De-Secularisation The Demographic Imperative. Demography in History Populations are generally stable...
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Transcript of De-Secularisation The Demographic Imperative. Demography in History Populations are generally stable...
De-Secularisation
The Demographic Imperative
Demography in History
Populations are generally stable over the longue duree Periodic population changes through technology, disease
and invasion Demography as Effect: Technological advantage
translates into expansion for some groups at others' expense through lower mortality (Europe) or military conquest (Europeans v. the rest; Bantu v. Khoi San)
Demography as Cause: Role of demographic pressure in causing revolution (Goldstone) or innovation (Durkheim)
Oft-cited role of demography in hastening decline of empires?
The Demographic Transition
From High Fertility/High Mortality to Low Fertility/Low Mortality
UK: Had slower fertility transition than France, had excess population growth for settlement which France did not. Geopolitical implications
Second Demographic Transition: permanently below-replacement fertility for 30 years in Europe and E Asia. Little movement beyond 1.5. Population decline
Who will replace? Values rather than economic status is most strongly linked
to fertility With mortality declining and state boundaries stable, could
values & fertility rather than technology now hold the key to group advantage?
The Rise of Demography
Demographic Transition Uneven Democracy, Equality, Liberty enhance
demographic impact Ethnic differentials have political
ramifications Ethnic Makeover Accepted. What about
religious makeover?
Demography and Modernisation
Modernisation: urbanisation, education, wealth, secularisation
Yet rural, uneducated, poor, religious have higher fertility
Was not true before late 19th c. Something has changed
Modernity must now move forward to stand still No one wants to be poor and uneducated, but
religion has a much stronger hold Modernity can take a 'European/East Asian' or
American route
Religious Demography and Politics?
Early Christianity, spread from some 40 converts in 30 A.D. to over 6 million adherents by 300 A.D. (Stark)
Mormon church: same 40 percent growth in past century, widening fertility gap
Evangelical Protestant growth in the 20th c. US: ¾ demographic. 'Red states' have 12-point TFR advantage over 'Blue' in 2004 election
Secularisation and Religious Fertility
"1. The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless,
2. The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before-- and they constitute a growing proportion of the world's population." (Inglehart & Norris 2004)
Which will dominate: religious fertility or secularisation?
Data
Based on 1981, 1990 and 2000 EVS, and 2004 ESS
10 Western European countries, in fixed proportions. 4 Scandinavian-Protestant, 4 mainly Catholic, 2 mixed
EVS-ESS continuity on children and attendance only
Weekly Attendance by Cohort, 1981-2004, Ten W. European Countries
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85
1981
1990
2000*
2004**
Weekly Attendance by Cohort, Early Secularising Societies
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85
1981
1990
2000*
2004**
Weekly Attendance by Cohort, Late Secularising Societies
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85
1981
1990
2000
2004*
Religiosity by Cohort, 'Early Secularising' Societies
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85
1981
1990
2000*
2004**
Religiosity by cohort, 'Late Secularising' Societies
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85
1981
1990
2000
2004*
Table 2. Regression Coefficients on Number of Children Ever Born, Females Aged 18+, 1981-2000 EVS and 2004 ESS. EVS
1981-2000 ESS
2004
Marital Status 0.353*** (0.007) 0.246*** (0.015) Religiosity 0.176*** (0.028) 0.045*** (0.008) Postmaterialism -0.089*** (0.023) - - Income .002 (0.007) 0.008 (0.012) Education -0.059*** (0.004) -0.025*** (0.007) Age 0.036*** (0.008) 0.035*** (0.005) Cohort -0.031 (0.046) 0.116 (0.080) Waveyear -0.088 (0.039) - - _cons 2.607*** (0.337) 73.072*** (15.230) R2 .356 .205 N 12046 3980 *p<.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001 N.B. No data for Norway in 2000. Postmaterialism not asked in ESS. For cohort, higher values refer to most recent.
