Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian Logic - S. Bhattacharya

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Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian LogicAuthor(s): S. Bhattacharya

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jul., 1955), pp. 155-162Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1397435 .

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Commentnd DiscussionDANIEL H. H. INGALLS ON INDIAN LOGIC

S. BHATTACHARYAALTHOUGH NDIAN PHILOSOPHY hasbeenattractingchol-ars forcenturiesrom ll partsof theworld, ndian ogichas remainedpracticallynknownutside ndia and is so eventoday.This s duepartly

tothefact hatnthenineteenthentury,henmost f the ranslationorkof theSanskritextswas done,theconcept f Westernogicwas whollydifferentrom he Indianconcept,o that ndianlogicwas neverreallyunderstoodyWestern cholars.Therewas also another ifficultyhichseemedalmost nsuperable.Advanced ndianlogic is writtenn a verycomplex ndhighly echnicalanguagewhich s very ifficulto translate,and even whena literal ranslationouldbe made, t did not make sense.So, what s needed n thebeginnings nota literal ranslationutan ex-planation f thetechniquef the anguage nd thebasic onceptssed nit.Butthis s notpossiblewithout thorough nderstandingf the subtletiesof ndian ogic.Happily, hetremendousdvancen the echnicalanguageof logicand itsphilosophyuring he astfiftyears n theWestenablesus totranslatendian ogic ntelligiblyntootherWesternanguages.Nowthat ogic n the West has passedthrougho manyphasesa logicwhichdoes notdistinguishetween ormal nd material ruth oes not appearso utterlytrangend ncomprehensible;ordo we wonder t the nclusionofpsychological,inguistic,ndother non-logical" attersn logic.More-over, ogic n theWest is today acing ifficultieshichhaveparallels nIndianlogic,though hesolutionsuggestednd eventhe approachesotheproblemsreboundto be differentow. So, a renewed ttemptt atranslationf a workon Indian ogicand itsexplanation, ith ll there-sources f contemporaryesternogicat hand, tands betterhance fsuccess oday han verbefore. hishope s ustifiedoa considerablextentbythe achievementfProfessor aniel H. H. Ingalls n his Materials ortheStudy fNavya-Nytyaogic.' Althoughndian ogic s notofonetype

1Materials for the Study of Navya-Nydya Logic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London:Oxford University Press; 1951). See review by Karl H. Porter in Philosophy East and West, IV, No.3 (October, 1954), 271-273.

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156 S. BHATTACHARYAand varies romystemo system,he ogicof theNavya-Nydyachoolofphilosophy as been gradually dopted,withnecessarymodifications,sthemodel n all the other ystems. he developmentf this ogic,whichextended ver everal enturies,asduemainlyotheworks fRaghundtha,Mathurindtha,agadi'a, nd Gadddhara,ll of whomcommentedn theoriginalworkof Gafigeia.Thus,there ould notbe a better hoice hanthe works f thesemasters or first enture,nd Ingallshas chosen hemost opular opic romhem.Ingalls'book s dividedntofive ections. ection dealswith hebiog-raphies f theauthors iscussedn thebook. In SectionI Ingallsexplainssome onceptsfNavya-Nydyaogic ndthe echniquef anguage.SectionIII, theshortestit covers arelyhalfa page), givestheoriginal extofGafigeban the"FiveDefinitionsfVyapti,"with n English ranslationand notes.SectionV containshe text fthecommentaryfMathurndi-thaon the text fGafigeba, ith translationnd notes. SectionV givesthe text f thecommentaryfRaghundthan thetext fGafigeba, ithtranslationndnotes. t isnotclearwhyRaghundthaasbeenplaced fterMathurdndtha,s he is historicallyarlier.The translationfthetexts s fairlyorrect,nd the noteswhich xplainthe translationorthe first imemakesystematicse of symbolsnd thefundamentalrinciplesfsymbolicogic. Thus,the bookcanbe regardedas a pioneerwork n Indian ogic. But ustbecause tis a pioneerwork tcouldnotbefree romnaccuraciesfexplanationnd nterpretationhichcan be avoidedonlywhen the relation etweenndian ogicand modernWesternogic sbetternderstood.ngalls eems ohave beencarriedwaybyhisenthusiasmo use symbolsnd theconcepts f symbolicogic, ndhasfailed onotice he ssential ifferenceetweenhe wo.It isnotpossiblehere opoint ut all theplaceswherengallshas deviated rom heNydyatheory.We candiscuss nly few ypicalrrors.The mostcommonnstance f theerror f interpretingydya n termsofformalogic s to conceive aksa, adhya,nd hetu s minor,major, ndmiddle erms espectively.heheading f SectionI, paragraph is "Termsof the nference;, h, andp." Under hisheadingngallswrites,Threeterms re implicitn all inferencesiven n the fullform ... thesadhya(hereafterbbreviateds'), thatwhich newishes oprove, .e.,themajorterm; he hetu 'h'), thecause, lsocalledthelingaorsign, .e., hemiddleterm; ndthepaksa ('p'), that nwhichwhenh is known oreside, canbe inferredo reside,.e.,the minor erm. n our stock xample, ires s,

