Deak.the Condition of Hegemony and the Possibility of Resistance.undercurrent v2n3 2005

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Undercurrent Volume II, No 3, 2005

The Condition of Hegemony and the Possibility of Resistance

Andrew Deak 1

ABSTRACT – In this essay I explore the status of hegemony in the current world order. Using a neo-Gramscian framework, I argue that the world is in a state of non-hegemony. Moreover, there are momentsof resistance, linked to the condition of non-hegemony. First I elaborate on the neo-Gramscianinterpretation of hegemony. From this, other terms such as passive revolution, non-hegemony, historicblocs, and counter-hegemony are then defined. After providing a brief historical materialist backdrop, Iargue the World Trade Organisation is representative of a moment of non-hegemony. I then explore howthey are connected to the emerging counter-hegemony seen in the Seattle Protests of 1999 and the WorldSocial Forum phenomena.

RÉSUMÉ – Dans cet essai, j’explore le statut de l’hégémonie dans le monde d’aujourd’hui. En utilisant uncadre néo-gramscien, je soutiens que le monde est dans un état de non-hégémonie. De plus, des momentsde résistance sont reliés à cette condition de non-hégémonie. J’approfondis d’abord l’interprétation néo- gramscienne de l’hégémonie. À partir de ce cadre théorique, d’autres termes, tels que la révolution passive, la non-hégémonie, les blocs historiques et la contre-hégémonie sont ensuite définis. Après avoir fait un bref survol du matérialiste historique, je soutiens que l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce estreprésentative d’un moment de non-hégémonie. J’explore finalement comment ils sont reliés à la contre-hégémonie émergente observée dans les manifestations de Seattle en 1999 et dans le phénomène du ForumSocial Mondial.

INTRODUCTION

When grappling with issues of global governance, we are faced with transient debatesreflecting the historical dynamics within a material world. The political theorist who effectively

captured history, and the social forces within it, was Antonio Gramsci. Whilst his work focusedon the political community in Italy at the beginning of the twentieth century, the framework thathe constructed has been revived and applied in the realm of International Relations over the lastseveral decades. This essay will largely draw from this neo-Gramscian approach and I will make

1 The author would like to acknowledge the insightful and stimulating discussions in the fourth year DEVS seminar atQueen’s University: The Political Economy of Global Governance, convened by Dr. Susanne Soederberg. It was out ofthe context of this course, and the enthusiastic and constructive debates the class members, that this paper wasconceived.



47 Andrew Deak


sense of hegemony vis-à-vis the current world order. I argue that the world social order is in anon-hegemonic moment, and that there is an emergence of a counter-hegemonic movement.Moreover, I will show that there is a link between the non-hegemonic phase, and the emergenceof counter-hegemonic movements, such as the Seattle protests of 1999 and the World SocialForum gatherings.

The essay will be organized into three sections. First, in order to examine the current

world order, I will explain the core tenets of Gramscian and neo-Gramscian theory. This willinvolve looking at Martin Carnoy’s chapter on ‘Gramsci and the State’ (Carnoy, 1984).Following this, a brief overview of neo-Gramscian literature will provide us with the necessarytools for assessing the new world order. I will draw on pertinent scholars such as Robert Cox andStephen Gill, and I will also touch upon Mark Rupert’s interpretations. These analysts will assistin providing a historical materialist backdrop which will allow for a better understanding of theshift between hegemony and non-hegemony.

Second, once the theoretical groundwork is laid, I will further unpack the claim that weare currently in a non-hegemonic moment. To do this we will look at an institution of globaleconomic governance, namely the World Trade Organization (WTO).

A critical evaluation of a key institution that comprises the global trade will demonstratethat the post-Bretton Woods era is marked by non-hegemony. This perspective allows us to ask

important questions concerning the political, economic, and social implications of this worldorder. What lies ahead for the current world order? Is it passive revolution or an emergence of acounter-hegemonic movement that challenges the dominance (rather than hegemony) of the US-led neoliberal world order? Or a mixture of both?

