Cyprus Combined Project

8/9/2019 Cyprus Combined Project

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Reimagining Reunification in Cyprus: Towards a Human-Centered

Approach to Negotiation and Peacebuilding on a Divided Island.

Shane HensingerProfessor Timothy Sisk Civil Wars and International Responses IIJosef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver


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Reimagining Reunification in Cyprus: Towards a Human-Centered Approach to

Negotiation and Peacebuilding on a Divided Island........................................................... 1

Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 4

Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 7

To the Republic of Cyprus ........................................................................................... 7To the Turkish Cypriot Government: .......................................................................... 8To the Government of Turkey: ................................................................................... 9

To the Government of Britain:.................................................................................. 10

To the Government of Greece:................................................................................. 10

To the European Union:............................................................................................ 11

To the United Nations:.............................................................................................. 11

Conflict Dynamics - Introduction ...................................................................................... 12

History............................................................................................................................... 13

British Rule .................................................................................................................... 13

Independence ............................................................................................................... 16Post- Independence ...................................................................................................... 18

The Invasion of Attila................................................................................................. 20

Visual Representation of the Decline of Bicommunal Villages in Cyprus..................... 22

Afterward ...................................................................................................................... 22

Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Strategies ..................................................................... 23

Environment.................................................................................................................. 24

Sports ............................................................................................................................ 26

Womens Issues ............................................................................................................ 27Educational Exchanges.................................................................................................. 28

Negotiation Dynamics - Introduction ............................................................................... 29

Negotiation ....................................................................................................................... 30

Bargaining Framework.................................................................................................. 30

Greek-Cypriot Bargaining Position................................................................................ 32

Turkish-Cypriot Bargaining Position.............................................................................. 33

Turkish, Greek and United States Negotiating Positions.............................................. 34History of the Negotiating Process ................................................................................... 35

The Vienna Talks 1975 - 1977 ....................................................................................... 36

Factors Contributing to Failure of the Vienna Talks and Subsequent Rounds of

Negotiations.................................................................................................................. 37

The Annan Plan ................................................................................................................. 40

The European Union ..................................................................................................... 40Turkish-Cypriots ............................................................................................................ 41

Turkey ........................................................................................................................... 42

Greek-Cypriots .............................................................................................................. 43

The Final Annan Plan (Annan V) ................................................................................... 44

The Defeat of the Annan Plan........................................................................................... 45

The Way Forward.......................................................................................................... 46


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Peacebuilding in Cyprus................................................................................................ 48

Sequencing the Institutions of the Annan Plan ........................................................ 48

Peacekeeping in Perpetuity? Drawing Down UNFICYP ......................................... 49

Peacebuilding on Cyprus - Introduction ................................................................ ........... 51

Horizontal Inequalities in Cyprus ...................................................................................... 52

Text Box 1.................................................................................................................. 53Table 1....................................................................................................................... 55

Table 2....................................................................................................................... 57

Table 3....................................................................................................................... 58

European Court of Human Rights Decision of March 2010.............................................. 58

Analysis of ECHR Decision................................................................................................. 60

Key Finding................................................................................................................ 61Key Finding................................................................................................................ 62

Greek Cypriot Reaction to ECHR Ruling ................................................................. ........... 62

Addressing Vertical Dilemmas on Both Sides of the Island.............................................. 64

Peacebuilding Conclusion ................................................................................................. 67

Report Conclusion............................................................................................................. 71

Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 73

Biblography ....................................................................................................................... 75


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Executive Summary

The Cyprus conflict represents one of the most intractable and protracted conflict

situations in the world today, rivaling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for length and

complexity it remains a seemingly intractable problem for the global community and in

particular for the United Nations and the European Union; the former of which is

charged with maintaining peace on Cyprus and the latter which admitted a divided

Cyprus as a full member in 2004 and now finds itself, somewhat unwillingly, as a party

to a conflict which previously had been viewed as existing on the periphery of Europe

but now, thanks to the growth of the European project, rests at its heart.

The conflict involves not only the two antagonists the ethnic Turk and ethnic Greek

populations on the island but also their protectors in Turkey and Greece respectively,

who, along with Britain, were given roles as guarantors under 1960 Treaty of

Guarantee. In addition the United Nations peacekeeping force on the island, UNFICYP,

has since 1963 has been tasked with keeping peace between the two sides and since

1974 with enforcing a ceasefire between Turkey and the government of the Republic of

Cyprus. As a player trusted by both sides in Cyprus UNFICYP plays a key role within this

report which recommends a reimagining of UNFICYPs role, utilizing the trust it has

built on Cyprus as a key part of building a new path forward to peace.


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Even prior to the Turkish invasion in 1974 which led to the partition of the island, the

two majority communities on Cyprus, ethnic Greek and ethnic Turkish, had led parallel

existences with little social interaction and wide disparities in income and education.

Endless rounds of negotiations between the two parties have led to high level accords

and even, in 2004, an agreed upon peace plan (the Annan plan) but the failure of the

Greek Cypriot side to rally both elite and mass opinion to the side of reunification led to

its defeat and the subsequent entry of Cyprus as a divided island to the European Union.

This in turn resulted in growing embitterment on the part of the north, which felt its

cooperation and acceptance of the plan had led not to greater rewards but to a

mounting sense of stagnation and strangulation as their self-declared state, the Turkish

Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) continued to suffer under an international embargo

and sanctions.

A growing threat exists where both sides will become accustomed and accepting of the

Taiwanization of the north a commonly used term which refers to a quasi-statehood

below the level of official acceptance by the international community. This is not an

ephemeral worry; polling data indicates acceptance of partition is increasingly viewed as

an acceptable alternative by both communities. Distrust between the two sides has

always been a major problem and is at the root of either sides inability to imagine a

new way forward. Key recommendations within this report for mitigating the issue of

trust and separation include utilizing the non-political ties which bind all people

together sports and the environment, to begin the process of building a sense of


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Cypriot community separate from ethnic identity and ameliorating the decades of

mistrust between the two communities.

Partly in response to the lack of progress on reunification as well as the lack of

inducements and rewards on the part of the international community, last month the

Turkish Cypriot side of the island elected a hard-line, nationalist president, Dervis

Eroglu, to replace their previous, pro-settlement leader Mehmet Ali Talat. The

consequences of the election are as yet unknown but the position of Eroglu in talks with

the Republic of Cyprus is well known no compromise on the key issue of the

recognition of the right of Turkish Cypriots to their own state.

Eroglus position, in combination with the stalling of EU-Turkish accession talks by the

Republic of Cyprus, spells trouble for the future of Cyprus as well as Turkeys

relationship with the EU the two of which are mutually and inseparably intertwined.

Turkey is increasingly losing patience with the European Union on both Cyprus and

other issues and believes it may never be offered membership while its client state, the

TRNC, sees no future within a Greek-dominated EU-member Cyprus. The situation on

Cyprus is frozen and requires creative, new approaches to both in order to thaw and

freshen negotiation and peacebuilding dynamics on both halves of the divided island,

with the European Union and the United Nations both playing key roles building off

their respective positions as a long-time guarantor of peace on the divided island and as

the main economic and diplomatic forum within the European theater.


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The recommendations arising from this report seek to utilize the two communities on

both sides of the island in a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding a human-

centered approach which seeks to reimagine the conflict outside of round after round of

negotiations between high-level elites on both sides of the island. This, together with

incentives for the north and reassurances for the south on both the cost and benefits of

reunification, are designed to slowly warm this frozen conflict, as well as to refresh it by

moving around current obstacles to peace and reunification in hopes of building a

strong momentum towards a permanent solution. The mitigation of horizontal

inequalities, which were present on Cyprus long before the Turkish invasion, is designed

to decrease their role in the continuation of the conflict while building increasingly

strong economic ties between the two sides which can only serve to remind both

communities of the benefits of peace and of economic reintegration.

