corporate foresight in europe

Technology Analysis & Strategic ManagementVol. 20, No. 3, May 2008, 321–336

Corporate foresight in Europe: from trendbased logics to open foresight

Cornelia Daheim∗ and Gereon Uerz

Z_punkt GmbH The Foresight Company

The paper analyses the role of corporate foresight (CF) as a future intelligence gathering process,which has come into widespread use in a business context where it is confronted with specificcontextual, processual and methodological challenges. The results of a 2005/2006 survey onCF by the University of St Gallen in co-operation with Z_punkt are used as a starting pointto provide insights into the goals, methods and use of CF in large corporations. Taking intoaccount the challenges facing CF and the factors considered critical for its success, the paperoutlines a historical contextualisation of CF practices from the 1980s onward, identifying theunderlying assumptions – the ‘dominant logic’ – and opting for a new model of CF as ‘openforesight’.

Keywords: corporate foresight waves; open foresight; trend research; contextual logic;strategic foresight

For corporations, concern with the future is once again fashionable: Deutsche Telekom in thesecond half of the 1990s came up with the simple, but striking slogan ‘Zukunft wird aus Ideengemacht’ (‘The future is made out of ideas’) with the aim of bringing together the future–ideas–telecom triangle. Siemens in-house magazine Pictures of the Future highlights its claim to be aleader in shaping tomorrow, focusing on infrastructure, automotive technology and traffic man-agement, security technology or health and medical technology. Another recent example of alarge company seeking to be identified as an innovative and positive force shaping the future isThyssen-Krupp, which claims ‘We’re developing the future for you’. The world’s largest chemicalcompany BASF has not only re-branded itself at the level of corporate design, but is also aiming toestablish a firm link between the company’s chemico-technical competence and its commitmentto ‘Shaping the Future’.

The use of the future as a catchphrase and the shaping and building of the future as a positivecomplement to a company’s image or brand is just one side of the coin. Another element is thewidespread use of foresight in and for businesses or corporate foresight. Futures studies, foresight,and, especially, corporate foresight (CF), are increasingly used for providing valuable input to the

∗Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 0953-7325 print/ISSN 1465-3990 online© 2008 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/09537320802000047http://www.informaworld.com

322 C. Daheim and G. Uerz

area of strategic planning, research, technology development and innovation but also for corporatecommunications and corporate identity/branding. Foresight in and for businesses has gainedimportance as a decision-making tool in strategic planning as research and development (R&D)has become ever more complex and the competitiveness in the highly dynamic global knowledgeeconomy has increased (Bezold 2006). CF is regarded by a growing number of corporations asthe tool of choice for preparing business for the future, whether in terms of producing a long-termstrategic vision, ideas for product innovations or a scenario for communication purposes. Themotives identified by Becker (2003) wherein most CF activities are grounded are still valid: CFis, on the one hand, the consequence of a company’s business operation that inherently requires along-term orientation – in industries with long product cycles, such as the chemical and automotiveindustry – and, on the other hand, a proactive step for coping with uncertainties in the businessenvironment. In recent years, CF has gained popularity as a tool for mainly strategy and innovationpurposes, for connecting or identifying the company (as a brand) with the future and paintingthe picture of a future-proof and ‘futurising’ company, a force shaping the future, and not justreacting to trends.

1. Recent developments in European corporate foresight

One of the main difficulties in evaluating the state of the art in CF is that its results, the methodsused and its impacts are restricted by confidentiality, as they are used for achieving competitiveadvantage. Coming up with a convincing innovation is one thing, letting others know about itand how foresight contributed is another. Therefore, CF takes place largely behind closed doors.Nevertheless, three new studies by Müller (2006), Van der Duin (2006) and Schwarz (2006) shedlight on the actual performance of foresight for and in business.

The new quantitative study1 by Adrian Müller (University of St. Gallen) that is presentedhere was realised in co-operation with Z_punkt and provides insights into the current practice inEurope of strategic foresight in companies or CF. The survey’s design, aims and main findingsare summed up in the following section and are linked to the two previous studies on CF carriedout by Becker (2003) with a geographical focus on Europe and Z_punkt (Burmeister et al. 2002)with a geographical focus on Germany.2

1.1. Survey sample and respondents’ foresight experience

For his study on CF in Europe, Müller (2006) contacted 152 large European companies of which44 responded (28.9%). There were three criteria for inclusion in the survey: the company had to (1)be large with an annual turnover of at least ¤150 million; (2) have its headquarters in Europe and(3) have a corporate strategic foresight process.3 Businesses from nine different countries and 13different industries (see Figure 1) took part in the survey with half the companies having an annualturnover of more than ¤10 billion. The majority (37.5%) of the participating companies had a totalworkforce of between 50,001 and 100,000; 72.5% of respondents were from German-speakingcountries.