smoke s h,mountains p" (p. 35). In footnote8 added to thison thesamepage,however, e says:"Since herelation etween andh is oneof



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COMMENTAND DISCUSSION 157pervasion,h maybe equal to s.... In suchcases, t is only byan extension fthe literalmeanings hatone can speakof 'major,'middle,' nd 'minor'terms. his sone reasonwhy preferokeep he anskritames,s,' h,' p.'"Let us firstxamine hisnote. Ifwe accept his rgument,e cannot sethese ermsven nAristotelianyllogisms,or ven nsyllogismshemajortermneed notalwaysbe wider han he minor erm.Forexample,n thesyllogism,All menare rational nimals; ll laughing nimals remen;therefore,ll laughing nimalsare rational nimals," hemajorterm s"rational nimals" nd theminor erm s "laughing nimals," nd thereis no differencen the denotationf the two terms.The majorterm anbe equal to theminor erm ven ftherelation etween hem s notper-vasion.Thenthe wotermsrerepresentednEuler's iagrams two irclescoinciding ith ach other.Thus the"onereason" f Ingalls s notveryconvincing.Now let us cometoparagraph . The veryheading "Termsofthe n-ference;, h,andp") ismisleading,or nNyaya nferenceheresno termat all in the senseof formalogic. A termnformalogic s defineds "awordor a group f wordswhich s used as the ubject, rthepredicate,rboth, n a logicalproposition." ow, inNyiya nference e are not deal-ingwithwords r sentences,ut with heobjects f therealworld. Andifwe forgethisdifferencend adopttheformalnterpretationfNyiyainferencet creates erious onfusion nd renders he mode of languagenonsensical.While it is perfectlyegitimateo saythat here s fire n thehill, t s nonsensicalosaythat heword fire"s on theword hill."Andthismistake,bvious hought s,hasbeencommittedyalmost ll. Thus,Th. Stcherbatskoirites,Le moyen erme stpresent ans e sujet paksaou 'petit xtreme') u syllogisme. xemple: l ya de la fumee ur a mon-tagne ... ."2 On page 30, Ingalls writes, . .. the hetu (the middle term)does not actually ccur n thepaksa" (footnote 1). But obviouslyhemiddle erm annot e presentnthe ubject, orcanthehetu themiddleterm) ccurnthepaksa.This mode f anguageswholly onsensical. heexplanationfthis sthatwhileNydyasdealingwith he nferentialnowl-edgewhich efersoobjects,ngalls ndStcherbatskoire, nder he nfluenceofformalogic,mistakingtfor heverbal xpressionf nference. odernformalogicdealsonlywith heverbal xpressionfknowledge. he veryfirst entence f Quine'sMathematicalogic3makes thisclear. "Mathe-

2As quoted by B. Faddegon, The Vaifesika-System (Amsterdam: Johannes Muller, 1918), pp. 316-317.SWillard Van Orman Quine, Mathematical Logic (rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1951).



