Weapons Warfare

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The Ottoman Empire Dates: 1453-1923 Political Considerations The Ottoman Empire, founded by Osman I (r. 1290- 1326), dominated much of southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa between the four- teenth and early twentieth centuries. Ottoman mili- tary superiority in the Balkans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries stemmed from the use of new modern armaments integrating infantry and cavalry with innovative tactics. The Ottomans borrowed methods from their adversaries and even used Chris- tian and Jewish soldiers and officers in their cam- paigns. In addition to a magnificent army, they had a navy that was among the best in the Mediterranean area. However, one aspect of the early Ottoman suc- cess has been greatly exaggerated—that of the Otto- mans’ superiority in numbers. The Ottomans’ rapid conquest of the Christian, Greek-speaking, Eastern Roman Byzantine Empire, as well as the other Bal- kan states in the years from 1290 to 1453, came not from larger forces but from essentially waiting for their Christian rivals to destroy each other in battle and then moving in and taking over the remaining territory. The Ottoman sultans made alliances with 587 Library of Congress The Ottoman Turks seize Constantinople from the Byzantines in 1453 to establish the Ottoman Empire.

Transcript of Weapons Warfare

  • The Ottoman EmpireDates: 1453-1923

    Political Considerations

    The Ottoman Empire, founded by Osman I (r. 1290-1326), dominated much of southeastern Europe, theMiddle East, and North Africa between the four-teenth and early twentieth centuries. Ottoman mili-tary superiority in the Balkans in the fifteenth andsixteenth centuries stemmed from the use of newmodern armaments integrating infantry and cavalrywith innovative tactics. The Ottomans borrowedmethods from their adversaries and even used Chris-tian and Jewish soldiers and officers in their cam-

    paigns. In addition to a magnificent army, they had anavy that was among the best in the Mediterraneanarea. However, one aspect of the early Ottoman suc-cess has been greatly exaggeratedthat of the Otto-mans superiority in numbers. The Ottomans rapidconquest of the Christian, Greek-speaking, EasternRoman Byzantine Empire, as well as the other Bal-kan states in the years from 1290 to 1453, came notfrom larger forces but from essentially waiting fortheir Christian rivals to destroy each other in battleand then moving in and taking over the remainingterritory. The Ottoman sultans made alliances with

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    Library of Congress

    The Ottoman Turks seize Constantinople from the Byzantines in 1453 to establish the Ottoman Empire.

  • Christian states, and Turkish soldiers served as mer-cenaries in Christian armies, just as Christians foughtin the Turkish armies.

    National mythology has also greatly exaggeratedthe historical significance of key Ottoman victoriesbefore 1453, such as the defeat of the Serbs at Kosovoon June 15, 1389. In many ways the Ottomans inher-ited the Balkans by default, because the Byzantinearmy collapsed as a result of internal civil wars andexternal invasions by the Western European Chris-tian Crusaders and other neighboring Christian states.

    The decisive victory that established the Ottomandomination of the Balkans was the Siege of Constan-tinople in 1453. The Turks had prepared for this bat-tle for fifty years. According to legend, the city was tofall to a sultan bearing the name of the prophet Mu-wammad. Sultan Mehmed I (r. 1402-1421) initiallyappeared to be that man, but an internal contest forthe throne and a war against Tamerlane in the east

    made his attack on the Byzantine capital impossible.However, when his grandson Mehmed II (1432-1481) ascended the throne in 1451, both sultan andpeople were ready.

    By 1453 Constantinople had become a shadow ofits former self. The citys population, which had onceexceeded one million people, had declined to onlyseveral tens of thousands. Constantinople was nolonger a unified city but rather a series of villages be-hind walls. Mehmed II prepared his attack carefully,building fortresses on both sides of the BosporusAnadolu Hisari on the Asian side and Rumeli Hisarion the European sidethe ruins of which still stand.He strengthened the janissary corps, raising theirpay and improving the officer ranks. He constructedcauseways over the Galati hill north of the old city, sothat he could have his ships dragged up and over tothe Golden Horn, the harbor of Constantinople, cir-cumnavigating the chain and flotilla that protected

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    Ottoman Empire at the endof Sleymans reign

    Ottoman Empire in 1520

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    Ottoman Expansion Under Sleyman the Magnificent

  • the entrance to the citys vulnerable side. Mehmedsfleet of 125 ships and an additional number ofsmaller support craft was five times larger than thatof the Greeks. With this fleet, Mehmed prevented theByzantines from bringing supplies by sea as they haddone in the past. The first Turkish troops to reach thewalls of Constantinople in April, 1453, were a fewknights, who were successfully met by the Byzantinesoldiers in a brief skirmish. Ottoman reinforcementsthen drove the Greeks back behind the walls. Mas-sive Turkish forces gathered over the next days,including cavalry, infantry, engineers, and navalforces. Most important were the cannons Mehmedhad placed at the heretofore impenetrable walls; theybegan a constant bombardment that continued forseven weeks until they finally breached the wall.

    Mehmed and his entourage of janissary soldiers,advisers, and imams, or religious leaders, took up theirpositions before the city. Mehmed offered the city ei-ther mercy if it surrendered without a fight, or pillageif it chose to fight. The Greeks chose to fight to the last.

    After the fall of Constantinople the Ottomans con-tinued to expand throughout the Muslim world in theNear East and North Africa. At the height of the em-pire under the sultan Sleyman I the Magnificent(1494 or 1495-1566) the European boundariesreached beyond the Danube River to the gates of Vi-enna. Sleymans failure to take the Habsburg capitalowed as much to the limitations of Ottoman militarytactics, especially the definition of its campaigns byannual sorties lasting only from the spring to the fall,as it did to the defense of the Vien-nese. Sleyman also fought and lostto the naval forces of King Philip IIof Spain (1527-1598) in the Medi-terranean at the celebrated Battle ofLepanto (1571).

