Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00002351

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-71910 TF-26102)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$21.9 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FOR A

JUDICIAL REFORM SUPPORT PROJECT

September 30, 2013

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department East Asia and Pacific Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective July 31, 2013)

Currency Unit = Philippine Peso (PHP) 1.00 = US$ 0.02312

US$ 1.00 = PHP 43.25

FISCAL YEAR

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APJR Action Program for Judicial Reform CA Court of Appeals CTA Court of Tax Appeals BAC Bids and Awards Committee DBM Department of Budget Management DOF Department of Finance DOJ Department of Justice e-CFM Enhanced Caseflow Management System EISP Enterprise Information Systems Plan EJOW Enhanced Justice on Wheels FMBO Fiscal Management and Budget Office HRD Human Resource Development ICC Investment Coordination Committee ISSP Information Systems Strategy Plan ISR Implementation Status Report JOW Justice on Wheels JRSP Judicial Reform Support Project MISO Management Information Systems Office MRDP MISO Re-engineering and Development Plan MTPDP Medium Term Philippine Development Plan OCA Office of Court Administration PHILJA Philippine Judicial Academy PMO Program Management Office PR&D Policy, Research and Development RCAO Regional Court Administration Office SC Supreme Court SB Sandiganbayan SONA State of the Nation Address

Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg

Country Director: Motoo Konishi

Sector Director: Sudhir Shetty

Project Team Leader: Amitabha Mukherjee

ICR Team Leader: Amitabha Mukherjee

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

JUDICIAL REFORM SUPPORT PROJECT

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in Implementation Status Reports H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 63. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 144. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 285. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 296. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 337. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 35Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 37Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 38Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 39Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 39Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 42Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 43Annex 7. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 43Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 43Annex 9. Summary of Borrower's ICR ......................................................................... 44

MAP

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Data Sheet

A. Basic Information

Country: Philippines Project Name: PH Judicial Reform Support Project

Project ID: P066076 L/C/TF Number(s): IBRD-71910, TF-26102

ICR Date: 09/25/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Original Total Commitment:

USD 21.90M Disbursed Amount: USD 20.61M

Revised Amount: USD 21.40M

Environmental Category: C

Implementing Agency: Supreme Court of the Philippines

Co-financiers and Other External Partners: Government of Japan B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: 06/07/2001 Effectiveness: 12/04/2003 12/04/2003

Appraisal: 05/05/2003 Restructuring(s)/ extensions:

12/16/2009 06/27/2011

Approval: 08/19/2003 Mid-term Review: 03/15/2007 04/26/2007

Closing: 12/31/2009 06/30/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Unsatisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: High

Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Borrower Performance: Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Not Rated Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency: Unsatisfactory Overall Bank Performance:

Moderately Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower Performance:

Unsatisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators

QAG Assessments (if any)

Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Unsatisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Law and justice 100 100

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Access to law and justice 29 30

Judicial and other dispute resolution mechanisms 29 30

Legal institutions for a market economy 28 25

Other public sector governance 14 15 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg Jemal-ud-din Kassum

Country Director: Motoo Konishi Robert V. Pulley

Sector Director Sudhir Shetty Homi Kharas

Sector Manager: Rogier J. E. van den Brink Barbara Nunberg

Project Team Leader: Amitabha Mukherjee Lloyd McKay

ICR Team Leader: Amitabha Mukherjee Not applicable

ICR Primary Author: Lloyd McKay Not applicable F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives The Project's development objective was to support the development of a more effective and accessible judicial system that fosters public trust and confidence. Specifically, the Project sought to support:

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(a) Ensuring speedy and fair dispensation of justice to all by improving the efficiency of case adjudication and access to justice through: improved information and communication technology (ICT)-based case and court records management systems; reorganization of the court jurisdictional structure; and piloting mechanisms for making courts more accessible to people in remote localities, through establishing mobile courts and conducting studies; (b) Upgrading the integrity of the judiciary through: developing a comprehensive Code of Ethics for justices, judges, lawyers and court personnel and alternative feedback mechanisms on judicial performance; implementing the Judicial Performance Management System; and enhancing professional development within the judiciary, through the introduction of a Human Resources Development Master Plan for non-judicial personnel of the judiciary; and strengthening the Philippines Judicial Academy (PHILJA); (c) Strengthening institutional capabilities through: implementing a decentralized administration model for the judiciary; installing comprehensive computer-based financial and administrative systems; developing model integrated court facilities; and strengthening policy, research and development (PR&D) capabilities through the establishment of a research facility and an electronic judicial library; and (d) Promoting stakeholder support for reform of the judiciary through: developing broad stakeholder support for the APJR, facilitating knowledge sharing, and ensuring professional management of the reform process. Revised Project Development Objectives There was no revision to the Project Development Objectives. (a) PDO Indicators

Indicator Baseline

Value Original Target

Values

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

More effective and accessible judicial system

5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction and confidence in Higher Courts

SC: +45% CA: +10% SB: +42% CTA: +10%.

2009: SC: +50% CA: +15% SB: +47% CTA: +15%.

2012: SC: +50% CA: +15% SB: +47% CTA: +15%.

Not known as final user survey was not completed at writing

5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction and confidence in Pilot Model Courts relative to the average for lower courts

Lapu-lapu City+55% Angeles City +38% Lower Courts +55%

2009: Lapu-lapu City +60% Angeles City +43% Lower Courts +55%

2012: Lapu-lapu City +60% Angeles City +43% Lower Courts +55%

Not known as final user survey was not completed at writing

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Improvement in case adjudication and access to justice

At least a 10 percentage reduction in case backlogs in Pilot Model Courts relative to the average of lower courts

2004: Lapu-lapu City: 92% Angeles City: 36% Lower Courts: 48%

2009: Lapu-lapu City: 82% Angeles City: 26% Lower Courts: 48%

2012: Lapu-lapu City:82% Angeles City: 26% Lower Courts: 48%

2012: Lapu-lapu City: 65% Angeles City: 37% Lower Courts: 44%

At least a 20 percent per annum increase in the number of citizens served by mobile courts after they become operational

20051: 125 (baseline)

2009: 311

2012: 538

2012: 843 cases

Enhancement in institutional integrity

Implementation of gender sensitive HRD Master Plan

Zero 2009: HRD Master Plan Implemented

2012: HRD Master Plan Implemented

Gender-sensitive HRD Master Plan completed by 2006

Strengthening institutional capacity Completion and testing of Pilot Model Court with provision of modern case management system, decentralized administration and financial management systems, and adequate physical infrastructure

Zero 2006: One completed by Midterm Review 2009: Two more completed by project end

2006: One completed by Midterm Review 2012: Two more completed by project end

No Pilot model Courts completed with agreed systems reforms in place. Lapu-Lapu City Hall of Justice constructed by 2008. Angeles City Hall of Justice constructed by 2012

5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction with Pilot Model Courts after first year of their operation

Net public satisfaction rating for trial courts: +15%2 (average for lower courts)

Too early to assess as Pilot Model Courts are not yet fully operational

Improvement in support for reform of judiciary: Maintenance of an active institutionalized program of public education, knowledge sharing, consultations, citizen feedback and dissemination of results

Active program ofpublic education, knowledge sharing, consultations, citizen feedback and dissemination of results

June 2011: 371 APJR-related activities (seminars, work-shops, consultations) conducted since 2003 but limited citizen feedback and dissemination of results

1 125 cases were heard in 2004 (baseline) according to Supreme Court data and no cases were mediated (mediation was added to the Justice On Wheels program by the Court in 2006). 2 Data from Social Weather Stations Survey (baseline)

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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicators

Indicator Baseline

Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Improvement in case adjudication and access to justice At least a 10 percentage reduction in case processing times (including median time from case filing to closing of file) in Higher Courts

2003: SC: 1.4 yearsCA: 1.3 yearsSB: 6.6 years

CTA: 2.6 years

2006: SC: 1.3 years CA: 1.2 years SB: 5.9 years

CTA: 2.3 years

2012: SC: 1.9 years CA: 2.3 years SB: 9.1 years

CTA: 2.1 years

Enhancement in institutional integrity

50 percent of judges and other court personnel receiving training on Code of Ethics

Zero

50 percent of judges and court personnel trained by midterm (2006)

50 percent of Judges and Court personnel trained by project completion (2012)

51% of judges and court personnel trained by 2006 84% of judges and court personnel trained by 2011

G. Ratings of Project Performance in Implementation Status Reports (ISRs)

No. Date ISR Archived

Development ObjectiveImplementation

Progress

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 11/02/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 06/28/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.31 3 12/03/2004 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.89 4 06/22/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.25 5 01/31/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.80 6 06/30/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.47 7 03/15/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.02 8 06/18/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.39 9 06/30/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.53

10 06/27/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.94 11 12/01/2010 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 12.45 12 06/27/2012 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 19.32

H. Restructurings

Restructuring Dates

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

12/16/2009 S S 11.74 Reallocate loan proceeds to

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Restructuring Dates

Board Approved

PDO Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

incorporate “renovations and additions to the headquarters of the Philippine Judicial Academy”, as it had not been possible to proceed with the Cagayan De Oro Pilot Model Court.

06/27/2011 U U 13.88

To focus support on priority “wrap-up” activities to facilitate achievement of the Project Development Objective, strengthen and sustain project results and impact, and ensure compliance with social and environmental safeguards. $0.5 million of the loan amount was canceled concurrently with this extension.

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal In the years immediately prior to preparation of the Judicial Reform Support Project (JRSP), the Philippine Judiciary:

i. Embraced the following “Vision” - “A judiciary that is independent, effective and efficient, and worthy of public trust and confidence …” (1998); and

ii. Adopted an Action Program for Judicial Reform (APJR, first adopted in 2000 and subsequently refined) with six pillars3:

a. Judicial systems and procedures, b. Institutional development, c. Human resources, d. Integrity infrastructure development, e. Access to justice by the poor, and f. Reform support systems.

The APJR was based on diagnostic studies funded by a Policy and Human Resource Development (PHRD) Grant from the Government of Japan (as part of the JRSP preparation process), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other multilateral and bilateral development partners, and responded to widespread public dissatisfaction with the judiciary, perceptions of corruption, and growing backlogs at all levels within the judiciary. Furthermore, APJR preparation and refinement involved substantial consultations with stakeholders within and outside the judicial system. The JRSP was designed to support implementation of the Supreme Court’s APJR, and in recognition of the reality that the scale and cost of these reforms, and the know-how to support and sustain implementation, required more technical and financial resources than could be provided by the Supreme Court’s own resources and capacities alone. The JRSP thus became part of an integrated array of supporting projects financed by multilateral (Asian Development Bank, European Commission, United National Development Program and World Bank) and bilateral (Australian Agency for International Development, Canadian International Development Agency and United States Agency for International Development) development partners (see Table 1). Overall coordination of support for the umbrella APJR was rightly in the hands of the Supreme Court. It was recognized that the full benefits of judicial reform efforts would only be realized when commensurate improvements were made in other parts of the justice system. And a diagnostic assessment of Department of Justice (DOJ) needs was under way with Asia Foundation support. Nevertheless, in view of the Supreme Court’s initiation of reforms and the World Bank’s experience in supporting judicial reforms in other countries, it was considered appropriate to focus Bank assistance on the Judiciary at that time.

3 The APJR targeted six key challenges: (a) delays in the delivery of justice and associated limits on access, (b) corruption in the Judiciary, (c) weak administrative structures and operating systems, (d) deficient court technologies and facilities, (e) underdeveloped human resources, and (f) improvements in information provided to the public and greater collaboration with civil society.

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Table 1. Development Partner Support for Philippine Action Program for Judicial Reform4

APJR Component

Multilaterals Bilaterals ADB EC UNDP WB AusAID CIDA USAID

Judicial Systems Procedures Institutional Development Human Resources Development

Integrity Infrastructure Development

Access to Justice by the Poor Reform Support Systems

Source: Project Appraisal Document, JRSP (Report no. 25504), World Bank, 2003.

As a central feature of Bank support to improve governance in the Philippines, improving the performance of the Judiciary was important to the overarching objective of the World Bank’s May 2002 Country Assistance Strategy – to support the Philippines in reducing poverty by achieving more rapid growth and empowering the poor to participate more fully in development. Improving judicial performance and governance more broadly was important to achieving the desired increase in investment and productivity. Prior to appraisal the Supreme Court had already established and staffed a Program Management Office (PMO) with responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the APJR and coordinating all development partner support. This PMO had procurement and financial management staff in place at the time of appraisal. And the Supreme Court adopted an updated Information Systems Strategy Plan (ISSP), a critical element of the foundation for systems reforms, prior to the loan becoming effective. A Program of Infrastructure Needs was also prepared, to serve as the foundation for assessing and financing the physical infrastructure modernization priorities. At appraisal, the proposed project met key criteria for likely success with judicial reform efforts, including (a) a high level of national ownership of and commitment to reform, (b) reaching out and working with users in the design and implementation of reform, (c) being mindful of absorptive capacity in sequencing implementation, (d) achieving results to reinforce momentum and support for on-going reform, and (e) ensuring that reforms and compatible with local culture. The Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) of July 2002 highlighted judicial reform as key to improvements in governance, growth and poverty reduction, and the President’s State of the Nation Address (SONA) endorsed the project. The Supreme Court’s commitment to the project was further demonstrated by the Chief Justice attending before the ICC meeting at the time the project was approved and an Associate Justice attending the ICC meeting when the extension of the closing date was considered.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators The overall objective of the JRSP was to “assist the borrower in developing a more effective and

4 The bilateral development partners, UNDP and EC all contributed grant support, though specific data on the amounts has not been provided, whereas the WB and ADB provided a blend of grant and loan support. The ADB loan funds were not passed on from the executive to the judiciary so this JRSP loan is, as yet, the only loan taken by the executive on behalf of the judiciary.

