=nominal exchange ratet =inflation,=inflation,

1=“Anti-Inflation” coefficient,=“Anti-Inflation” coefficient,

2=“Output Motive” coefficient,=“Output Motive” coefficient,

3=“Fear of Floating” coefficient.=“Fear of Floating” coefficient.

R = partial adjustment of the interest rate to target, = partial adjustment of the interest rate to target,

Rt =exogenous policy shock, which can be interpreted as the non-systematic component=exogenous policy shock, which can be interpreted as the non-systematic component

of monetary policy,of monetary policy,

ObjectiveObjective

• To capture the discretional components of monetary policy by eliminating the noise in To capture the discretional components of monetary policy by eliminating the noise in interest rates movements typically observed during SSS.*interest rates movements typically observed during SSS.*

*See Calvo (2006)

Average 1.31 0.34 0.92 0.57

Average 1.36 0.24 0.10 0.29

Source: (a) Lubik and Shorfheider (2007), (b) Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007).

Notes

Data for Argentina 98 considers the period 2001:1, 2002:2. Polish data start in 1998:1.

Characterizing Monetary Policy in SSS: Central Bank Reaction Function Estimates

• The “Fear of Floating” coefficientThe “Fear of Floating” coefficient ( ) ( ) is significantly larger in our group of EM is significantly larger in our group of EM countries suggesting the exchange rate countries suggesting the exchange rate is a more relevant concern.is a more relevant concern.

3

Argentina 94 1.04 0.70 1.46Argentina 98 0.13 0.18 6.99Brazil 97 0.71 0.19 0.25Chile 1.49 0.17 0.17Colombia 1.49 0.15 0.23Croatia 0.67 0.40 1.51Ecuador 1.15 0.17 0.23Indonesia 0.75 0.15 0.25Korea 1.64 0.33 0.72Malaysia 3.12 0.40 0.15Mexico 0.97 0.51 0.19Peru 1.92 0.53 0.82Philippines 1.59 0.43 0.23Poland 1.18 0.64 0.80Russia 0.71 0.68 0.64Thailand 2.00 0.17 1.04Turkey 93 1.19 0.17 0.29Turkey 98 1.77 0.20 0.50

0.730.640.500.220.490.570.750.950.310.200.760.440.470.160.940.750.560.87

Australia (a) 1.41 0.24 0.07New Zeland (a) 1.69 0.25 0.04United Kingdom (a) 1.30 0.20 0.13Canada (a) 1.30 0.23 0.14

0.240.37

0.260.31

South Africa (b) 1.11 0.27 0.11 0.27 • The “Anti Inflation” coefficientThe “Anti Inflation” coefficient ( ) ( ) is on is on average similar in our group of EM average similar in our group of EM countries to the control group, but with a countries to the control group, but with a greater dispersion in the former.greater dispersion in the former.

1

• Similarly with respect to the “Output Similarly with respect to the “Output Motive” coefficientMotive” coefficient ( ). ( ). 2

RttttRtRt syRR 3211 1

Central Bank Reaction FunctionCountry

Parameter Estimation

1 2 3 )1( R

• The initial reaction of the Central Bank The initial reaction of the Central Bank for a given value of the shock and the for a given value of the shock and the parameters is larger in our group of EM parameters is larger in our group of EM countriescountries (i.e. a larger (i.e. a larger (1 - )(1 - ) )R

