Current Developments & Challenges in Tsunami Warning Systems: Sri Lanka Rohan Samarajiva...
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Transcript of Current Developments & Challenges in Tsunami Warning Systems: Sri Lanka Rohan Samarajiva...
Current Developments & Challenges in Tsunami Warning Systems: Sri Lanka
Rohan Samarajiva
Agenda
How did warnings actually work in Sri Lanka? 26th December 2004 27th February 2005 28th March 2005
Current situation Legal and institutional framework and its
weaknesses The way forward: Public-private
partnerships
December 26th, 2004
Seismic information on 9.3 earthquake (0059 hrs UMT) known in Colombo (0110 UMT), more or less at same time as Hawai’i
Navy and Police knew of abnormal situation in East Coast after 0300 hrs but did not issue warning
Journalists got first information around 0300 and carried stories at 0334 and 0341 hrs
~40,000 lives lost from 0230 to 0600 hrs UMT, without one minute of official warning
February 27th, 2005 (2 months later)
PTWC unable to communicate to Government designated warning center using fax and email
March 27th, 2005 (3 months later) Great Nias Earthquake occured at 1610 UMT
(2210 LK time) PTWC issued tsunami bulletin at 1626 hrs UMT I received an SMS at 1658 hrs UMT and
confirmed quake using Internet BBC carried story around 1715 hrs UMT Sarvodaya district centers (and some
government officials) informed before government media carried warning & before congestion hit the networks
March 27th, 2005
Sri Lanka TV and radio channels carried warning & 2 km evacuation order at around 1730 hrs UMT Only 10 minutes before the 90 mts it took for
the first wave to hit East Coast on 26th December 2004
Media knew as early as 1700 hrs UMT but did not broadcast lacking authorization from government
No all clear announced after warning/ evacuation ordered
Policy discourse snapshot 29th March 2005: Select Committee
Sri Lankan legislators called for a single body to issue warnings on potential natural disasters
“We could not find any authority who was willing to say it was safe for people to go back, that is why we need a centralised system from where authoritative information can be obtained.”—head of broadcasting organization
A high-ranking official for media policy said the government will seek a public service clause in licenses issued to broadcasters, requiring uniform disaster alerts
Current situation: Institutional Disaster Management Act became law in
May 2005 Disaster Management Center established in
July 2005 under President Previous NDMC continues to exist under
Ministry of Social Services Ministry of Disaster Management created in
November 2005 Road Map published in December 2005
Current situation: warning
Weather-related: Department of Meteorology (Tsunami Early Warning Center)
Seismological: Geological Survey & Mines Bureau (24 hr monitoring of earthquake waveforms)
Ocean waves: National Aquatic Resources Authority
Media have trouble confirming stories; getting direction from government (July 2005)
Road Map on warning
Multi-hazard early warning center to be established by DMC within 1-2 years at cost of USD 0.28 m Multi-hazard EW Division of the DMC to be located at
premises of Meteorological Department Dissemination of alerts and warnings via
Existing government channels TV, newspapers (?), radio Police wireless network Military communication networks Explore options of using networks of Sri Lanka Red
Cross Society & other NGOs to “multiply” reach of conventional channels
Adopted model
National Early Warning System: Sri Lanka(statutory body)
Met. Dept
Geog. Survey & Mines Bureau
Int’l warning systems Etc...
EmergencyServices
Armedforces
DistrictAuthorities
Etc…Media
Detection and assessment of hazard
Issue warning
Telecom Operators
Hazard detection agencies
Private sector, Civil Society
Partnership
Weaknesses
Efficacy of DMC and its EW Division rests on quality of leadership No insulation from “ocean of bad
governance”; no lessons learned from experience with regulatory agencies/authorities
No independence for Director General No assured funding
Apparent total reliance of external funds
Weaknesses
Apparent over-reliance of seconded government officials, making likely a low-performance organization
Over-dependence on government & neglect of private sector
Lacuna re media and telecom E.g., former government-owned incumbent included
in DMC coordination chart, but not largest telco Communication of warnings ill understood
Over-reliance on government entities, non-reliance on the effective organizations
Lacuna on last-mile warning
Warning, a public good that has to be supplied despite government failure . . . Bangladesh: Warning supplied
through public-private partnerships “The cyclone of 1970 took the lives of
300,000 people but the cyclone of the same intensity of 1991 killed 138,000 people, and the cyclones of 1997 and 1998 resulted in only 127 and 6-7 deaths respectively”
More information
www.lirneasia.net Google relevant terms with Sri Lanka
included Samarajiva, R. (2005) Mobilizing
information and communications technologies for effective disaster warning: Lessons from the 2004 tsunami, New Media and Society (7(6); 731-47. http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/7/6/731. Prepublication version: http://www.lirneasia.net/2005/07/icts-and-early-warning/