Theory Cox Hegemony

7/29/2019 Theory Cox Hegemony

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RETHINKING MARXISM VOLUME 15 NUMBER 2 (APRIL 2003)

ISSN 0893-5696 print/ISSN 1475-8059 online/03/020153-27 2003 Association for Economic and Social AnalysisDOI: 10.1080/0893569032000113514

Social Forces in the Struggle overHegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectivesin International Political Economy

Adam David Morton

Introduction

Situated within a historical materialist problematic of social transformation and

deploying many insights from the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, a crucial break

with neorealist mainstream international relations approaches emerged by the 1980s

in the work of Robert Cox. In contrast to mainstream problem-solving routes to

hegemony in international relationsthat develop a static theory of politics; an

abstract, ahistorical conception of the state; and an appeal to universal validity

debate shifted toward a critical theory of hegemony, world order and historicalchange.1 Rather than a problem-solving preoccupation with the maintenance of

social power relationships, a critical theory of hegemony directs attention to ques-

tioning the prevailing order of the world. It therefore does not take institutions and

social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning

itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing (Cox

1981, 129). Yet, instead of contrasting the concerns of these competing approaches,

the aim here is to pursue a critical theoretical route to questions of hegemony. This

move does not necessarily foreclose dialogue between problem-solving and critical

theory, as they are not mutually exclusive enterprises, but it does remain wary ofthe assimilatory calls for synthesis that emanate from mainstream exponents.2

The critical impetus bears a less than direct affiliation to the constellation of

social thought known as the Frankfurt School represented by, among others, the work

1. While differences exist, the neorealist work of Kenneth Waltz, as well as that of RobertKeohane, can be included within mainstream, problem-solving international relationsapproaches to hegemony (see Waltz 1979, 1990, 1998, 1999; Keohane 1984, 1986, 1989a). Theclassic critique remains that by Richard Ashley (1984).2. The call for synthesis has been an abiding concern among many advocates of mainstreaminternational relations theory (see Baldwin 1993; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998;Keohane 1989a, 1734, 1989b, 1998). It can be regarded as a principal tactic in allocating theterms of debate and settling competing ontological and epistemological claims (see Smith1995a, 2000; Tickner 1997, 1998; Weber 1994).


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154 MORTON

of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno or, more recently, Jrgen Habermas (Cox 1995a,

32).3 Although overlaps may exist, it is specifically critical in the sense of asking how

existing social or world orders have come into being; how norms, institutions, or

social practices therefore emerge; and what forces may have the emancipatorypotential to change or transform the prevailing order. As such, a critical theory

develops a dialectical theory of history concerned not just with the past but with a

continual process of historical change and with exploring the potential for alternative

forms of development (Cox 1981, 129, 1334). This critical theory of hegemony thus

focuses on interaction between particular processes, notably springing from the

dialectical possibilities of change within the sphere of production and the exploita-

tive character of social relationsnot as unchanging, ahistorical essences but as a

continuing creation of new forms (132).

The emergence of this problematic can also be situated within a reaction to the

more scientific or positivistic currents within historical materialism. It is well known

that Antonio Gramsci himself reacted against the crude reasoning of Nikolai Bukharin

in the Popular Manual that sought to establish historical materialism as a positive

science or sociology (Bukharin 1969; Gramsci 1971, 41972). Similarly, for Cox, a

historical mode of thought was brought to bear on the study of historical change as

a reaction to the static and abstract understanding of capitalism associated with

Louis Althusser. Not unlike neorealist problem-solving approaches, Althusser sought

to design an ahistorical, systematic, and universalistic epistemology that amounted

to a Theological Marxism in its endeavor to reveal the inner essence of the universe

(Althusser 1969). The scientific character of Marxist knowledge was customarilyasserted by Althusser (1970, 132) in contrast with Coxs divergent, historical

materialist insistence on considering the ideational and material basis of social

practices inscribed in the transformative struggles between social forces stemming

from productive processes (Cox 1981, 133; 1983, 163).

The first section of this paper therefore outlines the conceptual framework

developed by Robert Cox and what has been recognized (see Morton 2001a) as

similar, but diverse, neo-Gramscian perspectives in international political economy

that constitute a distinct critical theory route to considering hegemony, world order,

and historical change. Subsequently, attention will turn to situating the worldeconomic crisis of the 1970s within the more recent debates about globalization and

how this period of structural change has been conceptualized. Finally, various

controversies surrounding the neo-Gramscian perspectives will be traced before

elaborating in conclusion the directions along which future research might proceed.

A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order, andHistorical Change

According to Cox, patterns of production relations are the starting point for analyzing

the operation and mechanisms of hegemony. Yet, from the start, this should not be

3. For useful discussion of the contradictory strands and influences between Frankfurt Schoolcritical theory and critical international relations theory, see Wyn Jones (2000).


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HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 155

taken as a move that reduces everything to production in an economistic sense:

Production . . . is to be understood in the broadest sense. It is not confined to the

production of physical goods used or consumed. It covers the production and

reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions thatare prerequisites to the production of physical goods (Cox 1989, 39).

These patterns are referred to as modes of social relations of production, which

encapsulate configurations of social forces engaged in the process of production. By

discerning different modes of social relations of production, it is possible to consider

how changing production relations give rise to particular social forces that become

the bases of power within and across states and within a specific world order (Cox

1987, 4). The objective of outlining different modes of social relations of production

is to question what promotes the emergence of particular modes and what might

explain the way in which modes combine or undergo transformation (103). It is

argued that the reciprocal relationship between production and power is crucial. To

examine this relationship, a framework is developed that focuses on how power in

social relations of production may give rise to certain social forces, how these social

forces may become the bases of power informs of state, and how this might shape

world order. This framework revolves around the social ontology of historical

structures.