Recommendations

To the Republic of Cyprus:

1. Utilize the desire of many Turkish Cypriots to end to their international isolation

to the advantage of both sides of the island by actively seeking to involve their

civic groups in negotiations and in communicating the position of the Republic of

Cyprus on reunification to the Turkish Cypriot population at-large. The


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government of the Republic of Cyprus claims to represent the entire island as

well as both populations its actions should reflect these aspirations.

2. Implement cross-border initiatives of a non-political nature, such as sports and

educational exchanges. Doing so does not imply recognition of the TRNC as a

separate state. Rather it recognized the needs of Turkish Cypriot citizens as

human beings and encourages them to establish greater ties with the Republic of

Cyprus. It also shows the world that the government remains committed to

reunification and not arbitrary punishment of its citizens in the north.

3. Offer to work with the north in implementing the acquis communautaire in

preparation for the eventual reunification of the two sides of the island. The Republic of

Cyprus would also benefit by beginning this process now so it will not act as an

impediment to reunification or increasing economic ties in the future.

4. End the governments opposition to the Immovable Property Commission (IPC)

recognized in the recent European Court of Human Rights ruling as a just solution to the

issue of outstanding property claims in the north. The government does not have to

endorse the decision but by utilizing the commission it can remove a major source of

tension and sorrow between the two communities and at no cost to itself. Continuing

resistance to the IPC could result in much larger costs to the Republic of Cyprus in the

future. Recognize the value of the IPC and allow citizens to make their own choices in

the matter.

To the Turkish Cypriot Government:


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1. Encourage Turkey to drop its opposition to allowing full movement of Greek

Cypriot ships, aircraft and goods in and out of Turkish ports-of-entry. Doing so

will remove a major irritant between the two parties and encourage the

government of the Republic of Cyprus that the Turkish Cypriot community is not

automatically endorsing the Turkish position on every issue and thus is acting as

good-faith partner in negotiations.

2. Immediately begin a census of all properties in the north to determine rightful

ownership and freeze construction on any disputed property currently until this

issue is resolved. The unresolved status of property ownership in the north is an

enormous drain on the ability of both sides of the island to come to a conclusion

on reunification. If necessary a commission composed of equal numbers of

Turkish and Greek Cypriots with an additional EU or NATO member to break an

impasse could be composed to assist with this process.

3.

Discuss seriously the idea of allowing resettlement of Varosha under joint-

administration with policing powers carried out by the United Nations or another

agreed-upon force.

To the Government of Turkey:

1. Immediately lift the prohibition on ships, aircraft and goods from the Republic of

Cyprus entering Turkish ports-of-entry. This should be done without

preconditions as a sign of Turkish willingness to compromise in key issues.


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2. Being the process of a withdrawal of a small number of Turkish soldiers from the

north. This need be only a token number and is designed, again, to show

movement in Turkeys positions.

3. Prohibit any further settlement of Turkish nationals in the north. This is a major

issue for both the Turkish and Greek populations of the island and is illegal under

international law. The status of those already in Cyprus can be negotiated in a

final agreement but continuing settlement must end, immediately.

To the Government of Britain:

1. British sovereign bases occupy prime portions of Cyprus, areas which could be

partly or entirely returned to Cyprus upon a successful reunification treaty

between the two sides of the island. Reexamine the role of the bases and their

necessity to British national security.

To the Government of Greece:

1. Encourage greater flexibility from the government of the Republic of Cyprus

on negotiating issues involving reunification. The interests of Greece and

Cyprus are not always mutually inclusive and encouraging this falsity has

resulted in a hardening of positions on both sides of the island.


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To the European Union:

1. Work with the Turkish side of Cyprus to begin the lengthy process of

implementing the acquis communautaire while at the same time offering

inducements to Turkey in the form of additional EU trade preferences.

To the United Nations:

1. Transform the role of UNFICYP from one of peacekeeping to one of peacebuilding by

utilizing the force, which has the trust of both sides in Cyprus, into one which works to

bring the two communities together through structured activities and peacebuilding

exercises and trips to each side of the island. Current examples of this approach include

meetings between businesses on both sides of the island. Consider expanding this

approach to additional civic and educational organizations.

2. Create a plan to sequence some of the local institutions of governance envisioned in the

Annan plan to Varosha and the areas near Varosha in order to show both sides that co-

governance has a future in Cyprus. This plan could then be submitted to a vote in the

areas recommended for attempts a joint-governance and resettlement.


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Conflict Dynamics - Introduction

The conflict in Cyprus resulting in the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 and stalemating in

the subsequent partition and frozen dynamics which exist today, represents in many ways the

latest conflict between the Greek and Turkish states or a significant part of the larger Greco-

Turkish issue with a thousand year history (Yelmaz 35). Both the Greek-Turkish war of 1920 and

the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 ensured that both Greece and Turkey have unmixed their

populations to a degree quite remarkable considering the multiethnic nature of each state prior

to these events. Cyprus is the last territory where large numbers of ethnic Cypriot Greeks and

ethnic Cypriot Turks once lived together and where Greece and Turkey still have major roles to

play in resolving (or prolonging) conflict between the two communities. A major, unresolved

irritant in relations between the two states is Cyprus and the problems of that island have

followed a path which closely parallels that of each respective communitys benefactors in

Greece and Turkey.

The dynamics of conflict in Cyprus between the ethnic Turkish community and the ethnic Greek

community have been heavily influenced by the fact that each community is watched over and

guaranteed by an outside power Greece takes a paternal interest in the Greek community

and Turkey does the same with the Turkish community (the title of this project refers to what

Turks refer to as Motherland and Babyland, Motherland being Turkey and Babyland being

Cyprus). This arrangement, guaranteed by the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, has resulted in the

two communities following the same dynamic their ethnic kin in Turkey and Greece have


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followed in relation to one another namely the interpretation of present events through the

mental representation of past traumas, as well as glories (Yelmaz 35).

The challenge then is to wean each community away from this dynamic and encourage the

development of a Cypriot identity separate from reliance on the ethnic or religious identity of

either of the guarantors of Cypruss two major communities. In this report as well as the ones

following it we will make specific recommendations to assist in peacebuilding and peacemaking

measures which we hope will build the confidence of both communities in one another and in

the Cypriot state outside of its current reliance on the guarantor powers of Turkey and

Greece.

History

There is significant disagreement as to relations between the two communities before the

British assumed control of Cyprus in 1878. Greek Cypriot writers tend to mention the 1832

execution of the Cypriot Orthodox archbishop and clergy by the Ottoman Empire for alleged

sympathies with those seeking independence for Greeks (Yelmas 39). But in the period after the

British took control of Cyprus it can generally be agreed that Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot

nationalism and intercommunal distrust intensified in series of steps or rachets. (Kaufmann

209).

British Rule


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The British allowed the communities to set up separate school systems, both of which

imported teachers from the respective mainlands who taught children to see themselves as

Greek or Turkish, not Cypriot. History in each community, from well before the possibility

of Cypriot independence until today, has represented its own people as consistently heroic and

the other as consistently barbaric (Kaufman 209).

This account is supported by Greek Cypriot writer Yiannis Papadakis who writes that in school in

Cyprus he learned the Turks were nomads, people with no civilization, people of the horse and

the sword, descendants of the Mongols, infidels, people of no real religion. People of the Koran,

Muslim fanatics Every important date in our history as Greeks bespoke our encounters with

Turkish barbarism. And I was a product of that history (Papadakis 6-9).

