This article was downloaded by: [UQ Library]On: 18 November 2014, At: 21:06Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The International Spectator: ItalianJournal of International AffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rspe20

Emerging Markets and GlobalGovernance: An Indian PerspectiveArundhati Ghose aa Foreign policy analyst and commentatorPublished online: 16 Dec 2010.

To cite this article: Arundhati Ghose (2010) Emerging Markets and Global Governance: An IndianPerspective, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 45:4, 49-61, DOI:10.1080/03932729.2010.527100

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2010.527100

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Emerging Markets and GlobalGovernance: An Indian Perspective

Arundhati Ghose

The startling emergence of China as an economic and military power has given rise

to apprehensions globally, but more so among the established powers. The appre-

hensions relate not only to the cultural and historical ‘alienness’ of China, but also

to its apparent willingness to challenge the global system and architecture of global

governance set in place by the West over half a century ago. While non-Western

countries are also wary of the possible impact on them and on the global order of

Chinese actions on a range of global issues, they appear to be willing to cooperate

with China on some of them in order to change a system that has often been seen as

inequitable and unbalanced. Yet, the apprehensions of the West would seem to

conflate the idea of a rising China with that of other emerging markets. It is argued

here that, given the historical, political and cultural experiences of these emerging

markets, their access to power and influence, if and when it happens, need not

necessarily take the same route as that of China. This is true particularly in the case

of India; for reasons which will be highlighted, India is likely, at least for the

foreseeable future, to remain within the existing paradigm of global governance,

though it may seek to adapt the rules and structures to better reflect its economic,

political and security interests. This would not preclude cooperation on a selective

basis on specific global issues with different partners. This would be apparent

particularly in the realm of global challenges such as climate change and non-

proliferation, international trade and finance and the global commons, such as

space, the oceans and cyberspace.

The new emphasis on global governance

Global governance has become the subject of much recent and mainly Western

debate and intense discussion, particularly in the context of the impact of rising

powers on such governance. While terminology may not be of substantive signifi-

cance, narratives are frequently predetermined by their use. The terms

Arundhati Ghose is a foreign policy analyst and commentator. Email: arundhati39@hotmail.com

The International Spectator, Vol. 45, No. 4, December 2010, 49–61 ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online� 2010 Istituto Affari Internazionali DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2010.527100

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

‘rising powers’ and ‘emerging markets’ are used interchangeably, though the

approaches denoted are widely different. According to Stewart Patrick, rising

powers

want to be at the high table, they want to alter the rules of the game and want more

say in global governance structures. But they are also – as self-defined developing

countries, leery of assuming additional burdens and obligations of power and parti-

cularly leery of picking up the check and providing public goods.1

While much of this opinion may be a fair reflection of a factual situation, the

inevitability of these developments is ignored. Emerging markets are not only

attractive because of the newness and size of their growing markets for the exports

of the established countries, but are now indispensable in the search for solutions to

global challenges such as the international economy and climate change. Both

terms refer, by and large, to the same group of countries, though an emerging

market may not be a rising power and, perhaps, vice versa (cf. Iran, which is not yet

an emerging market, but is certainly a power in the region, a fact frequently

ignored in the West). These countries will be referred to in the latter sense, that

is, as emerging markets since, apart from China, most of them do not yet impact

on the interests of the established countries in any significant way.

The term ‘global governance’ has been used to denote, variously, the power and

reach of multilateral institutions, the rules and norms set by them, the right of

(mainly Western) civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations to

participate in global decision-making in a kind of post-Westphalian world, where

the writ of the nation-state is, on occasion, superseded by a ‘global’ norm and, in

extreme cases, by agendas drawn up by the powerful on issues of importance to

them, to be negotiated with the participation of all countries – as in the case of, for

example, non-proliferation and international trade.