Upon returning to our neo-Gramscian theorists, the third section will establish the thrustof the central argument that there is an explicit link between this non-hegemonic period, and theemergence of a nascent counter-hegemonic movement (Cox, 2001). Thus I will conclude thatcounter-hegemony with regard to Seattle and the World Social Forum, is a direct response to thenon-hegemony, which is exemplified in this essay by the WTO.

THEORIZING HEGEMONY, NON-HEGEMONY, AND PASSIVE REVOLUTION

The main thesis needs to be substantiated by a theoretical framework. Carnoy provides a basic account of Gramsci’s thought as “a Marxist science of political action” (1984, p.65). Wecan see this idea of praxis in the original statement by Karl Marx himself that “[t]he philosophershave only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it.” (Marx, 1996, p.799)2.However, this does not imply that a political theory or doctrine can be mapped out that is blind tointerpreting and understanding real forces in the world. It is essential to first have aninterpretation to demystify a particular social order, and then highlight the potential strategies forchange.

One key term that Gramsci reformulates is hegemony. In his view, it “meant theideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes” (Carnoy,1984, p.66). In other words, the world-view of the dominant class is prevalent throughout society.As a result, the ruling powers can be seen to act in the best interests of the entire population. This

brings us to a more precise notion of hegemony, a notion that alludes to more than justdominance, instead we see “a necessary combination of consent and coercion” (Cox, 1983, p.127). Moreover, hegemony succeeds when the “consensual aspect of power is in theforefront”(Cox, 1983, p.127).

2 It should be noted this was a fundamental critique of Hegel’s idealism, and Marx urged that for the formed thinker, itwas important to roots ideas in ‘materialism’ so that we may identify the contradictions within the system of capitalism(Mandel, 1976, p.18).



The Condition of Hegemony and the Possibility of Resistance 48


Important distinctions need to be made regarding the relationship between the state andcivil society, and where hegemony fits in or, conversely, where the two fit into hegemony.Carnoy argues that the most applicable to advanced capitalist societies are where “[h]egemony isexpressed both in civil society and the state, yet there is considerable autonomy of privatehegemonic apparatuses from the state” (1984, p.74). According to this definition, the state is whatthe bourgeoisie fall back on when they lose control in their “struggle over consciousness”

(Carnoy, 1984, p.76). The state would then adopt a more coercive role when necessary. This mayoccur when consent is no longer the prevailing feature, and there are challenges presented to thesocial order. A period such as this is “non-hegemonic” (Cox, 1983, p.135).

Another key term that stems from this discussion of non-hegemonic moments is passiverevolution. As Carnoy points out, this is meant “to indicate the constant reorganization of state power and its relationship to the dominated classes to preserve dominant-class hegemony and toexclude the masses from exerting influence over political and economic institutions” (1984, p.76). Cox explains the two Gramscian notions of passive revolution. The first of these iscaesarism, whereby “a strong man intervenes to resolve the stalemate between equal and opposedsocial forces” (1983, p.129). In Production, Power and World Order , Cox points out that thisdoes not need to be in the form of Thatcherism, for example, but can potentially be “a caesarismwithout Caesar” (Cox, 1987, p.285).

The other aspect of passive revolution is called trasformismo. This can “serve as astrategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organizedopposition to established social and political power” (Cox, 1983, p.130). We are now gaining aclearer idea of the conditions of a non-hegemonic society via an understanding of passiverevolution.

Another Gramscian conceptual tool we need understand is that of counter-hegemony.This can occur in two different ways. One being a “war of movement,” which is where a groupcarries out a frontal attack on the sate. The other being a “war of position,” which means“actively building a counter-hegemony within an established hegemony” while resisting pettygains through the co-optation in a moment of passive revolution (Cox, 1983, pp.127-8). Ielaborate on counter-hegemony later on in this essay when I consider contemporary examples.