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accessible Judiciary that would foster public trust and confidence, through the implementation of the Supreme Court’s Action Program for Judicial reform”. Objectives and key performance indicators are in Table 2.

Table 2. Objectives and Performance Indicators

Objective Key performance indicators 1 Improving case

adjudication and access to justice

i. 5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction and confidence in Higher Courts.

ii. 5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction and confidence in Pilot model Courts relative to the average for lower courts.

iii. At least a 10 percentage reduction in case processing time (including mediation time from cases filed to closing of file) in Higher Courts.

iv. At least a 10 percentage reduction in case backlogs in Pilot Model Courts relative to the average for lower courts.

v. At least a 20 precent per annum increase in the number of citizens served by mobile courts after they become operational.

2 Enhancing institutional integrity

i. 50 percent of judges and other court personnel receiving training on Code of Ethics.

ii. Implementation of a gender sensitive Human Resource Development Master Plan.

3 Strengthening institutional capacity

i. Completion and testing of Pilot Model Courts with provision of modern case management systems, decentralized administration and financial management systems, and adequate physical infrastructure.

ii. 5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction with Pilot Model Courts after first year of their operation.

4 Assist in

strengthening support for the reform process

i. Maintenance of an active institutionalized program of public education, knowledge sharing, consultations, citizen feedback and dissemination of results.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification Although the JRSP was extended and amended, no revision was made to the project development objectives. Relevant project results indicators were updated to reflect the new closing date. Following discussions with the Supreme Court, it was felt that the PDO and indicators remained relevant, and additional proxy indicators (such as, for example, relevant ratings from the periodic Social Weather Stations surveys) could supplement the project results indicators without formally amending the key performance indicators.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries The benefits, and hence beneficiaries, of a more effective and accessible judiciary with increased public confidence and trust are far reaching and many. By consistently, predictably and transparently applying the rule of law in deciding cases before them in a timelier manner, courts could reduce corruption and increase respect for the law. This in turn could build confidence and reduce the cost of doing business. Though the locations of Pilot Model Courts would naturally be expected to receive greater early benefits, these would only be transitional as it was anticipated that such improvements would then be extended nation-wide as soon as resources and implementation capacity allowed.

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Reducing the backlog of cases before the Court of Tax Appeals and promoting tax compliance, would increase revenue collections and thereby enable public authorities to improve services. Poverty would be reduced indirectly through the effects of improved business confidence resulting in increased investment and faster economic and employment growth. Similarly, improved public services resulting from increased public revenue would indirectly reduce poverty. Indeed, Filipinos in general would benefit from the improved rule of law, not just those who have cases before courts. Indeed, improved access to justice would enhance the well-being of Filipinos in general. Poverty would be reduced directly as a result of improved access to justice by the poor and near-poor. This applies to improvements in dispute resolution, as well and cases resolved by formal court hearings. In fact, improvements in the timeliness of case resolution would benefit the relatively poor the most because the burden of delay is greater on the relatively poor.

1.5 Original Components The JRSP had four components:

A. Improving case adjudication and access to justice through: i. Designing and implementing an improved computer-based case management systems,

initially in the Supreme Court and higher courts (the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) and in the pilot model courts;

ii. Designing and implementing an improved court records management system; iii. Installing computer-aided transcription equipment in higher and pilot model courts; iv. Reorganizing the jurisdictional structure of courts; v. Developing policy options for addressing affordability constraints to access to the

court system by the poor; vi. Strengthening access to justice via mobile courts, and

vii. Upgrading the judiciary’s ICT system.

B. Enhancing institutional integrity through: i. Developing a comprehensive Code of Ethics for justices, judges, lawyers and court

personnel together with training; ii. Developing alternative feedback mechanisms on judicial performance that improve

the quality and quantity of venues for information exchange on judicial functions, operations and performance;

iii. Implementing a computerized judicial performance management system in three pilot courts and in the Higher Courts, and

iv. Introducing a gender sensitive Human Resources Development Master Plan for non-judicial personnel, and strengthening The Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).

C. Strengthening institutional capacity through:

i. Implementing a decentralized administration model for the judiciary in selected Pilot Model Courts;

ii. Developing and implementing a computer-based financial management improvement program for use in Pilot Model Courts;

iii. Establishing Pilot Model Courts in each of Mindanao, Visayas and Luzon; and iv. Establishing an electronic library and research facility.

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D. Assist in strengthening support for the reform process through: i. Undertaking a study of the possible impact of the APJR of judicial personnel;

ii. Carrying out knowledge sharing programs; iii. Providing technical and institutional support and assistance with implementation and

supervision, and undertaking programs for internal communication for the courts; iv. Implementing public communication programs to promote the Action Program for

Judicial Reform, and developing community outreach and user-surveys to obtain feedback; and

v. Strengthening the capacity of the Program Management Office. As such, the project was an integrated blend of institutional reforms supported by needed infrastructure. Admittedly, the modest loan ($21.9 million) financed only an initial set of activities within the judiciary’s vast infrastructure needs, but it was considered prudent to proceed with a project of this size initially so that the Court could draw on the experience gained from establishing three pilot model courts in addressing its wider infrastructure needs. Meanwhile, much could be achieved with regard to the project development objectives through institutional and systems reforms.

1.6 Revised Components Component B (iv) was amended to also include renovations and additions to the headquarters of the Philippine Judicial Academy. Component C was implicitly amended to omit development of a Pilot Model Court in Mindanao (Cagayan de Oro City), thereby reducing the number of Pilot Model Courts from three to two.

1.7 Other significant changes Construction of the Cagayan de Oro City Hall of Justice (HOJ) (one of the three original Pilot Model Courts) was deferred in July 2005 and the possibility of these funds being used towards the construction of a Manila Hall of Justice was explored. During 2008-2009, with project implementation progressing, the authorities proposed that the Bank approve additional financing for the JRSP, to complete the Manila Hall of Justice and key enterprise-wide information systems. However, given the pace of implementation, uncertainties surrounding the finalization of a site for the Manila HOJ, the upcoming retirement of the Chief Justice and uncertainty regarding the choice and timing of succession, this idea was abandoned. Construction of the Manila Hall of Justice did not eventuate within the time framework of this project and much of the funds originally provided for construction of the Cagayan de Oro City HOJ were reallocated to PHILJA. However, it is worth noting that the Court has continued to work to establish new Halls of Justice in both Cagayan de Oro and Manila. Land has now been secured for a new HOJ for trial courts and the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro, and the Court is in the process of using its own resources to build new Halls of Justice in Cagayan de Oro, Cebu and Manila." The project was extended twice: first, for 18 months from January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011 and second for 12 months till June 30, 2012. The first extension was in response to the request from the Court and the Executive for additional time to complete the project’s incomplete activities. At the time it was thought that an 18-month extension would be sufficient for this. However, towards the end of the extension period it became apparent that it was clearly impossible for the project activities to be completed in their entirety due to slow procurement. Thus, in June 2011 it was agreed that the Bank could not abandon the project with the Angeles City Hall of Justice

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building still under construction. Hence, a second and very limited 12 month extension was agreed and the project scope radically narrowed to enable completion of the civil works while ensuring compliance with safeguard policies, and the implementation of a very limited set of activities necessary for smooth project closing (e.g. the final user survey, preparation of the Borrower contribution for the ICR and an independent evaluation of the APJR). A clear timetable to complete the procurement process was agreed with dated legal covenants, after such dates the activities can unilaterally be canceled, and the loan was partially canceled ($500,000).

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry As noted in section 1, the JRSP was well-grounded in diagnostic analyses and supported a Philippine-led judicial reform program. There was strong national ownership of reforms, an extensive consultation process both within the judiciary and with society more broadly, and a Supreme Court PMO already established that would be responsible for supporting and overseeing implementation. The context appeared very conducive to effective support of reforms. There was a clear opportunity for the Bank to draw on its international experience in supporting strategic aspects of the reform program that the Supreme Court had already adopted and begun to implement. Moreover, the key findings from international experience, such as the importance of national ownership of reforms and involvement of users in reform program design, appeared to be well satisfied. The project scope and activities were thought to be quite modest, with only three pilot model courts to showcase the impact of integrated reforms, and upgraded information systems supporting improved court, case and financial management, together with training and human resource development, to achieve improved performance more broadly. It was anticipated that once the potential gains from comprehensive reforms were showcased under the JRSP, they could be implemented more broadly. However, in hindsight, there appears to have been a mismatch between the Project Development Objective (PDO) and the JRSP, as the PDO was more appropriate for the Judiciary’s overall Action Program for Judicial Reform rather than the APJR elements supported by the JRSP. Moreover, while the World Bank consistently viewed the systems reforms as the most important component of the project it has become apparent over time that some within the judiciary may have seen the construction of new buildings as the top priority. With successive changes in judicial leadership this disparity in focus and expectations became increasingly evident. In retrospect, though, the slow pace of actual reform during the project preparation period and the fact that there were only minor reform activities ready for implementation in the months following loan approval was a sign of things to come. Indeed, project preparation itself was not rushed, but was relatively protracted, being spread over three years. At the time of appraisal it was considered important to sustain strong multilateral support for the Philippine reform effort in 2003, though it was clear that disbursements in the months following loan approval would be modest. It was hoped that the pace of reforms and presentation of project components ready for disbursement would quickly gain pace, but that did not happen. Significant risks were identified and recognized during preparation, and risk mitigation measures identified. Unfortunately, these risk mitigation measures were not always effective. The risks identified at appraisal, and what actually happened, are summarized in Table 3.

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Table 3. Major Risks Became Reality

Risk Rating at appraisal

Outcome

1. Change in Supreme Court and hence reform leadership

M An Executive Committee was formed to lessen dependence on the Chief Justice. But retirements of Chief Justices, and changes in the composition of the Court as a whole and the JRSP Management Committee had a negative impact on the pace of reform and the achievement of intended project outcomes. Moreover, impeachment of the Chief Justice in December 2011 and conviction in May 2012 undermined public confidence in the judiciary, distracted the Court, stalled reform progress and thereby negatively impacted the project.

2. Inadequate or ineffective concurrent investment in human resource development

M An expansion of training, together with the early establishment of an e-Library, and a large rise in the salary of judges did mitigate this risk somewhat. But continued high vacancy rates for judges, and continuing limitations on prosecution and public defender resources, persisted.

3. Political upheaval during the project life

M There was no political upheaval during the project life.

4. Inadequate capacity, staffing and resources for the PMO5

M

The PMO was well-staffed and well-resourced initially, in terms of project management capacity. However, procurement and financial management capacity in the Supreme Court was – and remains – weak. Support from Supreme Court leadership for the PMO waned after the third year of the project; thereafter the PMO lost the trust of the Court leadership and its capacity was progressively undermined as approvals for activities were withheld, staff left and were frequently not replaced.

5. Inadequate funding/resources due to fiscal constraint

M This did not become a binding constraint in general, though very protracted procurement procedures within the Court caused delays in accessing project funds, and the computerization and Halls of Justice construction/renovation needs are so large that they naturally need to be spread over time.

6. Difficulties in effectively coordinating multiple contributions from different development partners

S This coordination was effective during preparation and the first three years of the project but the Philippine Development Partner Form coordinated by the Supreme Court virtually ceased to function after that. This lack of effective coordination has become evident in the lack of a common platform for information systems throughout the judicial system and confusion with regard to the Court’s approach to, and strategy for, administrative decentralization.

7. Resistance from interest groups that could oppose reforms

M Though not overt, it appears that key administrative units within the Supreme Court have been resistant to change. An assessment of possible impacts of the APJR on the judiciary’s personnel and the subsequent preparation and implementation of an impact mitigation program that was included in Component D of the JRSP to help allay the

5 This actually combined two very similar risks identified in the PAD.

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Table 3. Major Risks Became Reality

Risk Rating at appraisal

Outcome

possible personal concerns of judicial personnel, but this assessment was not undertaken. Second, the judiciary and legal profession as a whole have been resistant to management positions in Supreme Court Departments and Offices key to judicial modernization6 being held by non-lawyers, even when these positions are administrative or technical in their focus.

8. Slow flow of funds due to bureaucratic procedures could slow down project implementation and output delivery

S There was no issue with timely release of funds to the Court from the executive. However, the protracted administrative procedures within the judiciary, whereby the approval of the Court En Banc and/or the Chief Justice is mandatory at numerous stages, significantly delayed procurement, contracting, disbursement, acceptance of outputs and consequently project results and impact.

9. Overall risk rating S Unfortunately the majority of these risks actually became limitations on the project. There was no really effective way to shield the intended development outcomes from their impact although some (e.g. those at items 4, 6, 7 and 8) could have been mitigated through proactive actions by the Office of the Chief Justice or by the Court en Banc.