A social ontology merely refers to the key properties that are thought to consti-

tute the social world and thus represents claims about the nature and relationship of

agents and social structures. In this case, the social ontology of historical structures

refers to persistent social practices, made by collective human activity and trans-formed through collective human activity (4). An attempt is therefore made to

capture the reciprocal relationship of structures and actors (Cox 1995a, 33; 2000b,

559; Bieler and Morton 2001). Three spheres of activity thus constitute an historical

structure: the social relations of production, encompassing the totality of social

relations in material, institutional and discursive forms that engender particular

social forces;forms of state, consisting of historically contingent state/civil society

complexes; and world orders, which not only represent phases of stability and

conflict, but permit scope for thinking about how alternative forms of world order

might emerge (Cox 1981, 1358). These are represented schematically in fig. 1 (138).If considered dialectically, in relation to each other, then it becomes possible to

represent the historical process through the particular configuration of historical

structures. Social forces, as the main collective actors engendered by the social

Fig. 1. The dialectical relation of forces

Social

relations of production

Forms of

state

World

orders


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156 MORTON

relations of production, operate within and across all spheres of activity. Through

the rise of contending social forces, linked to changes in production, there may occur

mutually reinforcing transformations in the forms of state and world order. There is

no unilinear relationship between the spheres of activity, and the point of departureto explain the historical process may vary. For example, the point of departure could

equally be that of forms of state or world orders (153 n. 26). Within each of the

three main spheres it is argued that three further elements reciprocally combine to

constitute an historical structure: ideas, understood as intersubjective meanings as

well as collective images of world order; material capabilities, referring to accumu-

lated resources; and institutions, which are amalgams of the previous two elements.

These again are represented schematically in fig. 2 (136).

The aim is to break down over time coherent historical structuresconsisting of

different patterns of social relations of production, forms of state, and world order

that have existed within the capitalist mode of production (Cox 1987, 3968). In this

sense the point of departure for Cox is that of world order, and it is at this stage

that a discrete notion of hegemony begins to play a role in the overall conceptual

framework.

Within a world order, a situation of hegemony may prevail based on a coherent

conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collec-

tive image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which

administer the order with a certain semblance of universality (Cox 1981, 139).

Hegemony thus becomes more than simply state dominance. It appears as an

expression of broadly based consent manifest in the acceptance of ideas, supportedby material resources and institutions, which is initially established by social forces

occupying a leading role within a state but is then projected outward on a world

scale. Hegemony is therefore a form of dominance, but it refers more to a consensual

order so that dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but not a sufficient

condition of hegemony (139). As Cox has put it, hegemony is a form in which

dominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence . . . as if it were

the natural order of things . . . [It is] an internalized coherence which has most

probably arisen from an externally imposed order but has been transformed into an

intersubjectively constituted reality (1994: 366). Hence the importance ofincorporating an intersubjective realm within a focus on hegemony. If hegemony is

understood as an opinion-molding activity rather than as brute force or domi-

nance, then consideration has to turn to how a hegemonic social or world order is

based on values and understandings that permeate the nature of that order (Cox

Fig. 2. The dialectical moment of hegemony

Ideas

Material

capabilities

Institutions


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158 MORTON

creation of hegemony by a fundamental social group over subordinate groups.

Hegemony would therefore be established if the relationship between intellectuals

and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is

provided by an organic cohesion . . . Only then can there take place an exchange ofindividual elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders . . . and led, and can the

shared life be realized which alone is a social forcewith the creation of the

historical bloc (Gramsci 1971, 418).

These issues are encompassed within the focus on different forms of state which,

as Cox notes, are principally distinguished by the characteristics of their

historic[al] blocs, i.e. the configurations of social forces upon which state power

ultimately rests. A particular configuration of social forces defines in practice the

limits or parameters of state purposes, and the modus operandi of state action,

defines, in other words, the raison dtat for a particular state (Cox 1987, 105). In

short, by considering different forms of state, it becomes possible to analyze the

social basis of the state or to conceive of the historical content of different states.

The notion of the historical bloc aids this endeavor by directing attention to which

social forces may have been crucial in the formation of a historical bloc or particular

state; what contradictions may be contained within a historical bloc upon which a

form of state is founded; and what potential might exist for the formation of a rival

historical bloc that may transform a particular form of state (409 n. 10). A wider

theory of the state therefore emerges within this framework. Instead of underrating

state power and explaining it away, attention is given to social forces and processes

and how these relate to the development of states (Cox 1981, 128). Consideringdifferent forms of state as the expression of particular historical blocs and thus

relations across state/civil society fulfils this objective. Overall, this relationship is

referred to as the state/civil society complex that, clearly, owes an intellectual

debt to Gramsci.

For Gramsci, the state was not simply understood as an institution limited to the

government of the functionaries or the top political leaders and personalities

with direct governmental responsibilities. The tendency to solely concentrate on

such features of the state was pejoratively termed statolatry: it entailed viewing

the state as a perpetual entity limited to actions within political society (Gramsci1971, 178, 268). It could be argued that certain neorealist, state centric

approaches in international relations succumb to the tendency of statolatry.

However, according to Gramsci, the state presents itself in a second way, beyond

the political society of public figures and top leaders: the state is the entire

complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only

justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of

those over whom it rules (244). This second aspect of the state is referred to as

civil society. The realms of political and civil society within modern states were

inseparable so that, taken together, they combine to produce a notion of theintegral state.

What we can do . . . is to fix two major . . . levels: the one that can be

called civil society, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called

private, and that of political society or the state. These two levels


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correspond on the one hand to the function of hegemony which the

dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that

of direct domination or command exercised through the state and

juridical government. (Gramsci 1971, 12)

The state should be understood, then, not just as the apparatus of government

operating within the public sphere (government, political parties, military) but

also as part of the private sphere of civil society (church, media, education)

through which hegemony functions (261). It can therefore be argued that the state

in this conception is understood as a social relation. The state is not unquestioningly

taken as a distinct institutional category, or thing in itself, but conceived as a form

of social relations through which capitalism and hegemony are expressed (Poulantzas

1978). At an analytical level, then, the general notion of the state includes

elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense

that one might say that state = political society + civil society, in other words

hegemony protected by the armour of coercion) (Gramsci 1971, 263). It is this

combination of political and civil society that is referred to as the integral state

through which ruling classes organize intellectual and moral functions as part of the

political and cultural struggle for hegemony in the effort to establish an ethical

state (258, 271).

