Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006), pp....

88

Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006), pp. 88–114 DOI:10.1355/cs28-1e©2006ISEAS ISSN0219-797Xprint/ISSN1793-284Xelectronic

Indonesia Seven Years after Soeharto: Party System Institutionalization in a New Democracy

Paige Johnson Tan

This article examines what the performance of indonesia’s political parties seven years on from soeharto’s resignation can tell us about politics in the country. Using the party system institutionalization framework first developed by scott Mainwaring and Timothy scully in Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (1995), the article finds that indonesia’s parties and party system show a mixed score card, strengths and weaknesses mixing to deprive the parties of legitimacy. on balance, the 2004 elections and 2005 regional elections represent a step towards further deinstitutionalization due to the primacy of personalities in the direct elections of the president and the regional heads. Democracy may indeed now be the only game in town, but its operation is likely to be rocky. There is a silver lining, however; accountability has been somewhat improved due to the electorate’s realization of its power to reward and punish parties and political leaders.

Keywords: Soeharto, institutionalization,deinstitutionalization,NewDemocracy,political legitimacy, Indonesia,politicalparties,Yudhoyono.

It is often said, following Samuel Huntington, that it is not the firstelections after the fall of an authoritarian regime that matter;instead, the path to democracy is seen to be assured only aftersecond elections have been completed.1 Indonesia’s second post-Soeharto elections, both parliamentary and presidential, were heldfromApriltoSeptember2004.Furthermore,2005–2006iswitnessingthecountry’sfirst-everdirectelections for regionalheads,governors,mayors, and regents. Can the country be seen finally to be firmly

05 Paige p88-114.indd 88 6/12/06 10:35:21 AM

Masiah

Text Box

Reproduced from Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs Vol. 28, No. 1 (April 2006) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg >

http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg

indonesia seven Years after soeharto 89

on the path to democracy? Is democracy now “the only game intown”?

ThisarticleexamineswhattheperformanceofIndonesia’spoliticalpartiessevenyearsonfromformerauthoritarianpresidentSoeharto’sresignation can tell us about politics in the country. The parties areanimportantpartofthepoliticalsocietyenvisionedbyJuanLinzandAlfred Stepan as forming one of the integral “arenas” of democraticconsolidation (1996). By using the party system institutionalizationframework first developed by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scullyin Building Democratic institutions: Party systems in Latin america (1995), thearticleanalyses thedegreetowhichtheIndonesianpartysystem can be seen to be institutionalized, thus contributing to,as Mainwaring and Scully found in Latin America (or not, in thecase of less institutionalized systems), democratization, and stablegovernance.2

Thearticlefindsthat,acrossMainwaringandScully’scriteriaofpartysysteminstitutionalization,Indonesia’spartiesandpartysystemshowamixedscorecard,strengthsandweaknessesmixingtodeprivethe parties of legitimacy. On balance, the 2004 elections and 2005regionalelectionsrepresentasteptowardsfurtherdeinstitutionalizationdue to the primacy of personalities in the direct elections of thepresidentandtheregionalheads.Democracymayindeednowbetheonlygameintown,but itsoperationis likelytoberocky.Thereisasilver lining, however; accountability has been somewhat improveddue to theelectorate’s realizationof itspower to rewardandpunishparties andpolitical leaders.

Party System Institutionalization and Democracy

In much of the literature on transitions from authoritarian rule,the role of political parties is seen to be key. To Linz and Stepan,the development of political parties is part of the development of“political society”, by which they mean “that arena in which thepolity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right toexercise control over public power and the state apparatus”.3 Asscholars recognize, often it is not the political parties which bringdown the old regime (this is typically brought about on the backsof union members, human rights campaigners, and students, amongothers),butitistothepoliticalpartiesthatonemustlooktoobservethekernelofdemocraticconsolidationapparentinthetransitionfromauthoritarian rule. Consolidation requires political parties to build anewsystemofcompetitionforpoliticaloffice(O’DonnellandSchmitter

05 Paige p88-114.indd 89 6/12/06 10:35:21 AM

90 Paige Johnson Tan

1986,pp.57–58).O’DonnellandSchmitterseethefoundingelectionas“provokingparties”intoactionforthe“partyisthemoderninstitutionfor structuringandaggregating individualpreferences” (ibid.,p.58).Observers of areas as diverse as Russia, Portugal, and Chile haveseentheroleofpartiesaskeytounderstandingtheprogress(or lackthereof) of the transition.

