The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 19 | Issue 6 | Number 2 | Article ID 5558 | Mar 15, 2021

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Early Meiji Diplomacy Viewed through the Lens of theInternational Treaties Culminating in the Annexation of theRyukyus

Marco Tinello

Abstract: This paper focuses on Meiji Japan’sannexation of the Ryukyus as seen through theeyes of key Western diplomats in the 1870s.Although it played out over seven years, theannexation process unfolded relativelysmoothly on the international stage. Onereason for this was the skill with whichJapanese diplomats handled inquiries andpotential protests by Western diplomats. In thisarticle, I show that, as early as 1872, leadingmembers of the Meiji government were gainingfamiliarity with the nuances of Westerndiplomatic maneuvering. Indeed, in some waysthe annexation functioned as a rehearsal forfuture diplomatic challenges the regime wouldface. In retrospect, it offers an excellent lensthrough which to view Japanese diplomacy ofthe 1870s.1

Keywords: East Asian diplomacy, Meiji Japan’sdiplomacy; Ryūkyū shobun; the RyukyuKingdom’s annexation by Japan; Westernimperialism; international treaties.

Following the restoration of imperial power,Meiji Japan embraced modernization and, aspart of this process, it sought to determine itsnational borders in order to create a modernnation-state. In the north, in 1869, the Meijileaders incorporated the former foreignterritory known as “Ezo,” renaming itHokkaido; in 1875, they exchanged the islandof Sakhalin with Russia in return for theacquisition of the Kuril Islands; in the south, in1876, they annexed the Bonin Islands through aformal declaration; and in the same year, they

imposed an “unequal treaty” on Korea,employing the same kind of gunboat diplomacythat Commodore Matthew Perry had usedagainst Japan in 1853-54. Finally, in 1879,Japan formally annexed the former kingdom ofthe Ryukyus

As previous scholarship has shown, by the early1870s Japanese diplomats had recognized theinterconnected nature of Japan’s unresolvedborder issues and the need to devise a

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comprehensive policy towards them.2 AlthoughI fully acknowledge the importance ofunderstanding Meiji Japan’s national borderissues as a single question, in this paper Iconfine myself to addressing the Ryukyuanannexation to Japan.

Dissatisfied with the Ryukyus’ ambivalentstatus – China and Japan both laid claims to theterritory – in the new era of internationalrelations, between 1872 and 1879 Tokyo’sleaders resorted to political and diplomaticmaneuvers that aimed to formally incorporatethe Ryukyu Kingdom into the newly establishedMeiji state. They ordered the Ryukyus todispatch an embassy to Tokyo, where theyappointed the ruling monarch as “King of theRyūkyū Domain”; sent a punitive mission toTaiwan to avenge the deaths of a group ofRyukyuan fishermen considered to be“Japanese subjects”; concluded, through Britishmediation, an international agreement with theQing court that (implicitly) stated that theRyukyuan people were Japanese; ordered thekingdom to cease tributary relations withChina; and, finally, in the face of strongresistance from the Ryukyuan authorities,annexed the kingdom by force.

Historians have conventionally referred to thisprocess, which culminated in the establishmentof Okinawa prefecture in 1879, as the Ryūkyūshobun (“the disposit ion of Ryukyu,”1872-1879; hereafter “annexation”).3 GregorySmits has pointed out that during the 1880s,“the shobun became an international event,involving diplomatic activity between andamong China, Japan, Britain, the United States,France, and, of course, former officials of theRyūkyūan court.”4

As Smits’ analysis suggests, the Ryukyu islandspresented the new Meij i State with adiplomatic conundrum, one that involved notonly relations with China, but also itsrelationship with several Western countries,especially those which had negotiated treaties

with the Ryukyus (“Lew Chew”) in the 1850s.In other words, the Meiji leaders needed, at thevery least, the powers’ tacit approval of theirfuture plans for the islands.5

This paper focusses on the annexation as seenthrough the eyes of a number of key Westerndiplomats during the 1870s. Had thesediplomats chosen to make a serious issue ofJapan’s annexation of the Ryukyus, the mattercould easily have become more complex andinternational tensions escalated. Although itplayed out over seven years, the annexationunfolded re lat ive ly smoothly on theinternational stage. One reason for this was theskill with which Japanese diplomats handledquestions and potential protests by Westerndiplomats. As we will see, a number of theirinquiries were directed specifically at theRyukyuan treaties.6

As early as 1872, leading members of the Meijigovernment were becoming increasingly adeptat interpreting the nuances of Westerndiplomatic maneuvering.7 Indeed, theannexation of the Ryukyus can be seen as anearly example of the future diplomaticchallenges the regime would face. Inretrospect, the annexation provides anexcellent lens through which to view Japanesediplomacy of the 1870s.

The Ryukyuan treaties

In 1609, the Ryukyu Kingdom was defeated bythe Satsuma Domain and surrenderedunconditionally; as a result, it was placed underthe de facto rule of Satsuma (and by extension,of the Tokugawa bakufu).8 However, theRyukyus continued to maintain the posture ofan independent country, with Satsuma’sapproval and financial support, in order tomaintain tributary relations with China.9 In thisway, while Satsuma gave the kingdom a highdegree of autonomy in its internal affairs, itexercised considerable control over the

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kingdom’s foreign relations and created whatSmits has called a “theatrical state” in itsrelations with China.10

After centuries under this arrangement,Westerners arrived in East Asia, visiting boththe Ryukyus and Japan. Subsequently, theUnited States, France, and Holland concludedtreaties of amity with the Ryukyu Kingdom in1854, 1855, and 1859, respectively. In sodoing, these Western nations recognized thatthe kingdom possessed at least some degree ofdiplomatic capacity, as the Ryukyuanauthorit ies had signed these variousagreements without the direct involvement ofSatsuma officials. Ryukyuan officials draftedthe treaties they exchanged with their Westerncounterparts in classical Chinese and datedthem according to the Chinese calendar,omitting any reference to the kingdom’ssubordination to Japan.

The Ryukyuan officials who negotiated withthese Western powers were exercising thesame kind of “theatrical diplomacy” that theRyukyus had employed for centuries withChina. While they repeatedly emphasized thekingdom’s status as a tributary of China, theynever revealed their subordinate relationshipwith Satsuma and the bakufu.11 Although thepowers’ arrival was perceived as a threat to thekingdom’s stability, and the Ryukyuannegotiators took great pains to prevent thesigning of these agreements, in the end, theysuccumbed to the Westerners’ demands.

In the 1850s, Western observers were furtherprevented from fully understanding theRyukyus’ status by the bakufu’s ambiguousreplies when they asked about its relations withthe kingdom. When, in early 1854, CommodorePerry demanded that bakufu officials open theport of Naha, the Japanese negotiators repliedthat “the Ryukyu islands are very distant andthe opening of its ports cannot be discussed byus.” It was following this reply that Perrydecided to sign a treaty with the Ryukyus

without the bakufu’s involvement.12

On the other hand, the bakufu did not raise anyobjection to the compacts the Ryukyus signedwith the US and France, and when in 1857 theDutch asked the shogunate to mediate a treatybetween Holland and the Ryukyus, theshogunate replied that even though the RyukyuKingdom shitagafu (obeys or submits) to Japan,moto yori gaikoku no koto nite (“it has been aforeign kingdom from the beginning”), and thusit would be problematic for Japan’s rulers togive instructions about such a treaty.13 Fromthe bakufu’s perspective, the Ryukyus weresubordinate to Japan, but not part of Japan;thus, they thought it prudent not to intervenein the Ryukyuan–Dutch Treaty. Although, atthat time, the bakufu did not fully grasp that aninternational treaty was an agreement signedby two sovere ign s ta tes and a l l theramifications that flowed from that, it stilltacitly approved the instruments signed by theRyukyu Kingdom in the 1850s.

The Ryukyuan–American Treaty concluded onJuly 11, 1854, stipulated that American citizensin the Ryukyus should be treated with courtesyand friendship; Americans were granted theright of free trade and the ability to move freelyon the islands without restriction, as well as theright of extraterritoriality (but not of consularresidence); and that US ships in difficultyshould be assisted and treated with courtesy bythe Ryukyuan authorities. In the French treaty,in addition to these privileges, the MostFavored Nation clause was also included, alongwith rights to rent houses, land, and boats. TheDutch treaty was similar to the Americantreaty, but like the French instrument it alsoincluded the Most Favored Nation clause.

In the original documents, these agreementswere referred to variously as “treaties,”“compacts” and “conventions.” As the treatieslacked ratification clauses, the rights andrelations defined in them were valid andeffective immediately following the exchange of

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the documents between the parties involved.14

However, while the US government ratified itstreaty with the kingdom in 1855 (a purelydomestic act to formally sanction theagreement), the French and Dutch governmentdecided not to ratify their respective treatieswith the Ryukyus in the late 1860s.