Once again, the notion of hegemony is therefore extended and more fully

developed than in conventional approaches in international relations. Hegemony is

understood, as Overbeek (1994) has added, as a form of class rule, not primarily asa hierarchy of states. For Cox, class is viewed as a historical category and employed

in a heuristic way rather than as a static analytical category (Cox 1987, 3557, 1996e,

57). This means that class identity emerges within and through historical processes

of economic exploitation. Bring back exploitation as the hallmark of class, and at

once class struggle is in the forefront, as it should be (Ste. Croix 1981, 57). As such,

class-consciousness emerges, as E. P. Thompson (1968, 89; 1978) has argued, out

of particular historical contexts of struggle rather than mechanically deriving from

objective determinations that have an automatic place in production relations.

Hence class identity is captured within the broader notion of social forces. Classidentity is inscribed in social forces, but those are not reducible to class. Other forms

of identity are included within the rubric of social forcesethnic, nationalist,

religious, gender, sexualwith the aim of addressing how, like class, these derive

from a common material basis linked to relations of exploitation (Cox 1992, 35).

The construction of hegemony, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, therefore

occurs when a leading class transcends its particular economic-corporate interests

and is capable of binding and cohering the diverse aspirations and general interests

of various social forces. Within some neo-Gramscian perspectives, the construction

of hegemony is sometimes referred to as a comprehensive concept of control.

A concept of control represents a bid for hegemony: a project for the

conduct of public affairs and social control that aspires to be a legitimate

approximation of the general interest in the eyes of the ruling class and, at

the same time, the majority of the population, for at least a specific period.


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160 MORTON

It evolves through a series of compromises in which the fractional, special

interests are arbitrated and synthesized. (van der Pijl 1984, 7)4

Reference to the construction of hegemony, or the propagation throughoutsociety of a comprehensive concept of control, may be interchangeable. In either

case, to paraphrase Gramsci (1971, 1812), the process involves the most purely

political phase of struggle and occurs on a universal plane to result in the

forging of a historical bloc.

A historical bloc therefore implies the constitution of a radical and novel recon-

struction of the relational nature and identity of different interests within a social

formation (Nimni 1994, 107). It indicates an organic link between a diverse grouping

of interests that merge forms of class and cultural identity. The construction of a

historical bloc, Cox (1983, 168) adds, is therefore a national phenomenon and cannot

exist without a hegemonic social class. Yet the hegemony of a leading class can

manifest itself as an international phenomenon insofar as it represents the develop-

ment of a particular form of the social relations of production. Once hegemony has

been consolidated domestically, it may expand beyond a particular social order to

move outward on a world scale and insert itself through the world order (171; 1987,

14950). By doing so it can connect social forces across different countries. A world

hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national)

hegemony established by a . . . social class (Cox 1983, 171). The outward expansion

of particular modes of social relations of production and the interests of a leading

class on a world scale can also become supported by mechanisms of internationalorganization. This is what Gramsci (1971, 243) referred to as the internal and

international organizational relations of the state: that is, movements, voluntary

associations and organizations, such as the Rotary Club, or the Roman Catholic

Church that had an international character though rooted within the state. Social

forces may thus achieve hegemony within a national social order as well as through

world order by ensuring the promotion and expansion of a mode of production.

Hegemony can therefore operate at two levels: by constructing a historical bloc and

establishing social cohesion within a form of state as well as by expanding a mode

of production internationally and projecting hegemony through the level of worldorder. The national point of departure, however, remains vital. It is within a

particular historical bloc and form of state that hegemony is initially constructed.

Yet, beyond this initial consolidation, as hegemony begins to be asserted inter-

nationally, it is also within other different countries and particular forms of state that

struggles may develop as a result of the introduction of new modes of production.

For instance, in Gramscis time, this was born out by the expansion of Fordist

assembly plant production beyond the United States which would lead to the growing

world hegemony and power of Americanism and Fordism from the 1920s and 1930s.

The way in which world hegemony may consolidate itself locally within a differentnational setting is illuminated by the following passage: It is in the concept of

hegemony that those exigencies which are national in character are knotted together

4. For further perspectives developing this notion of hegemonic, or comprehensive, conceptsof control see, Overbeek (1990, 1993) or van der Pijl (1998).


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. . .A class that is international in character hasin as much as it guides social strata

which are narrowly national (intellectuals), and indeed frequently even less than

national: particularistic and municipalistic (the peasants)to nationalize itself in

a certain sense (241; emphasis added).As van der Pijl (1989, 12) has noted in relation to this passage, the struggle for

hegemony therefore involves translating particular interests, from a particular

form of state into forms of expansion that have universal applicability across a

variety of different states. Hence the importance of the national point of depar-

ture. It is within this context that hegemony is initially constructed, prior to outward

expansion on a world scale, and it is within this context that struggles unfold in

contesting hegemony. The national context remains the only place where an

historic[al] bloc can be founded, although world-economy and world-political condi-

tions materially influence the prospects for such an enterprise . . . [T]he task of

changing world order begins with the long, laborious effort to build new historic[al]

blocs within national boundaries (Cox 1983, 174).

As indicated above, world hegemony can be attained when international institu-

tions and mechanisms support a dominant mode of production and disseminate

universal norms and ideas, involving the intersubjective realm, in a move to trans-

form various state structures. In particular, international organizations can play a

key role in adjusting subordinate interests while facilitating the expansion of the

dominant economic and social forces (1723). With this emphasis, three successive

stages of world order are outlined by Cox within which the hegemonic relationship

between ideas, institutions, and material capabilities varied, and during whichdifferent forms of state and patterns of production relations prevailed. These are

the liberal international economy (17891873); the era of rival imperialisms

(18731945); and the neoliberal world order (post-World War II) (Cox 1987, 109).