Little of this is really new; since the end of World War II, the UN, particularly

through the Security Council, its several specialised agencies, the Bretton Woods

institutions, the GATT/WTO and many of the treaties and conventions in areas as

diverse as labour standards, non-proliferation, international humanitarian law and

international trade, have set rules and guidelines for what could be termed ‘global

governance’ according to this definition. However, the world has changed and is

changing rapidly into unprecedented and presently uncharted territory. The recent

emphasis on global governance clearly seems to indicate a desire for a return to the

earlier order and stability – and of course, power – a return, after decades of

prosperity and stability in the West, from a world made turbulent by economic

1S. M. Patrick, speaker at the Council for Foreign Relations symposium, ‘‘Rising Powers and GlobalInstitutions in the Twenty-First Century’’, 19 May 2010, Washington DC, http://www.cfr.org/publica-tion/22191/pqnel

50 A. Ghose

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

crises, with the rise on the horizon of other non-Western centres of power, parti-

cularly the dramatic emergence of a prosperous and assertive China.

Developing countries like India have, over the years, been in a reactive mode to

this global system,2 frequently resentful of global agendas being set without taking

into account the problems and constraints of countries like themselves.

Nevertheless, they have participated in an effort to protect their interests to the

extent possible. At present, there is little public debate or discussion, certainly in

India, on the contours of global governance as an new all-encompassing coherent

system; yet, the discrete elements of the global system are subject to close scrutiny

and analyses as shifts in power, events and relationships evolve. Developing coun-

tries, including India, have tended so far to support a rule-based system as provid-

ing a minimum protection from the vagaries of an alien world market which

inevitably impacts them even while the origins of the global trends and the con-

sequent rules have been formulated by the rich and the powerful. As a result, there

has been a continuing emphasis on the changing of the rules, a resetting of agendas.

It needs to be recognised, however, that the current system has helped many

developing countries. India and other developing countries like it have benefited

from the globalisation that has swept the world, albeit less as deliberate ‘govern-

ance’ and more as a phenomenon of which advantage could be taken, a system by

whose rules these countries are slowly learning to play. Globalisation, therefore, is

seen as an unstoppable and almost natural phenomenon, the interdependence or

opening up of markets and the freer flow of finances, technology and skilled

workers.

New international groupings

The new emphasis on global governance, on the other hand, would seem to imply

the reiteration or even the re-imposition of some order on the unpredictable

changes that globalisation has and is engendering. China, for one, has used the

current system to power its spectacular growth without ceding much in return.

Its emergence on the international stage has now put it in a position to influence, to

possibly change the existing rules, if not the existing system, perhaps even to

promote a ‘China model’ of development and progress that would more effectively

reflect its interests also. This appears to have caused much apprehension, particu-

larly in an economically troubled West, even while it has found some resonance in

other wary rising powers.

Kishore Mahbubani has questioned the reactions of the West to the rise, mainly

of China, in his ironic and almost prescient book, The New Asian Hemisphere.3

Other emerging markets have also seen unprecedented growth rates and a

2China has usually joined in meetings of the Group of 77 developing countries in the ‘G77þ1’ format.3Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere.

Global Governance: An Indian Perspective 51

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

dynamism in their economies which, on occasion, has given them a foretaste of the

possibility of increased influence on, if not yet the framing of agendas, the framing

of rules to take their interests into account, certainly in the economic field,

especially after the major global crisis of 2008–09 (which, in a sense continues

with the troubles of the Eurozone).

The emergence of the G20 which, at a level, should be accepted as a natural

outcome of economic developments taking place worldwide will, to the extent that

it appears to be ‘replacing’ the G7/G8, necessarily cause adjustment pains for the

erstwhile centres of economic power. As asserted in both the G20 Pittsburgh

Declaration and the Joint Statement of the Brasilia BRIC Summit, the G20 is

‘‘the premier forum for international coordination and cooperation’’ and should

‘‘be proactive and formulate a coherent strategy for the post-crisis period’’.4

The significance of the G20’s initial declaration is the recognition that the

Bretton Woods institutions need to change to reflect the new economic realities

(and it is here that India is participating in financial coordination). What is more

interesting, however, is the agenda the BRIC countries have set for themselves and

for the international community, not only through the mechanism of the G20.

