Contemporary Warfare

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CONTEMPORARY WARFARE IN THE

NEW GUINEA HIGHLANDS1

Aaron PodolefskyWest Virginia University

After decades of pacification and relative peace, intergroup warfare re-emergedin the Papua New Guinea highlands during the late 1960s and early 1970s, only afew years before national independence in 1975. Death and destruction, martiallaw, and delay in highlands development schemes have been the outcome.Most explanations of this resurgence posit either new causes (such as psycho?logical insecurity surrounding political independence from Australian rule ordisappointment at the slow speed of development) or attribute the increasedfighting to relaxation of government controls which suppressed fighting since thepacification process began. None of the explanations thus far advanced havelooked at changes in the structure or infrastructure of highlands societiesthemselves which could account for behavioral changes in the management ofconflict.

This paper employs a cultural materialist strategy. From a macrosociologicalperspective, infrastructural changes unintentionally induced during the colonialera resulted in changes in the structural relations between groups reducingexisting (albeit weak) indigenous mechanisms constraining conflict. Traditionally,groups maintained differential access to resources such as stone used for axes andsalt. Axe heads and salt were produced in local areas and traded for valuablesavailable elsewhere. I argue that the introduction and distribution of items such assalt and steel axes reduced the necessity for trade thereby altering the need for(function of) intertribal marriage as well as reducing extratribal contacts of a typewhich facilitated marriage between persons of different tribes. The reduction ofintertribal marriage, over time, resulted in a decay of the web of affinal and non-agnatic kin ties which had provided linkages between otherwise autonomoustribal political units. Thus, the resurgence of tribal fighting is, in part, a result ofthe reduction of constraints which might otherwise have facilitated the contain?ment of conflict rather than its expansion into warfare. This view sees warfare asone possible end result of a process of conflict management (Moore 1972).An advantage of this strategy is that it suggests a testable hypothesis which runscounter to conventional wisdom and informed opinion, namely, that the rate ofintertribal marriage would increase after pacification. In his discussion ofmarriage among the Maring, Rappaport (1969:121) reports that there areunmistakable indications that pacification, completed in 1958, will extend themarriage relations of Maring local groups. Speaking of young Simbu men,Whiteman (1973:35) states that with pacification they are able to wander furtherafield than in the past, and may develop various relationships with single teenagegirls over a wide area. Pacification, then, might reasonably be expected to resultin an increase in intertribal marriage. An increase or lack of change in the rate of

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74 Ethnologyintergroup marriage since contact would invalidate the model. The hypothesiswill be tested on data collected in the Gumine District, Simbu (formerly Chimbu)Province, Papua New Guinea.While it would be more direct to employ the rate of intergroup warfare as thedependent variable, varying*over time or geographic locale, both synchronic(cross-sectional) and diachronic (longitudinal) approaches are problematic. Nodata are available, past or present, which account for the vagaries of differentialreporting rates or media effects. Indeed, a 1973 committee investigating tribalfighting (Paney et al. 1973:2) notes changes in publicity and media attention givento fighting. Moreover, The Committee found it difficult to obtain reliable andcomprehensive statistics on the incidence of violence in the Highlands. Somegovernment officers have become unwilling to report at length on tribal fights,claiming that such reports elicit no action and are consequently a waste of time(Paney et al. 1973.3)2. A cross-sectional, or synchronic, study would need toexamine a sample sufficiently large as to account for the social forces involved inthe expansion or containment of a dispute, as well as the random occurrence ofprecipitating incidents.

BackgroundWarfare in traditional highlands societies has been regarded as chronic,

incessant, or endemic, and is said to have been accepted as a part of social living inmost areas (Berndt 1964:183). Glasse (1965:29), for example, states that untilthe 1950s warfare was the dominant orientation of Huli society. And Langness(1964:144) asserts that the pattern of warfare in at least major portions of thehighlands was one of the most continuous and violent on record.

However, hostilities were neither random nor did highlanders live in aperpetual state of conflict with all surrounding groups. As Brown (1982^4)notes, some neighboring groups maintained relations of permanent hostility andhad little to do with one another. In contrast, most neighboring tribes intermar-ried and attended one another's ceremonies.

Pacification was an early goal of the colonial administration. Speaking of theChimbu Province, Brown (i982a:534~535) reports that by the end ofthe 1930sfighting was rare in the vicinity of government stations. By 1940 Australianauthority was accepted and attacks on strangers and tribal fighting had nearlyended, although the entire highlands was not pacified until the 1960s.This period also witnessed the introduction of western goods such as salt andthe steel axe.