This discussion builds primarily from Mainwaring and Scully’s1995volumeonLatinAmerica,Building Democratic institutions: Party systems in Latin america.Mainwaring,workingalone,hasgoneontodevelop further the ideas first presented in the 1995 study with his1998article,“PartySystemsintheThirdWave”,andhis1999book,Rethinking Party systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. According to Mainwaring and Scully, past work onpartiesandpartysystemshasfocusedalmostexclusivelyonSartori’smeasuresofthepartysystem:thenumberofpartiesandthedegreeofpolarization(Sartori1976).Theseare,totheauthors,morerelevanttoadiscussionofWesternEuropeanpolitics.Developinganddevelopedcountriesmightwellsharefeaturesifevaluatedbasedonthenumberofparties.Why, then,do thepoliticalsystemsoperatesodifferently,theauthorsask.ToMainwaringandScully,theanswerliesindifferentdegreesofparty system institutionalization.

For the authors, an institutionalized party system is one inwhichthereisstabilityininter-partycompetition,partieshavestableroots in society, parties and elections are accepted as the legitimatemeans to determine who governs, and party organizations haverelatively stable rules and structures (Mainwaring and Scully 1995,p. 1). Institutionalization is not an either/or proposition. Rather,institutionalization ismeasured indegrees.

To Mainwaring and Scully, institutionalization of the partysystemiskey,notsomuchasanendinitself,butforwhatarelativelack of institutionalization can tell us about a country. Historically,holdingpoliticians accountablehasbeendifficult, legislaturesweak,and government legitimacy low in countries with weak parties andpartysystems,suchasBolivia,Brazil,andEcuador.Inthesesystems,“politics has a patrimonial flavour, as individual interest, politicalparty, andpublic good are fused” (ibid., p. 20).

Mainwaring and Scully use their framework to examineinstitutionalization across large swathes of time, in many countriesacross several different discrete party systems. However, in hisvolumeonBrazil,Mainwaringmentions that“[f]romtheperspectiveof party building, the first seven or eight years of democracy [the administrationsofSarneyandCollor]couldhardlyhavebeenworse”

05 Paige p88-114.indd 90 6/12/06 10:35:22 AM


(Mainwaring1999,p.100).Itisclearthatdynamicsareatworkearlyinaprocessofpolitical change that set thenormsandground rulesfor the new system. How this process has evolved in the first sevenyears of Indonesia’s transition is the focusof this article.

Indonesia’s Parties and Elections: The 2004 “Year of Elections”

Indonesia experienced three sets of elections in 2004. The first, inApril, was for the country’s legislative bodies from the national tothe local level (pemilu). The second, in July, was for the nationalpresidency (pilpres), thefirst time theholderof thisofficewouldbeelected directly by the people. As no candidate scored over 50 percent of the vote in this July first round, a run-off election was heldin September 2004 between July’s top two finishers. The issues inthe campaigns, such as they were, focused primarily on eliminatingcorruption, restoring higher levels of growth to the economy, andjob creation.

Todiscussafewofthemostsalientfeaturesofthepartysystemas 2004 began, the number of parties competing in the electionsdeclined from 48 in the 1999 elections to just 24. Six parties, thePartaiDemokrasiIndonesia-Perjuangan(IndonesianDemocracyParty-Struggle,orPDI-P),PartaiGolkar(FunctionalGroupParty,orGolkar),PartaiKebangkitanBangsa(NationalAwakeningParty,orPKB),PartaiPersatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, or PPP), PartaiAmanatNasional(NationalMandateParty,orPAN),andPartaiBulanBintang(CrescentStarParty,orPBB)qualifiedfor the2004electionsbased on their performance in the elections of 1999, earning morethan 2 per cent of seats in the country’s parliament.4 Other partiesin 2004 represented splinters from the larger parties: for example,PartaiNasionalBantengKemerdekaan (FreedomBullNationalParty,or PNBK) from PDI-P, Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (Concern for theNation Functional Group Party, or PKPB) from Golkar, and PartaiBintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party, or PBR) from PPP. Still otherparties representedreworkingsofparties thathad tried in1999, likethe Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) which wasthe renamed Partai Keadilan (Justice Party). The last category ofpartycompetingin2004wastheentirelynewparty,suchasSjahrir’sPartai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (New Indonesia Alliance Party,or PIB).

Table1showstheresultsoftheApril2004parliamentaryelectionspaired with those from Indonesia’s first post-authoritarian electionsheld in June1999.