Focus on 6 Early Secularizing Societies 5 Protestant Countries + France (Vanguard of
secularization) Crosstab 'Raised Religious?' and 'Are You
Religious?' questions (EVS 1991) to find apostates/converts
Generate figures on apostasy/conversion by 5-year age group and sex for input into projection
Percentage Difference between Currently Religious/Non-Religious Population and Proportion Raised Religious/Non-Religious, for Each Age Group, 1991, by Sex
Religious Population Net Gain
Nonreligious Population Net Gain
Age Group Male Female Male Female 18-24 -0.058 0.176 0.032 -0.124 25-29 -0.201 0.114 0.166 -0.103 30-34 0.139 0.086 -0.092 -0.083 35-39 -0.168 0.018 0.147 -0.022 40-44 -0.007 0.110 0.007 -0.146 45-49 -0.109 0.048 0.133 -0.075 50-54 -0.107 -0.007 0.135 0.013 55-59 -0.047 0.104 0.080 -0.200 60-64 -0.153 0.117 0.273 -0.215 65-69 -0.098 0.000 0.191 0.000 70-74 -0.056 0.082 0.098 -0.250 75+ 0.037 0.038 -0.048 -0.102 N.B. Based on crosstabulation of Religious and 'Raised Religious' individuals in EVS 1991.
Fig. 8 Projected Religious Population, 6 Early Secularising Societies, 2004-2104
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
2004 2014 2024 2034 2044 2054 2064 2074 2084 2094 2104
Pro
po
rtio
n R
eli
gio
us
1816-E6
1816-E10
1818-E6
Projections Under Fertility Convergence and Re-Secularisation Scenarios
The Role of Immigration
Immigrants to Europe have higher religiosity and higher fertility
Fertility behaviour trends toward host mean over the generations
Religiosity seems to decline much more slowly – esp. for Muslims
Immigration from Islamic sources will provide an increasing component of W. Europe's Population
Attendance at Religious Services, by Faith and Age,2004 ESS
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
We
ek
ly A
tte
nd
an
ce
RC
Prot
RC/Prot
Eastern
Muslims
Attend Worship* Retain Religious Practice*2001 2003 N
UK BP Muslims 37% 398 81% 277Foreign BP Muslims 37% 910 89% 817UK Afro Christians 31% 424 37% 57Foreign Afro Christians 48% 843 56% 39UK White Christians 16% 6923 29% 6304Foreign White Christians 26% 318 56% 151
Religious Retention by Faith and Birthplace, UK, 2001-3 (Excludes nonidentifiers. 'Practice' is self-description)
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
100%
2001 2003
Attend Worship* Retain Religious Practice*
UK BP Muslims
Foreign BP Muslims
UK Afro Christians
Foreign Afro Christians
UK White Christians
Foreign White Christians
'No Religion' will age due to decline in apostasy and low fertility Muslims will grow through immigration, fertility and religious retention Christians will stabilize due to higher fertility, female religiosity and
declining apostasy
Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK, 2001
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Muslim No religion Christian
% i
n A
ge
Ban
d
0 - 15
16 - 34
35 - 64
65 and over
Growth of European Islam
Not 'Eurabia' as scaremongers suggest, but: Austria: assuming only 20k immigrants per year,
projected to form 14-26 pc of population by 2051 (Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2006)
W. Europe will be 10-20 pc Muslim in 2050, up from 3 pc today
Age structure and urban concentration Note that religious revival in Europe is both a Muslim
and Christian phenomenon Political implications – depends on nature of
conservative political strategies
Conclusion: Secularisation
In Europe, more religious (Catholic) countries are secularising faster; less religious (mainly Protestant) countries may have ceased to secularise
Religious fertility and slowing of apostasy will lead to end of secularizing trend c. 2045-55 in Protestant western Europe even without immigration
Immigration, especially of Muslims, will greatly hasten and enhance the onset of de-secularization
R2 = .071; N=7534
Religiosity and Ideology, 1981-2000
Regression Coefficients on Ideological (Left-to-Right) Self-Placement, 1981-2000 EVS religious -0.334*** 0.034 age 0.003 0.005 class -0.051** 0.016 education 0.098*** 0.009 proud of nation -0.325*** 0.029 income 0.063*** 0.009 cohort -0.152** 0.044 _cons 5.081*** 0.421
*p<.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001
Political Implications
An issue for the medium to longer term Religious are much more right-leaning Right-leaning voters vote for more
conservative parties Religious conservatism (USA) vs Nationalist
conservatism (Europe?) What of the future of Enlightenment
modernity and the cultural project of modernism?
Disagree with idea that state 'Should Implement Shari'a Only', Egypt, 2000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
No child 1 child 2children
3children
4children
5children
6children
7children
8 ormore
children
Per
cen
tag
e D
isag
reei
ng
Future: Expand to Look at Middle East, South Asia and USA
IIASA, near Vienna
Project Website
http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html