Turkish teachers came to Cyprus bearing the new ideologies of Kemalism from Turkeys new

secular ruler Ataturk. Ataturk had switched the communal, Islamist vision of the former

Ottoman rulers to his new Turkish-based Kemalist ideology, which emphasized nationalism as

the binding force of Turkish identity abandoning allegiance to the caliphate, which Ataturk

abolished in 1924. By identifying with Ataturks vision of Turkish nationalism, the Turks of

Cyprus were also asserting their sense of separate identity from their Greek Cypriot neighbors

(Yelmaz 43).

Language was also a source of separation on the island with few Greek Cypriots speaking Turkish

but approximately 40% of Turkish Cypriots speaking Greek. As the two communities began their

process of self-segregation less and less members of the other community learned their


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neighbors language - meaning contacts between the two became increasingly limited (Fisher

309).

Strengthened by the acquired knowledge that each respective community was in the right and

the other in the wrong both communities began the process of gradual separation from one

another and greater identification with their ethnic/religious kin in the mother/fatherland.

For Greek Cypriots this took the form ofenosis (union) with the Greek state. In 1912 and 1931

there were pro-enosis riots in Cyprus. These were followed by a growing sense of Turkish

Cypriot nationalism which led to demands for taksim (partition) of the island.

After WWII the anti-colonialist wave which swept much of the world also reached Cyprus. In

1955 EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was formed to fight the British for Cypriot

independence. EOKA was also closely identified with the cause of enosis and the Orthodox

church and was exclusively Greek thus encouraging another, exclusively Turkish organization

called TMT (Turkish Defense Organization) to form which further divided the two communities.

Distrust built further because TMT aligned itself with British colonialists and engaged in limited

intercommunal fighting with the Greek Cypriots until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958

(Fisher 310). This trend of separate structures and institutions for each community also

manifested itself in politics as well with no cross-community parties or movements competing

for both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot votes before independence or after (Kaufmann 210).

The period between 1891 and 1931 saw the unmixing of previously ethnically-mixed villages in

Cyprus, from 43% to 36%.


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Independence

Cyprus gained independence in 1960 following the armed struggle for independence waged by

EOKA since 1955. Under the 1960 constitution power was to be shared between a Greek Cypriot

president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president who was given veto power. The 1960 constitution

was remarkably complex and created a power-sharing system which allowed the Turkish Cypriot

population a larger share of seats in the legislature (30%), civil service (30%), army (40%) and

police (30%) than their share of the population at that time, which was estimated to be around

20% of the total of Cyprus (Kaufmann 210). The constitution also incorporated the guarantee

treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain which outlawed enosis and taksim and

allowed Greece, Turkey or Britain to take steps to unilaterally remedy a breach of the treaty.

Finally the constitution separated Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot voters into separate ethnic

rolls which further institutionalized ethnic separation and prevented the development of cross-

community candidates from emerging at all. This meant that Greek Cypriots could only vote for

Greek Cypriot candidates and Turkish Cypriots could only vote for Turkish Cypriot candidates.

Political parties with candidates of different ethnic affiliation could not stand for elections

(Jarstad 28).

This complex document, designed with what the negotiators thought were the best interests of

both communities at heart, instead held the seeds of the destruction of bicommunal existence

on Cyprus. The president of Cyprus at the time, Archbishop Markarios, never supported the

constitution and insisted it wouldnt be binding on Greek Cypriots after independence

(Kaufmann 210). The constitution institutionalized ethno-communalism, because it failed to

take into account the psychological and sociological fact that the power-protection system


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increased suspicions, antagonism and conflict between the communities because of the

discriminations and uncertainties involved. The sectarian and divisive provisions of the 1960

arrangement constituted the seeds that led to its collapse three years later (Michael 26).

The consocialistic model of power sharing as laid out in the 1960 Cypriot constitution was a

failure for the reasons stated above and because it did nothing to encourage consensus

between competing factions within the government (Large & Sisk 100). Of course there existed

no ability in Cyprus to field an integrative approach to governance because there existed no

cross-community political parties, societies or institutions. The Cypriot constitution of 1960

cemented this state of affairs and did nothing to ameliorate it.

The birth of Cyprus as an independent state more closely resembled that of an arranged

marriage neither party wanted with both parties in love with different suitors who hovered at

the edge of the wedding yet refused to say I object when asked. Independence wasnt

wanted by the vast majority of Greek Cypriots, who desired enosis with Greece, nor by the

Turkish Cypriots, who saw independence as a stalking horse for enosis by the Greek Cypriots.

The mood of the new state was bleak, there were no festivals, no ringing of church bells, no

parades, no dancing people in the streets of Cyprus celebrating independence (Yelmaz 55). The

mood of the people of Cyprus was predictive the years ahead wouldnt hold much joy or

celebration for either Greek or Turkish Cypriots.

By independence in 1960 the proportion of ethnically-mixed villages in Cyprus had declined

from 36% in 1931 to 18% (Kaufmann 210).


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Post- Independence

The constitutional arrangement quickly proved unworkable because both identity groups

remained adversarial with each seeking to gain advantages within the new arrangements

(Fisher 310). None of it functioned except one provision that permitted Greece and Turkey to

maintain several hundred troops on the island, who became trainers and commanders of the

nationalist militias in both communities (Kaufman 210). The 1960 constitution froze the

situation and provided an unworkable framework in which to resolve issues of dispute which

neither party was willing to do. Both sides adhered strictly to their ethnic identity and no

mechanisms were put in place to foster even the beginning of a Cypriot identity separate from

ethnicity. Statements from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots contributed to this sense of ethnic

exclusion, with Makarios saying when first elected president in 1959 that For the first time in

centuries, the government of the island passes into Greek hands and Turkish Cypriot leaders

saying they couldnt be tools of Turkey because they werepartof Turkey (Yelmaz 58-59).

In addition the agreement was dependent on stable power relations between the two sides and

the other parties to the agreement (Greece, Turkey and Britain). When one side felt the power

relations had shifted it could simply abandon the agreement or seek to change it unilaterally

as Makarios did later. Power relations can shift because of changing military capacities,

demography or, as in the case of Cyprus, international actors (Jarstad 21).

In 1963 after Makarios unilaterally threatened to change the constitution the two sides

embarked on a hostile and protracted process of separation and segregation (Fisher 310).

Intercommunal violence broke out shortly before Christmas 1963 when British forces left their

sovereign bases and intervened to halt the violence establishing the Green Line which still


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divides Nicosia today (Souter 662). They were followed by the deployment of a United Nations

peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), which remains in Cyprus. In 1964 Turkey threatened to intervene

in Cyprus but after strong warnings from the United States used only air power in support of its

Turkish brethren instead (United States 1).

The outcome of Makarioss rejection of the constitution and the following intercommunal

violence was a large number of internally displaced persons (IDP), mainly Turkish Cypriots, who

coalesced into a series of small fortified enclaves run by the communitys political leaders

(Souter 662). These enclaves occupied less than 3% of Cypruss total land area but held almost

18% of its population. Movement to and from the enclaves was restricted and those inside felt

powerless and fearful of attacks by Greek Cypriots.

It is difficult to overestimate the magnitude of the 1964 crisis for the Turkish Cypriot

community. This was a seminal event for them. The Greek Cypriots failed to comprehend the

significance of the 1964 crisis in the Turkish Cypriot narrative. Their inability to to grasp the

centrality of this chosen trauma only compounded the mistrust factor in any prospective

endeavor toward coexistence and reunification. Cast in bereaved language, the 1964-1974 trial

would underline all future negotiating predispositions for the Turkish Cypriots (Michael 27).

After the events of 1964 the remainder of the 1960s and the early 1970s saw continuing

hostility and increasing segregation between the two communities, punctuated by intermittent

crises sparking Turkish involvement and repeated calls for enosis by nationalist elements in the

Greek-Cypriot community (Fisher 310).


