ecoCity eMotion -...
Transcript of ecoCity eMotion -...
Michael Steindl
Martin Winkler
Christian Miedl
AVL Software and Functions, Germany
Scalable Functional Safety Architecture for Electric Mobility Applications
“ecoCity eMotion” 24-25th September 2014, Erlangen, Germany
European Conference on Nanoelectronics and Embedded Systems for Electric Mobility
Presentation Outline
Introduction
State of the art Hardware Architecture
New approach: Hardware Qualifier
Emergency Operation Scenario
Standby Scenario
Conclusion
Introduction
Functional safety: Freedom of unacceptable risk due to
hazards caused by an faulty E/E systems”
Examples for functional risks in electric cars:
unintended acceleration
unintended loss of braking capability
Failures in E/E systems can
be classified in two categories:
Systematic failures
(e.g. software bug, specification fault)
Random failures
(e.g. unpredictable HW fault)
Source: AVL
Introduction
Measures are necessary to deal with such failures:
Systematic failures
Use suitable development processes and methods
Random failures
Use high quality components
(perfectness)
Use redundancy
Detection of errors
Transition to safe state
Error correction/
reconfiguration
Source: AVL
Introduction
Fail-safe system:
• Provides a safe state which can be achieved and maintained
without the support of the Control Unit
• Individual and dependent failures that lead to a loss of service are
safe
• Deactivation of service is generally safe Intended fault reaction
Fail-operational system:
• Safe state can not be achieved
and/or maintained
without the support of the ECU
• Deactivation / loss of service is
generally unsafe
Source: Wikipedia
State of the art Hardware Architecture
Hardware Architecture for Electronic throttle control
(Fail-safe system)
XCU MC
MU
Process Monitoring
Evaluation Processor Monitoring
"Regular" XCU Functions
Processor Monitoring
Disable
DRI
to safety-relevant power stages (e.g., injection and throttle)
Request for Failsafe Limitations
Reset
DRI
Input variables
Answer Question
or
Copy of Process Monitoring
ADC
Check
Analogue
inputs
Function (L1)
Process Monitoring (L2)
Processor Monitoring (L3)
Copy of Process Monitoring (L2’)
Source: EGAS-AK
State of the art Hardware Architecture
Q/A
Inverter VCU
AVL Monitoring Unit
Com.
Interface
Torque Request
Processor Mon.
Microcontroller
Input
(Acceleration
Pedal)
Application SW
Process Mon.
Processor Mon.
dis
ab
le
VCU Safe State request is
indicated to the system by
disabling CAN drivers
Limitations:
No communication possible in case
of an error
(debugging, re-flashing…)
No distinction between error and
normal system states with disabled
safety mechanisms
(e.g. start-up)
Difficult to test during runtime
(switch-off path check)
State of the art Hardware Architecture
Q/A
Inverter VCU
AVL Monitoring Unit
Com.
Interface
Torque Request
Processor Mon.
Microcontroller
Input
(Acceleration
Pedal)
Application SW
Process Mon.
Processor Mon.
disable
VCU Safe State request is
indicated to the system by
additional switch off path
Limitations:
Additional Hardware elements
necessary costs
New approach: Hardware Qualifier
Q/A
Inverter VCU
AVL Monitoring Unit
Com.
Interface
Regular Output
+ HW-Qualifier
HW-Qualifier
Processor Mon.
Microcontroller
Input
Application SW
Process Mon.
Processor Mon.
• Monitoring Unit determines µC HW-Status
(HW-Qualifier)
• HW-Qualifier is communicated over existing
interfaces to inverter via protected transfer
• Inverter evaluates received HW-Qualifier and
selects suitable system reaction
Advantages:
No communication cut-off in case of
an error
No redundant switch off path
Distinction between error and normal
system states with disabled safety
mechanisms
Increased diagnostic capability of
switch-off path
Degraded fault reaction possible
HW status can be easily provided to
multiple control units
Standby Scenario
Com.
Interface
µC HW
Status
Com.
Interface Standby
Output
Output
Microcontroller
Input
Application SW
Process Mon.
Processor Mon.
VCU
Q/A.
AVL Monitoring Unit
Processor Mon.
Standby - SW
Input
• Regular Output
• Standby Output
+ HW-Qualifier
• Microcontroller is completely switched-off in
certain operation modes (standby)
• Standby functionality is provided by MU
• Standby state is signaled to Inverter via HW
Qualifier
Advantages:
Reduced system energy
consumption
Enhanced system wake-up
concepts possible:
Several sources possible, e.g.:
Analog in
Digital in
CAN/Flexray/SPI/I²C
Complex evaluation possible
BCU MC MC
Emergency Operation Scenario
Inverter
Com.
Interface
HW-
Qualifier
Com.
Interface Backup
Output
Output
Microcontroller
Input
Application SW
Process Mon.
Processor Mon.
VCU
Q/A.
AVL Monitoring Unit
Processor Mon.
Redundant ASW
Input
• Regular Output
• Backup Output
+ HW-Qualifier
Advantages:
Increased system availability due
to emergency operation
functionality of Monitoring Unit in
case of faulty
main microcontroller
Additional resources for non-
safety functionalities on Monitoring
Unit available
• Monitoring Unit provides redundant ASW
functionality
• Error state is signaled to inverter via HW
Qualifier (Inverter limitation)
Conclusion
ECU error indication to System (Hardware Qualifier)
Safe State request via CAN without disabling CAN drivers
No additional hardware connections necessary
Distinction between error and normal system states with disabled
safety mechanisms possible
Graded fault reaction possible
Stand-by concept
Operation without main µC
Less quiescent current
Wake-up concept
Complex evaluation of arbitrary input sources possible
Emergency Operation (Fault-tolerant system design)
Limited functionality possible in case of an error
Conclusion
Fully compliant to normative requirements (ISO26262,
EGAS Concept)
Cost efficient
Scalable to customer requirements to provide enhanced
functionality without additional hardware
Thank you for your attention!
Contact
Dr. Michael Steindl
+49 941 63089 256
AVL Software and Functions GmbH
Im Gewerbepark B27
D-93059 Regensburg
Martin Winkler
+49 941 63089 122
Christian Miedl
+49 941 63089 148