05 Paige p88-114.indd 91 6/12/06 10:35:22 AM


Table1Parties’ Results in the 1999 and 2004 Parliamentary Elections:

Share of Vote, Number of Seats, and Share of Seats

1999 2004

Parties

% ofVote

no. ofseats

% ofseats

% ofVote

no. ofseats

% ofseats

Golkar 22.4 120 26.0 21.6 128 23.3PDI-P 33.7 153 33.1 18.5 109 19.8PKB 12.6 51 11.0 10.6 52 9.5PPP 10.7 58 12.6 8.2 58 10.5Demokrat n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.5 57 10.4PKS 1.4 7 1.5 7.3 45 8.2PAN 7 34 7.4 6.4 52 9.5PBR n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.4 13 2.4PBB 1.9 13 2.8 2.3 11 2.0PDS n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.1 12 2.2PKPI 1 4 0.9 1.3 1 0.2PPNUI 0.6 5 1.1 0.8 0 0.0PDKB 0.5 5 1.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Others 8.2 12 2.6 11 12 2.2

Total 100.0 462 100 100 550 100

Note: In the event a party’s name changed between 1999 and 2004, the most recentnamehasbeenused.Golkar=PartaiGolkar.PDI-P=PartaiDemokrasiIndonesia-Perjuangan.PKB=PartaiKebangkitanBangsa.PPP=PartaiPersatuanPembangunan.Demokrat=PartaiDemokrat.PKS=PartaiKeadilanSejahtera.PAN=PartaiAmanatNasional.PBR=PartaiBintangReformasi.PBB=PartaiBulanBintang.PDS=PartaiDamaiSejahtera.PKPI=PartaiKesatuandanPersatuanIndonesia.PPNUI=PartaiPersatuanNahdlatulUmmahIndonesia.PDKB=PartaiDemokrasiKasihBangsa. Sources: Electionworld.org, “Elections in Indonesia”, http://www.electionworld.org/indonesia.htm (accessed 3 March 2005); Elaine Paige Johnson, “Streams of LeastResistance: The Institutionalization of Political Parties and Democracy in Indonesia”,Ph.D.dissertation,UniversityofVirginia,2002;“PerhitunganPerolehanKursiDPRRI”,KPUIndonesia,http://www.kpu.go.id/dprkursi.php(accessed1March2005).

05 Paige p88-114.indd 92 6/12/06 10:35:23 AM


Commentaryonthe2004parliamentaryelectionsfrequentlycalledPartaiDemokrat(Demokrat)andPartaiKeadilanSejahtera(PKS),twoparties thatwereseen tocomeoutofnowhere tocapturemore than7 per cent of the vote each, the “winners” of the vote.5 Accordingto one observer, the parliamentary elections “ended the mandate ofthe status quo political parties” (Tomagola 2004, p. 44). The LowerHouseofparliament, theDewanPerwakilanRakyat (DPR),wouldbeoccupiedbylegislators,almost70percentofwhomwerenewtothebody, leadingmany toviewtheelectionsasa turningoutof theoldand an enteringof thenew.

Notsofast,though.Mostofthosehousemembersstillcomefromtheoldestablishedpoliticalparties. In fact, the top fourfinishers intheelectionscamefrom“thestatusquopoliticalparties”.Golkar,thepartyoftheSoehartoera,ledthepollswith21.6percentofthevoteand 128 seats. Golkar outperformed its rivals in 26 of the country’s32provincesand,whiletheparty’svotesharedroppedslightlyfrom1999, its seat total actually went up, from 120 to 128. PDI-P placedsecond, but the depth of the party’s drop in support from 1999 isglaring: from33.7percentof thevote, it fell to just18.5percent in2004. The party no longer was dominant in terms of parliamentaryseats either (with 109, or about one-fifth). Other large parties, PKB,PPP,andPAN,alsosawtheirnationalsharesofthevotedecline,PPPand PKB by 2 to 2.5 per cent and PAN by about half a point. PKSand Demokrat, the perceived “winners” of the elections, nipped thebig parties’ heels. PKS rose from just 1.4 per cent in 1999 to 7 percentin2004andgrabbed45seats,upfromjustseveninthepreviousparliament.Demokratdidnotexist in1999. It captured7.5percentofthevotenationwideand57seats.ThisturnaroundcausedpoliticalobserverRiswandhaImawantolabelGolkarandPDI-P“lonelywinners”(Imawan 2004, p. 182). They had won the election mathematicallybutprobablyhad little to feelhappy about.

Overall,17partieswonseatsinparliament,teninthedoubledigitsormore;thisrepresentedaslightshrinkagefrom1999,when21partiesscored representation at the national level. Still, more parties todayareplayersinthesystem.Partysystemscholarsuseameasurecalledthe effective number of parties to take the parties’ relative strengthsasawayofweedingout theconsequential from the inconsequentialparties and coming to a conclusion on the size of the party system.This is done by squaring each party’s share of the vote, summingthesquares,anddividingoneby the result.Theeffectivenumberofparties after the 2004 elections was 8.55, up strongly from 5.1 after1999,confirmingthedilutionofthepartysystemfrom1999to2004.

