er squadrons (VMF-214 and -323) and one night - …. Marines in the Korean...er squadrons (VMF-214...

squadrons of propeller-drivenVought F4U Corsairs, two day fight-er squadrons (VMF-214 and -323)and one night fighter squadron(VMF[N1-513). The remaining avia-tion units included headquarters,ground support, and air controlpersonnel in addition to an obser-vation squadron.

The observation squadron as-signed to the 1st Marine Brigadewas Marine Observation Squadron6 (VMO-6) commanded by MajorVincent J. Gottschalk. Its missionwas to conduct "tactical air recon-

naissance, artillery spotting, andother flight operations within thecapabilities of assigned aircraft insupport of ground units." This laststatement became a well-exercisedelastic clause under the innovativeguidance of Major Gottschalk, anengineering graduate of the Un-iversity of Michigan who saw sev-eral years sea duty in the Pacificbefore earning his wings. In ac-tion, Gottschalk saw to it that prac-tically any flying task in support ofground units, no matter how diffi-cult or outrageous it initially

seemed, fell within the capabilitiesof VMO-6 aircraft. He took com-mand of VMO-6 on 3 July and wasordered to be ready for overseasdeployment only four days later.

Marine observation squadronshad been serving as indispensablecomponents of Marine air-groundcombat teams since the BananaWars. Marine Observation Squad-ron 6 (then called VO-6M) wasspecifically formed for expedi-tionary duty in Nicaragua in 1928,but it was administratively trans-ferred back to Quantico for duty asa training unit about six monthslater. Marine observation squad-rons went by the wayside in 1933and did not re-emerge until opera-tions moved to the Western Pacificduring World War II. There, flyingsmall, nimble, high-wing, two-seat,single-engined Piper OE "Grass-hoppers" and similar Stinson OY-1"Sentinels" (often called Grass-hop-pers as well), VMOs provided aeri-al reconnaissance and artillery-naval gunfire spotting as well asperforming assorted utility dutieswhile attached to various Marinedivisions. Marine ObservationSquadron 6 was reactivated in1943, saw combat action onOkinawa in 1945, and participatedin the post-war occupation ofNorth China. Upon its return to theUnited States in 1947, the squadronflew in support of the 1st MarineDivision located at CampPendleton, California. The aircraftof VMO-6 did occasional artilleryspotting and sometimes supportedground maneuvers or performedadministrative duties, but the mainmission at Camp Pendleton was apractical one—spraying aerialinsecticide. In early June 1950,VMO-6 was assigned to the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing stationed atnearby Marine Corps Air Station ElToro.

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With the arrival of the first warn-ing orders, both Camp Pendleton

Capt Victor A. Armstrong, at the controls of a Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopter, was theofficer-in-charge of the VMO-6 helicopter section, the first Marine helicopter unitformed for combat duty. Holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross for actions inthe Paq,fic during World War II, he would attain the rank of major general andserve as the deputy chief of stafffor air.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130162

and Marine Corps Air Station ElToro became scenes of bedlam aspeople raced around to gathermaterials and units speedilyabsorbed new personnel. "Moth-balled" weapons and equipmentwere hurriedly broken out of stor-age and readied for use. Trains andplanes brought in personnel culledfrom posts and stations across theUnited States at all hours of theday and night. Arrivals were wel-comed on board and sent to theirnew units as soon as the hand-shakes finished. Space was at apremium, as was time. Round-the-clock work schedules were insti-tuted, and the unofficial order ofthe day became "sleep on theboat!"

Major Gottschalk was originallytold to form a four-plane, four-offi-cer, and 10-enlisted man detach-ment to accompany the 1stBrigade to Korea. Although thisdetachment was far smaller than awar-strength squadron, just findingenough airplanes was not an easytask. Gottschalk decided to takeeight well-worn OYs to ensure thatfour of them would be flyable—the rest would become "hangarqueens" until replacement parts ornew aircraft were in the supplypipeline. While the search forplanes and equipment got underway, Gottschalk's orders weremodified on 7 July. The entiresquadron would now be goingand, in accord with earlier recom-

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mendations, the squadron aircraftmix would also include heli-copters.

Eight officers and 30 enlistedmen were pulled out of HMX-1 atQuantico, Virginia, with orders tomove to the West Coast immedi-ately. Captain (later Major Gen-eral) Victor A. Armstrong was theofficer-in-charge of the helicopterdetachment. The other pilots in-cluded Captains George B. Farishand Eugene J. Pope, and FirstLieutenants Arthur R. Bancroft,Lloyd J. Engelhardt, Robert A.Longstaff, Max N. Nebergall, andGustave F. Lueddeke, Jr. The de-tachment's claim to historical famewas that this was the first perma-nent assignment of a Marine heli-copter unit to the Fleet MarineForce. Contrary to some assertions,this detachment was neither thefirst Marine combat helicoptersquadron nor was it the first U.S.helicopter detachment to see com-bat service—a helicopter element(later designated Flight F) from theU.S. Air Force 3d Air RescueSquadron and carrier-based U.S.Navy helicopters assigned to UtilityHelicopter Squadron 1 (HU-1)were already in action in Korea bythe time VMO-6 arrived.

Armstrong's detachment madeits way from Quantico to El Toro,California, leaving on 8 July andreporting for duty on the 10th.Upon arrival, helicopter detach-ment personnel were integratedinto VMO-6, and Captain Arm-strong was named that squadron'sexecutive officer. Because only thepersonnel of the helicopter de-tachment transferred from HMX-1,aircraft had to be found. Six HO3S-1 helicopters were obtained fromU.S. Navy sources (two each fromInyokern and Point Mugu,California, and two more from theoverhaul and maintenance facilityat San Diego). Only two days afterreporting in, the helicopter detach-


A Sikorsky H035-1 helicopter transports a passenger from one ship to anotherwhile the convoy carlying the VMO-6 helicopter section is enroute to Korea.Marine "Whirlybirds" flying off the carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) were rou-tinely used to deliver messages and personnel between ships.

Sikorsky HO3S- 1

Department of Defense l'hoto (USMC) A13] 099

The Sikorsky HO3S-1 was the first helicopterassigned to the U.S. Marine Corps. The HO3S wasthe naval variant of Sikorky's model S-5 1 commer-

cial helicopter. Despite its observation designation, theHO3S was actually a utility aircraft used for a variety ofroles. Among the 46 conceptual uses initially listed byMarine Corps Schools were the ones most used in Korea:search and rescue; aerial reconnaissance; medical evacu-ation; and liaison. The U.S. Air Force flew the same air-craft as a search and rescue helicopter designated H-5F.

The HO3S was the lineal descendent of earlierSikorsky designs, the initial HNS trainer and the first des-ignated military observation helicopter (alternately knownas the HO2S in naval service and the R-5A to the Army).The HO3S featured a more powerful engine that gave itadded lift and an increased payload. During the immedi-ate pre-war period, the HO3S proved to be an outstand-ing rescue craft that often utilized its winch to pulldowned pilots out of the water. Likewise, the HO3S wasan excellent observation platform for artillery spotting.

In Korea, its primary uses were as a liaison aircraft andas an aerial ambulance. A first-rate liaison aircraft withgood range, the HO3S had a dependable engine, and wasrugged enough that it required relatively little mainte-nance when compared to other rotary-wing aircraft of theday.

Even though the HO3S performed yeoman service at

the Pusan Perimeter, it had significant shortfalls as a com-bat aircraft. The tricycle landing gear and its high centerof gravity made the HO3S unstable on all hut flat solid ter-rain; the aircraft could not accommodate interior stretch-er loads; its lack of back-lit instrumentation precludedextended night and bad weather operations; and the highengine location made aircraft maintenance difficult.Another major drawback was that it required a great dealof strength and endurance to handle such a heavy aircraftfor an extended period without servo-controls. In addi-tion, the single main rotor and long tail assembly com-bined with a centrally located engine mount oftenrequired field expedient ballast adjustments to maintainin-flight stability, so it was not unusual for pilots to keepseveral sand bags or a seabag filled with rocks in thecabin.

Mrcraft Data

Manufacturer: Sikorsky Division of United AircraftCorporationPower Plant: Pratt and Whitney R-985 AN-7 Wasp Jr., 9cylinder, 450 horsepower, radial engineDimensions: Length, 57' 1/2"; height, 12' 11"; rotor, 48'composite construction bladePerformance: Cruising speed, 85 mph; range, 260 milesLift: Pilot plus two passengers or about 500 pounds ofcargo (excluding fuel)

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ment moved to San Diego toboard ship.

The crowded escort carrierBadoeng Strait (CVE 116) carrying60 Corsairs, 8 OY Sentinels, and 6Marine helicopters along with theiraircrews sailed for the Far East on14 July. Enroute helicopters wereused for inter-ship supply delivery,mail runs, and personnel transfers.The 1st Marine Brigade was origi-nally slated for a temporary lay-over in Japan where cargo couldhe sorted out then combat loadedand some rudimentary amphibioustraining would he conductedbefore the Marines entered thecombat zone. That was the planuntil the situation in Korea becameso grave that the 5th Marines wasordered to go directly to the belea-guered South Korean port city ofPusan. The aviation element wasstill slated to land in Japan, how-ever, so the ships carrying the avi-ation component split off andheaded for the Japanese port cityof Kohe.

As the ships of Navy TaskGroup 53.7 plowed through thePacific, Brigadier General Craigand his operations officerLieutenant Colonel Joseph L.

Stewart flew to Korea to attend aseries of command conferences.On 30 July, they learned that uponlanding the Marines would beattached to a U.S. Army task forceassigned to shore up the crum-bling southwest flank of theUnited Nations defense lines.Colonel Stewart called the aviationadvance party command post inJapan to warn that combat actionwas imminent and requested thatVMO-6 and Marine Tactical AirControl Squadron 2 (MTACS-2) besent on to Korea as quickly as pos-sible. This emergency phone callconfirmed that the situation inKorea was desperate. According-ly, when the Badeong Strait madelandfall on the evening of 31 July

1950, Major Gottschalk receivedword to begin operations at firstlight the next morning.

Marine Observation Squadron6's airplanes and helicopters wentashore on 1 August. The next daythe Marine air elements scatteredto the four winds. The day fightersquadrons boarded a pair of escortcarriers and then sailed for thecombat zone; the night fightersquadron joined an Air Force all-weather squadron at Itazuke AirBase on Kyushu; VMO-6 groundcrews and their equipment "trans-shipped" to a tank landing ship(LST) for transportation to Korea;and headquarters personnelmoved to Itami Air Base nearOsaka on the island of Honshu.

Helicopters Enter Combat

From Kobe, the helicopters ofVMO-6 proceeded to Itami wheretwo helicopters were assigned toMAG-33 headquarters. Theywould be held in Japan to provideliaison services between the wide-ly scattered aviation units and, atthe same time, be available asemergency replacements if need-ed. The other four HO3S-ls pro-ceeded to Korea. They made theirway from Itami to Iwakuni AirBase where they stayed overnight.After a detailed situation brief anda hasty final maintenance inspec-tion at Ashiya Air Base on north-ern Kyushu on the morning of 2August, the helicopters made thehop across the Tsushima Sraits.They landed at an airfield nearPusan, the logistics keystone ofthe United Nations defensiveperimeter.

The outlook in Korea was notgood when they arrived. The hard-pressed United Nations Commandwas struggling to hold onto a 60-by-90-mile area of southeast Koreaknown as the Pusan Perimeter.The North Korean drive south was

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slowing, but the outcome of thebattle for the Korean peninsulawas far from certain when the 1stProvisional Marine Brigade waswelcomed on board by EighthArmy commander Lieutenant Gen-eral Walton H. Walker, USA.

At the Pusan Perimeter, theMarine brigade acquitted itselfwell and showcased the combateffectiveness of the Marine air-ground team. The Marines wereused as a "fire brigade" movingfrom place to place to stamp outenemy threats. They spearheadedthe first U.N. offensive in Korea,and then twice threw back NKPApenetrations of the U.N. defensivelines. Marine air hit the enemywhen Corsairs swept out of thesky on the same day that theground element was comingashore at Pusan harbor. Thebrigade then consolidated at atemporary assembly area nearChangwon before mounting thefirst sustained United Nationsoffensive of the war. The initialground action occurred in thevicinity of Chindong-ni from 6 to 9August. From there the Marinespressed south to Kosong beforeturning north to the ChangchonPass after wiping out an enemymotorized regiment during theKosong "Turkey Shoot." On 13August, as they neared Sachon, theMarines were abruptly orderedback to Masan to prepare to sealoff an enemy penetration acrossthe Naktong River. Hard fighting atRed Slash Hill and carefully coor-dinated supporting arms firesthrew the North Koreans back.While recuperating at an areadubbed the Masan "Bean Patch,"the Marines had to return to theNaktong bulge to repulse theenemy one more time. Finally, on5 September, the Marines pulledout of the line and returned toPusan so they could mount out tolead MacArthur's amphibious turn-

ing movement at Inchon.Throughout the campaign, thehard-working HO3S-ls of VMO-6performed a wide variety of tasksand were so indispensable thatMarine and Army commanderswere soon demanding more heli-copters.

Upon its arrival at Pusan on 2August, the VMO-6's forward ech-elon was temporarily billeted in aSouth Korean schoolhouse locatedabout 10 miles west of the portuntil the squadron support ele-ment caught up and a more per-manent, and less crowded, sitecould he occupied. The rear party,which sailed from Kobe on boarda Japanese-manned landing ship,actually arrived at Pusan on 4August but could not move out fortwo more days due to the lack oftransportation. Squadron suppliesand equipment were laboriouslyloaded (there was no cargo han-dling machinery at hand) onto thedock then reloaded onto a train

for shipment west to Chinhae on 6August. Chinhae was a SouthKorean naval base, as well as thefuture home of the Korean MarineCorps, located only a short hopacross the bay from Masan. Thesite of a former Japanese ammuni-tion depot with an airstrip, it wasselected because it was close tothe action, had a 2,600-foot grassand concrete runway (alreadybeing used by a combined US-ROK Air Force training squadron),and included a pair of completedhangars with a third under con-struction. There were enoughQuonset huts to house the men,provide adequate office space,and warehouse supplies. Thisfacility would be VMO-6's homefield and base of operations untilthe 1st Provisional Marine Brigadewas dissolved in early September.