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The events of 1964 represent a chosen trauma by the Turkish Cypriots an event which has

gathered in their historical memory and has become mythologized by the group. Each group

accuses the other of refusing to understand or acknowledge its suffering and then mythologizes

a particular period of suffering, Once a terrible event in a groups history becomes a chosen

trauma, the truth about it does not really matter (Yelmaz 10). One of the biggest problems is

that people tend to forget what the others suffered and remember only their own sufferings.

We went through difficult times in 1963 but Greek Cypriots never mention these. But Greek

Cypriots went through difficult times in 1974. But the Cyprus problem did not start in 1974

(Papadakis 109).

By 1970 the percentage of ethnically-mixed villages in Cyprus had fallen to less than 10% (Fisher

310).

The Invasion of Attila.

Turkeys invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 is the event which led to the partition of the island and

the forced displacement of over 250,000 Greek Cypriots. For Greek Cypriots this event, hailed as

liberation by Turkish Cypriots, was as traumatizing as the 1964 crisis and subsequent exile to

small enclaves was to the Turkish Cypriots.

In response to a coup engineered in Athens by the right-wing junta then in power and led by

Cypriot Nikos Sampson, characterized as an extremely violent man well-known for his hatred

of Turks who once advocated cleansing the island of the stench of Turks, Turkey began a two-

part invasion designed to establish facts on the ground. (Webb & Groom 85, Kaufmann 214).


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The first part of the invasion, on July 20th, was followed by ethnic cleansing of Cypriot Turks from

Greek-held areas almost immediately (Kaufmann 214). On August 14th, following the end of talks

in Geneva between the four guarantor powers designed to seek a settlement to the previous

round of fighting, Turkey attacked again and pushed inwards from the beachheads it had

established, causing greater displacement of people, both Greek Cypriots heading south (away

from the Turkish invasion) and Turkish Cypriots heading north (towards the occupied areas) and

eventually occupying almost 37% of the island (Yilmaz 65). For Greek Cypriots the events of

1974 leading up to the invasion of Turkey, constitute their own chosen trauma in the same

manner the events between 1964 and 1974 mean to the Cypriot Turkish population.

The toll on the people of Cyprus was fierce. 4000 Greek soldiers and Cypriots were killed as well

as 2000 Turkish soldiers. The Turkish army committed rapes and killed women and children

(Kaufmann 215). Over 1500 people today are still considered disappeared by their families.

Almost no Turkish Cypriots remained in the south of Cyprus while less than 10,000 Greek

Cypriots remained in the north many of whom would be later placed under great pressure to

leave. Subsequent agreements allowed a UN-supervised population exchange which further

reduced the mixed communities in each state. Today less than 300 Greek Cypriots remain in the

Turkish-occupied areas of Cyprus, mainly in the remote Karpas Peninsula. Figures on the number

of Turkish Cypriots in the south the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, are

unavailable but it is thought less than 1000 chose to stay behind.

Each side has its own narrative for every significant event which has occurred in the history of

Cyprus. The year 1974 perpetuated the image of the unspeakable Turk as Orthodox


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Hellenisms eternal enemy, out to expel them from their ancestral homeland, in a melancholic

fatalism colored by betrayal, defeat and loss. Conversely 1974 is heralded as a peace

operation and celebrated by Turkish Cypriots as an antidote to Greek Cypriot oppression

(Michael 32). Neither side appears willing to acknowledge the others narrative not acceptbut

acknowledge. The principle of the ego of victimization doesnt allow empathy for ones

compatriots pain when one suffers then the other must suffer in return (Yilmaz 66).

Visual Representation of the Decline of Bicommunal Villages in Cyprus

Afterward

The conflict in Cyprus has been stalemated since 1974. Contrary to the low-level ethnic violence

which occupied the island from between 1955 and 1974 there have been very few incidents

since the Turkish invasion primarily or wholly because the two populations are unmixed now

to the point where very, very few Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots still live in close proximity

to one another.


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Because this project is broken into two parts conflict and escalation analysis followed by

peacemaking analysis at a later date, we will not go any further into the history of the conflict as

the conflict has remained essentially frozen since 1974.

Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Strategies

The conflict in Cyprus is complex and clouded with issues of ethnic nationalism, discrimination

(and fear of discrimination), the use of enemy images to stereotype the other as barbaric and

less than human, the over-involvement of guarantor powers Greece and Turkey in their co-

religionists affairs which has resulted in a stunted and nearly non-existent Cypriot identity and a

decades-long enforced separation which has allowed all of these elements and more to harden

together until each side is almost incapable of moving from its rehearsed role and seeing half-

way to the others position. The adoption of chosen traumas, chosen glories, the egoism of

victimization and hard-held religious and ethnic identities by both sides in the dispute present a

dizzyingly complex problem from which to embark on successful peacemaking and

peacebuilding strategies.

Yet there are areas of agreement which can be approached as cross-border efforts and which do

not require huge sacrifices on either side. These areas can then be used as confidence-building

measures to draw the two sides closer to one another and to work towards building a Cypriot

identity free of reliance on religious or nationalistic shibboleths. Several of the issues (women

and the environment) recommended here for cross-community cooperation are mentioned as


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instrumental in confidence building and in establishing a settlement that can be acceptable to

the larger population in other research, particularly in those dealing with conflict in

Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Aceh (Strand 187).

The European Union (EU) has taken the initiative in some of these areas but unfortunately in the

EU, where the Republic of Cyprus is a full member and the north and Turkey are not, Greek

Cypriots have eagerly used all the levers available to them to pursue what they see as their

national interest and need for justice (ICG 3). If opportunities for building cross-border

cooperation are stymied in the EU then countries should make the decision to pursue these

opportunities unilaterally as Britain and the United States appear to be doing in certain areas

including the ones mentioned below.

Environment

Sports

Womens Issues

Educational Exchanges

Environment

Cyprus occupies a unique spot in the Mediterranean and features a huge number of species,

plant and animal, which arent located elsewhere. In addition Cyprus serves as a nesting location

for numerous rare sea turtles which have actually rebounded in number since the Turkish

invasion due to the low number of tourists known to visit the Turkish-occupied north. As writer


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Alan Weisman wrote when visiting abandoned Varosha, At night, the darkened beachfront,

free of moonlight bathers, crawls with nesting loggerhead and green sea turtles (Weisman 97).

The resurgence of the natural environment into the void left by humans can be a comforting

and uniting factor if managed well. The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), a project

formed between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United

Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Programe

(UNDP) could serve as a framework within which to develop a process for cross-border

cooperation on issues of mutual concern between the two parts of Cyprus today (United

Nations 25).

A main issue sure to arise is that the Republic of Cyprus doesnt want to provide legitimacy to

the Turkish-occupied north, which declared independence in 1983. But the environment is an

issue which doesnt respect artificial boundaries across land, air or sea. Tackling issues of joint

concern between both communities, issues like ensuring sea turtles have clean beaches on

which to nest, the status of Cypruss native donkey population or discussing ways to mitigate

the effects of a dropping water table can be approached as joint-initiatives, if necessary done

outside the framework of government-to-government contacts through NGOs or multilateral

organizations.

The water issue, in particular, has been mentioned as having the potential to function both as a

unifier promoting collaboration between entities at different levels and scales but also an

irritant worsening already bad relations (Strand 191). Using Cypruss dropping water table as


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an opportunity to ensure structure dialogue with groups in the two communities could be

enormously valuable in building ties between the two groups (Strand 192).