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158 S. BHATTACHARYAmaticalogic t tsmost lementaryeveldealswith tatements,r declarativesentences,nd with heways fcompoundinghem ntofurtherentences."(Italics n theoriginal.)ButNydyaogicdeals with nferentialnowledgeas well as with tsverbal xpression.When an inferences analyzedntos, h,p, etc., t is theknowledge hich s analyzed.Whenan inferencesanalyzednto members"three rfive), t is the verbal xpression hichis studied.The failure odistinguishetween hese wo kinds fstudy asled Ingalls o commitmistakes.See below.)This difficultypart, here s another ifference hichhas passedun-noticed o far. The concept fpredicates not the ame n thetwo ogics.Thus, n thesentenceparvato ahniman"thehill s fiery), fiery"s thepredicate ccording o Western ogic,whereas ccording o Nydyathepredicates not "fiery" ut "fire."As a matter f fact, he concepts fsubject ndpredicaterevery ague n traditionalormalogic, nd thereis no uniform ulebywhich o determinehem n a sentence.4o, whenIngallswrites,In our stock xample ires s, smoke s h,mountains p,"afterquating,h,andp with hemajor,middle,ndminor erms,isposi-tion sdoublyndefensible.irst fall,hemakes he entencemeaningless,and thencommitsnother rror. n the inference,Whatever ossessessmoke ossesses ire; hemountainossessesmoke; herefore,hemountainpossesses ire,"t sdifficulto seehow theword smoke" r theword fire"canbe regardeds a term tall,forneither fthem sthecompleteubjectorpredicatefa proposition.he predicatefthe sentencethemountainpossessesmoke," r its ogicalform themountains thatwhich ossessessmoke" s not "smoke"but"thatwhichpossessesmoke"; o, also, "fire"is not theterm ut "thatwhichpossesses ire."Thus,"smoke" nd "fire"arenotterms, ut areonlyparts fterms,.e.,they renotcategorematicwords,but syncategorematicords, r, rather,ategorematicordsusedsyncategorematically.ut,accordingoNydya, ire,nd not thegroupofwords thatwhichpossesses ire," oreven theword fire,"s thesJidhya.So, also,with smoke."Nextwe come oa more undamentaloint. n SectionI, paragraphIngallswrites:"ModernWesternogicdistinguishesetween scriptsndassertions.An ascriptmerely ssociates predicatewith a subjector arelationwith tsterms,.g., John's eingrich' r John's eing hefatherof William,'whereas n assertionstatementr proposition) sserts hispredicationr relations a fact, .g., Johns rich' r Johns thefatherfWilliam.' Indian ogicfrom hemost ncient imes lso distinguisheshe

4See JohnCook Wilson,Statementnd Inference Oxford: The ClarendonPress,1926), Vol. I,Part 2, chap. 4.