In Korea, VMO-6 would beunder the operational control ofthe brigade but under the adminis-trative control of the wing. This

meant that the brigade, and laterthe division, commander throughhis air section would assign dailymissions while the aircraft wingwould provide supplies and per-sonnel administration. Unfortu-nately, the helicopters, whichbelonged partially to both, but notfully to the ground or aviationcommanders, seemed to he nei-ther fish nor fowl. To use MajorGottscha!k's words to describe thisawkward command and controlsystem: "Observation squadronswere the stepchildren of Marineaviation." This theoretical dichoto-my, however, in no way dimin-ished the practical use of heli-copters. They soon proved theirworth in combat and, in fact,became so indispensable that vir-tually every ground commanderrecommended additional heli-copters be made immediatelyavailable by the time the Marinesdeparted the Pusan Perimeter.

The hard-working Marine heli-copters were used for a wide vari-ety of missions that taxed them tothe limit during the month ofAugust 1950. The most commonuses were for command and con-trol, aerial reconnaissance, med-ical evacuation, and combatsearch and rescue; however, theyalso spotted artillery fire, dis-pensed emergency supplies, liftedindividuals to remote outposts,and provided high-speed commu-nications wire laying services aswell. An operational pattern soonemerged. Each morning the twoduty helicopter pilots would fly toGeneral Craig's command postwhere they would report to MajorJames N. Cupp, the brigade's airofficer, for tasking. At about noon,these two helicopters would herelieved on station by the othertwo. This aircraft rotation ensuredadequate pilot rest and gaveground crews time for daily main-tenance work. In addition, an ad

The commanding officer of VMO-6 holds a pre-mission pilot brief during theearly stages of the Korean War. From left to right are Capt George B. Farish, lstLtEugene P. Millette, Capt Victor A. Armstrong, lstLt Lloyd J. Engelhardt, MajVincent J. Gottschalk, Capt Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr., 2dLt Edgar F. Gaudette, Jr.,lstLt Gustave F. Lueddeke, Jr., and enlisted pilot TSgt Robert A. Hill.


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going on a reconnaissance,whether they had any rankon board, whether they werecarrying the commandinggeneral out to one of theunits, or whether they weregoing Out on an evacuationmission. . . . Since we hadcommunications facilities andthe air officer [did not] wecould. . . keep [him] abreastof the Situation.

hoc control system evolvedwhereby the helicopter pilotswould check in and out with theMTACS-2 air control section ontheir way to and from assignedmissions. As air traffic controlsquadron commander Major EltonMueller explained:

We maintained the same pos-itive radio contact with thehelicopters that we did withall the other aircraft operat-

ing with us. The division airofficer, however, controlledthe helicopters. When theywent out on a mission, theywould fly by our operatingsite, give us a call—a radiocheck—on our reporting-in-and-out net. . . . In this man-ner [we] knew when [they]went out on a mission [and]they would tell us what typeof mission they were goingon, i.e. whether they were

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Korea was a difficult arena ofoperations due to its rugged ter-rain, weather extremes, and poor-ly developed infrastructure as aer-ial observer Second LieutenantPatrick G. Sivert recalled: "It washot and dusty, the road networkwas very poor, and the countryvery mountainous. There was noapparent pattern of any sort to themountains. . . no particular rangesor draws, compartments, or corri-dors." The Marines were firstgreeted by sweltering heat andchoking dust, but within a fewmonths bitter cold and heavysnow brought south by the so-called "Siberian Express" wouldcreate vastly different operationalchallenges. The already difficulttopography was exacerbated bythe lack of modern hard surfaceroads as well as poor overlandcommunications links. River val-leys provided the only flat spacesuitable for roadways, but theywere susceptible to flash flooding.The lack of reliable telephonecommunications was also a prob-lem because the short-rangedinfantry radios of the day did notfunction well when out of the line-of-sight. The cumulative result ofthese disparate problems madeKorea an operational nightmare.Luckily, helicopters provided theideal technological fix. They wereunrestrained by the terrain, couldact as radio relays or lay wire athigh-speed, and easily flew over


On 3 August 1950, lstlt Gustave FLueddeke Jr., flew the first commandliaison mission in Korea. In additionto Jrrying commanders arounc4 healso logged numerous medical evacu-ations and flew rescue missionsbehind enemy lines.

traffic jams or roadless wilderness.According to Major Gottschalk,

the use of HO3S helicopters atPusan for command liaison workhad the greatest tactical value.

General Craig faced many unusualcommand circumstances due tothe emergency situation in Korea.Hurried planning, reliance uponoral orders, incomplete intelli-gence, poor communications, andinadequate maps all plagued thebrigade staff. Craig turned to thehelicopter to help solve his prob-lems. While stationed on Guam in1949, he became acquainted withhelicopters when he borrowed acarrier-based Navy HO3S-1 tomake command visits and observefield training, and Craig immedi-ately put this experience to use inKorea. On the morning of 3 August1950, he and his operations officer,Colonel Stewart, climbed into FirstLieutenant Gus-tave Lueddeke'swaiting HO3S, beginning the firstMarine helicopter flight in anactive combat zone. Craig andStewart were airborne almost all ofthat day. The initial leg took themfrom Pusan 30 miles west to thebrigade staging area at Changwon.Along the way, Lueddeke setdown amid some Korean huts toallow Craig to confer with a battal-

foreground markdirection.

ion commander leading the con-voy to its new assembly area. Aftera few minutes on the ground,Craig continued his journey to theactual site selected to become hisforward command post. Next, heflew back to Masan to meet withthe Eighth Army commander andthe commanding general of theU.S. Army task force slated to carryout the first United Nations offen-sive in Korea. On the way home,Craig stopped three times toinform small unit troop leadersabout the upcoming operation.Although this trip seems routine bymodern standards, that was cer-tainly not true in 1950. MarineCorps historian Lynn Montrossnoted the uniqueness of this featand its impact on the future: "Onlya helicopter could have made thisitinerary possible in a period of afew hours. A fixed-wing planecould not have landed in suchunlikely spots, and a jeep couldnot have covered the same routebefore nightfall over narrow, twist-ing roads choked with Army andMarine vehicles." He further

the landing area and indicate wind

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) Al 31 089

A Korean rice paddy serves as a makeshft-landing pad fora Marine HO3S-1 helicopter. The air panels laid out in the

678

opined: "A general and his staffcould now make direct. . . contactwith operations at the front as hadnever been possible before [andthis] enabled a commander to keepin personal touch with his forwardunits since the helicopter couldland virtually anywhere withoutasking favors of the terrain."

General Craig also said: "Timewas always pressing. Fortunately

helicopters . . . were alwaysavailable for observation, com-munications, and control.Without them I do not believe wewould have had the success wedid."

In addition to command andcontrol, a second valuable tacticaluse for helicopters was visualreconnaissance. A major problemduring the attack toward Sachonwas a scarcity of tactical maps,compounded by the fact that theonly maps readily available were

Pusan Perimeter.

inaccurate ones created by Jap-anese cartographers sometimebefore World War II. Villages weremisnamed and misplaced, manyroads were either not shown orwere incorrectly plotted, therewere no contour lines to accurate-ly depict terrain features, and thecomplex grid system was too con-fusing to be of much value.Although no one at Quantico hadpredicted that helicopters mighthave to replace maps for naviga-tion, this is exactly what happenedin Korea. Small unit commandersoften used helicopters to reconnoi-ter their routes of advance or tolocate good ground for defensivepositions. On the march heli-copters shadowed ground move-ments and provided over-the-hori-zon flank security. In addition,HO3Ss were used to direct artilleryfire, a task made difficult forground observers due to the poor

679

maps and hilly terrain that fre-quently masked targets.

Another ground support duty,one that had received much playat Quantico, was aerial wire lay-ing. A helicopter flying nap-of-the-earth could put down com-munications wire at the rate ofabout a mile per minute, far fasterthan a ground party could do it.The heavy and cumbersomespools presented no problem fora helicopter, whereas ground-based wire layers were severelylimited as to how much wire theycould carry and which terrainthey could cross. An additionalbonus was that by flying over treelines or narrow defiles, heli-copters could keep the wire over-head where it was not subject todestruction by tank treads orartillery bursts. Today, wire layingseems like a small thing but, inthe days before needed two-way

The leaders of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, BGenEdward A. Craig, left, and his deputy, BGen Thomas J.Cushinan, righl wait in the shade of a Sikorsky HO3S-1. The

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1385

commanding officer of VMO-6felt that command visits weremissions of the most tactical value during the fighting at the

radio reliability, land line commu-nications was vital for commandand control.

Two missions of marginal tacti-cal value had a significant impactupon morale, aerial medical evac-uations and airborne search andrescue. Helicopter evacuations,reported Major Gottschalk: "exert avery positive effect on groundtroops since they know theirchances of survival are tremen-dously in-creased. . . . A unit cutoff by land [could still] have itswounded evacuated [and] ithelped units by relieving them ofthe necessity of caring for them[thus] freeing more men for fight-ing. The use of helicopters for res-cue of downed pilots [was] also

important in bolstering [air crew]morale."

On 4 August, Marine helicoptersperformed their first aerial medicalevacuation when a Marine wound-ed by an accidental weapon dis-charge was flown from Changwonto the naval hospital train atMasan. The next day helicopterswere called out to deliver waterand rations to an infantry platoonsent to a nearby hilltop to checkout reports of an enemy observa-tion party located there."Whirlybirds" were used becausethey could deliver the cargo in amatter of minutes where it wouldhave taken a carrying party hoursto bring up in the rugged terrainand intense heat. Five Marines suf-

fering severe heat exhaustion andin need of advanced medical atten-tion were taken Out by helicopter.

On 8 August, the squadron con-ducted a night helicopter evacua-tion—another first. This was a dar-ing feat because the FIO3S did nothave proper instrumentation fornight operations. I)isregardingthese limitations, Captain Arm-strong flew off into the fading lightto pick up a critically woundedman and the regimental surgeon ofthe 5th Marines. The nearly blindhelicopter was guided back by thelight of flares and came to earthamid the glow of headlights. Thisdramatic flight was the first ofmore than 1,000 night evacuationsconducted in Korea.

The first of many Marine helicopter medical evacuations ground transportation could not traverse the rugged terrainoccurred when VMO-6 helicopters lifted several severe heat and stretcher-bearer evacuation would take too long.casualties to safety. "Whirlybirds" were often used because Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2855

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rapid evacuation of seriouslywounded and the immediate avail-ability of helicopter-providedwhole blood at forward medicalstations.

Unfortunately, the HO3S-1 wasa civilian model aircraft adoptedfor use as a military machine; itwas not designed to be a flyingambulance and, thus, poorly con-figured to be used as such. Marineground crews in Korea quicklymodified the HO3Ss to carrystretcher cases. The starboardobservation window was removedand straps secured the stretcher inflight, but still a wounded man'slegs protruded from the cabin. Thiswas a minor annoyance that sum-

As helicopter pilot CaptainNorman G. Ewers later recalled:

Normally, helicopter evacua-tion missions [were] per-formed on orders from thedivision air officer who re-lay[ed] the requests from themedical officers of the battal-ions or regiments. Heli-copters [were] used to evacu-ate only those who [were]critically wounded andrequire[d] immediate hospitaltreatment. The helicopter[made] it possible not only toget the man to the hospitalmuch more quickly, hut it[provided] a much easier ridethan travel by roads overrough terrain [and] thissmoother ride . . . prevent[edlhemorrhages.

Medical evacuations were flownwithout regard for difficult circum-

stances. The pilots took off in allkinds of weather, without the ben-efit of proper instrumentation orhoming devices, and often disre-garded enemy fire in the landingzones. A tribute to the helicopterpilots of VMO-6 was rendered by aground officer: "The flying of evac-uation helicopters from jury riggedand inadequate landing sites wasnothing short of miraculous.The pilots of the observationsquadron received far less creditthan they deserved. They used tofly at night [into] frontline landingstrips where I had trouble walk-ing." Frontline medical officerslikewise credited the flying skillsand bravery of the medical evacu-ation pilots for saving many lives.The mortality rate in Korea fell to anew low of only two percent, lessthan half the rate of World War IIand far below the nearly 50 per-cent rate prior to the AmericanCivil War, due in large part to the

681

mer, but during cold-weather oper-ations several cases of frostbittenfeet and lower legs caused by thesevere airborne wind chill wererecorded. In addition, the wound-ed man most often had to beloaded into the helicopter from aposition above the heads of thestretcher-bearers, a ponderous andawkward process. Inside the cabin,the pilot had to make quick ballastadjustments to ensure proper trimon the way home. Another prob-lem was the HO3S-l's high profileand unstable tricycle landing gear;at least one HO3S tipped overwhile idling on rough ground.Although all agreed that the HO3Swas invaluable in emergencies,there was room for mechanicalimprovement. This was handled intwo ways. First, requests for imme-diate deployment of an off -the-shelf medical evacuation heli-copter, the Bell HTL trainer, weresent up the chain-of-command.Second, Sikorsky Aircraft madedesign modifications to its newestobservation helicopter, the devel-opmental model S-52, whichreached the fleet as the HO5S.

One mission of mercy for whichthe HO3S was perfectly suited wasthe rescue of downed pilots.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-420545

The Sikorsky HO3S-1 was a civilian model helicopter acquired for use as anobservation aircraft. Unfortunately, the aircraft was poorly configured for med-ical evacuations, which often required Marines and Navy coipsmen to liftpatients into the aircraft from odd angles.

Helicopters were virtually the onlymeans by which a downed pilotcould be snatched from behindenemy lines and returned safelyhome within hours. The HO3S'sside-mounted winch was an idealtool for pulling an unfortunate avi-ator from the chilly waters off theKorean coast. The pilot or hiscrewman located the downed manand then the helicopter hoveredoverhead while the stricken manwas lifted to safety. LieutenantLueddeke made the first of theserescues on 10 August while con-ducting a ground reconnaissancewith the brigade commander onboard. Second Lieutenant Doyle H.Cole's Corsair was struck byground fire during a strafing run.Cole was unable to make it back tothe Badoeng Strait, so his planeplunged into the water. Luckily, hewas able get out and inflate his liferaft before the plane sank.Lueddeke's helicopter quicklyrushed toward the sinking plane toaffect an airborne rescue. General

Craig winched the soaked pilot upinto the helicopter as Lueddekehovered over the wreckage. Oncesafely inside the grinning pilotslapped his benefactor on the backwith the words "Thanks, Mac"before he noticed the general'srank insignia and was able to ren-der proper honors. The unper-turbed senior officer simplyreplied: "Glad to be of service,Lieutenant."