    After Sleyman the Ottoman Em-pire went into a decline. Succeedingsultans rarely left their palaces andplaced state matters in the hands oftheir ministers, most of whom wereChristian slaves taken in the childtax from Balkan families. The Otto-mans fought against Austria, Poland,the Papacy, and other European

    states for control of the Danubian plain for two hun-dred years. However, they found a European ally inFrance. In the late seventeenth century the grand vi-ziers of the Albanian Kprl family arrested thedecline of the Ottoman Empire and spearheaded a re-vival of its former power. However, in 1664 at Szent-gotthrd, on the Austrian-Hungarian border, the Ot-tomans suffered their first loss of land to the Christianpowers. After the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) theimproved European armies surpassed the Turkisharmy in organization, tactics, training, armament,and even leadership. The Turks, whose advancedtechniques and equipment had previously been theirstrong points, now found themselves falling behindtheir adversaries in these areas.

    The Ottomans failure to take Vienna in a secondattempt (1683) began the loss of their territory to theEuropean powers. In the eighteenth century the em-pire lost wars and land to both Austria and Russia.Inside the empire local warlords carved out virtuallyindependent fiefdoms throughout the imperial prov-inces. The sultans personal authority in reality didnot extend beyond Constantinople. The grand janis-sary corps, which had gained the right to marry, wereless an effective fighting force than a collection of si-necures. In 1792 Sultan Selim III (1761-1808) turnedto France, the empires old ally, for assistance inmodernizing Ottoman armed forces, creating a mod-ern corps in addition to the janissaries. However, theFrench Revolution (1789-1799) and the NapoleonicWars (1793-1815) interrupted the partnership. The

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    Turning Points1453 With use of large cannons, the Turks capture Constantinople from

    the Byzantines, establishing the Ottoman Empire.1571 The Battle of Lepanto II, fought between the Ottoman Turks and

    the Christian forces of Don Juan de Austria, is the last majornaval battle to be waged with galleys.

    1792 Modern French military techniques and arms are introduced intoTurkey.

    1826 The janissary corps are destroyed and the Turkish army ismodernized.

    1923 The Treaty of Lausanne creates the Republic of Turkey, bringingthe Ottoman Empire to its official end.

  • empire suffered from internal revolutions, such asthose by the Serbs and the Greeks, and from uprisingsby warlords and rogue pashas such as Ali Pala (1741-1822), known as the Lion of Janina, in modern Alba-nia, as well as wars with Russia and Persia. In a janis-sary revolt in 1806 Selim was dethroned and killed.His successor, Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839), be-lieved that the defeat of Napoleon would guaranteeOttoman territory at the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), but when the Greek uprising of 1821 split theEuropean alliance, Mahmud found himself at waragainst the combined forces of Russia, France, andEngland. In 1826, in order to modernize his forces, hedid away with the janissaries.

    Mahmuds successor, Abdlmecid I (1823-1861),allied himself to the powers by promising reforms in

    the treatment of his non-Muslim subjects. In the1830s and 1840s the powers protected Abdlmecidfrom a vassal revolt. In the 1850s England andFrance joined Abdlmecid in the victorious CrimeanWar (1853-1856) against Russia. However, in 1877Russia again went to war against the Turks to aid aBalkan uprising. Although the Russians defeated theTurks and liberated the Christian states of the region,England, Turkeys ally, prevented the Russian troopsfrom taking Istanbul.

    In the early twentieth century the Young TurkRevolution brought constitutional government andmore westernization to the empire. However, Turkeylost wars to Italy (1911) and to a coalition of Balkanstates (1912-1913), only managing to regain a mod-est amount of European territory around Edirne in the

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  • Second Balkan War (May-June, 1913). After feelingbetrayed by England and France, the Young Turkleaders turned toward friendship with Germany. Af-ter the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Turkeyjoined with the Central Powers in November of thatyear. Turkish troops faced the Russians in the Cauca-sus and the English in the Near East. The English hadby then occupied Egypt and supported a revolt of theArabs in Saudia Arabia and Palestine. With the col-lapse of Russia in 1917, the Turks received territoryin the Caucasus, but the following year the CentralPowers lost the war and the Allies divided up the ter-ritory of the empire among themselves.

    However, while the Allies occupied Constantino-ple, Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), later named Ata-trk, or Father of Turks, raised the standard of revoltin Ankara, where he set up a rival government.Kemal led the army to victory over the Greeks (1920-1922) and renegotiated the Treaty of Svres (1920) tohis advantage in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), cre-ating the Republic of Turkey and bringing the Otto-man Empire to its official end.

    Military Achievement

    The Ottoman Empire in its early years successfullydefeated the Christian powers of Europe and the Mus-lim states of the Near East. This success stemmedfrom the Ottomans innovative use of tactics andstrategy integrating cavalry and infantry. The Ot-toman cavalry, or sipahi (rendered in English asspahi), was drawn from the noble free-born Mus-lim class, whereas the infantry, the janissaries, wereslaves of the sultan forcibly recruited from the chil-dren of conquered European peoples, converted toIslam, and trained as fierce fighters. There were alsoirregular cavalry and infantry troops. The Ottomansalso did not hesitate, when it served their purposes, touse Christian or Jewish commanders, as well asChristian allies and mercenaries.

    The Muslims were among the first to effectivelyuse cannon and gunpowder. Their success againstEuropean armies continued into the seventeenth cen-tury, when the decline of the empire began.

    Weapons, Uniforms, and Armor

    In the early centuries the Ottomans effectively usedsiege weapons and artillery, such as mortars, cata-pults, and large cannons, that fired both iron andstone shot. Mehmed II, also called Mehmed the Con-queror, wished to have the most modern weapons andordered a Hungarian gunsmith to build him largecannons, one of which was used at Constantinople,that could fire 1,200-pound cannonballs. Janissariesused scimitars, knives, stabbing swords, battle-axes,and harquebuses. The Turks were also skilled marks-men using muskets. Ottoman archers continuouslyrained arrows on the defenders of cities they at-tacked. The Ottomans were renowned for theirsappers as well, who attacked the enemys fortifica-tions with axes. The spahi cavalry, true medievalwarriors, carried bows, swords, lances, shields, andmaces. The Ottoman navy consisted of corsairs andoared galleons.