Concentrating on the third era, known as pax Americana it is contended that a

United States-led hegemonic world order prevailed that was maintained through the

Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and institutions like the International

Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These institutions, along with the Group of Seven

(G-7) industrialized countries, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-

opment, and the Bank for International Settlements, have been collectively referredto as the G-7 nexus (Gill 1995a, 86). They have established mechanisms of

surveillance to ensure the harmonization of national policies in the attempt to

reconcile domestic social pressures with the requirements of a world economy (Cox

1981, 145). In the countries of advanced capitalism, the prevailing form of state was

based on principles of embedded liberalism (Ruggie 1982). There was a compro-

mise between certain domestic social groups (i.e., established labor seeking stability

and protection from economic and political vulnerabilities) and the interests of

multilateral institutions in the G-7 nexus with the aim of encouraging comparative

advantage, tariff reductions and international free trade, and increasing the inter-national division of labor through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT). Within this form of state of embedded liberalism, Keynesian demand

management was promoted alongside Fordist techniques of mass production (Gill and

Law 1988, 7980). The role of the state was to act as a mediator between the policy

priorities of the world economy and domestic groups. This was generally maintained


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162 MORTON

through social relations of production known as tripartite corporatism involving

government-business-labor coalitions. Such arrangements lent priority to central

agencies of government that maintained links between the national and the world

economyto wit, finance ministries, foreign trade and investment agencies, and theoffice of presidents or prime ministers (Cox 1987, 21930).5 This situation was

eventually accentuated following the world economic crisis of the 1970s and the

collapse of the Bretton Woods system during a period of structural change in the

world economy.

Elsewhere in the emerging global political economy, in countries of peripheral

capitalism, the form of state during the post-World War II period of United States-

led hegemony was generally based on principles of neomercantilist development.

This entailed more state-directed leadership that sought autonomy over the national

economy and growth through a model of import substitution industrialization. This

form of state was characterized by state corporatist social relations of production.

Yet, due to foreign penetration of the national economy, such production relations

did not encompass the whole economy. There would therefore be overlaps between

different modes, including enterprise and tripartite corporatism as well as subsist-

ence agricultural production, organized within a hierarchical arrangement (2304).

In the embedded liberal and neomercantilist forms of state, however, it is

argued that the forms and functions of United States-led hegemony began to alter

during a phase of structural change in the 1970s (see Morton 2003b). This conten-

tion is based around twin propositions linked to the internationalization of the state

and the internationalization of production. It is commonly argued that these devel-opments precipitated moves toward the phenomenon that is now recognized as

globalization.

Structural Change, Alternative Forms of State, andProduction Relations

The world economic crisis of 19734 followed the abandonment of the U.S. dollar/

gold standard link and signaled a move away from the Bretton Woods system of fixedexchange rates to more flexible adjustment measures. The crisis involved oil price

rises initiated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and

heightened inflation and indebtedness within the countries of advanced capitalism.

The post-World War II embedded liberal world order based on Keynesian demand

management and Fordist industrialism, involving tripartite, corporatist-type rela-

tions between government-business-labor, gave way to a restructuring of the social

relations of production. This involved the encouragement of social relations of

production based on enterprise corporatism, leading a shift in the coalitional basis

of various states away from a secure, unionized state sector toward the promotion

5. It is worth noting that though the state form of embedded liberalism is referred to by Coxas the neoliberal state, this precedent is not followed. This is because confusion can resultwhen using his term and distinguishing it from the more conventional understanding ofneoliberalism related to processes in the late 1970s and 1980s, which he calls hyper-liberalism.


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of private business interests and the creation of favorable conditions for internation-

ally and transnationally oriented business (Cox 1987, chap. 8). Hence a period of

structural change unfolded in the 1970s during which there was a tendency to

encourage, through different state/civil society relations, the consolidation of newpriorities. However, the ongoing changes stemming from the context of 1970s

structural change have been far from uniform. Nevertheless, the rising priorities of

enterprise corporatismamong others, monetarism, supply-side economics, and the

logic of competitivenessbegan increasingly to establish, albeit alongside prolonged

social struggle, a hegemonic aura throughout the world order during the 1980s and

1990s often referred to as the Reagan-Thatcher model of capitalism (Cox 1991/1996,

196). As Craig Murphy has noted, adjustment to the crisis occurred at different rates

in different regions, but in each case it resulted in a neo-liberal shift in govern-

mental economic policy and the increasing prominence of financial capital (1998a,

159). During this period of structural change in the 1970s, then, the social basis

across many forms of state altered as the logic of capitalist market relations created

a crisis of authority in established institutions and modes of governance (see Morton

2003b). This overall crisis, both of the world economy and of social power within

various forms of state, has been explained as the result of two particular tendencies:

the internationalization of production and the internationalization of the state that

led the thrust toward globalization.

Since the erosion of pax Americana principles of world order in the 1970s, there

has been an increasing internationalization of production and finance driven, at the

apex of an emerging global class structure, by a transnational managerial class(Cox 1981, 147). Taking advantage of differences between countries, there has been

an integration of production processes on a transnational scale with transnational

corporations promoting the operation of different elements of a single process in

different territorial locations. Besides the transnational managerial class, other

elements of productive capital (involved in manufacturing and extraction), including

small- and medium-sized businesses acting as contractors and suppliers and import/

export businesses, as well as elements of financial capital (involved in banking

insurance and finance) have been supportive of this internationalization of produc-

tion. Hence there has been a rise in the structural power of internationally mobilecapital supported and promoted by forms of elite interaction that have forged

common perspectives among business, state officials, and representatives of inter-

national organizations favoring the logic of capitalist market relations (Gill and Law

1989, 484). While some have championed such changes as the retreat of the state

(Strange 1996) or the emergence of a borderless world (Ohmae 1990, 1996), and

others have decried the global proportions of such changes in production (Hirst and

Thompson 1996; Weiss 1998), it is argued here that the internationalization of

production has profoundly restructuredbut not erodedthe role of the state. After

all, the state as an institutional and social entity . . . creates the possibility for thelimitation of such structural power, partly because of the political goods and services

which it supplies to capitalists and the institutional autonomy it possesses. The

stance of the state towards freedom of enterprise . . . is at the heart of this issue

(Gill and Law 1989, 480).