Not every rescue had such ahappy ending. Later that same dayLieutenant Lueddeke was sent torescue another VMF-323 pilot.This time the downed flyer wasCaptain Vivian M. Moses whoseplane had been hit by antiaircraftfire in enemy territory. Lueddekeskillfully negotiated a low-levelapproach behind enemy lines topick up the stranded pilot andreturned him to Chinhae for anovernight stay. The next morning,Moses returned to his ship wherehe promptly volunteered to flyanother combat mission. Ironically,

he was shot down once againbefore the helicopter that deliveredhim returned to action. his planecrashed into a rice paddy andflipped over when it struck thedike. Captain Moses was knockedunconscious as he fell from theplane and drowned before heli-copter pilot Captain Eugene J.Pope could save his life. Sadly,Vivian Moses became the firstMarine pilot to die in combat inKorea.

On 7 August, the first Marinehelicopter came under fire whenthe commanding general's hIO3S-1was caught in an enemy artillerybarrage. Luckily, the plane emergedundamaged after dropping GeneralCraig off. The first combat damageto a Marine helicopter occurred aweek later when an HO3S-1 lost itswindshield while evad-ing enemyantiaircraft fire. No "whirlyhircls"were lost to enemy fire during the580 missions flown by the heli-copter section of VMO-6 during thefighting at Pusan.

On 12 August, the Marineadvance toward Sachon wasabruptly halted due to a break-through that penetrated the U.N.lines near Miryang on the NaktongRiver. The situation was so criticalthat a battalion of the 5th Marineswas immediately ordered north tocounterattack. Once again, thehelicopter proved invaluable as aliaison vehicle. The battalion com-mander and the brigade operationsofficer mounted First LieutenantRobert Longstaff's H035-1 to ren-dezvous with a U.S. Army repre-sentative. They flew to theappointed place but could notlocate their man. Luckily, theywere able to orbit the area untilthey found a reconnaissance unit,which was able to contact their di-vision headquarters. The Marineswere told that instead of joiningthe Army unit as planned theyshould instead "look the situation

Marines refuel a VMO-6 helicopter in a rice paddy during the fighting in thePusan Perimeter. When a helicopter could not make it back to base, 55-gallondrums of fuel and a supply of oil had to be trucked out to the inake-shft land-ing pad.

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

682

Early aval Helicopters

The fir t t'.S. 'avy experience with rotary-\"ing aircraft was not a good one. Th' Pitcarin OP-l alltogiro, an 'lirplane not a tru' helicopter, had h en

te~Led and found wanting during th' era bet\\'e n the'\' orld '\' ars. It \\'a~ not until Igor ikorsky introduced his

-316 model h licopter on 13 January 19"12 that verticalwk ff and landing air raft became feasible. :iJ<orskyhad earlier fl wn the fir t practical merican helicopter,the -3 0, but that machine was only a te't bed. Thefollow-on c'-.316, de'ignated the XR- by th nny,had a two- 'eat side-by-. id enclosed cabin. 200horsep wer Warner R-550-3 engine that ran a single

verhead main rot r and a smaller anti-torque rotor onthe tail power d the aircraft. The XR-4 prototype couldhit a top 'peed of ar und - mile p r hour. cruised atahout 70 mile!; per hour, and had a range of about 130.In July 1912, th' 'avy t sted its fir t one; an R-4 tran fen'ed from the rmy and then promptly rede ignatedII ' -I b the I3ureau of eronautic!;. Two more w rrequi itioned fr m Army to k in larch 19..13. The newhelicopt r \\'a aucce. . and _2 more were procured foru a trainers I eginning on 16 ctober 19-d. The II c1 served a th primary na al aviation helicopter traineruntil the I3ell IITL- 'erie replaced it.

Several other early helicopter' (the Platt L Page R-land the Kellet R-2 and R-3) produ ed by other manufacturer~ \\ re con~idered but not ~elected. II wa not lost,however, because a bright young Kellet engineer, FrankPia~ecki, \ ould larer d velop tand m-rotor helicopterthat would become a mainstay of naval aviation. TheBell ircraft ompany \Vas LOO bu, turning out jets toenter the initial helicopter competition. but that corporation's mathematician and engineer nhur M. Youngwould oon revolutionize light helic pter deSign.

'ikor 'ky ircraft produced 1.33 II h licopters; theavy acccpted 2.3. the Army kept 58, and the I3riti h

Royal ir Forcc got 52. The first !;hipboard heli 'opter trials were c ndu ted by meri 'a'~ fir t certified military

helicopter pilot. rmy apwin Hollingworth "Frank"Gregory. lIe put hi' H' through it!; pa 'e!; by repeatedly landing and Laking off from th tanker Bllllker JlilIOperdling in Long Island :ound on 7 l\Iay 19-1.3. oa"lJuard Li 'utenant Command'r Frank . Erickson flew

the initial na\'a1 ervicc helicopter mer y mis~ion " h'nhe d livered two cases of blood plasma to a hospital at

'andy Hook on the ew Jersey ~hore. Doctor~ creditedErick on'!; tim ly arri\'al with saving several Ii\·e... therre cue rni'sion aiding both civilian and military per~on

nel in the e' York ar a soon ~ Howed. Thl:: .'. Armyand the ffice of trategic Selvice. both used helicopter!;for spe ial ombat mis~ions in Asia during World War TI.

The avy wa' satisfied enough with the H S [0 orderan additional 150 helicopters fr m ikor ky, 100 lIOS-Is(de!;ignated R-6 by the 'AAF) and -0 H02 '-I (Anndesignation R-5A) bd re (he end of the war. Th HO 'I was more compact, m r p werful. an I m re maneuverable than its H pr d 'ceSt-ior. It mount d a singleoverhead main rotor, and was powered b a 2.0 hpFranklin -105-9 engine. Three XlIO:-ls were request-d for testing from Army R-6 !-itO k~ in late 19'"12 and

\V re a cepted by th oaM uard, "vhich \Va. bythen nmning avy h licopter training at 1::"-' York'Floyd Bennett Field in March 19+t. After the ..var a second batch of 36 HO -h were assign cI t th avy helicopt r development . quadron (\ -3) aft r pa!;singacceplan e test!;. The avy abo t ok ~·o 1102 -1 (ArmyR-5A) t'M model in December 1915, but opted LO plac'an order for slightly modified, -51 comm'rcial modeb(de!;ignated H03 -0 which h 'came the standard avy,Marine, and oast Guard light utility helicopt r~ in 1917.

When the Coa t Guard returned to the Trea uryDepaltmem from the la\' Department on 2 De emb r19 5. the .. Javy took \' r helicopter training anddevelopm 'nt. ladn helicopter pilots learned their tradewith VX-3 before moving on to HMX-l at Quantico,

irginia, prior to th Kor an ar.

over and do what [they] thoughtproper [to] ensure the safety of the159th Field Artillery." The Marineshad neither detailed maps of thearea nor locating coordinates, sothey took to the air to conduct avisual reconnaissance and, hopefully, find the lost Army artillerymen. This was done, and theMarines returned to meet the rescue convoy on the road. After giving an estimate of the situation andfurther instructions, the two

Marines returned to the Army position to prepare for the rescue column's arrival. Concurrently, a helicopter piloted by LieutenantLueddeke carrying the artillery regimental commander and his operations officer located several survivors of an overrun artillery battery. They dropped a note ofencouragement then led a reliefparty to the spot. During thisexcursion, Lueddeke's H03S-1came under small arms fire and

683

had to "buck and jerk" its way outof the area using maneuvers notfound in the pilot's manual. Onlyhelicopters could have providedsuch assistance. Ground transportation would have been unable tofind the misplaced units in a timelymanner, while a light observationplane could not have moved backand forth between the supportedand supporting units with suchspeed and efficiency. The helicopters of VMO-6 saved the day.

Air-sea rescue was an important mission flown by VMO-6with the first such rescue made in August. Here, CaptEugene J. Pope at the controls of his HO3S-1 helicoptei is


congratulated by his still-wet fellow VIi'IO-C observation pilotCapt Alfred F Mc6aleb, Jr.

Two HO3S-1 helicopters, twopilots, and five mechanics as-signed to headquarters squadronin Japan were released from thatduty and joined VMO-6 at Chinhaeon 15 August, just in time for oneof the biggest battles for the PusanPerimeter. The 5th Marines hadbeen pulled back from Sachon,hurriedly replenished, and thenmarched north to seal off theNKPA penetration near Miryang.Helicopters were used for visualreconnaissance of the battle area,conducted liaison visits, scoutedthe routes of advance, screenedthe flanks, spotted artillery fires,

brought in supplies, and evacuatedcasualties as the Marines weretwice called on to throw the NorthKoreans back across the NaktongRiver. During that time the heli-copter pilots began to perfect eva-sive maneuvers that allowed themto dodge enemy ground fire. Italso became obvious that the fraillooking helicopters were tougherthan previously thought. Severalwere hit by enemy small arms firebut kept on flying, and others sur-vived some very hard landings inrough country. As General LemuelShepherd later noted about thetoughness of helicopters: "I saw

684

[them] come in with a dozen bulletholes [but] unless they are hit in avital part, they continue to fly."Still, the helicopters carried noarmor or weapons so they wereused in supporting roles except foremergency evacuations or deepsearch and rescue missions. Thebest tactic for those risky missionswas to get in and out as quickly aspossible while flying nap-of-the-earth using terrain to mask ingressand egress routes.

The Marine defense of thePusan Perimeter ended with thearrival of other elements of the 1stMarine Division and the remainder

Airfield Designation

Unit dati n nU11an I airfield· in Korea us d I ller-numt er designat r : th I tt r "K" indicated a maj r air ba. e; the leu r" .. indiated an au -jlimy landing trip; and the lett r" .. indicated that the

airfield adj ined a ., . rmy ba. e r headquart r . During the Korean'; ar.larin heli opter squadr n. op rat d from the following 10 aoom:

Marine Db ervation quadron 6hinha (K-IQ)

Kimp (K-I'I)

'\ onsan (K-2'»Yonpo (1\:-2 )

Maan (unnamed)Pohang (K-.3)

niu K-3 )H ngch n (J";:~I )

Kwanda -ri (unnam I)

of Major General Field Harris' 1stMarine Aircraft Wing fromCalifornia in preparation for thelanding at Inchon. By late August,the helicopter detachment hadlogged 580 sorties and 348 flighthours, conducted 35 medical evacuations, and flew 85 aerial recon-

onjong-ni unnam d):ohung-ni ( -~7)

inchon ( '-83)Tonggo-ri ( -9)Marine Transport quadron 161Puan K-1)Kangnung (1\:-18)

h d -ri ( - 3)Yongp -ni (A-1 )Taejong-ni ( -.33)

naissance mlSSlons. Throughoutthat time helicopter availabilitywas 100 percent. In his final reportMajor Gottschalk attributed thisremarkable accomplishment totwo factors: the excellent facilitiesat Chinhae and the ground supportcrew's professionalism, skill, and

willingness to put in long hours.This was no small achievementbecause helicopters required agreat deal more effort; more spareparts, more man-hours, and moresophisticated tools and workspaces than did the OY Sentinels.On the other hand, Gottschalk alsonoted that larger transport helicopters could have provided muchneeded services such as troop lifts,resupply, and command liaison,which were beyond the capabilities of the H03S-1.

General Craig, the first Marinecommander to use a helicopter asa command and control aircraftlater wrote:

Helicopters are a godsend. . .The mountainous terrain ofKorea presents a difficult problem for security. . . . [Transport]helicopters would be ideal to[quickly] post patrols and outguards on high, dominating terrain which would [normally]

A VMO-6 helicopter lands near the artillery positions of the1st Battalion} 11th Marines} along the Naktong River. The

H03S was designated as an "observation" platform but wasactually used as a light utility aircraft in Korea.


685

Almost any individual ques-tioned could offer some per-sonal story to emphasize thevaluable part played by [the]HO3S planes. . . . There is flOdoubt the enthusiasm voiced.

is entirely warranted.No effort should he spared toget helicopters—larger thanthe HO3S if possible—to thetheater at once, and on a pri-ority higher than any otherweapon. [We need] heli-copters, more helicopters,and more helicopters.

The Inchon-Seoul Campaign

take hours to climb. . . . [Morehelicopters] would . . . insurethe earlier defeat of the enemy.They should be made availablefor use at the earliest possibledate.

He also noted other Serviceinterest in rotary-wing aircraft bystating: "The Army is enthusiasticover our ideas of employment ofthis type of aircraft and is goingahead with the idea of employingthem on a large scale." Like Major

Gottschalk, Craig also recommend-ed that a transport helicoptersquadron be formed and sent toKorea as quickly as possible. TheDirector of Marine Corps Aviation,Brigadier General Clayton C.

Jerome, made the case for addi-tional helicopters in a memoran-dum to the Deputy Chief of NavalOperations (Air):

There are no superlativesadequate to describe the gen-eral reaction to the helicopter.

686

On 9 September, VMO-6 wasplaced under the operational con-trol of the 1st Marine Division,commanded by Major GeneralOliver P. "0. P." Smith, and underthe administrative control of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing. The Marines'next mission was destined tobecome a military classic—theamphibious assault at Inchon, abattle that dramatically reversedthe course of the Korean conflict.U.S. Army X Corps, spearheadedby the 1st Marine Division,launched a difficult daylong am-phibious landing then rapidlymoved inland to secure the supplydepot at Ascom City and KimpoAirfield. The campaign culminatedwith the retaking of the SouthKorean capital of Seoul. Thisseizure cut the enemy's main sup-ply routes and left the NKPA forcesin the south isolated. By the timethe lead elements of X Corps in thenorth and Eighth Army coming upfrom the Pusan Perimeter linkedup the NKPA was in full flight. Thatonce awesome fighting force hadbeen completely routed and washeaded for the dubious safety ofNorth Korea.