Robert Cox and Stephen Gill are two leading neo-Gramscians. When considering the ideaof hegemony and world order, Gill aptly notes: “Hegemony is even more difficult to achieve (andtherefore much rarer if not theoretically impossible) at the international level, where there is nosingle world state or a fully developed international civil society” (Gill, 2002, p.35). Up to this point we have understood hegemony without problematising state boundaries. The followingsection will show how Gramscian theory can be generalised over the global social order .

HISTORIC BLOCS AND PASSIVE REVOLUTIONS IN WORLD ORDER

Cox and Gill use the Gramscian notion of a historic bloc:

An historical bloc refers to an historical congruence between material forces,

institutions and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different forces politicallyorganized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction andcoherence to its constituent elements. Moreover, for a new historic bloc toemerge, its leaders must engage in ‘conscious planned struggle (Gill, 2003, p.58).

This allows us to frame periods, or moments in history, in which a congruence or a set of‘alliances’ can be identified at the centre of world order. Two such periods were the Pax Britannica (1812-1870s) and Pax Americana (the years following World War II; 1944-1971)(Cox, 1986, p.222). Cox illustrates how these two periods meet the Gramscian definition of



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hegemony. During the Pax Britannica the “norms of liberal economics…gained widespreadacceptance” and there was a “universalistic ideology which represented these norms as the basisof a harmony of interest” (Cox, 1986, p.223). Britain’s navy was the coercive force behind theconsensual aspect of British hegemony. Arguably, the Pax Americana met more of therequirements of hegemony as there were a larger number of formal institutions which helped tokeep a rigid configuration in place (Cox, 1986, p.224). As Cox contends, “[t]he Pax Americana

was hegemonic: it commanded a wide measure of consent among states outside the Soviet sphereand was able to provide sufficient benefits to associated and subordinated elements in order tomaintain there acquiescence” (1986, p.229).

Since these structures, or hegemonic moments, may be prone to contradictions as they tryto maintain order and stability in an inherently unstable capitalist system3, they inevitably recede back in a non-hegemonic status. As Gill points out, the Pax Americana was an internationalhistorical bloc that was based on Fordist foundations where political settlements included a widevariety of groups such as “moderate organized labour and big capital” (2003, p.58). However,Gill writes, “political change and economic globalization have undermined this integralhegemony. For example, there has been an ideological shift towards neo-conservatism in politicsand neo-liberalism in economics” (2003, p.59). He describes a shift from what was aninternational historic bloc to “an American-centred and –led transnational historic bloc, where

organized labour has been virtually marginalized” (Gill, 2003, p.59). That said, Gill doesdistinguish this new bloc as one that is characterised by US supremacy and non-hegemony. Coxmakes the claims that “[t]here is something that could be called a nascent historic bloc consistingof the most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in government, and the variety ofnetworks that evolve policy guidelines and propagate the ideology of globalization” (2001, p.12).Others go further to suggest formation of a transitional capitalist class (see van der Pijl, 1984 and1997).

Prior to the appearance of this nascent historic bloc, the “decline of centralizedmanagement characteristic of the world economy of Pax Americana” was seen throughout the1970s (Cox, 1986, p.300). In Neo-realism and Its Critics Cox describes the hegemonic phasesand shifts in the 1980s. He does this without the added historical hindsight of Gill’s Power and Resistance in the New World Order . Cox suggested three possible outcomes for future world

orders in lieu of a decline in US hegemony. First, the prospect for a new hegemony “based uponthe global structure of social power generated by the internationalization of production” (Cox,1986, p.237). The second being a “non-hegemonic world structure of conflicting power centres”(Cox, 1986, p.238). The third and less likely outcome is the development of “a counter-hegemony based on a Third-World coalition against core-country dominance” which would also “consist ofa coherent view of an alternative world order” (Cox, 1986, p.238). Thus, from what Gill argues,we are edging towards Cox’s first prediction, yet without the clear hegemony.