Risk rating – H (high risk), S (substantial risk), M (modest risk), N (negligible or low risk)

2.2 Implementation After initially being slow, project implementation gained momentum in the second and third years before waning from year four onwards. During the life of the project, the focus on outcomes waned with progressive narrowing of the project scope and increased focus on loan disbursements. There were five Chief Justices during the 8.5 years of the project, five Court Administrators, six heads of MISO and three Directors of the PMO. Though there were quick actions with respect to the initial acquisition and deployment of two Justice on Wheels buses and getting the e-library operating, it took until the third year of the project (August, 2006) to sign a contract of works to construct the Pilot Model Court in Lapu-Lapu City and the fourth year (October, 2007) to sign the construction contract for the Angeles City Hall of Justice. Even by the end of the project there has been limited modernization of the court, case, financial and human resource management systems within the judiciary. And the administrative decentralization initiative is currently stalled, with the Court yet to decide upon its approach to, and strategy for, decentralization7. The overall slow and uneven pace of implementation was reflected in the pattern of project disbursements. This pattern over time is summarized in Figure 1. Project disbursements were much slower than was anticipated at appraisal. Only seven percent of the loan proceeds were

6 E.g. the Fiscal Management and Budget Office, the Office of Halls of Justice and the Management Information Systems Office. 7 The Court spent considerable time and financial resources piloting a Regional Court Administration Office (RCAO) in Lapu-lapu, with the pilot being abandoned after an evaluation disclosed its ineffectiveness.

9

disbursed during the first two years. By the end of 2009 (the original project closing date), total disbursements amounted to $ 11.7 million, only 53 percent of the total loan amount. The slow disbursement rate was most acute in the case of works related to the Pilot Model Courts (see Table 4).

Figure 1. Disbursements Over the Life of the Project (USD million) Actual vs. Target

Table 4. Disbursements by Key Component (USD million) Year Total Expected

at Appraisal Actual

Works Goods Services Other Total 2004 3.0 0.16 0.39 0.02 0.57 2005 5.5 0.30 0.35 0.02 0.67 2006 6.3 1.03 1.30 0.71 0.04 3.08 2007 7.5 1.67 0.99 0.53 0.10 3.29 2008 1.1 0.41 1.49 0.30 0.09 2.29 2009 1.1 0.51 0.93 0.02 1.46 2010 0.49 0.24 0.04 0.77 2011 2.20 1.67 0.05 0.01 3.93 2012 3.76 0.36 0.20 0.23 4.55 Total 9.07 7.27 3.70 0.57 20.61

Source: Project financial records A key recurring feature of implementation has been the frequency with which high-quality analytical and diagnostic work exploring and evaluating reform options for various aspect of the overall APJR has either languished with no decision taken on what actions to take or has been followed by a decision on what options to pursue but then there has been little or no implementation. Examples include (a) the Enterprise Information Systems Plan (EISP) for 2010-14 and the associated MISO Re-engineering and Development Plan (MRDP), (b) reengineering of the Court’s jurisdictional structure, (c) the development of policy options for addressing affordability constraints to access the court system by the poor, and (d) the development of a whistleblower system. This highlights two key difficulties. First, rules and procedures have resulted in decision-making within the Supreme Court on judicial reform (including JRSP-

0

5

10

15

20

25

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Original Target

Revised Target

Actual

10

related) issues often being very slow. Second, even when decisions are made, such as the adoption of the EISP, there has been limited capacity to manage change and actually implement institutional reforms. This pattern of indecision and inaction with regard to system reforms has deprived the project of opportunities to showcase the intended reforms in court, case, financial and human resource management which were a central part of the anticipated changes to help improve judicial performance and access to justice. It has also contributed to delays in the construction of the pilot Halls of Justice, but the associated delays in institutional developments have been particularly detrimental to the pursuit of the PDO. A number of key factors adversely affected implementation: i. The cumbersome, slow and unpredictable procurement procedures (with the Court En

Banc involved in all but relatively small procurements and the Chief Justice involved at multiple stages in all procurements) greatly delayed implementation8. Significant delays arose at all stages of the procurement process: preparation and approval of specifications, cost estimates, terms of reference, and waiting for award of prerequisite contracts to determine requirements. Furthermore, at times there was a lack of appropriate segregation of duties of key Court officials involved in the JRSP. In the words of the Supreme Court such “situations and consequent temporary arrangements may have increased risks and have given rise to fiduciary issues.”9 Using the Government Procurement Policy Board’s performance assessment method, gave a rating of 1.19 out of 3.00 for the Supreme Court’s Bids and Awards Committee on the APJR in 2009. While there was an improvement in 2010, there were still significant weaknesses. For example, the average number of days from submission of bids to evaluation of bids was 60, compared with the standard of 8. Second, the shopping method took an average of four to five months from issuance of request for quotation to issuance of contract. The main reasons behind this poor procurement performance appear to be (a) frequent turnover of members of the BAC; (b) insufficient and ineffective procurement training to new members; and – perhaps most important - (c) BAC members’ fear of being exposed to allegations by losing bidders or to questions from the Commission on Audit, with the possibility of disciplinary proceedings and/or other (even criminal) sanctions. Consequently, decisions were delayed and processes prolonged. Also, since bidders came to know that contracts would take a long time to be awarded, some potential bidders appear to have chosen not to compete (as a result, the average number of bidders remained low for most contracts), while others factored the delay in contract award (and disbursement) into their prices. The procurement capacity does not appear to have improved in terms of efficiency, competitiveness and transparency over the JRSP period. The April 2007 World Bank Mid-term review Aide Memoire noted “… the length and time in processing and awarding of contracts are beyond the timelines prescribed under the Government Procurement reform Act No.9184”. In addressing this, the PMO met with the Government Procurement Policy Board to agree on the steps to assist the Supreme Court to improve procurement efficiency”. But no discernible improvement resulted. In fact, during 2010-2012 (i.e. the last 2 years of

8 The assessment of high risk given to procurement capacity at Appraisal turned out to be accurate. 9 An example of this is when the Chair of the Bids and Awards Committee for the APJR (BAC-APJR) was also the requestor of the services, the approver of the terms of reference, the end-user of the services provided by the firm, the authorizer of contract extensions, and the authorizer of payments to the firm.

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the project), the efficiency of key JRSP procurements seems to have declined (in contrast to other Bank-financed projects where, during the final years of a project, procurement tends to become more efficient due to the increased institutional capacity and proficiency). Most of the agreements on timelines for procurement processing and contract awards, which formed part of the June 2011 project closing date extension and Loan Agreement amendment, were not fulfilled.10 It is clear that (i) procurement improvements will require significant changes in the Court’s processes, practices and mindsets, including delegation of procurement authority to lower courts; (ii) the high turnover rate of Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) members must be reduced; (iii) the quality of procurement training needs to be improved; and (iv) BAC members must be empowered to decide on procurement issues and assured of protection against baseless allegations by losing bidders. Without these changes, the Court will continue to struggle to operate a timely and effective procurement process.

ii. Problems with the winning tender led to delays in constructing the Angeles City Hall of Justice and new bidding was needed to complete the construction. After much delay, a contract for construction of the Angeles City HOJ was awarded. However, implementation problems and a contractual dispute arose and work ceased in September 2009, with construction partially completed. Work did not recommence with a new contractor until July 2011 and was finally completed in May 2012.

iii. Financial management was marred by unreliable information and a lack of effective internal control procedures. In response to significant weaknesses in the Financial Management system being identified during preparation11, a financial management capacity building component was included in the project12. Unfortunately, though, this was not done and no significant progress was made to improve the overall Financial Management system. Issues noted during project support missions include: a) inadequate contract management; b) ineligible expenditures 13 ; c) un-reconciled fixed asset records and d) long outstanding liabilities. The control environment remained weak throughout the life of the project and there continued to be inadequate analysis and monitoring of financial data and frequent late submission of financial information.

10 Only five of the planned 23 contracts identified as part of the second extension to complete priority activities were awarded by June 2012. 11 These included a) FM organization being not fully staffed and very centralized in the SC main office, thereby slowing down transactions; b) weak controls on cash management; c) no clear line of responsibility between the Financial Management and Budget Office (FMBO) and the Office of the Court Administrator in terms of financial matters involving the lower courts; d) inadequate financial analysis and monitoring; e) the absence of a Financial Management Manual and f) an inadequate internal audit function. 12 Component B of the project envisaged, among other things, the “development and implementation of a financial management improvement program, including reporting and information systems, revenue management, fund management, physical asset management and the payroll system for use in selected Pilot Model Courts”. 13 Ineligible expenditures are expenditures on goods or services other than those eligible under the loan agreement and agreed upon in work programs or procurement plans for the intended purposed of the project. All ineligible expenditures identified have either been refunded or resolved (e.g., documented or justified), and the loan account was officially closed as of August 21, 2013.

12

Of the eight annual audit reports submitted, five were submitted late, four have unqualified or clean opinions, three have qualified audit opinions and the latest one (i.e. for 2011) received an adverse audit opinion.

iv. Failure to maintain an adequately staffed Program Management Office severely affected implementation during the second half of the project. The PMO was established prior to appraisal of the JRSP, and it was well staffed during the early years of implementation. Moreover, the PMO was given security by being established as an organic part of the Supreme Court’s structure (rather than as a temporary unit) and was paid from the Court’s budgetary allocations. However, with the waning of strong support from senior management midway through project implementation, PMO positions were frequently not refilled when staff left, and the capacity of the PMO declined.

v. Lack of clarity surrounding land titling and hence access to land with clear title on which to construct Halls of Justice led to the abandonment of efforts to establish a Pilot Hall of Justice in Cagayan de Oro within the project time frame. In addition, there was a delay of almost 2 years on PHILJA’s part in initiating the process of obtaining clear title to the land connected with the refurbishment of the PHILJA Annex Training Facility.

vi. The lack of continued strong support from senior management in the Supreme Court as changes of Chief Justice brought changes in emphasis and gave rise to a loss of reform momentum. In particular, the implementation of reforms slowed after 2006. More broadly, the evolving composition of the Supreme Court as a whole appears to have led to a waning of enthusiasm for the judicial reforms initiated under the Court’s Action Program for Judicial Reform. As mentioned earlier, important achievements were made after 2006, such as the completion of the Lapu Lapu City and Angeles City Halls of Justice, but progress with institutional reforms under the APJR waned.

vii. The inability of the Court to begin implementation of an integrated computerised judicial information system without repeatedly reviewing and changing plans has led to much piloting of different (and fragmented) options but limited actual progress with these core reforms. This was in spite of an updated EISP being adopted by the Court En Banc in September 2009.

viii. The inability of the Court to decide on and implement a decentralised basic court, case and financial management system has resulted in there still being very limited decentralisation. Various options have been explored and a Regional Court Administration Office piloted in Lapu-Lapu City, but after the JRSP project closed, decentralisation options were referred in late 2012 to yet another committee of the Court for examination. As a result, after a decade of efforts, there has yet to be substantive decentralisation.

One factor that has positively impacted the project and helped sustain an active dialogue of judicial reform has been the concurrent rise in momentum for judicial reform and improved judicial performance in other countries. The fact that numerous other countries have embarked on reform of the judiciary has provided opportunities for cross-country learning. Closely connected with this has been continued support from bilateral and multilateral development partners. In keeping with slow disbursements and slow implementation of reforms, performance ratings during the project period have been disappointing (see Table 5). Moreover, the ratings have deteriorated during the latter part of project implementation with the overall achievement of development objectives and overall project implementation both being rated “Unsatisfactory” during the last two years of the project, i.e. the period of extension.

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Table 5. Implementation Performance Ratings Dec

2004 Jun 2005

Jun 2006

Jun 2007

Jun 2008

Jun 2009

Nov 2010

Aug 2012

Summary development objective

S S MS S S S U U

Overall implementation progress

U S U S S S U U

Financial management S S MS S MS S S U

Project management U S MU S S S MU MU

Counterpart funding S S S S S S S

Procurement U MS U S S S MS MU

Monitoring and evaluation

S S MU S HU S MS U

Project component ratings

A. Improving case adjudication and access to justice

U S MS S S S HU MU

B. Enhanced institutional integrity

S S MU S S S S U

C. Strengthening institutional capacity

U S U S S S U U

D. Stakeholder support for reform

S S S S S S S U

E. Contingencies S S MU S DR DR S S Ratings: HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, MS=Moderately Satisfactory, MU=Moderately Unsatisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory. Source: Implementation Status Reports and implementation support mission reports All performance ratings, except that for counterpart funding, have varied over the project period. Financial management was assessed to be satisfactory or moderately satisfactory until near the end. The project’s FM system was considered unsatisfactory in the October 2011 FM Implementation Review mission due to: (a) delay in the settlement of open contracts, (b) long outstanding payables, (c) ineligible expenditures, and (d) lapses in internal controls. Procurement was rated unsatisfactory early on and then moderately unsatisfactory towards the end. Monitoring and evaluation has been rated unsatisfactory both in the middle of the project and again towards the end. Moreover, delays in contracting an independent evaluation of the APJR and a second user survey after the project closure mitigate against arguments for higher ratings since 2012.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Monitoring and evaluation has varied greatly over the project period, from satisfactory in the early years to highly unsatisfactory in 2008, back to satisfactory in 2009 and ended up unsatisfactory in 2012. This reflects the lack of attention to project results collection, monitoring and reporting. Even what little M&E information has been available has not been well used to feed back into management decisions and help guide refinements to the reform program. There have been pilot testing initiatives in the areas of information and communication technology options and decentralization, but the outcome of these have not led to timely follow-up decisions and actions concerning the future direction of reform in these important areas.

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The delay in undertaking a second user survey scheduled towards the end of the project, though for understandable reasons of results being biased by the impeachment process, has severely compromised the Monitoring and Evaluation effort. As a result, although the contract for the survey was issued in June 2013, the survey results needed to determine whether some of the project’s performance indicators have been achieved have not become available in time for ICR preparation.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Safeguard compliance has been largely satisfactory overall, though environmental safeguards were not always consistently observed in a timely manner during the construction of the Halls of Justice in Lapu-Lapu City and Angeles City, and of the PHILJA training facility. As a result finalization of the Lapu-Lapu City HOJ was delayed.