Change came quickly to New Guinea as exemplified in the words of Sterling(1943) m the ninth volume of the Smithsonian Institution War BackgroundStudies. Sterling writes: Headhunters and cannibals a generation ago, most ofthe natives of British New Guinea have now become so accustomed to the waysof the whites that they have been trained as workers and even to assist inadministering the white man's law.From the end of World War II through the 1970s educational and businessopportunities expanded, local government and village courts were introduced andnational self-government was attained in 1975. Highlanders came to expect thatdevelopment would lead to material gains.3Tribal warfare began to re-emerge as a significant national problem in about1970, five years before independence. By 1973 the government had becomeconcerned that the situation might deteriorate to a point that they could no longereffectively administer parts of the highlands (Paney et al. 1973:1). In 1972,according to a government report (Paney et al. 1973:38), 28 incidents involving50 or more persons were reported in the Western Highlands District. A decadelater Wormsley (1982) reports 60 fights per year in the Enga Province (the figuresare of course not directly comparable). Although the level of fighting declined in


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CONTEMPORARY WARFARE IN NEW GUINEA HIGHLANDS 75Enga during 1980 due to the declaration of a state of emergency, it increasedagain in 1981 and 1982. Martial law has also been declared in the SimbuProvince. Deaths lead to payback killing and to demands for compensationpayments. Inflated demands for excess compensation further compound theproblem (see Scaglion 1981).Koch (1974) has outlined five major theories of warfare: (1) biologicalevolution, (2) psychological theories, (3) cultural evolution, (4) ecological adapta?tion, and (5) social-structural analysis. Scholars concerned with the re-emergenceof fighting in New Guinea have been particularly cognizant of problems broughtabout by development.

Although there appears to be little doubt that present-day fighting has itshistoric roots in the traditional behavior patterns of highlands people, none havespecifically drawn upon biological evolution, cultural evolution, or ecologicaladaptation to explain the recent re-emergence of tribal warfare. Sillitoe (1981:70)goes the farthest in arguing that contemporary warfare comes from theHighlanders' recent past and not from contact with the technologically advancedoutside world.

Some researchers favor explanations which combine the traditional culturalheritage of violence with issues in development. Strathern (1981) notes strainsand pressures ranging from the introduction of local government councils tovehicle transport. Elsewhere (1974), he argues that new allegiances and bound?aries increase the scale of political alignments without the concurrent develop?ment ofa mechanism for ameliorating the conflict. Gordon (1983:205) seems toargue that the problem lies in the Enga's perception that the government,especially the courts, has become weaker and that this has led to the breakdownin law and order. He notes, however, that the police force in Enga has increasedfrom 72 in 1970 to 300 in 1981, and that the average sentence for riotousbehavior has grown from 3 months in 1970 to 9.6 months in 1978-9 with noapparent deterrent effect. Kiaps (field officers), Gordon suggests, have in fact lostpower for several reasons. Most interesting from the perspective of the presentanalysis involves the kiaps loss of control over access to goods. He (1983:209)states that The importance that the Enga attach to trade-goods should not beunderestimated. An old Engan is quoted as saying The first Kiaps gave beads,salt, steel axes?everyone wanted it so they all followed the Kiap and stoppedfighting. We stopped fighting because we did not want to lose the source of thesethings. I would add that once they followed the kiaps for these goods, previousimportant trade relations no longer needed to be kept up. Gordon alsoacknowledges problems created by intergroup suspicion, (1980:7), generationalconflict exacerbated by education (1980:9), and decline in men's houses and clanmeetings (1980:11). Similarly, Brown (1982a) believes that pacification was atemporary effect in which fighting was suppressed. The Simbu do not see thegovernment as holding power.

Explanations also combine development problems with psychologically orient-ed theories. Kerpi (1976) argues that contemporary violence is a protest risingout of psychological strain created by the drastic social change of an imposedeconomic and political system. Standish (1973) describes the period leading upto independence as one of stress, tension, and insecurity. He argues that thefighting is an expression of primordial attachments in the face of politicalinsecurity surrounding national independence from Australian colonial rule.Brown (1982a, 1982b) suggests that during the colonial period expectations forthe future included security, wealth, and the improvement of life. Disappoint-ment that these goals have not been realized is expressed in disorder (Brown1982b: 19-20). Brown suggests that what is needed is a political movement ratherthan the imposition of western institutions and suppression of fighting.The present paper cannot and does not formally refute any of these explana-


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76 Ethnologytions. Indeed, some make a great deal of sense and fill in part of a very complexpicture. However, it is difficult to evaluate the validity of these explanations sincevery little data are presented. For example, Standish (1973) presents no evidenceto assess whether, in fact, the level of stress has changed over time (precontact,postcontact, or independence era), or whether stress is associated with fighting oreven with differential levels of awareness about independence; the latter likelyexpressing itself geographically around centers of population and development.

Ethnographic Background?The Mul CommunityMul lies approximately 3 miles east of the Gumine District Headquarters and

32 miles south of Kundiawa, the capital of the Simbu province. The Guminepatrol post was established in 1954. During the early 1960s a dirt road wasconstructed linking Gumine to the capital and within a few years the road wasextended through Mul. Lying at an elevation of about 5,500 feet, Mul is thecentral portion ofa larger tribal territory which extends steeply from the southernedge of the Marigl Gorge to elevations of 8 to 9,000 feet.The area is densley populated. Land is either cultivated or fallow in grass orscrub regrowth. Individually owned trees are scattered and there are a yearlyincreasing number of coffee trees. The estimate made by Howlett et al. (1976:96)of 295 persons per square mile on cultivatable land appears to be accurate. Thisdensity is relatively high compared with other highland groups (see Brown andPodolefsky 1976).The people of Mul are Chimbus. Social relations and cultural patterns follow inmost important respects those extensively documented by Paula Brown innumerous publications. I will describe here only those dimensions of organizationmost directly relevant to the resurgence of tribal fighting.