The overwhelming majority of participants had many years’ experience with foresight (seeFigure 2), with half of all participating companies having run their own foresight process for upto 10 years (median: 10 years), about a quarter for up to 3 years, and 8% (three companies) formore than 30 years.

Corporate Foresight in Europe 323

Figure 1. Distribution of participants per line(s) of business.

Figure 2. Experience with corporate foresight (in years).


Figure 3. Organisational implementation of foresight.

1.2. Diverse organisational forms

The three types of organisational forms in CF identified by Becker (2003), namely (1) the collectingpost; (2) the observatory and (3) the think-tank, were not used as classification criteria by Müller(2006), but his findings suggest that the trend towards establishing specialised foresight units aswell as networked observatories or highly visible and renowned think-tanks within large com-panies has continued. The results of the survey indicate that in more than half of the companiesforesight processes are run by specialised departments, calledTrend Research’, ‘Global Foresight’,‘Market Intelligence’ or ‘Issue Management’, and that responsibility for the process only seldomrests with individual employees with a specific foresight or futurist portfolio (see Figure 3). Withthe exception of one company, all participants in the survey rely on external consultants and/orservices, but 60% only do so occasionally or seldom.

Looking at these results and recent developments in CF in Europe in general, it seems appro-priate to add a fourth type of organisational form in CF to the original Becker typology:4

namely the outsourcer (see Figure 4). This type of CF ‘unit’ identifies and defines the subjectarea and goals of a foresight process from its expert perspective within the company, but oftenallows the process itself or large parts of the research involved to be conducted by an externalorganisation/consultancy/think-tank before ‘re-integrating’ and utilising the results in strategicplanning or other business fields within the company. The process inside the company is oftenled by a project team selected in relation to the specific tasks and issues to be addressed by theforesight process, and even though the ‘unit’ as such is rather small, it has a high visibility withinthe company and outside it. The unit will have a high level of expertise in CF, but the majority ofthe day-to-day work, such as trend scanning, is simply outsourced.

1.3. Understanding the objectives of corporate foresight

Foresight is primarily used to achieve ‘hard’ objectives;5 namely supporting strategic decision-making in general, as indicated by the survey response – 87.5% of participants. The improvementof long-term planning (77.5%), enabling an early warning system as a tool for issue management(65%), improvement of the innovation process (57.5%) and improvement of the speed in reactingto environmental change are ranked as key objectives of CF. These findings mirror the two internaldrivers of foresight identified by Becker (2003), namely long-range monitoring and planning as


Figure 4. Corporate foresight – four types of organisational forms.

an inevitable prerequisite to strategic RTDI (research, technology, development and innovation)decisions in industries characterised by long product cycles and high development costs, andfirms pursuing an innovation leader strategy, which have to constantly monitor and react to theinnovation activities of their competitors.

This leaning towards ‘harder objectives’ is mirrored in a more functional approach to under-standing CF. Instrumentally, foresight processes are regarded as an environmental informationgathering process (72.5%), as a reflection and knowledge generating process (57.5%) and asa vision-building and direction-setting process (60%). A rather surprising result of the survey,which is elaborated on, further below, is the fact that only 10% of all companies strongly agreethat foresight is a participative communication process. The ‘outside-in’ perspective, focusing onenvironmental analysis and information gathering (see Figure 5), predominates, confirming thesame result from the Z_punkt (Burmeister et al. 2002) survey for German companies.

1.4. Overview of popular activities and methods

Trend analysis ranks highest amongst the methods used in CF with 26 of 40 companies reportingregular use of this method, without specifying how the trend analysis is conducted, e.g. whatsources are regarded as valuable for analysis. However, 80% of participating companies areworking with internal trend databases. Media/publication analysis is the second most regularlyemployed method (26 out of 40) followed by scenarios (19 out of 40), roadmapping (12) andparticipatory/creative methods (11). Whereas the Delphi method is in widespread use in publicforesight, it is less important in CF, with 25 firms reporting they have never or only seldomly usedthis tool, as compared to 10 companies reporting regular or sporadic use (see Figure 6). This ismainly in line with previous surveys and publications while what may be considered surprisingis the fact that, in comparison creative and participatory methods are, rather seldom used.