Mark Rupert’s interpretation of a New World Order is similar to that of Gill’s. He arguesthat it is a form of US neo-imperialism that is becoming increasingly more obvious andunabashed. “Coercion was never absent from neoliberal capitalism, of course, but to the greatestextent possible the exercise of power underlying this system was hidden or disguised.” (Rupert,2003, p.196). As a brief aside, the popular globalization thesis (trumpeted by many advocates of

neoliberalism) does not stand well against this historical materialist backdrop. We can see thatsuch an understanding of the history of world order does not cohere with the view that capitalist

3 An example of such a contradiction is the Keynesian ideology, which translated into the economic policy ofwelfarism, that was the basis of the Pax Americana that then proved to be an obstacle to US interests as peripheralstates could become economically completive and thus undermine the US position within the capitalist system as awhole.





globalization is an inevitable and natural process. In this same vein, many consider theglobalization thesis as being misleading.4

I argue that we are closer to a non-hegemonic world structure with conflicting powercentres. The emerging conflicting power centres, or more precisely, the counter-hegemonicmovements, are a direct result of the non-hegemonic moment. Gill suggests that “any attempt toconstruct a hegemonic system of rule will tend to generate, dialectically, a set of counter-

hegemonic forces, which may or may not be progressive” (2003, p.37). It is important to note thatsuch a movement can be spawned by imperial rivalry, and as such is not necessarily gearedtowards radical political transformation.

The thesis of this paper can thus be posited in theoretical terms. If hegemony is based onconsent and effective inclusion of subaltern groups, then counter-hegemony would emerge fromthe contradictions of a non-hegemonic period. When consent or legitimacy of an ethicalhegemony is lost, then subaltern groups become discontented. The conditions would be ripe for alegitimate and popular challenge the social order that had marginalized them.

It would serve this argument well to make sense of the world order at the beginning ofthe twenty-first century in order to grasp what constitutes resistance in what we will later call acounter-hegemonic movement. This will help to bring in an essential empirical component to the present discussion, which thus far has been very theoretical.

Earlier I briefly sketched out the non-hegemonic moment that characterizes the past twodecades. Gill has also described this as a “crisis in hegemony” (2003, p.67). This crisis is not adecline in US power, but is instead marked by “transformations of the structures of power” (Gill,2003). There are specific instances where a form of passive revolution, which is a component ofhegemonic crisis, are directly linked counter-hegemonic movements, and that there is in fact acertain dynamism or dialectic relationship between the two moments.

An institution to consider as part of the larger system working towards hegemony is theWTO. With the purpose of regulating (or formulating the rules for deregulating) world trade, it isa major centre of power within the world order. It is an offshoot of the GATT trading rounds thatcame from the cluster of Bretton Woods era, which were the formal institutions that consolidatedthe Pax Americana. The WTO is supposed to serve a hegemonic function within the internationalorder. Ideally, it is supposed to build consensus on issues of international trade

(http://www.wto.org). Many have pointed to a succession of failures between the Seattle 1999and Cancun 2003 meetings. Robert Wolfe gives a fairly neutral ‘policy perspective’ of the WTOthat assists in highlighting the fundamental contradictions within the organisation. “The centralhurdle in the Doha process, as it was at Seattle and Cancun, was the creation of a package bigenough to interest everyone” (Wolfe, 2004, p.582). Clearly, this would be the role of aninstitution that is supposed to uphold or (re-)produce hegemony. Wolfe points out that the Doharounds, which occurred after the failed WTO rounds in Seattle in 1999, did not teach us anythingabout the nascent processes of the WTO. No democratic lessons were learned and no real progress was made. The “developing countries were bought” via a process that was simply more“adroit and intelligent” than at the Seattle round (Wolfe, 2004, p.581). This buying out of thesubaltern countries can be considered a form of passive revolution, most likely trasformismo –that is, the co-optation marginalized groups.