    The Turks established local janissaries and otherregional corps in different parts of the empire, eachwith its own distinct uniforms, pennants, and stan-dards. The traditional Ottoman uniforms consisted ofshort, loose pantaloons, a short shirt with a large sash,a high turban, stockings that reached above the hemof the pantaloons, and Turkish-style slippers. Janis-saries also wore long, flowing robes and felt hats.The akhis, or officers, wore pantaloons, sashes,capes, red boots, long fur-trimmed robes, and tall,elaborately carved, large-plumed helmets whoseheight depended on the wearers rank. Janissary foodbearers wore black uniforms, sandals, pantaloons,short jackets with long sleeves, half-vestlike shirts,and conical hats. The sultans rode on caparisoned, ordecoratively adorned, horses and carried bejeweledweapons.

    The janissaries standard was the scarlet crescentand double-edged sword symbol of Osman, thefounder of the Ottoman dynasty. The akhis carriedstaffs with tails representing the sleeve of the sheik ofthe Bektashi dervishes, the janissaries religious or-der. The number of tails on the akhis staff dependedon his rank. The janissaries staff bore a spoon sym-bolizing their higher standard of living. The insigniaof the janissary corps was the soup pot and the spoon.

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  • Officers bore titles from the kitchen such as the FirstMaker of Soup, First Cook, and First Water-Bearer.The soup pot was the sacred object around which thejanissaries gathered to eat or discuss events and poli-cies. In rebellions they traditionally overturned thesesoup pots.

    In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Turk-ish armament lagged behind the times. In 1796 theFrench ambassador General Jean-Baptiste Aubert-Dubayet brought to Turkey several pieces of modernarmament and artillery as models for the Turks tocopy and French engineers and artillery officers toteach the Turks modern methods. In the nineteenthand twentieth centuries the Ottoman Empire contin-ued to modernize its forces and weaponry. BeforeWorld War I the Germans improved upon Turkisharms. German General Otto Liman von Sanders(1855-1929) came to Turkey to oversee the trainingof troops. During the war the Turks had excellentgunnery. However, two battleships ordered from En-gland, which were to be the best of the fleet, had notbeen delivered before the Turks joined the CentralPowers and were confiscated by the British. In thelate nineteenth century the Turks adopted typical Eu-ropean khaki winter and summer army and blue navyuniforms. For officers, the feza brimless, flat-crowned hatreplaced the turban.

    Military Organization

    Within the Ottoman Empire the government and themilitary were closely linked. The empire was dividedinto two parts: European and Asian, each governedby aghas, area governors who administered the em-pire in the name of the sultan. Under the aghas stoodthe provincial governors, or sanjak beys. The sanjak,which has come to mean province, was literally thestandard of the governor, or bey. In 1453 there weretwenty sanjaks in Asia and twenty-eight in Europe.The sanjak beys commanded troops, operated the po-licing powers in their provinces, and collected taxes.Within the sanjaks there were two types of agricul-tural estates: large zaimets and smaller timars. Otto-man theory held that all land belonged to God andwas managed by the sultan; the managers of these es-

    tates were free-born Muslim noblemen. The spahis,knights who served as the cavalry of the Ottoman ar-mies, were the most numerous Ottoman warriors.The early sultans gave most of the land they con-quered to these warriors, although a minor portionwas reserved for government and diplomatic offi-cials. The peasants, called rayah, literally cattle,were the serfs who worked the land. The other gov-erning functions were handled by the various Mus-lim, Christian, and Jewish religious authorities whoruled their own communities.

    The Ottomans used both regular and irregulartroops as police forces. The two most important regu-lar land forces were the janissary infantry corps andthe spahi knights. The Ottoman navy was a supple-mentary force that often carried janissary troops, aswell as naval officers and sailors.

    The janissaries were Christian and Jewish boys, asyoung as seven years old, periodically gathered in theBalkans through a child tax, called devshirme. Girlswere also gathered to serve in various harems. SultanOrhan (c. 1288-c. 1360) started the corps as a body-guard, and Murad I (c. 1326-1389) developed it as amilitia to guard the European territories. The boyswere selected for the janissary corps based on theirstrength and intelligence. They were educated asMuslim Bektashi dervishes, the religious order fa-vored by Ohran, and housed in barracks at Bursa. Af-ter the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed IImoved the main janissary barracks to the sultanspalace in the capital. During battle, conquered for-tresses served as their barracks, and local produceserved as their food.

    Aminority, approximately 15 percent, of the mostintelligent children were selected for governmentand diplomatic service, while the remainder weretrained for the janissaries. The boys were educated inthe palace school, where they studied subjects suchas Turkish history, Muslim literature, and romanticand martial music. They practiced gymnastics andsports on both foot and horseback to increase theirstrength and agility. The students became expertin archery, swordsmanship, javelin throwing, andriding.

    Early janissaries could not own property, marry,or perform other service, but they were armed and

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  • well paid and had a strong esprit de corps. They werethe most respected infantry in Europe: fearless, welltrained, dedicated troops with intelligent and cool-headed commanders. At the dedication of the corps,the sheik of the Bektashi, an officer of the corps,promised, Its visage shall be bright and shining, itsarm strong, its sword keen, its arrow sharp-pointed. Itshall be victorious in every battle and will never re-turn except in triumph. The janissaries were knownfor their military discipline, which rivaled that of theancient Greeks and Romans.

    In contrast to the inside aghas, who were leadersof the government and palace service, the chief janis-sary officers held the title of outside aghas. In thetime of Mehmed II they numbered a force of ten thou-sand. They were unique in Europe, where most ar-mies consisted almost completely of cavalry. Thejanissaries were commanded only by aghas, who hadbeen appointed by the sultan, and the provincial beysand pashas had no authority over them.