Employing a kinship idiom, Mul residents conceptualize their social groupingsas agnatic and having the segmentary nesting characteristics of a patrilinealmechanical model. Hierarchical segments link themselves as father/son, whileparallel segments are seen as brothers. Individuals, however, are less concernedwith this overall construct and tend to interact in terms of group composition andalignments. The structural distance between conflicting parties expresses itself inboth decisions and behaviors. The likelihood of an individual conflict escalatinginto warfare is directly related to this structural distance.The largest political group to unite in warfare is the tribe, a group of severalthousand individuals. Although the Kobulaku tribe is linked to other tribes in thevicinity through an origin myth, little co-operation is evidenced. The Kobulakutribe is segmented into five clans averaging 800 persons each. Clan members seethemselves as a solidary group. Generally, individually owned plots of land tendto cluster and people can point out rough boundaries between adjacent clans.Plots of land belonging to members of a particular subclan tend to cluster withinthe clan area. At time during disputes members of the same subclan may employthe one-blood idiom although they are not, strictly speaking, members of thesame one-blood group. This serves to emphasize the importance of a threatenedsocial relationship. The subclan section (or one-blood group>) is the first tomobilize for warfare. The potential for expansion of such conflicts depends to alarge degree on whether the relative position of the groups in the segmentarysystem lends itself to opposing alignments at the higher levels of segmentationand upon the past relations between the groups.Unlike subclan sections in most highlands societies (Brown 1967:50-51), thereis no restriction upon fighting between sections of the subclan. Within thesubclan section, however, there are moral restrictions on internal fighting. If co-members become extremely angry they may attack with fists, clubs, or staffs, butnot with axes, arrows, or spears. These restrictions are related to the notion that


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CONTEMPORARY WARFARE IN NEW GUINEA HIGHLANDS 77members of the subclan have one-blood, and that this common blood shouldnot be shed.

Segmentary principles operate in situations of co-operation as well as conflict.Members of a subclan section may enclose garden plots within a single fence andco-operate in the construction of mens* houses. All garden lands and mens' housesites are enclosed by fences to keep out pigs which are allowed to forage freely.Generally speaking, in terms of proximity of land holdings and residence, co?operation in gardening and house construction and the willingness to unite incommon defense and ceremonial exchange, the solidarity of a social group, interm of a readiness to act in concert (Cohen 1968:135), is inversely related tothe position in the segmentary hierarchy.Brown (1970:99-103) similarly notes that in the central Chimbu transactionsbetween clans and tribes are competitive while those within the clan arereciprocal.

Cross-cutting these segmentary principles are a variety of interpersonal ties(e.g., affinal and other non-agnatic relations, exchange ties and personal friend?ships) which affect behavior in conflict situations. It is these ephemeral ortransitory linkages which provide the avenues through which structurally autono?mous tribal groups interact.

Marriage and WarfareMarriage and warfare are linked in the minds of New Guinea highlanders. The

early writings of Salisbury (1962) and Meggitt (1958) report indigenous notionsthat highlanders marry their enemies. The Siane say They are our affinalrelatives; with them we fight (Salisbury 1962:25). Enga informants report Wemarry those whom we fight (Meggitt 1958:278). In an extensive study of Engawarfare, Meggitt (1977:42) supports the veracity of these assertions by reportingquite strong correlations between rates of intergroup marriage and killing.While there is little doubt that there is a strong association between marriageand warfare, it is not clear at all that they are causally related in any direct fashion,i.e., warfare causing marriage or marriage causing warfare. It is highly unlikelythat warfare causes marriage. Researchers (e.g., Brown 1964) have noted thedifficulty in arranging marriages between hostile groups. It is similarly unlikelythat marriage causes warfare (although exceptions can certainly be pointed out).While disputes may arise between bride and groom or their families, the relationsare generally highly valued and long term. The association between marriage andwarfare can be reduced to two separate relationships. First, highlanders mostfrequently marry their neighbors (Meggitt 1977:42, Brown 1964:340). Second,highlanders most frequently go to war with their neighbors. This is because in thehighlands, where travel is restricted and relations are multiplex, neighbors are theparties most likely to be involved in a dispute. Thus propinquity is causallyrelated to both marriage and warfare; the positive correlation between marriageand warfare is spurious. Indeed, the essence of the argument made here is that ifother variables could be controlled the association between warfare andmarriage would in fact be negative.The notion that there is no direct (as opposed to inverse) causal relationshipbetween warfare and marriage is critical. Warfare results from precipitatingdispute incidents in the absence of sufficiently powerful third party mechanismsand other constraints which affect the expansion or containment ofa dispute. Onedimension of constraint stems from marriage links.In her paper Enemies and Affines, Paula Brown (1964) carefully describesthe relevant social relations among the central Simbu. During wedding ceremo?nies speeches proclaim that the groups of the bride and groom (consisting ofsubclansmen, some clansmen, kin, and affines) should remain on friendly terms