The notion of the internationalization of the state captures this dynamic by


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164 MORTON

referring to the way transnational processes of consensus formation, underpinned by

the internationalization of production and the thrust of globalization, have been

transmitted through the policy-making channels of governments.6 The network of

control that has maintained the structural power of capital has also been supportedby an axis of influence consisting of institutions within the G-7 nexus (see above).

These institutions, along with the Trilateral Commission and other forums, have

ensured the ideological osmosis and dissemination of policies in favor of the

perceived exigencies of the global political economy. As a result, those state

agencies in close contact with the global economyoffices of presidents and prime

ministers, treasuries, central bankshave gained precedence over those agencies

closest to domestic public policyministries of labor and industry or planning offices

(Cox 1992, 31). It has been argued that this tendency in the transformation of the

state and the role of transnational elites (or a nbuleuse) in forging consensus

remains to be fully deciphered and needs much more study (301). Indeed, the

overall argument concerning the internationalization of the state was based on a

series of linked hypotheses suggestive for empirical investigation (Cox 1996d, 276).

Nevertheless, across the different forms of state in countries of advanced and

peripheral capitalism, the general depiction is that the state became a transmission

belt for neoliberalism and the logic of capitalist competition from global to local

spheres (Cox 1992, 31).

Although the thesis of the internationalization of the state has received much

recent criticism, the work of Stephen Gill has greatly contributed to understanding

this process as part of the changing character of United States-centered hegemonyin the global political economy, notably in his detailed analysis of the role of the

Trilateral Commission (Gill 1990). Similar to Cox, the global restructuring of produc-

tion along post-Fordist lines is located within a context of structural change in the

1970s. It was in this period that there was a transition from what Gill recognizes as

an international historical bloc of social forces, established in the post-World War

II period and centered in the United States but expanding on a world scale. This bloc

brought together fractions of productive and financial capital and elements within

state apparatuses to form a transatlantic political community. Since the 1970s,

conditions have emerged for the consolidation of a transnational historical bloc,forging links and a synthesis of interests and identities not only beyond national

boundaries and classes but also creating the conditions for the hegemony of tran-

snational capital. While there is reluctance to presume that transnational hegemony

has thus been attained, it is added that certain social forces have become prominent

and have attempted to achieve transnational hegemony.

Yet Gill departs from Gramsci to assert that a historical bloc may at times have

the potential to become hegemonic, implying that hegemony need not prevail for

a historical bloc to emerge (Gill 1993, 40). The case of the European Economic and

Monetary Union is analyzed within the terms of a transnational historical bloc (Gill2001, 545). Elsewhere it is added that the consolidation of neoliberalism within such

a bloc is based on supremacy rather than hegemony. Again drawing in principle from

Gramsci, it is argued that supremacy prevails when a situation of hegemony is not

6. For a similar, but competing, interpretation, see Picciotto (1991).


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apparent and when dominance is exercised through a historical bloc over fragmented

opposition. It is therefore argued that dominant forces within the contemporary

transnational historical bloc of neoliberalism practice a politics of supremacy (Gill

1995b, 400, 402, 412).7

This politics of supremacy is organized through two keyprocesses, the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism, and the concom-

itant spread of market civilization.

According to Gill, new constitutionalism involves the narrowing of the social basis

of popular participation within the world order of disciplinary neoliberalism. It

involves the hollowing out of democracy and the affirmation, in matters of political

economy, of a set of macroeconomic policies such as market efficiency, discipline

and confidence, policy credibility and competitiveness. It is the move towards

construction of legal or constitutional devices to remove or insulate substantially the

new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability (Gill

1991; 1992, 165). It results in an attempt to make neoliberalism the sole model of

development by disseminating the notion of market civilization based on an ideology

of capitalist progress and exclusionary or hierarchical patterns of social relations

(1995b, 399). Within the global political economy, mechanisms of surveillance have

supported the market civilization of new constitutionalism in something tentatively

likened to a global panopticon of surveillance (1995c). Overall, it is argued by Gill

that these features of new constitutionalism, disciplinary neoliberalism, and market

civilization are supported by the politics of supremacy rather than hegemony.

The overarching concept of supremacy has also been used to develop an under-

standing of the construction of U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World and howchallenges were mounted against the US in the 1970s through the New International

Economic Order (Augelli and Murphy 1988). It is argued that the ideological promo-

tion of American liberalism, based on individualism and free trade, assured American

supremacy through the 1970s and was reconstructed in the 1980s. Yet this projection

of supremacy did not simply unfold through domination. Rather than simply equating

supremacy with dominance, Augelli and Murphy argue that supremacy can be main-

tained through domination orhegemony (132). As Murphy (1994, 295 n. 8) outlines

in a separate study of industrial change and international organization, supremacy

defines the position of a leading class within a historical bloc and can be secured byhegemony as well as through domination. As Gramsci himself states, the supremacy

of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as domination and as intellectual

and moral leadership (1971, 57). Where the former strain of supremacy involves

subjugation by force, the latter involves leading allied groups. In sum, just as

hegemony itself should not be equated with domination, neither should the notion

of supremacy suffer the same fate.