The language used for the ‘new’ approach to global governance would appear to

be, by and large, a reiteration of the old: the health and stability of the global

economy, including international trade and stability of financial flows; interna-

tional security including the threat of terrorism, non-proliferation, climate

change; the need to strengthen multilateral institutions including the UN, the

IMF and the World Bank and the reiteration of the rules and norms set in a

different time. Yet, it is clear that the emerging countries’ interpretation carries a

different emphasis. India’s External Affairs Minister Somanahalli Mallaiah Krishna,

clearly voiced the view that ‘‘[t]he current global architecture is many decades old

and is no longer capable of adequately meeting the increasing challenges before us’’

and called for the reform of the UN, especially the UN Security Council, which he

characterised as ‘‘unrepresentative and undemocratic’’. He emphasized the impor-

tance of the ‘‘development dimension’’ in the Doha Round and the ‘‘urgent need

for bringing about reforms in the international financial institutions’’ following the

recent global economic meltdown.5

The BRIC agenda further specifies the difference in emphasis and has introduced

new issues and nuanced many of the old.6 A brief overview of the Joint Statement

illustrates this approach: while supporting the UN ‘‘playing the central role in

dealing with global challenges and threats’’, only a comprehensively reformed

UN that is more ‘‘effective, efficient and representative’’ would enable it to deal

4G20 Pittsburgh Declaration, 24–25 Sept. 2009, and the Joint Statement of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia,India and China) Summit, Brasilia, 14–15 April 2010.5BRIC Summit Joint Statement, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN15132435201004166Ibid.

52 A. Ghose

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

with present day global challenges more effectively. Similarly, support for the

Bretton Woods institutions is subject to several caveats. The BRIC countries

have identified, as a major objective, ‘‘a reformed and more stable financial archi-

tecture that will make the global economy less prone and more resilient to future

crises . . . there is a greater need for a more stable, predictable and diversified

international monetary system . . . . The IMF and World Bank urgently need to

address their legitimacy deficits.’’ Primary among the reforms is the need for a

‘‘substantial shift in voting power in favour of emerging market economies and

developing countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with

their relative weight in the world economy’’. The Joint Statement underlines the

view of these countries that the mandate of the Doha Round of trade talks is for a

‘‘development round’’. Development, agriculture, the fight against poverty, and

energy have been added to the global challenges of climate change (again with a

caveat: the outcome of the Mexico Conference – there is no reference to

Copenhagen – should ‘‘reflect the principles of the Convention (UNFCC), espe-

cially the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities’’) and,

of course, terrorism. There is no reference to non-proliferation or disarmament.

Clearly, the effort appears to be to adjust the current system incrementally to the

new realities.

The BRIC countries and their summit are only illustrative of this reaction of the

emerging markets to the revival of emphasis on older rules, some of which are

being distorted, it must be said, by their earlier enthusiasts and propagators. In fact,

in some cases, roles seem to have reversed, with developing countries supporting an

open economy and free trade and with the West tending to move towards a more

protectionist frame of mind. There are also several other similar groups of both

developing and developed countries which include the major emerging markets.

And there are several other emerging markets not included in BRIC; countries such

as South Africa, Indonesia and perhaps, even Egypt are rapidly joining the smaller

but more dynamic Asian countries, South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam. There

are therefore multiple sources from which impulses are originating for an adjust-

ment to, if not a change in, the rules of global governance as understood today by

many Western analysts and governments.

Conflating the rise of China with that of India

As already noted, the term ‘emerging markets’ itself explains not only much of their

attractiveness but also their growing influence. One of the main characteristics of

the major emerging markets is their size, and most of them, even those that

depended on the Western markets for their export-led growth, have turned towards

expanding domestic demand. The blossoming of these huge markets has inevitably

aided the ‘green shoots’ of recovery being felt in the Western economies.

Global Governance: An Indian Perspective 53

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

Of course, the Greek crisis, which should have been a European, that is, a regional

crisis to be solved by one of the richest markets in the world, had to turn to the

IMF, whose capital was recently expanded by contributions also from countries

such as China and even India. Such developments cannot but give these countries

not just a sense of power, but also a right to be party to the drawing up of

international financial rules and even the setting of the agendas of international

institutions.