05 Paige p88-114.indd 93 6/12/06 10:35:23 AM


Table2Concentration of the Parliamentary Vote:

Elections of 1955, 1999, and 2004

% share of Vote

1955 1999 2004

Top4parties 78 79.5 58.8Top5parties 80.9 86.5 66.3Top6parties 83.6 88.5 73.6Top7parties 85.6 89.9 80

Source: KPU Indonesia, Final Results, Parlia-mentary Elections 2004, http://www.kpu.go.id(accessed 25 June 2004); Biro Humas, Komisi Pemilihan Umum: Pemilu indonesia Dalam angka dan Fakta Tahun 1955–1999 (Jakarta:KPU,2000).

Table 2 presents a different look at the dilution of the partysystem.Fromanexaminationof the table, it isclear that theoverallstrengthofthebigpartieshasbeenwatereddownsomewhat(1955isincludedjustforcomparisonasIndonesia’sonlyfreeelectionsbefore1999). In 1999 almost 80 per cent of the vote went to the top fourparties;in2004thatfigurewasjust59percent.In1999almost90percent of the vote went to the top seven parties; in 2004 just 80 percent of thevotewas so concentrated.

But theseparliamentary electionswerenot theonly game tobeplayedin2004.AftertheAprilparliamentaryelections,partiesscoringat least 3 per cent of the seats in the DPR or 5 per cent of the votein theparliamentaryelectionswerepermitted toputupacandidatepairingfor thepresidential–vicepresidentialcontest tobegininJuly2004. After one candidate was ruled ineligible to stand on healthgrounds(PKB’sAbdurrahmanWahid),fivecandidatepairswereclearedtocompete.Results fromthe tworoundsof thepresidentialelectionarepresented inTable3.

Into 2003, many believed that the presidential election wasMegawati’stolose,thoughshewasawareoftheveryrealpossibilitythat incumbency could hurt her due to the need to make toughpolicychoiceswheninoffice.Thoughherregimehadnotperformedin stellar fashion, it had at least restored stability to both politicsand the economy after the tumult of the 1998–2001 period.Megawati, though, was unable or unwilling to move boldly forward

05 Paige p88-114.indd 94 6/12/06 10:35:24 AM


infindingsolutionstothecountry’smanyproblems:corruption,risingprices,sluggishgrowth,littleforeigninvestment,andunemployment.Further, thepresidentwassingularly incapableofcommunicating tothe public what efforts the government was in fact taking in theseareas.

ThisleftanopeningwhichwouldbefilledbyMegawati’sformercoordinatingministerforpoliticalandsecurityaffairs,SusiloBambangYudhoyono, commonly referred to by just his initials, SBY. SBY’scandidacydevelopedamomentum,greatlyhelpedbytheDemokrats’results in the parliamentary elections, and peaked at just the righttime to carry him through the two rounds of presidential elections.The campaign’s strategy was brilliant as well. SBY ran against theexisting political parties. In the words of an official with the SBYcampaign:“WewanttoportraySBYasthepeople’spresident,notasa party president” (Far eastern economic Review, 8 July 2004). Theformergeneral attractedvotesbecauseofhispersonalityasmuchasanything else. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs(NDI)FocusGroupsfoundpeoplelikedthefactthatSBYwas“polite”,“calm…[with]anauthoritativebearing”,firm,andbecauseheappearedtohave integrity (NDI2004,p.6).SBYwas thefirst choiceofmanyvoters and the second choice of both Golkar and PDI-P voters, too.Interestingly, in Indonesia’s historically communalized politics SBYwas popular with both supporters of secular-nationalist parties likeGolkarandPDI-PaswellassupportersofIslamic-leaningoraffiliatedparties (NDI 2004, p. 8), throwing out of the window notions thatIndonesia’spoliticswerehopelesslypolarized along these lines.

Table3Indonesian Presidential Elections, 2004 (Percentage score)

Presidential–Vice-Presidential Candidate Pair*

July 2004,

First Round

september 2004,

second Round

WirantoandSalahuddinWahidMegawatiSoekarnoputriandHasyimMuzadiAmienRaisandSiswonoYudoHusodoSusiloBambangYudhoyonoandJusufKallaHamzahHazandAgumGumelar

22.226.214.933.6

3.1

39.1

60.9

*Winnerofeachroundnotedinbold.Source:KPUIndonesia,“HasilPilpres”,http://www.kpu.go.id/hasil_pilpres/suara_sah-1.php(accessed3March2005).