Sports

Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus is not an internationally-recognized state so it does not have

the right to participate in sporting events outside of Turkey. Forming joint sports teams between

the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-occupied north could form a valuable source of cross-

border attachment and appreciation. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has a

football team which, because of the TRNCs disputed status, cannot play in international FIFA

tournaments. A team from Cyprus playing together, perhaps under a jointly agreed upon

symbol, would act to bring the two sides together in a way they havent been for decades.

The Olympics are designed to bring the worlds states together in peace and harmony, united

under the Olympic banner and committed to the ancient ideals of sportsmanship. Because the

TRNC isnt a recognized state it has no Olympic committee, any athlete who wanted to

participate would be forced to get a Turkish passport and compete under the flag of Turkey. And

the Republic of Cyprus up to this point has never won a metal in the Olympics winter or

summer. Approaching the Olympic committee in the south to accept and train athletes from the

north, who could perhaps compete under a neutral banner until reunification was achieved (in

the same manner as Taiwan) could serve as a visible and successful example of cooperation

across the divide. If objections were to arise bringing the issue of Greeces adoption of ethnic

Greek minorities from the Pontus (Paraskevi Patoulidou) and Albania (Pyrros Dimas) to compete


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for Greece in the Olympics (each who won a gold metal) could serve as an important reminder

of the role athletes from the TRNC could play in the Olympics on behalf of all Cypriots.

Womens Issues

Reams of data show us that the less participation of women in government and society the

more repressive and warlike a state turns out to be. Disenfranchising half of ones population is

a road to ruin whereas enfranchising women can act as a locus for advancement and prosperity.

Recognizing the valuable role women can play in peacebuilding the United Nations Security

Council passed resolution 1325 in 2000, which called for broader participation for women in

conflict resolution and that involve women in all the implementation mechanisms of the peace

agreements (Strand 188).

Because in conflict societies, the national problem historically dominates downplays social

issues, including womens issues too often the concerns of women and their ideas for resolving

conflict have been downplayed or ignored (Hadjiipavlou 238). Women are enlisted in the

conflict as sacrificing mothers who internalize their ethnic and national duty roles in

safeguarding the nation (Hadjiipavlou 238). As such they are denied their right to be full

participants in the peace process on both sides. In the last 30 years of official negotiations, no

Cypriot women has ever been appointed a member of the negotiating team (Hadjiipavlou 238).

Because Cyprus is seen as a patriarchal culture this is accepted as normal but even within

societies viewed as patriarchal women still have opinions and unique perspectives and their


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absence from the political discourse is neither healthy nor wise for government, society or for

women themselves.

The UNDP has funded (2006 2008) a $30,000,000 project in Cyprus based on mainstreaming

womens participation in peacemaking efforts on the island (UNDP). A report is expected soon

on its results but a greater effort must be made to bind women from the Republic of Cyprus and

the TRNC together in cross-border groups discussing issues of concern to women. As the UNDP

has taken a lead role so far it could continue to do so or delegate additional responsibilities to

gender-based NGOs eager to help build the process of peacebuilding forward (Georgiadu 1).

Educational Exchanges

Because of the international isolation of the TRNC students from the statelet often have to

procure Turkish passports to study abroad and are only allowed to study in Cyprus once they

obtain a Republic of Cyprus passport. Creating an exchange mechanism whereby students of

both the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC could study on each side of the dividing line would be

enormously beneficial in breaking down the negative stereotypes each community holds of the

other. A more immediate impact would be a growing number of citizens of each ethnic group

with the ability to speak the language of the other. It would also lift some of the sense of siege

which the Turkish Cypriot community feels under and encourage greater ties between the two

educational communities.


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The next portion of this report will move on to the negotiation dynamics present in the decades

of face-to-face talks between parties involved in the Cyprus dispute but primarily focusing on

talks between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots overseen by the UN Secretary-

Generals special representative on Cyprus.

Negotiation Dynamics - Introduction

This report will present an analysis of the negotiating strategies of the Greek-Cypriot

and Turkish-Cypriot sides in the Cyprus conflict since the Turkish invasion of 1974. The

focus will be in particular on the negotiation processes involved in the formulation the

Annan plan in 2004 and how both sides bargaining positions have evolved (or devolved)

since negotiations on reunification and a constitutional settlement began after the

Turkish invasion in 1974. This project will be relying heavily on the processes laid out by

Timothy Sisk in Bargaining with Bullets, focusing on the prenegotiation and

negotiation processes between the two sides and the theoretical concept of ripeness

as applied to the Cyprus situation after the invasion of Turkey in 1974 and preceding EU

accession in 2004, while looking to the applicability of the ripeness concept to current

negotiations preceding elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in mid-April

20101.

1Sisks work is strongly applicable in the sense that he outlines a powerful case for Peacemaking with

Power and negotiations leading to the building of effective and durable power-sharing institutions, both of

which resonate strongly in the case of Cyprus. Intertwined in Sisks recommendations is the issue of

bringing peace to warring parties, which is slightly less applicable to Cyprus due to the cessation of

intercommunal violence more than of a century ago. The major issues in Cyprus have morphed from

those centered around security in the traditional sense to those centered around the type of consociational

model and confidence buildings measures (CBMs) necessary to convince both communities to accept a

final agreement.


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The final piece will be analyzing the negotiation process for its applicability and

inducements towards the building of peace in particular looking at the institutions

imagined in the Annan plan. Specific policy recommendations will be offered towards

the goal of peacebuilding in Cyprus based on the models offered by the Annan plan. A

particular focus will be on Sisks idea of sequencing, but from a constitutional

perspective, the various institutions of the Annan plan to different parts of the island,

both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, which were more supportive of the Annan plan

in the referendum of 2004 in an attempt to demonstrate the potential effectiveness and

unity-enhancing role these institutions might play.

Negotiation

Bargaining Framework

The framework within which negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus have been

conducted has been set by UN, in particular by a number of UN Security Council (UNSC)

and General Assembly resolutions. The Secretary-General of the UN has been assigned

by the Security Council as a monitor of the talks under UNSC Resolution 353. UNSC

Resolutions 359, 360, 364, 365 and 367 further established and then strengthened the

Secretary-Generals role and that of the UN in the conflict.


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General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX) in November 1974 officially endorsed the

preliminary intercommunal talks as the main negotiating model for resolving the Cyprus

problem as well as affirming a number of key points (Michael 46).2 As General

Assembly resolutions are declarations without force of international law the UNSC

passed Resolution 367 affirming the General Assembly resolution which established

intercommunal talks as the sole legitimate negotiating process and confirmed the

Secretary-General as convener and facilitator of this process (Michael 47).3

The bargaining framework put in place by the UN guaranteed the primacy of the

organization and the Secretary-General in negotiations and locked-in the role of

intercommunal talks as the sole bargaining framework which would be utilized going

forward. By recognizing the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, mandating

that all refugees be allowed to return to their homes and urging the withdrawal of all

foreign troops from Cyprus the UN also endorsed a number of elements in the Greek-

Cypriot bargaining position, which had the effect of ensuring that the Turkish-Cypriot

side would always be operating from a legitimacy deficit in the eyes of the

2GA Resolution 3212, in part :1. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial

integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions

directed against it; 2. Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military

presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in itsaffairs; 5. . Considers that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties

concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end;

3UNSC Resolution 367: Requests the Secretary General accordingly to undertake a new mission of good

offices and to that end to convene the two parties under new agreed procedures and to place himself

personally at their disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the progress of comprehensive

negotiations, carried out in a reciprocal spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal

auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be facilitated (United Nations).


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international community and would contribute to a perception of the balance of power

between the two sides.