Figure 5. Activities within the foresight process.

1.5. Engagement of top management and resources

In 72.5% of all companies, foresight is promoted by top management, with 75% of companiesconsidering foresight as an executive responsibility and top management in 60% of all companiesregularly participating in foresight. Top management involvement in CF can be regarded as oneof the crucial success factors of CF, as experience shows that the continuity and impact of CFare much higher when a foresight process involves top management. This also increases thechances for firmly grounding an internal foresight unit within the company. Moreover, any processwithin a large corporation involving top management has a higher visibility and is regarded ashighly relevant. In addition, one may say that top management involvement also leads to theCF process being more closely tied to current or pressing issues the company is facing, thereby

Figure 6. Application of foresight methods.


guaranteeing its relevance. Furthermore, an involvement of high-level decision-makers makeseasier the implementation of results and recommendations.

Twenty-two of the 40 companies provided details of their foresight budgets with 20% having anannual budget of more than ¤1 million and 5% of more than ¤5 million. Altogether 26 companiesgave their insights on the changes in the foresight budgets experienced over the period 2000–2005with 37.5% reporting an increase, 22.5% no budget changes and only two companies indicatinga decrease in their annual foresight budgets.

1.6. Implications and challenges for corporate foresight

In Müller’s survey, 70% of the participants argue that the relevance of foresight within theircompany increased over the past 5 years and 60% believe that the relevance of foresight for thebusiness community in general has increased. As the data gathered by Müller overall suggests,foresight is well on its way to becoming an acknowledged approach in widespread use withinlarge companies.

Looking at this data, it also becomes clear that in spite of obvious dominant tendencies (such asan instrumental understanding of CF, increasing relevance of CF, rising budgets, the dominant useof trend analysis and scenarios, etc.), the field is rather heterogeneous. CF operates with a varietyof approaches, organisational forms and tools as well as diverging aims and different kinds ofoutputs. However, it is also obvious that the problems that occur and need to be resolved in any CFactivity are similar in most cases. This includes the tension between pressure for quickly achievingoutputs and a demand for methodological rigour, a lack of clarity about which types of tools areappropriate in relation to the aims of the exercise, as well as new needs for communicating resultsand linking them firmly to today’s decision-making. In addition, although 70% of respondentsstated that foresight has become more relevant (see Figure 7a), only 55% indicate that it hasbecome more appreciated in their company, and only 37.5% that it has become more appreciatedin general (see Figure 7b).

In Müller’s survey, participants reported the following arguments as most often used againstForesight or participation in Foresight processes: too long-term oriented, high costs, inapplicableresults, and lack of time. Only two participants reported Foresight to be beyond controversy.

The key challenges affecting CF were identified as follows (see Figure 8):

• Organisational and political barriers• Insufficient legitimation• (Perceived) High Costs.

This outcome highlights the fact that although CF is becoming more and more widespread, inmany places it is still far from being firmly embedded and here it is important to take into accountthe sample used (most companies having an established foresight process, etc.). One reason forpersisting problems with CF is the lack of clarity in its objectives and performance. Just threequarters of participants (30 companies) have explicit targets for their Foresight processes,6 butsome do not even have explicit objectives or implicit success indicators (15%, six companies).Only 37.5% of the participating companies control the implementation of the Foresight processeither formally or informally. In addition, only about one third of the companies (36.8%) overhauland improve their Foresight process regularly, while 79% do so only occasionally.7

Therefore, the need emerges for setting clear objectives, connecting foresight more closelyto decision-makers’ needs and for continuously reviewing, adapting and improving the process.


Figure 7. (a) Relevance of foresight in companies; (b) Appreciation of foresight in companies.

However, a closer analysis of the survey data indicates a number of contradictions. Only 10%regard CF as a participative communication process (in terms of how CF is understood or concep-tualised), while participation is ranked third among the critical success factors. The key criticalsuccess factors all point in the same direction (see Figure 9):

(1) Quality of results(2) Strategic relevance(3) Participation(4) Communication(5) Culture(6) Commitment

It is clear that apart from the obvious need for high quality results and strategic relevance,all other factors indicated as critical for effective decision-support can be grouped together as


Figure 8. Relevant problems of foresight in the own company.