Last page of the 1854 Ryukyu-US TreatyCourtesy of the Diplomatic Archives of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (外務省・

外交史料館蔵）

As early as 1862, the bakufu had revised itsformer policy and begun to characterize theRyukyus as subordinate to both China andJapan, while also strongly affirming Satsumacontrol over the kingdom as a means ofcontrolling the Western powers’ advances. Inthis way, the new policy provided the powerswith more detailed – but stil l far fromunambiguous – information about the Ryukyus

and their relations with China, Satsuma, andthe bakufu. Therefore, although in the 1860sthe bakufu had no intention of incorporatingthe kingdom, it had in effect created adiplomatic environment that would proveadvantageous to Meiji Japan when it eventuallydecided to annex the kingdom.15

Based on the foregoing analysis, i t isreasonable to dismiss the Ryukyuan treaties asirrelevant and problematic in terms of Japan’sinternational relations. However, because theyremained in place, any encroachment on theislands would potentially involve the Ryukyus’treaty partners. In the sections that follow, Idemonstrate that the discussions between theJapanese Foreign Minister, Soejima Taneomi,and the Western ministers based in Tokyo overJapan’s “alleged” annexation of the kingdom inlate 1872 illustrate the intentions – andinvolvement – of all parties in ways that are notimmediately apparent. By examining thesenegotiations and their outcomes in detail, Itease out Japan’s skillful responses to thepowers’ demands in determining the status ofthe Ryukyus.16

The debate over the political status of the

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Ryukyus within the Meiji government

Japan’s encounter with the Western imperialistpowers generated constant anxiety about thenation’s security. The Meiji leaders fullyunderstood that the “unequal treaties,” whichhad been signed by the Tokugawa bakufu in the1850s, had placed Japan in a subordinateposition with respect to the Western powersand, because of this, their revision was to begiven top priority.D While the main object of theIwakura Mission of 1871-73 was the revision ofthe treaties, the Meiji officials who visited theUS and Europe clearly understood from theinf lexible att i tudes of their Westerncounterparts that it would require a longprocess of radical reform to achieve their goal.The other pressing issue, as I noted at theoutset, was the need for Meiji Japan toestablish well-defined national borders.

A l though the Mei j i government hadprovisionally assigned control of the Ryukyus tothe newly established Kagoshima prefecture(1871), in the spring of 1872, when the IwakuraMission was abroad, Meiji leaders began todiscuss the Ryukyu Kingdom’s political statusin earnest. From their discussions, three mainproposals emerged.

First, the deputy minister of the Ministry ofFinance, Inoue Kaoru, proposed that Japanabolish the dual subordination system and, inorder to enhance the prestige of the MeijiEmperor, bring the Ryukyu Kingdom underexclusive Japanese rule.18

Japan’s Foreign Minister, Soejima Taneomi,who also sought to bring the Ryukyus underJapan’s exclusive rule, proposed that, as a firststep, the Ryukyuan king, Shō Tai, shouldreceive his investiture from the Meiji emperor.Soejima also suggested appointing Shō Tai asking of a newly established Ryūkyū Domain andterminating all “private intercourse” (shikō)between the Ryukyu Kingdom and foreigncountries.19

The third proposal came from the members ofthe sain, or Ministry of the Left, who submitteda detailed, nine-point plan that argued thatJapan should maintain the status quo bydeclaring publicly that the Ryukyu Kingdomwas subordinate to both China and Japan.20

In the event, the Meiji leaders adoptedSoejima’s proposal and the Ryukyu Kingdomwas required to dispatch an embassy to Tokyo.

At around the same time (early summer 1872),news of what became known as the TaiwanIncident reached the Meiji government. In1871, a group of fishermen from the Ryukyus’Miyako Island were shipwrecked on an isolatedpart of the Taiwanese coast; 54 of the 69survivors were killed by indigenous peopleknown as the Botan. For Japan’s leaders, theincident underlined the need to resolve theRyukyus’ ambiguous political status andincorporate the kingdom into the new Meijistate.21

On October 16, 1872, when the Ryukyuanembassy arrived in Tokyo, the Meiji emperorformally appointed the king of the Ryukyus,Shō Tai, as king of the Ryūkyū Domain – a movethat seemed intended to replicate the Chineseemperor’s investiture of the Ryukyuan royalline. Despite this installation having noprecedent in relations between Japan and theRyukyus, the Meiji leaders used it to establish aclear hierarchical relationship between theJapanese emperor and the Ryukyuan king.22

This was the first political measure taken bythe Meiji leaders to bring the Ryukyu Kingdominto a closer relationship with their centralgovernment administration. It is important tokeep in mind, however, that at the time theseevents were taking place, king Shō Tai was inOkinawa and was unaware that the Meijigovernment had conferred this new title on himthrough his ambassadors (the significance ofthis is made clear below).

For some Japanese officials, the emperor’sinvestiture of the Ryukyuan king meant that the

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kingdom’s international treaties were now nulland void. For example, on the same day thatShō Tai was appointed king of the RyūkyūDomain, Kabayama Sukenori, a major generalin the Imperial Japanese Army hailing from theformer domain of Satsuma, recorded in hisdiary that Shō Tai’s new role meant that theRyukyus’ treaties with the Western powers hadbeen effectively rescinded.23 Thus, just as theTokugawa bakufu had not regarded theRyukyus’ foreign treaties as an impediment toits control of the kingdom, Kabayama did notforesee further involvement of the Westernpowers in Ryukyuan matters now that, as hethought, the treaties had been abolished.

Shortly after the investiture, on October 30,1872, the Meiji government replaced theresident magistrate appointed by Satsuma witha branch office of the Foreign Ministry tooversee the Ryukyus’ diplomatic relations withthe powers.

Aware of the diplomatic sensitivities involved,the Meiji leaders decided against informing theQing of Shō Tai’s new appointment, allowingthe Ryukyus to continue tributary relationswith China. However, during the Ryukyuanembassy’s stay in Tokyo, the Meiji governmentin formed the Amer ican and Frenchrepresentatives, albeit informally, that Japanwould henceforth assume responsibility for theRyukyus – a clear indication of Japan’s newstance toward the kingdom.

De Long’s request to the Meiji government

In the pre-telegraph age – as was the case inEast Asia in the 1870s – the actions anddecisions of diplomats stationed abroad oftenhad an immense influence on the diplomacy oftheir governments. As we will see, it was a timewhen the exchange of notes between diplomatscould change the status of territory regardlessof the reality on the ground.

When Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomirevealed his plans for the Ryukyus to theAmerican minister in Tokyo, Charles E. DeLong, the status of the treaty that the kingdomhad signed with the US in 1854 emerged as aquestion of major importance.24 After Soejimaprivately informed De Long of Japan’sannexation of the Ryukyus (as a result of ShōTai’s appointment as king of the RyūkyūDomain), on October 20, 1872, the Americanminister wrote to Soejima seeking clarificationof the status of the 1854 agreement:

Understanding you advised me a few dayssince that the King of the Lew ChewIslands had been called upon by theJapanese Government to resign his titlesand estates to it, which had been done,letters patent of nobility issued to himconstituting him a member of the nobilityof your Empire ranking [him] as to theformer daimios, thus incorporating LewChew as an integral portion of theJapanese Empire; I feel called upon to callyour attention to a Compact entered intobetween the former Kingdom of Lew Chewand the United States of America, on the11th of July 1854 … and to ask if the samewill be observed in all its provisions byYour Government within the territoriallimits of the former Kingdom.25

It is clear from this letter that De Longunderstood (from Soejima’s words) that Shō Taihad resigned his “titles and estates” to theMeiji government and that the Ryukyus hadbeen incorporated into Japan.26 This is animportant point because, according to Japanesesources, at that time (1872) Meiji leaders hadnot yet made clear their intention “to annex”the Ryukyus.27 As soon as he learned of thekingdom’s new status, De Long soughtassurances that the change of status would notnegatively affect the US and its treaty.

De Long’s exchange with Soejima in 1872 haslong been known to scholarship; previous

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studies have used it to demonstrate the closerelationship between the two men.28 However,earlier studies have failed to consider why, ofall the questions he might have put, De Longasked the Japanese government if it would takeresponsibility for the 1854 treaty.

De Long’s reasoning is clarified in a letter hesent to the US Secretary of State, HamiltonFish, in which he explained Shō Tai’s newappointment and the consequent formalincorporation of the Ryukyus into Japan. DeLong wrote that the king “had accepted” hisnew title and the kingdom’s incorporation. Aswe have seen, however, Shō Tai did not knowwhat was happening in Tokyo at that time.Most likely De Long’s understanding was basedon what Soejima had told him. Next, De Longnoted that the Ryukyus–US Compact, whichhad been “proclaimed” by American PresidentFranklin Pierce in 1855, “gave to our peoplecertain privileges not embodied in our treatywith Japan” and that because of this he hadrequested, and obtained, an undertaking fromthe Japanese Foreign Minister to respect andobserve its contents.29

Thus, De Long was unconcerned by theRyukyus’ new status so long as Americanscould continue to enjoy freedom of trade andmovement in the islands – a right they did nothave in Japan at that time.30

In his letter to Fish, De Long also noted thatthe Ta iwan Inc ident gave the US an“opportunity” (with the assistance of theformer American Consul in Amoi, General C. LeGendre) to “put our legation at Peking andyourself [Fish] in such rapport with the viewsand intentions of this government [Japan] as tobe of substantial benefit to us and at the sametime advance my standing and intimacy withthis government [Japan].”31 Because De Longwas seeking to ingratiate himself with theJapanese government and be seen to cooperatewith them, it seems he had no interest inverifying the accuracy of Soejima’s claims

about the new status of the Ryukyus.

