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7th Pan-European International Relations Conference of the Standing Group on

International Relations (SGIR) of the ECPR, 09-11/09/2010, Stockholm

Democracy Promotion or Demotion? US and German Reactions to

the Rise of Political Islam in Turkey

Cemal Karakas, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)

Abstract

Since the terror attacks of September 11, the USA has been engaged in a war against

international, i.e. Islamist terrorism. Experts and politicians alike continue to debate the

prospects and the risks of democratization and democracy promotion in the Muslim World. In

this context Turkey is – due to its Westernization process and the secular character of the

political regime – considered by its two major ODA donor countries the USA and Germany,

to be an “inspiration” for the Muslim world. Nevertheless, Turkey has also been facing the

rise of political Islam since the mid 1990s which poses a challenge not only for the normative

orientation but also for the hard security and economical interest of the USA and Germany.

How have the two donor countries reacted? This paper summarizes the US and German

reactions to the Welfare Party in the 1990s. It then analyzes the policy of the governing

Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the transformation of democracy in Turkey since

2002. Following that, it analyzes both the USA’s and Germany’s perception of and reaction to

the rise and the policy of the AKP, especially with a view to their democracy promotion

policies. The paper concludes with implications for “Western” donor countries and their

democracy promotion in Muslim states.

Draft: Please do not cite without author’s permission

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1. Introduction

Turkey is the only country in the community of Muslim states in which (a) Islam is not the

state religion and secularism is anchored in the constitution, which is (b) a member of NATO

and which is (c) a candidate for accession to the European Union (EU). The USA and

Germany are the most important donor countries for Turkey in terms of foreign assistance and

development cooperation. Leading politicians in both countries, particularly since the terrorist

attacks of 11 September 2001, see Turkey, due to its democratic-secular regime, as a

normative “model” or “inspiration” for other Muslim states (Nasr 2005; Tepe 2005).

Nonetheless, both donor countries, since the coming to power of the Welfare Party (RP) in

1996/97 and the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from 2002 onwards, have

been faced with political movements ranging from a pro-Islamic to an outright Islamist

orientation, confronting the donors with the following dilemmas: either (1) to tolerate the

omnipotent role of the Kemalist state elite and their restrictive measures (e.g. coup or the

threat thereof, the banning of political parties) in the interest of maintaining Turkey's secular

political regime and pro-Western institutional integration, or (2) to tolerate, by upholding their

own democracy postulate, the taking over of the government by these parties, even though – if

one is to believe the words of the Kemalist state elite – they are secretly working towards the

“Iranification”, i.e. the “Islamization”, of state and society, accompanied by a drift of Turkey

away from the “West”.

Opinions are especially divided about the AKP, led by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, which

has been governing alone since 2002. Although the AKP was able to achieve the initiation of

accession talks to the EU (2005) with an impressive policy of democratization, its politicizing

of religion contributed significantly to internal political destabilization. Moreover, there has

been evidence of an increasing authoritarization of the AKP in terms of domestic politics

since 2007, as well as a foreign policy shift towards the Islamic world, which contradicts both

the democratic norms of the donor states and their “hard” economic and security interests.

The present paper addresses the following questions: (1) In which cases have the policies and

rhetoric of the RP and particularly the AKP conflicted with the interests of the donor

countries? (2) What are the perceptions and reactions of the USA and Germany to the rise to

power and the policy of the RP and especially the AKP? (3) How can the variance in the

foreign assistance and democracy promotion of the donor countries be explained?

The paper proceeds as follows: it begins with a summarizing status quo ante analysis of the

dealings of the two donor states with the RP. This is followed by an analysis of the policies

and rhetoric of the AKP. It then analyzes the perception and reaction of the USA and

Germany regarding the rise to power and the policy of the AKP, as well as their foreign

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assistance and democracy promotion. Finally, the paper draws conclusions and considers

some implications for “Western” donor countries and their democracy promotion in other

Muslim states.

2. The Dealings of the USA and Germany with the Welfare Party (RP) 2.1 USA: Interests, Conflicts, Perceptions, Reactions

In the 1990s, as during the Cold War, relations between the USA and Turkey were primarily

shaped by geostrategic interests. The NATO partner Turkey was classified by the USA as a

“pivotal state” due to its direct proximity to 13 of the 16 trouble spots identified by NATO. In

1991, the Enhanced Partnership was agreed upon. Until the RP came to power, the USA had

specifically pursued the following interests in relations with Turkey: active and passive

support for the USA in the Iraq War for the liberation of Kuwait and the monitoring of the

Northern Iraqi airspace which followed (Operation Provide Comfort); solving the Greek-

Turkish disagreements about border conflicts in the Aegean and in Cyprus; extension of the

Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership; strengthening of human and minority rights including a

solution to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and religious freedom, particularly for Christians and

the Alevi; improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations; stabilization of the Turkish economy

(Sayari 2004; Lesser 2007; Altunisik 2004; Isyar 2005).

In December 1995, the Islamist RP won the parliamentary elections with 21% of the vote. In

June 1996, RP leader Necmettin Erbakan was elected Prime Minister of Turkey in a coalition

government with the Kemalist-conservative DYP (True Path Party). His election was received

cautiously in the USA due to the fact that Erbakan had repeatedly flaunted his anti-

Americanism, anti-Zionism and anti-Europeanism during the election campaign, and pleaded

in favor of a Turkish withdrawal from NATO (Akkaya et al. 1996; Akinci 1999).1

Nevertheless, Erbakan showed himself to be pragmatic – for reasons of “national security” he

not only extended “Operation Providing Comfort”, but also respected the partnership with

Israel. However, Erbakan's official visits to the “rogue states” of Libya and Iran for the

purposes of extension Turkish foreign trade relations drew sharp criticism from the USA for

undermining international sanctions and for allegedly endangering Western solidarity and the

Western security alliance.2

The populist politicization of religion by the RP – there was a demand, among other things,

for a removal of the ban on headscarves at universities and, in some cases, for the introduction

of the Sharia – resulted, however, in the Turkish military presenting the Prime Minister with a 1 Cf. State Department, Daily Press Briefing, Briefer: Nicolas Burns, 01.07.1996. 2 Article „Kurs der Türkei beunruhigt die USA – Regierung Erbakan geht auf islamische Nachbarn zu“, Frankfurter Rundschau, 14.08.1996.

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catalogue of political measures for “combating Islam” at the end of February 1997.3 This step

taken by the military, which went down in history as a “soft coup”, along with the increasing

protests of the pro-Kemalist public and media led to the loss of the coalition's majority in

parliament, resulting in the resignation of Erbakan in June 1997 after only one year in office.

In 1998, the RP was banned (Karakas 2007b; Akinci 1999; Yürüsen/Yayla 1997).

The perception and reaction of the US government to these measures was fraught with

contradictions. In a statement requested by Congress in early 1997, the State Department

emphasized the democratic legitimization of the RP-DYP government and stressed that an

“Iranification” of Turkey was unlikely.4 The Department of Defense, however, defended the

“soft coup” and the political role of the military: “Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, put

great emphasis on the importance of maintaining a secular government in order to create a

Turkish democracy, a principle that the Turkish military is constitutionally-mandated and

determined to uphold.”5 The USA was against a “hard” coup, but had no objection to a civil

“intervention” on the part of the military and to the process of banning the party (Carpenter

1999).6 Erbakan's fall was tolerated by the USA firstly because he was a threat to US foreign

and security interests, but also because he was a danger to US stabilization interests regarding

Turkish internal affairs and economic policy. From a US point of view, the situation under

Erbakan had led to an endangering of the secular political system and a fuelling of anti-

Americanism, but not to the desired resolution of the “Kurdish” question or the stabilization

of the Turkish economy.

The reaction analysis regarding foreign assistance and democracy promotion clearly shows

that the USA – independent of the RP election victory – was confronted with a trade-off

between security/stability interests versus democracy/human rights. The US Congress, for

example, agreed to a conditional provision of foreign assistance (and also weapons) to

Turkey. Between 1994 and 1997, Congress approved the aid measures, but made their

delivery dependent on issues of human rights and the opening of the Turkish-Armenian

border (Yilmaz 2004).7 The US government was against the conditional aspect of the funds,

3 Article „Die türkischen Militärs haben ein Machtwort gesprochen. Nationaler Sicherheitsrat bekräftigt Prinzipien Atatürks – Regierung ohne Islamisten?“, FAZ, 02.03.1997 4 US Congress, Questions for the record submitted by Mr. Frelinghuysen, answer submitted by State Department, in: House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations, Export financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1998, Part 2. 5 US Congress, Questions for the record submitted by Ms. Pelosi, answer submitted by Department of Defense, in: House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations, Export financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1998, Part 2. 6 Cf. State Department, Daily Press Briefing; Briefer: Nicholas Burns, 16.06.1997; State Department, Daily Press Briefing, Briefer: James P. Rubin, 16.01.1998. 7 Article “Keine Demokratie – keine Dollars. Der amerikanische Verteidigungsminister in Ankara“, FAZ, 23.07.1994.