    When the Ottoman Empire went into decline, the

    janissary corps began to deteriorate. Muslims wererecruited into the janissaries, affecting the traditionalcamaraderie. Janissaries also worked as artisans tosupplement their income. During Sleymans reign,they received the right to marry, and their sons beganentering the corps, first through loopholes in the lawand later through quotas. Nepotism grew rampant.Murad IV (1612-1640), recognizing the de factopractice, abolished the devshirme. Janissaries oftenpaid others to serve in the field in their place, whilestill collecting their pay and enjoying their privi-leges.

    The corps, if they disagreed with the imperial poli-cies, would often mutiny in the field or in Constanti-nople. The janissaries began to influence politics asearly as the fifteenth century, when they backed thesultan Mehmed I against his brothers, but in the sev-enteenth century the corps became stronger than thesultan. Sultans and ministers curried favor with thejanissaries as well as the spahis through promotionand pay raises.

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  • The vizier Kprl Amca-z3de Hseyin (died1702) tried to reverse the downward trend by revis-ing the muster roles of the janissaries, improving mil-itary equipment for both the janissaries and the navy,building new barracks, and refurbishing the imperialdefenses, but the measures proved to be only tempo-rary. The Ottoman forces also included renowned ar-tillery and engineering units and highly skilled arti-sans who were supported through a guild system.These artisans supplied the Ottoman armies andmaintained their morale and standard of living.

    The Turkish sipahi cavalry were considered to bewithout peer. They were ready at any moment on thecommand of the sanjak beys to leave their fields andjoin in battle. Failure do so would mean loss of theirposition. Although the ranks were not hereditary, theson of a deceased spahi might be given a smallamount of land for his needs. He would then have toprove himself in battle to earn a tamir or zaimet.There were also mounted soldiers at a lesser rankthan spahi, and the spahis of the Porte in Constantino-ple, the men of the sultan, who formed a separatecorps. In the seventeenth century the number of feu-dal spahis dwindled, and, like the janissaries, thespahi also began to hire substitutes, some of whomwere unscrupulous adventurers. Spahis were no lon-ger suited for all-year duty against the modern Euro-pean artillery. At the Battle of Mez-Keresztes(1596) against Hungary they left the field en masse.The sultan dismissed thirty thousand spahis, turninga large group of nobles into landless malcontents andfurther increasing the problems of the empire.

    In times of war the Ottoman Empire employed asupplemental irregular cavalry, the akinjis. Other ir-regular troops were the azab corps, a reserve infantryfounded by Orhan. The sixteenth century governor ofBosnia used another irregular force to police hissanjak. These irregular troops did not receive regularpay but were rewarded with spoils of war. However,jealous of the pay and privileges of the regular forces,they sometimes rebelled.

    In the seventeenth century the Ottoman Empirealso fell behind in inventory and supply. While thegreat powers of Europe established modern profes-sional armies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-ries, the sultans stubbornly held on to their antiquated

    traditional techniques. They lacked modern financ-ing procedures and an industrial system based onflexibility, free enterprise, and competition that wasrequired for modern warfare. Pillaging and living offthe land no longer sufficed. The haphazard Turkishsystem of taxes and economic restrictions held theempires military behind while its European enemiesforged ahead. Furthermore, the janissaries and arti-san guilds joined together to protect their traditionalprivileges and maintain the militarys traditional pro-cedures.

    In the eighteenth century all aspects of the armytraining, discipline, armament, fortifications, fieldmaneuversfell to a substandard state. Incompe-tence and ignorance ruled even in the most elemen-tary matters. Open defiance and mutiny were ram-pant among the troops. Theft of supplies by bothofficers and soldiers was common. Janissaries oftendid not go on campaign but hired people in theirstead. Janissaries would fight with their officers ordemand privileges reserved for officers. The corpsbecame a parasitic burden, a shadow of the unbeat-able force it had been in its early days.

    After a loss to the Russians in 1792, Sultan SelimIII was anxious to reform his army. Although Selimsmany reforms were not limited to military matters,an overhaul of the army played a key part in hisplans. Selim looked to France, where the FrenchRevolution of 1789 had brought about a new order.He sent special ambassadors to the courts of Europeand studied their detailed reports. He was particu-larly interested in guns and artillery, about whichhe himself had written a treatise. He was especiallyimpressed with the revolutionary French army andrequested help from Paris to improve the Turkishmilitary. The French experts improved Turkish gunfoundries, arsenals, and equipment. In both the armyand navy they taught the Turks gunnery, fortifica-tions, navigation, and related subjects. The Turkishengineering school was brought up to modern stan-dards.

    However, the sultans advisers were divided.Some insisted on maintaining the old Turkish ways atany cost, whereas others advocated the Western tech-niques only to restore the past Turkish glory; stillothers called for a complete overhaul of the Turkish

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  • military and society in the Western manner. Selim es-tablished the Topijia small force of prisoners, Eu-ropean deserters, and poor Muslimsand had themtrained in the Western fashion as a prototype army.Impressed by the Topijis superiority, Selim tried tointroduce their methods and arms into the Turkishforces. The spahis accepted the new methods, but thejanissaries continued to resist modernization. Selimthus enlarged the Topiji force, which by then in-cluded some of the French officers who had re-mained in Turkey. In 1805 he introduced a draft butwas assassinated the following year in a janissary re-volt. Mahmud II then ascended the throne.

    The success of Mehmed Ali of Egypt in building aWestern army with Muslims encouraged Mahmud todo away with the janissaries and rely solely upon thenew army. Mahmud replaced the European officers

    training the troops with Muslims and ordered 150troops from each janissary battalion to join the newcorps. On June 15, 1826, as expected, the janissariesrevolted, overturning their soup pots and invadingthe palace. Mahmud was ready. He had increased hisloyal artillery troops, placing them in strategic pointsin the streets. They drove the rebels back to their bar-racks, where they barricaded themselves and weredestroyed by artillery in less then an hour. More thansix thousand died in the shelling. Mahmud executedthe surviving leaders, disbanded the corps, and out-lawed the Bektashi dervish religious order. The re-maining janissaries were exiled to Asia.