05 Paige p88-114.indd 95 6/12/06 10:35:24 AM


It seems that a vote for SBY was cast as a vote for change. Thecandidate campaigned with a simple message that he would workhardtocreateamore“secure,just,andprosperousIndonesia”.Infact,SBY’s landslide60percentof thevote in thepresidentialelection’ssecondroundcouldbeseenasanoverwhelmingmandateforchange.But,again,notso fast.Manyof thosebackingSBY’scandidacywereformerGolkarstalwarts,thepillarsoftheauthoritarianSoehartoregime.The new president himself is a former general. SBY campaignedbrilliantlysellinghoneyedwords, serenity,and fewconcretedetails.Discussions the author conducted with SBY voters during thepresidential election’sfirst roundsuggested that thosechoosingSBYexpected him to save the nation’s politics and economy from thecountry’sbickeringandself-seekingpoliticians.Typically,theelectionofacharismaticstrongmanwouldbeseen tobeantithetical topartysystem institutionalizationas strongmen likeDeGaulle,Yeltsin,andChaveztypicallyseektoweakenexistingpoliticalparties.However,inIndonesia’scase,SBYhasnotproventobeapartydestroyer.Rather,thecautious,doctorate-holdingformergeneralhasbuiltallianceswithexistingpartiesandhisvice-presidenthascapturedtheleadershipofthe election-toppingGolkar.

Regional elections: 2005–2006

Since theparliamentaryandpresidentialcontestsof2004, Indonesiahasembarkedonanotherelectionproject.Forthefirsttime,Indonesia’sregional heads, governors, regents, and mayors, are being directlyelectedbythepeople(pilkada). TheelectionsbeganinJune2005andcontinueinto2006.Asthetermsofserving,appointedregionalheadsexpire in the future, direct elections will be held to fill those slotsas well. This is a game of consequence. With Indonesia’s launchingofitsmassivedecentralizationprojectin2001,theseregionalleadershavebothmore resources andwider authority.

As the regionalelection lawwascrafted in theparty-dominatednationalparliament,thepartiesassuredamonopolyroleforthemselvesincontestingtheselocalraces.However,thusfar,thedynamicappearstobesomewhatdifferentfromthenationalpictureintheregionalraces,acomplexdancebetweenthepartiesandincumbents/localnotables.The party centres were allowed a say in candidate selection for theregional contests by the election law. In some cases, the parties putforththeirowncandidates forofficefromwithinthepartystructure.In other cases, though, the parties have attempted to attract servingofficialsorthosebelievedtohavepulledinthelocalities,duetoethnic,family,orfinancialconsiderations,torununderapartybanner.This

05 Paige p88-114.indd 96 6/12/06 10:35:24 AM


changesthepowerbalancebetweenpartyandcandidateslightlyandwill be interesting to observeover the comingyears.

The elections were organized by local election commissions(KPUD); thismeansacentralrepositoryof informationonthewholepanoply of elections is lacking. Press reports covering the earlyrounds suggest that turn-out was not as high as 2004’s contests inmanyareas,perhaps70per cent andas lowas50per cent in someplaces.Protests (including theburningofa localelectionoffice)andallegations of vote buying and other malfeasance have accompaniedthepolls inavarietyofareas,but, asat thiswriting, thepolls seemto have gone off relatively peacefully. There were further concernsthat fraud would be widespread due to the lack of monitors andpressattentiontothecontests.Instead,awidevarietyofindependentcitizengroupsacross thearchipelagoseem tohavearisen toobservethevoteprocess.

Party system institutionalization in indonesia

During the preceding discussion, I have outlined a number of waysin which Indonesia’s party system has changed from 1999 to 2005.Newpartieshaverisen;someolderoneshavedeclined.Thenumberof parties competing in the system has grown smaller, as has thenumber of parties achieving representation in parliament. Despitethis, theeffectivenumberofpartiesinthesystemhasactuallyrisen,as the bulk of the vote has been dispersed among more parties.The presidential and regional election contests have turned moreon personalities than parties. Now it is time to turn from this basicdiscussion of the party system to a consideration of the degree ofinstitutionalization apparent in theparty system.

stability in inter-party Competition

Scholarsexaminingpartysysteminstitutionalizationlooktointer-partycompetitionasprovidingaclueto therelativestabilityor instabilityof the overall complex of party relationships and voter preferences.Systems such as the United States’, in which the actual number ofswingvotersisrelativelysmallfromelectiontoelection,wouldbeseentoprovide ahighdegreeof stability.6Howdoes Indonesia fare?