Greek-Cypriot Bargaining Position

The bargaining position of the two parties directly involved in the Cyprus conflict, the

Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides, was each informed by the events of 1974,

when Turkey invaded the island in response to a coup engineered by the junta in

Greece. Following this series of events the Greek-Cypriot government, in conjunction

with Greece, laid out its positions, which came to be known as the Athens doctrine

(Michael 39). The doctrine is as follows:

1. The government of the Republic of Cyprus as the sole, legal government of

Cyprus2. Support for a multiregional, bicommunal federation

3. The area comprising Turkish Cyprus should be equivalent to their share of the

population or in any case not exceed 25% of the population

4. The right of return of all refugees to their homes and property before the Turkish

invasion.

5. The right of property and freedom of movement of the population.

6. The removal of all foreign troops from Cyprus

The issue of international recognition of the government of the Republic of Cyprus is

extremely important from an analytical framework in looking at the balance of power in

the conflict. The Republic of Cyprus recognition by the international community as well

as its membership in multilateral institutions like the United Nations and (eventually)

the European Union has resulted in an asymmetrical balance of power between the two


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sides (Schiff 390). Looking at the issue while applying Timothy Sisks perspective on

fluctuating stalemate illustrates the fact of the Republic of Cypruss international

legitimacy, endorsement of three of its bargaining position and its membership in

international organizations has resulted in a situation where the Republic of Cyprus is

always ascendant against the Turkish-Cypriot side. This has resulted in a polarizing

condition, perpetuating conflict and not leading to avenues for resolution. (Sisk 43).

Turkish-Cypriot Bargaining Position

In sharp contrast to the position of the Greek-Cypriot side the Turkish-Cypriots regarded

the Turkish invasion in 1974 as legal under Turkeys guarantor powers. Their negotiation

conditions reflected this reality and also their belief that the Republic of Cyprus as

established under the 1960 constitution was no longer valid. The position of the Turkish-

Cypriot side was in large part an attempt to lock in their gains since 1974 and consisted

of the following:

1. The maintenance of the ethnic homogeneity of northern Cyprus.

2. The continuation of the Turkish military presence in northern Cyprus and the

role of Turkey as a military guarantor.

3. The support for a bicommunal and biregional state.

4. The rejection of a unified or multiregional state as proposed by the Greek-

Cypriot side.

As mentioned in the sections on the negotiating framework and the Greek-Cypriot

position the Turkish bargaining position was affected by a lack of international

legitimacy. The Turkish Cypriots operated under a strict international embargo which

impacted every area of life in Turkish Cyprus including the ability to travel abroad, to


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participate in international sports competitions, receive international loans and many

other restrictions. None of the Turkish-Cypriot bargaining positions were legitimized by

the international community and it received no international backing other than that of

the Turkish government. During most of the negotiation phrase leading up to the Annan

plan the Turkish-Cypriot side was punished with a number of coercive measures and

offered almost no non-coercive ones, a balance of which is necessary to induce the

parties to accept the settlement plan (Sisk 39).

This isolation would negatively affect the psyche of the Turkish-Cypriot side, causing an

imbalance in the perception of the symmetry of power between the two sides, and

would contribute to a position of defiance on the part of the Turkish-Cypriots which was

indirectly responsible for the declaration of independence of the TRNC in 1983.4

Additionally the Greek Cypriot economic and political embargo, aimed at preventing

recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state, only compounded the ideology of

separateness, which did not bode well for peacebuilding efforts during the negotiation

process (Michael 42).

Turkish, Greek and United States Negotiating Positions

4I am not endorsing the declaration of independence on the part of the TRNC but I am stating that their

isolation and the lack of incentives extended to the Turkish Cypriots caused a hardening of their negotiating

position which led to the independence declaration.


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The Turkish and Greek states, as guarantor powers under the 1960 Constitution of the

Republic of Cyprus, also had a place at the negotiating table where their positions

adhered closely to those of their ethnic kin in Cyprus.

Greece followed the slogan Cyprus Decides and Greece Follows while Turkey adopted

a paternalistic approach towards the Turkish Cypriot state. The Turkish Republic was

heavily involved in the governance and subsidization of the Turkish-Cypriot state from

the point of its invasion in 1974 onward.

The US has been characterized as the most important non-primary player in the

dispute (Michael 65).US strategy in the conflict was primarily concerned with keeping

Cyprus out of the Soviet orbit and maintaining peace between NATO allies Greece and

Turkey. US policy has also been influenced by the role of the politically important Greek-

American political lobby in the United States. The US, since the failure of the Nimetz

proposals in 1978, has tended to play a background role to that of the UNSG.

History of the Negotiating Process

The Cyprus conflict has experienced a lengthy negotiation process composed of

multiparty mediation held under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General

(UNSG). These efforts have included representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot

sides and at times the guarantor powers of Turkey & Greece as well as secondary

powers like the United States. In this section I will focus on the major negotiating efforts


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in Cyprus including the talks mediated by UNSG Kurt Waldheim which resulted in high

level agreements and then focus on the only agreement to have ever been submitted to

both sides in the conflict for ratification the Annan agreement.

The Vienna Talks 1975 - 1977

The Vienna Talks held between the two sides under the auspices of the UNSG and the

bargaining framework laid out by UNSC Resolution 367 comprised several rounds of

negotiations from 1975 1977 and collapsed upon the death of Cypriot President

Markarios, after which new negotiations took place under different monikers.

The Vienna talks were plagued by a lack of convergent interests and expectations on all

sides. One side would come to the table with a proposal on governance and the other

would respond with proposals on territoriality. The UN was hampered by the distrust of

the Turkish-Cypriot side, which was angered at numerous UN resolutions affirming its

opponents negotiating points and thus couldnt act as a powerful peacemaker. The

Greek-Cypriot side had successfully internationalized the issue and knew it was in an

ascendant position vis--vis the Turkish side.

While several High Level agreements were negotiated over the years of negotiation

they all suffered from ambiguity on terms, in particular the use of bicommunal as a

reference point. There was a point of agreement in 1978 on the issue which was seen as

a major concession by the Greek side when it acknowledged that there would be


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separate control by each community of different parts of the island. This concession

could be interpreted as a ripe moment.

A ripe moment, as discussed by Sisk, usually occurs during the process of prenegotiation

and is a high-risk strategy, as the opposing party may seize upon a sign of conciliation

as weakness and, rather than responding with a reciprocal act of conciliation, may

defect or escalate in order to take advantage of the perception of weakness (Sisk 46).

There was no further concession on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot side which was

symbolic of the lack of a convergence of interests between the two sides that plagued

the negotiations during all of their iterations.

Factors Contributing to Failure of the Vienna Talks and Subsequent

Rounds of Negotiations

From an analytical framework on negotiation the following appear as the lead causes of

the failure of the Vienna Talks and the subsequent rounds of negotiations leading to the

Annan plan. These factors are not listed in any particular order.

1. Asymmetrical balance of power between the two sides leading to a fluctuating

stalemate.

2. Lack of credible third-party guarantees.

3. Lack of ripe moment (convergent expectations) leading to meaningful

concessions from both sides.4. Failure to employ peacemaking with power on behalf of the mediator.

The perception of security from each sides perspective was radically different. Each

party also saw its sphere of power differently and resented the power of the other,


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but as time would move on each partys sphere would grow or shrink proportionally

to the other and actions such as UN resolutions buttressing the Greek-Cypriot side

(which was a deliberate and strategically important attempt by the Republic of Cyprus

to internationalize the situation) further added to each sides perception of the

balance of power in the situation (Michael 75). As illustrated in the section on the

Greek-Cypriot bargaining position this situation has resulted in an asymmetrical balance

of power which led to a fluctuating stalemate and deadlock in negotiations.