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78 Ethnologyand exchange visits and food. The marriage creates individual ties and obligationsoutside the clan which, while not institutionalized, are not wholly voluntary. Atvarious stages in the life cycle payments are obligatory. Given the widelydocumented emphasis on transaction in highlands social relations, it is importantto note that Whenever a formal food presentation occurs between clans, thedonors and recipients are related to one another as affines and nonagnaticcognates (Brown 1964:345). Extratribal relatives play an important role inconflict situations.

The prevailing hostility between neighboring tribes gives extratribal relatives a special complexrole. Men try not to injure their close kin and affines in any conflict between their agnatic group andthe group of their relatives, but they may not attempt to prevent or stop hostilities. In any dealingsbetween neighboring tribes, men with connections in both take a leading part; their political sphereof action encompasses both. When intermediaries and peacemakers are required, these men areactive (Brown 1964:348).

Thus, in Central Simbu, affines played some role in attempting to preventwarfare and were important in restoring peace. No amount of oral history datawill tell us how many wars did not occur due to efforts made through thesechannels. Nor can such data tell us how many wars were shorter or less intensethan they would have been had there been fewer cross-cutting ties.Among the similarly densely populated Mae Enga, Meggitt (1977:12) has also

recognized the importance of cross-cutting ties. He notes that:Even while or after two men or groups fight over an issue, others may intervene to urgenegotiation and compromise . . . Whether, however, noncombatants initiate some kind of concilia-tion or simply stand by and watch the fighting spread depends on a complex set of conditions . . .relevant factors . . . include, for instance, the importance traditionally ascribed to the object in

contention (is it a pig or a sweet potato garden?), the number of antagonists, the kinship, affinal, orexchange connections among some or all of them, and between them and interested noncomba?tants.Moreover, the frequency of intergroup marriage is related to the expansion orcontainment of a dispute. That is, the more intermarriage the greater the chancethat disputes will be handled without violence or that the violence can becontained. Brown (1964:352) notes that:especially within the tribe, the supporters of each party include men with affines on the otherside, most of whom are on good terms with their in-laws and have no wish to offend them. In suchcases some men stay out of the fight while others, while participating, avoid meeting their affines in

combat. This may serve to confme interclan conflict. Between tribes, similar serious disputes canmore easily lead to fighting because fewer men have close ties which restrain them from supportingtheir fellow tribesmen.In sum, while there is an apparent correlation between marriage and warfare,

marriage, in fact, establishes a social relationship which acts primarily as aconstraint upon the expansion of a dispute. Second, as Meggitt suggests, it is notmerely the marriage ties between the two groups, but also between them andtheir allies, i.e., the web of affinal relations. Third, the frequency of marriage, ordensity of the web, is related to efficacy of conflict management processes.

Changing Pattern of Intertribal MarriageHypothesis

The model outlined above suggests that the frequency of intertribal marriagehas declined over the last few decades. The research hypothesis is that theproportion of marriages contracted between persons of different tribes wasgreater before contact than in the recent post contact period. I shall test thefollowing null hypothesis:


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Contemporary Warfare in New Guinea Highlands 79Ho: The proportion of marriages contracted between persons of different tribesin precontact times was less than or equal to the proportion of marriagescontracted between persons of different tribes during the recent post contact

period.Data

A sample of marriages arranged prior to extensive external influence can bederived from genealogies. As Barnes (1967:116) notes, Genealogical informa?tion can be used for the study of the demography of a community, of its patternsof marriage, fertility, migration, and the like. Conditions in one generation can becontrasted with those in another, and some indication gained of the direction andextent of change. He goes on to caution that Genealogies must not however betreated as if they were random samples of a wider population, for the probabilitythat an individual will occur in a genealogy collected by the ethnographer varieswith the individuals fertility, the longevity, of his relatives and descendants andsimilar factors ... Thus the genealogy of a random sample of individuals doesnot produce a random sample of ancestors. At the same time, one could arguethat the genealogy of a sample with a known bias (e.g., all males) will produce asample of ancestors and contemporaries more representative of the group interms of certain categories (e.g., the distribution of males and females). Thegenealogical method would appear to be the only possible method of obtaining asample of unrecorded marriages between people no longer alive.The critical unit of analysis is marriage ties rather than number of individuals.Therefore, where a man is married to more than one woman, each marriage tie iscounted in its appropriate category. Duplications stemming from overlappinggenealogies were eliminated from the analysis.