In this scenario, which is necessarily an oversimplified one, there are vast differ-

ences of approach and indeed, performance. China today is perhaps the greatest

cause of apprehension in the West as it begins to reveal strengths that could place it

in the role of a rival if not an alternative to the Western model. The reliance on

China, not only on economic issues of trade and finance, but also on issues of

international security, has given rise to a plethora of proposals in Western literature

on how to deal with this new phenomenon. This is somewhat reminiscent of the

‘Japan syndrome’ of the 1970s – but Japan was an ally of the US and the West, was

not a permanent member of the UN Security Council and did not have nuclear

weapons, though it depended on the ‘extended deterrence’ of US nuclear weapons

for its security. The rise of Japan created interest and a stir in the West, but not the

apprehensions of a militarily, technologically and economically resurgent China.

This country has been asked to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’, presumably in

the existing global system, abiding by the existing rules and as a member of

existing multilateral institutions. Whether it does so or not, will depend on its

growing power, wealth and global influence. It still seeks parity with the United

States, but is willing to tweak the rules at the edges in pursuit of its national

interests, much like the power centres of the West have done in the past. China

seems to have accepted that it is only the weak that are expected to comply with

the rules, whether in the case of nuclear non-proliferation, international trade or

even the global commons, such as the oceans, space and cyberspace. So far, China

appears to be ready to work within – to the extent it suits its immediate com-

mercial or political interests – the contours of the present system of global

governance and to accept, broadly, its constraints. However, its recent ‘‘asser-

tiveness’’, to quote the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, has raised some

concerns. Recent developments such as the Chinese claim that the South China

Sea and the Yellow Sea are among its ‘core’ interests, as well as its development of

the river systems on the Tibetan Plateau which could adversely affect the river

systems of both South and South East Asia, would seem to presage a more

revisionist role, some overweening in its ambitions. The apprehensions of the

neighbours, including India, reflect, though at a different level and on specific

national interests, those of the West.

There is a common tendency to conflate the rise of China with that of India and

the rest of Asia. Brahma Chellaney, together with many other Western

54 A. Ghose

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

commentators, sees the ‘‘centre of gravity in world affairs moving to a dynamic and

thriving Asia’’.

Economically and politically, Asia appears poised to determine the new world order.

With the world’s fastest-growing markets, fastest-rising military expenditures and

most serious hotspots (including the epicenter of international terrorism), Asia holds

the key to the future global order.7

This conflation constricts India’s actions on many issues, such as climate change

and international trade. Today, China is the world’s largest polluter and its econ-

omy is larger than those of the other three BRIC countries combined. Its exports

and foreign exchange reserve holdings are also more than twice those of the other

three BRIC countries combined.8

Apart from the fact that, as groupings such as BRIC and, in some cases,

BRICSAM (including South Africa and Mexico) prove, the spread of emerging

markets is not geographically limited, the fact remains that it is only China that has

grown and is growing at a spectacular rate, accumulating economic and military

power and a stated desire to act globally. Most of the other emerging markets are

still developing countries, albeit with healthy economic growth rates, but with all

the constraints of poverty, disorganisation and a lack of the power to actually

change the ground rules of global governance. BRIC is an attempt to do so with

caution, as much of its members’ success has grown out of the current system and

they are wary to enter into a period of instability and change without more con-

fidence in the sustainability of their prosperity.

Yet there are indications that some emerging markets are spreading their influ-

ence beyond their borders: South Africa, for example, and more significantly, Brazil

and Turkey, which have taken the initiative, whatever the final outcome, to reduce

tensions and seek to mediate – the original objective of the EU-3 – between Iran

and the US on the former’s nuclear programme. China, too, remains still some-

what constrained, working to achieve its own objectives in collaboration with other

‘like-minded’ countries, for example, the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India,

China) group in climate change negotiations. China, for all the periodic muscle-

flexing which worries its neighbours, takes positions in multilateral fora closer to

the positions of developing countries, particularly when its own interests are

involved. Yet China remains sui generis, and the transference of Western attitudes

and apprehensions of the challenge of China to other emerging markets, over-

simplifies a complex situation at best and, at worst, creates rigidities in positions

in what is essentially a fluid and evolving situation.

7Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut.8Jaeger, ‘‘Trade Dependence Vary Greatly Among the BRIC’’.