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primarily for geostrategic and security policy reasons.8 The conditions placed on the

assistance were criticized by nearly all Turkish political parties because they would pose a

threat to Turkish national security interests in the fight against the PKK. For this reason,

Turkey did not accept the payment of the assistance funds (Table 1) Anderson 2004: 116;

Callaway/Matthews 2008: 148f; Gabelnick 1999).

To be precise, the foreign assistance during the 1990s provided through the US Agency for

International Development (USAID) programs was intended to be used primarily for regional

development purposes.9 The State Department made individual grants from the Human Rights

and Democracy Fund (HRDF) to support goals including freedom of religion, freedom of

speech, human rights and the eradication of torture. The National Endowment for Democracy

(NED) and its two largest implementing organizations, the National Democratic Institute

(NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), called for projects for the

strengthening of Good Governance (including separation of powers and anti-corruption

measures, political participation for women and young adults), constitutional legality

(including fair trial, banning torture) and democratic norms (minority rights, freedom of

speech). Altogether, the rise to power of the RP had no direct effect on the funding of the

USAID, as this was being phased out at the time (Table 1). Nonetheless, the NED increased

its grants to Turkey annually during the governance period of the RP from 1995 to 1998, and

reduced them again afterwards (Table 6).

2.2 Germany: Interests, Conflicts, Perceptions, Reactions

In the first half of the 1990s, the frequently cited “traditional friendship” between Germany

and Turkey experienced significant turbulence. A defining feature of the bilateral relations is

the “domestic-foreign reciprocity”, or the interdependency of German domestic or foreign

policy and Turkish domestic or foreign policy (Kramer 2007; Sen 2006). The reason for this –

and an important difference from USA-Turkey relations – is the fact that around 2 million

people of Turkish origin live in Germany. However, this is not a homogeneous group, but

rather a demographic group with heterogeneous sub-identities (Turks, Kurds, Alevi, Sunnis,

Islamists, etc). One example of the “domestic-foreign reciprocity” is the “spill-over” of

Turkish internal conflicts (such as Turkish vs. Kurdish nationalists, Sunni extremists vs. Alevi

or Islamists vs. Kemalists) to the diaspora in Germany at the beginning of the 1990s (Pratt

Ewing 2003). The German desire for democracy, human rights and stability in Turkey is

connected to the hope that this will contribute to a civilizing of inner-Turkish conflicts in

8 Cf. Statement by Madeleine Albright in Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, 12.02.1997. 9 Cf. USAID Information on Turkey, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/tr/

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Germany (Akkaya 2003: 108; Steinbach 1994: 82). Until the election victory of the RP,

Germany had been pursuing the following interests in particular: better social integration of

the population of Turkish and Kurdish (Muslim) origin living in Germany; improvement of

human and minority rights in Turkey (Kurds and religious freedom for Christians);

strengthening of domestic security, particularly concerning the Kurdish terrorist organization

PKK as well as Turkish Islamists and their networks; stabilization of the Turkish economy

and further development of the good bilateral economic ties (Kramer 2007b; Weick 2000).

The election of Erbakan as Prime Minister was received cautiously in Germany, the attitude

of the Foreign Ministry was “wait and see”. Although Erbakan was respected as a well known

politician who had “belonged to the political establishment for 30 years” and who knew very

well “what the West hoped for from Turkey”,10 his policies and rhetoric produced widespread

concern in Germany and resulted in contradicting perceptions. Opinion within the German

Federal Government, a coalition between the Christian Democrats and Liberals, was divided:

on the one hand, it was deemed necessary not to be overrun by the developments in Turkey in

a similar fashion to the Islamic Revolution in Iran at the end of the 1970s,11 but on the other

hand, Foreign Minister Kinkel (FDP) saw no reason to mistrust Turkey under the government

of Erbakan. The “normalization” of relations between Turkey and its Islamic neighbors was

considered to be an important contribution to security in the entire region.12

The topic of human rights, however, became a serious problem for German-Turkish relations

– as it indeed had been before the rule of the RP. In contrast to his claims during the election

campaign of seriously dedicating himself to the “Kurdish” question and human rights, Prime

Minister Erbakan avoided a reasonable dialogue with the Germany political scene and was

widely criticized.13 A more serious disagreement, however, transpired at the beginning of

March 1997. Several Christian Democrat government leaders, including German Chancellor

Kohl (CDU), had declared that Turkey was “not a candidate for accession to the European

Union”. The reason given was that “Turkey is an Islamic country”.14 This racist position not

only strengthened anti-European and anti-German sentiments in Turkey, but also led to

disagreements between the USA and Germany, but weakened German criticism on Turkey’s

10 Article „Ganz gelassen wartet Bonn erst ein bisschen ab – Deutsche Politik will den neuen türkischen Regierungschef Erbakan nicht zuletzt am Verhältnis zu den Kurden messen“, Frankfurter Rundschau, 09.07.1996 11 Article „Der neue Mann in Ankara stört Bonns Gelassenheit nun doch ein wenig – Die Abkommen der türkischen Regierung mit ihren Nachbarn wecken Sorge deutscher Politiker“, Frankfurter Rundschau, 16.08.1996. 12 Article „Kinkel: Kein Hysterie“, taz, 17.08.1997. 13 Article „Schrille Töne aus Ankara – Erbakan verweigert Bonner Abgeordneten Dialog über Menschenrechte“, Die Welt, 29.11.1996. 14 Article „Ankara besteht auf Perspektive eines EU-Beitritts“, FAZ, 06.03.1997; Article „Rache an Ost-Rom“, Die Tageszeitung, 06.03.1997.

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poor human rights situation (Anderson 2004: 318f; Nourney 2003: 20). Furthermore it led to

disagreements between the USA and Germany. The USA saw a danger to American security

and stability interests in Eastern Europe because Turkey had threatened to block the Eastern

extension of NATO until it was officially named a candidate country for EU accession

(Riemer 2006).

Of particular interest is the reaction in Germany to both the coup threat and the resignation of

Erbakan: both were officially neutrally “registered”, but unofficially, there was “great relief”

both within the government and in the German parliament at Erbakan's resignation.15

Erbakan, with his anti-European and anti-German sentiments, had become a problem for the

bilateral relations and, from the German point of view, had encouraged an Islamization in

Turkey which (via networks, donations, migration) was threatening to cross over to the

Turkish diaspora in Germany. An important role in the influencing of German politics was

played by Turkish secular-Kemalist “pressure groups” in Germany (Atilgan 2002: 4). The

German reaction to the banning of the RP was in line with that of the EU, in which the

outlawing of the party was “regretfully noted”. The EU respected the decision, but urged

Turkey to respect democratic pluralism and freedom of speech and opinion in the future.16

In terms of development cooperation, Germany was the world's largest donor state for Turkey

in the 1990s (Table 1). For Germany, however, there was a trade-off between economic

interests and human rights which arose when the NATO partner Turkey began to use weapons

delivered by Germany – at that time the second largest arms supplier to Turkey – in the

South-Eastern Kurdish region of the country as part of the fight against the PKK.17 In 1992

and 1994 there were (brief) suspensions of the delivery of weapons. But the usefulness of

German development aid was also questioned, since no improvement in the human rights

situation had been reached (Refflinghaus 2001: 51; Frank 2000). The Federal Ministry of

Development and Economic Cooperation (BMZ), through the Minister of Development Aid

Spranger (CSU), however, pleaded for a continuation of technical and financial cooperation:

“There are also foreign policy issues at stake, particularly in the case of Turkey. Turkey is an

important NATO partner, whose geostrategic importance for the West must be taken

seriously. Furthermore, it is important for us that Turkey remains stable and is not endangered

by Islamic fundamentalism. We also have to take domestic policy issues into consideration.

15 Interview with MP Uta Zapf (SPD) and the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt). 16 Auswärtiges Amt / German Foreign Office, Declaration of the European Union on the Banning of the Refah Party in Turkey, 22.01.1998. 17 Article „Bonn lieferte der Türkei weiter Waffen“, Frankfurter Rundschau, 26.01.1995.

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Nearly 2 million Turkish people live in Germany. We thus wish to keep relations between the

two countries as harmonious as possible.”18

While the BMZ had committed itself primarily to socio-economic development (BMZ 1993,

1995, 1998), the Foreign Office and the German Embassy in Ankara took up the issues of

human rights, constitutionality and religious freedom for the Christian minority. The political

foundations, primarily funded by the BMZ, focused on the issues of good governance, human

and minority rights, union rights, strengthening of the communal self-administration,

liberalization of the economy as well as sustainable development.19

A direct correlation exists between the election victory of the RP and the German ODA: the

ODA commitments to Turkey tripled between 1995 and 1997. As the disbursements show,

Turkey accepted the German ODA (Table 1). Germany had also spoken out in favor of

democracy and human rights, but – in contrast to the USA – had not made the payment of

ODA conditional. A variance can also be seen in the financial means of the foundations:

between 1990 and 1994, the BMZ approved sums totaling around EUR 3.7 million for the

Turkey projects of the foundations. Between 1995 and 1998, however, aid payments rose to

EUR 9.8 million, and were reduced again afterwards (Table 7).