Figure 9. Critical success factors of effective decision support.

‘soft factors’. There is a tendency to focus on the ‘harder factors’ when discussing the ‘quality’of foresight projects, for example the methods and the quality of the data and information, areregarded as being of secondary importance. To put it very simply: what is critical for the successand impact of any CF activity is that outcomes are highly relevant to today’s strategic questionsand of high quality, that there is a high degree of participation and involvement, an adequateand inspiring communication within and about the process and its results, as well as a ‘foresightculture’ and commitment to the process.8

As with any survey, the results answer many questions and simultaneously pose new ones.In the following section, we would like to concentrate on the two key questions that the surveyresults pose: ‘How does one ensure that the critical success factors are met?’ What could be thenext phase of CF?


2. Towards open foresight: linking trend research and strategic knowledge throughcontextual logic

The clear leaning towards soft factors in what are being regarded as critical success factors ofCF contradicts the more instrumental understanding or conceptualisation of CF. In the followingsection, the case is made that this kind of contradiction is typical of any CF process as it toucheson the key question of how foresight is being framed. In order to illustrate this point, a modelof four waves of CF is presented with each wave representing a ‘dominant logic’ of how CF isunderstood.

Figure 10. Corporate foresight waves and their key characteristics.

Table 1. Corporate foresight waves and their key characteristics.

Dominant Expert-based Model-based Trend-based Context-basedCF-paradigm foresight foresight foresight ‘open’ foresight

Assumption: Known by means Calculated by Projected by means Shaped by meansFuture can be . . . of expertise means of models of (scanned) of interaction

developmentsKey characteristics Belief in Experts Quantitative and Trends Integrating ‘soft’ and

dominant, but: ‘subjective’ models ‘hard’ approaches1970s: Turn to the Extrapolation Weak signals Understanding &qualitative and interpreting/wider environment evaluating change

Systems Early warning Opening up:Participation,interaction & process

First opening Dominated by Mix of qualitative Action- andtowards ‘soft ‘hard science’ and quantitative innovation-orientedsciences’

Indicators More attention ondiscontinuities

Perspective Exploring change Calculating change Reacting to change Understanding &anticipating/shapingchange

Output Delphis, roadmaps, Models & matrixes Trend-databases, Scenarios; wild cards;scenarios monitoring systems action plans &

innovation ideas


This dominant logic is not exclusive, rather, it is typical that in any foresight process during itsimplementation, different understandings of foresight emerge and need to be integrated. There-fore, the wave model is also meant to distinguish between different ‘poles’ of conceptualisingand implementing foresight which are often simultaneously present within an organisation orinstitution (and any foresight process), sometimes even clashing and causing friction within theforesight process. The four (rather roughly sketched) types of dominant thinking/logic shouldhelp to clarify how CF has evolved, showing that different kinds of dominant logic have influ-enced the way foresight is conducted, and that each dominant logic comes with certain pitfalls.The model also encompasses what is seen as emerging in ‘the next phase’, namely Open Foresightas a new concept and approach for addressing the above-mentioned challenges and ensuring thatthe critical success factors are met.

In studying the development of CF from the mid 1970s on, three distinct (although overlapping)phases or waves can be identified, all grounded in (hidden) assumptions, expressing the dominantlogic of futures studies/foresight and the broader socio-cultural context of the respective phase.

Wave 1: The key assumption of expert-based foresight and the dominant logic of this phase is thatthe future can be foreseen by collecting and comparing the opinions of (numerous) experts. Akey pitfall here is the delegation of responsibility for the contents and outcomes of the foresightexercise to experts, which can lead to the company losing track of interdependencies betweendifferent developments and ignoring inter-disciplinary questions and issues as well as decisionsthat need to be taken.

Wave 2: Model-based foresight is characterised by the assumption that the future can be calculatedthrough the use of appropriate computer models based on huge amounts of data and mathematicalfinesse. As with expert-based foresight, the pitfall lies in delegating responsibility for generatingforesight knowledge to a certain group of people and losing sight of foresight’s impacts on today’sdecisions on strategy and innovation.