In response, Fish approved De Long’s requestto take measures to ensure that the Japanesegovernment would observe the Ryukyus–USCompact.32 Fish wrote that “it is supposed thatthe absorption or incorporation of one state byanother does not discharge or release, withinthe limits of the absorbed or incorporatedstate, the obligation which it may be under to athird power at the time of such absorption orincorporation.”33 It is thus clear that in theAmericans’ interpretation, Japan’s annexationof the Ryukyus was that it was a fait accompli –a precondition for future discussion with Japanas to whether it would respect the 1854 treaty.

Fish’s phrase, “it is supposed,” is of particularin teres t . In h i s v iew, fo l lowing theincorporation of one state into another, theannexed state’s former obligations included ininternational treaties would not be rescinded. Athorough investigation of the position ofinternational law on this question at that timewould require a separate article. Here,however, it is sufficient to consider the pointthat precisely because De Long informed Fishthat Japan had already assured him that itwould uphold American privileges in theRyukyus, Fish promptly approved thisarrangement, which he “supposed” was inaccordance with international law.34

The French government is informed of theRyukyus’ annexation to Japan

The French Minister in Tokyo, Paul Louis deTurenne, also played an important role inevents as they unfolded in late 1872.35 OnOctober 16, 1872 (the same day Shō Tai wasappointed king of the Ryūkyū Domain),Turenne wrote to his government informing itthat some days previously, Soejima had toldhim of Japan’s intention to claim the Ryukyus,and that this decision was closely connected tothe Taiwan Incident. Turenne informed Paris

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that he understood the reasoning behindSoejima’s plan, since the US and Prussia, whichlacked bases in East Asia, might have aninterest in the islands. Turenne had respondedby telling Soejima that he hoped he wouldsucceed in his intentions. Turenne alsoreported that he had asked Soejima whether heexpected Chinese opposition to Japan’s plansfor the Ryukyus, as Beijing had exercised itsown rights over the archipelago for threecenturies. According to Turenne, Soejimareplied that he was planning to propose “acompromise” to the Ryukyuan ambassador:Japanese assistance and abolition of thetraditional annual tribute to Satsuma inexchange for the ambassador’s commitment toreject Chinese “interference” in the kingdom’saffairs. Once this deal was accepted, and if theRyukyuan “prince” (Soejima was likelyreferring to the king) was willing to renouncehis “essential attributes of sovereignty” (auxattributs essentiels de la souveraineté), Soejimaplanned to have the kingdom redesignated as ahan (domain) and to appoint the Ryukyuan kingas a member of the Japanese court. Turenneargued that Soejima’s plan deserved seriousconsideration by the French governmentbecause, although he thought it unlikely thatthe two countries would go to war over theissue, it was likely to destabilize Japan–Chinarelations once China learned of it.36

Turenne’s report to his government revealsthat, before Shō Tai was appointed king of theRyūkyū Domain on October 16, 1872, Soejimahad already obtained Turenne’s tacit approvalfor Japan’s intention to annex the kingdom andtransform it into a Japanese domain. AlthoughSoejima told Turenne that he was planning toof fer a compromise to the Ryukyuanambassador, there is no evidence that any suchoffer was ever extended from the Meiji leadersto the Ryukyuan envoys.

A few days later, on October 29, Turenne againwrote to Paris with the news that Soejima hadinformed him that the Ryukyuan ambassador

had accepted his offer of compromise and, as aresult, “apart from the possibility of Chineseinterference in this matter,” the territory’sincorporation into Japan “can be considered asaccomplished.”37

Although France had earlier signed a treatywith the Ryukyus which was never ratified,Turenne did not refer to this in the letter. Forhim, the Ryukyu Kingdom was dependent onboth China and Japan; he also saw it as thepossible target of American and Germanimperialism, as well as a complicating factor inChina–Japan relations. Like De Long, Turennealso accepted Soejima’s statements withoutverifying them (as we have seen, since therewas no offer of compromise on the table, theambassador could not have accepted what didnot exist). Turenne did not seek clarification orverification when Soejima told him that theambassador had accepted the offer withoutspecifying whether the king had indeedrenounced his “essential attributes ofsovereignty.”

Thus, French diplomatic sources reveal that inlate 1872 Soejima was already talking aboutthe Ryukyus’ annexation to Japan to a seniorFrench official.

At this point, some clarification is in order.Since France had decided not to ratify thetreaty it had made with the Ryukyus, it isunderstandable that Turenne did not raise thetreaty as an issue during his meetings withSoejima. As we have seen, rather than seeingthe Ryukyus as an independent kingdom,Turenne maintained the view that the islandswere subordinate to both China and Japan.However, it is important to appreciate that,based on the surviving sources, neither theRyukyuan, Meiji, nor Qing governments evermade an issue of this lack of ratification. In1862, a French mission had gone to theRyukyus and ascertained that the treaty Francehad signed with the kingdom in 1855 was stillbeing observed by the Ryukyuan authorities.

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Thus, from the Ryukyus’ perspective, the treatywith France remained in force. However, whenin 1867 the French government (afterconsulting Holland about the status of its treatywith the Ryukyus) decided not to ratify thetreaty, it did not notify the Ryukyu Kingdom ofits decision to drop the Ryukyuan-FrenchTreaty from its list of formal treaties.38

Thus, in the eyes of the Ryukyuan, Japanese,a n d C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t s , t h eRyukyuan–French Treaty was a formal andbinding agreement and, as a result, theirrespective heads of state considered France’sinvolvement in Ryukyuan affairs to besignificant. In other words, far from being amere bystander, the French government wasanother actor involved, at least indirectly, inthe developing Ryukyuan story.

Soejima’s response to the Westerndiplomats’ inquiries

At this point, let us reconsider what we haveexamined so far from the Meiji government’sperspective. As we have seen, neither De Longnor Turenne sought further clarification aboutSoejima’s assertions and informed theirgovernments that the Ryukyuan king and hisambassador had accepted the Japanesegovernment’s offers, including the kingdom’sincorporation into Japan.

Returning to the negotiations between De Longand Soejima – as De Long’s inquiry showed, theAmericans had privileges in the Ryukyus andwere unwilling to renounce their treaty rights.De Long asked that the treaty be honored in allits provisions and sine die (indefinitely). But, atthe same time, by using the words “thusincorporating Lew Chew as an integral portionof the Japanese Empire,” he was effectivelyadmitting that the Ryukyus had been annexed.Thus, De Long’s decision not to question thekingdom’s incorporation and to consult Japanalone on the future of the US–Ryukyu Compact

was key to determining Soejima’s stance on theRyukyuan-American Treaty. This had a doublyfavorable outcome for Japan: It both offeredMeiji leaders a prudent solution to the problemof the pre-existing treaty (by implicitlysuggesting that Japan assume responsibility forit) and, more importantly, it assured theJapanese government that, so long as it upheldthe treaty in all its provisions, the US would notobstruct Japanese encroachment on theRyukyus.

Mindful of De Long’s interests, Soejima did notargue that the Ryukyus’ treaties were invalid(or had been rescinded, as some Japaneseofficials believed), as this would have certainlytriggered American objections. As we haveseen, in the 1870s Japan was politicallysubordinate to the Western powers and wouldnot risk antagonizing the Americans on theRyukyuan issue. The best option for Japan wasto accede to the concessions demanded by DeLong. On November 5, 1872, Soejima wrote toDe Long: “The Lew Chew Islands have beendependencies of this empire for hundreds ofyears, and to them the title of Han [domain]was recently given.” Giving the Ryukyus thestatus of a domain was, according to Soejima,all that the Meiji government had done untilthat point. Then, using De Long’s own words,he went on: “As you [De Long] say, the LewChew being an integral portion of the JapaneseEmpire, it is natural that the provisions of acompact … wi l l be observed by th i sgovernment.” 3 9

Soejima showed his diplomatic skills by usingDe Long’s own words to demonstrate that hisAmerican colleague had already acknowledgedthe kingdom’s annexation; this being the case,Soejima felt able to grant major concessions tothe US government in return for its tacitapproval of Japan’s annexation of the Ryukyus.

In assessing these bilateral discussions, it isimportant to appreciate that, initially, De Longhad asked whether Japan would honor the

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Ryukyuan–American Treaty, an option thatMeiji Japan might have rejected at this stage(Kabayama, for example, was talking about“abrogation” of the treaties, not “upholding”them). Consequently, Soejima accepted DeLong’s suggestion that Japan take fullresponsibility for the treaty signed by theRyukyu Kingdom with the US. In this way, theMeiji leaders deftly sidelined one of thestrongest potential supporters of the kingdom’sautonomy, given that the American governmentalone had ratified its treaty with the Ryukyus.

Following De Long’s inquiry and Soejima’sresponse, the US and Japanese governmentsreached an important, albeit informal,consensus. On December 21, 1872, MoriArinori, the representative of the Meijigovernment in Washington, D.C., wrote toSoejima informing the Japanese governmentthat during a “private conversation” with Fish,the secretary of state had assured him that “sol o n g a s J a p a n u p h o l d s t h e[Ryukyuan–American] Treaty in all itsprovisions and does not make any changes to it,[the US government] will not raise anyobjections at all.”40

Thus, through an informal understandingbetween the two governments, the Meijigovernment obtained tacit approval from theUS for the continuation of the Ryukyuan-American Treaty and, more importantly, ofJapan’s annexation of the Ryukyus.