    After the destruction of the janissaries, Mahmudreintroduced the old title serasker; originally held bya high commander of general rank, it was now givento the commander in chief who also served as minis-

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    F. R. Niglutsch

    The British defeat of the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Navarino Bay in 1827 effectively destroyed the Ottomannavy and paved the way for Greek independence.

  • ter of war and handled police duties in Constantino-ple. He paid special attention to the new army.Twelve thousand men were stationed at Constantino-ple and elsewhere in the provinces. Mahmud turnedto England and Prussia for assistance training thenew army. Officers were sent to England, and Britishofficers came to Turkey. Prussia sent LieutenantHelmuth von Moltke (1800-1891), who later becamean architect of Prussias renowned army, as a militaryadviser. Von Moltke helped to modernize the Otto-man Empires defenses and to train and organize thenew troops. He was dissatisfied, however, withMahmud and the Ottoman army, who resisted in-struction from foreigners. Turkey and Prussia ex-changed cadets and officers as well, establishing aGerman tradition that would continue through thelife of the empire.

    In the 1840s the army was reorganized into activeand reserve units, and the term of active service wasreduced from twelve to five years. Soldiers who hadactively served for five years would serve the balanceof seven years in their home provinces as reserves.The military was further reorganized along Westernlines, the number of troops was increased to 250,000,and military schools were established.

    In 1808 the Young Turk Revolution brought Ger-man trained officers forward. Enver Pala (1881-1922), one of the leaders of the revolt, had trained inGerman methods as a young officer and now went toBerlin as military attach. The war minister SevketPala (1858-1913) actually trained in Germany. Thus,the German influence that had existed since the timeof Mahmud actually increased during the nineteenthcentury.

    After the Young Turk Revolution, the use of offi-cers in government positions reduced the efficiencyof the army and navy in the field. Furthermore, capa-ble officers opposed to the government were sent todistant posts. The defeats of the Italian and BalkanWars impressed upon the new leaders the need formassive reform. Enver Pala, who by that time hadbecome one of the ruling triumvirate along withMehmed Talt Pala (1872-1921) and Ahmed CemalPala (1872-1922) took this in hand. Much of theproblem was the mistrust that the older officers hadof the young military supporters of the revolution, a

    situation that demanded a general purge of the seniorofficers. Sevket Pala recognized the problem but re-fused to dismiss his friends in the officer corps.Therefore Enver Pala took over the ministry and con-vinced the reluctant Sultan Mehmed V (1844-1918)to issue a decree retiring officers over fifty-five yearsof age. A new agreement with Berlin brought fortyGerman officers to Turkey. They were led by Limanvon Sanders, who was placed in charge of the firstarmy in Constantinople.

    Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics

    From the early days of the Ottoman Empire, the doc-trine of warfare called for the conquest of Muslimand Christian land in the name of God. In fact, all ofthe empires territory was seen to be Gods land, ad-ministered by the sultan through aghas, beys, and pa-shas, military leaders as well as government officials.When the Ottoman sultans became the rulers of theMuslims of the Near East, they revived the old title ofcaliph, for the religious leader of Islam.

    The Ottoman strategy was simple. On yearly cam-paigns, which, after 1453, began from Constantino-ple in a formal ceremonial military parade and lasteduntil late fall, their well-trained and courageous ar-mies fought and conquered as much land and asmany cities as they could. Victims who acquiescedwere shown mercy. Those who resisted suffered abrief period of brutal pillage. In the fifteenth and six-teenth centuries the Ottomans managed the lands un-der their control well. Even non-Muslim communi-ties had a great deal of autonomy. In the latercenturies, inefficient government and arbitrary ac-tions of virtually independent warlords, landlords,and local beys and pashas inflicted hardship.

    The Ottomans learned from their adversaries,studying Western military forces and strategies. Af-ter the seventeenth century the viziers, more oftenthan the sultan, marched on campaigns and some-times participated in battles. Although the army wasthe main force, a flotilla of hundreds of boats accom-panied the troops on the rivers of the region under at-tack.

    Atypical order of battle in the open field consisted

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  • of three armies. For example, at Kosovo Field in1389, Sultan Murad I commanded the center with hisjanissary corps and spahi knights. By tradition thearmy of the region where the battle was fought occu-pied the right flank. Thus Bayezid I (c. 1360-1403),the sultans son and heir, led the army of Europe onhis right. A younger son led the army of Asia on theleft flank. At Kosovo an advance guard of two thou-sand archers began the attack. However, the standardOttoman practice was to begin battle with an inferiorline of irregulars. The janissaries would attack ac-companied by drums and cymbals and exhorted bytheir non-janissary brothers of the Bektashi der-

    vishes. If the enemy forces outnumbered the Turks,the strategy changed, and the Ottomans would wait inhiding for the battle to begin.

    The Ottoman forces, well suited for siege warfare,used both cannons and mines. They dug trenchesabout 1,500 meters from the besieged city walls andset up their artillery behind the ridges. Archers thencontinually rained arrows on the city, while janissar-ies scaled the walls. The Turks were willing to con-tinue a siege as long as it took for a city to surrender orfall. They often gave generous terms of surrender, al-lowing those who wished to leave the city to gofreely.

    Contemporary SourcesThe best primary sources on the military history of the Ottoman Empire available in English

    and held in American libraries are memoirs and contemporary accounts of battles. Among thebest of the former are the memoirs of Sir Edwin Pears (1835-1919), Forty Years in Constantino-ple: The Recollections of Sir Edwin Pears, 1873-1915 (1916), Evliya elebis (c. 1611-c. 1682)Travels in Palestine (1834), and Konstanty Michalowiczs (born c. 1435) Memoirs of a Janis-sary (1975), an account of a fifteenth century Turkish warrior found in the microform collectionof the University of Michigan. The University of Michigan is the repository of numerous eye-witness accounts of Turkish-Western battle, a number of which have been published. SuraiyaFaroqhis Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources (1999) is a generalsurvey of sources in Turkish and other languages.