i

Anti Inflation CoefficientAnti Inflation Coefficient

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

ARG 98HRV

BRA 97RUSIDN

MEXARG 94

ECUPOL

TUR 93COLCHLPHLKOR

TUR 98PERTHAMYS

44%

Control Group Control Group Avg.: 1.4Avg.: 1.4

at the outset of the SSS 1

Output Motive CoefficientOutput Motive Coefficient

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8

IDNCOLTHAECU

TUR 93CHL

ARG 98BRA 97TUR 98

KORMYS HRVPHLMEXPERPOLRUS

ARG 94

Control Group Control Group Avg.: 0.2Avg.: 0.2

50%


CB Reaction CoefficientCB Reaction Coefficient

100%

Fear of Floating CoefficientFear of Floating Coefficient

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0NZLAUSZAFGBRCAN

MYS CHLMEXCOLECUPHL

BRA 97IDN

TUR 93TUR 98

RUSKORPOLPERTHA

ARG 94HRV

ARG 98

Control GroupControl Group Control Group Avg.: 0.1Avg.: 0.1


0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

POLMYSCHLKORPERPHLCOL

BRA 97TUR 93

HRVARG 98ARG 94

THAECUMEX

TUR 98RUSIDN

( ) at the outset of the SSS1 - 1 - R

83%

Characterizing Monetary Policy in SSS: Central Bank Reaction Function Estimates

Monetary Policy Trade-Offs in a SSS: the Typical Shock*

*Average of the 18 episodes of the sample

14%

16%

18%

20%

22%

24%

26%

t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t

InflationInflation(Annualized rate, in %)

Quarter

Output Peak

Output Trough15.2%

25.2%

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t

OutputOutput(GDP trough=100)

Quarter

Output Peak

Output Trough

-7.5%

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t

Nominal Exchange RateNominal Exchange Rate(GDP trough=100)

Quarter

Output Trough

Output Peak

+43.1%

Characterizing Fiscal Policy in a SSS: Computation of Monetary Policy Indices

Characterization of Monetary Policy in SSS Characterization of Monetary Policy in SSS

Countries with a higher (lower) value of the index will have a Countries with a higher (lower) value of the index will have a more contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy than more contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy than countries with a lower (higher) value of the index, in a SSS countries with a lower (higher) value of the index, in a SSS episode.episode.

I.I. We construct a We construct a Monetary Policy Regime IndexMonetary Policy Regime Index at the outset of the SSS, given by*: at the outset of the SSS, given by*:

)]1([)]1([)]1([

2

31

R

RR

tYST )/,(

• Inflation/Output Trade-Off IndexInflation/Output Trade-Off Index at the outset of the SSS: at the outset of the SSS:

)]1([)]1([

2

1

R

R

tYT /

• Exchange Rate/Output Trade-Off IndexExchange Rate/Output Trade-Off Index at the outset of the SSS: at the outset of the SSS:

)]1([)]1([

2

3

R

R

tYST /

II.II. We construct two separate Monetary Policy indices, given by*:We construct two separate Monetary Policy indices, given by*:

These indices are used as a proxy of how monetary policy (i.e. interest rates) will react These indices are used as a proxy of how monetary policy (i.e. interest rates) will react during a SSS episode.during a SSS episode.

*Where are computed as deviations with respect to the sample mean .*Where are computed as deviations with respect to the sample mean .)1( Ri )1( Ri

Countries with a higher (lower) value of the index will have a more Countries with a higher (lower) value of the index will have a more contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy than countries with a contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy than countries with a lower (higher) value of the index, in a SSS episode.lower (higher) value of the index, in a SSS episode.

Countries with a higher (lower) value of the index will have a more Countries with a higher (lower) value of the index will have a more contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy than countries with a contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy than countries with a lower (higher) value of the index, in a SSS episode.lower (higher) value of the index, in a SSS episode.

We first compute as the dependent variable the output performance during SSS, as We first compute as the dependent variable the output performance during SSS, as described by the (output) peak to trough variations described by the (output) peak to trough variations ( ).( ).

tY

The Impact of Monetary and Fiscal Policy on Output in a SSS: Empirical Strategy

We then relate our measures of monetary and fiscal policy to output performance by We then relate our measures of monetary and fiscal policy to output performance by performing simple OLS regressions :performing simple OLS regressions :

539.02 RAdjusted

• Model IModel I

(2.534) (-2.024)tttt YSTIY )/,(008.0932.1040.0 *

Monetary, Fiscal Policy and Output Performance in SSS

Fitted GDP Variation

Ac

tua

l G

DP

Va

ria

tio

n

ARG 94

ARG 98

BRA 97

CHL

COLHRV

ECU

IDN

KOR

MYS 97MEX

PERPHL

POL

RUS

THA

TUR 93

TUR 98

-0.25

-0.20

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

-0.25 -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10

(Actual vs. Fitted GDP variation)Model IModel I

Fiscal Policy and Output Performance in SSS

GD

P V

ari

ati

on

(

Y

)