Table 6. Safeguard performance ratings Dec

2004 Jun

2005 Jun

2006 Jun

2007 Jun

2008 Jun

2009 Nov 2010

Jun 2012

Overall safeguard compliance

S S S S MS S

Environmental assessment

S S S S MS S

Ratings: HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, MS=Moderately Satisfactory, MU=Moderately Unsatisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory. Source: Implementation Status Reports and implementation support mission reports

Fiduciary issues were generally well-attended to during the first half of the project. However, fiduciary failures appear to have begun in 2010 and accelerated in 2011. From mid-2010, as project decision-making became more centralized and PMO capacity deteriorated (along with PMO attention to fiduciary issues), lack of segregation of functions led to a problematic internal control environment and attenuated internal checks and balances; some expenditure on ineligible items, and some retroactive contracts; vendor payments began to be delayed; and project accounts differences between Court offices remained un-reconciled for prolonged periods. As a result, the reliability of project financial information deteriorated, and fiduciary risks increased.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase The full potential for improvements in judicial performance is yet to be realized and the Supreme Court continues to explore initiatives to pursue these and to strengthen society’s confidence. Given the natural conservative nature of the justice system, reform of the judiciary is understandably hard and time consuming. And it is an area in which national independence and sovereignty is highly respected and highly guarded. Apart from the substantial ongoing support USAID for the computerization of courts, the options for further support from development partners are unclear at this time. But, given the importance and the challenges inherent in judicial reforms, this would seem to be a natural area for development partners to continue to be available to provide support as and when such support can be helpful and efficiently utilized, with clear results and impact.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

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The overall objective of the JRSP – to assist the Philippines in developing a more effective and accessible Judiciary that would foster public trust and confidence – was strategic and remains relevant. Moreover, the positioning of this project in support of a Philippine-designed reform program (the Supreme Court’s APJR) was appropriate. However, in hindsight, the design and implementation schedule were probably ambitious regarding what institutional reforms were considered feasible to implement within a six-year period in the Philippines, the delays inherent in land title complications in the Philippines and a very protracted and centralized procurement process within the Judiciary. Moreover, the design was vulnerable to the effects of changes in senior leadership within the Judiciary and the natural resistance to change by judicial and administrative institutions that are so steeped in tradition. To be successful, the type of far-reaching institutional reforms supported by the JRSP, needs sustained support from leaders and champions within and across the Judiciary and from the other branches of government, and it needs sustained buy-in by administrative units within the judiciary. Meanwhile, the importance of improvements to judicial performance continues to be so high that it still remains a priority for the Philippines and for development partner support.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Overarching Objective. More effective and accessible judicial system This overarching objective draws on the sum of actions taken to pursue the four subsequent objectives. Hence, the discussion of actions to achieve this objective is spread over the discussion of all objectives in the following sub-sections. There was a study undertaken to explore options for improve access to justice and expedite case dispensation through re-engineering the Court’s jurisdictional structure but its proposals were modest and have yet to be acted upon. Meanwhile, vacancy rates for judge positions in lower courts remains high, at over 20 percent in spite of a very sharp increase in judges’ salaries in 2005. There was success in reducing the number of vacancies early in the project period, especially in Regional Courts, but the overall vacancy rate in lower courts has remained high, thus adding to the excessive workload of judges. Indeed, there continues to be significant vacancy rates for judge and public prosecutor positions, though the vacancy rates for public defender positions has fallen in recent years and it appears that there could well be overstaffing among support level positions. Table 7. Vacancy Rates for Key Judicial Positions (% end of year) Vacancy Rates (percentage)

Year Regional Trial Courts Judges

Metropolitan Trial Courts

Judges

Public Prosecutors

Public Defendants

2003 17.4 18.3 16.4 10.8 2004 19.2 13.4 29.4 14.4 2005 15.1 39.7 25.6 17.3 2006 16.6 36.1 24.9 12.5 2007 16.2 24.6 17.6 13.7 2008 19.1 26.3 22.8 13.7 2009 21.5 26.4 24.1 6.0 2010 19.8 28.5 21.2 5.0 2011 21.3 30.1 24.4 3.4

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Vacancy Rates (percentage) Year Regional Trial

Courts Judges Metropolitan Trial Courts

Judges

Public Prosecutors

Public Defendants

2012 19.2 30.3 26.8 5.2 Source: OCA, Supreme Court Areas in which the Philippines has made noticeable changes during the life of this project include (a) environmental law and (b) the protection of human rights. Environmental law and application have been strengthened with the development and application of the writs of Amparo and Kalikasan, while improving the protection of human rights was a Court focus during 2007-9. Related performance indicators:

i. 5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction and confidence in Higher Courts. Not achieved. There was improvement in the early years of project implementation, but this has not been maintained and has been severely compromised by other events (in particular the impeachment of the Chief Justice in 2012) that have distracted the Court and adversely affected user satisfaction. In this situation it is impossible to determine whether the partial implementation of reforms implemented with project support would have, by itself, significantly improved user satisfaction.

The Social Weather Stations’ net satisfaction rating for the Chief Justice was high in 2003 (+13 rating) but declined progressively to be very low in 2011 (-44 rating).

ii. 5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction and confidence in Pilot model Courts relative to the average for lower courts. Achievement uncertain. Though there is some survey evidence that user satisfaction has increased by more than 5 percentage points for Lapu-Lapu City Courts, there is too little consistent survey data to be definitive. From a survey it is clear that the overwhelming majority of court lawyers, litigants, prosecutors, police and other stakeholders in the Lapu-Lapu Court (84 percent) in mid-2012 had confidence in the impartiality of the Court and that their cases will be solved satisfactorily. In reality, though, even the two pilot model courts for which new and refurbished building have been completed (Lapu-Lapu City and Angeles City) are still not operating as envisaged because the computerisation of information systems and improvements in case and court management are only partially in place and the additional courtrooms remain empty because the new courts to use them have yet to be created and staffed. Hence, with only partial implementation, one would not expect to see the anticipated improvement in outcomes.

Objective 1. Improving case adjudication and access to justice. Though ICT-based court and case management systems have been piloted in Pasay City and Lapu-Lapu City, and ICT-based systems have been introduced in the Higher Courts, these have not yet been extended to the lower courts as a whole. Indeed, there is still uncertainty regarding the IT platform and standards to be adopted for the judiciary as a whole. Moreover, while the Case Management Information Systems already introduced in the Court of Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals and the Supreme Court are operating reasonably effectively, the one in the

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Sandiganbayan is not operating well, is not compatible with that in the other Higher Courts, and the court is in the process of switching to the system used by the other higher courts14. An overall Enterprise Information Systems Plan (EISP) was prepared for 2010-2014, and approved by the Supreme Court En Banc in 2009. But this has not been implemented as planned. Meanwhile, an Enhanced Caseflow Management System (e-CFM) has been pilot tested in Lapu-Lapu City and Pasay City Trial Courts. The Judiciary’s Management Information Systems Office (MISO) is working on progressively expanding the enhancement of information systems as resources allow, but progress has been slower than anticipated or hoped for. To date there has been limited modernization of court, case, financial and human resource management processes and systems. The Court has been quite successful in establishing a Justice on Wheels (JOW) system based on buses as mobile courts. This began with two buses in 2004 and initial focused on mediation, case adjudication, and information dissemination. The number of buses has subsequently been expanded to eight, and the JOW program was enhanced to include medical and dental services for prisoners (EJOW) in 2007. Moreover, two of the buses have been strategically deployed to provide court facilities in locations where the existing courtrooms were damaged by natural disasters. However, the EJOW program has not always been used for the primary purpose of extending access to justice in under-served areas, as was its original primary focus. It has been valuable in (a) decongesting selected courts by disposing of cases, (b) helping to decongest prisons by expediting release of detainees and prisoners and (c) expanding mediation. At times it appears to have also been used to promote the public profile of senior judicial officials. It even seems possible that prison releases and case disposals may have been timed on occasions to coincide with the visit of EJOW mobile courts, thus enhancing publicity. In the absence of data on geographical deployment, downtime, EJOW operating costs and concurrent case disposals by adjacent courts, it is not possible to assess the cost-effectiveness and impact of the EJOW program.15 A key focus of efforts to decongest court dockets has been on small claims cases. Following the promulgation of simplified Rules and Procedures for Small Claims Cases in 2008, and initial piloting with USAID support, the small claims case management system (SC2MS in Court parlance) initiative was expanded to a further 800 lower courts with IT equipment financed by the JRSP and associated training during 2011 and 2012 (see Figure 2). This opportunistic support for an initiative that could make a significant impact on case decongestion has led to a sharp rise in the timeliness of small claims case dispensation, as many cases that would otherwise appear in the caseload of Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts have been handled under these new procedures. The rise in pending small claims court cases (Table 8) has been more than offset by a sharp fall in pending cases in Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts (see Table 10).

14 Although the Sandiganbayan had piloted the introduction of ICT-based case management systems several years ago, the situation has so deteriorated that the court now operates a manual paper-based system (including for case assignment and case management). 15 This data has been requested from the PMO and OCA for more than a year but has not yet been received.

18

Figure 2. First-Level Courts where ICT Equipment was Financed Through JRSP to Expedite Disposal of Small Claims Cases

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Table 8. Small Claims Court Performance

Period Case Inflow Case Outflow Pending Cases (end of period)

2009 January – March 231 58 328 April – June 444 158 614 July – September 344 191 767 October – December 506 203 1070 2010 January – March 405 284 1191 April – June 1315 641 1865 July – September 2604 1839 2630 October – December 2723 2219 3134 2011 January – March 5272 3404 5002 April – June 4746 4483 5265 July – September 5560 5030 5795 October – December 5413 4376 6832 2012 January – March 5886 5071 7647 April – June 4845 4473 8019 July – September 4743 3771 8991 October – December 3463 2873 9581

Source: Office of Court Administration, Supreme Court The most recent initiative to help improve the timeliness of case dispensation is the empowering of judges to accept depositions in place of face-to-face evidence from witnesses. However, while this is welcomed by judges and has the potential to speed up case hearings, much will depend on whether needed expansion in capacity in the prosecutors’ offices and the public defendants’ offices is forthcoming to make the realization of potential court time saving possible. Related performance indicators:

i. At least a 10 percentage reduction in case processing time (including mediation time from cases filed to closing of file) in Higher Courts. Achieved for the Court of Tax Appeals only. The Court of Tax Appeals has successfully reduced case management time by about 20 percent from 2003 to 2012 through improved case management supported by computerised information systems. Though there was progress in reducing case processing time for the Supreme Court during the first half of the project implementation period this has slipped back during the latter years as the momentum for reform waned and the Court became increasingly distracted by impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. The Court of Appeals has been successful in computerising information systems. However, the average case management time has increased by nearly 80 percent between 2003 and 2012. Similarly, the Sandiganbayan has actually experienced a marked increase in average case processing time (38 percent between 2003 and 2012). Improvements in information technology have led to improvements in case tracking, but there does not appear to have been a resulting improvement in case processing time except for the impressive achievements with regard to small claims cases. However, increased success with the disposal of aged cases (especially for the Sandiganbayan), which is part of the reform effort supported by the JRSP, has militated against reductions in average case management time. To fully assess the impact on case management times it would be necessary to disaggregate the data and separate out

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dealing with aged cases, thus providing more nuanced information on case management time.

The Supreme Court’s view is that “the more efficient tracking and disposition of aged cases, which could be partly attributed to the reform initiatives under the JRSP, accounted for the unexpected increase (and therefore, an ostensible and seeming deterioration) in the average case processing time for the Higher Courts, particularly for the Sandiganbayan. This is so because only when cases are disposed will they be counted/included in the computation of this indicator. Thus, as more aged cases are being disposed, they tend to increase the value of the indicator.”16 

Table 9. Average Case Processing Time in Philippine Courts: 1998 to 201217

Court 2003 2008 2012

Supreme Court 1.4 1.6 1.9

Court of Appeals 1.3 2.3 2.3

Court of Tax Appeals 2.6 2.1 2.1

Sandiganbayan 6.6 4.4 9.1 Source: OCA

Note: While the lower courts (Regional Trial Courts, and Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts) do submit semi-annual docket inventory information to OCA, this is not processed in a manner that yields information on average case processing time.18

ii. At least a 10 percentage reduction in case backlogs in Pilot Model Courts relative to

the average for lower courts. Partially achieved. While there has been a 27 percent decrease since 2004 for Lapu-Lapu City, there has as yet been little change for Angeles City. However, the intention of this was to assess the impact of Pilot Model Courts and it is premature to evaluate this because they are not yet fully operational. While the buildings have been physically completed the agreed systems improvements that were the core of the Pilot Model are only partially in place. Moreover, additional courts in these premises are yet to be authorised and staffed.

It seems likely that the decongestion of Lapu-Lapu City Courts to date is attributable to a combination of a targeted judicial audit with close monitoring of case management initiated in 2010 and the new provisions for handled small claims cases.

16 Supreme Court email of September 20, 2013 and letter of September 23, 2013 17 Average in years 18 The Supreme Court Program Management Office has clarified in its email of September 20, 2013 that the “values for the average case processing time for the regional trial courts (second level) and metropolitan/municipal trial courts (first level) could not be generated from the records of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The monthly report of cases submitted by the first and second level courts primarily contains only the number of cases disposed, pending and beyond the prescribed period for promulgation (i.e., backlog). The difficulty also stems from the fact that there are no "systems" being used by the OCA to be able to determine the average case processing time, nor an electronic database of the "Docket Inventory" submitted semi-annually by the lower court judges. Incidentally, the docket inventory contains information on the cases that could actually be used to determine the case processing time. Finally, the OCA-Court Management Office's present operations do not include such docket analysis. Docket inventory reports are mainly just compiled and copies are retrieved only when requested during judicial audits for verification of cases disposed by specific judges.”

