DG Protection

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Protection of Power Systems with Distributed Generation: State of the Art Martin Geidl Power Systems Laboratory Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich [email protected] 20th July 2005

description

DG Protection Philosophy

Transcript of DG Protection

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Protection of Power Systems with Distributed

Generation: State of the Art

Martin GeidlPower Systems Laboratory

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) [email protected]

20th July 2005

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Abstract

The integration of distributed sources into existing networks brings up sev-eral technical, economical and regulatory questions. In terms of physicalintegration, protection is one of the major issues. Therefore new protec-tion schemes for both distributed generators (DG) and utility distributionnetworks have been developed in the recent years, but there are still openquestions.

This document is the result of a literature study and intends to givean overview of issues and current state concerning protection of DG. Thefirst part gives a basic introduction to distributed generation and powersystem protection. In section 2 protection issues concerning DG are outlined,then the current practice is described in section 3. In section 4 some newapproaches in this field are reported and finally section 5 concludes with anoutlook.

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Contents

List of Acronyms 2

1 Introduction 31.1 Distributed Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.2 Power System Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.3 Generation and Interconnection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.3.1 Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.3.2 Transformers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.3.3 Power Electronic Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.3.4 Interconnection System View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2 Protection Issues with DG 72.1 Short Circuit Power and Fault Current Level . . . . . . . . . 82.2 Reduced Reach of Impedance Relays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102.3 Reverse Power Flow and Voltage Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . 102.4 Islanding and Auto Reclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122.5 Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.5.1 Ferroresonance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.5.2 Grounding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3 Current Practice 143.1 Island Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3.1.1 Passive Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.1.2 Active Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3.2 Interconnect vs. Generator Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193.3 Examples of State-of-the-Art Relays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.3.1 Integrated Generator Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 213.3.2 Loss of Mains Relay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213.3.3 Integrated Genset Control Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 223.3.4 General Electric Universal Interconnection Device . . 22

3.4 International Recommendations, Guidelines and Standards . 23

4 New Approaches 234.1 Adaptive Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234.2 Synchronized Phasor Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254.3 Intelligent Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5 Conclusion and Future Work 26

References 27

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List of Acronyms

AC Alternating CurrentAEPS Area Electric Power SystemAM Asynchronous MachineAPS Adaptive Protection SystemCHP Combined Heat and PowerDC Direct CurrentDER Distributed Energy RessourceDG Distributed, Decentralized, or Dispersed GenerationEG Embedded GenerationGPS Global Positioning SystemHV High VoltageIED Intelligent Electronic DeviceIM Induction MachineLOE Loss Of EarthLOG Loss Of GridLOM Loss Of MainsLV Low VoltageMV Medium VoltageNDZ Non-Detection ZonePCC Point of Common CouplingPFC Power Factor CorrectionPMU Phasor Measurement UnitPV PhotoVoltaicsROCOF Rate Of Change Of FrequencySCADA Supervisory Control And Data AcquisitionSM Synchronous MachineSPS Special Protection SchemesUI Universal InterconnectionVVS Voltage Vector Shift

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1 Introduction

1.1 Distributed Generation

Distributed, dispersed, decentralized or embedded generation (DG, EG) arekeywords for an upcoming probable paradigm shift in electric power gener-ation.1 As mentioned in [1], there is no standing international definition forthese terms, but there are a number of legal definitions in several countries.A proposal for a definition of distributed generation is given in [4]. However,many distributed power sources have some characteristics in common:

• Their rating is small compared to conventional power plants,

• they are often privately owned,

• they are not centrally dispatched,

• they are connected to MV or LV distribution networks,

• they do not contribute to frequency or voltage control,

• and usually they were not considered when the local grid was planed.Hence, there are infrastructural needs as, for example, means of com-munication.

Two major reasons for an increased utilization of DG are liberalized mar-kets which are now opened for various kinds of participants, and the globaltrend of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which leads to more renewable,CO2-neutral sources which are normally small-scaled. Further reasons arediscussed in [1] and others.

Besides a number of benefits, there are some technical, economical andregulatory issues with DG. In terms of market regulation, licensing, gov-ernment aid and privacy are typical concerns. Economical considerationsdisplay a possible cost increase not only for generation but also for trans-mission and distribution. Finally, there is the technical point of view, andprotection turned out to be one of the most problematical technical issuessince its malfunction could cause serious risk for people and components.

1.2 Power System Protection

Basic power system protection principles are outlined in standard literature[13, 14]. The primary purpose of power system protection is to ensure safeoperation of power systems, thus to care for the safety of people, personnel

1Surveys about DG are given in [1, 2, 3].

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and equipment. Furthermore, the task is to minimize the impact of un-avoidable faults in the system.2 From an electrical point of view, dangeroussituations can occur from

• overcurrents and

• overvoltages.

For example, an asynchronous coupling of networks results in high currents.Earth faults can cause high touch voltages and therefore endanger people.The general problem is always voltage and/or current out of limit. Hence,the aim is to avoid overcurrents and overvoltages to guarantee secure oper-ation of power systems.

For the safety of the components it is also necessary to regard device-specific concerns, for example oil temperature in transformers, gas pressurein gas insulated components etc. These points are not directly related toelectrical values, but, as mentioned, they always come from or lead to unal-lowed high voltages or currents.

Another issue is mechanical stress. Whenever power is converted elec-tromechanically, one has to consider not only the electrical but also the me-chanical equipment. An example is mechanical resonance of steam turbinesdue to underfrequency.