To prepare for the Inchon land-ing, Major Gottschalk divided hissquadron into forward and rear


MajGen Field Harris, left, commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircrqft Wing,MajGen Oliver P Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Division, and BGenThomas J. Cush man, assistant wing commandei meet in Tokyo, Japan, a weekbefore the landing at Inchon.

echelons. The forward echelon, 10officers, 48 enlisted men, and 8helicopters, loaded on board Jap-anese-manned LST Q079 atChinhae. During the voyage, theMarines and Japanese crew sharedmess facilities. Luckily, detach-ment commander Captain VictorArmstrong spoke fluent Jap-anese—he had resided in Japanfor 15 years before the outbreak ofWorld War II. Four officers and 43enlisted men remained behind tosafeguard squadron property atChinhae.

Once ashore the Marine heli-copter detachment picked up rightwhere it left off, but on a muchlarger scale. The main missionsremained command and liaison,aerial evacuation of seriouslywounded, combat search and res-cue of downed fliers, and visualreconnaissance. Although thenumber of HO3S helicopters haddoubled since August, thedemands for their time continuedto increase.

Major General Smith, the 1stMarine Division commander and aformer member of the ShepherdBoard in 1946, quickly became ahelicopter advocate. "The heli-copter was of inestimable value tothe division commander and hisstaff in keeping personal contactwith subordinate units in a mini-mum of transit time," he asserted.Generals Smith and Craig, nowassistant division commander,depended upon helicopters to visitthe front on a daily basis and unitcommanders scouted proposedroutes of advance, although emer-gency medical evacuations weregiven priority over liaison andreconnaissance. With as few asonly four helicopters operational,however, command and liaisonvisits were often interrupted whenthe commander's helicopter wasdiverted for emergency missions.When critically wounded men

needed a ride the generals andcolonels either used alternativetransportation or waited until their"chopper" returned. The list ofdignitaries using helicopter trans-port during September 1950included Fleet Marine Force,Pacific, commander LieutenantGeneral Lemuel Shepherd, Com-mandant Clifton B. Cates, and XCorps commander, U.S. ArmyMajor General Edward M. Almond.At Inchon, just as at Pusan, themost often heard complaint abouthelicopters was that there werenot enough of them.

Although Marine helicoptersplayed no combat role on the firstday at Inchon, Navy helicoptersdid spot naval gunfire during thepreliminary bombardment. On 16September (D+1), Marine heli-copters entered the fray flying 14missions. The landing ship-basedMarine "whirlybirds" flew recon-naissance and artillery spottingmissions over Wolmi-do Island,and First Lieutenant Max Nebergallpulled a Navy pilot out of thedrink. On the afternoon of 17September, ground Marines cap-tured Kimpo Airfield, the largest

"Whirlybird" pilots in Korea were famous for their daring feats while rescuingdowned flyers and evacuating seriously wounded men; among the very best werelstLts Robert A. Longstaff and Gustave F Lueddeke, Jr. of VMO-6. Tragically, theMarine Corps lost two of it most promising pioneer helicopter pilots whenLongstaff was killed in action at the Chosin Reservoir and Lueddeke succumbedtopoliomyelitis not long after returning from Korea.


687

airfield in Korea, virtually intact.The first U.S. aircraft to land therewas Captain Armstrong's HO3S,which arrived at mid-morning on18 September as Marines searchedfor the remnants of the previousnight's NKPA counterattack force.Armstrong carried two early pro-ponents of Marine helicopter oper-ations, Lieutenant General Shep-herd and his operations officerColonel Victor H. Krulak.

On 19 September, the 1st MarineDivision moved its command postfrom Inchon to Oeoso-ri. The nextday VMO-6 moved to nearbyKimpo, which thereafter served asthe squadron's base of operationsuntil the subsequent move north.The final phase of the Inchon turn-ing movement—the recapture ofSeoul—was about to begin, andhelicopters proved to be particular-ly valuable when terrain obstaclesseparated elements of the divisionduring the drive to retake the cap-ital. The general operational pat-tern was for one helicopter to beearmarked for each regimentalcommander in addition to oneeach for the division commanderand his assistant commander. Theregimental helicopters were pri-marily used for reconnaissance andmedical evacuations, the divisioncommander's for liaison, and theassistant division commander's forreconnaissance; any unassignedhelicopters underwent mainte-nance while standing by for emer-gency evacuations or combatsearch and rescue.

The major obstacle on the wayto Seoul was the Han River. Brig-adier General Craig used his heli-copter to locate a suitable crossingarea, scout key terrain, and surveythe road approaches to the SouthKorean capital. Although fewenemy soldiers actually showedthemselves, Captain Armstrong,Craig's pilot, had to dodge scat-tered small arms fire along the

way. As a result of his aerial recon-naissance, Craig recommendedthat the 5th Marines move acrossthe Han at an abandoned ferry sitenear Haengju and then seize thehigh ground overlooking Seoul.

Just as before, combat searchand rescue was an important addi-tional duty for the helicopters ofVMO-6. On 21 September 1950,the squadron received word that apilot had gone down behindenemy lines and was jammedinside his cockpit. Anticipating a

688

difficult extraction, First LieutenantArthur R. Bancroft loaded his planecaptain on board then took off tomake the rescue. The area was"hot," so friendly planes main-tained a rescue combat air patrolto strafe any enemy who showedtheir heads. Bancroft set his HO3Sdown and remained at the controlswhile the helicopter idled with itsrotor blades slowly turning. Thecrew chief could not free theencased pilot alone, so Bancrofthad to leave the aircraft to assist.

Department of l)efense Photo (IJSMC) A130249

Gapt Victor A. Armstrong, right, proudly displays the cake sent from the carrierPhilippine Sea (CV47) asMaj Vincentf Gottschalk, VMO-6's commanding ofJi-cei' looks on. Capt Armstrong made a daring behind-the-lines rescue of a Navypilot shot down near Seoul and the cake was sent ashore as a mark of appreci-ation.

Who was the First Marine Helicopter Pilot?

There is some dispute about who the first MarineCorps helicopter pilot actually was. According toMarine lore that honor goes to fighter ace and

famed test pilot Marion E. Carl, but the official records ofthe naval service identify Major Armond H. DeLalio asMarine helicopter pilot number one, and Marion Carl him-self proclaimed that Desmond E. Canavan was probablythe first Marine to fly a helicopter.

According to the Marine Corps' official history, Marinesand Helicopters, 1962-1973, "Major General Marion E.Carl is generally credited with being the first Marine tolearn how to fly a helicopter in July 1945 [but] it was notuntil some years later that he was officially designated [assuch]." In his autobiography, Pushing The Envelope(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), Carl relatesthat he learned how to fly a Sikorsky HNS (R-4) while atest pilot stationed at the Naval Air Test Center, PatuxentRiver, Maryland. He was given about three hours ofinstruction before he soloed. In that same memoir, how-ever, he states that fellow Marine Desmond Canavan wasflying helicopters in late 1944. Carl's claim that he washelicopter pilot number one rests upon the fact that hewas the first Marine to log the 40 hours required for cer-tification even though he never applied for such certifica-tion. Neither Carl nor Canovan appear on the naval ser-vice helicopter pilot certification list prior to June 1950.

Marine Corps Historian Lynn Montross, the recognizedauthority on early Marine helicopter operations, lists NavyCross holder Armond DeLalio as having flown U.S. Navyhelicopters at New York's Floyd Bennett Field then underthe auspices of the U.S. Coast Guard in 1944. He is offi-cially recognized as the first Marine certified as a heli-copter pilot, achieving that honor on 8 August 1946.DeLalio was the operations officer for Navy helicoptersquadron VX-3 at that time. He was killed during a testflight in 1952 when a rocket-assisted takeoff pod mal-functioned causing his HRS helicopter to catch fire andthen crash.

The Navy register of early helicopter pilots lists 250qualifiers prior to the onset of the Korean War in June1950; 33 are Marines, including three enlisted naval avia-tion pilots (the famous "Flying Sergeants" of the MarineCorps).

While who should be recognized as the true "GrayEagle" of Marine helicopter aviation remains murky, thereis little doubt about the specific incident that started theMarine Corps helicopter program. That event occurred atQuantico, Virginia, in 1946 and was described by heli-copter pioneer Edward C. Dyer:

One day Marion Carl, a test pilot at Patuxent, flew ahelicopter to Marine Corps Schools to demonstrateit to the students. . . . He hoisted [Lieutenant Colonel

Marine corps Historical center Photo collectionLtCol Armond H. DeLalio, recipient of the Navy Cross Jbrheroism as a pilot with Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron241 during the battle of Midway and a Marine Coipshelicopter pioneer, was honored in 1965 when an ele-mentary school at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, wasdedicated in his name.

Victor H.] Brute Krulak . . . about 15 feet [off theground] and pulled him into the cockpit. [LieutenantColonel Merrill B.] Twining and I were standing bythe window and watching and I said 'Bill, let's .

quit fooling around.' He said 'OK! . . . He wrote thetheory. . . principles. . . background. . . reasoning• . . and I wrote [an implementation] program."

Marion Carl recalled that he specifically selectedLieutenant Colonel Krulak because his small stature andlightweight could be accommodated by the limited roomand lift capability of his HOS-1 helicopter. Krulak there-after became a helicopter devotee.

689

While the two Marines busily freedthe trapped pilot, the helicopter'scollective friction device workedloose and the plane tipped on itsside where the beating rotorsdestroyed the aircraft. Luckily,Lieutenant Robert Longstaff wasable to pick up the grounded trioalthough his overloaded HO3Sstaggered under the excessiveweight until it reached friendlylines. Bancroft then promptlymounted another helicopter to res-cue a second Navy flier before theday ended.

Two days later, Captain Arm-strong recorded the longest searchand rescue operation yet by aVMO-6 helicopter when he flewnearly 100 miles behind enemylines to rescue a downed Navypilot. On the return flight, he ranout fuel over friendly territory,temporarily put down, refueled,and then landed at Kimpo afterdark using a flashlight to illumi-nate his control panel. The res-cued pilot turned Out to be asquadron commander from thecarrier Philzppine Sea (CV 47).The next day, VMO-6 received alarge layer cake, compliments ofthe U.S. Navy as a reward forArmstrong's fine work. Converse-ly, Lieutenant Longstaff flew theshortest rescue mission of the warpicking up a pair of Marines froma Grumman F7F Tigercat thatcrashed after taking off fromKimpo. That mission on the 25thtook less than six minutes. Thepilot was Lieutenant Colonel MaxJ. Volcansek, Jr., of Marine NightFighter Squadron 542, one of threesquadron commanders to godown that day.

A more dramatic rescue alsooccurred on 25 September. A Navyhelicopter "on loan" to the Marinessuffered battle damage during adeep rescue mission and wasforced to put down near the HanRiver. Word that an American air-

crew was down in enemy territorydid not reach the division air offi-cer until about 2100—after sunset.Captain Armstrong took off de-spite the fact that the HO3S hadneither proper instrumentation norlanding lights for limited visibilityflying. Armstrong needed botharms and both feet to control thehelicopter, so he held a flashlightbetween his knees to illuminatethe unlit instrument panel. Hespotted the downed aircraft in theglow of light cast from the burningcity of Seoul and set down on anearby sandbar. The crew, a Navypilot and a Marine enlisted man,swam to Armstrong's waiting heli-copter for a safe ride home. Heonce again had to rely uponmakeshift lights upon arrival at thelanding zone.

Thus far in Korea, vMo-6 hadlost helicopters to operational inci-dents but had suffered no fatali-ties. Tragically, this string of luckcame to an end on 29 September.A VMO-6 Sentinel was shot downabout five miles north of Seoul.Reports indicated the aerial ob-server was killed in the crash, butthe pilot was able get out. FirstLieutenants Lloyd Engelhardt andArthur Bancroft, both of who pre-viously had logged deep searchand rescue missions, were at thedivision command post when thecall for help came in. Both imme-diately volunteered to go, butMajor James Cupp, the division airofficer, ordered them to wait untilmore detailed information becameavailable. A few minutes later theylearned that the OY went downbeyond the Marine frontlines nearUijongbu, an unsecured areateeming with enemy and knownto be infested with antiaircraftguns. Bancroft, who won a coinflip to decide who would makethe rescue, took the lead withEngelhardt trailing by about a halfmile. They found the crash site,

690

but as Bancroft's helicopter beganto settle it was hit by enemy fireand disintegrated in a fireball.Engel-hardt called for fighterplanes to survey the area. Theyreported Bancroft had been killed,and there was no sign of thedowned pilot. First LieutenantArthur R. Bancroft thus becamethe first Marine helicopter pilot todie in action.

Helicopters became crucial forcommand liaison. The rugged ter-rain, a major river, and wide dis-persal of fighting units made con-trol difficult. Helicopter mobilitymade it possible for commandersto scout approach routes, identifykey terrain, attend conferences inthe rear, and then quickly there-after meet subordinate comman-ders face-to-face. On 28 Septem-ber, Major General Smith coordi-nated the defense of Seoul as hevisited each of his three regimentalcommand posts: the 1st Marines atSeoul's Duk Soo Palace; the 5thMarines at the Seoul Women'sUniversity; and the recently arrived7th Marines on the city's westernoutskirts. The 1st and 5th Marineswere to defend in place while the7th attacked toward Uijonghu. On3 October, Armstrong flew Com-mandant Cates on an aerial surveyof the Inchon-Seoul area and afrontline inspection tour highlight-ed by observation of an attack bythe 7th Marines on the 4th. Thiswas the final ground combataction of the campaign, althoughMarine helicopters continued to flydeep rescue and medical evacua-tion missions from Kimpothroughout the rest of October.Lieutenant Engelhardt rescued aMarine pilot near Chunchon on 3October and then plucked an AirForce pilot up at Sihyon-ni on the5th.

When the Inchon-Seoul cam-paign was officially declared overat noon on 7 October 1950, VMO-

U.S. Naval Aviation Designations

D uring th Kor an c nflict, the avy Bureau fronautics u d de'ignati n Y'tem mat con

veyed a lot of information about it quadronand air raft in a con ise manner.

Squadron De.lgnations:The Bureau recogniz d three aircraft squadron types:

lightcr than air (Z); hea ier than air (V); and helicopter(H). [n addition, Marine air raft quadrons were identified by th insertion of the letter "M" betw en the aircraftrype and the quadron function. [n general, a three letter prefix followed by up to d1J'ee number. was used to

identify individual Marine aircraft quadron. The firstlett r (a ''Y'' or "11") identified dle primary air raft rypu ed by th quadron, the second letter ("M") identifiedit a a Marine aviation unit. and me third ("0" indicatingobselvation and "W for tran. portation) identified thesquadron', primary mission; the numbers in the suffixsometimes identified the squadron's unit affiliation andalway noted its precedence order.