There was no effort to fundamentally change the policies to be more inclusive and moredemocratic. One can even say that the trasformismo is incomplete as all the ideas and interests ofthe subordinate groups are yet to be co-opted and the interest of the Quad group of the US,Canada, Japan, and the EU take priority. In the same light, for an institution that serves a

4 Hirst and Thompson have argued that it is a myth (1999), while the more radical historical materialist would suggest

that globalization more than just a myth, but a mask to cover US imperialism (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001). That

discussion, however, is not with the scope of this essay.



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hegemonic function, decisions should be made by consensus. However, the WTO hasencountered numerous difficulties in arriving at legitimate outcomes hence further compromisingits status as a moment of hegemony. This claim of illegitimacy requires closer scrutiny.

Ilan Kapoor makes an effective case to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the WTO. Thereare several analysts who have pointed out that “despite its outwardly democratic ways, it hasquestionable decision-making procedures that result in hegemonic western neoliberalism and/or a

deficit – if not a ‘crisis’ – of legitimacy and accountability” (Kapoor, 2004, p.522). Kapoor drawson the Habermasian notion of deliberative democracy in order to substantiate such a claim. Thisensuing assessment of the WTO’s procedures shows how “inadequate legitimating rules and lackof rational deliberations in the WTO yield power politics, coerced decision making and unjustoutcomes” (Kapoor, 2004, p.523). Aside from the exclusionary practices, such as the “western-organized ‘green room’ caucuses”, Kapoor argues that removal of critical discourse causes adepoliticisation of the ministerial meetings, which further impairs any possibility for effectivechange. Gill aptly terms this “new constitutionalism” (1998, p.5). This refers to the drive to “separate economic policies from broad political accountability in order to make governmentsmore responsive to the discipline of market forces and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and processes” (Gill, 1998). There may indeed be forums to discuss ordebate issues of importance (the World Economic Forums or the WTO rounds), but the terms of

debate and the ideological framework are predetermined and preconfigured5. In this sense, eitherone participates (if allowed) and agrees to the framework, or one is excluded altogether. Oncemore, we can see the co-optation, if it occurs at all, is half-hearted.

The WTO’s treatment of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in contrast withMultinational Corporations (MNCs), reveals more half-hearted co-optation and as such, it can becalled incomplete trasformismo. A complete marginalisation has occurred with certain NGOsectors, namely those that are “non-conforming and southern ones” (Kapoor, 2004, p.533). In theSingapore Ministerial Conference, “65% of the civic organisations accredited toattend…represented business interests” (Kapoor, 2004, p.530). It is no wonder that the WTO isvery selective about the participation of civil society as the smaller and more critical NGOswould “politicise issues (environment, human rights, small farming, child labour, etc.) that have been systemically neglected” (Kapoor, 2004, p.531).

Considering this criticism of the WTO’s internal structure and decision-making processes, we can claim that it lacks genuine consensus building capacity. This impedes its abilityto establish hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, because the consensual aspect is fragile at best.The “WTO has created the illusion of fair rules” from which “powerful (and mainly western)states derive substantial advantage” (Kapoor, 2004, p.536). When a certain order is based onfraud as opposed to genuine consent or consensus, then it can be said to be non-hegemonic as “aglobal hegemony would need to have not only economic legitimacy and effectiveness, it wouldalso need to have moral credibility” (Gill and Law, 1993, p.94). Understanding these fundamental problems of the WTO, and witnessing its inability to arrive at consensus and deliver a packagethat satisfies everyone, we can conclude that this particular institution is not effectively (re-)producing hegemony. The WTO’s institutional crises of legitimacy can translate directly into a broader neo-Gramscian notion of a crisis in hegemony.