3. Kemalists vs. AKP: The Struggle for the “True” Republic

In November 2002, the political rise of the AKP began. The party of Prime Minister Tayyip

Erdogan won the parliamentary elections with 34% of the vote, and in July 2007 was able to

increase its success in the snap election, gaining 47% of the vote. How can the success of the

AKP be explained?

Following the banning of the RP and its short-lived successor the FP (Virtue Party), the AKP,

in summer 2001, emerged from the split in the Islamist movement. The reform wing under the

leadership of Abdullah Gül and Tayyip Erdogan had criticized the authoritarian leadership

style of Erbakan, along with the failures of the RP during its rule and the Islamist rhetoric

which had provoked the banning of the party (Dagi 2008; Ayata 2004; Yavuz 2003). This

change in ideology was reflected in the party program, in which the AKP committed itself to

fulfilling the demands for democracy and human rights and declared its respect for the basic

principles of Kemalism. The most important point of the party program – which was also the

biggest difference from the RP – was the clear support for the “Western” world, while the

Islamic world played only a minor role. Accession to the EU was proclaimed as a top priority;

18 Article „Ich halte am Kriterium Menschenrechte fest – Minister Carl-Dieter Spranger über die Bedingungen deutscher Entwicklungshilfe“, Frankfurter Rundschau, 11.06.1993. 19 Interviews with the German Foreign Office, German Embassy Ankara and foundations; on the work of the foundations see as well Hummel 1994; Duymaz 1994; Gorawantschy 1994.

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NATO and the USA were identified as important partners.20 This transformation process was

described by Stephen Kinzer (2003: 11) as “the most astonishing political revolution” in the

Middle East. This change in ideology, along with the most serious economic crisis in Turkish

history in early 2001 and the 10% election threshold – the AKP won nearly two-thirds of the

seats in parliament with only one-third of the vote – made the electoral success of 2002

possible (Özel 2003; Önis 2006; Cavdar 2006; Seufert 2004).

The AKP started out as a reformist, market-liberal/conservative, hybrid political movement,

which was able to acquire votes not only from the Islamic-Sunni milieu, but also from

proponents of EU accession, liberals, the economic sector and from the Alevite and Kurdish

milieu. The successes of the AKP, which has now governed alone for eight years, include the

democratization policies designed to meet the “Copenhagen Criteria” – this made possible the

beginning of the accession talks with the EU (2005) – as well as its effective economic policy,

which provided Turkey with the longest economic boom in its history lasting from 2003 until

the beginning of the international financial crisis. These successes are even acknowledged by

critics of the AKP (Baran 2008; Cagaptay 2005).

Nevertheless, a power struggle has broken out, particularly since 2006/2007, between the old,

secular-Kemalist and the new, pro-Islamic elites of the AKP centered around the idea of the

“true” republic (Kramer 2007a; Shankland 2007). This conflict has shaken the foundations of

the Kemalist system - these are based essentially on the Kemalist principles of republicanism,

nationalism and secularism, which were anchored in the constitution of 1982 following the

military coup of 1980. According to the Kemalist understanding of republicanism, it is,

however, not the relevance of the res publica, the common polity, which is emphasized, but

rather the heightened importance of state sovereignty and its organs, i.e. the “state power” is

given a higher priority than “people power”. This concept forms the basis for the omnipotent

character of the Turkish state. This understanding is authoritarian in the sense that the state is

not an instrument of politics, but rather politics must serve the state (Kramer 2004b). In order

to secure its power, the Kemalist state has developed the competencies of its protection

institutions and the possibilities for them to have an impact on politics (primarily the Turkish

military through coups/coup threats and the judiciary through the banning of parties) (Jung

2001). In addition, the political system is characterized by a poor system of checks and

balances and the highest election threshold in Europe – designed to stabilize the political

system (Parla 1991: 103f; Kramer 2004: 7; Kinzer 2001: 26f). The Kemalist understanding of

nationalism is also problematic. Its effects in terms of Realpolitik can primarily be seen in the

20 The party program of the AKP can be found online, also in English, at: http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html

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case of limited rights for the Kurdish, Alevite and Christian minorities, but also in the

notorious § 301 of the criminal code, which makes an insult to the “Turkish nation” a

punishable offence (e.g. the trial of the novelist Orhan Pamuk) (Smith 2005; Wedel 2006).

This is a significant impediment to freedom of speech, freedom of the press and a critical

examination of the Turkish-Armenian past. The Kemalist understanding of secularism is also

undemocratic. The Turkish state has not only committed itself to the one-sided demands of

the majority Sunni Islam, thus raising it to the status of an unofficial state religion (and

negating Turkey's Alevite and Christian identity in the process), but has also created for itself

a monopoly on interpretation of this religion (i.e., the headscarf “turban” is labeled as “an

anti-secularist, political symbol”) (Göle 1997, 2003; Göztepe 2004; Toprak 1989).

The Kemalist-secular and pro-Western state elite is preoccupied with the protection of its

prerogative on state resources and of the ideology of the country's founder Atatürk. From the

point of view of the Kemalist state elite (and possibly the donor states as well), the following

tensions have thus arisen between them and the AKP government:

a) “Islamization” of State and Society

From the point of view of the Kemalist state elite, the principle of secularism has been

seriously endangered at several points, most recently when Gül became the President of

Turkey in August 2007. When Gül first announced his candidacy for the office of president in

early 2007, the military indirectly threatened to “intervene” at the end of April 2007 (the so-

called “e-coup”). It supported – as in the case of the RP in 1997 – Kemalist-secular protest

groups (Karakas 2007a). However, this time it had the opposite effect. The parliamentary

snap election of summer 2007 democratically legitimized the AKP more strongly than in

2002. Gül was subsequently voted in as president by parliament, with the AKP thus filling the

two highest offices in the land. Since then, the Kemalists have been very concerned about the

spread of AKP “clientele politics” - the filling of central posts throughout the state with their

own people, i.e. “Islamists”.21

The accusations of “Islamization” of state and society have gathered strength due to measures

such as the successive banning of alcoholic drinks from the canteens of government agencies

or the limitation of alcohol provision in municipalities governed by the AKP. The biggest

controversy, however, centered around the rigid ban on headscarves not only for female civil

service employees, but also for students (Toprak 2005). The attempt by the AKP to break up

the interpretation monopoly of the Kemalists on the headscarf and to remove the ban in early

2008 through a change to the constitution resulted in a move to ban the party

21 Article „Die Türkei denkt sich neu“, Le Monde diplomatique, 12.02.2010.

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b) Slowing Down of EU Reforms, Increasing Authoritarization, Perpetuation of Democratic

Defects Inherent to the System

Under the AKP Government, the accession process to the EU has produced only a limited

softening of the rigid Kemalist principles of republicanism and nationalism. Although the

cultural rights of the Kurdish population have been strengthened – the use of the Kurdish

language is now allowed in the media and in election campaigns, and the language can now

be taught in private schools – only marginal progress has been made in terms of religious

freedom, especially for the Alevite and Christian minorities. These rights are also of

importance for the donor states (Oehring 2003).22 With respect to freedom of speech and

freedom of the press, an increasing degree of authoritarianism can be observed in the AKP

Government since 2007, as demonstrated by internet censorship (e.g. the banning of

“youtube” because of an alleged “insult” to the nation's founder Atatürk) or the dealings with

the Dogan Media Group (known, for example, for the daily newspaper “Hürriyet”), which has

been critical of the AKP. The latter is claimed to have committed tax fraud over a period of

several years, and should now pay a record fine equivalent to around EUR 2 billion.23 An

increase in authoritarianism can also be seen in dealings with other critics of the AKP. In the

course of the “Ergenekon” investigation targeting the “Deep State” which began in summer

2008, several hundred people, included retired generals as well as opposition politicians and

journalists, have been arrested under suspicion of planning a coup against the AKP

Government. As the executive power, the government thereby exerted direct influence on the

investigations of the judiciary and partly used the arrests to discredit critics whom they

considered undesirable (Jenkins 2009). The decision of the AKP, in the course of the current

reform of the constitution, to retain executive influence on the judiciary was also problematic,

as was the decision to go against their promise and not reduce the 10% election threshold,

made in the hope of profiting from it again in the future.24 As these examples show, the

Kemalist system defects are now ironically and unintentionally contributing to the

22 Article „Türkei gibt Kurden mehr Rechte“, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13.11.2009; Cf. State Department, Report “Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports, May 2010”, chapter on Turkey. 23 Cf. Article „Medienunternehmer Dogan gibt Kampf gegen Erdogan auf“, Der Tagesspiegel, 03.01.2010. 24 The Minister of Justice is currently the head of the High Council of Judges and State Attorneys. This council „appraises“ the nationwide actions of judges and state attorneys and can remove them from cases for political reasons. In March 2006, for example, the state attorney in the city of Van was stripped of office because he had prosecuted the then commander-in-chief of the army, General Büyükanit, for abuse of his position. Cf. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Politischer Bericht Türkei, Mai 2006. The suggestion of the AKP Government that, as part of the reform of the constitution of 1982 being undertaken at the time, in the future the president should choose 16 of the 19 members of the Constitution Tribunal, seven of those being directly appointed at his personal discretion, also strengthens the influence of the executive on the judiciary and undermines the separation of powers. Cf. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Die Verfassungsreform 2010, Fokus Türkei, No. 17/2010.