In addition to the neo-Gramscian perspectives discussed so far, there also exists

a diverse array of similar perspectives analyzing hegemony in the global political

economy. This includes, among others, an account of the historically specific way inwhich mass production was institutionalized in the United States and how this

propelled forms of American-centered leadership and world hegemony in the post-

World War II period (Rupert 1995a). Extending this analysis, there has also been

7. The same argument is also apparent in Gill (1998).


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166 MORTON

consideration of struggles between social forces in the United States over the North

American Free Trade Agreement and globalization (Rupert 1995b, 2000). There have

also been analyses of European integration within the context of globalization and

the role of transnational classes within European governance (Bieler 2000; Bieler andMorton 2001b; van Apeldoorn 2000; Holman and van der Pijl 1996; Holman, Over-

beek, and Ryner 1998; Shields 2001, 2003); the internationalization and democratiz-

ation of Southern Europe, particularly Spain, within the global political economy

(Holman 1996); and analysis of international organizations, including the role of

gender and womens movements (Lee 1995; Stienstra 1994; Whitworth 1994). There

has also been a recent return to understanding forms of U.S. foreign policy interven-

tion within countries of peripheral capitalism. This has included analyzing the

promotion of polyarchy defined as a system in which a small group actually rules

and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elec-

tions carefully managed by elites (Robinson 1996, 49). Polyarchy, or low-intensity

democracy, is therefore analyzed as an adjunct of U.S. hegemony through institu-

tions such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the National

Endowment for Democracy in the particular countries of the Philippines, Chile,

Nicaragua, and Haiti, and tentatively extended with reference to the former Soviet

bloc and South Africa. Other recent research has similarly focused on the promotion

of democracy in Southern Africa (Taylor 2001) as well as the construction and

contestation of hegemony in Mexico (Morton 2002, 2003a, 2003b). Furthermore,

aspects of neoliberalism and cultural hegemony have been dealt with in a study of

mass communications scholarship in Chile (Davies 1999). There are clearly a varietyof neo-Gramscian perspectives dealing with a diversity of issues linked to the analysis

of hegemony in the global political economy. The next section outlines some of the

criticisms leveled against such perspectives and indicates in what direction current

research is proceeding.

Welcome Debate: Controversies SurroundingNeo-Gramscian Perspectives

Since the challenge of neo-Gramscian perspectives to mainstream problem-solving

approaches in international relations, a more recent period of intellectual and

political ferment has arisen. This has involved closer scrutiny of the neo-Gramscian

perspectives themselves from a variety of viewpoints. Yet, there has been rare

engagement with such criticisms. Beneath the surface impression of claims to

openness, therefore, it seems that, in relation to criticisms, a politics of forgetting

has persisted. Yet, as Steve Smith (1995b) has forewarned, it is incumbent upon such

perspectives to remain self-reflective about possible weaknesses. This section will

therefore outline a series of criticisms made against the perspectives as well ashighlight issues of disagreement with such criticisms.

In broad outline, neo-Gramscian perspectives have been criticized as too unfash-

ionably marxisant or, alternatively, as too lacking in Marxist rigor. They are seen as

unfashionable because many retain an essentially historical materialist position as

central to analysisfocusing on the decisive nucleus of economic activity (Gramsci


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1971, 161)but without succumbing to expressions of economism. Hence the

accusation that analysis remains caught within modernist assumptions that take as

foundational the structures of historical processes determining the realms of the

possible (Ashley 1989, 275). However, rather than succumbing to this problem, thefallibility of all knowledge claims is accepted across neo-Gramscian perspectives,

which leads to a degree of diffidence about the foundations for knowledge (see

Neufeld 1995). A minimal foundationalism is therefore implied, based on a cautious,

contingent, and transitory universalism that combines dialogue between universal

values and local definitions within historically specific circumstances (Booth 1995;

Cox 1995b, 14; Cox 2000b, 46; Linklater 1998, 45, 101, 1067; Rengger and Hoffman

1996).8 Elsewhere, other commentators have alternatively decried the lack of

historical materialist rigor within neo-Gramscian perspectives.

According to Peter Burnham (1991), the neo-Gramscian treatment of hegemony

amounts to a pluralist empiricism that fails to recognize the central importance

of the capital relation and is therefore preoccupied with the articulation of ideology.

By granting equal weight to ideas and material capabilities, it is argued, the

contradictions of the capital relation are blurred, resulting in a slide towards an

idealist account of the determination of economic policy (81). Hence there is an

inability to grapple with the dynamics of globalization because the categories of

state and market are regarded as opposed forms of social organization that operate

separately, in external relationship to one another. This leads to a supposed reifica-

tion of the state as a thing in itself standing outside the relationship between

capital and labor (Burnham 1997, 1999, 2000). Instead, it is recommended that atotalizing theory, rooted in central organizing principles, be developed that is

attentive to the relations between labor, capital, and the state. To what extent this

totalizing approach results in a unified view of labor and a heroic vision of the

working class as an undifferentiated mass is, however, an open question.

In specific response to these criticisms, it was outlined earlier in the paper how

the social relations of production are taken as the starting point for thinking about

world order and the way they engender configurations of social forces. By thus asking

which modes of social relations of production within capitalism have been prevalent

in particular historical circumstances, the state is not treated as an unquestionedcategory. Indeed, rather closer to Burnhams own position than he might admit, the

state is treated as an aspect of the social relations of production so that questions

about the apparent separation of politics and economics or states and markets within

capitalism are promoted (see Burnham 1994). Although a fully developed theory of

the state is not evident, there clearly exists a set of at least implicit assumptions

about the state as a form of social relations through which capitalism and hegemony

are expressed. Therefore, akin to arguments elsewhere, it is possible from within a

neo-Gramscian perspective to raise questions about how different forms of state are

established and howthrough the contradictions of capitalthe functions of thestate are revised and supplemented (Holloway and Picciotto 1977).

Additionally, Burnham (1991, 76) argues that the account of hegemony developed

across neo-Gramscian perspectives is barely distinguishable from a sophisticated

8. These issues are usefully surveyed in George (1994).


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168 MORTON

neo-realist account. Yet this undervalues a critical theory route to hegemony and

the insistence on an ethical dimension to analysis in which questions of justice,

legitimacy and moral credibility are integrated sociologically into the whole and into

many . . . key concepts (Gill 1993, 24). Ideas are accepted as part of the globalpolitical economy itself, which facilitates recognition of the ideology and normative

element underpinning a perspective. The production of intersubjective meanings

within this theory of hegemony is therefore also undervalued. While Burnhams

critique does rightly point to the danger of overstating the role of ideas within neo-

Gramscian perspectives (Bieler 1996), the function of intellectual activity across

state/civil society relations and the role of consent as a necessary form of hegemony

should not be overlooked. After all, ideologies are anything but arbitrary; they are

real historical facts which must be combated and their nature as instruments of

domination exposed (Gramsci 1995, 395). The point is therefore not to take the

position of Theological Marxists who focus on the law of value and the law of

motion of capital as absolute knowledge rather than as hypotheses (Cox 1996c,

176). Rather than upholding a fixed notion of historical materialism, the point is to

follow the spirit of Raymond Williams (1977, 34) and remain open to a body of

thinking that is active, developing, and unfinished. Therefore, though neo-Gramscian

perspectives cannot be separated from historical materialism, they may be distin-

guished within it (Smith 1996).