Traditionally, stability in inter-party competition is measuredthrough volatility from one election to the next. Volatility is simplyameasureofthedegreeofchangeinoverallsupportforthepoliticalparties in the system from one election to the next.7 Parliamentaryelection volatility (calculated by the vote) from 1999 to 2004 was

05 Paige p88-114.indd 97 6/12/06 10:35:25 AM


28.55; calculated by seats earned, the figure was 25.78. This is highcompared with established democracies such as the United Statesand Switzerland, where figures in the range of four are common.Indonesia’svolatility is justonparwithother transitionalcountries,however.MainwaringlistsvolatilityfiguresforPoland(31.4)andtheCzech Republic (29.2) during the 1990s (during the early years oftheir transitions) that are quite close to Indonesia’s current level ofvolatility (Mainwaring1999, p. 29).

Clearly, the parties have not yet found their natural levels ofsupport (if they are ever to find these), and we will continue toexperience instability in inter-party competition for the foreseeablefuture. Contributing particularly this time to Indonesia’s moderatelyhigh levelofvolatilitywas thePDI-P’sdramatic15-pointdownwardswing.8Golkarsupporttoohasfallenfromtheabsurdlevelsitachievedunder Soeharto’s authoritarian regime (sometimes more than 90 percent in areas of Eastern Indonesia) to the more moderate 20–30 percent range, scoring generally in the teens on the island of Java.

Beyond volatility, are there any other notes we might take ofthe nature of inter-party competition since Soeharto fell? DeborahNorden critiques classical party system theory’s emphasis on thenumberofpartiesand ideologicalpolarizationandsays thatwhat isimportant to examine in newer democracies is the nature of inter-partycompetition,whether that competition is collusive, combative,or moderate (Norden 1998). Moderate competition, according toNorden, is the most promising for democracy, as it prevents therise of extra-system movements attendant to collusive competition(because significant interests may be unrepresented) and the chaosof combative competition (in which defeating one’s rival is moreimportantthanthesurvivalofdemocracyitself).Fromtheperspectiveofpartysysteminstitutionalization,moderatecompetitionwouldseemtooffer advantages as itwouldpresageorderly change.

Overall, Indonesia’s system shows a mixture of collusive,combative, and moderate features. In the legislature, party leadersseem to collude to shepherd the business of parliament withouttransparency (votes are rarely taken, and decisions are arrived at byfactionleader-drivenconsensus).DanSlaterfinds“partiessharepowerfarmore thantheyfight over it”,with thepartiesacting likeacartel(Slater2004,p.3).Party relationsare alsocombative, as thepainfulimpeachmentofAbdurrahmanWahidin2001showed,accompaniedby months of escalating demonstrations both for and against thepresident with fears that the nation was headed towards civil war.Butparty competition is alsomoderate.

05 Paige p88-114.indd 98 6/12/06 10:35:25 AM


Fromtherulelessnessofthecampaignin1999inwhichruleswereviolatedwithimpunityandsanctionsrarelytakeninmostcasesbyelectionsupervisorybodies,thelonglistofelectionviolationsin2004(7,000accordingtotheelectionoversightbodyPanwaslu)couldactuallyrepresentapositivedevelopment.9Theseviolationsrangedfromthesmall(flyerswheretheywerenotsupposedtobe,involvingchildrenincampaignactivities)tothenot-so-small(attemptstovotetwice,givinggiftsormoneytobuyvotes,intimidationofvoters,ballotofficialspre-punchingballots).Perhaps,though,theincreasingattentiontotheseviolationsandthepenaltiesthatwerehandeddownthistimearoundwereacase,asO’DonnellandSchmitterobservedlikeningtransitionstoamulti-layerchessgame:“withpeoplechallengingtherulesoneverymove”but“becomingprogressivelymesmerizedbythedramatheyareparticipatingin”and“gradually…committedtoplayingmoredecorouslyandloyallytotherulestheythemselveshaveelaborated”(O’DonnellandSchmitter1986,p.66).Electionsin2004wereslightlymoredecorousplay(evidencingmoderatecompetition);atleastviolationsweremorepublic,andtherewasmorepressuretoactuponthem.