Thus, VMo-6 was dle sixm heavier-than-air Malineobsclvation squadron formed. The single digit indicatedthat thc squadron was not specifically affiliated with apani ular aircraft "ing (observation . quadrons \ ereattached to ground units). On th other band, HMR-161

as the fir t Marine h Ii opter tran p It -quadrona igned to dle 1-t Marine Aircraft Wing (the fir t "1"indicating initial as ignmenr to the wing, number' above"6" were us d for non-fixed wing aircraft. and th last "I"signifying it wa the fif t quadron formed).

Aircraft DesignationIndividual aircraft dcsignations used a similar identifi

cation system. The Bureau of A ronautics gave eachnaval aircraft a mix d I rrer and number designation.

Except for xperim mal or prototyp heli opt rs, thfir t I ttcr wa - an "H" indicating r taly-wing statu '; theecond I ner indicated it primary purpo e (,,0" for

observation. "R" for transpolt, or "Y" for train 1'); a number (except in the case of th fir t model) indicated themanufacturer's sequence for producing dlat specific aircraft rype; me next lerrer idemified mc manufaclLlrer "L"for Bell, "p" for Pia ecki, or " "for ikor k ); and thenumber follOWing a da h indicated a equential modification f that aircraft model.

Thus, the H03 -1 wa ikor ky Aircraft', third m delb clvation h licopter with on modifi 'ation: the I IRP

was Pia. ecki's fir t tran port heli opter; the 1111.- \ a.the fOUlth m dificati n to B 1I ircraft's original trainerhelicopter; the HOS was ikor ky's fifth observationmodel; and th HR -1 was 'ikorsky' first transport helicopter.

The Bureau' y tern wa . a good one that remained inusc for four decade, but dlere were a few problem .First, aircraft were often used for role other than th eas ignecl. For xample, me H03S-1 wa~ aCRwlIy a utiliryaircraft that during field 'elvice performed many tasksodler than ob ervation, a to k that actually became a selc1om-u' d s c nclary mis'ion in Korea. ,e 'ond, the proliferation of missions and manufacturers as time pass dled to confusing duplication of letters (''T'' \ as variou lyused to indicated toq)edo trainer, and transport aircraft).Third, bck of inter- ervi e consist ncy produced confu'ion (the Tavy H03 -1 wa an H-5F to the Air Force andrmy). The naval aircraft designation y tern wa'

replaced by a joint aircraft designation system in 1962,but the Bureau's squadron de ignation sy tem remains ineffect.

6 helicopters had flown 643 missions, evacuated 139 seriouslywounded men, and rescued 12 airmen from behind enemy lines orout of the water.

The success of VMo-6's fledgling helicopter detachment hadwide-ranging effects that spreadwell beyond the theater of operations and impacted more than justthe Marine Corps. In the UnitedStates, military dogmatists andcivilian pundits complained longand loud about lack of interSelvice unity in Korea. However,in the words of Major GeneralJohn P. Condon, an expert in jointoperations and an experienced air

group commander in Korea: "Thefarther from Washington, the lessinter-Service differences came intoplay." This dictate was borne outby Marine helicopter operations inlate October. On the 21st, CaptainGene W. Morrison made a series offlights to evacuate eight seriouslywounded Army paratroopers fromSukchon to Pyongyang in hisH03S. Three days later, CaptainWallace D. Blatt, who had provided helicopter coverage for thewithdrawal of U.S. forces fromChina, and First Lieutenant CharlesC. Ward flew deep into enemy territory to rescue a pair of Air Forcepilots down near Koto-ri, more

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than 100 miles inland from theirtemporary base at Wonsan Harbor.These were only a few of manytimes Marine helicopters rescuedor aided other American servicemen in Korea. Although both theu.s. Navy and Air Force were flying helicopters in Korea, theMarine success with rotary-wingoperations at Pusan and Inchonprodded the Air Force to attachhelicopter units specifically earmarked for medical evacuation toArmy field hospitals. Likewise, aclamor for organic transport andobservation helicopters arose fromu.s. Army commanders. The utilityand practicality of helicopters in

combat zones had been firmlyestablished by the Marines ofVMO-6 in less than three months.

The Chosin Reservoir

General MacArthur's successfulturning movement at Inchon dras-tically changed the course of theKorean War. Thereafter, the NKPAwas a broken machine with itsscattered remnants headed for theprotection of North Korea's hinter-lands or a safe haven inside China.MacArthur, sensing a chance toend the conflict by trapping theremaining North Korean forces,sent his United Nations Commandspeeding north beyond the 38thParallel in a race for the Yalu Riverdespite warnings not to do so.

MacArthur split his forces tohasten the pursuit. He ordered theEighth Army forward in the westand opted to use X Corps, includ-ing the 1st Marine Division, for anamphibious landing at Wonsan innortheast Korea. Once again,VMO-6 split into forward and rearelements. The advance party (4officers and 70 enlisted menknown as the "surface" echelon)embarked on board LST 1123 andthen sailed for Wonsan on 13October. Most pilots, all VMO-6aircraft, and a skeleton ground-support crew remained at Kimpo.Fifth Air Force specifically taskedthe Marine helicopters with sup-porting a U.S. Army parachutedrop near Pyongyang, but theMarines also would conduct com-bat search and rescue as needed.This "flight" echelon was com-posed of 17 officers and 19 enlist-ed men with Captain Armstrong asofficer-in-charge. The stay-behindelement was to continue opera-tions from Kimpo until ramp spaceat Wonsan became available.Included in the helicopter flightechelon were several newlyarrived pilots and replacement air-

craft ferried in from the UnitedStates on board the aircraft carrierLeyte (CV 32). The new aircraftwere welcome additions that madenine Marine HO3S helicoptersavailable.

United Nations ground forcespressed forward against only tokenresistance. A South Korean divi-sion occupied Wonsan in earlyOctober, but the amphibious taskforce carrying VMO-6 had to marktime sailing up and down the eastcoast until the harbor could becleared of mines. Consequently,members of VMO-6's stay-behindechelon actually set down in NorthKorea before the advance party.On 23 October, Captain Blatt andLieutenant Ward flew north fromKimpo to Wonsan. The airfieldserved as the squadron's home

Capt Wallace D. Blatt, a helicopterpilot assigned to VMO-6 in Korea, hadbeen a Marine multi-engined trans-port pilot at Guam and Okinawa dur-ing World War II. He learned to flyhelicopters immediately after the warand was the first Marine helicopterpilot deployed overseas when he flew aborrowed Navy HO3S-1 during theoccupation of North China.

National Archives Photo (USMC) A130580

692

base from then until VMO-6moved to Yonpo on 3 November.The embarked surface echelonfinally got ashore on the 25th, andthe flight echelon completed itsmovement to Wonsan three dayslater.

Immediately after landing, the1st Marine Division began opera-tions. One regiment occupiedWonsan and manned two battal-ion-sized outposts (Majon-ni to thewest and Kojo to the south) whiletwo regiments proceeded about 50miles north to the port ofHungnam and the railway junctionat Hamhung before moving outtoward the Chosin Reservoir some78 miles farther inland. Althoughintelligence estimates indicatedthere would be little resistance andX Corps commander, MajorGeneral Edward M. Almond, want-ed a rapid inland movement, theenemy had other ideas. A nightattack at Kojo caught the Ameri-cans by surprise and cut the mainsupply route while unexpectedlystrong NKPA forces encircled theMajon-ni outpost. With no over-land routes open, helicoptersbecame the only reliable link withboth outposts.

The 1st Marine Division wasalerted that the Kojo garrison wasunder attack in the early morninghours of 28 October. Emergencyrequests for medical assistance,specifically aerial evacuation heli-copters and a hospital receivingship in addition to ground rein-forcements, were quickly actedupon. Six HO3S helicopters weredispatched. As Captain GeneMorrison later recalled, the situa-tion was desperate enough that henever shut his engine down afterarriving at Wonsan on his ferryflight from Kimpo. Instead, hereceived a hurried cockpit briefand was on his way to Kojo with-out ever leaving the aircraft.Captains Blatt and Morrison, and

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A134641The hospital ship Repose (ALl 17) at anchor in Inchon ship's stern, this configuration became standard on all hos-Harbor. Note the helicopter-landing pad mounted on the pital ships during the course of the Korean War.

Lieutenants Engelhardt, Lueddeke,and Ward, collectively flew 17 seri-ously wounded men from Kojo tothe hospital ship Repose (AH 17) atWonsan Harbor. Captain George B.Farish provided airborne searchand rescue. During a search on 29October, he spotted the word"HELP" spelled out in straw abouta mile northeast of Tongchon. AsFarish trolled the area, a lone fig-ure emerged from cover and thenbegan waving. Farish shouted:"Hey Mac, looking for a ride?" Hethen plucked up the first of sever-al lost Marines he brought in thatday. During several of the rescuesFarish left his helicopter to assistbadly wounded men to the idlingaircraft. Unfortunately, his daringattempt to rescue a Navy pilotunder fire late in the day came tonaught when it was discovered theman was already dead.

Helicopters played an importantrole at Majon-ni, a vital road junc-tion located in a Y-shaped valleyabout 25 miles west of Wonsan.

Capt Gene W Morrison, a helicopterpilot with VMO-6, was one of the firstMarine "Whirlybirds" to arrive innorthern Korea from Kimpo Airfieldto support the Chosin Reservoir cam-paign. At Yonpo Airfield, he wasimmediately diverted to help evacuateserious wounded Marines from Kojo tothe hospital ship Repose (AH 17) inWonsan Harbor.National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130604

693

The village was occupied withoutresistance on 28 October, but with-in a week the garrison was com-pletely surrounded and the vulner-able main supply route becameknown as "Ambush Alley." Radiocommunications between Majon-ni and Wonsan was uncertainbecause intervening high groundand intermittent atmospheric inter-ference allowed an open windowof only a few hours each day, sothe only reliable communicationslinks were messages carried in andout by helicopter or OY pilots. Forthe most part, the Majon-ni strongpoint was supplied by airdrop andcasualty evacuation was by heli-copter from 2 November until thesiege lifted.

The Chosin Reservoir campaigntested the endurance of the"whirlybirds" and the skill of theirpilots and the fortitude of theirground crews like no other periodbefore Chinese anti-aircraft firebegan to light up the cloudedskies of northeast Korea. The via-

bility of extended helicopter oper-ations at high altitude and in diffi-cult weather conditions was at thattime still conjectural. It wasbelieved that helicopters might notbe able to operate safely at anypoint beyond Chinhung-ni at themouth of the Funcilin Pass, abouttwo-thirds of the way to the ChosinReservoir, due to the thin air at thataltitude. The effect of prolongedcold weather on helicopter opera-

tions was also a source of concern.This issue came to the fore whenCaptain Eugene Pope had to returnhis HO3S after only four minutesaloft because the collective andcyclic controls were too stiff toadequately control flight. Groundcrews subsequently switched tolight weight lubricants and tried toeither hangar or cover all aircraftwhen not in use. These measurescompensated for, but did not corn-

694

pletely alleviate, cold weather-induced problems. Re-duced lift inlow temperatures at high altitudeand flight in windy conditionsmade flying in the mountainousterrain hazardous, hut there wasno choice when emergenciesoccurred. It also became apparentthat ground-effect hovers wouldnot be possible in the foreseeablefuture. An additional problem wasthe ungainly configuration of theHO3S-1, which required stretchercases to extend outside the cabin.Sub-freezing temperatures andextreme airborne wind chill factorsput already wounded men at riskfor frostbite while enroute to safe-ty. Thus, the already limited flightenvelope of the HO3S-1 was fur-ther restricted by terrain andweather.

On 2 November, the 1st MarineDivision began its ascent towardthe reservoir following a helicopterreconnaissance of the SudongValley. No enemy troops werelocated from the sky, hut groundunits were soon mixing it up withthe first Chinese Com-munist unitsyet encountered. General Smithignored the advice of the X Corpscommander to speed it up and.instead moved his division steadilyahead along a single-lane road,keeping all units tied in and estab-lishing strong points along theway. His foresight and prudencelikely saved the 1st MarineDivision from annihilation whenthe Chinese sprang their trap a fewweeks later.

Helicopters scouted hill-maskedflanks, reconnoitered the roadway,laid communications wire, provid-ed radio relays, and brought incrucial small items in addition totheir by-then normal jobs of com-mand liaison and medical evacua-tion. Despite increasingly poorweather, First Lieutenant Ward flew115 miles from Yonpo to Songjin torescue an Air Force airborne for-

ward air controller whose planehad gone down near the ChosinReservoir on 5 No-vember. TheHO3S was badly buffeted by cross-winds and strained to bite into thechilly thin air. Three days later,Captain Pope's helicopter wasblown out of the sky by turbulentwinds while on a resupply run.The helicopter was a wreck, butPope escaped without seriousinjury. Lieutenant Ward arrived totake him out but was beset by atemperamental starter, so bothpilots spent the night at a groundcommand post.

By 26 November, the 1st MarineDivision was dangerously spreadout. Little active resistance had yetbeen encountered, but veterancommanders were leery that thingsmight be going too well. TheMarines had moved upward

through the snow-covered Fun-chilin Pass over the main supplyroute, a treacherous, icy, winding,narrow, dirt road. General Smithwisely established a series of out-posts along the way; a regimentalsupply base at Koto-ri just north ofthe Funchilin Pass, an airstrip anddivision headquarters at Hagaru-rion the southern tip of the reser-voir, a company-sized outpostguarded the Toktong Pass fromFox Hill, and a jump off pointmanned by two regiments atYudam-ni on the western tip of thereservoir.

Conditions were terrible. Swirl-ing snow and sub-zero tempera-tures were the result of the winds,which blew down from Man-churia. It would be hard to imag-ine more difficult flying conditionsfor helicopter operations. The bit-

695

terly cold, short days and lack ofrepair facilities hampered heli-copter maintenance. It was underthese dire circumstances that themettle of VMO-6's helicopter sec-tion was truly tested.

