Section 7

VALMONTE v. BELMONTE

FACTS:Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al.

Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts."

On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

Issue: Whether or not Valmonte, et. al. may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured by Imelda Marcos in favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa.

Held: The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 states that "The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State.

In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.

As stated in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. Herein, the information sought by Valmonte, et. al. is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the 7 February 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. However, a second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. On this matter, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues.

The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. Although it may be true that when the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. Such competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in the present case. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.

Thus, neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, Belmonte, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted.

It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny.

In fine, Valmonte, et. al. are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured.

GONZALES v. NARVASA

Digest 1FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.

HELD: It is the duty of the Executive Secretary to answer the letter of the petitioner. The letter deals with matters of public concern, appointments to public offices and utilization of public property. The Executive Secretary is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of appointment papers.

Digest 2Petitioner asks the Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Zamora to answer his letter requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang.

The Court ruled that Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. Respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property.

With regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.

CHAVEZ v. PCGG

Digest 1FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

VDA DE URBANO v. GSIS

FACTS:1. In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm property in Q.C. to Gsis to secure a housing loan. Since they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on the property and emerged as the highest bidder.2. In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. They wrote to the GSIS Acquired Assets Department signifying their intent to reclaim. On October 16, GSIS told them to pay the redemption price of 154k in full before Nov 18, 1984.3. The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the Acquired Assets Dpeartment subsequently told them to pay 174k in cash with an extension of 30 days to the November date. Failure to do so forfeited the reclamation of the property and sold in a public bidding.4. The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of the property. The Gsis AAD declined.5. The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loan worth 240,000 with the GSIS real estate department to repurchase their foreclosed property. Despite attempts from Vice Governor Mathay to adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the the petitioners were unable to pay. GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor.6. The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase the property for 250,000 spot cash. Without knowledge of the rival offer, the petitioners then offered a 50,000 downpayment with the 124k balance to be paid in 5 years. He also enclosed 10k in check as earnest money. The Board informed them that it had adopted reolution 881 that declined their offer to repurchase.7. At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the property. They accepted her offer of purchase. A new TCT was issued to her.8. The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded because a certificate of award or sale was not issued in favor of the applicant. Moreover, the applicant, Urbano the petitioner, was 81 years old and no longer a member of the GSIS. It wasnt given due consideration.9. Having learned about the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners requested the formal investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC of QC branch 102.10. The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of appeals.11. Hence this petition.

Issues:1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property?2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public bidding?3. Was GSIS in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?

Ruling: Petition Dismissed

Ratio:1. No

Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the GSIS to acquire, utilize, and dispose of real or personal properties in the Philippines or elsewhere. It was amended by PD 1981 which gave the GSIS the power to compromise or release any claim or settled liability to the system.

SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in determining the terms and condition of financial accommodations to its members with the dual purpose of making the GSIS more responsive to the needs of GSIS members. The laws also stipulated that the Board could exercise discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioners offer to repurchase the subject property taking into account the dual purpose enunciated in the whereas clause of PD 1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its members.

With regard to the Boards exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC, the Court also held that repurchase of foreclosed property after redemption period imposes no such obligation on the purchaser (the board in this case) to re-sell the property since the property belongs to him (the board as well)

The boards denial of petitioners request to purchase the subject property was not based on whim but on a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the petitioners to make good their repeated offers to purchase the subject property. Based on the circumstances, the petitioners were repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay.

In the comments of the AAD manager, the observation was that the petitioners lacked the capacity to pay up.

The petitioners are not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter of right. The Board exercised its discretion in accordance with law in denying their requests and the GSIS cant be faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted under the petitioners application under Operation Pabahay. The sale to respondent cant be annulled on such invoked right.

2. No.

The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of the assets through public bidding and only upon its failure, through a public sale.

GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not apply because it covered unserviceable govt property and not acquired assets.SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) applies only to unserviceable govt property or those no longer needed. The house was obviously not unserviceable. And it was still used by petitioners.

With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the General guidelines on the divestment or disposal of assets of government owned corporations the law stipulated that it availed of an exception to the requirement of disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to sales of merchandise held for sale in the regular course of business. The Court read it in relation to Coa circular 89-296 which provided for Audit Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other Assets of Government Agencies, which also did not apply the public bidding disposal requirement to merchandise or inventory held for sale in the regular course of business nor to the disposal by govt financial institutions of foreclosed assets or collaterals acquired in the regular course of business and not transferred to the Govt under proclamation no 50.The modes of disposal included Public auction and sale thru negotiation.

Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question whether the subject property was covered by the said Circular or falls under its exception. It held that 89-296 was to be interpreted with 86-264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the same thing ought to be taken in consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari material are to be taken together as if they were one law.

Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that these were used to generate more revenue for GOCCS through the disposition of its non-preforming assets. (Look into PD 50 or the asset privatization trust in the case) According to the court, the policy intent on the disposition of acquired assets then governed the case at bar.

Was the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these laws? The court said yes, which meant that their sale negotiation fell under the regular course of business, and thus did not offend the requirements of the said coa circulars.

3. No.

GSIS denial of petitioners further requests for repurchase of subject property was based on a factual determination of the petitioners financial capacity and the GSIS charter, PD 1146. Also, GSIS sold the property to dela Cruz only after giving them one year to repurchase.

The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte case, cant also impute bad faith on GSIS when it was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In the Valmonte case, the court held that the constitutional right to information was limited to matters of public concern to transactions involving public interest.The sale of the property was not imbued by public interests as it was a purely private transaction. Pets. Cant demand to be informed of such public negotiation since they had no interest on the subject property since they failed to comply with the GSIS terms of repurchase and the denial to repurchase under the GSIS terms.