From that time, the Meiji government – which,as we have seen, gave little weight to Franceand Holland’s decision not to ratify theirrespective Ryukyuan treaties – handled thekingdom’s treaties with kid gloves, even to theextent of making no mention of theseagreements during negotiations with Franceand Holland.41 In other words, Japan left bothcountries to make the first move in anydiscussion of the treaties, although the issuewas never raised by either party. Japan onlydiscussed the Ryukyuan treaties when other

nations raised the matter first, as happenedwith the US.

In March 1873, with the clear intention ofproving that Japan was in charge of Ryukyuandiplomacy, the Meiji government ordered theRyukyus to hand over the original documentson which the three treaties were based.Although Ryukyuan officials firmly opposed thedirective, the documents were seized in May1874 and the Meiji leaders then returned to theRyūkyū Domain a copy of the originaldocuments. At that point, the Ryukyuanofficials implored the Meiji leaders not tochange the content of their treaties duringnegotiations with the powers.42

A number of other powers were also focusingtheir attention on the Ryukyuan treaties. OnAugust 27, 1873, at the very time when theforeign ministers in Tokyo were pressing Japanto open up the interior of the country toforeigners, the Italian Acting Minister, ConteBalzarino Litta, and the German Minister,Maximilian A. S. Von Brandt, each sent verysimi lar requests to Soej ima. Havingacknowledged that the Ryukyus were now anintegral part of Japan (even though the islandswould not be formally incorporated for sixyears), they asked the Meiji government tosubmit notes granting Italian and Germanvessels and citizens the same rights andprivileges included in the former Ryukyuantreaties and extended to the US, France, andHolland. It is interesting to observe that bothdiplomats considered that, temporarily at least,the simple exchange of notes was sufficient forthe granting of these concessions. Thealternative, they noted, was for the Meijigovernment to sign a new treaty that wouldmeet their requests, if that was its preferredoption.43

Thus , whi le the I ta l ian and Germanrepresentatives sought major concessions (theupholding of the Ryukyuan treaties in all theirprovisions and indefinitely, even though neither

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Italy nor Germany had had formal relationswith the Ryukyus), by offering to settle theissue through the exchange of notes they alsomade it clear that they had no intention toundermine the Japanese government; in fact, asimple exchange of letters would avoidinvoking the MFN clause enjoyed by all ofJapan’s treaty partners.

On September 19, 1873, Soejima replied thathe would handle the matter as outlined in theirproposal and would inform the Ryūkyū Domainof the new arrangements.44 In this way, inreturn for Italy and Germany’s tacit approval,the Meiji government granted them the sameprivileges enjoyed by the US, France, andHolland in the Ryukyus.

Once the Western powers (the US and Franceand, after 1873, Italy and Germany) hadaccepted that Japan had formal responsibilityfor the Ryukyus, Japan had only to convince theChinese government and, to a lesser extent, theRyukyuan authorities, who now foundthemselves stripped of their former (albeit“theatrical”) diplomatic status.

The Western diplomats in Japan were therepresentatives of imperialist states that werenaturally focused on their own interests andprivileges. Certainly, they did not feel anymoral or other kind of obligation to advocatefor Ryukyuan sovereignty or autonomy. Rather,they perceived the kingdom as a minor actor inthe East Asian arena, having nothing of greatvalue to offer their ambitions. However, thefact that a number of Western diplomats hadaccepted the Japanese annexation so swiftlywas advantageous for the still politically weakJapan, whose attitude toward the imperialistpowers veered between suspicion andadmiration. At the same time, the diplomats’acceptance of Japan’s actions put the Ryukyuanauthorities into a difficult spot. They wereunaware that the treaties had been supersededby Japan with Western blessing, and theywanted to maintain their former arrangements

with China and Japan. In addition, the Chinesegovernment knew nothing about the informalunderstanding reached by Soejima with ahandful of Western diplomats. It was in thiscontext that when in 1873 a group of Ryukyuanofficials in Tokyo sought guarantees of theirkingdom’s future from Soejima (who had justreturned from China for the ratification of the1871 Sino-Japanese Treaty), the Japaneseforeign minister told them that the Ryukyuanpolity and government would remain“unchanged through eternity” (kokutai seitaieikyū ai kawarazu).45

Significantly, Western documents revealinformation about the annexation that is notfound in Japanese sources. In private meetings,Soejima sought to justify the Japaneseincorporation of the Ryukyus by assuring DeLong and Turenne that the Ryukyuans – theRyukyuan king and his ambassador – hadaccepted annexation, despite the fact that thiswas not the case. In other words, during thebuild-up to formal annexation, Soejima wascareful to ensure that both the US and France(powers that had signed treaties with theRyukyus) would not raise any objections toJapan’s plans.

Britain had its own intelligence sources on thematter. On October 22, 1872, the British ActingMinster in Tokyo, R. G. Watson, informed hisgovernment of the arrival of the Ryukyuanembassy in the Japanese capital, noting thatthe Meiji government “it seems has takenadvantage of the visit of this mission to takeLoochoo entirely under its protection, and toincorporate it with the Japanese Empire” as a“Han.”46 It seems that Watson did not receivethis information directly from Soejima, as DeLong and Turenne had done. Apparently,Soejima selected the diplomats to whom hedisclosed Japan’s plans for the Ryukyus.47

The legacy of De Long’s inquiry and

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Soejima’s response

In May 1874 Meiji Japan invaded Taiwan torevenge the 1871 massacre of a group ofshipwrecked Ryukyuan fishermen.48 Although,following protracted negotiations betweenChina and Japan, the two countries signed anagreement on October 31, 1874, they failed toagree on the status of the Ryukyus.

A year later, in early 1875, what was to be thelast Ryukyuan tributary embassy arrived inBeijing. The Taiwan Expedition and the arrivalof this mission in China showed that theRyukyus had not in fact been incorporated toJapan, as previously declared in the Americanand French dispatches.

At this point, the Japanese Acting Minister inBeijing, Tei Einei, informed his Americancolleague, Minister B. P. Avery, that the Meijigovernment had decided to assert “thecomplete jurisdiction of Japan over the islands.”On May 30, 1875, Avery informed the USSecretary of State, H. Fish, of thesedevelopments. 4 9

On July 29, 1875, Fish wrote to John Bingham,who had replaced De Long in Tokyo two yearsearlier, reminding him that “A compact wasconcluded between the United states and theRoyal Government of the Lewchew … grantingcertain privileges to American citizens andvessels going to the Lew Chew islands.” Fishwas citing the very words used by De Long in1872; now, he instructed Bingham to “examinethe quest ion, and in the event of anyconsolidation of those islands by Japan, see to itthat our compact be preserved, unless it shouldbe found more advantageous … to apply thetreaty with Japan.”50

These exchanges show that, mindful of the1872 developments, Fish focused on Americanprivileges that must be “preserved” or evenincreased in the event that the treaty withJapan proved more advantageous to theAmericans in the Ryukyus.

Following Fish’s instructions, on April 4, 1876Bingham wrote to the Japanese ForeignMinister, Terashima Munenori: “I make theseinquiries because it is the wish of myGovernment to know whether anything hasbeen done in the premises which in anywisecontravenes, limits, or changes the subsistingcompact between my Government and that ofthe Lew Chew Islands.”51 Again we see apersistent concern that Japan preserve UStreaty rights in the territory of the RyukyuKingdom.52

On May 31, 1876, Terashima (who had askedabout, and consequently been informed by theMeiji government about Soejima’s 1872response to De Long53) replied to Bingham,writing that “this government [Japan] has notat any time interfered with the rights of theUnited States as secured by its subsistingcompact with the Lew Chew and before takingsuch action this Government will confer withthe Government of the United States.”54

We can observe a nuanced shift in the Japanesestrategy around the Ryukyuan–AmericanTreaty. Whereas in 1872 Soejima had promisedDe Long to uphold the treaty in its entirety andindefinitely, in 1876, Terashima informedBingham that Japan had been maintainingAmerican privileges in the Ryukyus. Although,in the near future, Japan was planning to makesome changes to the arrangement, he assuredhis American colleague that “before takingsuch action,” the Meiji government wouldinform the US government.

After receiving Terashima’s reply, the USgovernment did not make further inquiries onthe matter and, for a second time, theRyukyuan issue was settled through anexchange of notes between the JapaneseForeign Minister and the American Minister inTokyo.

The Ryukyus’ request for help from the US

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and France in 1878

As part of their attempt to preserve thekingdom, the Ryukyuan authorities called onthe US, France, and Britain (whose diplomatsalso represented the Dutch government inTokyo) for help. While the events of 1878-79require a detailed and thorough analysis, inwhat follows I set out only the major points forreasons of space.55

In August 1878, the American minister JohnBingham met a group of senior Ryukyuanoff ic ia ls in Tokyo, who urged the USgovernment to prevent the annexation of theirkingdom to Japan. In drafting their petitions,these officials received a good deal of supportand guidance from the Chinese legation.