    Books and ArticlesAksan, Virginia. Ottoman War and Warfare, 1453-1812. In European Warfare, 1453-1815,

    edited by Jeremy Black. New York: St. Martins Press, 1999._______. Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged. Harlow, England: Longman/

    Pearson, 2007.Almond, Ian. Muslims, Protestants, and Peasants: Ottoman Hungary, 1526-1683. In Two

    Faiths, One Banner: When Muslims Marched with Christians Across Europes Battle-grounds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009.

    Faroqhi, Suraiya. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Ottoman Warfare. In The Ottoman Em-pire and the World Around It. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

    Gabriel, Richard A. The Siege of Constantinople. Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1992.Goodwin, Godfrey. The Janissaries. London: Saqi, 1992.Guilmartin, John F., Jr. Ideology and Conflict: The Wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1606.

    In Warfare and Empires: Contact and Conflict Between European and Non-European Mili-tary and Maritime Forces and Cultures, edited by Douglas M. Peers. Brookfield, Vt.:Ashgate/Variorum, 1997.

    Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power. New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2002.

    Murphey, Rhoads. Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers UniversityPress, 1999.

    The Ottoman Empire 597

  • Nicole, David. Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 1300-1400. Botley, Oxford, England: Osprey,1985.

    Reid, James J. Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse, 1839-1878. Stuttgart, Ger-many: Steiner, 2000.

    Turfan, M. Naim. Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, Military, and Ottoman Collapse. London:I. B. Taurus, 1999.

    Turnbull, Stephen. The Ottoman Empire, 1326-1699. New York: Routledge, 2003.Zorlu, Tuncay. Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the Modernisation of the

    Ottoman Navy. New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008.

    Films and Other MediaLawrence of Arabia. Feature film. Columbia Pictures, 1962.The Ottoman Empire: The War Machine. Documentary. History Channel, 2006.The Ottoman Empire, 1280-1683. Documentary. Landmark Films, 1995.Suleyman the Magnificent. Documentary. National Gallery and Metropolitan Museum of Art,

    1987.

    Frederick B. Chary

    598 Warfare in the Age of Expansion

  • Literature and Warfare

    Overview

    War is lifes greatest conflict and the ultimate form ofcompetition. As such, it continues to provide writerswith a fertile field for examining the always intriguingcomplexities of human nature. Warfare is often railedagainst, and on occasion it has been chic to view it asobsolete. In the overall scheme of things, however,war has generally managed to remain popular. Indeed,the noted philosophers Will and Ariel Durant oncecalculated that in the past 3,000 years only 268 ofthose years have been free of war. With this in mind,it is perhaps not surprising that wars have providedgrist for some of the worlds most enduring literature.

    Significance

    Literature that focuses on war recognizes how waraffects human behavior through characters created inliterature.

    History of Literatureand Warfare

    Ancient WorldOrganized armies have fought against each other forat least ten thousand years. Either at war or in antici-pation of war, military infrastructures have played akey role in the organization of human societies. Theearliest civilizations of China, for example, were es-tablished by organized armies.

    Accounts of the earliest conflicts were preservedin song and story through oral tradition, often settingwarfare in a mythological context. Rigvedic hymnsof ancient India, for instance, relate tales of the war-rior god Indra. A Babylonian epic poem, War of theGods, deals with the myth of world creation and theestablishment of divine hierarchy, which formed partof a New Years festival.

    The earliest literary work in the Western traditionto deal with war is found in the Iliad (c. 750 b.c.e.;English translation, 1611), ostensibly written byHomer (c. 750 b.c.e.), but whether or not it is a workof shared authorship is a moot point. One of the clas-sics of world literature, the Iliad deals with the verylong and savage war between Athens and Spartathe Trojan War (c. 1200-1100 b.c.e.)with the cul-minating siege of Troy, which dragged on for threedecades. The war was originally based on a strugglefor control of important trade routes across theHellespont. However, in the Iliad, the story centerson one incident: the Trojans attempt to recover theabducted Helen of Troy. When Agamemnonkingof the Greeks (who invade Troy), refuses to ransomChryseis to her father, the god Apollo inflicts aplague of pestilence on them, compelling Agamem-non to return the girl. Not to be entirely thwarted, Ag-amemnon takes Achilles prized concubine instead.Dishonored, Achilles withdraws his warriors. Warhere is depicted as not only mean and bloody but alsoa process of retaliation and quid pro quo. During thisprocess, when a warrior is slain or an attack is perpe-trated, the fury of the combatants escalates. Suchendlessly escalating conflict required a resolution,and Homer offered one in the Odyssey (c. 725 b.c.e.;English translation, 1614), which tells the story of asurvivor of the Trojan War, Odysseus (or Ulysses),who undergoes a series of adventures that function astests and atonements before he can return home to ajoyful reunion with his wife, Penelope. Both the Iliadand the Odyssey draw heavily on the rich storehouseof Greek mythology, and in so doing provide a di-vine perspective on the issues of loss and redemp-tion surrounding the Greek view of war.

    In the Aeneid (29-19 b.c.e.; English translation,1553), war is the context for nation-building: TheRoman poet Vergil (Publius Vergilius Maro) uses lit-erature as a sort of genealogical tool to reconstructthe beginnings of the Roman Empire. In this epicpoem, the Greek warrior Aeneas has fled his native

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  • land following the Trojan War andafter a series ofadventures, some harrowingarrives in Italy, wherehe proceeds to recount the details of the Trojan War.After defeating the Rutulian leader Turnus in battleand miraculously recovering from a wound receivedin combat, Aeneas marries Lavinia (daughter ofLatinus, king of the Latins) and establishes the newkingdom on the Seven Hills that has been promisedto him in a dream.

    Medieval WorldThe adopted nephew of Charlemagne, the knightRoland, and his bosom friend Oliver, together withtheir valiant comrades, sacrifice their lives to protectCharlemagnes army by defending the pass atRoncesvalles in the Pyrenees Mountains in 778 c.e.Their epic defense was later immortalized in theanonymous Chanson de Roland (c. 1100; The Songof Roland).