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It is only in the Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts that there has been a significant and sustained reduction in cases pending in Philippine courts (see Table 10). In contrast, Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court have all had an increase in cases pending. There was a reduction between 2004 and 2008 for both the Supreme Court and the Court of Tax Appeals, but these gains have since been reversed. However, it is noted that this rise in the number of cases before the senior courts does not necessarily mean that there has been an increase in case processing time, as it may be due to an increase in the number of new cases.

Table 10. Cases Pending in Philippine Courts: 1998 to 201219

Court 2004 2008 2012

Supreme Court 6,656 5,695 7,040

Court of Appeals 23,098 16,991 22,904

Court of Tax Appeals 712 688 856

Sandiganbayan 1,784 2,164 2,299

Regional Trial Courts 337,449 360,433 392,825

Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts 370,777 256,111 206,242

Source: SC data for 2008 and 2012. JRO (2-12-07) for 2004 and higher courts in 1998. Staff Appraisal report for lower courts in 1998.

iii. At least a 20 percent per annum increase in the number of citizens served by mobile

courts after they become operational. Achieved overall but not on a year-by-year basis. After an impressively rapid build-up in performance up until 2010 there has been a drop in EJOW achievements since (see Table 11). It appears that the impeachment proceedings distracted Supreme Court attention from the EJOW program, thus highlighting the unfortunate dependence of EJOW activity on regular involvement of Supreme Court Justices and senior officials. One would have anticipated that the EJOW Program would have been operating effectively and sustainably without intensive involvement by high-level Supreme Court officials well before now.

Table 11. Enhanced Justice On Wheels Achievements

Period Cases

Heard/Tried

Cases successfully

mediated

IBP legal aid beneficiaries

Number of

inmates released

Number of inmates

receiving medical/ dental

services

No. of barangay officials to whom

information disseminated

2004-5 245 160 200620 2007-8 3409 595 731 5386 6700 2009 2084 508 1782 1497 5200 2010 7097 1411 2757 3190 3080 2011 702 752 1166 1170 3299 4216

19 End of calendar year 20 No data reported by Supreme Court

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2012 843 58 713 495 2346 3000 Source: EJOW Committee, Supreme Court Objective 2. Enhancing institutional integrity. The development and adoption of a Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and a new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary by April 2004 demonstrated early intent with regard to this objective. Moreover, there has been extensive in-service training of court personnel, especially in the early years of the project. Second, a gender sensitive Human Resource Development Plan was developed and adopted by 2006. A Strategic Gender and Development Mainstreaming Plan had been adopted in 2004 recognizing the important role of women. Third, there have been important JRSP-financed investments in computers, distance learning equipment, building refurbishment and furniture to complement the Japan-funded new building to strengthen PHILJA. The initial push to enhance integrity has not been well supported by effective follow-up training, by the effective implementation of a computerized court management system, or by the establishment of more user-friendly alternative feedback mechanisms. The technical working group responsible for exploring options for establishing an improved whistleblowing system submitted its findings the Court En Banc in 2009, but a decision is still pending. Finally, the computers and distance learning equipment purchased as part of strengthening PHILJA has been of limited value because there was no internet connection available at PHILJA until May 2013. While the new general training rooms at PHILJA are being quite well utilized, the 64 computers placed in a dedicated computer training room have only been used once till March 2013 since they were purchased 2.5 years ago. Related performance indicators:

i. 50 percent of judges and other court personnel receiving training on Code of Ethics. Achieved. Widespread training (97 per cent of court personnel) has been undertaken, but the achievement of a sustained outcome impact is less clear as there has been limited follow-up.

ii. Implementation of a gender sensitive Human Resource Development Master Plan. Achieved. A five-year gender-sensitive HRD plan was developed by 2006 and circulars issued implementing it. Moreover, there has been an expansion of in-service training of judges and court personnel with PHILJA being heavily involved and the establishment of an e-library has sharply improved the availability of timely information to judges. However, while the judiciary has been successful in advancing gender balance and making more timely information and training more available, ongoing effort is needed to achieve genuine and sustained improvements in human resources.

Objective 3. Strengthening institutional capacity. The establishment of an e-library was an impressive early achievement by the Court. This e-library has made Supreme Court decisions widely available much more quickly than had been the case through the compilation of printed books. As can be seen from Table 12, usage of this e-library expanded rapidly during the 2004-2006 period, and has continued to expand since.

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Table 12. E-Library Use

Year Pages loaded First time visits Return visits Total visits 2006 36930 9430 2800 12230 2007 714563 211224 81883 293107 2008 879144 293615 104169 397784 2009 801720 255291 105316 360607 2010 809367 361441 160641 522082 2011 1005140 488210 191029 679239

201221 87493 47445 13726 61171 Source: StatCounter

A Regional Court Administration Office was piloted in Lapu-Lapu City but then closed following evaluation. Meanwhile, all options for decentralization, including the roll-out of regional court administration offices and more direct decentralization to individual Hall of Justice sites, are being reviewed by a new Committee on decentralization established by the Supreme Court En Banc in January 2013. However, this committee does not include the type of outside expertise on administrative options and change management that one might expect for a fully informed review. As yet the contracting of all court services for all lower courts, from security to cleaning, canteen, building maintenance and common use supplies is still centralized in Manila. This has continued to frustrate lower court officials and impede the timely response to needs as they arise. In spite of what appear to be clear potential benefits to judicial service delivery, there has yet to be substantive decentralization of court administration. Meanwhile, local government units continue to be a source of material support to lower level courts, thus creating the possibility of a conflict of interest when cases before the court involve local governments or their officials. As mentioned in section 2, the planned development and implementation of a financial management improvement program has not materialized. Financial management capacity within the Supreme Court was weak when the project was prepared and it still is. Analytical work on financial management was undertaken with support from the Asian Development Bank but there has been no resulting change22. Though the buildings are now complete for two of the three planned Pilot Model Courts (Lapu-Lapu City and Angeles City), this has been a slow and challenging process. Plans to construct the Pilot Model Court for Cagayan de Oro City were abandoned in 2005 due to an inability to resolve issues regarding land title. This was replaced by a plan to construct a Pilot Model Court in Manila, but after extensive preparation and protracted debate over two potential sites, the actual construction of a much-needed new Hall of Justice for Manila has been deferred beyond the time frame for the JRSP. Meanwhile, the process of designing and constructing the two Pilot Model Court buildings has resulted in improvements in the standard HOJ design template. Such improvements, showcased in Angeles City and Lapu-Lapu City, include making access to the Clerks of Court more user-friendly, provision for information near the entrance (though there is little information actually available on site as yet), and facilities for detainees.

21 Only till January 26 for 2012 22 Financial Accounting and Administrative Structure, two of the studies supported by ADB TA#3693-PH1, Strengthening the Independence and Defining the Accountability of the Judiciary

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The completion of these Pilot Model Court buildings does not, however, constitute the full establishment of the planned Pilot Model Courts, as the associated systems changes (court, case, financial and human resource management and systems) are yet to be fully implemented. Hence, while judges and staff working in these locations are delighted to have the new facilities it is premature to say that the Pilot Model Courts are fully operational. For example, the Pilot Model Courts in Lapu-Lapu City and Angeles City have yet to include genuine decentralization of administration from Manila. Additional IT capacity has been provided, but the full potential of a streamlined court and case management system is yet to be realized. Finally, the additional courtrooms that have been constructed remain empty because the laws to establish additional courts for these facilities are yet to be passed. Thereafter, it will take at least two years to recruit the additional judges and court staff. Related performance indicators:

i. Completion and testing of Pilot Model Courts with provision of modern case management systems, decentralized administration and financial management systems, and adequate physical infrastructure. Not satisfied. While the Pilot Model Court buildings are complete for two of the three sites – Lapu-Lapu City and Angeles City – anticipated systems changes provision, such as modern case management, is only partially in place and these sites do not yet have decentralized administration and financial management systems.

ii. 5 percentage-point increase in user satisfaction with Pilot Model Courts after first year of their operation. Not yet applicable, as none of the Pilot Model Courts are not yet fully operational.

Objective 4. Assist in strengthening support for the reform process. There has been knowledge sharing with such widespread foreign jurisdictions as Venezuela, Guatemala, Mexico, Spain, Egypt, South Africa and China. Philippine justices have participated in Asia Pacific Judicial Reform Forums in Sydney (2006) Kuala Lumpur (2007), Singapore (2008) and Beijing (2010) and a Distinguished Lecture series featuring notable international speakers was established. During project preparation, and till about early 2010, the Supreme Court actively coordinated relatively wide-ranging stakeholder consultations to explore options and garnish support for reforms, but this was not sustained thereafter. Thereafter, a succession of events placed this process on the back burner due to the judicial leadership’s other preoccupations.23 Knowledge

23 Some may ask whether project design should have included the continuation of stakeholder consultations as some sort of condition for continuing or extending the project. However, doing so would have implied a lack of confidence that the Supreme Court would continue doing what it was already doing and was explicitly committed to as part of its APJR. Not only was the overall reform program designed and being led by the Supreme Court but an ongoing consultation process was part of this and was already operating. The falling off in consultations was a casualty of developments in the Court from early 2010 onwards, developments that could not have been anticipated and which would almost certainly have curtailed consultations irrespective of how they had been specified in project design. From early 2010, the Court leadership was first immobilized and then in a state of siege, due to successive developments (the impending retirement of the Chief Justice in May 2010, the succession process, the appointment of a new Chief Justice in May 2010, his impeachment in December 2011 and conviction in May 2012, the

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sharing was part of consultations within the judiciary during the early years of the project, and there has been assistance in using new ICT equipment. The assessment of possible impacts of the APJR on the judiciary’s personnel and the subsequent preparation and implementation of an impact mitigation program that was included in Component D of the JRSP was not undertaken. This deprived the Court of a way to allay the concerns of anyone who felt that their employment and livelihood might be adversely affected by its reform program. Establishment of the Program Management Office provided a much needed capacity to facilitate reform initiatives and help coordinate development partner support, but its capacity was undermined during the second half of the project period through reductions in staffing, the loss of key expertise and protracted delays is decision making by the Court. Related performance indicators:

i. Maintenance of an active institutionalized program of public education, knowledge sharing, consultations, citizen feedback and dissemination of results. Initially satisfactory, but has become unsatisfactory in the later years of the project. Though such initiatives were undertaken during the early years of the project this effort has waned as changes in Judicial leadership successively changed the pace and focus of reforms. The initial user survey undertaken in 2006, but the contract for the second one was not issued until June 2013, with the result being a lack of data on outcomes and impacts. This has deprived the Court of valuable feedback. As a result, although the contract for the survey was issued in June 2013, the survey results needed to determine whether some of the project’s performance indicators have been achieved have not become available in time for ICR preparation.

3.3 Efficiency No cost benefit analysis has been done for this project, at appraisal or on completion, as it is very difficult to reliably estimate the economic and social benefits. In addition it is very difficult to accurately attribute benefits to JRSP initiatives when it is part of a wider APJR. However, it was anticipated that the fiscal cost of this project ($24.4 million) would be more than offset by increased tax revenue due to improved compliance, increased revenue from court fees and improvements in the efficiency of judicial operations. In retrospect it is very difficult to even confirm this. Overall tax revenue has certainly increased but even if one could estimate what share of this was due to improved compliance, it would not be possible to estimate with confidence what part of this improved compliance was due to the project. Similarly, while revenue form court fees has increased one cannot confidently determine how much of this increase was attributable to the project. What is clear is that delays, difficulties and disappointments discussed elsewhere in the report have reduced the efficiency of the project from what it could have been. Changes in the level of support from senior Court Management for the originally designed APJR, very protracted procurement and decision making processes often involving the Court En Banc, inherent institutional reluctance to change, and a tendency to examine some options (e.g. decentralization) repeatedly and defer decisions have undermined the efficiency of this project. So too has the

appointment of a new Chief Justice in August 2012 and the subsequent healing process) which effectively focused judicial leadership inward rather than outward.

26

dependence of the judiciary on other parts of government for complementary actions, such as the creating of additional courts and judge positions, and a lack of continued effective coordination of development partner support.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Unsatisfactory. Though there have been some significant achievements under the program, the majority of development outcome objectives are yet to be achieved. This rating is consistent with ratings given in implementation status and results reports during the latter years of implementation of the project (see table 13). Moreover, contracts for the independent evaluation and user survey were not signed until June 2013, 11 months after the project closing date.