The petitioners set out in detail the five-centuryhistory of tributary relations between Chinaand the Ryukyus; they explained that the US,France, and Holland had concluded treatieswith the Ryukyus, specifying that theagreements were to be written in Chinese anddated according to the Chinese calendar. “As toour intercourse with Japan” before 1868, thepetitioners merely stated that “it was formerlywith the dependency of Satsuma.” Next, theydetailed the “compulsory orders” issued by theMeiji government from 1872 onward, which,among other things, specified that “allbusiness” in the islands “should be transactedwith the Department of Foreign Affairs.” Theypointed out that “in your petitioners’ humbleopinion though our kingdom be but a smallnationality, nevertheless, it is a nationality.” Onthe treaties, they argued that if the Ryukyushad been prohibited from enjoying the sametributary relations with China, since “thetreaties into which we have entered” werewritten in Chinese and dated according to theChinese calendar, they “will be like so muchwastepaper.” Finally, they pointed out that as“the United States recognized and treated Lewchew as a distinct nationality and permitted usto enter into treaty relations, … we turn to the

United States, in the hope that they may adviseand induce Japan to leave Lew Chew to remainas it has been hitherto.”56

In sum, the approach taken by the petitionerswas to seek Western support based on theRyukyus’ existing treaty relations and to paperover their former relations with Satsuma andthe bakufu.57 (The petitions handed to theFrench and British legations were very similarin content.)

In response, Bingham informed his governmentthat Japan’s demands on the Ryukyus infringedthe Ryukyus–US Treaty and, more importantly,that “It seems to me that this Government[Japan] is too late in asserting supremeauthority over those islands after allowing themperfect freedom for five centuries, andmanifestly assenting to the action [the signingof the Ryukyu-US Treaty] taken by Lew Chewwith our own Government in 1854.”58

Bingham’s response is significant because ofthe chain of logic that it demonstrated: basedon his own interpretation of international law, asenior Western diplomat had concluded that –because Japan had allowed the Ryukyus tocontinue their relations with China and sign atreaty with the US – there was a good case forthe Ryukyus to be seen as independent ofJapan. Bingham saw the infringement of theRyukyuan-American Treaty as a possible reasonfor American involvement in the issue.Bingham’s criticism of Japan is especiallysignificant when we consider that, in contrastto most Western diplomats, he had displayed anempathy and sensitivity toward Japan duringhis long tenure in Tokyo (1873-1885) and madeserious efforts to revise the many “unequaltreaties” that Japan had concluded with theWest.59

We cannot dismiss the fact, however, thatBingham based his opinions on the Ryukyuanpetition, which failed to mention Satsuma’s defacto control of the Ryukyus.

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In late 1878, the American assistant secretaryof state, F. W. Seward, replied to Bingham:“According to the information in the possessionof the Department the independence of the LewChew Islands is a matter of dispute solelybetween the government of China and the LewChew Islands on one side and the governmentof Japan on the other, and is a question inwhich this government cannot interfere unlessits rights under Treaty stipulations with any ofthe powers concerned in the controversyappear to be endangered.” Seward alsoreminded Bingham that “This declaration (thepreviously mentioned Terashima’s reply toBingham of May 31, 1876) of the Minister ofForeign Affairs does not appear to beinconsistent either with the stipulation of theinstrument above referred to or with anyinformation hitherto communicated to thisDepartment.”6 0 In other words, the USgovernment saw no reasons to intervene in thematter because Japan had been continuing tohonor the Ryukyus–US Treaty.

The Ryukyuan officials fared no better withFrance. In late 1878, while the Chineselegation in Japan was pressing the Tokyo-basedFrench minister Louis de Geoffrey (who hadarrived in Japan a year earlier) to meet theRyukyuan envoys, Geoffrey wrote to hisgovernment that he was trying to avoidmeeting the Ryukyuan officials and, moreimportantly, that France had “no directinterest” in supporting Chinese (and Ryukyuan)claims, even if they were supported by the“law” (or even if they were simply “just”). Healso argued that if France had to choosebetween China and Japan on the issue, it woulddo better to support Japan, through which “wehave more to gain in moral and material[terms].”61

In the end, the Chinese legation succeeded inarranging an appointment between theRyukyuan envoys and Geoffrey; however, theminister did not change his mind after meetingwith the Ryukyuan officials and reading their

petition.

At the time, French sympathies were warmertowards Japan than China, as France’s relationswith China were becoming increasinglycomplicated and strained over the Tonkinquestion concerning the status of northernVietnam on China’s border. However, it is alsoimportant to note that Geoffrey refused tosupport the Ryukyus, not because France hadnot yet ratified its treaty with the tiny kingdom,but because he did not foresee any directinterest in championing its cause.62

In early 1879, after a summary of the Ryukyuanofficials’ petitions had been published in theNichi Nichi newspaper, the British minister inJapan, Harry Parkes, questioned ForeignMinister Terashima Munenori about Japan’splans in the Ryukyus. When Parkes insistedthat it was commonly understood that theRyukyus had been paying tribute to China (inaddition to Japan), Terashima argued that thedistinction between “tribute” and “taxes”proved that the Ryukyus had not beensubordinate to the Qing, but only to Satsuma,which had been collecting taxes from thekingdom.63 This distinction became a crucialargument in Japan’s claims on the Ryukyus asEast Asia subscribed increasingly to Western-based international law.

Towards bilateral negotiations

As we have seen, the Meiji government did notrescind the Ryukyuan treaties; instead, Soejimaand Terashima promised the powers that theirprivileges in the Ryukyus would continue. Theirpromises to the US government bore fruit atthe precise moment when the Ryukyuanauthorities were seeking American help.

On the other hand, from late 1878, Qingofficials were at pains to point out to Japan andWestern diplomats alike that the RyukyuKingdom had concluded international treaties

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on its own behalf. The Chinese claims weremainly based on the fact that the kingdom hadbeen a tributary of China for centuries, that theRyukyus had signed these foreign treaties as anindependent state, and that annexation wouldbe in violation of the 1871 Sino-JapaneseTreaty.64

After the Qing court began issuing stronglyworded protests through its Tokyo-baseddiplomats opposing Japan’s action in theislands and Ryukyuan officials petitionedforeign diplomats, the Meiji governmentdecided to proceed with formal annexation toavoid the Ryukyuan issue escalating into aninternational dispute.

Shortly after the establishment of Okinawaprefecture in April 1879, Meiji constitutionalexpert Inoue Kowashi handed the Japanesegovernment an important memorandumdiscussing potential friction between Japan andChina over the new prefecture.65 Inoue, whodrafted most of Japan’s diplomatic documentsin the 1870s and 80s, told his government thatthe three treaties which the Ryukyu Kingdomhad signed in the 1850s would likely become amajor sticking point for Japan.66

In the memorandum (dated July 3, 1879), Inouepointed out that if the Qing were to claim thatthe Ryukyus were a semi-independent state,the Meiji government would find it very difficultto counter this argument. Inoue pointed tonumerous examples in the West where, when apowerful state tried to annex a small countrywhich was unable to defend itself, other powersjoined together to oppose the incorporation.Inoue feared that the Qing might join with thepowers and apply this strategy to the Ryukyus;in such a case, Japan would need to work veryhard to counter this kind of argument.

Next, Inoue pointed out that the fact that theRyukyus had signed treaties with the US,France, and Holland in the 1850s was “amatter of the greatest difficulty” (ichi nokon’nan naru j i jō) . Because this was

tantamount to the bakufu leaders tacitlyapproving these agreements, the Meijigovernment would be at great pains to defendits position; moreover, these treaties were validinstruments. Dated according to the Chinesecalendar, they were written in Western andChinese languages, and were formally treatiesof amity. Although the Ryukyus had been aJapanese dependency of Satsuma, in theirexternal relations they had seemed to functionas an independent state, thus giving theChinese plenty of ammunition for their claims.

Next, after retracing the exchange of notesbetween Soejima and Terashima with theirAmerican counterparts, and noting that Japanhad never made arrangements with France andHolland about the treaties, Inoue pointed outthat when the Japanese foreign ministers hadadvised the American diplomats that Japanwould continue to uphold the Ryukyuan-American treaty, this implied that the Meijigovernment had admitted that the Ryukyuantreaties were valid instruments. It also provedthat the Meiji leaders had recognized that, inthe past, the Ryukyus had the “right” (kenri) tosign treaties. Given these realities, Inoueforesaw major obstacles for the Meijigovernment as it sought to support its claimsthrough the lens of international law.67

Inoue warned that what Smits has called theRyukyus’ “theatrical state and diplomacy,” aswell as the Meiji government’s decision touphold the Ryukyuan-American Treaty, mightturn out to be detrimental to Japan’s claimswhen p laced under the spot l ight o finternational law. It is important to note,however, that whi le Inoue urged hisgovernment to prepare counter-arguments tothe Chinese claims, he also appreciated thatthe treaties would become a problem for Japani f the Ryukyuan quest ion became aninternational issue – that is, if the Westernpowers became involved (a possibility that, forvarious reasons, failed to eventuate).68

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At the very time Inoue was presenting hismemorandum, a number of key diplomatsinformed their goverments about the Ryukyuanissue. On August 1, 1879, the day that Parkessent the Ryukyuan petition to the Britishgovernment, he wrote that “a difference of agrave character has arisen between theGovernments of China and Japan” over Japan’sactions in the islands. He stated that, while theRyukyuan people had been paying tribute toboth countries, “they have at the same timeformed a separate nationality and have enjoyedtheir own autonomy.”69 Then, when on August29 Bingham sent the American governmenttranslations of the original documents that theMeiji leaders had presented to the Chinesegovernment on July 16 concerning relationsbetween the Ryukyus and Japan up to 1868(including the surrender documents signed bythe Ryukyuan king and his officials in 1611), heobserved that “The paper does not in myopinion make a very strong case if indeed itmakes any case whatever for the action takenby Japan in 1872 and since.”70 When Parkessent the same translations to his government,he wrote “It seems to me that in claiming thatthey have exercised sovereign control overLoochoo for a long period…the JapaneseGovernment omit to explain why they permittedLoochoo to keep up direct official relations withChina…and to send every other year, withmarked regularity and considerable ceremony,Public Envoys with tribute to the Court ofPeking.”7 1 It seems that, in the monthsfollowing their reception, a number ofinfluential Western diplomats had beeninfluenced by the arguments of the Ryukyuanpetitioners.