    Among Germanic peoples, one of the most influ-ential works of literature was the Nibelungenlied(c. 1200; English verse translation, 1848; prose trans-lation, 1877), set in the fifth century in north-centralEurope. Although medieval in origins, the Nibe-lungenlied, like the Homeric writings, draws on nu-merous myths, including Siegfrieds titanic battlewith a great dragon, including rituals of ancient wor-ship that are woven throughout the work. War, again,is depicted in the context of national origins and iden-tity, with an emphasis not on realism but on themythic and glorified aspects of battle, reflecting anancient Germanic cult of hero worship.

    By the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance,the literature of war had begun to depart from the reli-ance on mythology found in earlier literature and toconcern itself more with historical reality. The topicof war continues to provide an opportunity for writ-ers to speak of glory, honor, and courage, but with in-creasing fidelity to the background against which thestory is set. William Shakespeares Henry plays, forexampleHenry IV, Part I (1592), Henry IV, Part II(1597) and Henry V (c. 1598-1599)smoothlyblend poetry and history both to glorify England andto explain how the notoriously un-princely Henry Vevolved from a rakish and somewhat unprincipledyouth into a revered king, the hero of Agincourt. In

    the belief that he has as much lawful right to thethrone of France as did Charles, the reigning Frenchmonarch, Henry V makes his claim for that crown.Insulted by Charless son, the Dauphin, Henry pre-pares for war. At the decisive Battle of Agincourt,Henrys leadership carries the day, despite the factthat his army is outnumbered and weakened by ill-ness. Shakespeare glorifies Henry V (r. 1413-1422)and his victory at Agincourt, and his contemporariesmay well have regarded the portrayal as an overtly pa-triotic affirmation of contemporary warfare againstSpain. However, many critics have seen in the playslanguage and portrayals a more ambiguous attitudetoward warfare and perhaps a veiled criticism of con-temporary events in Elizabethan England (whereopen criticism of the monarchy and its policies wouldnot have been safe). The play thus illustrates both thegrowth in literature referencing actual events and thesensitivities, and potential dangers, of doing so.

    Modern WorldAs world civilizations advanced in age and (espe-cially) technology, these achievements were re-flected in world conflicts. Wars increasingly ex-panded their sphere of impact. Increasingly, battleswere no longer confined to unpopulated areas. Ac-cordingly, literature sought to keep pace with theevolution of modern warfare. Although the heroicvalues present in the literature of ancient and medi-eval wars was still to be found in literature the real-ism, the suffering and horror of war became increas-ingly evident.

    As warfare evolved into the so-called modernperiod, writers sought to present their subjects morerealistically. Literary characters provided the oppor-tunity and the voice to reveal a more accurate por-trayal of the grim horrors found on the battlefield. Inliterature as in real life, war as a glorious confronta-tion of chivalric honor was now depicted as a bloodycrucible of suffering and death.

    Novels, plays, and poems increasingly began toaddress not only the external events of war but alsothe soldiers personal experience of such traumaticevents, from courage to cowardice. In StephenCranes classic Civil War novel, The Red Badge ofCourage: An Episode of the American Civil War

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  • (1895), young Henry Fleming finds himself tor-mented by fear. Having dreamed of glorious battlesas a young farm lad, he was at first anxious to tastecombat, as are many soldiers who find themselves onthe field of war for the first time. Now, as his regi-ment advances, Henry sees battle as an escape fromthe boredom of inactivity. Then comes battle, with itscacophony of sounds, followed by an enemy counter-attack and panic. Henry flees from the field and nowthinks of himself as a coward. In a subsequent battle,he redeems himself, earning the praise of his lieuten-ant. The novel offers the reader an instructive psycho-logical profile of one young man enduring the chaos,fear, and self-doubt that every soldier must face.

    In his 1929 novel of World War I, Im Westennichts Neues (1929; All Quiet on the Western Front,1929), Erich Maria Remarque produced what is gen-erally thought to be the best-known work of antiwarliterature published between the two world wars. Thenovel was subsequently adapted for the screen, star-ring actor Lew Ayres. So forcefully did the film de-pict the horror of war that Ayres became a pacifistand later refused to serve in the military duringWorld War II.

    Two other haunting and memorable literary state-ments to emerge from World War I are LieutenantColonel John McCraes poem In Flanders Fields(1915) and the poem Rouge Bouquet (1918), bySergeant Joyce Kilmer (perhaps best known for hispoem Trees, 1914). In Rouge Bouquet, Kilmermemorialized his World War I comrades, who hadperished at Rouge Bouquet, near Baccarat in France.Many other poets emerged from this war, includingthe war poets Wilson Owen, who died in battle at theage of twenty-five, and his friend Siegfried Sassoon.

    World War I and its fierce trench warfare gave riseto what a group of writers called the lost genera-tion; they not only depicted the horror of war butalso questioned its value and necessity as a means ofresolving disputes between nations. In his novel AFarewell to Arms (1929), Ernest Hemingway wrotewhat many regard as the strongest polemic againstwar. The story is told through the eyes of a youngAmerican officer, Lieutenant Frederic Henry, who isattached to a medical unit on the Italian front. Therehe meets and falls in love with a nurse, Catherine

    Barkley. Wounded, Henry is hospitalized and even-tually has surgery on his knee. He and Catherine aretogether during his rehabilitation. She becomes preg-nant. While attempting to avoid capture by the Ger-mans, Henry deserts, and the two manage to reachSwitzerland, where Catherine and the baby both sub-sequently die.

    One of the most meaningful works of modern lit-erature to address the subject of war, NormanMailers The Naked and the Dead (1948), is regardedby some as the best novel of World War II. The au-thor set his story on a South Pacific island, focusingprimarily on one platoon of soldiers: their trials andtribulations, their interactions with one another, and

    Literature and Warfare 875

    The Granger Collection, New York

    The original 1929 front jacket cover for Erich MariaRemarques All Quiet on the Western Front.