Each of the two variables can be viewed as dichotomous. The dependentvariable is the distribution of marriage ties. Operationalization of the dependentvariable, i.e., whether the marriage link is within or between tribes, depends uponthe natal group of the spouse. The independent variable is defined by theestablishment ofthe first patrol post at Gumine in 1954. Prior to this time contacthad been only sporadic. Since the beginning of influence is both approximateand processual, the recent pattern of marriages is defined as the distribution ofmarriages contracted within the ten year period prior to the research (i.e., 1966-1976). Thus, marriages which were estimated to have occurred between 1954 and1966 were eliminated from the analysis.In areas of the highlands where contact was earlier, as in the central Chimbu,this process may have begun significantly earlier.Findings

The null hypothesis (H0) that the proportion of intertribal marriages has goneup or remained the same can be rejected (p < 0.001, see Table 1). Thus, we tendto believe, based upon these data, that there has in fact been an overall decline inintertribal marriage. Moreover, the association between contact and the declinein intergroup marriage (phi = .34) must be considered rather strong considering^priori expectations about the extent of such a change (i.e., a change in themarriage pattern from 100 per cent between groups to 100 per cent withingroups would be necessary to produce a phi value of 1.00; this is a highly unlikelyoccurrence in this case).The data reveal that there has been a statistically significant change in themarriage pattern in the anticipated direction. Figure 1 describes the proportion ofmarriage ties within and between tribes, before and after western influence.Comparing the intertribal (between) and intratribal (within) marriage rates in theprecontact sample (labeled before), we see that intertribal marriage was nearlythree times as frequent as intratribal marriage. Ofthe 114 marriage ties recorded


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80 EthnologyTABLE 1. MARRIAGE TIES BY TIME PERIOD

Before AfterContact Contact

N % N %

Between tribes 85 75% 30 40%Within tribes 29 25% 44 60%

Total 114 100% 74 100%

chi squared =21.86 1 dfp < 0.001 (one tail)

phi = .341

in the precontact sample, 85 (75 per cent) were between members of differenttribes while only 29 (25 per cent) were within the tribe. This allowed for a densenetwork of affinal ties between autonomous political groups. In the recent post?contact period (labeled after), in contrast, the number of intertribal marriagesdrops below the number intratribal marriages. Ofthe 74 marriage ties in the post?contact sample, only 30 (40 per cent) were between persons of different tribeswhile 44 (60 per cent) were within the tribe. The intertribal marriage rate in therecent period is nearly half that of the pre-contact period.

Figure 2 visualizes these changes over time. The decline in intertribal marriagecan be contrasted with the rise in intertribal marriage rates. The argumentpresented in this paper is that the dramatic reduction of intertribal marriage rateshad significant implications for the structure of relations between politicallyautonomous tribal groups.A Secondary Analysis

Sometimes it is possible to replicate one's findings by performing a secondaryanalysis on data collected by other researchers.

In 1964 Paula Brown published data on the marriage of some men in theNaregu tribe who live in the central Simbu near the capital of Kundiawa. Data fortwo clans are divided into previous generations (prior to 1930) and presentgeneration. (Data from a third clan includes only the present generation and will,therefore, be eliminated from this analysis.) Brown's categories for marriage tiesmay be collapsed to match those used above.What should we expect, a priori? Since Brown did not arrange the data toaddress this particular question, we expect some differences. Her temporaldichotomy is previous and present generation rather than before and aftercontact. Europeans did not reach this area until the mid 1930s and Brown's dataare dichotomized at 1930. This means that pre-contact marriages are included inthe present generation sample. Neither do Brown's data allow for a decade oftransition. Based upon these differences in data sets, we would expect thedifference between the previous and present samples to be less extreme than thedifference between the before and after sample in the Mul data (i.e., we expect alower measure of association).The data in Table 2 is derived from Brown's (1964:342) Table 1.


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100908070605040302010

0

Contemporary Warfare in New Guinea Highlands 8iFigure 1

PERCENTAGE OF MARRIAGE TIES

?

BeforeWithin tribes

After(Between tribes

The data reveal a statistically significant change in the marriage pattern,although the association is lower (as we expected it would be) than in Mul. Thebetween tribe marriage rate (in the sample) dropped from 6o to 47 per cent. Thischange was sufficient to draw Brown's attention. While the analysis fits ourpredictions, we cannot be certain that the change in marriage pattern observed byPaula Brown in central Simbu represents the same process occurring in Mulnearly twenty years later. Indeed, Brown's (1964:340) explanation that the causeof these changes were particular historical events, namely, the relocation of clangroups, may indeed be the correct one. Nevertheless, the analysis is intriguing. Iwould suggest that what Brown was observing was, in fact, the initial stages of aprocess of change initiated by a reduction in the necessity for trade.4

Trade and MarriageGiven the conventional wisdom that pacification would lead to greaterintertribal contact and, therefore, an increase in the rate of intertribal marriage, it

remains to be explained why such an unlikely event, namely, the decrease in theproportion of intertribal marriages, should occur. In other words, what forces orsituations affected the marriage pattern?Interviews with young men of marriageable age and some of the oldest men inthe community elicited two different perspectives. (Unfortunately, it was notpossible for me, being a male, to maintain serious conversation with women onthis topic.) Young men typically explained that they do not find wives from otherareas because they are tired ; they just do not have any desire to travel the longdistances to visit women of other areas when there are women close at hand. Thisemic explanation is not particularly satisfactory from an anthropological perspec?tive.