Global Governance: An Indian Perspective 55

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

Compelled to seek change

Given India’s wariness of many of China’s approaches, its cooperation with the

latter on issues such as climate change and trade has been questioned by some in

the West. India’s bilateral relations with an immediate neighbour that is rapidly

growing more powerful is necessarily a complex one. While bilateral trade con-

tinues to grow strongly, several China’s actions cause acute discomfort in India. Yet,

India, like China, is interested in changing some of the rules and, as seen above,

China too needs support in its efforts to get the international system to be more

responsive to its development imperatives. For example, the united front of the

developed countries on the issue of climate change and the similarity of approaches

of India, China, Brazil and South Africa – the demand for equity in the respon-

sibilities to be adopted by them – make cooperation inevitable. On the other hand,

as pointed out above, India and the other members of the G4 (Brazil, Japan and

Germany) are working together to restructure the Security Council to include these

countries as permanent members to reflect more accurately the international dis-

pensation of power today – a stand that China has not favoured so far. Cooperation

to obtain the objectives of most emerging powers is therefore, selective and issue

based.

As has already been noted, there is little focus or strategic attention in India on

setting agendas for global governance. Yet the debate on India’s role in the new and

swiftly changing world order is, in a sense, forcing it to face new challenges. Many

feel that India has already ‘repositioned’ itself in the world order; others prefer a

more status quo-ist approach (working within the existing system and attempting

incremental reforms). A large majority, however, feel that India inevitably has to be

anti-status quo-ist, with over 600 million people outside the market, their interests

not being reflected in the international rules and institutions. The repeated use of

the word ‘inclusive’ in describing not only its own growth policies but the bases of

global policies in order to achieve sustainability, would seem to underline India’s

compulsions to change some of the economic institutions and their rules at a time

when its own power to do so increases or when it is able to push this agenda

together with other countries in a similar position.

Before examining the contours of this ongoing debate, some of the drivers and

parameters within which Indian policies are bound to operate must be identified.

First and foremost, as a democracy with powerful state (regional) governments,

passing through a period of fairly divisive politics and coalition governments, the

pressures of a society in transition will have to be taken into account in any

responses to external developments. It also needs to be noted that the state con-

tinues to play a significant part in the Indian economy, though much of the growth

and dynamism has its origins in the private sector. Secondly, India’s diversity, in

languages, ethnicities and cultures makes decision-making processes complex and

protracted. Its colonial heritage also plays a part in determining attitudes in

56 A. Ghose

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

international fora, though with the passing of time, as new generations enter

decision-making levels, the impact of this factor appears to be declining. In addi-

tion, the growth of a powerful civil society is beginning to have an influence on

policies of government and is likely to grow in the future, even as the formal

positions of left political parties are on the wane. On the other hand, while

India’s focus today is on its internal economic and social development, it lives in

a troubled and rough neighbourhood. Security issues today play as important a part

in determining India’s reactions to global developments as its ambitions in the

economic and social sphere.

It has to be noted that, in the medium term and most certainly in the longer

term, as India’s middle classes grow and the size of the population outside the

market diminishes and a newer generation articulates its priorities, reflexes to resist

external pressures on externally set agendas and rules will also weaken. Today,

however, any government that wishes to continue in power, whether in the states

or at the centre, will have to be responsive to the large majority with votes, on issues

which might be perceived as restricting India’s freedom of action in determining its

own national interests.

Nuclear non-proliferation: a case of repositioning

Perhaps the most telling illustration of India’s reactions to an important issue of

global governance is the evolution of its position, frequently overlooked in the

commentaries of more rigid non-proliferation ‘absolutists’, on the issue of nuclear

non-proliferation, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

(FMCT).

Since global sanctions were imposed on India following its nuclear test in 1974,

India has been viscerally against any association with the NPT, even in the most

indirect of ways. It viewed the treaty as flawed in that it not only offered no security

assurances to non-nuclear weapon states and therefore adversely affected its security

vis-a-vis China, which was then emerging as a full-fledged nuclear weapon state

with hostile intent towards India, but was also discriminatory and unequal and

only reflected the interests of the nuclear weapon states and their allies. India

committed itself to the elimination of all nuclear weapons and this would have

met its purposes but, as recognised by George Perkovich in his book India’s NuclearBomb, ‘‘India may have had logic, principle and the 1965 mandate on its side, but

the United States and the other nuclear weapon States had power on their side.’’