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authoritarian development of the AKP and leading to a further perpetuation of democracy

deficits inherent to the system in Turkey.

c) “Turning away” from the “West”

In contrast to the Kemalist parties, which had mostly pursued a pro-Western foreign policy

during the 1990s, the emphasis of AKP foreign policy was placed on Turkey’s closest

neighbors. This new foreign policy doctrine, named “Strategic Depth”, essentially postulates a

proactive foreign policy with the goal of “zero problems” with neighboring states. The aim is

for Turkey to grow into the role of a regional hegemon and an “honest mediator” (Davutoglu

2005). This has resulted, among other things, in Turkey agreeing to the reunification of

Cyprus (2004), in a rapprochement with Greece, Armenia and Iraq, and in Turkey mediating

in the Israel-Palestine and Israel-Syria conflicts. The new foreign policy has also resulted,

however, in Turkey pursuing its own national economic and security interest to a greater

extent. The Turkish parliament, for example, forbade US troops from invading Iraq from

Turkish territory in March 2003. Furthermore, there was an extension of political and

economical relations with the authoritarian regimes in Russia, Iran and Syria, accompanied by

an increasing criticism of Israel's Middle East policy.

4. The Dealings of the USA and Germany with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 4.1. USA: Interests, Conflicts, Perceptions, Reactions

Following the resignation of Prime Minister Erbakan in summer 1997, US-Turkish relations

settled once again. The Enhanced Partnership was upgraded in 1999 under the Clinton

Administration to a Strategic Partnership. This was primarily an expression of the new US

goal of pursuing its own economic interests by building oil and gas pipelines through Turkey

as well as developing Turkey into a pro-Western energy hub situated between the Balkan, the

Caucasus and the Middle East. For the Bush Administration, the first important aim was to

stabilize the chronically volatile Turkish economy – early 2001 had seen the worst crisis in

Turkish history. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Turkey was asked

to support the USA in the international war on terror, especially in Afghanistan (ISAF). It was

also hoped that Ankara would help topple the regime of Saddam Hussein in the planned Iraq

campaign. The normative dimension was also new: as mentioned at the beginning, the

Muslim nation of Turkey was praised by the USA following the attacks of 11 September 2001

as a “model” and “inspiration” for other Muslim states due to its secular government and pro-

Western stance (Larrabee 2008; Sayari 2004; Aydin/Erhan 2004; Burwell 2008).

13

In November 2002, the AKP won the parliamentary elections in Turkey. The victory was

received cautiously in the USA: “Let us at this point congratulate the Justice and

Development Party on its electoral success in yesterday's parliamentary elections. We also

congratulate the Turkish people in demonstrating through their conduct of the election the

vibrancy of Turkey's democracy.”25 It is unclear whether the congratulatory tones were ironic

or whether they were meant honestly. Just a few days after the election, the designated head

of the Turkish General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök, was received by Secretary of State Colin

Powell. The event was officially deemed an inaugural visit, although there were also

discussions about the future of Turkish domestic and foreign policy under the AKP which was

soon to be governing alone (Kapsis 2006: 41f; Heper 2005).

In December 2002, AKP leader Erdogan, who had spent 4 months in prison in 1999 for

“goading religious-based antagonism” and could not be sworn in as Prime Minister until 11

March 2003 due to the necessity of a by-election, was received by President Bush virtually as

a head of state.26 The USA demonstrated a pragmatic attitude towards the AKP based on the

following reasoning: with the special treatment of Erdogan, the praising of Turkey and the

AKP as “models” for the Muslim world, as well as the promise of supporting an initiation of

negotiations for the accession of Turkey at the upcoming EU summit in Copenhagen,

President Bush hoped to “buy” the support of the AKP Government for the upcoming war in

Iraq (Walker 2007/08: 96). This goal was underlined by the massive increase in US foreign

assistance and the extra payments (supplementals) via the Economic Support Fund (ESF) of

USD 200 million for the Fiscal Year 2003, and of USD 1 billion for the Fiscal Year 2004

(Table 1). The justification given for this was: “Turkey is a front-line state and one of our

most important allies. Its strategic location in the nexus of Europe, the Middle East, the

Caucasus, and the Caspian, coupled with its unique status as the only predominantly Muslim

NATO member, make it an active and extremely valuable partner” (CBJ 2003). The ESF

funds were intended to help “to mitigate the economic stress Turkey is experiencing as a

result of its support for combating international terrorism. The transfer of ESF funds to

Turkey will help to meet urgent financing needs, contribute to internal stability, and

demonstrate continuing U.S. Support” (CBJ 2004). This time, there was no conditionality of

US aid connected to questions of democracy and human rights, as had been the case in the

1990s. Although the commitments were approved by Congress, there were no disbursements

in 2003 because the AKP Government chose not to accept them (Table 1). One of the reasons

for this was that the Turkish parliament, dominated by AKP MPs, had, in conjunction with the

25 State Department, Press Briefing by Spokesman Richard Boucher, 04.11.2002. 26 White House, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, 10.12.2002.

14

opposition, denied US troops permission to invade Northern Iraq from Turkish territory in

March 2003 citing reasons of national security, and had “merely” granted the USA access to

Turkish airspace.

With the exception of the ESF supplementals connected to the Iraq war, US disappointment

over Turkey in fact had little effect on foreign assistance. Independently of the coming to

power of the AKP, the USA had already increased its funding for the accounts “Foreign

Military Assistance” (FMF), “Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related”

(NADR) and “Migration and Refugee Assistance” in 2002, and approved them again in the

following years (Table 2). The USA demonstrated flexibility and pragmatism in order to

protect national interests. These included the supply of American troops and the stabilization

of post-war Iraq from the Turkish military base Incirlik; the retention of the support of

Muslim Turkey, primarily of symbolic importance, for the ISAF deployment in Afghanistan;

support for Turkey in the fight against Islamic and particularly Kurdish terrorism in Turkey;

the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as well as the

stemming of refugee flows in the border regions of Iraq (CBJ 2003-2010). The efforts of the

USA paid off: under the arbitration of Washington, the NATO partners Turkey and Greece

agreed to resolve their border disputes in the Aegean through civil channels, and the AKP

Government approved the reunification of Cyprus in spring 2004. From a US point of view,

both actions were important, particularly for the trouble-free interoperability of NATO.

Of particular interest, however, is the variance in the program “International Military

Education Training” (IMET) (Table 2). In this program, financed by the State Department and

implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Department (DSCA), foreign

military officers learn primarily about the improvement of interoperability between their

national armed forces and those of the USA, but there are also seminars about the

(subordinate) role of the military in a democratic state.27 While the justification for the funds

in the Fiscal Year 2003 still read “IMET training will (…) teach fundamental democratic

principles which help strengthen Turkey’s commitment to democracy and human rights”

(CBJ 2003), that of the Fiscal Years 2004-2007 spoke of the USA only having an interest in a

“well trained, U.S.-oriented Turkish officer corps” (italics by Cemal Karakas), with no

mention any longer of democracy or human rights in connection with the military (CBJ 2004-

2007). The US orientation of the Turkish military was also emphasized in the years which

followed (CBJ 2008-2010). The increase in IMET funds since 2002 reflects the US concerns

about an “Islamization” and a drift of the Turkish military away from the USA, and has led to

US support for a Kemalist “counterweight” to the AKP.

27 Further information on the IMET can be found online at: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/65533.htm

15

Although, the US government was impressed by the AKP reform policy between 2002 and

2005 and by the meeting of the “Copenhagen Criteria”, and despite the agreement on the

extension of the Strategic Partnership, US-Turkish relations have taken a dramatic turn for

the worse since 2006.28 Following a series of terrorist attacks by the Kurdish underground

organization PKK which was operating from the Turkish-Iraqi border region, the USA

rejected the idea of a Turkish invasion of Northern Iraq in order not to endanger its own

security interests in Iraq. This, however, had the unintentional result of further inflaming the

anti-Americanism in Turkey which had been on the rise since the beginning of the Iraq war,

and of sparking accusations that the USA had an interest in an independent “Kurdistan”. As a

result of this, the AKP Government sought to approach the authoritarian regimes in the

“rogue states” of Syria and Iran in order to combat the common enemy PKK (Uslu et al.

2005; Taspinar 2005; Barkey 2009).