Throughout the history of the Vienna talks and through subsequent rounds of

negotiations another critical element was missing the lack of third-party guarantees

necessary to assist both sides in bridging the security dilemma which existed between

them. Credible enforcement is a necessary component of a functional peace

agreement and in the case of Cyprus neither party was prepared to accept the

guarantees the UN offered as credible. No additional third-party with the necessary

standing amongst the two sides then stepped forward, leaving this critical element

unfulfilled.

Talks between the two sides were also hampered by the lack of a mediator with

power, as Sisk calls it. The United Nations did not have the ability to offer a package of

non-coercive and coercive inducements to both sides. Because the UN was operating

under specific UNSC resolutions which had recognized a number of the bargaining

positions of the Greek-Cypriots its ability to act as a powerful peacemaker with the


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[ability] to exercise strategic strength in leveraging the parties into peace was limited

by the self-imposed conditions under which it operated (Sisk 156). As talks were

mandated to be conducted under the auspices of the UN, a body which repeatedly

passed resolutions the Turkish-Cypriot side felt were in opposition to their negotiating

position, this created a situation where the Turkish-Cypriot side would increasingly

come to view the UN as a not a partial mediator but one biased in favor of the Greek-

Cypriots. Whether this is true or not is unimportant, for what matters most in the

negotiating process are theperceptions of both sides.

All of the factors discussed in this section are critical to the success of any peacemaking

effort. The appearance of any one of them is troubling; the appearance of four would

make it extremely difficult to achieve meaningful progress in negotiations and are

directly responsible for the failure of the Vienna talks. Because none of them were

successfully ameliorated they have also played a role in the failure of subsequent

negotiations up to the Annan plan.

Fact Point 1

In 1983, in response to a UNGA assembly which demanded the withdrawal of all Turkish troopsfrom the island, the return of refugees to their homes and which called on all states to assist thegovernment of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise its full and effective control over the entire

territory of Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriots declared the independence of the Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus (TRNC). No country other than Turkey recognized the TRNC and today Turkeyremains the only country to have done so.


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The Annan Plan

The Annan Plan as submitted to the voters of Cyprus in April of 2004 was a product of

prenegotiation and negotiation from 2002 2004, but its creation through negotiation

was a product of the convergence of a number of different interests of primary and on-

primary actors to the Cyprus situation. The plan can be considered the product of a

ripe moment which was catalyzed by the decision of UNSG Kofi Annan to approach

negotiations from a different perspective and attempt to ameliorate the factors

discussed earlier which had led to the failure of other negotiation rounds in the past.

Specifically Annan would attempt a four-pronged linkage approach to the new round of

negotiations (Michael 169).

1. Annan intended to utilize the membership applications of both Cyprus and

Turkey [to the EU] as a catalyst for settlement/membership.

2. Enlist the active support of the main external parties to the issue the UnitedStates and Britain.

3.

Lock in the support of the motherlands Greece and Turkey.4. Use these pathways to alter the entrenched positions of the two communities.

Another significant factor in the negotiations was the ability of the UNSG to unilaterally

impose conditions in any of the areas of the eventual agreement in the event of the two

sides to find a path forward. This was unique in that it prevented either party from

acting as the role of spoiler.

The European Union

The European Union (EU) began membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus

in 1990. This fact was viewed negatively by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership led by


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longtime President Rauf Denktash, because it once again reinforced their perception of

asymmetry in balance of power and the always ascendant status of the Greek-Cypriot

side in international legitimacy.

The decision of the European Union in 2002 to drop conditionally as a requirement for

Cypriot membership allowed the Republic of Cyprus to feel free of significant

constraints and act upon its own interests in the negotiations (Schiff 406). The EU

created a sense of crisis of impending sanctions that were directed at a single party

Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots while Greek Cypriots were under strictly verbal

pressure that was unaccompanied by any explicit theme (Schiff 406). The EU lacked any

meaningful ability to act as a peacemaker with power and was largely relegated to the

sidelines of the negotiations

Turkish-Cypriots

The position of the Turkish-Cypriots had changed from the earlier rounds of

negotiations (Vienna) due to a convergence of a number of factors within and outside

the TRNC.

1.

Change in internal political dynamics/Mass & elite support for peace - RaufDenktashs political position was threatened due to rising economic and political

discord within the TRNC. The decades of international isolation imposed on the

TRNC had led to a decline in living standards amongst the Turkish-Cypriotpopulation caused inflation and a high emigration rate and there was growing

resentment to the influx of settlers from Anatolia and the continuing meddling in

the affairs of the TRNC by the Turkish state (see table below).


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2. The win-set of the TRNC changed between the rounds of negotiations after the

Turkish invasion to the beginning of the negotiations on the Annan plan because

the prospect of imminent EU citizenship seemed to represent a better prospect

for their future than continuing on with the existing state of affairs (Schiff 396).

3. Support of Elites - Parliamentary elections in Dec, 2003 brought to power in the

TRNC the opposition bloc, led by Mehmet Ali Talat. The new governmentdeclared it would work to achieve a unification agreement, which would

ultimately be decided in a referendum (Schiff 397).

4. Changing attitude of external ally/actor (Turkey) the guarantors, protectors

and subsidizers of the TRNC, had changed with the advent of the AKP

government (discussed below)

The Turkish-Cypriot side appeared motivated by the fact an agreement held greater

benefits than they would achieve by abrogating negotiations and returning to the

status quo (Sisk 55).

Per capita income in the north and south of Cyprus, 2004 (US$1,000s) 2

Nominal World Bank Atlas PPP Corrected

North 8.1 7.2 14.8

South 19.4 17.6 22.3

Ratio (north/south

as a percentage)

42 41 66

Source: World Bank (2006)

Turkey

Turkeys desire to see a settlement achieved in Cyprus was motivated by its own desires

to join the European Union and by the fact that the new AKP government, elected in

November 2002, saw its own political fortunes as linked to European Union

membership, which it knew was highly unlikely in the event a divided Cyprus was

admitted to the EU with Turkish troops considered as occupiers in the north.


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During negotiation over the Annan plan through all of its iterations, Turkeys Prime

Minister Erdogan made it quite clear he would not be tolerating a rejectionist policy on

the part of Denktash (Asmussen 7). Denktash was now boxed in were he to choose to

defy Turkey he would have to resign in which case Mehmet Ali Talat would take over as

President.

Greek-Cypriots

Contrasting starkly to the changes in the position of the TRNC and Turkey the Greek-

Cypriot side felt its position was assured by its guaranteed admission to the European

Union regardless of whether a unification agreement was reached or not. Despite

knowing its membership was a fait accompli the Greek-Cypriot side came under

considerable pressure from the US, UN, the EU and Greece to reach a settlement

before May 1st (Schiff 399).

There also did not exist within the Republic of Cyprus the same groundswell of either

mass or grassroots support for negotiations and settlement which existed in the TRNC

which can be attributed to the fact that the populace of the Republic of Cyprus had seen

itself as ascendant for a number of years and their assured admission to the European

Union was the ultimate guarantee of that ascendancy. The Greek-Cypriot side felt it

could not be worse off than in the case of an agreement which failed to protect its

interests (Schiff 401).


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The bargaining position of the Greek-Cypriot side was not motivated by the same

combination of external and internal factors that have been shown to be present in the

TRNC and Turkey. There existed no convergence of interests within the Republic of

Cyprus on negotiation and for settlement.

The Final Annan Plan (Annan V)

The Final Annan plan was a complex and lengthy document with five appendices and

nine annexes covering matters ranging from federal government, constitutional law and

federal laws, property rights, reconciliation commissions and the coming into being of

a new state of affairs. For the sake of expediency the focus here will be on the

constitutional arrangements of the document under the envisioned United Cyprus

Republic (UCR).