While the older men could not explain why the distribution of marriages intheir younger days differed from that of more recent years, they were able todescribe the ways young men and women met prospective spouses from other


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82 Ethnology

1009080706050403020100

Figure 2MARRIAGE TIES OVER TIME

BeforepWithin tribes

AfterQBetween tribes

tribes prior to the coming of Europeans twenty years earlier. The old menreported that when they were young trade was very important. Salt, stone axes,bird of paradise feathers, shells of different kinds, pandanus oil, carpul fur, andthe like were traded between tribes during trading expeditions. Figure 3 maps thetrade network as described by the older residents of Mul.When they were young, the old men reported, they would dress in their finestdecorations and travel to the places described in Figure 3. The women at theseplaces, they said, would see them arrayed in all their finery and want to marrythem. Of course, the situation may not have been quite this straightforward.These reports drew my attention to the link between intertribal marriage andtrade for scarce necessary and luxury resources. What would be the effect of theintroduction of European goods upon trade? And, could this affect marriagepatterns?

According to the old men, pigs from Mul were traded south to the lowerelevation, less densely populated areas in return for bird of paradise feathers andcarpul fur (see Figure 3). Some of the fur and feathers were traded for cowrieshells with people from Sina Sina. Cowries, in turn, were traded to the Gomgalesfor kina shells. Carpul fur and pandanus oil were traded to the east for salt.Finally, some of the fur and feathers obtained from the south, and the saltobtained from the east were traded to the northwest for stone axes and smallshells; which had in turn been brought in from even farther off.Enter the ubiquitous steel axe; exit the stone axe. No one in Mul today woulduse a stone axe. Indeed, it was difficiilt to find someone who recalled how toattach stone to handle. The effect was that the primary raison d'etre for tradebetween the peoples of Mul and Era (i.e., the need for stone axes) was eliminatedand the Muls' need for fur, feathers, and salt was reduced (what may have begunto increase was a need for cash). Similarly, salt increasingly became more readilyavailable. Nowadays it can be purchased at the store on the government station orin small trade stores which stock, for example, three bags of salt, two packs ofcigarettes, a bit of rice, and two or three tins of mackerel. The availability of saltlocally eliminates the need to trade for it and further reduces the need for fur.


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Contemporary Warfare in New Guinea Highlands 83TABLE 2. MARRIAGES OF SOME MEN IN NAREGU TRIBE

chi squared =8.597 1 dfp < 0.005 (one tail)

Phi ? .1272

Thus, two of the five trade routes shown on Figure 3 become totally unnecessaryand the usefulness of trade items from a third are reduced.The elimination of the need to trade for necessary scarce resources allowedsome trade relations to atrophy. I use the term atrophy since the process was

probably one of gradual disuse of trade networks rather than a catastrophicchange. The remaining trade relations were reliant upon the need for luxuryitems such as shells and feathers. Scholars who have done long-term research inNew Guinea have described the highlanders' declining interest in these decora?tive items.

With the introduction of western goods and the reduction of trade, both theneed and the opportunity for intermarriage declined. I am arguing that intertribalmarriage was functional in that it facilitated intergroup economic transactions.While there are a range of rights and obligations as well as affective ties whichmake marriage into neighboring groups preferable, more distant marriages haverecognized importance. This same point was made by Rappaport (1969:121) inhis study of the Tsembaga Maring:

While unions between men and women of a single local group are generally preferred, theTsembaga recognize certain advantages in marriages to members of other local groups. . . . unionswith groups north of the Simbai River and south of the Bismarks strengthen trading relationships.Bird-of-paradise plumes and shell ornaments are still obtained from these groups and until the1950s stone axes from the Jimi Valley were traded for salt manufactured in the Simbai Valley.In an early paper on the Siani, Salisbury (1956:62) linked trade and marriage

directly by focusing on the exchange of nonutilitarian valuables which occurred atmarriage and at the rites of passage for children of the marriage. Valuables weretraded in from the coast about 70 miles to the northeast. Trading took the form ofceremonial gift exchange between affines. At the same time, Salisbury reports astatistically significant trend for Siane men to obtain wives from the south andwest while their sisters marry into groups from the north and east (the directionfrom which valuables come).Even more interesting for the present purpose is Salisbury's report on the affectofthe introduction of European wealth goods. The European settlements nearestthe Siane were in Goroka and Asaroka, 30 miles to the east and north. Groupsnearest these (who were already closer than the Siane to coastal wealth) quicklybecame wealthy in shells, cloth, and other European goods. Salisbury (1956:646)