India’s rejection of the treaty

would characterize its nuclear diplomacy for decades: it supported the principle of

ensuring that nuclear material and capabilities would be used only for peaceful

purposes, but it resisted any measures that would allow some states to retain nuclear

Global Governance: An Indian Perspective 57

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

weapons while denying others the full freedom to exploit their resources as they saw

fit. India was and would remain fiercely jealous of its sovereignty, resistant to any

inequalities and inequities, wary of any semblance of colonialism and righteous in its

demands for disarmament.9

In 1996, India rejected the CTBT and in 1998 carried out five full-fledged nuclear

tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Additional sanctions were imposed

on India at that time, too. But, in 1991, India had taken the decision not only to

liberalise its internal market, but also to cautiously open up its economy to global

trade and financial flows. India had started, albeit slowly, to integrate itself into the

global economy. As a result, its response to global reactions to its nuclear tests was

vastly different from the one in the early 1970s. India entered into detailed strategic

discussions with all major powers, particularly the United States. It announced that

it would not stand in the way of the CTBT entering into force, an indirect way of

assuring the international community that it would sign the treaty if all others

required to do so by its Article XIV also signed and ratified it. The foreign ministers

of two successive governments publicly stated that India would abide by the objec-

tives and principles of the NPT, as a nuclear weapon state, but that since that treaty

did not reflect the realities on the ground and continued to be discriminatory and

unequal, it would not consider becoming party to it.

Since that time, in 2005, the US and India agreed on a resumption of civil

nuclear cooperation, a decision that was, in 2008, approved by the 45 members of

the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Without going into the details of the tortuous

and prolonged negotiations between India and the US and the equally intense

debates within the NSG, it needs to be noted that, following this development,

India’s position on non-proliferation, the non-proliferation regime and the NPT

itself underwent a shift in emphasis.

While India is unlikely to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and did

not attend the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Indian prime minister did

attend US President Barack Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit held shortly

prior to it (12–13 April 2010). In his statement to that Conference, Prime

Minister Singh took a forward looking stance, not decrying the inequalities and

flaws of the NPT, but emphasizing the central role of the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) and of export controls, an issue which, even a few years ago

would have been unthinkable for an Indian representative. He underlined, instead,

that India had harmonised Indian export control guidelines and lists with those of

the NSG and MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime).10

9Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb.10‘‘Our commitment to not transfer nuclear weapons or related materials and technologies to NNWS(non-nuclear weapon states) or non-state actors is enshrined in domestic law through the enactment of theWMD Act. We stand committed not to transfer reprocessing and enrichment technologies and equipmentto countries that do not possess them.’’ Statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the NuclearSecurity Summit, Washington (The Hindu, 13 April 2010).

58 A. Ghose

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

At the same time, India as a state with nuclear weapons, has clearly supported the

start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, though the elimination of

nuclear weapons remains a major part of its nuclear policy. Surrounded to the

north and west by not very friendly nuclear weapon states, India has based its

doctrine on a ‘no first use’ posture, and is working with other countries to promote

what has now become a more acceptable objective of a nuclear weapon free world.

India has also signed the Additional Protocol with the IAEA and placed its civilian

nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, even the reactors indigenously designed

and manufactured.

It is clear that India has repositioned itself on the nuclear issue and, with some

caveats, appears willing to abide by the rules and norms set down globally in

this area.

Participation in select fora on select questions

India has, as a developing yet rapidly growing country with rapidly growing energy

needs, taken a position as mentioned above, on climate change that is based on the

principle of equity. Working together with the BASIC countries (which include

China, perhaps the world’s largest polluter) is dictated mainly by the need to form

a kind of counterweight to the coordinated positions of the advanced Western

countries which, in trying to reduce the burden on themselves, have demanded

equal action from countries like India which have a low carbon footprint on per

capita terms and are in the process of growing. By agreeing to restrict the energy

intensity of this growth, India has opted for a less than confrontational approach,

even while protecting the interests of its people’s future.