A different series of criticisms have separately centered on the thesis of globali-

zation and the internationalization of the state proposed by neo-Gramscian perspec-

tives. In particular, Leo Panitch has argued that an account unfolds which is too top-down in its expression of power relations, assuming that globalization is a process

that proceeds from the global to the national or the outside-in. The point that

globalization is authored by states is thus overlooked by developing the metaphor of

a transmission belt from the global to the national within the thesis of the inter-

nationalization of the state (Panitch 1994, 2000). It has been added that this is a

one-way view of internationalization that respectively overlooks reciprocal inter-

action between the global and the local; overlooks mutually reinforcing social

relations within the global political economy; or ignores class conflict within national

social formations (Ling 1996; Baker 1999; Moran 1998). The role of the state,following Panitchs (1994, 74) argument, is still determined by struggles among social

forces located within particular social formations, even though social forces may be

implicated in transnational structures. Instead, it is argued that neo-Gramscian

perspectives fail to identify and engage with these contradictions of capitalism. Yet,

these issues are not necessarily beyond the scope of a neo-Gramscian conceptual

framework.

It will be recalled from the above discussion that the point of departure within

such an approach could equally be changing social relations of production within

forms of state orworld order (Cox 1981, 153 n. 26). Indeed, Coxs focus has beenon historical blocs underpinning particular states and how these are connected

through the mutual interests of social classes in different countries. Further,

following Cox, the national context is the only place where a historical bloc can be

founded and where the task of building new historical blocs, as the basis for

counterhegemony to change world order, must begin. Alternatively, though Gill


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tends to take a different tack on the application of notions such as historical bloc

and supremacy, he is still interested in analyzing attempts to constitutionalize

neoliberalism at the domestic, regional, and global levels. As Gill puts it, there is

a growing contradiction between the tendency towards the globality and universalityof capital in the neoliberal form and the particularity of the legitimation and

enforcement of its key exploitative relations by the state. Whereas capital tends

towards universality, it cannot operate outside of or beyond the political context,

and involves, planning, legitimation, and the use of coercive capacities by the state

(1995b, 422).

Therefore, the emphasis should not be misunderstood. Like attempts elsewhere

to grapple with globalization (Radice 1998, 1999, 2000), there is a focus on trans-

national networks of production and how national governments have lost much

autonomy in policymaking, but also how states are still an integral part of this

process. The overall position adopted on the relationship between the global and

the national, or between hegemony and historical bloc, may differ from one neo-

Gramscian perspective to the next, but it is usually driven by the purpose and

empirical context of the research. Yet, noting the above concerns, the peculiarities

of history within specific national historical and cultural contexts should not be

overlooked. It is therefore perhaps important to admit the significance of taking a

national point of departurefollowing Gramscithat involves focusing on the

intertwined relationship between international forces and national relations

within state/civil society relations that react both passively and actively to the

mediation of global and regional forces (Showstack Sassoon 2001).Further criticisms have also focused on how the hegemony of transnational

capital has been overestimated and how the possibility for transformation within

world order is thereby diminished by neo-Gramscian perspectives (Drainville 1995).

Analysis, notes Andr Drainville, must give way to more active sorties against

transnational neoliberalism, and the analysis of concepts of control must beget

original concepts of resistance (1994, 125). It is therefore important, as Paul

Cammack (1999) has added, to avoid overstating the coherence of neoliberalism and

to identify materially grounded opportunities for counterhegemonic action. All too

often, a host of questions related to counterhegemonic forms of resistance are leftfor future research. Hence the importance of focusing on movements of resistance

and addressing strategies of structural transformation that may be seen as the

formation and basis of counterhegemony (Morton 2002).9 The demonstrations during

the Carnival Against Capitalism (London, June 1999), mobilizations against the

World Trade Organization (Seattle, November 1999), protests against the Inter-

national Monetary Fund and World Bank (Washington, April 2000, and Prague,

September 2000), and riots during the European Union summit at Nice (December

2000), as well as the G-8 meeting at Genoa (July 2001), would all seemingly further

expose the imperative of analyzing globalization as a set of highly contested socialrelations. Such demonstrations might even precipitate the realization that globaliz-

ation is class struggle.

9. For further initial attempts to deal with issues of resistance, see Cox (1999) and Gill (2000,2001). A version of the former is available in Spanish; see Cox (1998).


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170 MORTON

The final and most recent criticisms arise from the call for a much needed

engagement by neo-Gramscian perspectives with the writings of Gramsci and thus

the complex methodological, ontological, epistemological, and contextual issues

that embroiled the Italian thinker (Germain and Kenny 1998). This emphasis waspresaged in an earlier argument warning that the incorporation of Gramscian insights

into international relations and international political economy ran the risk of

denuding the borrowed concepts of the theoretical significance in which they

cohere (Smith 1994, 147). To commit the latter error could reduce scholars to

searching for gems in the Prison Notebooks in order to save international

political economy from pervasive economism (Gareau 1993, 301; see also Gareau

1996). To be sure, such criticisms and warnings have rightly drawn attention to the

importance of remaining engaged with Gramscis own writings. Germain and Kenny

also rightly call for greater sensitivity to the problems of meaning and understanding

in the history of ideas when appropriating Gramsci for contemporary application. In

such ways, then, the demand to remain (re)engaged with Gramscis thought and

practice was a necessary one to make and well overdue. However, once such tasks

are undertaken, it is clear that problems do arise with some of the key claims made

by Germain and Kenny (Morton 2003c). In particular, they have asked whether the

concept of hegemony can sustain explanatory power beyond the national context

and thus withstand the way hegemony has been internationalized within a neo-

Gramscian framework (Germain and Kenny 1998, 17). Also, they have claimed that

concepts such as hegemony, civil society, and historical bloc were used exclusively

in the grounding of national social formations by Gramsci (20). Yet, once the demandto historicize and develop a wider theoretical and practical reading of Gramsci is

taken seriously, these claims are revealed to be somewhat hollow.