Table 13. Summary ratings over time Dec

2004 Jun

2005 Jun

2006 Jun

2007 Jun

2008 Jun

2009 Nov 2010

Jun 2012

Progress towards achievement of project development objective

S S MS S S S U U

Overall implementation progress

U S U S S S U U

Overall risk rating M H Ratings: HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, MS=Moderately Satisfactory, MU=Moderately Unsatisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, M=Moderate, H=High Source: Implementation status reports and implementation support mission reports Although the refurbished and extended Halls of Justice are now completed in Lapu-Lapu City and Angeles City, the envisaged Pilot Model Courts in these locations are still not fully operational as the anticipated improvements in case, court, financial, and human resource management systems are yet to be fully implemented and the additional courtrooms that have been constructed remain empty because the additional courts that would use these facilities have not yet been established by the legislature. Similarly, though computerization has come to the Higher Courts, its potential is only partly being used. Hence, not surprisingly, the targeted reductions in case backlog have not been achieved. Second, PHILJA is now well-equipped with a distance learning center and computers for training, but delays in gaining access to internet facilities have severely limited the value of computer training and left the distance learning center inoperative until May 2013. Third, while the e-library, Justice on Wheels and small claims court improvements are noteworthy, the lack of a Model Pilot Court in Cagayan de Oro City deprives the Court of an opportunity to showcase reforms in Mindanao. Fourth, though a new Code of Conduct has been adopted and widespread initial training undertaken, this has not been followed up and complemented by improvements in feedback mechanisms and an increase in the general perceptions regarding the Judiciary Fifth, though electronic recording of fee payments has been introduced along with electronic payments to staff, there is little genuine decentralization of administrative decisions and little real change to budget and financial management practices.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

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This project was not designed to directly impact poverty though an improvement in business confidence and governance in general would accompany improved performance by the judiciary would indirectly benefit the poor. However, the recent focus of small claims cases and the substantial number of such cases resolved with project support through computerisation have directly benefited the poor and near poor. And, with the adoption of a new gender-sensitive Human Resource Master Plan, the Judiciary’s gender balance has been further strengthened. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Institutional change and strengthening has been a core part of this project and hence pervades much of the broader discussion of development outcome objectives and outcomes. As highlighted in various places in this report, institutional change has fallen well short of what was hoped for. PHILJA’s capacity has been markedly enhanced. The establishment of a Program Management Office was an early enhancement of institutional strengthening but its capacity and influence waned during the second half of the project period. The widespread increase in computer use through all levels of the judiciary has enhanced capacity, as has the expansion of training efforts and the e-library. But the continued lack of a well-integrated and well-coordinated ICT system in operation limits the full power of this greater availability of computer hardware. After extensive deliberations regarding decentralization, court administration and decisions regarding the provision of basic HOJ services continued to be highly centralized and a limitation on the efficiency of lower courts. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) One of the most significant outcomes of the JRSP has been the heightened level of discussion and awareness throughout the judiciary of the need for reforms to improve judicial performance. The project has resulted in the Bank being very actively involved in a substantive dialogue with the Court en Banc, with the appellate and lower courts, and with the various administrative units of the Court on reform options and implementation for the past decade. The most visible unintended outcome and impacts are probably the success of the Small Claims Cases and the rise in successful mediation. Both have important effects on the access to justice, especially by the poor and near-poor. In addition to the above, the perspective of the Supreme Court on the project’s unintended benefits and consequences (expressed at page 30 of the Borrower Contribution at Annex 9) is also worth recording: “There are, however, benefits and opportunities derived from the Project that were not captured by the performance indicators. From the consultations done in the two pilot model courts, the psychic reward of an improved court image, the physical comfort, the improvements in work efficiency, the stronger commitment to live up to the image of a model court, the happy faces of those transacting business with the court are just examples of effects not captured by the indicators nor measured under the surveys. Better cooperation and relationship with the LGU was also mentioned as a positive effect since the LGU also shares in the improved image and prestige. Cases brought to mediation improved in success rates. The Public Attorney's Office (P AO) reported that they are able to help more indigent litigants and do not mind the late work hours because of the better work environment and space for the lawyers and the litigants. Because of the privacy now being enjoyed, the litigants are more candid which result in faster ways of disposing cases. The one stop concept of the pilot court added to the court's accessibility and effectiveness in dealing with its clients. (Annex 12 for Highlights of recent FGDs in Angeles and Lapu-lapu HoJs). The experience of managing and implementing a reform process with all the successes, challenges and constraints is an invaluable gain in knowledge, behavior and skills

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outside of the expected benefits from the Project. The training[s] done under the Project have provided opportunities for self-improvement among the judges and the court personnel.”

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops A stakeholder workshop was organized by the Supreme Court in June 2012 in Cebu, where current and former Chief Justices, Justices, judges, other stakeholders (from justice-related entities such as the Department of Justice, the DILG, prosecution, public defenders, probation officers, Ombudsman Office etc.) were invited, along with the Bank and other development partners who had supported the APJR. The workshop was largely attended, and the key items for discussion related to the implementation experience and lessons to be drawn from the APJR and the JRSP. Other than the above, no beneficiary survey or stakeholder workshop has been undertaken as part of preparation for this ICR.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Substantial All eight of the risks identified at Appraisal and reviewed in Table 3 of this report persist (see Section 2). Not only has progress been slow and modest, but some of the gains achieved have not been maintained and continued progress with efforts to improve judicial performance and build public confidence in the judiciary remain vulnerable to significant risks. Sustainability remains uncertain. One risk that is dramatically reduced with the appointment of the current Chief Justice is that arising from successive changes in Chief Justice, as there should not be any further change for more than a decade. This continuity and stability in Supreme Court leadership would help achieve sustained reforms provided other risks are contained. Furthermore, this stability of Supreme Court senior management would provide a sound foundation for renewed coordination of development partner assistance. Achieving renewed and unified support from the Court en Banc for reforms is also uncertain. All but one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court are new since the Court’s Action Program for Judicial Reform was launched more than a decade ago. And there are varying degrees of enthusiasm for reforms among the existing Supreme Court Justices. Moreover, uncertainties arising from continuing changes to the Court as members reach the compulsory retirement age will persist. With the mid-term elections just completed there are now three years before the next Presidential election, thus providing a period of stability on that front too. Meanwhile, a growing economy with rising tax revenues should enable government to provide funding for continued improvement in judicial facilities, equipment and human resource development. Hopefully, during this period of relative stability, the various parts of government as a whole will find a way to more effectively work together to address the need for adjustment to the number and location of Regional and Municipal Trial Courts, as this has not kept pace with the evolving number and geographic distribution of court cases.

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Though there is recognition of the need for concurrent and complementary reforms to the Department of Justice the actual achievement of this change to alleviate constraints associate with the capacity of the prosecution and public defenders offices also constitutes a risk. And the same applies to the capacity of the police and prisons. Without concurrent improvements in other areas of the justice system, a perfect judiciary would be unable to achieve the desired development objectives in terms of access to justice and public trust. Uncertainty also persists with regard to the future role, functions and capacity of the Program Management Office. As mentioned earlier, its capacity has waned in recent years. If there is to be a renewed judicial reform effort, the capacity to coordinate and monitor this effort will need to be strengthened and a renewed PMO could be central to this. There is also need for a strategic planning capacity within the judiciary and it may be possible for the PMO to evolve into this if provided with suitable capacity, support and personnel. The benefits of further reform will depend very heavily on the extent of those reforms. Substantive reform of court, case, financial, and human resource management systems are needed to achieve major improvements in judicial performance, and more timely access to justice. Decentralization of court management is needed to meet day-to-day operating needs of courts more effectively. Yet the nature and extent of decentralization to be implemented remains unknown. The desired direction of information and communications systems improvements is clearer but will likely take considerable time, as the provision of needed resources and the capacity to implement such capacity improvements is limited. Lastly, sustaining efforts to improve human resources will be an on-going challenge and hence also constitutes an ongoing risk. Integrity training and feedback mechanisms need regular maintenance and, while significant progress has been made, there is no certainty that this will be maintained. There is yet to be a sustained reduction in vacancies rates for lower court judge positions to the desired low levels though salaries have been sharply increased.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory Key aspects of project preparation have been reviewed in sections 1 and 2.1. Not only was this project in direct support of the Philippine-initiated APJR, thereby reflecting strong Philippine ownership, but it was well-grounded in background diagnostic work and complied well with other lessons learned from elsewhere. Users were engaged in widespread consultations and involved in the design of reforms. Absorptive capacity was considered in sequencing implementation as was compatible with local culture. And the early achievement of results was targeted to reinforce momentum and strengthen support for on-going reform. In hindsight, there were four weaknesses in project design. First there was a degree of compromise in that while many in the judiciary saw the construction of new court buildings as the most important component of the project, the judicial leadership and the Bank viewed systems improvement (i.e. of court, case, financial and human resource management) as the highest priority. The buildings were to have been a means of showcasing these reforms. This difference in emphasis has lived on throughout the project and is reflected in the observation made in this ICR that the Pilot Model Courts in Lapu-Lapu City and Angeles City are still incomplete because

30

the systems reforms are largely yet to occur. Second, key risks were clearly identified (see Table 3), but effective options for sheltering the project from the majority of them were not developed. Hence, as many of these risks became reality they have limited project achievement and outcomes. Third, there is a disconnect between the project being in a sense a pilot and the overarching PDO and relatively broad performance indicators. The PDO was taken from the overarching APJR – the development of a more effective and accessible judicial system that would foster public trust and confidence – when something more limited to the actual scope of the project would perhaps have been more appropriate. Though the JRSP was a substantial injection of loan funds supporting institutional systems reform showcased in Pilot Model Courts it was well short of what would be needed to make a major dent in either the physical and information infrastructure needs of the judiciary, or in court performance in terms of backlog reduction/case processing times. Thus it was overly ambitious to expect it to achieve this PDO. Fourth, insufficient attention was given to the potential difficulties arising from unclear land titling. This was not highlighted as a risk, which it was, as evidenced by the inability to proceed with construction of the Cagayan de Oro City Hall of Justice. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The substantive high quality dialogue on JRSP issues that has characterized supervision of this project is a credit to the Supreme Court and the World Bank implementation support team. There have been challenging issues to deal with and numerous changes in personnel in the Supreme Court and its administrative units and in the World Bank team. Yet the mutual commitment to improving judicial performance and interest in Philippine development more broadly, together with mutual respect and appreciation, has underpinned a high quality dialogue. Within the framework of the JRSP, the Bank provided the Court with valuable analytical and technical advice while appreciating the independence of the judiciary and respecting its leadership of reforms. Implementation support missions twice each year were complemented by substantial additional support provided electronically, from the World Bank’s Office in Manila and through the Supreme Court’s active participation in the World Bank’s knowledge-sharing initiatives such as the Justice Sector Peer-Assisted Learning (JUSTPAL) Network. Indeed, the Bank’s task team leader was resident in Manila for a substantial part of the project life. In keeping with the recognized strategic importance of judicial reform, the Bank provided an unusually large and intensive overall amount of implementation support and supervision for this project, and there was an unusually large and prolonged involvement of relatively senior Bank personnel. Moreover, implementation support was for a longer period than expected because the closing date was extended by 2.5 years. In reality, the Bank has been responsive to the Court’s needs and requests throughout the project period through the length, volume and intensity of the technical support provided. Aide Memoires of implementation support missions provided clear recommendations and guidance. Difficulties were well documented and suggestions provided. Moreover, there has been diligent follow up of issues until solutions are found. The latest such example is the need for the PHILJA training center to have clear title to the land on which it is built, an issue that has persisted well past the closing date for the project. Implementation support from the Bank consistently highlighted the importance of ICT and advocated the strengthening of MISO. Similarly, the importance of improving judiciary

31

procurement and financial management, together with options for doing do, features frequently in dialogue. Implementation Status Reports became progressively more detailed over the course of the project. However, they did not always provide a full explanation of why Implementation Performance ratings changed. For example, monitoring and evaluation ratings changed from satisfactory one year (2007) to highly unsatisfactory the next, and changed almost every year of the project, yet the reason for these changes is not well documented. As discussed in section 2 on implementation the project was extended twice, the second time with a narrowing of the project scope to complete construction of the Angeles City Hall of Justice building plus a very limited set of activities to smooth project completion. However, there was no concurrent updating of the Project Development Objectives in spite of the fact that the initial overarching PDO was overly ambitious. While the disappointing lack of reforms and improvements in judicial performance renders the overall development outcome of the JRSP unsatisfactory this does not offset the high quality of implementation support provided by the Bank and the sustained high quality dialogue. One could well argue that the quality of supervision has been fully satisfactory, though a rating of moderately satisfactory is proposed here. The Supreme Court assessed Bank performance on quality of supervision at page 25 of its ICR Contribution as follows: “The Bank's implementation assistance had been helpful and timely in identifying operational issues and constraints, and in providing the necessary suggestions to address the issues. The details are documented in the Aides Memoire of the ISR Missions covering the period of JRSP implementation.” The Court also opined, at page 35, that “The Bank's ISR24 reports provided a wealth of useful information on project issues and advice. These reports should have been taken seriously and agreements monitored and evaluated for actions taken.” (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory As noted above this project was designed in support of an overarching Action Program for Judicial Reform that had been designed by the judiciary and was already being implemented with support from a number of development partners. At the time of negotiations the JRSP met the criteria for a successful project - (a) a high level of national ownership of and commitment to reform, (b) reaching out and working with users in the design and implementation of reform, (c) being mindful of absorptive capacity in sequencing implementation, (d) achieving results to reinforce momentum and support for on-going reform, and (e) ensuring that reforms were compatible with local institutional culture and reality. There were significant risks that were well documented in the Project Appraisal Document, but effective risk mitigation actions were not developed. Throughout the life of the JRSP, the Bank provided high quality and intensive implementation support and maintained a constant substantive dialogue on judicial reform with frequently