As an original member of the WTO, India is also engaged in examining ways in

which that organisation can be institutionally reformed. In a thoughtful collection

of essays on the subject, Debra Steger notes that the General Agreement on Tariff

and Trade (GATT, the predecessor of the WTO) and its negotiating rounds

were launched during the Cold War and led by the United States. The modes of

negotiations were developed with a single power dominating the process and others

following suit. Eventually, trade negotiations developed into a bipolar framework,

with the growth and emergence of post-war Europe negotiating at the table in

Geneva with a single voice under a common commercial policy . . . . Others, such

as Japan and large developing countries played an important but not decisive role. 11

The essay by Thomas Cottier states that,

With the advent of the emerging economies, the WTO faces a multipolar

world . . . major decisions have required the consent of a number of countries,

including Brazil and India. The accession of China to the WTO in 2001 profoundly

11Steger, Redesigning the World Trade Organization.

Global Governance: An Indian Perspective 59

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

shifted the negotiating dynamic at the WTO . . . . The future accession of Russia will

further change the political economy of the WTO.12

According to another essay in the same book, the WTO is not only challenged by a

lack of leadership through the loss of momentum in the ‘liberal transatlantic

moment’, but also,

as we move toward a multipolar trade world, some of the leading actors (the United

States and the European Union) are showing signs of reluctance to agree to deals that

asymmetrically profit other emerging nations . . . these types of agreements (are)

difficult to sell at home to negatively affected communities . . . but some emerging

powers (e.g. China and Brazil) pose certain challenges to the United States (and to

some extent to the European Union) with regard to foreign and security policy . . . .

There is real concern that the current financial crisis and the negative spill-over

effects on growth figures will make parties even more suspicious . . . .13

From these excerpts, it is clear that the need for adjustment to the changing world

will have to come not just from the emerging economies which are causing/leading

the change, but from the ‘older’ powers, as economic and therefore political and, in

some cases, military power spreads beyond the traditional boundaries that they had

become used to.

India is deeply involved in the process of debating and working on the future of

the WTO as an organisation and, for example, reshaping the Generalised System of

Preferences (GSP) for developing countries. It appears keenly aware of the impor-

tance of the institution and a rule-based system which would protect its interests as

a developing country, however large. The system is accepted but efforts are being

made to adapt the rules to meet the new realities.

Conclusion

Global governance is not static; the emerging markets, the rising powers are usher-

ing in a period of change, in which new countries are participating in setting

agendas and drawing up new rules. These countries are themselves trying to

adjust to the new circumstances in which they find themselves, both domestically

and internationally. For a country like India, the task would appear daunting. It is

frequently criticised as not being ready or willing to exercise the power it has

obviously developed in recent times. It needs to be remembered, however, that

India has never been a ‘revolutionary’ country; even its independence was won

through protracted negotiations. Even if it could, India is not likely to demand

drastic changes in the global system; as a cautious player, it is just as unlikely to

support sudden and disruptive change. It would seek to resist ‘taking sides’ in a

12Cottier, ‘‘A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision Making’’.13Elsig, ‘‘WTO Decision-Making’’.

60 A. Ghose

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014

US–China search to set the global agenda. It is much more likely that India will

seek to abide by the rules, provided it has had a part, as a liberal democracy, in the

framing of them. Such changes as it might support are likely to be incremental and

far less dramatic than what some apparently expect of it.

References

Chellaney, B. Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan. New York: HarperCollins

Publishers, 2007.

Cottier, T. ‘‘A Two-Tier Approach to WTO Decision Making’’. In Redesigning the World Trade

Organization for the Twenty-first Century, edited by Debra P. Steger. Waterloo, Ontario:

Wilfrid Laurier University Press/CIGI/IDRC, 2010.

Elsig, M. ‘‘WTO Decision-Making: Can We get a Little Help from the Secretariat and the Critical

Mass?’’. In Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century, edited by

Debra P. Steger. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press/CIGI/IDRC, 2010.

Jaeger, M. ‘‘Trade Dependence and Economic-Political Vulnerability Vary Greatly Among the

BRIC’’, Talking Point. Frankfurt a.M: Deutsche Bank Research, 2010.

Mahbubani, K. The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East.

New York: Public Affairs, 2008.

Perkovich, G. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1999.

Steger, D. P. Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century. Waterloo, Ontario:

Wilfrid Laurier University Press/CIGI/IDRC, 2010.

Global Governance: An Indian Perspective 61

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

UQ

Lib

rary

] at

21:

06 1

8 N

ovem

ber

2014