Nowadays, electromechanical protection devices are replaced by micro-processor based relays with a number of integrated features. Currents andvoltages are suitably transformed and isolated from the line quantities byinstrument transformers and converted into digital form. These values areinputs for several algorithms which then reach tripping decisions. Furtherinformation about computer relaying can be found in [13, 14].

For the design and coordination of protective relays in a network, someoverall rules have become widely accepted:

Selectivity: A protection system should disconnect only the faulted part(or the smallest possible part containing the fault) of the system inorder to minimize fault consequences.

Redundancy: A protection system has to care for redundant function ofrelays in order to improve reliability. Redundant functionalities areplaned and referred to as backup protection. Moreover, redundancyis reached by combining different protection principles, for exampledistance and differential protection for transmission lines.

Grading: For the purpose of clear selectivity and redundancy, relay char-acteristics are graded. This measure helps to achieve high redundancywhereas selectivity is not disabled.

2Avoidable problems such as system instabilities are subjected to Special ProtectionSchemes (SPS) as reported in [15].

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Security: The security of a relay protection system is the ”ability to rejectall power system events and transients that are not faults so thathealthy parts of the power system are not unnecessarily disconnected”[16].

Dependability: The dependability of a relay protection system is ”the abil-ity to detect and disconnect all faults within the protected zone” [16].

Different network topologies require different protection schemes. In thefollowing paragraphs some typical systems should be described shortly. Thesimplest network structure to protect are radial systems, therefore simple re-lays are used [13]. Normally, time-dependent, graded overcurrent protectionis installed regarding redundancy (backup protection). More sophisticatedrelays are used for the protection of rings and meshed grids. Impedancerelays trip due to a low voltage-current quotient. Since these relays allowto determine the position of the fault on the line, they are also called dis-tance relays. Detailed descriptions are given in [1, 13, 14]. A very commonprinciple for the protection of generators, transformers, busbars and lines isdifferential protection. The trigger criteria is, simply speaking, a certain dif-ference between input and output current. Furthermore, a number of othertechniques are used, also device-specific ones.

1.3 Generation and Interconnection Systems

Common distributed generators and network interfaces should be outlinedin the following paragraphs. Overviews are given in [1, 17, 18, 19, 20].

1.3.1 Machines

Synchronous Machines (SM) are widely used for larger water, steam andcombustion engine driven plants, for instance Combined Heat and Power(CHP) plants. By varying the excitation current, it is possible to controlthe reactive behavior of the SM, i.e. to regulate the voltage. The possibilityof voltage control is a major benefit and makes island operation possible.

Asynchronous or Induction Machines (AM, IM) are primarily used forwind and smaller hydro plants. Since these machines derive their excitationfrom the network, they always consume an inductive current and thereforebehave as reactive loads even if they are providing active power. Hence,voltage control and island operation is normally not possible with AM. Anadditional fact to consider is that these machines normally run with a lowpower factor. The fault behavior of AM is determined by a low positive andnegative sequence impedance. With AM in the network, the fault currentlevel3 is normally increased.

3The fault current level is defined in section 2.1.

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In order to increase the power factor, AM are sometimes equipped withPower Factor Correction (PFC) [17, 21, 22]. So-called PFC-AM are able tocontinue operation if the main supply is lost, but voltage and frequency willnot be stable.

For modern wind power stations double-fed induction machines are used.The relation between the network frequency fn, the rotor current frequencyfr and the mechanical frequency of the shaft fm in such machines is

k2πfm + fr = fn (1)

where k is an integer constant due to the machine design. This equation ex-plains how the machine can operate with various mechanical speed whereasthe network frequency fn is constant: The rotor circuit has to be fed witha corresponding frequency fr. This method enables wind turbines to run ina wider range of speed and therefore to optimize efficiency.4

DC Machines are rarely used as generators because they need to beconnected to the AC system via an expensive inverter. Another disadvantageis that the brushes have to be serviced frequently.

1.3.2 Transformers

Whenever machines or inverters are connected to networks of different nom-inal voltage, transformers are needed. The high voltage winding of thetransformer is usually used to meet the grounding requirements of the utility.Delta-wye configurations are commonly installed for isolated generators. Interms of protection, the transformer connection is important since the zerosequence impedance depends very much on the winding type (delta/wye)and also on the earth connection. Reference [19] compares five commontransformer connections outlining their problems and benefits.

1.3.3 Power Electronic Interfaces

Whenever primary power is not transformed via a rotating AC machine,power electronic devices are used as a utility connection. Also wind powerstations are often connected via converters. In large wind parks a commonDC busbar collects the power and delivers it to the utility grid via onerectifier and one transformer [23].

Microturbines usually drive a synchronous machine at very high speed(due to efficiency). The high frequency has to be converted to the nominalutility frequency. Photovoltaic panels and fuel cells directly produce DCpower which has to be converted.

An advantage of power electronic converters is their controllability. Any-way, a converter has to be equipped with a controller that can be used to

4This method is also used for pump storage hydro stations because the most efficientspeed of Pelton turbines varies with the head.

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achieve a number of functionalities. Voltage or reactive power control couldbe integrated in converters as an additional feature [20].

In terms of protection, it is a clear disadvantage of semiconductor de-vices that their valves are almost not overloadable, i.e. overload can notbe accepted for a longer time. Therefore converter controls are designedto prohibit high currents what leads to a lack of short circuit power whichis necessary to trip protection. In section 2.1 the fault level is discussed.This fault level may be low in networks with a large contingent of converter-connected power sources.