24 The acronym ISR here refers to Implementation Support and Review (missions).

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changing personnel in the Supreme Court and its key administrative units. However, this support was not effective in achieving the substantive reforms targeted for project support.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Not rated As the Judiciary is an independent and autonomous part of government as whole, the government (defined in this case to be the executive and legislative branches) has taken a modest role in this project. As the conduit for loan funds and the provider of budgetary resources, the executive was consistently supportive. But the executive and legislative branches of government did not provide timely support when it came to creating new courts to operate in the newly constructed courtrooms in Lapu-Lapu and Angeles City. Furthermore, there has been a lack of coordinated engagement by all three branches in establishing a country-wide needs-driven system for determining the number and location of courts (including consolidation of courts where needed) as population density and caseloads vary over time. These challenges inevitably militated against the smooth and timely implementation of judicial reforms and hence the project’s attainment of targeted outcomes. It is in keeping with the independence of the judiciary and the modest involvement of government in the JRSP, that government performance be not rated. (b) Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory As discussed throughout the first four sections of this report, the Court was substantially less effective in implementing JRSP-financed institutional reforms and civil works than was anticipated. Even by the end of the twice-extended closing date, reform achievements were modest. Much of the Court’s original APJR remains a work in progress, as does important parts of what this Judicial Reform Support Project was designed to support. Equally disappointing is the fact that the Court is probably no better equipped to implement such a project successfully and in a timely manner now than it was when the JRSP began because key aspects of institutional capacity have not been strengthened. Implementation was very slow, leading to two extensions of the closing date. Problems with land titling resulted in one of the three Pilot Model Court sites being abandoned mid-project. Then, after substantial preparation and feasibility studies the alternative of constructing new facilities for the Regional and Metropolitan Trial Courts in Manila was deferred beyond the life of the project because of Court flip-flops during 2009-2011 on finally deciding on a site. Despite adopting an ICT policy and strategy in September 2009, the Court’s inability to implement a judiciary-wide ICT-based case, financial and human resource management system with substantial decentralization in a timely manner has deprived it of an opportunity to fully leverage and showcase, through the JRSP, the potential benefits of such reforms. In general, high-quality diagnostic analysis and planning has been completed on many areas for reform, but this has not been followed through by actual reform implementation. Nevertheless, there continues to be an active dialogue exploring options for further improving judicial performance. At the time of project closing in June 2012, both the Bank and the Court agreed that in view of the special circumstances, the Court, as a special case and in an effort to get basic minimum information for the ICR, would utilize the unspent JRSP GOP allocations beyond the closing date

33

to finance and complete three delayed activities. These were to be completed by December 31, 2012, and comprised (i) an independent evaluation of the APJR, (ii) the final user survey, and (iii) a consultant to prepare the Borrower’s contribution to the ICR. Accordingly the Bank, at the request of the Court, extended the ICR completion deadline to March 31, 2013, and finally to September 30, 2013 after the Court informed the Bank that contracting for these three assignments would take more time than anticipated. However the APJR independent evaluation and the user survey were not contracted until June 2013 thus depriving this ICR of relevant data and information that could have informed the assessment and ratings. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Unsatisfactory The very slow progress with project implementation, the incompleteness of associated institutional reforms, delays in the completion of ICR-related actions and lack of information/data needed for a more complete assessment of project components (e.g. data on mobile courts) leads to the overall rating of unsatisfactory. There have been numerous factors (such as successive changes in Supreme Court leadership, and the impeachment of the Chief Justice during the final year of the project) contributing to this, but understanding the causes does not elevate this to a satisfactory performance. Key capacities that are essential for effective project implementation, such as financial management and timely procurement, have consistently fallen short and have not been adequately strengthened during the project period as was hoped. Lack of success in moving from top class analytical work on reform options to the actual implementation of preferred options persists and has hampered to pursuit of development outcomes.

6. Lessons Learned It may be more reasonable to refer to these as lessons reinforced rather than lessons learned from the experience of this project. They reflect various aspects of what could be considered key foundations for effective and sustained institutional reform, and in some cases link directly with risks identified during project preparation. It was known at the outset that this was a high-risk but high-potential reward project and indeed implementation delays and the limited nature of clear sustained development outcomes from the project have been consistent with this concern.

a) Strong and consistent support from the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc is essential for sustained reform. Judicial reform, including this project, enjoyed this type of strong support during the first three years of this project but less so in the subsequent years. Indeed, at the turn of the century the Chief Justice was instrumental in preparation of the umbrella APJR and initiating its implementation. The waning of senior Court management support 25 (and indeed from the Court as a whole) for the reforms as envisaged at the start of the project, reduced attainment of the project’s development outcomes.

25 This occurred after the first few years of the project with successive Chief Justices bringing somewhat different and generally more modest reform visions. There were five Chief Justices during the eight and a half years of the JRSP whereas it was anticipated that there would only be two during the originally planned six-year project.

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b) When key capacities (such as financial management and timely procurement processes) necessary for effective project implementation are weak at the start, success with early efforts to build them is essential. Protracted procurement procedures and time-consuming management processes requiring heavy involvement by senior officials can undermine reform momentum and project results. Delays in finalising procurement arrangements for the construction and renovation of Halls of Justice for Lapu-Lapu City and Angeles City did not avoid problems during construction. But they did delay construction and hence the pursuit of early achievements. Similarly, inadequate financial management arrangements and capacity have hampered fiduciary monitoring and management controls.

c) Project design could build in ‘circuit breakers’ to allow disengagement during project implementation if certain key assumptions are not fulfilled, or unforeseen events occur. In the case of the JRSP, such a ‘circuit breaker’ was inserted during the second extension (in the form of dated covenants to enable the Bank to cancel loan proceeds if the contracts for associated activities were not signed by agreed dates). In hindsight, given the independence of the judiciary and the reluctance of executive oversight bodies to intervene in projects implemented by the Supreme Court, it would have been helpful for such provisions to have been inserted in the legal documents at the outset, so that the Court or the Bank could have avoided – until too late - becoming locked into an unsatisfactory situation from which there was no escape for any of the parties involved.

d) Consistent commitment of key administrative offices of the judiciary, as well as the Court en Banc, is essential for effective and sustained implementation of institutional reforms. While the establishment of a Program Management Office has been critical in coordinating and catalysing reforms and in getting reforms under way, it can never be a full substitute for the genuine embrace of reforms by key organic units such as the Office of Court Administration (OCA), MISO or the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO).

e) Whenever focus moves from results and implementing agencies shift focus from outcomes to process, reform momentum wanes. Following due process is important but is not itself a project outcome. Similarly, while piloting reform options can be a valuable part of diagnostic research, excessive piloting can become a form of procrastination and ultimately undermine reform efforts by delaying achievements. In this case, the prolonged piloting and indecision surrounding options for decentralising, streamlining and automating court, case, financial and human resource management has greatly deferred the attainment of results and impact, and undermined reform momentum. Prioritization is needed to stay focused on results and avoid being excessively distracted by process.

f) Care is needed to ensure that a dedicated PMO is well-equipped and supported throughout the project life, and that it works effectively with the judiciary’s key operating institutions 26 , in supporting and coordinating reforms, rather than succumbing to time-driven pressures and becoming directly involved in implementing reforms. Some quick reform gains can be achieved by dedicated project implementing agencies directly imposing reforms with authority derived from senior management. But without the genuine embrace of reforms by organic administrative units of the judiciary, short–term gains can be more than offset by medium and longer-term

26 For example, the Office of Court Administrator, Management Information Systems Office, Office of Halls of Justice, and Fiscal Management and Budget Office.

35

losses arising from the exacerbation of natural institutional resistance to change. Considerable time and effective working-level cooperation and teamwork between a PMO and organic institutional management is critical to build and sustain institutional support for reforms.

g) Active support from the other branches of government and key related agencies of government (e.g. DOJ) is essential for necessary complementary actions that are outside the purview of the Judiciary. Without this wider support, risks arising from institutional impediments outside the control of the Judiciary can limit the attainment of desired development outcomes. In this case delays in establishing additional courts to make use of expanded court facilities constructed under the project as part of Pilot Model Courts has delayed and limited the achievement of targets project outcomes. Second, action by the DOJ is critical for ensuring that the constraints on the capacity of the prosecution office do not limit the attainment of potential improvements in judicial performance.

h) Sustained coordination of development-partner assistance with effective local leadership is important for effectiveness and enduring success. In this case there was an effective donor forum led and coordinated by the Supreme Court at the time this project was prepared and during early years of implementation but this was not sustained beyond the third year of the project. This has led to inadequate coordination of development partner support. Furthermore, differing visions and fragmented (and uncoordinated) financial support advanced by individual development partners has contributed to significant distraction, confusion and delays in reform.

i) Care is needed to ensure that Project Development Objectives and Performance Indicators match the scope of the project well. In this case, there was somewhat of disconnect in that the PDO was more appropriate for the judiciary’s overarching APJR than the JRSP. Similarly, some of the performance indicators presumed that parts of the overall judicial reform program not directly under the JRSP would be concurrently achieved. Without this match between the project and PDOs, assessing project performance is difficult.

Justice sector reform remains so important for sustained poverty reduction and overall human and economic development objectives that it warrants continued support from development partners. The attainment of targeted outcomes from individual support initiatives will continue to be high risk, but the potential rewards are very high. Indeed, improved justice sector performance in the Philippines remains critical for the broader attainment of improved governance and confidence in the consistent and transparent rule of law.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The Borrower’s ICR Report is included as Annex 9. The most significant difference between this and the Borrower’s ICR Report pertains to the ratings. In all but the substantial risk to development outcomes, the Bank has rated outcome and performance more negatively than the Borrower has. These differences are summarized below in Table 14. While the Bank very much appreciates this opportunity to have worked closely with the Philippine Judiciary in support of its Action Program for Judicial Reform, progress towards the objectives of the JRSP and with the Court’s broader reform agenda has been such that the Bank cannot agree to a ‘Satisfactory” rating.

36

Table 14. Comparison of Bank and Borrower Ratings of the JRSP Bank Rating Borrower Rating Development Outcome Unsatisfactory Partially Achieved Risk to development outcomes

Substantial Substantial

Bank PerformanceEnsuring quality at entry Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Quality of supervision Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory Bank overall Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory

inclined towards Satisfactory Borrower Performance Government Not rated Satisfactory Implementing agency Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Borrower overall Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory

towards Satisfactory In parallel with this, Data Sheet G (Ratings of Project Performance in ICRs) in the Borrower ICR Contribution is incomplete. In Data Sheet G there are actually six occasions when either the achievement of Development Outcomes (DO) or Implementation Progress (IP) were rated as Unsatisfactory, compared with only two in the Borrower Contribution version of this Data Sheet. (b) Co-financiers There were no direct co-financiers. (c) Other partners and stakeholders The ADB and USAID have both remained actively involved in supporting Philippine judiciary reform efforts throughout the past decade. Not only did the ADB provide substantial Technical assistance early on and an adjustment loan, but support for judicial reform remains a part of its technical support for good governance. USAID have provided substantial support for upgrading information systems and computerizing court and case management.

37

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

A. Improving Case Management and Access to Justice

6.37 5.69 89.3

B. Enhancing Institutional Integrity

0.27 0.24 88.9

C. Strengthening Institutional Capacity of the Judiciary

14.76 13.07 88.6

D. Stakeholder Support for Reform and Program Management Office

0.84 0.72 85.7

CONTINGENCIES 1.96 1.96 100.0

Total Baseline Cost 24.20 21.68 89.6 Total Project Costs 24.20 21.68 89.6

Front-end fee IBRD 0.22 0.22 100.0 Total Financing Required 24.42 21.90 89.7

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Co-

financing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 2.50 2.50 100.0 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

21.90 20.61 94.1

38

Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component Outputs A. Improving case adjudication and access to justice i. Designing and implementing an improved

computer-based case management systems, initially in the Supreme Court and higher courts (the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) and in the pilot model courts;

ii. Designing and implementing an improved court records management system;

iii. Installing computer-aided transcription equipment in higher and pilot model courts;

iv. Reorganizing the jurisdictional structure of courts;

v. Developing policy options for addressing affordability constraints to access to the court system by the poor;

vi. Strengthening access to justice via mobile courts, and

vii. Upgrading the judiciary’s ICT system.

i. Computer-based case management system operating in Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals. A different system operated in the Sandiganbayan for a while but is now being replaced. Computer-based case management system pilot tested in Pasay City and Lapu-Lapu City Courts.

ii. Computer-based records management systems introduced in higher courts

iii. Computer-aided transcription equipment not yet installed.

iv. High quality study of re-engineering of Court’s jurisdictional structure undertaken and submitted to the Court en Banc, but no action taken.

v. Study of options for addressing affordability constraints on access to the courts by the poor completed by 2010 but no action has yet been taken.

vi. Eight mobile courts have been established and used to help decongest selected courts and prisons. Two now being used in place of courts damaged by natural disasters. But mobile courts not widely used to extend justice in underserved remote areas.

vii. EISP development and adopted in 2009. Additional: Rules and Procedures for small claims cases

improved in 2008 and computer facilities provided to 831 first level courts, helping decongestion.

Judicial Audit in 2010 for Lapu-Lapu City Courts helped to reduce case backlog. 

B. Enhancing institutional integrity i. Developing a comprehensive Code of

Ethics for justices, judges, lawyers and court personnel together with training;

ii. Developing alternative feedback mechanisms on judicial performance that improve the quality and quantity of venues for information exchange on judicial functions, operations and performance;

iii. Implementing a computerized judicial performance management system in three pilot courts and in the Higher Courts, and

iv. Introducing a gender sensitive Human Resources Development Master Plan for non-judicial personnel, and strengthening The Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).

i. Code of Conduct for court and judicial personnel promulgated in 2004 and 97 percent of personnel trained during the project period.

ii.  Whistle-blower proposal drafts and submitted to Supreme Court but no action yet taken.

iii. A computerized judicial performance

management system has yet to be implemented in any of the target courts

iv. Gender sensitive Human resource Development Plan developed in 2006 and is being implemented. PHILJA has been substantially strengthened with renovation, additional capacity, computer equipment and a distance learning capability.