The Annan plan was a model of consociational power sharing. It allowed a minority veto

on matters of importance to the group, defined proportionality as the basis for

governance and allowed for substantial group autonomy (Sisk 57). It defined structures

and institutions which would allow for the sequenced return of refugees, guaranteeing

that for 19 years the ethnic balance of power in the different sections of Cyprus would

not be impacted. It ensured adequate compensation for those who lost land and/or

housing and also ensured that the process would not result in expulsions of either side

from dwellings they occupied currently (Annan Plan for Cyprus).


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The Defeat of the Annan Plan

There was no implementation of the Annan plan because it was defeated in a

referendum in April 2004. It was approved by a majority of 64.9% on the Turkish Cypriot

side but was defeated resoundingly on the Greek Cypriot side by a majority of 75.8%.

The plan suffered from a number of defects in the eyes of both sides but was supported

on the Turkish side by a majority of the political establishment and by the consensus of

Turkish Cypriots that the plan represented the best deal they were going to get.

The Greek Cypriot side had a different perspective and different realities. A majority of

the political establishment (the elites) of the Republic of Cyprus, led by Papadopulous,

urged a No vote. This judgment was based on the perception amongst the Greek

Cypriot population that they had already given up enough (they had, after all, lost over

1/3 of their island to Turkish military occupation for almost 20 years at the time of the

vote) and that the agreement in no way represented their ascendant position as a

member of the European Union. This attitude can be encapsulated by Papdopoulos

statement that he did not receive a State to deliver a Community (Michael 180).

A ripe moment requires a convergence of expectations by all sides to be successful

(Sisk 46). The entry of Cyprus to the EU, the change in the political scene of the TRNC

and outside pressure were all seen as a prime motivating factor for all sides which


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would induce the ripe moment necessary to bring the conflict to a conclusion. Sadly

this did not take into account the fact that for the Greek Cypriot side there did not exist

that convergence of expectations. There was certainly a convergence of expectation

of every other side from Turkey, from the EU, from the Turkish Cypriots, Greece, the

UN and the United States. But the Greek Cypriot side, due to its advantaged bargaining

position and guaranteed entry to the EU, never had that moment of convergence critical

to creating an inducement to settlement.

In addition the guarantee by the European Union of accession regardless of whether

peace was reached on the island or not robbed the EU of the ability to induce a

mutually-hurting stalemate. When the European Union dropped conditionality as a

condition for Cypriot accession it should have undertaken the process of socializing the

Cypriot political elite to realize the post-nation character of the Union (Kaymak and

Vural 88). In this the EU failed entirely, with most of its initial focus on convincing the

Turkish-Cypriot side to pass the plan.

Fact Point 2

Primary reasons for failure of Annan plan in Referendum

Lack of elite supportwhich translated into lack of mass support within theRepublic of Cyprus.

Lack of convergence of interests within the Republic of Cyprus.

Failure to use cooperate-reward, defect-punishmentapproach on the part of theUN or EU in reference to the Republic of Cyprus.

The Way Forward


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Peacemaking efforts continue in Cyprus today and are motivated by the fact that a pro-

compromise Greek President, Demetris Christofias, was elected in 2008. With the

ascendance of Mehmet Ali Talat to the presidency of the TRNC in 2005 there could be a

convergence of expectations on both sides that was lacking during the negotiation

process leading up to the defeat of the Annan plan in 2004. In particular the issue of a

lack of support from the elite and masses in The Republic of Cyprus may be impacted by

the fact that the head of their state is in support of peacemaking efforts.

Without an agreement soon, before new presidential election in the TRNC in April 2010,

the prospects for peace look grim in Cyprus. The political situation in the TRNC doesnt

look positive for the re-election of pro-Annan agreement president Talat. There exists

today a dangerous situation on Cyprus where both sides have become increasingly

accepting of partition what can be referred to as the Taiwanization of Cyprus.

Especially alarming is the fact that it is the youngest segments of both communities

that would vote no in the largest numbers in any referendum on the UN-mediated

settlement plan: (ICG 7). The failure of the global community to live up to its promises in

regards to the TRNC the promise of aid and additional recognition if they passed the

Annan plan, has been blocked in many cases by the intransigence of the Republic of

Cyprus. This has led to a lessening of support from within both the elites and larger

public in the TRNC and jeopardized the future passage of any peace plan in the north of

the island.


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Peacebuilding in Cyprus

Sequencing the Institutions of the Annan Plan

In the wake of the failure of the Annan plan there exists a chance to work towards

peacebuilding efforts in the hopes of creating institutions spanning both sides of the

island. The Annan plan was far more heavily supported in the enclaved Famagusta area

of the Republic of Cyprus than in any other district (see map above). This seems to be

because individuals in this district would have been strongly and directly affected by

the Annan Plan, given that within three months they would have regained the capital

city of their district, and the whole region would have been upgraded economically,

socially and culturally (Lordos 24).

Greek-CypriotFamagusta

Varosha


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Negotiators could look to the results of the 2004 referendum on a district by district

basis and seek to apply a set of the institutions on a local level in the Famagusta district

as well as an equally-populated, adjacent portion of the TRNC which had supported the

agreement as well. This experiment could act as a test tube to implement, under strict

observation by both parties, certain portions of the agreement, such as a jointly-elected

district/city government and the return of Varosha, or part of Varosha to the control of

those who fled the area in 1974, which could then operate under joint-administration as

a condition of its return. These CBMs could demonstrate (hopefully) the effectiveness

and relevance to daily life of the Annan plan and contribute to acceptance of the plan on

both sides.

The residents of the Famagusta district saw tangible benefits from the passage of the

Annan plan and accordingly they supported it in larger numbers than anywhere else.

This same situation applied in the TRNC as well. The key then is to convince the rest of

the elites and the masses of the Greek Cypriot side of the tangible benefits from a new

peace agreement. Only by doing so will any new agreement receive approval on both

sides of the divided island.

Peacekeeping in Perpetuity? Drawing Down UNFICYP

The United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus has been in place since 1964 and

tasked with the maintenance of its current functions since 1974. It currently consists of

1,052 personnel of which 941 are peacekeeping troops. It is routinely reauthorized


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every six months by the UNSC and currently is budgeted for $54.41 million on a yearly

basis of that amount 1/3 is paid by Cyprus and $6 million by Greece (UNFICYP).

There exists on Cyprus today a situation which no longer requires a UN peacekeeping

force at the level UNFICYP maintains. The presence of the troops is no longer required

to maintain peace but are acting to enforce the situation of partition on the island which

risks becoming permanent the longer the Greek-Cypriot public feels it is not in its

interest to approve a solution to the Cyprus problem. The force can be reduced in a

gradual manner in order to not upset the security situation but which may act as a

catalyst in inducing a ripe moment in negotiations.


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Peacebuilding on Cyprus - Introduction

The case of the Cyprus conflict differs radically from many other conflicts which are analyzed

using post-conflict analysis because, unlike conflicts in states such as Sri Lanka and El Salvador,

the conflict in Cyprus is a frozen conflict which has devolved into a situation where two

populations, Greek and Turkish Cypriot, live in separate states one recognized internationally,

the other a pariah state with no international recognition other than that of its patron Turkey.

The two states are almost completely mono-ethnic and their existence represent the end result

of the use of population exchanges as a method of halting, if not ending, conflict based on

religion or ethnicity.

When analyzing the Cyprus conflicts peacebuilding phase we are therefore left with a situation

which defies the neat analysis applied to other conflicts. Today a situation like the one is Cyprus

exists nowhere in the world (excepting perhaps Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The Cyprus conflict

is not an active, on-going conflict involving hostilities, it is not a conflict ended by the military

victory of one side or

Cyprus Combined Project

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Transcript of Cyprus Combined Project