1.3.4 Interconnection System View

Reference [24] gives a review of DG interconnection systems and states sometrends and research needs. Also the commercial status of interconnectionequipment (list of manufacturers, cost and pricing, etc.) is outlined. In-terconnection systems are defined as ”the means by which the DER unitelectrically connects to the outside electrical power system and providesprotection, monitoring, control, metering and dispatch of the DER unit,”where DER are Distributed Energy Resources [24]. Network interfaces aredescribed from a system point of view using functional schemes as shown infigure 1. Several typical schemes and configurations are outlined accordingto:

1. Does the system use an inverter?

2. Does the system have a parallel connection to the local grid?

3. Can the system export power to the local grid?

4. Is the system remotely dispatchable?

A test report of a Universal Interconnection (UI) device is given in [25].The device that was designed by General Electrics connects the DG withthe local load as well as with the grid. The UI device is further described insection 3.3.4.

2 Protection Issues with DG

The overall problem when integrating DG in existing networks is that distri-bution systems are planned as passive networks, carrying the power unidi-rectionally from the central generation (HV level) downstream to the loadsat MV/LV level. The protection system design in common MV and LV dis-tribution networks is determined by a passive paradigm, i.e. no generationis expected in the network [20].

With distributed sources, the networks get active and conventional pro-tection turns out to be unsuitable. The following sections will outline themost important issues.

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conversion

conditioning

local

protection

transfer switch

parall. switchgear

DERmonitoringmetering

DER control dispatch andcontrol

Meter

interconnection system

local loads,distribution

DERPCC

AEPS

power flow

information flow

Figure 1: Interconnection system functional scheme [24]; AEPS. . . Area Elec-tric Power System; DER. . . Distributed Energy Resource; PCC. . . Point ofCommon Coupling.

2.1 Short Circuit Power and Fault Current Level

The fault current level describes the effect of faults in terms of current orpower. It gives an indication of the short circuit current or (apparent) powerboost. In [1] the fault level in p.u. is defined as

fl = i =1

|zth|(2)

whereas i is the fault current related to the nominal current and zth isthe inner impedance of the Thevenin representation of the network in p.u.Examples for this value are given in [1], typical fault levels in distributionnetworks are in a range of 10–15 p.u., where 1 p.u. corresponds to the ratedcurrent.

This is, phase-phase or phase-earth faults normaly result in an overcur-rent which is significantly higher than the operational or nominal current.5

This is a very basic precondition for the function of (instantaneous) overcur-rent protection. The fault current has to be distinguishable from the normaloperational current. To fulfill that, there has to be a powerful source pro-viding a high fault current until the relay triggers. This is not the case forall kinds of generation devices (see section 1.3). Especially power electronicconverters are often equipped with controllers that prevent high currents. If,for example, a remote part of a distribution network is equipped with largePV installations, it could happen that in case of a failure there is almost nosignificant rise of the phase current and the fault is therefore not detectedfrom the overcurrent protection system. The question arises, why one needsto care about a fault if there is no fault current. The answer is that dan-

5The amplitude of the fault current is dependent on the fault impedance, for phase-earth faults it is also highly dependent on the grounding.

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PSfrag replacements

Idg

U

IfInw

L1 L2 L3

b1 b2 b3 b4

G

TR a

Figure 2: Short circuit at a. Current from transmission network Inw, currentfrom embedded generator Idg.

gerous touch voltages may occur even if the current is low. Furthermorepermanent faults may spread out and destroy more equipment.

With DG in the network, the fault impedance zth can also decreasedue to parallel circuits, therefore the fault level increases and there couldbe unexpected high fault currents in case of a failure. This situation putscomponents at risk since they were not designed to operate under that cir-cumstances.

For correct operation it is also important that the relay measures the realfault current which was expected and taken under consideration when therelay was configured. Figure 2 shows a distribution feeder with an embeddedgenerator that supplies part of the local loads. Assuming a short circuit atpoint a, the generator will also contribute to the total fault current

If = Inw + Idg (3)

but the relay R will only measure the current coming from the network infeedInw. This is, the relay detects only a part of the real fault current and maytherefore not trigger properly. As mentioned in [26, 27] there is an increasedrisk especially for high impedance faults that overcurrent protection withinverse time-current characteristic may not trigger in sufficient time.

One can find another influence of DG on fault currents when assuminga short circuit at the busbar b2. In this case, the fault current contributionfrom the generator passes the relay in reverse direction what could causeproblems if directional relays are used. DG can also affect the current di-rection during normal operation, this issue is explained in section 2.3.

Concluding the issues concerning short circuit faults it can be stated thatdispersed generation affects the

• amplitude,

• direction and

• duration (indirectly)

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of fault currents. The last point is a result of inverse time-current charac-teristics (or grading respectively).

2.2 Reduced Reach of Impedance Relays

The phenomena of reduced reach of distance relays due to embedded powerinfeed is mentioned in [26, 27, 29] and other references. In [14] this problemis considered for conventional power systems.

The reach of an impedance relay is the maximum fault distance thattriggers the relay in a certain impedance zone, or in a certain time due toits configuration. This maximum distance corresponds to a maximum faultimpedance or a minimum fault current that is detected.