Beginning on the night of 27November, the advance elementsof the 1st Marine Division becameheavily engaged at Yudam-ni andHagaru-ri. The fierce fighting at theChosin Reservoir required an all-hands effort by VMO-6 when morethan six Chinese divisions tried tooverrun two Marine regiments andcut the main supply route at sever-al points. Helicopter pilots Blattand Morrison both reported enemyroadblocks between Koto-ri andHagaru-ri, the first official confir-mation that the 1st Marine Divisionwas surrounded. The Marines'abortive advance was about to

Aerial evacuation of wounded and severely frostbittenMarines and soldiers from Hagaru-ri saved numerous lives.From late November to mid-December, Maj Vincent J.


Gottschalk 's squadron conducted a total of 191 helicopterevacuations out of a total of 1,544 flights.

become a breakout an epic of mod-ern warfare during which theMarines "attacked in a differentdirection" bringing out most of theirequipment and all of their wound-ed.

Several helicopters moved for-ward to Hagaru-ri to save flight timeon 28 November, and all availableaircraft flew from dawn until duskeach day for the next week-and-a-half. General Smith often used heli-copters to visit his scattered unitsduring that time. The helicopters ofVMO-6 logged 40 sorties (1 recon-naissance, 16 transport, and 23medical evacuations) in 73.7 flighthours on the 29th. Fifty seriouslyinjured men were flown out andnumerous vital supplies (particular-ly radio batteries and medicine)were brought in; General Smith vis-ited the forward command posts,and a large group of enemy wasspotted by helicopter that day.Captain Farish's HO3S was hit sev-eral times as he delivered supplies

to an isolated rifle companyperched atop Fox Hill. As he laterrelated: "They ran me off." Farishlimped back to Hagaru-ri and safe-ly landed under covering fire by theMarines in the perimeter, but hisaircraft was operationally groundeddue to damage to the main rotortransmission. The next day, Lieu-tenant Engelhardt's H035 was hitwhile delivering vital radio batteriesto Fox Hill. A bullet just missed thepilot, and the helicopter was sodamaged that it had to return tobase for emergency repairs aftercarrying out one wounded Marine.Forty-three other casualties weresuccessfully brought out that day aswell by the HO3S-ls of VMO-6.Helicopters carried out 50 woundedand brought in medical supplies,gasoline, radio batteries, and tankparts in almost 60 hours of flighttime on 30 November.

The Marines consolidated atHagaru-ri, broke out of the Chi-nese trap at Koto-ri, and moved

National Archives Photo (U5N) 80-G-420288

Helicopter pilot lstLt Robert A. Long-staff poses in front of his HO3S-1 heli-copter decked out in flight gear afterdelivering a downed Navy airman tothe Sicily (CVE 118.). Longsta/f was thesecond Marine helicopter pilot killedin action when his aircraft was hit byantiaircraft fire at the ChosinReservoir.

back toward the sea by way of anair dropped Treadway portablebridge that spanned the FunchilinPass. Throughout the ordeal at thereservoir, helicopters were the onlydependable means of physical con-tact between scattered units. Theyprovided liaison, reconnaissance,and medical evacuation; whenevera "whirlybird" flew a medical sup-ply mission, ammunition and radiobatteries were part of the incomingload. These operations were notwithout cost. On 3 December, FirstLieutenant Long-staff was killed atToktong Pass when his helicopterwas brought down by enemy firewhile trying to rescue a criticallywounded man. Captain Blatt playeda role in a daring but ultimatelytragic event. After several frustratinghours trying to start his frozen heli-copter, Blatt was finally able to gethis aircraft to crank up just as anemergency rescue mission came in.Blatt took off but then returnedwhen the covering air patrol toldhim an ax and fire extinguisher

Although operating at the extreme edge of their performance envelope, theMarine HO3S-ls of VMO-6 provided reliable service at the Chosin Reservoir.During the most critical period the squadron's helicopters and OYs provided theonly physical contact between units separated by enemy action.

National Archives Photo (U5MC) 1 27-N-A5398

696

would he needed to free thetrapped pilot, Ensign Jesse L.

Brown, USN. Arriving at the scene,Blatt joined Navy Lieutenant JuniorGrade Thomas J. Hudner, Jr., whohad purposely crash-landed hisplane in order to assist Brown.Despite their best efforts, theycould not extract the mortallywounded man before he died. Thesaddened men had to returnempty handed, but Hudner laterreceived the Medal of Honor forhis unselfish actions to rescue theUnited States Navy's first African-American combat pilot.

After the 1st Marine Divisiondeparted Koto-ri for Hungnam on6 December, VMO-6 moved backto Yonpo. During the ensuing voy-age from Hungnam some of thesquadron's helicopters were ear-marked to conduct emergency res-cues during carrier-borne air oper-ations. On 12 December, the firstelements of the squadron (includ-ing two helicopters) began to backload on board LST Q082 for imme-diate transportation to Hungnam,which would then be followed bya seaborne redeployment toPusan. Seven helicopters remainedbehind until additional ship spacescould be found. On 17 December,three HO3Ss flew from their tem-porary home on the beach atWonsan to the battleship Missouri(BB 63) and then each trans-shipped to three different carriers(the Leyte [CV 32], Princeton [CV371, and Philippine Sea [CV 471) forduty as standby plane guards, afourth HO3S served the heavycruiser St. Paul (CA 73). Threeadditional helicopters embarkedon board the Missouri late in theday. Enroute, Lieutenant ColonelRichard W. Wyczawski, comman-der of Marine Fighter Squadron212, was charged with overseeingthe movement of VMO-6's "lostsheep" during the voyage toPusan. They were successively

located on board their variousships and then gathered togetheron board the light carrier Bataan(CVL 29) as the convoy sailedsouth. Unfortunately, three heli-copters were damaged enroute byhigh winds and heavy seas. Thefour operable "whirlybirds" flewoff their host carriers to Masan on26 December 1950. The otherswere off loaded at Pusan Harborand underwent repairs.

The return to Masan closed thebooks on the Chosin Reservoircampaign. During the movementnorth and the ensuing breakoutbetween 28 October and 15December, Marine helicopters flew64 reconnaissance, 421 transport,191 medical evacuation, 60 utility,and 11 search and rescue missions;more than 200 wounded menwere flown Out, most of whomwould have died without speedymedical assistance. All of this, ofcourse, could not have been pos-sible without the outstanding sup-port of the tireless ground crewsaided by Mr. Harold Nachlin, themuch-respected civilian technicalrepresentative from SikorskyAircraft. As impressive as theseachievements were, however, theChosin campaign once againpointed Out the inadequacy of theHO3S as a military aircraft. A moreeffective medical evacuation plat-form was desperately needed, aswas a viable transport helicopter.Fortunately, each of these was inthe pipeline and would soon seecombat service.

Pohang to the Punchbowl

The unexpected CommunistWinter Offensive initiated thelongest retreat in American militaryhistory. While X Corps pulled backfrom northeast Korea, the EighthArmy fell back more than 600miles before halting south ofSeoul. During the next eight

697

months the U.S. Marines wouldrest and rebuild at Masan, chaseelusive North Korean guerrillasnear Pohang, lead the UnitedNations Command drive up centralKorea from Wonju to the HwachonReservoir, survive the last majorChinese offensive of the war, thenonce again claw their way north toa rugged mountain area just northof the 38th Parallel where the U.N.lines would remain until the endof the war. Throughout those U.N.counteroffensives the helicoptersof VMO-6 continued to provideoutstanding support.

While the Marines in Koreawere slogging their way back fromChosin, several Bell HTL heli-copters arrived in Japan. The HTLwas a two-seat, single-engine air-craft that was already familiar toevery helicopter pilot because theyhad learned to fly helicoptersusing Bell-made trainers atLakehurst and Quantico. Thesesmall "fishbowls" (so called due totheir prominent plexiglass bubblecanopies) mounted two evacua-tion pods, one on each side of thefuselage. This handy configurationmade the Bells much better adapt-ed for medical evacuation than thevenerable Sikorskys. Unfortunate-ly, their relatively underpoweredengines were unsuited for high-altitude, cold-weather operations,so they were kept in reserve untilthe Marines returned to Pusan.Most of the older HTL-3s wereassigned to headquarters or main-tenance squadrons while all of thenewer HTL-4s went to VMO-6. Theplan was to gradually replace theHO3S-ls as HTL-4s became avail-able. On 28 December 1950, threeHTL-4s, two HTL-3s, and anotherHO3S-1 joined the ranks of VMO-6. First Lieutenant John L. Scottflew the first operational missionwith an HTL-4 on 2 January 1951.As the New Year dawned, VMO-6mustered 13 helicopters and nine

Bell HTL

Thanks to the opening credits of the long-runningtelevision series "M· • ·Il," a heli opter deliveringwounded men to a field hospital remain' one f

the mo t enduring images of th Korean onflicr. The aircraft ~ atured n that how was a Bell odel-4, theame ryp fI wn by the Marines under the designation

IITL and by the rmy and Air Force as the H-13.Th M dcl-47 fir t flew in 1946. was granted the first

ever U.. comm rdal helicopter license in 194 , andremain d in pr duction for almost 0 years. Militaty versions saw extensi e service in both Korea and ietnam.and several gen rations of naval aviation heli opterpilot learned to fly u. ing HTLs. Early modelllTL-_ trainers used at Lakehur t Naval Air tation, ew .Jers y,mounted wheel' in tead of skids and were covered infabric wh n the first Marine trainees learned to fly rotarywing aircraFt. The Chief of aval Operations deSignatedthe IITL as th pro pective observation heli opter in1949. The press of combat operation in K rea, patticularly the need for a more. uitable aerial medjcal eva ualion platform than the H03 , led to a ma "ive influx ofI ITL-4s to Marine Ob ervation quad ron 6 at the end of1950.

The unique t chnical fcature of all Bell heli opt r'wa a two-bladed rotor and stabilizer y tern thatreduced flying "eight without harming performan e,and the unique visual feature f the HTL was its clear

Plexiglas "goldfish bowl" cabin anopy that allowed allround vision. The HTL- 's squat configuration and skidsallowed it to land in rough terrain whil the inclusion oftwo e terior stretch r pods made it the preferred aircraftfor field vacuation' of seriousl)' wounded men.Unfottunately, it had an unreliable engin and a notoriously w ak el ctrical system that together required inordinate maintenance time while its limited fuel supplyeverely reduced the helicopt r's combat radius.

ev ral generations of naval aviator learn d to flyusing I-ITL train rs. and the Bureau of eronautic eventually purcha 'ed more than 200 IITLs, the last of whichwere till regularly flying mar than two decades aFterthe fif t on ~ took t the air. dvanced versions of thHTL developed into the UH-l Tluey and Al-i-1 Cobra, theutility and attack heli opters that arm today's Fl etMarin Force:..

AircraftDalaManufacturer: Bell Aircraft CompanyPower Plant: 200 hp Franklin 0-335-5Dimensions: L ngth, 41'5"; hight, 9' 2"; r tor, 35' twoblade with stabilizerPerfonnance: Cruising peed, 60 mph' ceiling, rang, 1SOmilesLift: Pil t plus two passengers or two eXlcrnally mountedstr tch r

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Capt George B. Farish, a helicopterpilot with VMO-6, stands by his BellHTL. Farish, by late 1950, had partic-pated in more than 100 combat mis-sions and was responsible for the evac-uation of more than 55 seriouslywounded United Nations troops.

OY observation aircraft. An influxof fresh faces was a welcome sightas well because, according toCaptain Gene Morrison, "the oldhands . . . were . . . pretty tired"after six-months of grueling combatduty. Just as with the ground units,a significant personnel change wasunderway. The Regulars were giv-ing way to recalled reservists. Bythe end of January 1951, the num-ber of Reserve pilots in VMO-6equaled the number of Regulars.

The 1st Marine Division spent amonth recuperating throughoutthe uneventful respite at the MasanBean Patch. During that time,VMO-6 operated from an airstripnear the waterfront. A mainte-nance detachment including fourofficers and 11 enlisted menmoved from Korea to Itami AirBase in Japan to prepare the grow-ing fleet of arriving helicopters forcombat service. Most helicoptermissions at Masan were utility andliaison flights, although occasionalaerial reconnaissance and familiar-ization flights were also made.

Concurrently, plans were beingformulated for the Marines tomove about 70 miles northeast tosecure the X Corps eastern flankby conducting antiguerrilla opera-tions near the coastal village ofPohang.

Helicopters proved invaluablefor liaison work even before the1st Marine Division moved to Po-hang. Unfortunately, poor weatheroften hampered flying conditions.General Smith had several hair-raising encounters en-route toplanning conferences, but healways arrived on time. TwoHO3S-ls were tossed about byhigh winds as they carried GeneralSmith's forward command group

to meet with the new Eighth Armycommander, Lieutenant GeneralMatthew B. Ridgway, USA, on 30December 1950 at Kyongju. Theymade it on time despite the har-rowing flight conditions. On 8January 1951, General Smith wassummoned to a commander's con-ference at Taegu. Dense foggrounded all fixed-wing aircraft, soSmith boarded LieutenantLueddeke's H035 for the flight.Lueddeke followed some dimlyvisible railroad tracks at about 400feet, twice having to suddenlyswerve to avoid mountainsidesalong the way. Once, the visibilitywas so reduced that Lueddeke hadto put the plane down in a rice

One of the little noted, but important missions performed by VMO-6 helicopterswas laying telephone wire between frontline positions. Here a squadron groundcrewman loads wire spools onto a HTL -4 flown by Capt James R. 0 Moore.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) Al 31086

699

paddy; Smith lit his pipe and madesmall talk while waiting to resumehis journey. Not long thereafter,the pair took to the air once again;this time using roadside telephoneposts to guide them.

In early 1951, the 1st MarineDivision rooted Out remnants of aNorth Korean division that hadinfiltrated the region surroundingPohang and threatened X Corpsheadquarters at Taegu. Dubbedthe "Pohang Guerrilla Hunt," thecampaign sought to secure thisarea as it held the only usable porton Korea's southeastern coast, themain supply route for east-centralKorea, and three vital airfields.