39

C. Strengthening institutional capacity i. Implementing a decentralized

administration model for the judiciary in selected Pilot Model Courts;

ii. Developing and implementing a computer-based financial management improvement program for use in Pilot Model Courts;

iii. Establishing Pilot Model Courts in each of Mindanao, Visayas and Luzon; and

iv. Establishing an electronic library and

research facility.

i. Regional Office of Court Administrator pilot tested in Lapu-Lapu City but then suspended. No significant decentralization now in place.

ii. Financial management improvement program yet to be implemented

iii. Pilot Model Halls of Justice completed in Lapu-Lapu City (Visayas) and Angeles City (Luzon) but none in Mindanao. But these are without much of the anticipated systems reforms.

iv. E-library established quickly and is widely used thus helping judges and judicial personnel be better informed 

D. Assist in strengthening support for the reform process i. Undertaking a study of the possible impact

of the APJR of judicial personnel; ii. Carrying out knowledge sharing programs; iii. Providing technical and institutional

support and assistance with implementation and supervision, and undertaking programs for internal communication for the courts;

iv. Implementing public communication programs to promote the Action Program for Judicial Reform, and developing community outreach and user-surveys to obtain feedback; and

v. Strengthening the capacity of the Program Management Office.

i. No study of the possible impact of APJR reforms has been done.

ii. Distinguished lecture series established. Exchanges with numerous foreign judiciaries, including Spain, Egypt, South Africa and China. Asia Pacific Judicial Forum established and held forums in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

iii. Consultations within the judiciary during preparation and in the early years of implementation. Change Management Committee established

iv. Wide array of workshops and consultations held early in the project period. Enhanced Justice on Wheels included public information events. First user survey done but second only begun in mid-2013. 

v. Capacity of Program Management Office weakened, rather than strengthened, during the project period

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis There was no economic or financial analysis.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes Project Processing Schedule

Project Schedule Planned Actual Time taken to prepare project (months) 24 First Bank mission (identification) 03/01/2001 Appraisal mission departure 05/05/2003 05/05/2003 Negotiations 05/22/2003 05/22/2003 Planned Date of Effectiveness 11/10/2003 12/04/2003

Prepared by: Supreme Court of the Philippines Preparation assistance: Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) Grant from Govt. of Japan

40

Bank staff who worked on the project included: Name Specialty

Mr. Lloyd McKay Lead Economist (Task Team Leader) Mr. Anthony G. Toft Senior Counsel (LJR Specialist)Mr. Waleed Haider Malik Senior Public Sector Management Specialist Mr. Richard Messick Senior Public Sector SpecialistMs. Karin Nordlander Lead CounselMr. Gerald Thacker Infrastructure SpecialistMr. Fulvio Carbonaro ICT SpecialistMs. Cecilia D. Vales Senior Operations Officer (Procurement) Mr. Joseph G. Reyes Operations Officer (Financial Management) Mr. Jose Tiburcio Nicolas Operations Officer (Social Protection) Ms. Maya Gabriela Q. Villaluz Operations Officer (Environment) Mr. James P. Villafuerte EconomistMs. Neena Shrestha Program AssistantMs. Marjorie P. Espiritu Program AssistantMs. Muriel S. Greaves Program AssistantMr. Walter Meza-Cuadra Program Assistant

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending Fulvio Carbonaro Consultant EASPR IT Specialist Marjorie P. Espiritu Program Assistant Muriel S. Greaves Program Assistant EASPR

Walid Haider Malik Senior Public Sector Management Specialist

LCSPR Public Sector Management

Richard Messick Senior Public Sector Specialist PRMPS Public Sector Lloyd McKay Lead Economist EASPR TTL Walter Meza-Cuadra Program Assistant EASPR Jose Tiburcio Nicolas Operations Officer EACPH Social Protection Karin Nordlander Lead Counsel LEGAL

Joseph G. Reyes Operations Officer EACPH Financial Management

Neena Shrestha Program Assistant EACPH

Philip Gerald Thacker Consultant ECSPE Infrastructure Specialist

Anthony G. Toft Senior Council LEGAL Legal Cecilia D. Vales Lead Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement Officer James P. Villafuerte Economist EASPR Economics Maya Gabriela Q. Villaluz Operations Officer EACPH Environment

Supervision/ICR

Agnes Albert-Loth Sr Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Financial Management

Aisha Lanette de Guzman Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Financial Management

Rene SD. Manuel Senior Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement Lloyd McKay Consultant ECSP4 ICR preparation Amitabha Mukherjee Lead Public Sector Specialist ECSP4 Judicial Reform; TTLSusana Padilla Program Assistant ECSP4

41

Zoi Melina Papoutsis Consultant ECSP4 Data Analysis, Operations Support &ICR Drafting

Gerardo F. Parco Operations Officer EASPS Environmental Safeguards

Evelyn D. Quirante Program Assistant CFRVP Procurement

Joseph G. Reyes Financial Management Specialist EAPCO Financial Management

Samuel Haile Selassie Senior Procurement Specialist EAPCO Procurement

Ramesh Sivapathasundram Lead E-Governance Specialist TWICT Information & Communications Technology

Philip Gerald Thacker Consultant ECSPE Physical Infrastructure

Anthony G. Toft Deputy General Counsel (Operations) LEGVP Legal Cecilia D. Vales Lead Procurement Specialist EAPPR Procurement; TTL

Maya Gabriela Q. Villaluz Senior Operations Officer EASPS Environmental Safeguards

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY00 10.67 FY01 105.15 FY02 143.95 FY03 173.53 FY04 30.03 FY05 20.90 FY06 0.02 FY07 2.50 FY08 1.21

Total: 487.96 Supervision/ICR

FY00 0.00 FY01 8.43 FY02 0.00 FY03 5.27 FY04 23.52 FY05 88.21 FY06 150.68 FY07 120.67 FY08 67.45

Total: 464.23

42

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results There was no beneficiary survey undertaken.

43

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

There was no stakeholder workshop.

Annex 7. Comments of Co financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

None obtained.

Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents

There are no additional supporting documents.

44

Annex 9. Summary of Borrower's ICR The Borrower’s ICR is attached on the following page.

IliganIligan

PasigPasigQuezon Quezon

GeneralGeneralSantosSantos

LucenaLucena

ViracViracBatangasBatangas

BoacBoacMamburaoMamburao

RomblonRomblon

Santa CruzSanta Cruz

AntipoloAntipolo

BalerBalerPalayan Palayan

TarlacTarlacIbaIba

MalolosMalolosBalangaBalanga

Trece MartiresTrece Martires

Laoag CityLaoag City

ViganViganBanguedBangued

TabukTabuk

IlaganIlagan

CabarroguisCabarroguis

BontocBontocLagaweLagawe

BayombongBayombongLa TrinidadLa Trinidad

LingayenLingayen

KabugaoKabugao

BascoBasco

Puerto PrincesaPuerto Princesa

PiliPili

SorsogonSorsogon

DaetDaet

MasbateMasbateCatarmanCatarman

BoronganBoronganCatbaloganCatbalogan

NavalNaval

MaasinMaasin

BacolodBacolod

DumagueteDumaguete SiquijorSiquijor

TagbilaranTagbilaran

MambajaoMambajao

SurigaoSurigao

San JoseSan Jose

TandagTandag

Tubod Tubod

ProsperidadProsperidad

TagumTagumNabunturanNabunturan

MatiMatiKidapawanKidapawan

DigosDigosIsulanIsulan

Marawi Marawi

MalaybalayMalaybalay

OroquietaOroquietaDipologDipolog

IpilIpil

IsabelaIsabelaCityCity

JoloJolo

KaliboKaliboRoxas CityRoxas City

San Jose deSan Jose deBuenavistaBuenavista

JordanJordan

AlabelAlabel

PanglimaPanglimaSugalaSugala

ZamboangaZamboanga Shariff AguakShariff Aguak(Maganoy)(Maganoy)

San FernandoSan Fernando

TuguegaraoTuguegarao

BaguioBaguioSan FernandoSan Fernando

LegaspiLegaspi

TaclobanTacloban

CebuCebu

ButuanButuan

DavaoDavaoCotabatoCotabato

CagayanCagayande Oro de Oro

IloiloIloilo

PagadianPagadian

KoronadalKoronadal

CalapanCalapan

CalambaCalamba

MANILAMANILA

MALAYSIAMALAYSIA

Iligan

PasigQuezon

GeneralSantos

Lucena

ViracBatangas

BoacMamburao

Romblon

Santa Cruz

Antipolo

BalerPalayan

TarlacIba

MalolosBalanga

Trece Martires

Laoag City

ViganBangued

Tabuk

Ilagan

Cabarroguis

BontocLagawe

BayombongLa Trinidad

Lingayen

Kabugao

Basco

Puerto Princesa

Pili

Sorsogon

Daet

MasbateCatarman

BoronganCatbalogan

Naval

Maasin

Bacolod

Dumaguete Siquijor

Tagbilaran

Mambajao

Surigao

San Jose

Tandag

Tubod

Prosperidad

TagumNabunturan

MatiKidapawan

DigosIsulan

Marawi

Malaybalay

OroquietaDipolog

Ipil

IsabelaCity

Jolo

KaliboRoxas City

San Jose deBuenavista

Jordan

Alabel

PanglimaSugala

Zamboanga Shariff Aguak(Maganoy)

San Fernando

Tuguegarao

BaguioSan Fernando

Legaspi

Tacloban

Cebu

Butuan

DavaoCotabato

Cagayande Oro

Iloilo

Pagadian

Koronadal

Calapan

Calamba

MANILA

1

2

4

6

7

11

14

17

18

19

20

2122

16

23

2425

27

31

39

42 46

47

49

54

75

59

62

65

66

71

73

74

76

80

79

77

78

63

3

5 9

10

8

12

13

15

28

29

30

26

32

33

34

35 36

37

38

40

41

43

44 45

48

50

51

52

53

55

56

58

61

64

68

69

70

60

67

72

57

ZAMBOANGA CITY

ICAR II

III

IV-A

V

IV-B VI VII

VIII

IX X

XIII

XI

XII

ARMM

NCR

MALAYSIA

Celebes Sea

Moro

Sulu Sea

Leyte Gulf

Visayan

Sea

Mindoro Strait

SibuyanSea

Phi l ippine

Sea

Babuyan Channel

Luzon Strai t

Gulf

DavaoGulf

MindanaoSea

BatanIslands

BabuyanIslands

PolilloIslands

LubangIslands

Catanduanes

TicaoSibuyanTablas

Busuanga

SemiraraIslands

CuyoIslands

Culion

Linapacah

Dumaran

Bugsuk

Balabac

Cagayan Sulu

Tawi-Tawi

Sulu

Basilan

Mindanao

CamiguinSiquijor

Negros

Panay

Bohol

Cebu Leyte

SamarMasbate

Marinduque

BuriasMindoro

Palawan

Luzon

Dinagat

Siargao

Sarangani

20ºN

10ºN

5ºN125ºE

120ºE

125ºE

IlocosIlocos NorteIlocos SurLa UnionPangasinan

Cordillera Admin. Reg.AbraApayaoBenguetIfugaoKalingaMountain Province

Cagayan ValleyBatanesCagayanIsabelaNueva VizcayaQuirino

Central LuzonAuroraBataanBulacanNueva EcijaPampangaTarlacZambales

National Capital Reg.

CALABARZONBatangasCaviteLagunaQuezonRizal

MIMAROPAMarinduqueMindoro OccidentalMindoro OrientalPalawan*Romblon

BicolAlbayCamarines NorteCamarines SurCatanduanesMasbateSorsogon

Western VisayasAklanAntiqueCapizGuimarasIloiloNegros Occidental

Central VisayasBoholCebuNegros OrientalSiquijor

Eastern VisayasBiliranEastern SamarLeyteNorthern SamarSamarSouthern Leyte

Zamboanga PeninsulaZamboanga del NorteZamboanga del SurZamboanga SibugayZamboanga City

I1234

CAR56789

10

II1112131415

III16171819202122

NCR

IV-A2324252627

IV-B2829303132

V333435363738

VI394041424344

VII45464748

VIII495051525354

IX555657---

Northern MindanaoBukidnonCamiguinLanao del NorteMisamis OccidentalMisamis Oriental

Davao Reg.Compostela ValleyDavao del NorteDavao del SurDavao Oriental

SOCCSKSARGENNorth CotabatoSaranganiSouth CotabatoSultan Kudarat

CaragaAgusan del NorteAgusan del SurDinagat IslandsSurigao del NorteSurigao del Sur

Autonomous Reg. inMuslim MindanaoBasilanLanao del SurMaguindanao**SuluTawi-Tawi

X5859606162

XI63646566

XII67686970

XIII7172737475

ARMM

7677787980

**Shariff Aguak (Maganoy) andSultan Kudarat serve as co-capitalsof the province.

*Executive Order 429, May 23, 2005,provides for the transfer of Palawanprovince (#31) from Region IV toRegion VI; Administrative Order 129holds EO429 in abeyance until animplementation plan is approvedby the President.

PHILIPPINES

0 50 100

0 50 100 Miles

150 Kilometers

IBRD 33466R4

NOVEMBER 2012

PHIL IPPINESSELECTED CITIES

PROVINCE CAPITALS

REGION CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

PROVINCE BOUNDARIES

REGION BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, o r any endo r s emen t o r a c c e p t a n c e o f s u c h boundaries.