Considering figure 2, one can calculate the voltage measured by the relayR in case of a short circuit at a6

Ur = InwZ23 + (Inw + Idg)Z3a (4)

where Z23 is the line impedance from bus b2 to bus b3 and Z3a is theimpedance between bus b3 and the fault location a. This voltage is increaseddue to the additional infeed at bus b3. Hence, the impedance measured bythe relay R

Zr =Ur

Inw

= Z23 + Z3a +Idg

Inw

Z3a

︸ ︷︷ ︸

disturbance

(5)

is higher than the real fault impedance (as seen from R) what corresponds toan apparently increased fault distance. Consequently, the relay may triggerin higher grading time resp. in another distance zone.

For certain relay settings which were determined during planning studies,the fault has to be closer to the relay to operate it within the originallyintended distance zone. The active area of the relay is therefore shortened,its reach is reduced. Note that the apparent impedance varies with Idg/Inw.A possible solution to this problem is outlined in section 4.1.

2.3 Reverse Power Flow and Voltage Profile

Radial distribution networks are usually designed for unidirectional powerflow, from the infeed downstream to the loads. This assumption is reflectedin standard protection schemes with directional overcurrent relays. With agenerator on the distribution feeder, the load flow situation may change. Ifthe local production exceeds the local consumption, power flow changes itsdirection [30]. Reverse power flow is problematic if it is not considered inthe protection system design. Moreover, reverse power flow implies a reversevoltage gradient along a radial feeder.

6Load currents are neglected for this consideration.

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PSfrag replacements

Idg

U

∂U∂x

x

x

I23 I34

Inw

Il1 Il2 Il3

b1 b2 b3 b4

G

T

Figure 3: Voltage profile and gradient on a distribution feeder with andwithout contribution of generator G. Solid line: Idg = 0, downstream powerflow; dahsed line: Idg > Il2 + Il3, reverse power flow between b2 and b3.

Dispersed generation always affects the voltage profile along a distri-bution line. Beside power quality issues, this could cause a violation ofvoltage limits and cause additional voltage stress for the equipment. Thevoltage increase/drop ∆U due to power in-/outfeed can be approximatedwith [1, 29, 31]

∆U ≈PdgRth +QdgXth

Un

(6)

where Un is the nominal voltage of the system, Rth + j Xth is the lineimpedance (Thevenin equivalent respectively) and Pdg + j Qdg is the powerinfeed of the DG.

An analytical method of calculating the influence of DG on the voltageprofile of distribution feeders is presented in [32, 33, 34].

Figure 3 pictures the voltage gradient along a distribution feeder withand without embedded generation. The power flow direction corresponds tothe sign of the voltage gradient. In this situation the power flow directionbetween bus b2 and b3 is changed due to the infeed at bus b3.

Especially in highly loaded or weak networks dispersed generation canalso influence the voltage profile in a positive way and turn into a powerquality benefit.

Reference [35] describes another issue concerning the voltage profile ondistribution feeders. Usually tap-changing transformers are used for thevoltage regulation in distribution networks which change the taps, i.e. their

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turns ratio, due to the load current. If the DG is located near the networkinfeed (e.g. at bus b2 in figure 3), it influences tap-changing because the DGinfeed decreases the resulting load for the transformer. Hence tap-changingcharacteristics will be shifted, the infeed voltage will not be regulated cor-rectly.

2.4 Islanding and Auto Reclosure

Critical situations can occur if a part of the utility network is islanded andan integrated DG unit is connected. This situation is commonly referredto as Loss Of Mains (LOM) or Loss Of Grid (LOG). When LOM occurs,neither the voltage nor the frequency are controlled by the utility supply.

Normally, islanding is the consequence of a fault in the network. Ifan embedded generator continues its operation after the utility supply wasdisconnected, faults may not clear since the arc is still charged.

Small embedded generators (or grid interfaces respectively) are oftennot equipped with voltage control, therefore the voltage magnitude of anislanded network is not kept between desired limits, and undefined voltagemagnitudes may occur during island operation.

Another result of missing control might be frequency instability. Sincereal systems are never balanced exactly, the frequency will change due toactive power unbalance. Uncontrolled frequency represents a high risk formachines and drives.

Since arc faults normally clear after a short interruption of the supply,automatic (instantaneous) reclosure is a common relay feature. With a con-tinuously operating generator in the network, two problems may arise whenthe utility network is automatically reconnected after a short interruption:

• The fault may not have cleared since the arc was fed from the DGunit, therefore instantaneous reclosure may not succeed.

• In the islanded part of the grid, the frequency may have changed dueto active power unbalance.7 Reclosing the switch would couple twoasynchronously operating systems.

Extended dead time (ti in figure 4) has to be regarded between theseparation of the DG unit and the reconnection of the utility supply tomake fault clearing possible. Common off-time settings of auto reclosurerelays are between 100 ms and 1000 ms. With DG in the network, the totaloff-time has to be prolonged. Reference [27] recommends a reclosure intervalof 1 s or more for distribution feeders with embedded generators.

A linear approximation for the frequency change during island operationis given in [1, 36]. The rate of change of frequency is expressed as a function

7Even if there is active power control, the island will not run synchronously with theutility system.

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of the active power unbalance

∆P =∑

Pdg −∑

Pl (7)

the inertia constant of the machine H, the machines’ rated power Sn andthe frequency before LOM fs:

df

dt=

∆Pfs

2SnH(8)

It is straight forward to calculate the frequency change

∆f =∆Pfs

2SnH· ti (9)

This approach does only consider the frequency change due to islanding, thefault is not regarded.