To further understand the ways in which the parties compete,scholarslooktoideologicaldistance,theparties’differencesofstanceon fundamental political or economic questions. According to thislogic,greaterideologicaldistancepresentsopportunitiesforparalysingor de-stabilizing inter-party competition. In Indonesia, ideology hasbecomelesssalientin2004and2005evenfromthelowstartingpointof1999.Atleast in1999,partiesseemedtobattleoverwhethertheywere reformist or status quo. Others contended between Islam andsecularismorbetweendifferentunderstandingsof Islam(Indonesia’spartystreams,towhichIreturnbelow).Today,thepictureismuddieras most parties have made alliances across these former ideologicalchasms. On the parties’ platforms for the April 2004 parliamentaryelections, Habibie Center scholar Irman Lanti observed that the“platforms were made only to complete the registration procedurein KPU (the election commission)”, not as a genuine reflection ofprogrammatic intent (“ReportonDiscussion”,2004,p. 22).Convertstonotionallysecular-nationalistSBY’spresidentialcampaignincludedthe Islamic modernist PKS and PBB. In the campaigns for regionalelectionsin2005,localexpediencythrewtogetherpartiesthatwouldalsoseemtobeideologicalpolaropposites.InWestSumatra,secularPDI-P teamed with Islamic PBB to field a candidate. Elsewhere, itwas Islamic PKS with secular PKPI (Partai Kesatuan dan PersatuanIndonesia).Ideologicaldistanceisnotanimportantfactorinpolarizingcompetition among Indonesia’sparties.

05 Paige p88-114.indd 99 6/12/06 10:35:25 AM


stable Roots

Mainwaring and Scully look to parties having stable roots in thepopulation as providing stability to the party system. This is in asense related to stability in inter-party competition above. If partieshaveconsistentbasesofvotersonwhichtocallfromoneelectiontothenext, inter-party competitionwill bemore stable.

A method Mainwaring and Scully use to examine whether theparties have stable roots in society is to look at the average age ofpartieswinning10percentormoreofthevote.Thismakesintuitivesense as a measure since older parties would suggest more stayingpowerand thusmorestable roots insociety.For Indonesia, this isaratherloadedmeasure,though,sinceonlythreepartiestopped10percentof thevote in2004:Golkar (founded in1964),PDI-P (asplinterof Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, formed in 1973), and PKB (foundedin 1998).10 So, Indonesia’s relatively long-lived average age of 25.6mightspeakpoorlytothepartysystemasawhole.Ifwelookedatthetopsevenparties, thosewith6percentormoreof thevote, though,we still find an average age of 17.2 years (PPP [1973], PD [2003],PKS [1998],PAN [1998]).This suggests thatdespite thenew-nessofIndonesia’s democracy the top-scoring parties are more rooted thantheymight atfirst glance appear.

Rootedness might also be found by locating specific geographicareas or socio-economic groups associated with the various politicalparties. Parties that have roots in groups such as these can expect acertain level of support from election to election, thus contributingto the stability of theparty system.

Table4presentsasimpleviewofgeographicrooting,drawingadistinction between parties that do well on Java,11 where a majorityof the country’s voters live and where ethnic Javanese dominate, tothose that do well off-Java. Java accounts for almost 62 per cent ofIndonesia’s population but just 55 per cent of seats in the county’snational legislature, the DPR. Those parties with a high degree ofJavadependencein2004includePKBwith87percentofitssupportfrom Java,PDI-Pwith71per cent, andPartaiDemokratwith68percent. On the lower end of the scale, we find PAN with 60 per centof its support coming from Java and Golkar with just 52 per cent.From these simple calculations, we can see that PKB and PDI-P areJava-basedpoliticalparties,whileGolkar is anoff-Java party.

Breakdowns of results from opinion polls in 2004 add furtherinsighttowhatwecanobservefromtheJava/non-Javacleavageabove.Voters in rural areas, those with less education and lower incomes

05 Paige p88-114.indd 100 6/12/06 10:35:26 AM


tended tovote forGolkar,PDI-P,PPP,andPKB. Incontrast, those inurbanareas,withmoreeducationandhigherincomestendedtovoteDemokrat, PKS, or PAN in 2004 (LP3ES April 2004). So in terms ofbothgeography,Java/off-Java,aswellassocio-economiccharacteristics,thepartiesdo indeedhavedifferent complexions.

Dwight King and colleagues also find important continuitiesin voting from 1999 to 2004, with districts choosing similar partiesor similar types of parties from one election to the next (King et al.2005). Conventionally understood in terms of aliran, or stream,Indonesia’s parties can be broadly understood as secular-nationalist(PDI-P,Demokrat),Islamicmodernist(PKS,PAN),Islamictraditionalist(PKB), and Christian/minority (such as the Partai Damai Sejahtera,Prosperous Peace Party, PDS).12 King and colleagues find impressiveand clear correlations between parties/party stream chosen in 1999and2004.