From the US point of view, the politicization of religion by the AKP (such as in the case of

the “headscarf” question), which had been on the increase since 2006, was particularly

problematic because the growing power struggle between the AKP and the Turkish military

was beginning to destabilize the country and lead to a stagnation of the EU reform process.29

The climax of the power struggle came at the end of April 2007 with the indirect coup threat

on the internet site of the General Staff (“e-coup”) to be put into practice if Foreign Minister

Gül was to run for the office of president. The reaction of the State Department was

interesting: “We have real confidence in Turkey's democracy and we have confidence in their

constitutional processes. (…) We are encouraging everybody to participate in Turkey's

democracy according to their constitution and laws” (italics by C.K.).30 The reaction was

reminiscent of the reaction to the fall of the RP in 1997. The USA had no interest in a “hard”

coup at that stage either, as this would have endangered the democratization process and the

political stability of Turkey, but nevertheless emphasized again the contested constitutionally

legitimate role of the military as a political corrective. The split between the Bush

administration and the AKP government was clearly visible in the election victory of the AKP

in July 2007, in the election of Gül as President in August 2007, as well as in the ceasing of

the move to ban the AKP in summer 2008. All of these developments were met with cautious

comments from the USA;31 and in the case of the impending ban on the AKP, Secretary of

28 Article „US praises AKP role in Turkey’s democratization“, Turkish Daily News, 11.11.2005; Further information on the “Strategic Partnership” can be found online at: http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statement_070508.html 29 Article „Troubles ahead“, The Economist, 19.10.2006; Article „Der General spricht“, FAZ, 04.10.2006. 30 State Department, Press Briefing by Sean McCormack, 30.04.2007. 31 State Department, Press Briefing by Sean McCormack, 27.07.2007; State Department, Press Briefing by Sean McCormack, 15.08.2007; State Department, Press Briefing by Sean McCormack, 30.07.2008.

16

State Rice commented soberly: “We believe and hope that this will be decided within

Turkey’s democratic context and by its secular democratic principles.”32

From a US perspective, an “Islamization” of Turkish foreign policy has been evident since the

election victory of 2007. The AKP government has increasingly questioned Turkish

participation in the ISAF deployment in Afghanistan, developed its ties to Iran – the signing

of the gas agreement with Iran was seen as a strengthening of the Iranian regime – and harshly

criticized Israel's Middle East policy.33 In terms of domestic policy, an increasing

authoritarianism has been evident with respect to freedom of speech and freedom of the press,

including, as mentioned previously, the growing internet censorship, the dealings with the

AKP critical Dogan Media Group, the “Ergenekon” investigations and the lack of checks and

balances.34

Despite the tense relationship with the AKP Government, the Bush Administration distanced

itself from Congress' new Armenia resolution in late 2007 in order to avoid the realization of

Turkey's threat to expel the USA from the Incirlik military base – this would have had grave

consequences for the supply of US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example (Giragosian

2009). The USA has also continued its foreign assistance. The idea behind this has also been

to remain engaged in order to protect national interests. The justification for the Fiscal Year

2007 indeed states that “Turkey is a front-line state, a key ally in the war on terrorism (…). Its

success as a democratic, open-economy Muslim state rooted in the West is important to U.S.

efforts at political and economic reform in the Middle East and Eurasia” (CBJ 2007). There

was also an increase in ESF funding: “The increase in Economic Support Funds (ESF) from

Fiscal Year 2006 to Fiscal Year 2008 reflects the importance of addressing economic

development issues that, in turn, can help deep seated social problems. High unemployment

and poverty, particularly in the Kurdish-speaking Southeast, have led to domestic instability,

posing an obstacle to Turkey's EU accession” (CBJ 2008). For the Fiscal Year 2009, the

justification reads: “A Muslim-majority nation of over 70 million with a working, secular

democracy, a free market economy and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)

second-largest military, Turkey can play a leadership role in the region and has served as a

model for modernizing nations worldwide. The significant increase in security assistance

reflects (…) the U.S. effort to establish Turkey as a regional hub for fighting terrorism, human

trafficking, narcotics trafficking, and other activities” (CBJ 2009).

32 Secretary Condoleezza Rice: Remarks at the American-Turkish Council Luncheon, Washington, 15.04.2008. 33 Article “Iran, Turkey sign deal on gas exports to Europe”, Reuters.com, 14.07.2007; Article „Kritik an Israel. Türkei kritisiert Israel - Erdogan benutzt Gaza-Krieg für Wahlkampf“, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.01.2009. 34 State Department, Report “Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports, May 2009”, chapter on Turkey.

17

As Tables 1, 2 and 6 show, nearly all the foreign assistance accounts (ODA/ESF, FMF,

NADR, IMET, NED) for Turkey in the 7-year reference period 2002-2008, i.e. during the rule

of the AKP, reveal greater amounts than in the period 1995-2001, the era of the RP and the

time that followed it. From 1995 to 2001, the USA granted Turkey around USD 170 million

in ODA disbursements, with another USD 11.2 million from the State Department (mostly for

the programs “Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, etc.”, “Migration and Refugee Assistance”)

and USD 9.9 million for the IMET program (Table 2). Between 2002 and 2008, the figures

rose to USD 254 million for the ODA disbursements, USD 35 million for “Nonproliferation,

Anti-Terrorism, etc.” and “Migration and Refugee Assistance” and USD 23.7 million for the

IMET program. With respect to democracy promotion, the “disbursements” of the USA for

“Government and Civil Society” projects between 2005 and 2008 totaled around USD 7.8

million (Table 3). A closer examination of the foreign assistance shows that the US aid is

somewhat Janus-faced, i.e. the funds benefit not only the AKP Government or the public

sector, but primarily the “opponents” of their one-party rule. Apart from the military, this can

be seen in the case of independent judiciary and media, as well as in the strengthening of

(other) parties and civil society. To be precise, around USD 2 million, or 26% of total aid,

flowed into the public sector, while USD 3.2 million, or 41%, went to “NGO & Civil Society”

(Tables 3 and 4). The NED more than doubled its grants to Turkey. It approved around USD

4.2 million for the period 1995-2001, and USD 9.5 million for 2002-2008. Since 2006, the

NED has primarily funded projects for human rights, freedom of religion, constitutional

legality, parliamentary development, political participation for women and young adults,

pluralism, freedom of the press and development of the weak Turkish civil society.35

4.2. Germany: Interests, Conflicts, Perceptions, Reactions

German-Turkish relations also settled once again after 1998, although the decisive factor for

this was not so much the resignation of Prime Minister Erbakan and the banning of the RP,

but rather the change of government in Germany from the Christian Democrat/Liberal

coalition to that of the Social Democrats and Greens in autumn 1998. The new government

played a decisive role in Turkey being officially declared a candidate for accession to the EU

in 1999. At the beginning of the 2000s, Germany was pursuing the following interests in its

foreign policy regarding Turkey: the strengthening of human and minority rights in Turkey in

order to prevent a “spill-over” of inner-Turkish conflicts to Germany as in the 1990s; better

integration of the population of Turkish and Kurdish origin in Germany; the begin of the EU

accession talks with Turkey; development of foreign trade relations (Kramer 2007b; 2004a;

35 Cf. NED Annual Yearbooks, www.ned.org

18

Frech/Öcal 2006; Morgil 2003; Leggewie 2004). Furthermore, the necessity of democracy

promotion in the Islamic world was emphasized by the Federal Ministry for Economic

Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ)

in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the case of Turkey as well as in other places,

this was to be achieved not by way of financial transfers, but rather through an “intercultural

dialogue”.36

In general, relations between Germany and Turkey were less affected by the electoral victory

of the AKP and its policies than relations between the USA and Turkey, despite the cautious

reaction to the AKP election victory in 2002. The Federal Government hoped for a pro-

European stance from the AKP Government. “Initial signals” were “received with goodwill”

in Berlin, although there was an anxious wait for the actual composition of the government

and the policy program to emerge.37 The AKP Government, however, surprised the SPD-

Green Federal Government with its dynamic EU reform policy which displayed a “model”

character for other Muslim states: “The Erdogan Government, which was initially viewed

with skepticism, has succeeded in achieving more reforms in the past year and a half than

were introduced in the decades before. This must be acknowledged, even though there is still

much to be done.”38 The precise meaning of “still much to be done” was a key topic of the

Foreign Office report on human rights for the period 2002-2005. In this report, there was

criticism of the lack of human rights and freedom of speech, as well as concerns about torture,

limitations placed on the Christian community and violence against women.39

Despite the initial skepticism towards the AKP Government, German foreign assistance

continued largely unchanged, as Table 1 shows. Germany was also the most important donor

for Turkey in the 2000s, although the development policy cooperation ended, as planned, with

a final commitment in 2008 (BMZ 2009). The reasons for this included the positive socio-

economic development of Turkey and the initiation of negotiations for accession to the EU

(2005). The main goals of the German technical and financial cooperation after 2002 were

environmentally friendly municipal development, economic development, decentralization

and a reduction of the regional disparity between the industrialized West and the

underdeveloped East of Turkey: “Focusing attention on this region helps to curb migration,

which is in the interest of both the Turkish side (less congestion in metropolitan areas, more

36 Article „Auf dem islamischen Auge blind - Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik muss umdenken / Interkultureller Dialog“, FAZ, 17.11.2001. 37 Article „Reaktionen nach politischer Wende in der Türkei bleiben zurückhaltend“, Berliner Morgenpost, 05.11.002 38 Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, German Bundestag, 15th Election Period, 78th Session, 26.11.2003, p. 6772. 39 Foreign Office: 7th Report of the Federal Government on its human rights policy in foreign relations and other policy areas, report period: 1 April 2002 to 28 February 2005, Berlin 2005, p. 281-282.