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84 Ethnology

Figure 3EXCHANGE NETWORK

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ARABUL\

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reports that, as a result of this increased wealth, the movement of women in thatdirection became more pronounced. He also notes that Neither the wealthdifference nor the movement of women is recognized in Siane idealogy.Thus, Salisbury clearly links marriage patterns to the need to obtain wealth not

locally available, although no mention is made of utilitarian goods. While theinitial response to wealthy neighbors is to increase wife giving, it is easy to seethat once wealth is more evenly (and locally) distributed this reason for marryingout will no longer be of major consequence.Particularly in the many areas of the highlands where marriages were arranged

by families with minimal, if any, consultation with the bride or groom, consider?ation of trade relations was likely to play a role in the selection of a spouse.Families had an interest in the establishment or maintenance of trade relations.At the same time that the function of intertribal marriage for maintaining theeconomic system in terms of access to necessary resources was eliminated, the

decline in trade itself reduced the opportunity to make marriage arrangementsbetween non-adjacent groups. Generally speaking, opportunity for marriage isnot random but may be structured by factors such as class, caste, religiousaffiliation, sorority membership, or political borders. Changes in this structure ofopportunity may lead to observable changes in marriage patterns. In other words,a change in the visiting (or trading) pattern between autonomous political groupscould affect the structure of opportunity. The importance of opportunity remains


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Contemporary Warfare in New Guinea Highlands 85whether the individuals are free to choose their own mates or whether suchchoices are made for them.

Brown (1969:82-83) notes that in central Simbu elders choose a person'sspouse for them and, although they can refuse, the bride and groom usuallyaccept even though they may never have met. She reports further that somegroups do not intermarry because of lack of opportunity to make arrangements.Administrative policy and mission influence may have speeded the process. Insome areas, such as South Fore (Glasse 1969:24) or Manga (Cook 1969:104),Australian patrol officers insisted (or at least strongly urged) that brides consentand that women have a right to choose a spouse. And Brown (1969:19) notes thatnowadays more marriages are being initiated by the couples themselves. Optationis likely to further increase the importance of the structure of opportunity.In sum, the argument here is that the replacement, by western goods, ofresources secured through trade reduced the economic need (function) forintergroup marriage and the opportunity to arrange such marriages. The effect ofthese changes were not felt immediately because of the extant relations betweengroups. Over time fewer and fewer intertribal marriages were arranged to replacethose of the passing generation. The net effect was a gradual decay of the web ofaffinal and non-agnatic ties which cut across tribal boundaries.

CONCLUSIONGordon (1980) has insightfully pointed out that there is very little sense in

talking about or planning development if people live in fear of renewed tribalfighting. Moreover, he notes that this is a testing time for anthropologists whofind that their explanatory models are somewhat inadequate (1980:1). Indeed,few of the explanations begin from a particular theoretical position nor even aunified conceptual model; there is little discussion of the mechanisms by whichsuggested causes result in the behavior being explained; and, little evidence ispresented to test, or attempt to falsify, the explanations.In this paper, I have employed a particular theoretic strategy, namely, culturalmaterialism, in which the efficacy of explanatory models are ranked: infrastruc?ture, structure, and superstructure. Harris (1979:56) states:

Cultural materialists give highest priority to the effort to formulate and test theories in whichinfrastructural variables are the primary causal factors. Failure to identify such factors in theinfrastructure warrants the formulation of theories in which structural variables are tested for causalprimacy.

Prior to contact with the outside world, stone axe heads and salt were producedin local areas where these resources were available. Redistribution was accom-plished through trade. One of the functions of intertribal marriage was thefacilitation of trade between autonomous political groups. With the earlyintroduction of western goods, particularly steel axes and salt, local productionwas discontinued and marriage was no longer necessary to maintain these traderelations. As trade was discontinued, so declined the opportunity to makemarriage arrangements between non-adjacent groups. Of course, extant marriageties facilitated continued contact between groups, but probably less frequently,and there was no pragmatic reason for young people to marry others from distantareas. Particularly in the case of women, where such a marriage necessitated amove far from her natal family, there were distinct disadvantages. Thus, as olderpeople died and fewer marriages were arranged between groups, the web ofaffinal and non-agnatic kin ties decayed. Intertribal marriages provided a linkagethrough which groups could communicate, and a mechanism and reason forcontaining conflict. With the decline in intergroup marriage over time, thelikelihood of a dispute expanding into full scale warfare increased.


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86 EthnologyThis explanation began with infrastructural conditions (production) andshowed how they were causally related to structural changes (trade relations)which in turn caused further structural changes (the web of kin ties) finally

leading to changes in conflict behaviors. I have tried to explain each ofthe stagesin this temporal process, i.e., the relationship between trade and marriage and therelationship between marriage and warfare.Scientific hypotheses and models can be tested by examining predictions whichcan be deduced from them (Hemple 1965:12, cited in Harris 1979:16). Themodel which I have outlined predicts the unlikely occurrence that, with pacifica-tion and the ability to wander further afield without the threat of life and limb,intertribal marriage actually declined rather than rose as was thought would bethe case. The hypothesis was tested on genealogical data collected in this researchsite as well as on data published earlier from a different area of the Simbuprovince. This is but a single case study and there is no statistical reason to extendthe findings to other areas of the highlands. However, the inability to falsify thehypothesis in this case, lends support to the general efficacy of the explanation.