Figure 4 shows an example for an auto reclosure procedure where anembedded generator is not disconnecting although it is islanded with thelocal grid. Here it is assumed that there is a lack of active power afterislanding, i.e.

∑Pdg <

∑Pl, therefore the island frequency decreases.

LOM and automatic reclosure are some of the most challenging issues ofDG protection and therefore a lot of research has been done in that area.The only solution to this problem seems to be disconnecting the DG unitas soon as LOM occurred. Thus it is necessary to detect islands fast andreliably. Several islanding detection methods are presented in section 3.1.

2.5 Other Issues

Besides the issues mentioned in the previous sections, there are some otherproblems concerning the integration of DG. These issues are already knownfrom experience with conventional power systems.

2.5.1 Ferroresonance

As described in [26, 27], ferroresonance can occur and damage customerequipment or transformers. For cable lines, where faults are normally per-manent, fast-blowing fuses are used as overcurrent protection. Since thefuses in the three phases do not trigger simultaneously, it may happen thata transformer is connected only via two phases for a short time. Then, thecapacitance of the cable is in series with the transformer inductance whatcould cause disorted/high voltages and currents due to resonance conditions.

2.5.2 Grounding

In [18, 19, 26, 27, 37] possible grounding problems due to multiple groundcurrent paths are mentioned. If a DG unit is connected via a grounded delta-wye transformer, earth faults on the utility line will cause ground currents

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PSfrag replacements

S

Son

off

fs fi

fi

∆f

t

t

tf td tr

ti

G

∑Pl

∑Pdg

Figure 4: Auto reclosure procedure: fault occurs at tf , disconnection of attd, reconnection at tr, reclosure interval ti; state of utility switch S, utilitysynchronous frequency fs, island frequency fi, frequency drop ∆f .

in both directions, from the fault to the utility transformer as well as to theDG transformer. This is normaly not considered in the distribution systemground fault coordination.

In [37] the problem of Loss Of Earth (LOE) for single point groundeddistribution systems is demonstrated. Whenever the utility earth connectionis lost, the whole system gets ungrounded.

3 Current Practice

3.1 Island Detection

The difficulties with islanded DG have been outlined in section 2.4. Toprevent island operation, the protection system has to detect islands quicklyand reliably. This is the task of loss of mains protection. References [21, 38]divide island detection into passive and active methods. Some of them willbe outlined in the following sections.

3.1.1 Passive Methods

These methods detect loss of mains by passively measuring or monitoringthe system state.

Under-/Overvoltage A clear indication of lost utility supply is very lowvoltage. If there are uncontrolled generators in the network, the voltage

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PSfrag replacements

S

S

b1 b2 b3

Enw

Enw

Edg

Edg

U l

U l

ZnwZdg

Zl

Inw

Inw

Idg

IdgG

I l

Figure 5: Voltage vector shift after islanding. Thevenin eqivalent of thenetwork with Enw, Znw and of the generator with Edg, Zdg respectively.

can also rise (for example due to resonance) and exceed the upper limit.Therefore, under- and overvoltage relays are a simple islanding protectionmethod. In larger islands the voltage collapse will take some time, thereforethis kind of LOM protection is often too slow.

Under-/Overfrequency As mentioned, real systems are never balancedexactly. After LOM happened, the frequency in the island changes due toequation (8). Hence frequency out of limits can indicate island operation.The frequency does not change instantaneously but continuously, thus fre-quency relaying is a rather slow method.

Voltage Vector Shift (VVS) This method is outlined in [1] and others,it is also referred to as phase displacement [38] or phase jump [25] method.Figure 5 shows the situation when part of the load is fed from an embeddedgenerator and the rest is supplied from a distribution network. The distri-bution network and the embedded generator are represented by equivalentcircuits, both operating on the local load. After the utility switch S dis-connects, the local load has to be supplied from the generator G. Assumingconstant load, the transmission angle, i.e. the voltage phase difference be-

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PSfrag replacements

π π + ϑ

ωt

ul(t)

Figure 6: Extended half cycle due to voltage vector shift of ϑ = 15◦; ul(t) isthe voltage at the load terminal, ω is the nominal angular frequency of thesystem.

tween the generator and the load terminal has to rapidly increase due tothe sudden power flow increase. This increased transmission angle is shownin figure 5. Dotted lines represent parallel supply, solid phasors show thesituation after islanding. Figure 6 pictures the situation in the time domain.Due to the vector jump, the duration of the concerned period is extended.Voltage vector relays monitor the duration of every half cycle and initiatetripping if a certain limit is exceed. Common voltage vector shift relays tripwith ϑpickup = 6. . . 12◦ [1, 17].

Rate of Change of Voltage Loss of mains detection due to the rate ofchange of voltage is introduced in [39]. Usually voltage changes are slow inlarge interconnected power systems. If a distribution system gets separated,a rate of change of voltage occurs that is significantly higher than duringnormal operation. Therefore rate of change of voltage can be used to detectisland operation. A major handicap of this method is that it is sensitive tonetwork disturbances other than LOM.

Rate of Change of Frequency (ROCOF) As discussed in section 2.4,the frequency in an island will change rapidly due to active power unbalance.The corresponding frequency slope can be used to detect loss of mains.Whenever df/dt exceeds a certain limit, relays are tripped. Typical pickupvalues are set in a range of 0.1 to 1.0 Hz/s, the operating time is between 0.2and 0.5 s [1, 17]. A problem with ROCOF protection is unwanted trippingresulting from frequency excursions due to loss of bulk supply, for examplefaults in the transmission grid. Another reason for malfunction is phaseshifts caused from other network disturbances.