Having made a brief assessment of the WTO, and seeing that – at least in terms of globalgovernance of trade – it is in a crisis of legitimacy and that its efforts to address the crisis are half-hearted, we can claim to be witness to a non-hegemonic event6. Furthermore, we have observed,

5 Robert Latham in a general critique of global governance, refers to this as “post-political phenomenon” (Latham,1999, p.25). What this means is that there is no real balance of interest or a dialectic relationship between thoseinvolved and as such the phenomenon considered beyond politics.6 Although I isolate the state of the WTO as case study, the non-hegemonic moment is pervasive throughout theinternational system. Susanne Soederberg effectively demonstrates an example of caesarism – the other form of passiverevolution – in the New International Financial Architecture (NIFA). This was essentially a response to the Asian Crisis





from Kapoor, that the WTO is in fact coercive in its decision-making meaning that all of theconditions of non-hegemony are present. As we can see, passive revolution in the form oftrasformismo, and caesarism elsewhere, is a part this non-hegemonic moment. Kapoor helps infurther describing the current non-hegemonic period as both exclusionary and depoliticised.

R ESPONSES TO THE NON-HEGEMONIC MOMENT: PROSPECTS FOR COUNTER -HEGEMONY

Let us return to our theoretical basis in order to interpret the significance of the non-hegemonic moment. Cox succinctly comments on Gramsci’s notion of a ‘crisis of hegemony’:

What he identified by these terms was a disarticulation between social groupsand their putative political leaders, in sum a crisis in representation. In such assituation, old and new social forces coexisted, but the old ones had becomedetached from the political organizations that had formerly represented them, andthe new ones had no produced organizations or “organic” intellectuals who couldlead them effectively and bring them into coalescence with existing social forcesto form a new hegemonic bloc. Two outcomes are possible in an organic crisis:either the constitution of a new hegemony or caesarism, .i.e., the freezing of

unresolved contradictions (Cox, 1986, p.273).

Freezing of unresolved contradictions has been shown in the previous discussion on the WTO.Such a moment will tend to spawn counter-hegemonic forces. It would be an opportune time todiscuss exactly what we might mean by the term ‘counter-hegemony’. The ensuing deliberationswill highlight the ‘disarticulation between social groups and their putative leaders’.

Having made precise our understanding of the contradictions of non-hegemony, we canturn to some concrete examples of direct opposition or resistance to neoliberal globalization. Anotable example is the protests against the WTO in Seattle 1999 which Ronald Munk has calledthe beginnings of a “global social movement” (Munk, 2004, p.1). This first major demonstrationagainst the WTO gives an example where large group has been marginalized to the extent thatthey wish for the complete destruction of the WTO. When the ministerial rounds have been held

in accessible areas (ie. not Doha), these protests follow suit. There have been a similar series of protests against other trade rounds (the summit of the Americas in Quebec City) and the annualmeetings of institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, which gives an indication as to thescope of the problems of hegemony within the international system.

What might be the cause of these sudden outbursts of protest? The WTO, wanting theappearance of legitimacy, transparency, and accountability, has always battled with the question:which individuals and organisations are to be included, and in what capacity? “The [WTO] choseto equate civil society with NGOs, rather than pursuing a broader, more inclusive andrepresentative spectrum of public opinion” (Wilkinson, 2002, p.203). Taking this into account,and also bearing in mind our previous discussions of the WTO being a depoliticised space, itlogically follows that those marginalized by the WTO and neoliberal globalization as a wholewould point to the WTO as a centre of illegitimate power and would voice their frustrations.

The protests of Seattle, however, do not present us with a sustained counter-hegemonicmovement. Arguably it affirmed the non-hegemonic moment in attracting attention to the WTO.

of 1998. For more elaboration, see Barry Eichengreen Toward A New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda (1999). The NIFA, according to Soederberg, “seems to be a necessary counterpart to the WTO”(2002, p.14). Soederberg contradicts claims that NIFA represents a new political agenda, a meaningful transformationof how the world’s financial system is governed (2000, p.20). As Soederberg puts it: “The NIFA signals an attempt tofreeze the…contradictions found in the structural incoherence of global capitalism by strengthening the existinginstitutional structures of imposed leadership” (2002, p.11). According to Soedeberg, the imposed leadership of the NIFA is a form of caesarism, and in this case, without a Caesar (2002, p.5).