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COMMENT AND DISCUSSION 159two." Now,this s a verymisleadingtatementnd is thesource ferrors.An ascript f Westernogicis neither mental tatenora realfact. InNyaya ogicthecomplex John's eingrich" s not nterpretedn thisway.All knowledge ries o statesomethingeal. If in anycase we cannotdecidewhether complexsreal ornot, hat sduesimplyo our gnoranceor insufficientnowledge. hus,what s known s ascriptnWesternogicis, accordingo Nydya ogic, imply uspendedudgment, doubtwhichcannot e resolvedimply ecause fthe ncompetencef theknower. o,Nydya ogicclassifiesll suchknowledges falseknowledge.Nydya ogicis a logiconlyof categorical ropositions. ypothetical,robable, r dis-junctive ropositionsreall false ropositions,ccordingoNydya,or hereis nothingnreality hich ancorrespondo"if-then,"maybe,"or"either-or." Every alidknowledge,r,rather,very omplete nowledge,alid orinvalid,must ssert omething. non-assertivenowledges thereforecontradictionn terms. ngallssays: "Inferringoroneself onsistsf thethree-stagerocesswe have described, amely, nowledge f pervasion,operative nowledge,nd knowledge f inference. ne mayconceive fthisthree-stagerocess s a non-assertiveyllogism. ustwhat the valueor modeof itsstages s, is hardto say. Theyare notsimply scripts,orinference,ven whenproduced oroneself,s a valid form fknowledge,and valid knowledgeprama) is defined s knowledge orrespondingowhat heworld eallys. They recertainlyot ssertions,or heNaiydyikawould then have no need of recourse o the five-memberedyllogism"(p. 34). Thisdifficultyshisown creation.Aswe havealreadymentioned,Ingallshas failed odistinguishetweenn inferencend itsverbal xpres-sion. He thinks ere hat nferenceor hesakeofothers, hich ontainsfivemembers,s logicallyuperioro the nferenceoroneself. n thishehasmisinterpretedheNydya iew,for, ccordingoNydyaogic, heonlypurpose fthefive-memberedyllogisms toproducenothers hatknowl-edgewhich ne hasacquired or neself.Theknowledge hichsproducedbythisfive-memberedyllogism as exactly hesame ogicalvalueas theknowledgewhichone has gainedforoneself ythe three-memberedyl-logism. he number fthemembersf thetwotypes f syllogismsariesbecause fnon-logicaleasons. n an inferenceor hesakeofothers,nehas to use language n a particular aywhich s differentrom hewayin which ne expressesn inferenceoroneselfwithoutryingoproducethatknowledgen others.The real causeofinferentialnowledgen bothcases s theoperative nowledge.The fivemembers f the nferencerealways hemembersf theverbal xpressionf the inferencend neverof the process f the inferentialnowledge.The process f inferential



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160 S. BHATTACHARYAknowledgen the nferenceorthe sakeof otherss the samethree-stageprocess.So faras the nferentialnowledges concerned,here annot eanyfive-stagerocess.The members f an inferenceoroneself nd thoseofone for he akeofothers o notdiffernkind; ndtheconclusionslsohavethesame ogicalvalue. Ifwe compare he twotypes,hepointwillbecome lear. In an inferenceorthe sakeof others here refivemem-bers,while n an inferenceoroneself here reonlythreemembers,utthere sno rule sto which fthe hreemembers illconstitutehe nferencefor neself. ometimeshefirsthreemembersfthe nferenceor he akeof others re taken, ometimeshe lastthree.But in boththeforms finferenceor neself he ogicalvalue remainshe ame.This s so becausetheextra womembers f the nferenceor hesakeofothers o not addto the ogicalvalueofthe nferencet all. The number nd order f themembers fan inferencenNydya re notdeterminedy any ogicalcon-sideration ut simply n psychologicalrounds.The firstmember f aNyaya yllogismor hesakeof otherss, therefore,ot an ascript,utanincomplete nowledge, hich rom he ogicalpoint f view s really alse;it does notfunctions a premise f thesyllogismt all. It is statedn aninference orthe sake of others, nlyto drawtheir ttentiono a pointwhich s goingto be proved.The reason s purely sychologicalndhasnothing o do with the logicalnature f the inference. ur knowledgeproceedsrom doubtful ental tate,wherewe do notknowwith ertaintywhether complexs real ornot. Thenbyfurthernowledge e cometoa complete nowledge here he tate fdoubt sresolved. n an inferencefor he sakeofothers hefirstmember tates omething hich s possible,but whichhasnotyetbeenproved o be true.So theres furtherffortoprove t. But fthefirst embertatesomethinghichsself-contradictorythenthere s no needfor nyfurtherfforto provethematterwhich sat onceknown o be false. In thecase of inferenceoroneself, ne maystate irstheknowledgefpervasionnd thenmaypassoverto theopera-tiveknowledge,nd then o theconclusion.Or,onemayproceed romprobable onclusionnd thenmayseek out thereason nd thepervasiverelation.Here one is remindedf Mill'scharge gainst heAristotelianyllogism,that t does notrepresenthe actualprocess f inference. is pointwasthat heuniversalremisesnotpresentnconsciousnesshenonea'tuallyinfers.All actual inferencesre, according o him,fromparticular oparticular. ut accordingo Nydya his s a totally alseanalysis f thepsychologicalrocess finference.very rocess finference ust ontaina universalremise. utMillgrantedhat, houghheorder f theproposi-