As Inoue’s memorandum shows, the Meijileaders had already grasped the diplomaticsignificance of the Ryukyus’ treaties and theirpotential legal significance. However, since theRyukyu Kingdom had concluded severalinternational treaties, it lay with the Westernpowers to choose to minimize their importance;and it was only because of their tacit approval

that Meiji Japan was able to take a strongerstance toward China over the treaties.

In late 1879, after the Chinese reasserted theirclaim that the Ryukyu Kingdom was both atributary of China and an independent kingdom(citing its international treaties as evidence),the Meiji government strongly rebutted theirclaims.

The Meiji leaders continued to frame theannexation of the Ryukyus as simply a matterof domestic reorganization by the Japanesegovernment; among other arguments, theyasserted that the tribute China had receivedfrom the kingdom was merely nominal, and thatChina’s investiture of the Ryukyuan kings wasan empty title. On the other hand, by employinglegal notions of effective possession and rule,the Japanese leaders claimed that the Satsumadomain had exercised “substantial effects”upon Ryukyuan “laws, taxes, and internaladministration.”72

With regard to the treaties, the Meiji leadersasserted that the Qing had “absolutely norelation” with the Ryukyuan treaties and thatthe Western powers were the only “partiesconcerned” (tōjisha). They added that thepowers had not grasped the true relationsobtaining between Satsuma and the Ryukyus,and that during the pre-modern era, manyarrangements had been agreed (according tofeudal principles) that would be inconceivablein the present era of centralized government.And they had already assured the Westernnations involved that Japan would uphold thetreaties. Based on these arguments, the Meijileaders concluded that the treaties in no wayproved that the Ryukyus had not been an“internal dependency” (naizoku) of Japan.73

Even after the kingdom’s formal annexation,the Ryukyuan treaties were never formallyabolished74; in late summer 1879, the Meijigovernment considered assuring the Frenchgovernment that it would uphold the latter’streaty rights in the Ryukyus (an option that was

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later abandoned after the Meiji leaders realizedthat the Ryukyuan-French Compact was notlisted among France’s formal treaties).75

In 1880, following the advice proffered byformer US president Ulysses Grant, Japan andChina agreed to enter bilateral negotiationsaimed at settling the Ryukyuan issue. Japansought to exploit its established position in theRyukyus to put pressure on the Qing to grant itequal status with the Western powers in China.In the end, however, the two states were notable to find a compromise, and it was Japan’svictory in the First Sino-Japanese War of1894-95 that, among other factors, effectivelyresolved the Ryukyuan question in Japan’sfavor.

Conclusions

This study has set out to show that, as early asthe 1870s, Japanese diplomats wereincreasingly mastering the nuances of Western-style diplomatic maneuvering. The skill withwhich Soejima and Terashima handledinquiries and potential protests by Westerndiplomats bears witness to this point. Soejimapersuaded his Western counterparts that theRyukyuan king and his ambassador had freelyaccepted Japanese annexation, while, on theother hand, he promised the Ryukyuan envoysthat Japan would not change the kingdom’straditional polity and government.76 In hismemorandum, Inoue Kowashi showed a deepunderstanding of the theory of the balance ofpower and clearly appreciated that thebakufu’s tacit approval of the Ryukyuantreaties, as well as the Meiji government’spromise to honour the Ryukyuan-AmericanTreaty, could very well undermine Japan’sclaims. On the other hand, Chinese andRyukyuan officials showed their skill inleveraging Western concepts of soveregnty andnationality, which clearly had an impact in1878-79 on the Western d ip lomats ’understanding of the Ryukyuan issue. This

study has also demonstrated that Meiji Japanbenefitted massively from the responses of theWestern powers over the issue, which helpedpave the way for Japan to annex the Ryukyusfrom early in the process, and take a strongerstance toward China in the aftermath ofannexation.

This latter point is a crucial one, as theannexation of the archipelago was, along withthe incorporation of Hokkaido, one of the firstexpansionist expressions of the newly Japanesenation-state of the Meiji era. Placed in apolitically subordinate position and constantlyfearing Western intrusion, Japan understoodthe importance of granting concessions to theWestern powers in return for their tacitapproval of its encroachment on the Ryukyus.This cooperation was possible because, in the1870s, Japan and the powers had mutualinterests in the Ryukyus, namely Japan’s needof the powers’ tacit approval and the latters’willingness to preserve their privileges, andthey were able to satisfy their differentinterests through an informal exchange. On theother hand, the Meiji leaders felt emboldenedto strike an uncompromising stance towardtheir Asian neighbors which, from that pointon, would rapidly intensify. In fact, it was at thevery moment that Japan annexed the Ryukyusthat the Qing began to question its traditionalpolicy of non-interference toward Korea.Indeed, the annexation of the Ryukyus can beseen as the first expression of the diplomaticchallenges that Meiji Japan would face in thefuture. Looking back, the annexation providesan excellent lens through which to view theMeiji government’s early diplomacy towardEast Asia and the West.

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20, 2018.

Marco Tinello is an assistant professor of East Asian and Japanese history in the Faculty ofCross-Cultural and Japanese Studies at Kanagawa University. His research focuses on earlymodern and modern East Asian diplomacy. He is the author of Sekai-shi kara mita “Ryukyushobun” (Yōju Shorin, 2017), which was awarded the 16th Tokugawa Award/Special Award in2018, and several peer-reviewed articles in Japanese on Ryukyu diplomatic history. In 2015,he also received the 1st Professor Josef Kreiner Hosei University Award for InternationalStudies, and in 2016 the 38th Okinawa Bunka Kyōkai Prize (Higa Shunchō Award).

is an assistant professor of East Asian and Japanese history in the Faculty of Cross-Culturaland Japanese Studies at Kanagawa University. His research focuses on early modern andmodern East Asian diplomacy. He is the author of Sekai-shi kara mita “Ryukyu shobun” (YōjuShorin, 2017), which was awarded the 16th Tokugawa Award/Special Award in 2018, andseveral peer-reviewed articles in Japanese on Ryukyu diplomatic history. In 2015, he alsoreceived the 1st Professor Josef Kreiner Hosei University Award for International Studies, andin 2016 the 38th Okinawa Bunka Kyōkai Prize (Higa Shunchō Award).

marcotinello@hotmail.com

Notes1 This paper is a fully updated version of Marco Tinello, Sekai-shi kara mita “Ryūkyū shobun”,Yōju shorin, 2017. I deeply thank Professor Gregory Smits for his invaluable comments andsuggestions that allowed me to greatly improve the quality of the manuscript.2 Robert Eskildsen, Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia: the Taiwan Expedition andthe birth of Japanese Imperialism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Yamamoto Takahiro, Balance offavour: the emergence of territorial boundaries around Japan, 1861-1875, PhD Thesis, TheLondon School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2015.3 Considering that, when annexing the Ryukyus, the Meiji government’s chief priority waseliminating the archipelago’s traditional subordination to both China (from the 14th century)and Japan (from the 17th century), earlier studies have understandably viewed the annexationas an event in which the Ryukyus, Japan, and China were the main actors. See, for example,Kinjō Seitoku, Ryūkyū shobun ron, Okinawa taimususha, 1978; Araki Moriaki, Shin Okinawashiron, Okinawa taimususha, 1980; Gabe Masao, Meiji kokka to Okinawa, San’ichi shobō,1979; Rosa Caroli, Il Mito dell’Omogeneità Giapponese: Storia di Okinawa, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 1999; Nishizato Kikō, Shin-matsu Chū-Ryū-Nichi kankei-shi no kenkyū, Kyoto, Kyotodaigaku shuppankai, 2005; Umeki Tetsuto, Shin Ryūkyū koku no rekishi, Tokyo, Hōseidaigaku shuppankyoku, 2013; Namihira Tsuneo, Kindai Higashi Ajia no naka no Ryūkyūheigō: Chūka sekai chitsujo kara shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon he, Tokyo, Iwanami shoten,