The VMO-6 ground support ele-ments moved from Masan toPohang by air, truck convoy, andship beginning on 13 January 1951.The move was complete by 16February. Pohang's mountainousand forested terrain hid the enemywho quickly broke up into smallgroups when the Marines arrived.The solution was saturationpatrolling. The Marines sent outfire-team and squad-sized patrolsoperating from platoon- and com-pany-bases to flush out enemystragglers. Helicopters were usedfor observation, reconnaissance,laying wire, command and control,medical evacuations, re-supply ofisolated small units, and trans-portation of fire teams to remotehilltops. The guerrillas were drivenunderground by relentless Marinepressure, hut not decisivelydefeated. In the words of the offi-cial history: "In retrospect, had [afull] squadron of helicopters beenavailable . . . its quick lift . . . in-creased mobility and surveillancewould have made quite a differ-ence in the conduct of action."Unrealized at the time, the use ofhelicopters at Pohang was actuallya foretaste of the methods thatwould be used by the U.S. Marinesand Army on a much larger scale

National Archives Photo (UsMc) 127-N-A131826

Capt Clarence W Parkins points outthe spot where he was Jbrced to crashland his helicopter in the water duringa test flight. Parkins later becameVMO-6's acting commander.

in Vietnam more than a decadelater.

The most notable helicopterincident of the guerrilla huntoccurred when First LieutenantJohn Scott flew the first night med-ical evacuation by a Bell heli-copter. There were several othernerve-wracking experiences aswell. On 27 January, for example,an HTL-4 flown by Captain HaroldG. McRay caught a skid on a low-strung cable and crashed whileattempting to takeoff from An-dong. The aircraft was wreckedbut neither the pilot nor his pas-senger, Brigadier General Lewis B."Chesty" Puller, who had been"frocked" to this rank the nightbefore, were injured.

The helicopters of VMO-6 evac-uated 59 men, most from the 7thMarines at Topyong-dong, be-tween 25 and 31 January.Helicopter evacuations directly tohospital ships became routineoperations. The advantages of thistime-saving and life-saving methodwere enumerated by Captain John

700

W. McElroy, USNR, the comman-der of the hospital ship Consola-tion (AH 15): "tests . . . conclusive-ly proved the superiority of [heli-copters for] embarking and evacu-ating patients to and from the ship.There was less handling in thatpatients were moved directly fromairstrip to ship in one short hop,thereby eliminating . . . long andrough stages by boat and ambu-lance [and] 'choppers' [could] oper-ate when seas were too rough forboat handling." When the Con-solation returned stateside for anoverhaul in July, a helicopter-land-ing platform designed by MarineMajor Stanley V. Titterud wasadded and Marine pilots instructedthe ship's company in proper land-ing procedures. Upon return her toKorean waters, a pair of SikorskyH-19 (U.S. Air Force designationfor the HRS) search and rescuehelicopters were stationed perma-nently on board the Consolation tocarry out medical evacuationflights. U.S. Army aircraft eventual-ly replaced these Air Force heli-copters. Operations became sosmooth that it was not unusual fora litter case to be off the helicopterand on the way to the emergencyroom within a minute or less.Eventually, all hospital ships weresimilarly outfitted with landingplatforms. There is no definitivetally as to how many seriouslywounded men were saved due tothe swift treatment afforded by thehelicopters of all Services, butmost estimates reach well into thehundreds.

On 1 February, Captain GeneMorrison made a daring nightlanding on the deck of the Con-solation. The next day a similarevacuation flight to the Consola-tion almost ended in tragedy whena delirious patient became so vio-lent that Captain Clarence W.Parkins had to make an unsched-uled landing so he and the corps-

man on board could subdue andbind the man. Parkins thenresumed the mercy flight.

From Pohang, the Marines weretapped to lead IX Corps up thecenter of the peninsula during aseries of limited objective attacks,Operations Killer, Ripper, andRugged, collectively called the'Ridgway Offensives." These suc-cessive attacks, which began inlate February and continuedthroughout March and April, grad-ually pushed the Communists outof the Som River Valley and backabove the Hwachon Reservoir.During that time, VMO-6 followedin trail of the advance, successive-ly moving forward from Pohang toChung-ju, Wonju, Hongchon, andChungchon, only to move backagain when the Chinese mountedtheir spring offensives.

The Marines jumped off on 21February, but traffic congestiondelayed the arrival of Marineassault troops and hampered com-mand and control. Luckily, Gen-eral Smith had the use of a heli-copter and was able to communi-cate directly with his subordinatesand he present to observe the ini-tial attack. In the words of MarineCorps historian Lynn Montross:"Only the helicopter . . . enabledGeneral Smith to solve his timeand space problems prior toOperation Killer. The division wasrequired to move 150 miles byroad and rail from Pohang to theobjective area near Wonju in cen-tral Korea, with only one roadbeing available for the last 30miles."

Three days later, Marine Gen-eral Smith was hurriedly sum-moned to the IX Corps advancedcommand post to take commandafter the commanding general diedof a heart attack. This battlefieldpromotion, however, was onlytemporary until a more seniorArmy general arrived. Smith corn-

mandeered a Marine helicopter touse during his time at IX Corps. Ashe later explained: "at the Corpslevel the helicopter was even moreessential for command purposesthan at the division level."

Just as before, although not anofficial task for observationsquadrons, combat search and res-cue missions remained a high pri-ority. Captain Morrison picked upa Marine fighter pilot downed nearSong-gol on 12 March. On 27

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March, two Marine helicoptersflown by Captain Norman C. Ewersand First Lieutenant Robert A.Strong were called out to conducta search and rescue mission for anAir Force C-119 Flying Boxcar thathad gone down behind enemylines. They found the site, setdown, picked up three injuredcrewmen, and recovered the bodyof a fourth airman. The impact ofhelicopters on operations in Koreawas such that by that time this dar-

Marine OperationsSpring 19510 30

MIes

ing mission that would once havegarnered stateside headlines, hadbecome routine.

Between 1 January and 30March, VMO-6 evacuated 539wounded Marines (60 in January,99 in February, and 370 in March).The helicopter section was ex-tremely fortunate; it lost only twoaircraft (General Puller's HTL-4 andan HO3S-1 lost to a takeoff incidenton 12 March) and suffered no onekilled in action. Unfortunately, themonth of April was a tough one;three helicopters would be lostduring heavy fighting.

April began with a command

change for VMO-6. Major Gotts-chalk departed on the last day ofMarch and the officer-in-chargehelicopter section, Captain Clar-ence W. Parkins, became the actingsquadron commander until thearrival of Major David W. Mc-Farland who would command thesquadron for the next six months.The squadron at that time num-bered 28 officers and 125 enlistedmen with nine OY observation air-craft, five HO3S-ls, and six HTL-4s.

The 13th of April was a busy dayfor helicopter search and rescue.First, Captain James R. O'Mooreand Technical Sergeant Philip K.

Mackert took off to search for a lostaircraft with the help of a flight ofMarine Corsairs. They were unableto locate that pilot and one of theCorsair escorts was shot down.O'Moore set his H035 down, thenhe and Mackert rushed over to tryto save the pilot but it was too late.Later that day, Captain ValdemarSchmidt, Jr.'s HO3S-1 was broughtdown by enemy fire during a res-cue mission about 20 miles behindenemy lines. Several hits fromsmall arms fire caused a loss ofpower and control as the heli-copter made its final approach. Hecrash landed in hilly terrain and his

As commanding officer of VMO-6 Maj David W. artille7y accuracy, the mere presence of an OY overheadMcFarland initiated night aerial observation flights by OY would often silence enemy artillery.planes. Instead of the intended improvement in Marine National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A131464

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aircraft rolled over upon impact.Schmidt suffered only minorinjuries, but his passenger,Corporal Robert Sarvia wrenchedhis leg, cut his hand, and went intoshock. American aircraft circlingabove kept the enemy at bay withstrafing runs until helicopter pilotCaptain Frank E. Wilson arrived onthe scene. Wilson picked up thetwo Marines in addition to the AirForce pilot they had came afterand then made his precarious wayback in the dark, flying an over-loaded helicopter without naviga-tional aids. Jeeps, trucks, and flareslit the field for Wilson's returningaircraft.

Not every mission had a happyending. Sometimes, despite greateffort on the part of helicopterpilots, a rescue could not be made.On 14 April, Captain GeneMorrison made three attempts topick up a downed pilot, but hisHO3S was turned away by enemyfire each time. Captain NormanEwers then tried, but he took somany hits he had to return to baseempty handed as well. Plans weremade to rig a stretcher to lift thepilot Out the next morning, butinclement weather intervened.When OY aircraft flying over thetarget area could not locate theman, the helicopter rescue wasscrubbed.

On the night of 22 April, theChinese mounted their longexpected Fifth Phase Offensive.When a South Korean unit on theMarines' left flank broke and ran,the 1st Marine Division pulledback and formed a semi-circle onthe high ground to defend severalvital river crossings. The bitterfighting, collectively known as thebattle of Horseshoe Ridge, wasmarked by fierce hand-to-handcombat and several last ditchdefensive stands by isolated unitsthat equaled the combat intensityat the Naktong bulge or the Chosin

Reservoir. The division sufferedabout 500 casualties in three daysfighting.

The last days of April found thehelicopters of VMO-6 busily evac-uating wounded men from dawnuntil dusk in an all-hands effortuntil the Marines reached the NoName Line. At about 0600 on the23d, all helicopters were airborneand most continued operationsthroughout the day with 36 indi-vidual flights made (15 by HO3S-is and 21 by HTL-4s). Fifty wound-ed Marines were evacuated.Captain Dwain L. Redalen logged18 evacuations in almost 10 hours

of flying; First Lieutenant GeorgeA. Eaton was a close second with16 men brought out. The next dayan HTL-4 was lost to enemy firewhen First Lieutenant Robert E.Mathewson was shot out of thesky as he attempted a medicalevacuation. Enemy fire hit theengine, instrument pedestal, andtail sections renderingMathewson's aircraft uncontrol-lable as he hovered over the airpanels set out to mark the landingzone. Mathewson crash-landed butwas uninjured. Lieutenant JohnScott, who set a record with 18evacuations in one day, tried to fly

Capt Norman G. Ewers receives word that a helicopter is needed in the Jbrwardarea for a reconnaissance mission. During daylight hours VMO-6 pilots stood bywith elements of the 1st Marine Division, maintaining constant contact with tac-tical air controllers by field telephone.


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Marine Division.

in despite the danger, but waswaved off by Mathewson whothen picked up a rifle and tem-porarily joined the infantry. Hiscrippled aircraft was destroyed bydernolitions before the Marinesdeparted. Thirty-two helicoptermissions were flown, and aboutanother 50 seriously woundedwere evacuated by Mathewson'sfellow pilots.

The United Nations Commandbriefly regrouped behind the NoName Line, repelled a secondCommunist offensive, then onceagain set off north—this timeheading the Kansas Line along the38th Parallel. Non-stop fightinghad exhausted the enemy and hisforces were seriously depletedafter suffering grievous losses inthe recently concluded springoffensive. The desperation of theenemy was evident as unprece-dented numbers of them began tosurrender. This time it was the

Communists who were "buggingout." By the end of June, theUnited Nations Command wasonce again about to enter NorthKorea. At that point, the Com-munists called for a cessation ofoffensive actions as a prelude topeace talks. The United Nationsaccepted this condition, and thefighting forces of both sides tem-porarily settled down along a linenot far from the original pre-warborder between the two Koreas.

During August, VMO-6 operatedfrom Songjong until the 28th, thenmoved to Sohung. The month sawseveral rescue missions. FirstLieutenant Joseph C. Gardiner, Jr.,picked up a downed Marine fight-er pilot on 12 August. On 28August, Major Kenneth C. Smedleyused his HTL-4 to pull two com-munications men stranded on asmall island in the middle of arapidly rising river out of harm'sway. That same day, Captain

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Frank E. Wilson lost control of hisHTL-4 when a crewman jumpedout of the hovering aircraft duringan attempted rescue. CaptainFrank G. Parks was credited withsaving several lives by deliveringwhole blood in darkness on 29August despite the fact his heli-copter had no lit instrumentation,no landing lights, and no hominglocator.

When peace talks broke downin September, Lieutenant GeneralJames A. Van Fleet, USA, comman-der of the Eighth Army since mid-April, mounted a series of limitedattacks intended as much to pres-sure the Communists back to thepeace table as to secure dominat-ing terrain just north of the KansasLine. The Marine sector featured avolcanic depression known as thePunchbowl. Its capture was a

bloody three-week slugfest foughtover nearly impassable roadlessmountain terrain, so helicopterswere much in demand. Marinepilots were at risk as they coura-geously defied enemy fire on theirmissions of mercy. The H03 andHTL helicopters delivered smallloads of medicine, ammunition,and radio batteries to the front andthen brought out 541 severelywounded men. Another frequentmission was the delivery of wholeblood to forward-deployed Med-ical Companies A and E of the 1stMedical Battalion.

On 16 September the light heli-copters of VMO-6 evacuated 85men. First Lieutenant JosephGardiner led the pack with 17medical evacuations. Major Ed-ward L. Barker's HTL was hit byenemy artillery as he tried to liftout a pair of wounded Marines.He escaped without injury, butone of his passengers succumbedto his wounds before reachingmedical sanctuary. The followingday, Captain William G. Carter'sHTL-4 crashed while conducting


lstLt Joseph C. Gardiner, left, an HO3S-1 pilot with VMO-6, is awarded a NavyCommendation Ribbon and a pair of gold stars denoting second and thirdawards of the Air Medal for combat actions during the Inchon-Seoul campaign.Marine helicopters played an important role in the drive inland by providingtransportation, medical evacuation, and visual reconnaissance for the 1st

an emergency medical evacuation.Ground personnel attempting toassist the landing on rough terraingrabbed the helicopter's skids butinadvertently tipped the aircraftcausing it to crash. The aircraft waslost and the pilot suffered non-threatening injuries. CaptainGilbert R. Templeton's HO3S-1 washit by enemy fire during a resupplymission on 21 September;Templeton was able to return tobase for repairs, but the missionhad to be scrubbed. Major Ken-neth C. Smedley, the squadron'sexecutive officer, crashed when hisHO3S-1 lost hover and set downhard on uneven ground. When theplane began to slip over the steepcliff, Smedley had to intentionallyroll the helicopter on its side tostop its descent. Neither he nor hispassenger was injured, but thehelicopter was wrecked.