Once again the pivotal issue is the national point of departure. The notion of

historical bloc, as argued above, was certainly limited to relations within society

involving the development of productive forces, the level of coercion, or relations

between political parties that constitute hegemonic systems within the state. Yet

constant references were made by Gramsci to hegemony based on relations

between international forcesinvolving the requisites of great powers, sovereignty

and independence that constitute the combinations of states in hegemonicsystems (Gramsci 1971, 176). Indeed, within Gramscis national point of depar-

ture there was a constant and dialectical juxtaposition between the national and

international realms.

[T]he internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination which

is original and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations must be

understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one wishes

to dominate them and direct them. To be sure, the line of development is

towards internationalism, but the point of departure is nationaland itis from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective is

international and cannot be otherwise. (Ibid.: 240)

Moreover, Gramsci himself discussed features of world hegemony and made

reference to the hegemony of the United States and American global hegemony


19/27


while also discussing identity movements, voluntary associations, and international

public and private organizations that had an international character while main-

taining a presence within the national realm (Gramsci 1977, 7982, 8993; 1992,

16770, 291, 3545; 1996, 26971, 282, 31820). Therefore, rather than an undulynarrow and restrictive reading of Gramsci, it is better to appreciate that the point

of departure for Gramsci was national which involved a focus on how social forces

within this realm were intertwined and shaped by the dialectic of global andlocal

social forces (Murphy 1998b; Rupert 1998). After all, Gramsci commented on the

dynamic of hegemony and treated both the Renaissance state system and politics

within the twentieth-century within the same framework and with the same

concepts (Augelli and Murphy 1993, 127).

Conclusion

To summarize, this argument has pursued a critical theory route to hegemony that

provides a distinctive alternative to mainstream international relations theory as

well as so-called structural Marxism that has little practical applicability to concrete

problems. Notably, a case was made for a critical theory of hegemony that directs

attention to relations between social interests in the struggle for consensual lead-

ership rather than concentrating solely on state dominance, by demonstrating how

various neo-Gramscian perspectives have developed a particular historical materi-

alist focus on and critique of capitalism.As a result, it was argued that the conceptual framework developed by such neo-

Gramscian perspectives rethinks prevalent ontological assumptions in international

relations due to a theory of hegemony that focuses on social forces engendered by

changes in the social relations of production, forms of state and world order. It was

highlighted how this route to hegemony opens up questions about the social

processes that create and transform different forms of state. Attention is thus drawn

towards the raison dtat or the basis of state power, including the social basis of

hegemony or the configuration of social forces upon which power rests across the

terrain of state/civil society relations. With an appreciation of how ideas, institu-tions, and material capabilities interact in the construction and contestation of

hegemony, it was also possible to pay attention to issues of intersubjectivity.

Therefore, a critical theory of hegemony was developed that was not equated with

dominance and thus went beyond a theory of the state-as-force. Finally, by recog-

nizing the different social purpose behind a critical theory committed to historical

change, this route to hegemony poses an epistemological challenge to knowledge

claims associated with positivist social science.

In a separate section, the thesis of the internationalization of the state and the

internationalization of production was outlined within which, it was argued, theforms of world hegemony were altered in a period of structural change in the

emerging global political economy of the 1970s. Subsequently, a series of criticisms

was also outlined concerning the neo-Gramscian perspectives. Analysis can be

pushed into further theoretical and empirical areas by addressing some of these

criticisms. For example, in terms of further research directions, benefit could be


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172 MORTON

gained by directly considering the role of organized labor in contesting the latest

agenda of neoliberal globalization (Bieler 2003).10 It is also important to problema-

tize the tactics and strategies of resistances to neoliberalism by giving further

thought to autonomous forms of peasant mobilization in Latin America, such as theMovimento (dos Trabalhadores Rurais) Sem Terra (MST: Movement of Landless Rural

Workers) in Brazil and the Ejrcito Zapatista de Liberacin Nacional (EZLN: Zapatista

Army of National Liberation) in Chiapas, Mexico (Morton 2002). At a more explicitly

theoretical level, additional work could also be conducted in revealing Gramscis

theory of the state and then situating this within a wider discussion of state theory

(Bieler and Morton 2003).

The overall theoretical and political consequences of such research can be

ascertained from two angles. First, there is a rejection of objectivist or empiricist

claims to value-free social enquiry dominant throughout the academy. This means

that, however controversial it may be, there is an emancipatory basis to research.

Second, linked to the rejection of such empiricist and positivist knowledge claims,

greater emphasis is also accorded the principle of theoretical reflexivity. This entails

reflection on the process of theorizing itself and includes three traits: self-

awareness, as much as possible, about underlying premises; recognition of the

inherently politico-normative dimension of analysis; and an affirmation that judg-

ments about the merits of contending perspectives can be made in the absence of

objective criteria (Neufeld 1995, 401). The advantage of theoretical reflexivity

is that an opportunity is left to explain the emergence and social purpose of a

particular perspective and ones own political position. However, though theory isitself a form of political practice, it is not sufficienthence the importance of instilling

a greater degree of invigorated social engagement within and beyond the practice of

theory to encompass the realm of everyday life. What ultimately matters, then, is

the way in which Gramscis legacy gets interpreted, transmitted and used so that it

[can] remain an effective tool not only for the critical analysis of hegemony but also

for the development of an alternative politics and culture (Buttigieg 1986, 15).

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Andreas Bieler, Joseph Buttigieg, David Ruccio, and the

anonymous reviewers for reading and commenting on previous versions of this

paper. The financial support of an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)

Postdoctoral Fellowship is also acknowledged (Ref.: T026271041).

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