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Rate of Change of Power and Power Factor Loss of grid algorithmsbased on the rate of change of the generator active power output are outlinedin [38, 40]. In [40] the instantaneous power is derived from the generatorvoltages and currents and then the rate of change of power is used in alimiting function that prohibits mal-function due to system disturbances.The results of the studies in [40] show that the algorithm needs at least sixcycles (120 ms) to detect LOM what is rather slow compared with otherLOM detection methods. Reference [39] presents simulation results arguingthat the most sensitive variables to system disturbances are time derivativeof voltage, current, impedance, absolute change of voltage, current, currentangle, impedance and changes in power factor, whereas some of these areredundant. Certain situations are studied and a suitable logic for a LOMrelay is derived using the rate of change of voltage and changes in powerfactor.

Elliptical Trajectories Whenever a fault occurs on a line, the corre-sponding voltage an current changes at the sending end are related to eachother by an elliptical trajectory [41]. The trajectory of voltage and cur-rent change (in combination with scaling factors) is described by an orbitalequation. The investigations in [41] show that the shape of this trajectorychanges significantly after islanding.

3.1.2 Active Methods

Beside passive measurements and monitoring, there are active methods ofLOM detection where the detection system (relay) is actively interactingwith the power system in order to get an indication for island operation.

Reactive Error Export This highly reliable means of LOM detection isshortly discussed in [21]. For this method, the generator is controlled ona certain reactive power output. Whenever islanding occurs, it is assumedthat it is not possible to deliver the specified amount of reactive power to thelocal grid since there is no corresponding load. This reactive export error istaken as an indicator for LOM.

Fault Level Monitoring The fault level in a certain point of the gridcan be measured using a point-on-wave switched thyristor [21]. The valveis triggered close to the voltage zero crossing and the current through ashunt inductor is measured. The system impedance and the fault level canbe quickly calculated (every half cycle) with the disadvantage of slightlychanged voltage shape near the zero crossover.

System Impedance Monitoring In [21] a method is introduced that de-tects LOM by actively monitoring the system impedance. A high frequency

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PSfrag replacements

Enw

Znw

Edg

Zdg

Uhf

C

M

S

Figure 7: System impedance monitoring. The meter M will measure anincreased HF signal when the utility network is disconnected.

source (a few volts at a frequency of a few kHz) is connected via a couplingcapacitor at the interconnection point. As pictured in figure 7, the capaci-tor is in series with the equivalent network impedance. When the systemsare synchronized, the impedance Zdg||Znw is low, therefore the HF-rippleat coupling point is negligible. After islanding, the impedance increasesdramatically to Zdg and the divided HF-signal is clearly detectable.

Frequency Shift Inverter-interfaced DG can be protected against LOMusing frequency shift methods [42, 43]. The output current of the converter iscontrolled to a frequency which is slightly different to the nominal frequencyof the system. This is done by varying the power factor during a cycle andre-synchronization at the begin of a new cycle. Under normal conditions,the terminal frequency is dictated by the powerful bulk supply. If the mainssupply is lost, frequency will drift until a certain shutdown level is exceed.

Voltage Pulse Perturbation and Correlation In [43, 44] two methodsof islanding detection for inverter-connected DG are presented that use aperturbation signal of the output voltage. For the first method, the inverteroutput is perturbed with a square pulse. This square pulse appears in boththe inner voltage of the source and the voltage at interconnection point.If islanding happens, the apparent impedance at the generator terminalincreases and therefore the perturbation can be measured at the point ofcommon coupling (similar to system impedance monitoring). The secondmethod uses a correlation function to detect LOM. The inner voltage of thesource is randomly perturbed and correlated with the voltage change at theinterconnection point. During normal operation, the apparent impedance islow and the voltage waveform at the interconnection point will not reflectthe perturbation signal. After islanding the modulation signal will appearin both the inner voltage and the voltage at the interconnection point what

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PSfrag replacements

G

51N

81

27,59

LOG

87

51V

32

40

Figure 8: Protection scheme for a generator embedded in an MV utility grid[1]. Relay numbers are explained in table 1.

results in a strong correlation.

3.2 Interconnect vs. Generator Protection

Protection concerns both the distribution grid as well as the distributedgenerator itself. Therefore protection schemes have to be implemented onboth sides of the Point of Common Coupling (PCC). In [18, 19] the wholeprotection system is split into two parts:

Interconnect protection: It protects the grid from the DG unit, i.e. itprovides the protection on the grid-side for parallel operation of the DGand the grid. The requirements for this part are normally establishedby the utility.

Generator protection: It is installed at the generator-side of the PCC andprotects the DG from internal faults and abnormal operating condi-tions. Usually, the utility is not responsible for this kind of protection.

A typical multifunction interconnect relay configuration is outlined in[19], whereas [1] presents some generator protection schemes.

Figure 8 pictures a typical relay configuration for a generator embeddedin a MV utility grid [1]. This system protects the generator from internalfaults and abnormal operating conditions. The relay function numbers arelisted in table 1 on page 20. Figure 9 shows the assembly of functionalitiesincluded in a typical multifunction interconnect relay.

3.3 Examples of State-of-the-Art Relays

A number of companies are offering generator protection and control systems[24]. Three examples of generator protection devices are presented in thissection.