The fighting for the Punchbowllasted until late September. Afterthat, both sides settled down andbegan to dig in. The capture of thePunchhowl marked the last majoroffensive action by the Marines inKorea.

As the first year of the KoreanWar came to a close there could belittle doubt that the helicopter wasthe most important tactical innova-tion to date. The plucky little air-craft had proven themselves adapt-able, versatile, and survivable. Theability of the helicopter to traversedifficult terrain, to land in tightspots, and to rapidly scout unfa-miliar territory made it the pre-ferred mode of transportation forgenerals and colonels; downedpilots could look forward to beinghoisted out of the freezing water orgrabbed up from behind enemylines with a certainty never beforeexperienced; and almost 2,000men had been lifted to hospitalswith in a few hours of beingwounded, a factor that greatlyincreased survival rates. There was

little doubt the helicopter was hereto stay, but thus far in the war the"whirlybirds" had not yet beenused for their proposed main mis-sions and original raison d'etre:vertical en-velopment and assaultsupport. This was due to the inad-equate lift of the machines current-ly available, but that was about tochange as the war entered its sec-ond year.

Arrival of HMR-161

Marine Transport HelicopterSquadron 161 (HMR-161) was thefirst transport helicopter squadronin history. It was also the first fullhelicopter squadron committed tocombat. Mounted in brand newSikorsky HRS-1 helicopters, HMR-161 arrived in Korea in earlySeptember 1951 and was soon test-ing new operational methodsunder actual combat conditions, alittle more than one year afterBrigadier General Edward Craig'soriginal recommendation that sucha squadron be sent into combat.The squadron's arrival at that par-ticular juncture in the war was for-tuitous because the 1st MarineDivision, then slogging its waynorth against stubborn Communistresistance in the mountains of east-central Korea, was led by two earlyand very influential proponents ofhelicopters—division commanderMajor General Gerald C. Thomasand his chief of staff Colonel VictorH. Krulak. Both Marines wereplank holders in the helicopterprogram; from Washington, D.C.,and Quantico, Virginia, theypushed for adoption of rotary-winged aircraft and created a test-bed squadron immediately afterthe war. Krulak helped write initialhelicopter doctrine and drew upmany of the first operational plansused by HMX-1, while Thomaspushed for expanded helicopterdevelopment at Head-quarters

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Marine Corps in the immediatepost-war period, then gained prac-tical experience in their use atQuantico after his return fromChina in the late 1940s. Both menwere known throughout the Corpsas innovators and visionaries, butthey also garnered reputations forthorough planning and meticulousexecution of those plans. In retro-spect, it was clear that HMR-161and the 1st Marine Division formeda perfect match.

Plans to create transport heli-copter squadrons had been on theboard well before the outbreak ofthe Korean War. In fact, early post-war planners envisioned a Marinehelicopter aircraft wing comprising10 squadrons with 24 helicopterseach. The proposed machinesshould be able to carry 15-20 menor 4,000 pounds of cargo. This wasno small order because that num-ber of aircraft just about equaledthe entire American helicopter pro-duction to that time and no exist-ing helicopter could come close tolifting the specified number oftroops or amount cargo. The mainsticking points were lack of funds,a ceiling on aircraft procurement,and—most importantly—lack of asuitable aircraft. The demands ofthe Korean War loosened up fund-ing and virtually eliminated aircraftprocurement restrictions. Thus, theonly remaining roadblock becamethe machines themselves.

Long-range plans in the late1940s called for the creation of upto six transport helicopter squad-rons by the mid-1950s. Thisleisurely pace was driven as muchby technology as by anything else.The Marines wanted a reliable,high-performance, heavy-lift heli-copter to carry cohesive tacticalunits ashore from escort carriersand then rapidly build up supplieswithin the beachhead. The prob-lem was the machines of the daywere too limited in range, lift, and

The HRS transport helicopter was the military ver-sion of the Sikorsky S-55 commercial aircraft. Itfeatured the familiar Sikorsky design signatures, a

single overhead main rotor and a small anti-torque rotoron the tail boom. Although many of its components weresimply enlarged versions of similar ones found in theHO3S, the HRS did not look much like the Marines' ear-liest observation helicopter. It was much larger, its cargospace included seats for eight passengers, the two-seatcockpit was located high on the fuselage and set fartherback than the HO3S, and the engine was mounted lowon the front of the aircraft rather than high amidships.Although initially selected as only an interim model untila larger heavy-lift helicopter became available, the NavyDepartment eventually purchased 235 variants of the S-55. The U.S. Army and Air Force flew similar models asH-19s, and the Coast Guard variant was the HO4S-3G.

The Marine Corps turned to the Sikorsky S-55 after itsfirst choice, the Piasecki H-16, outgrew the ability tooperate from small escort carriers—foreseen as the trans-port helicopter's primary mission. The Navy was alreadylooking at one version of the S-55; an antisubmarine vari-ant designated the HO4S. There was no obvious exter-nal difference between the HRS and the HO4S. This wasbecause the main difference was each respective air-craft's mission. The Marine transport helicopter did awaywith mine detection equipment but mounted troop seatsand had self-sealing fuel tanks. The most innovative fea-ture of the S-55 was its engine placement. It was set lowin the helicopter's nose. A drive shaft ran up through theback of the cockpit to provide power to the three-blad-ed overhead main rotor. The engine placement made iteasy to reach, cutting maintenance time. That configura-tion also eliminated critical center-of-gravity problemsthat plagued both the HO3S and the HTL. The HRS alsomounted a drop hook to carry external loads under the

cabin. The main shortfalls of the HRS were that themachine was underpowered and mechanical failuresrequired them to be grounded on several occasions. NoMarine HRSs were lost to enemy fire, but several crashedwhile hovering and at least two went down in mid-airdue to engine failure.

The HRS was a great step forward, but it was not thetransport helicopter Marine planners envisioned. Theywanted an aircraft that could carry 15 or more men toensure unit integrity during assaults and generatingenough lift to carry most division equipment. The mainproblem with the HRS was lifting power. Although ratedfor eight passengers, in the harsh reality of the Koreanmountains the HRS could only carry about six men—only four if they were fully combat loaded. Both IgorSikorsky and Frank Piasecki worked feverishly to dcliv-er a more capable aircraft, but that advance would haveto wait until the development of a practical turbine heli-copter engine.

The first batch of Marine HRS-ls included 60machines and the second order of HRS-2s mustered 91,the final version (HRS-3) included 89 more. Only the firsttwo variants saw action in Korea, but some HRS-3s werestill in the Marine inventory when their designation waschanged to the CH-19E in accordance with theDepartment of Defense unified designation system in1962.

Aircraft Data

Manufacturer: Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United AircraftCorporationpe: Transport helicopterAccommodation: Ten-places (two crew and eight passen-gers)Power Plant: One 600 hp Pratt & Whitney R-1340-57Cruising speed: 80 mphPayload: 1,050 pounds

Sikorsky HRS-1National Archives l'hoto (USN) 80-0-433339

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avionics. Frank Piasecki's tandemrotor helicopters seemed to offerthe best potential. However, thedevelopment of an improved ver-sion of the Flying Banana was tak-ing too long, and its projected sizewas not compatible with escortcarrier deck space. The Marines,therefore, reluctantly opted to gowith an interim transport heli-copter until a more capable air-craft became a reality. Themachine they chose was a variantof the Sikorsky model S-55, whichwas already in naval service as theHO4S. The HO4S featured thestandard Sikorsky frame: a singleoverhead rotor with a tail-mountedanti-torque rotor. Many of its com-ponents were little more than larg-er versions of those of the HO3S,but a front-mounted engine great-ly enhanced ease of maintenanceand in-flight stability. Luckily, theantisubmarine warfare HO4S heli-copter required only minor modi-fications to meet Marine Corps

requirements. A Marine assaulttransport helicopter, designatedthe HRS, was created by eliminat-ing the antisubmarine warfaresuites and then adding self-sealingfuel tanks and placing troop seatsin the cargo bay. An initial orderfor 40 HRS-ls was sent to SikorskyAircraft in July 1950. The "interim"tag, however, may have been pre-mature. Every U.S. Armed Serviceand many of our allies eventuallyused the S-55 (designated H-19 bythe Army and Air Force), and 235HO4S/HRS variants entered navalservice over the next decade.

On 15 January 1951, the firstMarine transport squadron wasformed at Marine Corps Air StationEl Toro. The unit tentatively wasdesignated HMR-1 ("H" for heli-copter, "M" for Marine, "R" fortransport, and "1" for first), butthat name was changed before thesquadron became operational.The new squadron was given theprefix "1" because it would be

assigned to the 1st Marine AircraftWing; the middle number "6" wasadopted because the highest fixed-wing designator to that time hadbeen "5"; and the last "1" indicatedit was the first squadron formed,thus the new squadron becameHMR-161. The commanding offi-cer was Lieutenant ColonelGeorge W. Herring, the formerexecutive officer of HMX-1. A mixof regulars and reservists populat-ed the new transport helicoptersquadron. Most of the pilots, likethe squadron's executive officerMajor William P. Mitchell, hadbeen fixed-wing pilots in thePacific. Lieutenant Colonel Her-ring, however, had received theNavy Cross as a Marine raiderbefore receiving his wings. Whilethe mix of regular and reservepilots was about equal, most'of thesquadron's enlisted personnelwere reservists. The squadrontrained at the Navy's formerlighter-than-air base located at

copters would be used in modern warfare as envisioned bythe Marine Corps.

Marine corps Historical Center Photo Collection

In July 1951, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161staged a helicopter demonstration for the press at CampPendleton, California. Its purpose was to show how heli-

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support to ground troops.

Tustin, California, not far fromCamp Pendleton while waiting forits new helicopters. The squadrongradually built up to its fullstrength of 43 officers and 244enlisted men flying 15 HRS-1 heli-copters before receiving orders toprepare to ship Out for Korea inJuly 1951.

The squadron embarked at SanDiego on 16 August with the heli-copters and aircrews on board theescort carrier Sitkob Bay (CVE 86)and the equipment and a workingparty on board the civilian-manned cargo ship Great Falls.The squadron arrived at Pusan on2 September. In Korea, HMR-161came under the administrative

control of the 1st Marine AircraftWing and the operational controlof the 1st Marine Division, thesame command and controlarrangements used by VMO-6.Four days after landing, HMR-161moved from airfield K-i (PusanEast) to airfield K-18 (KangnungAirdrome) in central Korea. Fromthere, the advance echelon movedby truck and air to X-83 at Chodo-ri, an auxiliary airstrip not far fromthe division headquarters, alreadyhosting VMO-6. A rear echelonremained at K-18 to conductadvanced maintenance and makecomplex repairs.

The fact that HMR-161 was evenin Korea was at least partially due

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the efforts of Major GeneralThomas and Colonel Krulak whoactively pushed to speed the paceof getting transport helicoptersinto the combat zone. Thomas andKrulak were well aware of thetechnical limitations of the HRS-1and the demands of Korea's diffi-cult weather and rugged terrain, sothey began testing its abilitiesslowly. The initial helicopter oper-ations were modest ones to testthe waters, carefully conductedwith little risk. First came a coupleof resupply efforts well shieldedfrom enemy observation anddirect fire. Next came small-scaletroop lifts, eventually increasing tobattalion-sized movements. Tac-tical innovations were also on theagenda: counter-guerrilla activities;a night assault; and rapid move-ment of rocket batteries. It was notlong before a division of laboremerged. The smaller aircraft ofVMO-6 concentrated on medicalevacuations, reconnaissance,observation, and liaison work,while HMR-161 conducted aerialresupply, moved troops, andexperimented with vertical envel-opment. Although the HRS coulddo everything its smaller kincould, medical evacuations andcombat search and rescue weresecondary missions for HMR-161.This was possible because of thestatic nature of the fighting. In fact,the combat situation eventuallybecame stable enough that it waspossible to increase emphasis onamphibious training even thoughthe squadron remained in thecombat zone, a factor that lent ele-ments of realism and urgency tothe helicopter training programthat were probably not present atQuantico, Virginia, or OnslowBeach, North Carolina. The stun-ning success in Korea of heli-copters used for assault supportsilenced critics and convertedskeptics. In the words of historian

Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

A Marine Sikorsky HRS-1 transport helicopter is loaded on board the escort car-rier Sitkoh Bay (CITE 86) at San Diego, California, for the journey to Korea. Thearrival of H/VIR-161 and the HRS-1 would mark a new era in Marine airborne


LtCol George W Herring, right, corn-inanding officer of HJVIR-161, is wel-comed to Korea by LtCol Edward VFinn, the 1st Marine Division's airofficer. LtCol Herring commanded theworld's first transport helicoptersquadron used in combat.

Lynn Montross, with the introduc-tion of HMR-161 to Korea "a newera of military transport haddawned."

The first order of business wasto conduct familiarization flightsso the pilots could become accus-tomed to the terrain and get a feelfor the tactical and operationalconditions at the front. The veter-an pilots of VMO-6's helicopterelement indoctrinated the newmen of HMR-161 in flying condi-tions and combat procedures. Alsoduring this time various potentiallanding zones and flight routeswere identified. While the pilotswere busy flying, selected mem-bers of the shore party battalionbecame familiar with helicopterlanding and loading procedureswhile planners met to prepare forthe squadron's first combat opera-

tion. General Thomas wiselydecided to use a series of cautiousactivities until both the helicoptercrews and ground units got up tospeed, he then pushed an aggres-sive agenda featuring a wide vari-ety missions that became progres-sively more complex and that thor-oughly tested existing operationalprocedures and new theories forhelicopter employment.

The initial combat operation byHMR-161 took place only twoweeks after its arrival. It wasdubbed Operation Windmill tohonor the HRS's unofficial nick-name, "Flying Windmill." Mindfulof the chaotic experiences of thefirst Packard exercise at CampLejeune, North Carolina, and wellaware of the dictates of Phib-31,Krulak and Thomas ensured thenew transport helicopters would

MajGen Gerald C. Thomas centei in command of the 1stMarine Division, discusses plans for using the new 10-placeSikorsky HRS-1 helicopters with the leaders of HMR-161,LtCol George W Herring, the commanding officer, right,

and his executive officer, Maj William P Mitchell. Thomaswas instrumental both in bringing helicopters into theMarine Coips and getting the first Marine helicopter trans-port squadron to Korea in 1951.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-132027

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