Wave 3: Currently, the assumption that businesses can understand the future by anticipating theimpact of trends on customers and markets seems to be the dominant logic, hereby termed trend-based foresight. Focusing on trends in CF has the advantage of resulting in a high level ofcommunication of results, but poses the threat of focusing efforts on how best to scan and monitortrends and, most importantly, of limiting CF to a reactive perspective whereby a company isprojected as merely being ‘driven’ by trends or its environment in general.

One of the central questions relates to whether CF is conceptualised merely as a coping strat-egy, i.e. catching up with the latest trends and dealing with them, or as a proactive approach toshape the future. What unites these first three waves is a reactive perspective, rooted in the oftenhidden, implicit, but influential belief that the future can somehow be grasped, and that this isthe key to a foresight activity. As a result, the bulk of time and efforts is spent on calculations,methodology discussion, analysis and data collection. However, the history of futures studies,the numerous examples of predictions gone wrong as well as the state of the art of any futures-related theoretical concepts make it clear that the future, very simply, cannot be grasped. Thekey to foresight is making sense of often contradictory information, drawing conclusions on theirimpact, dealing with diverging opinions, subjectivity and uncertainty, depicting future options,and, most importantly: deciding on actions to take. Therefore, any dominant logic that centres onthe belief that the future can be grasped endangers the success of foresight as it tends to focus theprocess on rather technological, detail-oriented, data-centred questions, while the key strategic


or direction-setting questions are ‘suppressed’, pushed into the background or delayed. Whilerecalling the fact that Müller’s survey highlighted the fact that the success and impact of CF doesnot rely on methodology or data, it is clear that the ability to deal with recurring dominant logicsand keeping the process focused on the key questions is of highest importance to the future of CF.

From this perspective, the fact that the top-ranked foresight activity in Müller’s survey istrend analysis (with creative and participatory methods being used only half as much) is ratherdisturbing, together with the instrumental understanding of CF. At the same time, the criticalsuccess factors named by participants point in another direction towards a new conceptualisationof foresight in a more open sense.

Wave 4: Open Foresight – the next phase which is emerging, can also be regarded as an answer tomany of the current challenges of CF, being based on the assumption that businesses can shapefuture contexts and markets by anticipating through an open dialogue the dynamic interactionbetween social, technological and economic forces.

‘Open’foresight pays tribute to the increased socio-cultural and socio-technical dynamic result-ing from the emergence of the networked society, where almost everything is interconnected andthe separation of spheres of life, like technology, economics, politics and culture, has come to anend. The spheres or systems which were once ‘closed’ have now become ‘open’, in the sense thatthe number of autonomous zones has decreased, as Van der Duin (2006) has noted. This needsto be taken into account in any successful CF project – the opening up in terms of (content andthematic) perspective, but also in terms of interaction within the process.

The term relates to the concept of ‘open innovation’, pioneered by Von Hippel (1988) anddescribed by Chesbrough (2003), which created a stir in the business world. Open innovationcalls for the integration/participation of (lead) users into the innovation process for developingproducts and services that better meet the actual needs of customers, thereby reducing the costof failed innovation efforts, but the concept of ‘open’ foresight should offer something more thanjust the current hype. This emerging type of CF is apparently characterised by transparency, amethodological hybrid, context orientation and participation. Though it needs to be based onmethodological and topical expertise (and include of course methodologies associated with theprevious phases, actually integrating them, but avoiding to let methodological discussions takecentre stage), its focus lies mainly in the communication and discussion process wherein decisionsrelated to future strategy and innovation need to be taken. If carefully implemented, open foresightshould be able to provide outcomes that fit the companies’needs. Although open foresight is set todiffuse and blend into decision-making and not just prepare the way, it still needs to adopt a daringapproach and come up with creative (disruptions) irritations which are often more important for thefuture development of a company than just confirming and underpinning established knowledgethrough futures trends.