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The participants were well organized and were effective “insofar as that particular round of theWTO negotiations could not be concluded” which also “meant that Seattle 1999 would be etchedin popular consciousness” (Munck, 2004, p.4). As Munck would contest, however, such an eventhas tended to propagate a myth or a ghost of the social movement, rather than a concrete exampleof an effective counter-hegemonic movement. It is too incoherent and inchoate to point to assomething that is more than just symbolic.

Susan George , a leading activist and intellectual, notes that “the popular movement mayhave gained time and scored a fine victory, but it has not yet got the moratorium and review itwas seeking” and furthermore, it must devise a strategy to “keep up the mobilisation and pressure, and mount an offensive of counter-proposals with the ultimate objective of buildinggenuine international democracy. This will call for a sustained collective effort, for discussionand action” (2000). As we shall see below, this is the World Social Forums represent ‘a sustainedcollective effort, for discussion and action’.

For a more concrete conceptual understanding of counter-hegemony, we can turn to MarkRupert interpretation of Gramsci:

At the core of Gramsci’s project was a critical pedagogy which took as itsstarting point the tensions and possibilities latent within popular common sense,

and which sought to build out of the materials of popular common sense anemancipatory political culture and a social movement to enact it – not simplyanother hegemony rearranging occupants of superior/subordinate social positions, but a transformative counter-hegemony (2003, p.186).

Rupert has taken this notion of a ‘common sense’ and used it to describe the politics ofgovernance/resistance. From our definition of a counter-hegemonic force, we can argue this because there has to be a sustained effort, or as Rupert would call it, a new ‘common sense’ inorder to build a new world view. For other neo-Gramscian’s, this would be the essential strugglefor consciousness. In this light, Seattle 1999 and other spaces of protest are difficult to placewithin the conceptual framework of counter-hegemony because of their inchoate nature.Although in recent years these inchoate movements have begun to manifest themselves in a more

organized and articulate manner; they are creating spaces and forums for a more effectivestruggle for consciousness. There is a concerted effort to create a new common sense, a newworldview. Tom Mertes has characterized this as a ‘Movement of Movements’ and points to avast array of resistance groups (2004).

At the centre of the discussion of the new Movement of Movements is the significance ofthe World Social Forums (WSF). Michael Hardt compares the WSF to the Bandung Conferencein Indonesia in 1955, where leaders of the non-aligned groups of the Cold War era gathered(Hardt, 2002, p.112). We can refer to the charter that states their purpose:

Together we are building a great alliance to create a new society, different fromthe dominant logic wherein the free market and money are considered the onlymeasure of wealth. Davos represents the concentration of wealth, the

globalisation of poverty and the destruction of out Earth. Porto Alegre representsthe hope that a new world is possible where human beings and nature are thecentre of our concern (www.worldsocialforum.org).

Since 2001 the WSF has occurred annually, and has diversified its meeting location to Mumbai,India and in 2006, Karachi, Pakistan. There have also been a series of regionally focused SocialForums. The point of the forum according to Hardt is “to globalize further the movements, bothwithin each society and across the world” (2002, p.112). While Hardt recognizes the significanceof the WSF, he also notes its very complex nature in that the strategies for change are so diverse





and often conflicting. Tom Mertes provides a more affirmative interpretation of the WSF and itssignificance as a nascent apex of what Munk dubs the ‘Global Social Movement’ (GSM) andwhat Rupert calls the ‘Global Justice Movement’ (GJM). In Mertes view, the forum provides astarting point for the organization of a movement that attempts to build something truly counter-hegemonic. Munck also affirms the significance of the WSF in that “the movement was takingseriously its task to go beyond proclamatory statements and build a viable political alternative to

neo-liberal globalisation, a counter hegemonic globalisation of its own” (2004, p.6). Indeed,within the WSF charter of principles it is acknowledged that it is a “permanent process of seekingand building alternatives” (2002). This leaves us with two questions: what would this more robustcounter-hegemony look like and how will it be achieved?