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Table 1: Explanation of relay numbers [1, 46].Number Application

21 distance

25 synchronizing

27 undervoltage

27N neutral undervoltage

32 directional power

40 loss of excitation

46 neg. seq. current

47 neg. seq. voltage

50 instantaneous overcurrent

50N neutral instantaneous overcurrent

51N neutral time overcurrent

51V voltage-restrained overcurrent

59 overvoltage

59I instantaneous overvoltage

59N neutral overvoltage

60FL voltage transformer fuse failure

67 directional overcurrent

79 reclosing

81 frequency (under and over)

81R rate of change of frequency

87 differential

LOM loss of mains

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PSfrag replacements

G

T

standard optional

32

60FL

21

51V

67

46

50

27

59

81

81R

47

59I

50N

51N

27N

59N

79

25

Figure 9: Typical multifunction interconnect relay [19]. Relay numbers areexplained in table 1.

3.3.1 Integrated Generator Protection

The digital generator protection DGP54BABA from General Electrics In-dustrial Systems is an integrated generator protection with all features ofclassical protection [47]: overvoltage, under-/overfrequency, loss of excita-tion and overexcitation, unbalanced current, differential protection etc.

The device offers remote programming and data acquisition via a RS-232 serial interface. Fault reports of the last three faults are stored in theinternal memory.

3.3.2 Loss of Mains Relay

Tyco Electronics offers the loss of mains protection relays 246-ROCL and256-ROCL which are designed for applications where generators are runningin parallel with a mains supply [48].

Both rate of change of frequency and voltage vector shift measurementare integrated to detect disconnection of a generator.

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The user can adjust the setting for

• VVS from 2 to 24◦ in steps of 2◦,

• ROCOF from 0.10 to 1.00 Hz/s in steps of 0.05 Hz/s, and

• startup delay from 2 to 12 s.

Phase steps and rate of change of frequency can be monitored contin-uously using the fibre-optic digital data and status output. The responsetime for phase angle shifts is up to 2 cycles, for frequency rate changes it iswithin 32 cycles. A relay time of 5 ms has to be added.

In [48] it is mentioned that voltage vector shifts correspond to ratesof change of frequency, what has to be considered in the relay settings.Otherwise it is not possible to get a clear distinction between ROCOF andVVS trips.

3.3.3 Integrated Genset Control Device

Woodward offers the Easygen-1000 genset control for single unit operation[49]. The device integrates a number of features for measurement, protectionand control.

In terms of protection it provides voltage, frequency, overload, reverseand reduced power, load imbalance, definite and inverse time-overcurrent,ground fault and loss of mains detection.

3.3.4 General Electric Universal Interconnection Device

General Electric has developed a universal interconnection device for theinterconnection of distributed energy resources (also mentioned in section1.3.4) [25]. Its main components are:

• A so-called Intelligent Electronic Device (IED), based on existing relaytechnology, that provides protection, control and other features, alsoremote control.

• Two switches that enable operation of the DG in parallel to the gridor on the local load.

• Two circuit breakers for emergency protection.

• Measurement transformers for metering and monitoring.

• Power supply for the IED, the contact relays, and a battery charger.

The test report of this device especially emphasizes the issue of LOM [25].It is mentioned that passive detection methods fail if the frequency/voltagedeviation after islanding does not exceed a certain threshold. This resultsin a so-called Non-Detection Zone (NDZ) of the relay. This problem can besolved by adding a directional power protection.

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3.4 International Recommendations, Guidelines and Stan-

dards

Besides a number of national and utility-specific interconnection rules, thereare several international standards and recommendations published [20, 50,51]. The probably most important are:

• IEEE C37.95-1989 Guide for Protective Relaying of Utility-ConsumerInterconnections [52]

• IEEE 929-2000 Recommended Practice for Utility Interface of Photo-voltaic (PV) Systems [53]

• IEEE 242-2001 Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordina-tion of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems [46]

• IEEE 1547 Series of Standards for Interconnection [54] (in progress)

4 New Approaches

4.1 Adaptive Protection Systems

Adaptive protection is as ”an online activity that modifies the preferredprotective response to a change in system conditions or requirements. Itis usually automatic, but can include timely human intervention” [55]. Anadaptive relay is ”a relay that can have its settings, characteristics or logicfunctions changed online in a timely manner by means of externally gener-ated signals or control action” [55].

In other words, adaptive protection systems are systems which allow tochange relay characteristics/settings due to the actual system state. Forexample, the primary zone pickup value of a distance relay can be changedonline according to power infeed from a T-connected generator (see section2.2).

There are several adaptive techniques proposed in [55] which use onlineinformation of the system to optimise the protection system function. Someexamples are:

• Adaptive system impedance modeling (an up-to-date impedance modelof the network that provides input data for a relay)

• Adaptive sequential instantaneous tripping (for faults near the remotestation)

• Adaptive multi-terminal distance relay coverage (regarding infeed fromT-connections in the relay settings)

• Adaptive reclosure (prevent unsuccessful reclosure for permanent faults,high-speed reclosure in case of false trips).

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POWER SYSTEM

VOLTAGES AND CURRENTS

BREAKER

STATUS

RELAY

SETTINGS

NETWORK

TOPOLOGY

PROGRAM

STATE

ESTIMATOR

RELAY

SETTING

PROGRAM

FAULT

ANALYSIS

PROGRAM

Figure 10: Block diagram of adaptive relay coordination software [57].