  • the same fears and issues with which young HenryFleming grapples in The Red Badge of Courage. Inthe world of The Naked and the Dead, there is littleempathy among the members of the platoon, and nosympathy whatever for their Japanese foes. Mailerintroduces a second element to his novel, wherein heuses his story as a forum to describe ridiculous armyrules and protocols, always the source of irritation forthe soldiers. The novel also sets the conflict in per-spective by providing background for the campaignand a critique of military judgment.

    Satire and comedy have been used in many mod-ern works to depict and condemn war. Critique ofwar becomes an outright condemnation in JosephHellers Catch-22 (1961), which uses satire to focuson the futility and sheer idiocy of the way in whichthe military prosecuted war. Hellers main charac-

    ter, Yossarian, a bomber pilot based in Italy, haslooked at enough sky. He has no interest in hero-ism, medals, or glory. His one abiding interest is toget rotated home. In what almost appears to be acontrived setup, Yossarian finds that each time heapproaches the required number of missions toqualify for rotation home, the higher echelon in-creases the number. Determined, Yossarian resortsto various deceptions to try to defeat the system.Heller provides a supporting cast of characters ev-ery bit as devious as Yossarian. Hilarious in its sa-tiric effect, Catch-22 speaks against war as loudlyas more serious worksbut here by casting war asa farce.

    The novel Mister Roberts (1946), by ThomasHeggen (adapted for the stage in 1948 by Heggenand Joshua Logan, and in 1955 released as a fea-ture film), focuses on life as a soldier, making theaudience aware that men in combat must deal notonly with fear and suffering but also with the bore-dom of daily life in the backwater of war. The set-ting is a supply ship in the South Pacific com-manded by a tyrannical captain who cares onlyabout his next promotion. The hero, LieutenantDouglas Roberts, who longs for a transfer to com-bat, finally gets his request for transfer approvedby the captainor rather by the members of thecrew, who forge the captains signature in repay-ment for Robertss having managed to secure lib-

    erty for the crew by agreeing to give up challengingthe captains authority.

    The Vietnam War (1961-1975) has occasionedmany novels. In these works, realism has continuedto be emphasizedincluding, again, the psychologi-cal experiences of the individual soldier. In the caseof Tim OBrien, a Vietnam War veteran, psychologi-cal realism renders his novels extremely personal tothe point where, at times, the narrative crosses theboundary between actual fact and internal imagin-ings. Going After Cacciato (1978, revised 1989),which won a 1979 National Book Award, examinesthe conflicting moral imperatives of the VietnamWar when the point-of-view character, Paul Berlin,joins others in his platoon to retrieve the deserterCacciato (literally the hunted in Italian), who hasvowed to escape the war by walking to Paris. The ac-

    876 Culture and Warfare

    Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images

    Ernest Hemingways A Farewell to Arms.

  • tual events in the narrative are seamlessly interruptedby Berlins fantasies and fears, making the distinc-tion between reality and Berlins psychological statedifficult to discern. The clear sense, however, is thatCacciato, in attempting to carry out his insanely boldplan, is a heroin some ways a goal to be pursued

    rather than a criminal to be huntedas the soldiersgrapple with the moral ambiguities of following or-ders not because they believe in the war but becausethey need to avoid the fate that Cacciato will inevita-bly meet when they finally locate him near the Lao-tian border.

    Books and ArticlesBarlow, Adrian. The Great War in British Literature. New York: Cambridge University Press,

    2000. Elucidates the different ways that World War I has been used in British literature andhow that literature has impacted people.

    Berkvam, Michael L. Writing the Story of France in World War II: Literature and Memory,1942-1958. New Orleans: University Press of the South, 2000. Looks at the works of litera-ture that portray French life during World War II, after the fall of Paris, showing that not allFrench resisted the Germans and many later wrote about it.

    Chakravarty, Prasanta. Like Parchment in the Fire: Literature and Radicalism in the EnglishCivil War. New York: Routledge, 2006. Uses the literature of English sects during the CivilWar to outline the roots of what would later be called liberalism.

    Dawes, James. The Language of War: Literature and Culture in the U.S. from the Civil WarThrough World War II. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. Analyzes theties between language and violence, looking at how words frame the experience and under-standing of war.

    Griffin, Martin. Ashes of the Mind: War and Memory in Northern Literature, 1865-1900.Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009. Uses the literature of three northern po-ets and two writers of fiction to investigate the social memory of war and its place in cement-ing national values.

    Jones, Kathryn N. Journeys of Remembrance: Memories of the Second World War in Frenchand German Literature, 1960-1980. London: Legenda, 2007. Focuses on the memory of theHolocaust in the literature of France, West Germany, and East Germany during 1960-1980.

    Mickenberg, Julia. Learning from the Left: Childrens Literature, the Cold War, and RadicalPolitics in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Examines a specificgenre of childrens books during the 1920s-1960s that went against the Cold War rhetoricto teach so-called radical viewpoints, many of which are now mainstream.

    Natter, Wolfgang. Literature at War, 1914-1940: Representing the Time of Greatness inGermany. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999. Ties German literature aboutWorld War I to the rise of a military ethos that persisted through the German defeat andhelped prepare the ground for Adolf Hitlers rise and World War II.

    Phillips, Kathy J. Manipulating Masculinity: War and Gender in Modern British and AmericanLiterature. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. By using examples from the literaturefrom World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq, this study illuminates how men aregoaded into war mentality through the feminization of common traits.

    Taylor, Mark J. The Vietnam War in History, Literature, and Film. Tuscaloosa: University ofAlabama Press, 2003. Uses a case study approach in looking at five episodes during the Viet-nam War to examine how returning veterans are regarded in film and literature.

    Jerry Keenan

    Literature and Warfare 877

    Warfare in the Age of ExpansionThe Ottoman EmpireOttoman Expansion Under Sleyman the MagnificentTurning PointsThe Ottoman Empire, c. 1700Republic of Turkey, 1923