The term ‘open’ foresight refers to at least four criteria of openness. Open foresight shouldinvolve relevant stakeholders from inside and outside the client’s organisation; it should be‘environmentally’ open, by not prematurely narrowing its (thematic) perspective to just onesector/environment and it should be organised/institutionalised as an open process that doesnot end when the hard objective of one specific project has been achieved. Last but not least,open foresight within a business context should be open to disruptive trends or open the respec-tive organisation to disruptive factors, as it becomes increasingly important for CF not to delivertrends and empirical evidence which confirm habits and beliefs, business models or products –‘confirmative knowledge’ – but to ask the right questions. These disruptions or challenges of thecurrently dominant beliefs, assumptions and mindsets could act as constructive perturbations –


‘perturbative or disruptive knowledge’ – forcing the ‘system’ to evolve to the next level/stage.Therefore CF should do more than just meet a company’s need: It should identify the phenomena,options and developments on the fringes of the company’s perception or outside its perceptivehorizon, i.e. the blind spots within the company’s environmental and horizon scanning activitiesand analysis regarding the future. It should then feed the gathered information and insight backto the respective organisation thereby providing insights enabling the company to work on ideasand tools to meet a wide range of possible future needs, relating to its own organisational formand business environment, including its future customers.

Furthermore, Open Foresight will need to be able to deal effectively with ‘old’ dominant think-ing that re-emerges and to keep the process firmly focussed on its aim of taking decisions on futureactions. The dominant logic is one of the factors which most blocks change and influences per-ceptions within any company, especially at a time when corporate identities have grown strongerto strengthen internal company cohesion and present a powerful, fully integrated ‘unit’ image tothe market and stakeholders. Opening up perspectives to a new logic of a disruptive, intangibletype whilst instilling in a positive way an open future approach, and focusing foresight efforts onhow to shape the future will constitute the main challenge for Open Foresight.

Postulating the emergence of and need for ‘Open Foresight’, thereby emphasising the driveto think beyond trends, does not underplay the necessity of empirical trend research nor theimportance of trend-related information for corporate strategy building. It should be emphasisedthat empirical trend research and trend extrapolation in CF have always been somewhat differentto what was understood by trend gurus in the 1990s. Empirical trend analysis in CF does notprimarily or necessarily focus on the ‘novum’, i.e. spotting a new phenomenon or technologyas early as possible, although emerging phenomena – e.g. emerging issues or emerging tech-nologies and weak signal monitoring – are important in environmental and horizon scanningactivities.

However, trend-based thinking has reached its limits. On the one hand in the majority of casesnon-operationalised trend information provided to corporations often leads to ‘trend stand-alones’,e.g. trend reports, with very limited connection to core strategic processes. The complaint ‘weknow about the trends, but we don’t know what this means for our business’ aptly summarisesthe resulting discontent stemming from the missing bridge between empirical trend informationand business strategy.

On the other hand, trends have not only become overstretched owing to trend overdoses andtrend hypes in the 1990s, but trend information is increasingly becoming a commodity. If basedon empirical evidence and monitored over a certain period of time – thereby ensuring that atrend is a trend, and not just erratic ‘noise’ – there are only a limited number of trends to beobserved, monitored and described. As most major corporations and institutions either scan therelevant environment (the backdrop of globalisation requires that the relevant environment nowencompasses the whole globe) themselves or outsource their trend-research. As a result the listof relevant, empirical trends and mega-trends is very likely to look the same in all multinationalcorporations.

Therefore in order for corporations to gain added value from trend analysis, it is no longersufficient to come up with a list of trends, but to link the sphere of strategy and strategic planningeffectively with the sphere of trends and trend research. Neef and Glockner (2006) in their modelof CF (see Figure 11) distinguish between four central parameters, grouped as poles within thetwo spheres of strategy/strategic thought and trend/trend-thought. The trend sphere stretchesbetween the ‘customer’ and ‘environment’ poles, whereas the strategic sphere spans between the‘corporation’ and ‘market’ poles.


Figure 11. Combining trend thinking and strategy work.

What differentiates the four parameters is their degree of entrepreneurial influence and the timehorizon within which an assessment of future developments is reasonable and possible.

Taking a closer look at the sphere of strategic thinking, it is obvious that corporations, notwith-standing their desire to determine or foresee the future actions of their corporate environment, canonly very indirectly or collaterally affect the greater socio-cultural and economic environment inwhich they are operating which is pre-determined and path-dependent. On the other hand, futuredevelopments in this environment are relatively easy to anticipate (and ‘predict’) even within along time horizon, e.g. on the level of mega-trends, demographic development or urbanisation. Incontrast, changes in customer behaviour and preferences can be assessed as an input for strategicplanning only in the short- or medium-term as indicated by trends in fast-moving consumer goods.Depending on the power of a given corporation, markets can to a certain degree be influenced, butdue to increased market dynamics, market developments can only be assessed within a medium-term horizon. There seems to be a missing link between the much-practised trend scanning andits results for strategic thinking which is governed by pressing present-day questions, a shortertime horizon and the need to operationalise knowledge and insights. A contextual logic approachwithin Corporate Foresight, understood as Open Foresight, is what we see as that missing link.