In [56] it is proposed to use real-time synchronized phasor measurementsof bus voltages and line currents as a source of information for adaptiverelays.

A feasibility study for adaptive protection of a part of a real distributionsystem is demonstrated in [57]. The paper shows the basic requirements forimplementing adaptive relaying concepts:

1. Microprocessor-based relays

2. Appropriate software for relay modelling, relay coordination and com-munication

3. Appropriate means of communication

A relay coordination software model as shown in figure 10 is introducedwhich makes real time changes of relay configurations possible.

In [58] adaptive and conventional reach settings for distance relays arecompared for a certain network structure. The simulation results show dif-ferences between conventional settings due to offline worst case studies andoptimal adaptive reach settings of about 10%.

An adaptive scheme for optimal coordination of overcurrent relays ispresented in [59]. The sum of the first zone operating times Tii of n relaysis taken as an objective function to minimize, whereas the coordinationtime interval between the zones ∆T builds the constraint. The optimizationproblem is then formulated as

minimise F =n∑

i=1

Tii (10)

with Tji ≥ Tii +∆T (11)

Tii is assumed to be a function of certain relay parameters which are resultsof the optimization. After a change in the network, the optimization wasexecuted and relay settings have been updated with the optimal parameters.The algorithm was successfully applied to the IEEE 30-bus test system.

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TRANSFORMER ANALOG FILTER A/D mP

GPS CLOCK

COMMUNICATION

INTERFACE

ANALOG VOLTAGE AND

CURRENT INPUT

PHASOR

OUTPUT

Figure 11: Block diagram of PMU [60]. After the analog voltage and currentsignals are transformed and filtered, they are converted into digital form andrepresented as phasors.

4.2 Synchronized Phasor Measurement

A power systems’ state can be determined using so-called Phasor Measure-ment Units (PMU). Such PMUs provide synchronized measurement of ter-minal voltage and current phasors in time intervals down to 20 ms [60].Synchronisation of the phasors is achieved using the Global Positioning Sys-tem (GPS). A block diagram of a PMU is pictured in figure 11.

In so-called Wide Area Protection Systems, the measured voltage andcurrent phasors are transferred to a central computer where they are pro-cessed and used for monitoring, state estimation, protection, control andoptimization [15, 61]. Such systems offer great opportunities for protectionand control. The possibility of using PMU measurement data for adaptiveprotection schemes is outlined in [62].

A possible application of synchronized phasor measurements could beLOM detection. The data gathered from PMUs installed at either side ofthe coupling point (PCC) could be used for real-time phasor comparison(a kind of phase differential protection). However, PMUs are quite costlydevices (up to EUR 10’000 and more), therefore this technically feasiblealternative will hardly be economically justifiable for this application.

4.3 Intelligent Systems

Reference [63] gives an overview of intelligent systems in electric power de-livery. Autonomous systems and computational intelligence are proposed aspossible solutions for decentralized control.

An adaptive distance protection using an artificial neural network isdemonstrated in [64]. In this case adaption is reached by training the neuralnetwork to a certain performance, i.e. characteristic. As pictured in figure

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PSfrag replacements

X

R

Figure 12: Adaption of an impedance relay characteristic to fault impedanceby the use of artificial neural networks. Solid line: normal relay character-istic; dotted line: trained characteristic for high impedance faults [64].

12, the neurons can be trained in such a way that the normal behavior(circle) is adapted for high impedance faults. In [64] the relay errors aresignificantly reduced with the described method.

5 Conclusion and Future Work

Much literature is available concerning protection of distributed generation.Many publications demonstrate the same problems and issues, but solutionsare rare. A general approach is still missing, but first steps are visible [24].

In [29] it is discussed that the numerical relations of typical values suchas line impedances, generator ratings etc. are equal in different networks(HV, MV, LV) if per-unit values are considered. The scaled system aspectsin terms of power flow are almost the same for small-scaled distributed gen-eration and for large-scaled centralized plants. This point indicates oncemore that the key issues concerning integration of DG are related to infras-tructural items such as data acquisition, operation, protection and control.Adequate infrastructure, as it is commonly installed in HV transmissionnetworks and conventional, centralized power plants, is missing.

From the authors’ point of view, there are three key issues to solve:

1. Information: Integrating DG into existing distribution networks is anissue because data acquisition systems are not available. The installa-tion of an information system such as as the Supervisory Control AndData Acquisition (SCADA) system (usually installed in transmissionsystems) would help to solve many problems. The internet is alreadyeasily accessible, therefore it could be a great chance to utilize it forthe purpose of power system operation [65].

2. Coordination: Proper coordination is a fundamental requirement forsatisfying operation of protective relays. System studies and analysis

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have to be performed case-by-case to properly coordinate the protec-tion settings. Software could be implemented that offers special coor-dination features for the integration of DG in distribution systems.

3. Adaptation: As mentioned in [64], the implementation of adaptive pro-tection is a challenging task since information which is normally notavailable in distribution networks is needed to update the relay set-tings.

Visions, future trends and expected developments in the field of electricpower delivery are presented in [66, 67, 68, 69, 70]. The general view is thatdistributed generation is expected to play an important role in future energysystems.

Future work could be related to the points discussed in the previousparagraphs, whereas three major questions arise:

• How should future distribution systems be designed to simplify inte-gration of DG (towards a plug-and-play system)?

• How can islanded parts of distribution systems be operated and re-synchronized?

• How can DG be dispatched centrally (if wanted), and what data in-frastructure is needed to achieve this?

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