Much of this touches on what Rupert, Cox and Gill would contend as an avenue foreffective counter-hegemony. Andre Drainville helps to clarify the politics of Gill by selecting acaption that defines who the bigger actors might be in a counter-hegemonic movement. To namea few:

organizations and movements that might form part of a counter-hegemonic blocinclude[ing] Amnesty International, green parties and ecological groups, socialistthink-tanks like the Transnational Institute, peace groups, such as Oxfam, andreligious organizations such as the World Council of Churches (Gill and Law,

1993 cited in: Drainville, 2004, pp.30-1).

We can then purport that the WSF is more significant than Seattle, because the forum representsthe opening of a space in which the NGOs, such as those that Gill is indicating above, canorganize, improve lines of communication, enlist support and increase their respective knowledgeof one another. Rupert argues that as a moment of the Global Justice Movement (GJM), the WSFhas begun to “(re-)construct a transnational common sense and corresponding forms of politicalorganisation and activity” (2003, p.198). Whether or not this will be successful is anotherquestion, one in which Rupert’s claim is dependent on whether “activist and ‘organicintellectuals’ embedded within those sites are able to articulate globalisation/solidarity inopposition to strong currents of globalisation/nationalism” (Rupert, 2003, p.198). In the very leastwe can recognize a response to the non-hegemonic moment by groups who will not stand for

illegitimate institutions and outright US supremacy.

CONCLUSION

I have interpreted world order from a neo-Gramscian perspective and established thathegemony needs to reproduce itself on the basis of consensus and legitimacy. Gill and Cox havehelped to demonstrate that the post-Pax Americana epoch has seen a decline in US hegemony, but reproduction of US dominance, in a non-hegemonic way. The conditions of the non-hegemonic period are characterised by passive revolutions. Up to our current period, theconsequence has been more blatant forms of imperialism, leading to a crisis in legitimacy ofworld order. As the neo-Gramscian framework suggests, prolonged periods of non-hegemony are bound to produce counter-hegemonic forces. We saw that the WTO, due to its lack of legitimacy,

has been struggling to (re-)create a positive public image and to subsequently gain public support.From this, we can observe that aspects of civil society have begun to reproduce themselves in theemancipatory sense that Cox claims could be the basis for a new world order (2001, p.8). InSeattle protest emerged out of a general dissatisfaction with neoliberal globalization, and theWTO Ministerial was a point of contention and confrontation. With the maturity of the movement(GSMs or GJMs), we saw the initiation of the WSF as a new potential power centre (howeverlimited its power may). This was a direct response to neoliberal dominance as it was designed tocoincide directly with the World Economic Forum in Davos which annually brings together thosewishing to discuss how to (re-)form the world economy for their own interests.



55 Andrew Deak


I would like to close with sentiments that are similar to those of Rupert: the counter-hegemony represented by the WSF is simply the beginning to what may become a nascenthistoric bloc comprised of factions of subordinate classes based in all countries. These wouldwork against that of the more established, yet still nascent transnational capitalist historic bloc. Itwill be several decades before the passive revolutions could effectively co-opt subaltern groupsand their ideas. Only then could genuine hegemony be established. Incidentally, this may become

increasingly difficult with the further radicalization of disaffected groups via future World SocialForums and the continued efforts to open political spaces to contend power centres establishedduring the infancy of the Pax Americana. This radicalization and opening of political spaces isembodied in the clichéd, but apt slogan: ‘another world is possible’.

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Deak.the Condition of Hegemony and the Possibility of Resistance.undercurrent v2n3 2005

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