19

political stability) and the German side (avoiding the expected surge of migrants under the

accession perspective)” (Schultz 2003: 90). Alongside the stabilization of socio-economic

development, the “Islam Dialogue” established in 2002 was of great interest – this is led in

Turkey by the political department of the German Embassy in Ankara. The aim is for better

understanding between the “West” and the Islamic world about the furtherance of intra-social

pluralism and the dismantling of anti-Western hatred. The “foreign-domestic reciprocity” in

German-Turkish relations becomes especially clear here. Since 2002 for instance, Turkish

imams have been trained through the German Embassy for service in Germany. The training

program includes not only German language instruction, but also discussion about the

(subordinate) role of religion in a democracy, Islamism and questions of social integration in

Germany. These measures can be seen as indirect democracy promotion.40 Furthermore, the

Ernst Reuter Initiative (ERI) was founded in 2006 as part of the “Intercultural Dialogue”

program. This was the German-Turkish “answer” to the “Mohammed” caricatures and is

intended to impart, by means of bilateral projects, basic democratic values such as tolerance

and religious freedom.41

With respect to democracy promotion, however, the political foundations became a problem

in bilateral relations in 2002/2003. In the 2000s, they had concerned themselves in their

political education programs primarily with the issues of human rights, gender, regional

development, environment, entrepreneurship, trade unions, German-Turkish intercultural

dialogue, freedom of the press and constitutional legality. However, even before the coming

to power of the AKP, they were accused in a Kemalist-nationalistic motivated lawsuit by the

Justice Department of spying for the German Government and undermining the territorial and

societal integrity of Turkey. Although the case was dropped in late 2003 due to a lack of

evidence, the bureaucratic restrictions on the German (and other) foundations were greatly

increased following this, impeding their political education activities considerably.42

Further tensions in bilateral relations arose when Turkey refused to recognize Cyprus and

when Angela Merkel from the Christian Democratic CDU/CSU became Federal Chancellor in

a grand coalition with the Social Democratic SPD (2005). Although there is a general interest

in Germany in favor of a stable “pro-Western” and democratic Turkey which spans all parties,

the CDU/CSU feel that this should occur without Turkish accession to the EU. The primarily

culturalist and anti-Islamic politicization of Turkish EU accession has, on the one hand, arisen

in response to the Islamophobia of the German population, which has increased since the

40 Interview with German Embassy in Ankara. 41 Further information on the Ernst-Reuter-Initiative: http://www.auswaertiges.de 42 Article „Verfahren gegen deutsche Stiftungen beginnt / Beweislage der Anklage ist dürftig“, FAZ, 26.12.2002; Article „Kein Verfahren wegen deutscher Stiftungen“, FAZ, 31.12.2003.

20

attacks of 11 September 2001 (Winkler 2003; Wehler 2004; Gerhards 2006); but on the other

hand has thwarted the conditionality policy of the EU, has led to a holdup of reforms in

Turkey and has contributed to a “turning away” of Turkey from Europe. Furthermore, it has

weakened the credibility of German criticism of democracy and human rights in Turkey

(Schmalz-Jacobsen 2003: 102f; Leibold/Kühnel 2006).

The Foreign Office, in its human rights report for 2005-2008, criticized the slowing down of

the democratization process and called for an improvement in freedom of religion, especially

for Christians and the Alevi, and for minority rights and freedom of speech.43 However, the

Federal Government once again failed to mention what the AKP Government considered to

be a lack of rights for (Sunni) Muslims in Kemalist Turkey (e.g. the rigid ban on

headscarves). The AKP accused Germany (and the EU) of “double standards” in questions of

human rights. In Germany, though, the argument about the “headscarf” ban was considered to

be an “internal Turkish problem”.44

The German reactions to the power struggle between the Kemalist state elite and the AKP

Government, which had been growing since 2006, were particularly interesting. The coup

threats made by the Turkish military against the AKP Government were decisively

condemned, while the AKP election victory of 2007 was greeted with praise: “The Turkish

population has clearly expressed their trust in the government of Prime Minister Erdogan

through democratic elections. Based on this, the Turkish Government now has a strong

mandate to continue policies of stability and reform.”45 The election of Gül as president was

also welcomed, while the move to ban the AKP was criticized: “The AKP, under the

leadership of President Gül and Prime Minister Erdogan, has shown that it is committed to the

principles of democracy and constitutional legality.”46 The perceptions and reactions of

Germany to these events showed a marked difference from that of the USA, which had

increasingly labeled the AKP as “Islamist”.

There have, nevertheless, been several points of tension in German-Turkish relations since the

second half of 2007. Alongside the previously mentioned authoritarization of the AKP, the

following actions were criticized by the German Government, partly due to pressure from

Turkish secular pressure groups within Germany: the Turkish gas deal with Iran, and

43 Foreign Office: 8th Report of the Federal Government on its human rights policy in foreign relations and other policy areas, report period: 1 March 2005 – 29 February 2008, Berlin 2008, p. 300-301; Article „EU: Die Türkei steht vor Gericht. Der umstrittene Prozess gegen den Schriftsteller Pamuk soll heute beginnen“, 16.12.2005 44 Interviews with German MPs Uta Zapf (SPD), Ulla Jeplke (Die Linke), Holger Haibach (CDU). 45 Foreign Office, Press release „Bundesminister Steinmeier zum Ausgang der Wahlen in der Türkei“, 23.07.2007. 46 Foreign Office, Press release „Bundesminister Steinmeier gratuliert dem Präsidenten der Republik Türkei zu seiner Wahl“, 28.08.2007; Foreign Office, Press release „Bundesregierung kritisiert Verbotsverfahren gegen türkische Regierungspartei AKP“, 17.03.2008.

21

particularly the “arbitrary” inclusion of Iran in the Nabucco Pipeline in summer 2007; the

appearance of Prime Minister Erdogan in Cologne in early 2008, in the course of which he

advised the Turkish population in Germany not to let themselves be “assimilated” by the

majority German society; the Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq for the purposes of

fighting the PKK due to the fear of a renewed “spill-over” of inner-Turkish conflicts into

Germany; the donation scandal surrounding the AKP-affiliated charity organization “Deniz

Feneri”, which collected several million euro from Turkish people in Germany, embezzled the

funds and possibly used them – according to the accusation made by the German public

prosecution – to finance the AKP.47

What reactions can be observed with respect to foreign assistance and democracy promotion?

As Table 1 shows, since the beginning of negotiations for Turkish accession to the EU (2005),

there has interestingly been no substitution effect of Germany profiting from the

conditionality policy of the EU as a “free rider” In fact, the opposite is true: Germany not only

pays around 20% of the pre-accession aid of over EUR 1 billion per year to Turkey, but

between 2002 and 2008, Berlin also paid around USD 800 million in ODA disbursements

(Table 1).48 In addition, German disbursements for “Government & Civil Society” projects in

Turkey have increased markedly since 2005, with “Government Administration”, “Civil

Society”, “Judicial Development” and “Free Flow of Information” in particular being

strengthened (Tables 3,5). Between 2005 and 2008, around USD 19.5 million was paid to

“Government and civil society” projects. Of these funds, USD 8.3 million or 42% went to the

“public sector” and USD 7 million or 36% to “NGO and civil society” (Table 3). Since 2006,

there has been an increase primarily in funding for “Free Flow of Information” and “Civil

Society” (Table 5). Several aspects of individual projects are worthy of mention, such as legal

cooperation agreed upon in 2007 in questions of protection of human rights, political checks

and balances, the position of the judiciary in relation to the media and the implementation of

EU guidelines in the national justice system, along with the strengthening of constitutional

consciousness in Turkey as called for by the German Foreign Office in 2008.49 These aspects

highlight the fact that the German Government has reacted to the authoritarization of the AKP

over recent years and called for stronger civil corrective measures for politics (particularly

civil society, freedom of speech, freedom of the press).