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2014; Mizuno Norihito, “Early Meiji Policies Towards the Ryukyus and the TaiwaneseAboriginal Territories,” Modern Asian Studies 43, 2009, 683–739.4 Gregory Smits, “The Ryūkyū Shobun in East Asian and World History,” Josef Kreiner, ed.,Ryukyu in World History, Bonn, Bier’sche Verlagsanstalt, 2001.5 On this point see, Ozawa Yōsuke, “Gaimushō kankatsu-ki ni okeru tai Ryūkyūhan seisaku,”Hōsei shigaku, vol. 87, Hōsei daigaku shi gakkai (ed.), 2017.6 Recently, Okabe Toshikazu has argued that, by promising to take responsibility for theRyukyuan treaties, the Meiji government was able to obtain the Western powers’ support; inso doing, the treaties became a useful political tool that the Meiji leaders used to strengthentheir claims during their negotiations with China (Okabe Toshikazu, “Bei-Futsu-Ransankakoku jōyaku to ‘Ryūkyū shobun,’” Higashi Ajia Kindaishi, 23, 2019). Okabe, however,bases his analysis entirely on Japanese sources and does not discuss the relationship betweenthe powers and Japan during the 1870s, which is the focus of the present article.7 For a detailed study of the diplomatic capability of the Japanese leadership during the earlyMeiji era, see Marlene J. Mayo, “A Catechism of Western diplomacy: the Japanese andHamilton Fish, 1872,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 26 No 3 May 1967, 389-410.8 The status of the Ryukyus during the early modern era has been the subject of academicdiscussion for decades. A commonly – but not universally – accepted definition of thearchipelago among Japanese historians is a “foreign country within the Tokugawa baku-hansystem” (see, for example, Kamiya Nobuyuki, 1990). Smits has recently argued that, as aresult of the unconditional surrender of the territory to Japan in 1609, all the Ryukyu islandsbecame Shimazu territory (Gregory Smits, “Rethinking Earlier Ryukyuan History”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Vol. 17, Issue 7, April 2019). To add another element to thedebate, in the bakumatsu era, even when it began to assert its control over the islands, thebakufu always referred to the Ryukyus, in both internal and foreign communications, as asubordinate but foreign territory (Marco Tinello, “A New Interpretation of the Bakufu'sRefusal to Open the Ryukyus to Commodore Perry,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Japan Focus,Vol. 16, Issue 17, No. 3, 2018).9 “Tributary” in the context of premodern Chinese foreign relations did not ordinarily meanpolitical subordination. Although the topic is complex, “tributary” relations were mainlyeconomic in nature, albeit with ritual recognition of Chinese cultural superiority required as aprerequisite for de facto trade.10 Gregory Smits, Maritime Ryukyu, 1050-1650, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2018,251-252.11 On the relationship between the Ryukyus’ posture as an independent country and Ryukyuandiplomacy, see Watanabe Miki, “Inpei seisaku no tenkai to Ryū-Shin-Nichi kankei,” Ryūdaishigaku, vol. 20, 2018, 63-64.12 Before signing the Ryukyus-US Compact, on July 18, 1854, Commodore M. C. Perry wroteto the Secretary of the Navy that “Lew-Chew, it appears, is in a measure an independentsovereignty, holding only slight allegiance either to Japan or China” (Message of thePresident of the United States, transmitting a report of the Secretary of the Navy, incompliance with a resolution of the Senate of December 6, 1854, calling for correspondence,&c., relative to the naval expedition to Japan, by the United States Navy Department, TheLibrary of Congress, 1855, 168). I deeply thank Takeishi Kazumi, proprietor of Yōju shorin, forsending me this document.

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13 BGKM, vol. 15, Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Henshanjo (ed.), Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1972,599-600.14 See, for example, Hunter Miller (Ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the UnitedStates of America, Vol. 6, Publications of the Department of State no. 1719, United StatesGovernment Printing Office Washington, 1942, 755.15 Marco Tinello, “Senhappyakurokuju nendai ni okeru Tokugawa bakufu ni yoru Ryūkyū noichiduke: bakufu ga Igirisu seifu ni teishutsu shita 'hensho' to hokokusho wo chūshin ni,”Tōyō-shi kenkyū, 78, no.3 (2019), 96.16 Given a lack of documentary evidence, I have not covered the Dutch government’s attitudetoward Japan’s annexation of the Ryukyus. The Dutch minister in Edo, Jhr. F. P. van derHoeven, left Tokyo on October 1, 1872, immediately prior to the period (late 1872) examinedin this article. When in 1878 the Ryukyuan envoys asked their Western treaty partners (theUS, France, and Holland) for support, the Dutch government was then represented by theBritish minister in Tokyo, Harry Parkes. Since the Dutch perspective on the Ryukyuanquestion is very significant, I look forward to forthcoming publications that clarify this aspectof the annexation.17 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910,University of California Press, 1998, 1-28.18 Meiji bunka shiryō sōsho, vol. 4, gaikō hen, Meiji Bunka Shiryō Sōsho Kankōkai, Kazamashobō, 1959-1963, 819 Ibid., 9.20 Ryūkyū shozoku mondai kankei shiryō, Yokoyama Manabu seinin henshū, Honkoku shoseki,1980, dai 2 shū, dai 6, jō-chū, 7-9.21 Gregory Smits, 2001, 281 (cited in note 4).22 This point is investigated in detail in Namihira, 2014, 142 (cited in note 3).23 Kabayama Aisuke, Chichi, Kabayama Sukenori, Denki sōsho 44, Ōzorasha, 1988, 186.24 Soejima Taneomi’s foreign diplomacy is often described as “national rights diplomacy” as,during his short tenure (1871–73), he sought to protect and expand Meiji Japan’s nationalrights wherever he saw the opportunity. He also established close relations with a handful ofAmerican diplomats who were sympathetic toward his foreign policy stance. See, Eskildsen,2019, 75-76 (cited in note 2); Mori Toshihiko, “Soejima Taneomi no tai-Shin gaikō,” Hōgakuzasshi, 41-4, 1995, 485-519.25 FRUS, 1872, No. 244 (De Long to Fish, November 6, 1872), 553-555.26 Charles E. De Long is often characterized both as someone who lacked experience indiplomatic affairs and was vastly ambitious. For a detailed study on De Long in Japan see,Jack L. Hammersmith, Spoilsmen in a “flowery fairyland”: the development of the USLegation in Japan, 1859-1906, Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998, 80-10527 In their 1872 proposals, Inoue Kaoru and Soejima Taneomi suggested bringing the Ryukyusunder Japan’s exclusive subordination but did not explicitly mention the “annexation” of theRyukyus to Japan.28 Gabe Masao, 1979, 40. Also, it is important to observe that General C. Le Gendre wouldbegin his collaboration with Soejima immediately after De Long’s acknowledgement of theRyukyus’ incorporation. For a thorough investigation of the cooperation between Soejima andLe Gendre, see Eskildsen, 2019.

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29 FRUS, 1872, No. 244 (De Long to Fish, November 6, 1872), 553-555.30 For a detailed comparison of the Treaty of Kanagawa between the US and Japan (1854) andthe Ryukyuan-American Treaty (1854), see Uehara Kenzen, Kurobune raikō to Ryūkyū ōkoku,Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2020.31 FRUS, 1872, No. 244 (De Long to Fish, November 6, 1872), 553-555.32 For a detailed study of US relations with East Asia and Japan under Hamilton Fish, seeMarlene J. Mayo (cited in note 7).33 FRUS, 1872, No. 247 (Fish to De Long, December 18, 1872), 564.34 On this question, earlier studies argued that “Perhaps the correspondence of 1872 wasoverlooked.” (See, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Vol.6, 1942, 784, cited in note 14). Although my research in this subject is still at an early stage,it is worth noting that according to Henry Wheaton (in his, Elements of international law,Boston: Little, Brown, and company, 1866, Part III, Chap. II, section 275), treaties have anexpiration clause “in case either of the contracting parties loses its existence as anindependent State.” Thus, following international law, a different arrangement might havedeveloped from the one proposed by De Long. At the same time, however, we cannot dismissGregory Smits’ view (cited in note 8) that the Ryukyus had lost their independence as early as1609.35 For a thorough study of the French government’s relations with the Ryukyus from the early-modern period to the modern era, see Patrick Beillevaire, “Furansu seifu no tai-Ryūkyū kokuseisaku,” in Furansu ni okeru Ryūkyū kankei shiryō no hakkutsu tosono kisoteki kenkyū,Heisei 9 nendo ~ Heisei 11 nendo, Kagakukenkyūhi hojokinn kiban kenkyū (A) (2) Kenkyūhōkokusho, 2000.36 Correspondance Politique (hereafter CP), Japon, vol. 21 (Turenne to Remusat, October16,1872), 466-46937 Ibid., (Turenne to Remusat, October 29, 1872), 479-480.38 For an accurate account of the decision by France and Holland not to ratify their treatiessigned with the Ryukyus see, Yokoyama Yoshinori, “Nihon no kaikoku to Ryūkyū,” Kokka totaigai kankei: atarashii kinsei-shi 2, Shin jinbutsu ōraisha, 1996.39 FRUS, 1872, No. 244 (De Long to Fish, November 6, 1872), 553-554.40 Ryūkyū shozoku mondai kankei shiryō, dai 2 shū, dai 1 dai 2, 1258.41 On this observation, see Namihira, 2014, 309-310 (cited in note 3).42 Okabe, 2019,19-20 (cited in note 6).43 Ryūkyū shozoku mondai kankei shiryō, dai 2 shū, dai 6, jō-chū, 1259-60.44 Ibid., dai 2 shū, dai 6, jō-chū, 1261.45 Namihira, 2014, 227-228. (cited in note 3). On Soejima’s 1873 mission to China, see WayneC. McWilliams, “East Meets East: the Soejima Mission to China, 1873,” MonumentaNipponica, 30, 1975, 237-275.46 FO 46/156, Japan Correspondence (Watson to Hammond, October 22, 1872), 50-57.47 On November 16, 1872, the Japan Weekly Mail published an English translation of theImperial Decree addressed to Shō Tai (published in Daijōkan Nisshi on October 16), whichstated that “Ryukyu is now our southern border … We will confer on you a signal honor byraising you to be the king of the Ryukyu domain and appointing you a noble.” On 26November, sending his government a copy of this article, Turenne commented that the