NOTESi. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (Grant No. BNS76-218 37) isgreatfully acknowledged.2. The problem is akin to that encountered by students of criminology. Significant differences existbetween victimization rates ( real levels) and crime rates as reported in the Unified Crime Reportswhich are based upon crimes reported to the police.3. For a more extensive discussion of this period with special reference to the resurgence offighting see Brown 1982a and 1982b.4. Paula Brown reports (pers. comm.) that recently many Simbu women are marrying outside theSimbu to men they had met in the district or on visits. She notes that there are, now, advantages forolder men having a daughter married to a prestigious outsider. Naregu men who migrate probablyalso marry outsiders.Such marriages further the process described here since, although they are extra-tribal, they do notlink neighboring potential enemy groups.

BIBLIOGRAPHYBarnes, J. 1967. Genealogies. The Craft of Social Anthropology, ed. A. L., Epstein, pp. 101-128. New York.Berndt, R. M. 1964. Warfare in the New Guinea Highlands. American Anthropologist 66:183-203.Brown, P. 1964. Enemies and Affines. Ethnology 3:335-356.- 1967. Chimbu Political System. Anthropological Forum 2:36-52.- 1969. Marriage in Chimbu. Pigs, Pearlshells and Women, eds. R. M. Glasse and M.Meggitt, pp. 77-95. Englewood Cliffs.- 1970. Chimbu Transactions. Man 5:99-117.- 1982a. Conflict in the New Guinea Highlands. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 26:525-546.- 1982b. Chimbu Disorder: Tribal Fighting in Newly Independent Papua New Guinea.Pacific Viewpoint 22:1-21.Brown, P., and A. M. Podolefsky. 1976. Population Density, Agricultural Intensity, LandTenure and Group Size in the New Guinea Highlands. Ethnology 15:211-238.Cohen, P. 1968. Modern Social Theory, New York.Cook, E. A. 1969. Marriage Among the Manga. Pigs, Pearlshells and Women, eds. R. M. Glasseand M. Meggitt, pp. 96-116. Englewood Cliffs.Glasse, R. M. 1965. The Huli ofthe Southern Highlands. Gods, Ghosts and Men in Melanesia,eds. P. Lawrence and M. Meggitt, pp. 27-49. Melbourne.- 1969. Marriage in South Fore. Pigs, Pearlshells and Women, eds. R. M. Glasse and M.Meggitt, 16-37. Englewood Cliffs.Gordon, R. 1980. Rituals of Governance and the Breakdown of Law and Order in Papua NewGuinea. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Associa?tion. Washington, DC.- 1983. The Decline of the Kiapdom and the Resurgence of Tribal Fighting in Enga.Oceania 53:205-223.Harris, M. 1979. Cultural Materialism: The Struggle For A Science of Culture. New York.Hemple, K. 1965. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs.


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Contemporary Warfare in New Guinea Highlands 87Howlett, D. et al. 1976. Chimbu: Issues in Development. Development Studies CentreMonograph No. 4. Canberra.Kerpi, K. 1976. Strains, Tensions, and Tribesmen. New Guinea 10:2-18.Koch, K. 1974. The Anthropology of Warfare. Addison-Wesley Module in Anthropology No.Langness, L. 1964. Bena Bena Social Structure. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University ofWashington, Seattle.Meggitt, M. 1958. The Enga of the New Guinea Highlands. Oceania 28:253-330.- 1977. Blood is their Argument: Warfare Among the Mae Enga Tribesmen of the NewGuinea Highlands. Palo Alto.Moore, S. F. 1972. Legal Liability and Evolutionary Interpretation: Some Aspects of StrictLiability, Self-help and Collective Responsibility. The Allocation of Responsibility, ed. M.Gluckman, pp. 51-108. Manchester.Paney, P. et al. 1973. Report of the Committee Investigating Tribal Fighting in the Highlands.Port Moresby.Rappaport, R. 1969. Marriage Among the Maring. Pigs, Pearlshells and Women, eds. R. M.Glasse and M. Meggitt, pp. 117-137. Englewood Cliffs.Salisbury, R. F. 1956. Assymetrical Marriage Systems. American Anthropologist 58:639-655.- 1962. From Stone to Steel. London.Scaglion, R. 1981. Homicide Compensation in Papua New Guinea: Problems and Prospects.Law Reform Commission Monograph #1. Port Moresby.Sillitoe, P. 1981. Some More on War: A Wola Perspective. In Homicide Compensation inPapua New Guinea, ed. R. Scaglion, pp. 70-81. Port Moresby.Standish, B. 1973. The Highlands. New Guinea 8:4-30.Strathern, A. 1974. When Dispute Procedures Fail. Contention and Dispute, ed. A. L. Epstein,pp. 240-270 Canberra.- 1981. Compensation: Should there be a Law? Homicide Compensation in Papua NewGuinea, ed. R. Scaglion, pp. 5-24. Port Moresby.Sterling, M. W. 1943. The Native Peoples of New Guinea. Smithsonian Institution WarBackground Studies no. 9.Whiteman, J. 1973. Chimbu Family Relationships in Port Moresby. New Guinea Research

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