47 Article “Iranisches Erdgas für die Türkei. Wirtschaftliche Notwendigkeit mit politischen Hintergedanken“, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28.09.2007; Article „Erdogan warnt Deutschtürken vor Assimilation“, Die Welt, 10.02.2008; Article „Spendenbetrug für die islamische Sache“, Frankfurter Rundschau, 18.09.2008. 48 The reduction of around USD 400 million from the period 1995-2001 can be explained, as previously mentioned, by the phasing out of German ODA by 2008. 49 Federal Ministry of Justice: Press release „Deutschland und Türkei zeichnen Vereinbarung zur justiziellen Zusammenarbeit“, Berlin, 21.02.2007; Cf. Studie zum Ansehen des türkischen Jusitzwesens; http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Menschenrechte/Aktuell/08-Tuerkei.html

22

The reaction analysis also demonstrates that the BMZ payments to the political foundations

have been greatly increased since 2002. Between 2002 and 2008, the foundations received

more than EUR 21 million (plus EUR 3 million for 2009). In the period 1995-2001, the figure

was EUR 17.6 million (Table 7). This case also interestingly revealed no substitution effect

resulting from the approach to EU accession. On the contrary: the increase in funding for the

foundations demonstrates that in this case too, Germany is directly engaged and wishes to

exert influence itself over democratization in Turkey. A closer examination of the work of the

foundations shows that there have only been isolated adaptations to AKP policy. Ironically,

the biggest difference can be found between the Christian Democratic Konrad-Adenauer-

Stiftung (KAS) and the liberal Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS) – the corresponding

political parties CDU/CSU and FDP have formed the Federal Coalition Government since

2009. While the KAS, due to the “common religious-conservative basic values”, has the

closest relations of all German foundations with the AKP and its civil society organizations,

the FNS has deemed the AKP “Islamist” and rejects a structural cooperation with it and its

subsidiary organizations. The KAS hopes, among other things, to play an important role in the

“internationalization” of those AKP politicians suspected of being “Islamist” (Kurt 2009: 72-

73). The FNS, in contrast, has conducted several projects since 2007 aimed at the

strengthening of secularism in Turkey. The FES and the HBS have a pragmatic relationship

with the AKP. In general, they do not partake in direct advising of the government, but there

are individual cases of cooperation with the civil society close to the AKP.50

5. Summary, Tentative Conclusions and Implications for “Western” Donor Countries

and Democracy Promotion in Muslim States

Both the USA and Germany have an interest in a stable, secular-Western and democratic

Turkey, although the implications for the two donors states differ and are, in some cases,

contradictory.

US dealings with the pro-Islamic and Islamist governing parties and the Kemalist state elite

since the 1990s have mainly displayed continuity. In order to protect geostrategic interests, a

pragmatic form of cooperation was sought with the democratically elected RP and AKP

Governments. Foreign assistance continued to be paid, but neither the coup threats nor the

moves to ban the Islamist RP and, according to the USA, the “anti-secular” AKP, was

criticized by the US Government. With regular references to constitutionalism, i.e. suggesting

that Turkey should solve its problems by civil means and in accordance with its (military)

constitution, the omnipotent role of the Kemalist protection institutions was militarily and

50 Interviews with German foundations.

23

judicially endorsed. The main US goal and interest was to keep a stable - and thus non-

Islamist-governed - Turkey on a pro-Western course. With respect to the frequently cited

“model/inspiration” role of Turkey for other Muslim states, the key feature from a US

perspective is clearly the subordination of the sovereignty of the people, or “people power”, to

that of the authoritarian state, or “state power”.

Germany's dealings with the pro-Islamic and Islamist governing parties and the Kemalist state

elite, however, are marked by some changes since the 1990s. Germany's pragmatic

cooperation with the RP and the AKP, along with the mostly unconditional provision of

foreign assistance, are primarily a product of the exceptional “domestic-foreign reciprocity”

in their bilateral relations. Moreover, German foreign policy regarding Turkey is shaped to a

large extent by strong and very particular internal social interests. While there was also relief

in Germany at the resignation of Erbakan and a general acceptance of the banning of the RP,

Germany supported the AKP during the power struggle between the AKP Government and

the Kemalist state elite. In contrast to the RP, the AKP is not regarded in Germany as an

“Islamist” party working towards the “Iranification” of Turkey, but rather as reform-oriented,

religious-conservative mass movement which has, for populist reasons, politicized religion for

its own benefit and is increasingly displaying authoritarian characteristics. Ironically, it is the

Kemalist system deficits which have eased this process of authoritarization and have led to a

perpetuation of the democracy deficits inherent to the system in Turkey. Altogether, however,

German efforts have contributed to a strengthening of the Turkish democracy process, in that

Germany supported the democratically elected AKP Government during the struggle for

power. This support from Germany was based on the notion that the AKP is the political force

which is best able to fulfill German interests, including the democratization and stabilization

of Turkey and the continuation of the EU admission process. From a German perspective, the

key feature of the “model” function of Turkey is the mostly pro-democratic shift in ideology

and the EU reform policy of the AKP. However, there are also contradictions on the German

side. With the party political and culturalist politicization of Turkey's EU admission and the

discussion surrounding the “Privileged Partnership”, Germany has also contributed to the

slowing down of the EU reform process of democratization, and has created conditions under

which Turkey is more inclined to search for more reliable partners in authoritarian regimes.

In terms of democracy promotion, there has interestingly been no substitution effect despite

the initiation of negotiations with Turkey for EU accession: neither the USA nor Germany are

“free riders” of the EU conditionality policy. Indeed, the opposite is true: funding for

“Governance & Civil Society” projects as well as for political foundations has increased in

both donor states in recent years. This demonstrates that the donors, for reasons concerning

24

their own national interests, wish to remain engaged in order to maintain the ability to exert

influence directly on state and non-state players, policies and processes in Turkey.

From the reaction analysis of the USA and Germany, the following tentative theoretical and

empirical implications can be derived with respect to “Western” concepts of democracy

promotion in other Muslim states:

The rise of pro-Islamic elites and parties is often a conflict-ridden process, both in Turkey and

in other Muslim countries. “Western” donor states should be wary of prematurely establishing

a dichotomy in Muslim recipient countries between the stereotypes “it is good because it is

Western-secular” and “it is bad because it is anti-Western and Islamist”. As the example of

Turkey shows, it is not only difficult, but can also lead to dilemmas and contradictory

reactions on the part of the donor states. For the donor countries, it is important not only to

question their own understanding of democracy and human rights, but also that of the secular

elites and pro-Islamic elites in the recipient country. The example of Turkey demonstrates the

complexity of such questions. For instance, both the Kemalist and Muslim elites have their

own understanding of democracy when it comes to the “headscarf” issue: the AKP argues that

every woman should have the right to dress as she wishes, i.e. the wearing of a headscarf is

defended as a “human right”. The Kemalist state elite, however, take a very different position.

As part of their interpretation monopoly on Sunni Islam, they consider the Islamic headscarf

to be an “anti-secular” political symbol. They also emphasize that there should not only be a

right to religion, but also a right to freedom from religion. In this issue, the “Western” donor

states are (not only in Turkey) confronted with a trade-off between “protection against

Islamization vs. religious freedom for Muslims”, and generally with the question of how

much visible religion a secular (Muslim) state can accept, and how much religious freedom a

(Muslim) democracy must provide. From the point of view of the AKP Government, there

was a loss of credibility on the part of the donor states when they mainly drew attention to the

insufficient cultural rights of the Kurds or the lack of religious freedom for Christians, albeit

with good reason, but at the same time avoided the issue of rights for Muslims in Kemalist

Turkey.

Loss of credibility also occurs when cases arise of discrimination against Muslim minorities

in the donor states. In Germany, for example, there were several attacks during the 1990s by

right-wing extremists on Turkish and Kurdish families. Since the terrorist attacks of 11

September 2001, a growing “Islamophobia” has been evident in several “Western” states

(including the USA and Germany) which not only raises questions – partly justified – about

the ability of Muslims in the diaspora to integrate socially, but has also been politically

instrumentalized (e.g. the minaret ban in Switzerland or the politicizing of Turkey's accession

25

to the EU). These factors could also potentially impede the democratization efforts of the

donor countries.

Furthermore, Western donor states should be wary of making hurried choices of partners in

Muslim countries. In the interest of preserving their credibility, the donor states should

respect the results of democratic elections. This is especially important when large political

parties or mass movements such as the AKP take up Islamic issues which would otherwise be

left to Islamist splinter groups. The fact that the USA chose to support the Kemalists and base

its arguments on constitutionalism is problematic, since the Turkish constitution itself is, for

the most part, undemocratic. The result has been a growing anti-Americanism which not only

complicates the bilateral relations but also complicates the democratization work of the US

quasi-governmental implementing organizations and political foundations.

Many “Western” donor countries (including the USA and Germany) conduct foreign trade or

security cooperation with authoritarian regimes in order to protect their own national interests.

Many Muslim recipient states, such as Turkey, are poor in natural resources, plagued by high

unemployment or threatened by terrorism. Their foreign trade and security agreements with

authoritarian states or “rogue states” should thus not be understood a priori as a turning away

from the “West” by the donor states, but should be recognized as legitimate moves to protect

their own interests.