Corporate Foresight/Open Foresight is capable of opening up the market perspective to thedynamics of the business environment through its concept of ‘contextual logic’. By not focusinginnovation solely on products but also analysing the actual (real world/everyday life) context ofthe application of products (or services), a contextual logic framework provides the possibilityto assess the real potential for innovation, arising from the interaction of corporations and theircustomers. Contextual logic thus does not isolate the corporation- customer poles but takes a closerlook at the interconnectivity of the two poles, thereby redefining the producer-consumer interfaces.With reference to the consumer goods market, this simply means that products, technologies andservices are considered as a result parts of the actual ‘Lebenswelt’ (living sphere) of the customer,a part of everyday life, generating new options, and complicating or easing everyday life. The


corporation (and its products and services) in this perspective is a partner and co-producer of thecustomer’s ‘Lebenswelt’.

A well-defined trend concept, made operational in robust trend-research and trend-monitoringremains an essential method within a contextually oriented Corporate Foresight approach, ascontexts do change as well. Trend research within this framework looks beyond the obvious:detecting patterns and deep structures behind (the drivers of) change, an indispensable input forstrategic planning.

In helping decision makers to shape the future by better anticipating future changes, openforesight’s contextual logic-oriented approach replaces the ‘trend – impact – reaction’ chain with‘trend – context – strategy’. In this emerging practice,9 creative processes directly open up andflow into a reflection on markets, strategic options and new business models, leading to operationalaction.

Notes

1. The quoted data from Müller (2006) stems from an unpublished paper. See also http://www.strategicforesight.ch.2. The Z_punkt (Burmeister et al. 2002) study included data from 26 German corporations, while Becker interviewed

18 European companies.3. Finally included were 40 companies, as four failed at least one criterion for inclusion.4. This addition is not a result of the study by Müller, but an addition by Z_punkt. It is based on our practical experience

in the field, and on discussions with Corporate Foresight experts and colleagues in Europe. For more information onthis question, please refer to Heinzelbecker (2006).

5. By ‘hard’ objectives Müller is referring to those objectives which are explicitly and functionally related to specificstrategic tasks and processes.

6. The majority of these companies (16 out of 30) work with qualitative and quantitative objectives.7. Of these companies, 63.6% overhaul and improve their process annually, one company each does its process review

monthly and every four years, respectively, while – still surprising enough – only one company admits to ‘never’overhauling its foresight process.

8. Although this is not elaborated on in detail here, it is important to stress the parallels between public (national,regional, state or political body financed) and corporate foresight with respect to critical success factors. While thecharacteristics or aims, the organisational structure and the degree of inclusiveness or participation tend to differ inpublic foresight processes, the bottom line on success factors is the same. If a project or unit does not produce resultsthat can be operationalised and are helpful for decision-making, it risks losing support, credibility and justification.The IPTS FOR-LEARN project (see 2006 Seville FTA conference paper by Olivier da Costa and Philine Warnke,or the project’s website http://forlearn.jrc.es/) provides an analysis of how the impact of public foresight can bestrengthened.

9. Corporations considered as avant-garde in the emerging practice of context-driven Open Foresight include GermanBASF AG on the one hand, with its stress on closely linking foresight to strategic decision-making as effectivelyas possible, and, Philips, on the other, with its approach focussing on linking customer and context perspec-tives to innovation and growth opportunities (see http://www.design.philips.com/about/design/newvaluebyonedesign/section-13991/index.html).

References

Becker, P. 2003. Corporate foresight in Europe: a first overview. European Commission Community Research WorkingPaper, Luxembourg.

Bezold, C. 2006. Corporate foresight in the US. Presentation at the WFS Conference, Creating Global Strategies forHumanity’s Future, Ontario Canada, 28–30 July 2006. http://www.wfs.org/bezold06b.ppt (last accessed 2007).

Burmeister, K., A. Neef, B. Albert and H. Glockner. 2002. Zukunftsforschung und Unternehmen. Praxis, Methoden,Perspektiven. Essen: Z_punkt The Foresight Company [available in German only; a summary of the main results inEnglish can be downloaded from: http://www.z-punkt.de]


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