TUR 98

TUR 93THA

RUS

POL

PHLPER

MEXMYS 97

KOR

IDN

ECUHRV

COLCHL

BRA 97

ARG 98ARG 94

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

-0.045 -0.035 -0.025 -0.015 -0.005 0.005 0.015

*tI

(GDP variation and Structural Fiscal Impulse controlled by the rest of policy parameters)

Model I: Fiscal PolicyModel I: Fiscal Policy

GD

P V

ari

ati

on

(

Y

)

TUR 98TUR 93

THA

RUS

POL

PHL

PER

MEX MYS 97

KOR

IDN

ECU

HRV

COL

CHL

BRA 97

ARG 98

ARG 94

-0.08

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

-8.00 -6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00

tyST )/,(

Model I: Monetary PolicyModel I: Monetary Policy(GDP variation and Monetary Policy Index controlled by the rest of policy parameters)

Monetary Policy and Output Performance in SSS

The Impact of Monetary and Fiscal Policy on Output in a SSS: Empirical Strategy

• Model IIModel II

554.02 RAdjusted

We first compute as the dependent variable the output performance during SSS, as We first compute as the dependent variable the output performance during SSS, as described by the (output) peak to trough variations described by the (output) peak to trough variations ( ).( ).

tY

We then relate our measures of monetary and fiscal policy to output performance by We then relate our measures of monetary and fiscal policy to output performance by performing simple OLS regressions :performing simple OLS regressions :

539.02 RAdjusted

• Model IModel I

(2.534) (-2.024)tttt YSTIY )/,(008.0932.1040.0 *

ttttt YSTYTIY )/(007.0)/(020.0111.2022.0 *

(2.768) (-1.920) (-1.850)

Monetary Policy and Output Performance in SSSG

DP

Var

iati

on

(

Y )

Inflation/Output Trade-Off IndexInflation/Output Trade-Off Index(GDP variation and Inflation/Output Trade-Off

controlled by the rest of policy parameters)

tYT /

ARG 94

ARG 98

BRA 97

CHL

COL

HRV

ECU

IDN

KOR

MYS 97

MEX

PERPHL

POL

RUS

THA

TUR 93

TUR 98

-0.10

-0.08

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

0.12

-1.50 -1.00 -0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50

Model II:Model II:

tYST /

(GDP variation and Exchange Rate/Output Trade-Off controlled by the rest of policy parameters)

Exchange Rate/Output Trade-Off IndexExchange Rate/Output Trade-Off Index

TUR 98

TUR 93

THA

RUS

POL

PHLPER

MEX

MYS 97

KOR

IDN

ECUHRV

COL

CHLBRA 97

ARG 98

ARG 94

-0.08

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0.00

0.02

0.04

0.06

0.08

0.10

-8.00 -6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00

GD

P V

aria

tio

n (

Y

)

Model II:Model II:

Monetary and Fiscal Policies in SSS: An Evaluation

Is Tighter Brighter?

It is Not.

Is Looser Mightier?

Maybe Yes, Maybe Not.

Ernesto Talvi**Ernesto Talvi**

Prepared for Presentation at the Session “Responding to Sudden Stops”, Prepared for Presentation at the Session “Responding to Sudden Stops”, XXVI Meeting of the Latin American Network of Central Banks and Finance XXVI Meeting of the Latin American Network of Central Banks and Finance

Ministries, IADB, Washington DCMinistries, IADB, Washington DC

October 17October 17thth, 2007, 2007

Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Sudden Stop: Is Tighter Brighter?

Pablo Ottonello**Pablo Ottonello**

Federico Sturzenegger***Federico Sturzenegger***

Boston University*, CERES**, Harvard University and Universidad Torcuato di Tella***Boston University*, CERES**, Harvard University and Universidad Torcuato di Tella***

Alberto Ortiz*Alberto Ortiz*

Ernesto Talvi** Prepared for Presentation at the Session “Responding to Sudden Stops”, XXVI...

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