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annexation of the Ryukyus could be considered “with good reason” by the Japanese to be “afait accompli.” CP, Japon, vol. 21 (Turenne to Remusat, November 26, 1872), 492-493. FromAmerican, French, and British sources, it seems that as early as October 1872 the Meijigovernment was already planning to annex the Ryukyus; however, this plan had been made inprivate and was known only to the Western diplomats in Tokyo. We can surmise that thereason for the lack of an official announcement was concern over managing objections by theRyukyuan and Qing officials.48 For a detailed study of the Taiwan Expedition, including the powers’ stance on the matter,see Eskildsen, 2019 (cited in note 2).49 FRUS, 1875, No. 158 (Avery to Fish, May 30, 1875), 331-332.50 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, Vol. 6, 1942, 784-785(cited in note 14).51 Ryūkyū shozoku mondai kankei shiryō, dai 2 shū, dai 1 dai 2, 1262-64.52 With regard to Japan’s annexation of the Bonin Islands in 1875-76, Yamamoto Takahiro haspointed out that “The United States and Britain, in turn, condoned Japanese rule while tryingto preserve their privileges of extraterritoriality,” Yamamoto, 2015, 190 (cited in note 2).53 On this point see, Okabe Toshikazu, 2019, 20 (cited in note 6).54 Ryūkyū shozoku mondai kankei shiryō, dai 2 shū, dai 1 dai 2, 1265-66.55 The British stance on the Ryukyuan question requires a thorough study, which I hope toundertake in a separate work.56 Diplomatic Despatches (N.A.M. 133), Japan, Vol. 38, No. 844 (Bingham to Evarts,September 2, 1878), 28-33.57 By contrast, between 1875 and 1876, the Ryukyuan authorities repeatedly appealed to theMeiji government by invoking Confucian notions of dual obligation to justify the maintenanceof their relations with China. The annexation turned out to be a long process, mainly as aresult of the Ryukyuan authorities’ resistance and, from late 1878, the strong protests madeby the Qing. It is important to observe, however, that resistance to annexation was restrictedalmost exclusively to the Ryukyuan authorities and never involved the Ryukyuan people as awhole. See Gregory Smits, “New Cultures, New Identities: Becoming Okinawan and Japanesein Nineteenth-Century Ryukyu,” in James Ketelaar, Yasunori Kojima, Peter Nosco (eds.)Values, Identity, and Equality in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Japan, Brill, 2015,159-178.58 Diplomatic Despatches (N.A.M. 133), Japan, Vol. 38, No. 844, (Bingham to Evarts,September 2, 1878), 24-28.59 Jack L. Hammersmith, 1998, 108 (cited in note 26).60 Diplomatic Instructions, 1801-1906, Japan, N. A. M 77, Roll 105 vol. 2 (2), 133 (131), 1878,No. 380, (F. W. Seward to Bingham, October 9, 1878), 455-458.61 CP, Japon, Vol. 26 (Geoffrey to Waddington, November 18, 1878), 362-384; 392-402. In hislong report, Geoffrey also mentioned that although the Ryukyus had been under the dualsubordination of China and Japan, they had maintained a level of independence, signedtreaties with foreign states and governed their people freely. He also referred to the 1872Japanese Imperial Decree that declared the annexation of the islands as a “Han.” Geoffreyadded that, around that time, the Japanese government had promised the US, Holland, andFrance that it would take over and uphold all the obligations defined in the Ryukyuan treaties.

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In this way, it seems that De Long’s and Soejima’s arrangement would also be extended to theother Ryukyu treaty partners. As we will see below, however, in 1879 Inoue Kowashi and theMeiji government observed that Japan had never mentioned the treaties in their negotiationswith France and Holland.62 Ibid., Geoffrey was fully aware that France had not ratified the treaty; in his report, hesurmised that if France intervened in favor of the Qing, Japan might respond by saying thatthe Ryukyuan–French Treaty had never been ratified. However, at that time, the Meijigovernment did not realize that the agreement had not received the French government’sformal sanction.63 Ryūkyū shobun, ka (last volume), Matsuda Michiyuki (ed.), 132-138.64 The 1871 Sino-Japanese Treaty stipulated, among other things, that “in all that regards theterritorial possession of either country the two Governments shall treat each other withproper courtesy, without the slightest infringement or encroachment on either side.” For anexcellent discussion of the Chinese perspective on the Ryukyuan issue, see Okamoto Takashi,Chūgoku no tanjō: Higashi Ajia no kindai gaikō to kokka keisei, Nagoya daigaku shuppankai,2017. Despite the Chinese protests, at first the Meiji leaders refused to formally negotiateover the Ryukyus and they did not submit the first memorandum supporting their claims tothe Qing until July 16, 1879.65 On Inoue Kowashi’s constitutional documents, see Yamashita Shigekazu, Ryūkyū-Okinawashi kenkyū josetsu, Ochanomizu shobō, 1999.AW66 For a detailed analysis of Inoue’s memorandum, see Namihira, 2014, 307-312 (cited in note3). Here, I focus on Inoue’s discussion of the Ryukyuan treaties.67 Inoue Kowashi den, shiryō hen dai ichi, 174-177.68 On this matter, I have argued elsewhere that former US president Ulysses Grant played animportant role in the Ryukyuan affair in the summer of 1879. At precisely the time when anumber of Qing officials thought it was absolutely necessary to include the Western powers inthe Ryukyuan question and Inoue Kowashi was concerned that the Ryukyuan affair mightinvolve the powers, Grant arrived in Japan and, after accepting a Chinese request to mediatein the Ryukyuan controversy between China and Japan, he suggested among other things thatthe two East Asian nations not allow any of the Western powers to enter the negotiations.China and Japan followed his advice, and the question did not blow up into an internationalissue as Inoue had feared. Marco Tinello, 2017, cited in note 1.69 FO 46/247, Japan Correspondence, N. 140 (Parkes to Salisbury, August 1, 1879), 75-134.70 United States, Department of State, General Records of the Department of State (R.G. 59),Diplomatic Despatches, Japan (N.A.M. 133), No. 943, (Bingham to Evarts, August 29, 1879),3-24.71 FO 46/247, Japan Correspondence, N.163 (Parkes to Salisbury, September 18, 1879),342-343.72 For a detailed analysis of the Meiji government’s 1879 claims as they related to China, seeNamihira, 2014, 292-298, 304-312 (cited in note 3).73 DNGB, vol. 12, 191-200.74 On the termination of the Ryukyuan-American Treaty, see Treaties and Other InternationalActs of the United States of America, Vol. 6, 1942, 786 (cited in note 14).75 It is unknown whether the Meiji leaders referred to international law when they decided to

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uphold the Ryukyuan-American Treaty in 1872. We might surmise that since De Long’sinquiry (1872) had a favorable outcome for both the US and Japan, the leaders of bothcountries had not investigated the requirements of international law on the issue in detail.However, the fact that despite formal annexation in 1879 Japan continued to maintainWestern privileges in the Ryukyus is indicative of Japan’s weak position in relation to thepowers in the second half of the 19th century. For example, in reply to the Japanesegovernment’s claim that “the annexation of Hawaii would tend to endanger certain rights ofJapanese subjects,” on June 25, 1897, US Secretary of State, John Sherman, pointed out that“The principle of public law whereby the existing treaties of a State cease upon itsincorporation into another State is well defined by Halleck…also Wheaton…To this end thetermination of the existing treaties of Hawaii is recited as a condition precedent. The treaty ofannexation does not abrogate those instruments, it is the fact that Hawaii’s ceasing to exist asan independent contractant that extinguishes those contracts.” DNGB, vol. 30, 997-999. (also,see John Basset Moore (ed.), A Digest of International Law as Embodied in DiplomaticDiscussions, Treaties and Other International Agreements, Washington: Govt. Print. Off,1906, 348-350).76 As one example of how Western diplomats were being manipulated, on December 2, 1878,Geoffrey wrote to his colleague and friend, the French minister in Beijing, stating that theRyukyuan people were “good and interesting” people, and that their claims were “just.” Headded that the Japanese had boldly annexed Ryukyuan territory and persuaded the wholeworld that the Chinese had acknowledged it. See, Beillevaire, 2000 (cited in note 35).