26

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30

Appendix: Tables

Table 1: USA51 and Germany52: Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Turkey in Commitments53 and Disbursements54, Data in Mio. USD

USA

Germany

Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements

1990 14,66 13,00 199,24 429,19

1991 325,36 325,00 342,88 322,75

1992 1,35 1,00 173,22 226,03

1993 200,40 200,00 123,11 201,07

1994 0,40 - 206,52 183,32

1995 165,71 166,00 101,45 200,67

1996 33,49 - 183,82 263,55

1997 22,32 - 310,22 190,69

1998 - 0,43 97,10 143,70

1999 4,12 1,97 124,33 152,50

2000 3,60 - 39,24 103,34

2001 1,20 1,63 92,65 131,77

2002 203,56 204,70 114,94 100,77

2003 1.008,22 7,28 71,91 124,78

2004 10,34 9,37 90,98 107,71

2005 16,11 12,87 87,34 115,48

2006 4,47 3,31 80,27 101,28

2007 11,66 7,08 81,05 111,61

2008 11,26 9,38 214,80 143,94

Note: Data taken from OECD, figures rounded.

51 USAID reports annually on all flows. 52 BMZ reports annually on flows from numerous German agencies (GTZ, KfW, Federal Institutions, Ministries and Foundations and Hermes). 53 Commitment: A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organization. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements. 54 Disbursement: The release of funds to or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. In the case of activities carried out in donor countries, such as training, administration or public awareness programs, disbursement is taken to have occurred when the funds have been transferred to the service provider or the recipient. It can take several years to disburse a commitment.

31

Table 2: USA: ODA-Incompatible Economic and Military Assistance to Turkey, Disbursements in Mio. USD

Program or Account 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

State Department, Total Thereof:

0.45 0.51 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.71 1.29 1.71 1.60 1.15 0.81 3.89 4.74 3.01 1.60 4.52 4.10 6.90 10.08

Narcotics Control

0.40 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.05 0.05 . . 0.12 . . . .

Migration and Refugee Assistance

. . . . . . 0.45 0.54 0.34 . 0.11 3.01 1.90 1.51 . 2.03 2.03 3.26 6.66

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related (NADR)

. . . . . . . . . . . 0.10 2.20 0.60 0.60 1.22 0.48 2.01 1.50

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

3.37 3.55 3.29 3.03 1.01 1.10 1.10 1.45 1.51 1.51 1.55 1.69 2.76 2.80 4.99 3.72 3.01 3.50 2.88

Department of Denfense: Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF)

412.22 500.00 475.00 . . . . . . . . . 48.00 17.35 35.00 33.73 14.85 14.23 6.82

Source: US Overseas Loans & Grants, figures rounded.

32

Table 3: USA and Germany: Commitments and Disbursements according to OECD-Classification “Government & Civil Society”, “Publi c Sector” and “NGO & Civil Society”, Data in Mio. USD

USA

Germany

Commitments

Government & Civil

Society Total

thereof: Public Sector /

NGO & Civil Society

Disbursements

Government & Civil

Society Total

thereof: Public Sector /

NGO & Civil Society

Commitments

Government & Civil

Society Total

thereof: Public Sector /

NGO & Civil Society

Disbursements

Government & Civil

Society Total

thereof: Public Sector /

NGO & Civil Society

1999 0,20 no data available 0,88 no data available

2000 0,03 no data available 0,0* no data available

2001 0,50 no data available 0,0* no data available

2002 0,62 0,62 0,05 0,05

2003 2,02 2,02 1,93 1,00

2004 2,31 2,01 0,41 0,84

2005 2,50

Public: 0,7

NGO: -

2,09

Public: 0,7

NGO: -

0,21

Public:0,2

NGO: -

2,64

Public: 0,2

NGO: -

2006 1,50

Public: 0,2

NGO: -

1,43

Public: 0,2

NGO: -

5,65

Public: 3,7

NGO: 1,9

5,83

Public: 3,7

NGO: 2,1

2007 1,53

Public: 0,0*

NGO: 1,5

1,64

Public: 0,1

NGO: 1,5

2,78

Public: 1,0

NGO: -

5,26

Public: 1,0

NGO: 2,5

2008 2,64

Public: 0,9

NGO: 1,7

2,65

Public: 1,0

NGO: 1,7

6,07

Public: 3,6

NGO: 2,4

5,80

Public: 3,4

NGO: 2,4

Total 13,85 12,46 17,98 21,42

Note: Data taken from OECD, figures rounded. Commitments for “Government & Civil Society” are only available from 1999. Figures for “Disbursements” are only available from 2002. The division according to “Public Sector” and “NGO & Civil Society” was only made from 2004 onwards. The note (*) to the figure “0,0” means that in this case, the figure for the commitment or disbursement was less than USD 50,000.

33

Table 4: USA: Turkey Disbursements according to OECD-Classification “Government & Civil Society” Subdivided according to “Purpose Codes”

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Disbursements “Government &

Civil Society” Total, thereof

“Purpose Code”:

0,62 2,02 2,01 2,09 1,43 1,64 2,65

Government Administration - - 0,60 0,04 0,11 0,70 0,56

Strengthening Civil Society - 0,16 0,35 0,16 0,13 0,43 0,11

Legal / Judicial Development - 0,30 - 0,09 - - 0,06

Human Rights 0,40 - - 0,13 0,09 0,05 0,05

Women’s Equality - - - - 0,08 0,13 0,16

Elections - 0,25 - - 0,35 - 0,70

Free Flow of Information - 0,03 - 0,05 0,10 0,20 0,05

Economic and Development

Policy / Planning

- - 0,33 0,70 0,40 - -

Note: Date taken from OECD, figures rounded.

Table 5: Germany: Turkey Disbursements according to OECD-Classification “Government & Civil Society” Subdivided according to “Purpose Codes”

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Disbursements “Government &

Civil Society” Total, thereof

“Purpose Code”:

0,05 1,00 0,84 2,64 5,83 5,26 5,80

Government Administration - 0,02 - 0,19 0,48 0,95 0,68

Strengthening Civil Society - 0,56 0,47 0,52 2,12 2,47 2,45

Legal / Judicial Development 0,05 0,38 0,37 - - 0,08 0,18

Human Rights - - - - - - -

Women’s Equality - - - - - - -

Elections - - - - - - -

Free Flow of Information - - - 1,93 3,18 1,71 2,48

Economic and Development

Policy / Planning

0,00 0,00 - 0,00 0,00 - -

Note: Date taken from OECD, figures rounded.

34

Table 6: USA: National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Grants55 for Turkey, Data in Thousands USD

NED Grants

Total

thereof:

International Republican Institute

(IRI)

thereof:

National Democratic Institute (NDI)

thereof:

Other NGO

1990

50,0 - - 50,0

1991

156,1 - - 156,1

1992

50,0 - - 50,0

1993

48,8 48,8 - -

1994

71,6 71,6 - -

1995

309,7 249,7 - 60,0

1996

442,7 442,7 - -

1997

671,6 299,6 203,7 168,3

1998

760,6 450,0 199,6 111,0

1999

651,3 278,7 211,8 160,8

2000

646,9 235,7 236,2 175,0

2001

717,6 309,9 284,2 123,5

2002

621,3 300,0 286,3 35,0

2003

899,2 330,0 300,0 269,2

2004

1.104,6 330,0 340,0 434,6

2005

1.397,9 530,0 350,0 517,9

2006

1.911,0 473,9 550,0 887,1

2007

1.679,9 700,0 390,0 589,9

2008

1.887,3 700,0 470,0 717,3

Total

14.078,1 5.750,6 3.821,8 4.505,7

55 Grant: Transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required.

35

Table 7: Germany: Approved Funds for Turkey from the Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ) to German Political Foundations for Democratization Projects with a link to Turkey, Figures Rounded, Data in Thousands EUR

Total

Approved BMZ Funds

therof:

Friedrich-Ebert-

Stiftung (FES)

thereof: Konrad-

Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)

thereof:

Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (FNS)

thereof:

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

(HBS)

thereof: Rosa-

Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS)

1990

933

41

892

-

-

-

1991

1.454

1.329

125

-

-

-

1992

214

51

163

-

-

-

1993

365

-

345

-

20

-

1994

874

41

802

-

31

-

1995

1.861

767

930

77

87

-

1996

1.646

767

726

51

102

-

1997

3.036

1.023

1.173

511

329

-

1998

3.324

767

1.870

435

252

-

1999

2.696

767

1.104

435

390

-

2000

2.656

767

1.094

281

514

-

2001

2.365

460

1.242

305

358

-

2002

3.294

690

1.763

483

358

-

2003

2.603

690

950

440

523

-

2004

2.475

740

1.000

445

280

10

2005

3.515

740

1.720

450

470

135

2006

2.879

740

800

520

658

161

2007

2.472

740

800

400

457

75

2008

3.893

740

1.800

287

908

158

2009

3.043

927

860

372

734

150

Total

45.598

12.787

20.159

5.492

6.471

689