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COMMENT AND DISCUSSION 161tions n the Aristotelianyllogisms not theactual order ollowedn theprocess f reasoning, etthe form f thesyllogisms necessaryo test tsvalidity. he members f theNydya yllogism, hetherive-memberedrthree-membered,reordered sychologically,or, ccordingoNyiya ogic,notmerelyheorder f themembers,uteventhe form fthesyllogism,hasnothingo do with hevalidityfthe nference. ydya ogicdoesnotbelieve hat particularorm s necessaryo make the nferencealid,orevento test tsvalidity. he validityfthe nference,ccordingoNydya,is determinedhollybythe material riterion,hat s,bythetruth ftheknowledgefpervasion,ndofother nowledgenvolvednthe nference.So, inNydya heresnodistinctionetween ormal nd materialruth,ndthus heformf nferenceasnological mportance.t isdeterminedurelyon psychologicalrounds.This is a fundamentaloint n Indian ogic ngeneral.To saythat ndian ogichas distinguishedetween scriptsndassertionsn the Western ense s, therefore,ottrue.The failure o appreciatehisdifferences thecause offurtheronfusionsandmisconceptions.hus, n footnote3 on page 33, Ingallsquoteswithapproval he nterpretationfFaddegon hat heNydyayllogism'resem-bles moreourhypotheticalhanourcategoricalyllogism.' Nothing anbe fartherrom hetruth.The universal ropositionnNyIya s alwayscategoricalropositionnd can never e equatedwith hypotheticalrop-osition.Hypothetical,isjunctive,roblematicropositionsre all false,accordingo Nydya, nd thedifferenceetween hem nd thecategoricalpropositionss one of kind. A propositionf onekind annever e reducedto a propositionf theotherkind. "All menaremortal"s, accordingoNydya, undamentallyifferentrom hehypotheticalorm If there s aman, henhe ismortal,"r "Ifx be a man, henhe ismortal.''The failureto realizethis has put Ingallson a wrong rack.Thus,he identifiesheabsence ftheconjointwith healternativeenial (p. 64, footnote18).And he wonderswhyDe Morgan's aw is unknownn Nyiya ogic. Thereason s obvious. De Morgan's aw states omething hich s impossibleaccordingo Nydya ogic. A categorical ropositiontating heconjunc-tion of denials can neverbe equivalent o a deniedalternation,oranalternation,ccordingoNydya,s always alse.We arenot ryingo ustifyhere nepositionrtheother; hepoint sthat fweforgethis undamentaldifferenceetween hetwo ogics, nd try o interpretydya n terms fmathematicalogic,we are boundto misstate heNydyaposition om-pletely.From theNydyapointof view,the reductionf all modes oftruth-functiono three rimitives5s as unjustifieds thereductionf them5Quine, op. cit, pp. 42 ff.



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162 S. BHATTACHARYAto oneprimitive." y~ya ogic recognizes egationndconjunctions theonlymodes ftruth-function.he othermodes ecognized ymathematicallogic renotrecognizedyNydya. o,theresnopossibilityf De Morgan'slaw nNyiya.So, lso,with anyatara."We will conclude y pointingutanothermistake.On page 34, Ingallsattributes representativeheoryfknowledgeo Nydya.But this s onefundamentalointon whichNyiya psychologynd epistemologyifferfrom hose fSiirnkhya,oga,Veddnta,ndother chools f ndianphilos-ophy.Accordingo Nydya, here an be no suchentitys an imageormentalpicture.Knowledge efers irectlyo objects nd notthroughhemediationfa tertiumuid.Thesemistakes,hough hey re fundamentalnd vitiate hediscussionof SectionI, yet eave thetranslationf the textsmoreor lessunaffected,and Ingallsmustbe congratulatedn making success f an admittedlyvery ifficultob.

6Ibid., p.45 ff.

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Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian Logic - S. Bhattacharya

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