The different complexions of the parties and the convincingevidence brought to bear by King and colleagues do suggest thatthe parties seem to have a core of voters upon which to call fromelection to election, the crux of rootedness. Still, something niggles.Rooted parties are chosen by voters consistently from year to yearandelectiontoelection.Pollingin2003suggestedthatlargenumbersof “swing voters” were up for grabs in 2004. In mid-2003, 58 percent of respondents to a national Asia Foundation poll were unsurewhat party they would support in the upcoming parliamentaryelections (Asia Foundation, 2003, p. 98). This did not suggest that

Table4Big Seven Parties with Java Dependence

Partyshare of Vote from Java

2004 Parliamentary elections

GolkarPDI-PPKBPPPDemokratPKSPAN

52.871.287.566.26966.560

Source:CalculatedfromKPUIndonesia,FinalResults,Parliamentary Elections 2004, http://www.kpu.go.id(accessed25June2004).

05 Paige p88-114.indd 101 6/12/06 10:35:26 AM


Tabl

e5

Su

pp

ort

for

Pre

sid

enti

al C

and

idat

es (

Rou

nd

I/J

uly

200

4a)

by

Par

ty C

hos

en i

n P

arli

amen

tary

Con

test

, A

pri

l 20

04b

Par

ty C

hos

enP

erce

nta

ge o

f s

up

por

t

in a

pri

l P

arli

amen

tary

ele

ctio

ns

su

silo

Bam

ban

gY

ud

hoy

ono

Meg

awat

is

oeka

rnop

utr

iW

iran

toa

mie

n R

ais

ham

zah

haz

Don

’t K

now

/n

o R

esp

onse

Gol

kar

39.1

5.1

38.4

b5.

11.

111

.2P

DI-

P22

.359

.2b

3.8

1.2

n.a

.13

.5P

PP

39.4

37.

110

.126

.3b

14.1

PK

B47

.45.

918

.42.

62.

623

.1D

emok

rat

87.3

b2.

43.

22

n.a

.5.

1P

KS

40.2

17.

239

.22.

110

.3PA

N14

.70.

92.

671

.6b

0.9

9.3

PB

B48

.62.

710

.818

.95.

413

.6P

BR

52.2

4.3

17.4

26.1

n.a

.n

.a.

PD

S33

.333

.322

.2n

.a.

n.a

.11

.2

Oth

ers

59.1

610

.49.

61.

713

.2S

ecre

t36

.16.

47.

14.

91.

943

.6N

ore

spon

se23

.82.

42.

44.

82.

464

.2

No

te:

Rea

da

cros

sp

resi

den

tial

can

did

ate

colu

mn

sas

su

pp

ort

for

can

did

ates

fro

me

ach

par

ty’s

vot

ers.

a In

terv

iew

sco

nd

uct

edJ

un

e20

04.

N(

nu

mbe

rof

res

pon

den

ts)

=2

,000

.b

Sol

idit

yof

su

pp

ort

from

can

did

ate’

sow

np

arty

.s

ou

rc

e:

IFE

S,

Wav

eX

IVT

rack

ing

Su

rvey

s,1

Ju

ly2

004,

htt

p:/

/ww

w.i

fes.

org.

05 Paige p88-114.indd 102 6/12/06 10:35:27 AM


voterswouldbehavewithagreatdealof loyalty from1999,and thewide swings in thevote in the2004parliamentary elections suggestthat many did not. The subsequent presidential election vote inparticular demonstrated that the parties, aside from a hard core ofrootedsupporters,couldnotcommandvoters’selectionofaparticularpresidential candidate.

Table5reportspollingresultsaftertheApril2004parliamentaryelections and links party voters in the parliamentary elections withcandidatesforthepresidentialelectionwhichwouldbeheldinJuly.Aswithvoterssupportingthesamepartyfromyeartoyear,insystemsinwhichthepartieshavestablerootsinsociety,wewouldexpecttoseevoterschooseapartyandapresidentialcandidatefromthesameparty in simultaneous (ornear-simultaneous) elections.

The results shown in Table 5 belie this idea in the case ofIndonesia. The superscripts b in the table show party voters whoplanned to stick with the party’s presidential candidate in the firstround of the presidential elections. The “loyalty rate” was highestforDemokratvoters (87per cent); this is intuitivelyunderstandable.Since Demokrat was set up as a vehicle for Yudhoyono, it wouldmake sense that voters that chose the party intended to chooseSBY as their presidential candidate. Amien Rais appeared likelyto hold 71 per cent of PAN voters, but interestingly, 14 per centof PAN votes, too, were headed to SBY. Megawati might have keptalmost 60 per cent of PDI-P voters, but a significant 22 per centplanned to vote SBY in the presidential race after choosing PDI-P for parliament. More Golkar voters chose SBY than planned tochoose theparty’sowncandidate,Wiranto (39 to38per cent).WithPPP voters too SBY was more popular than party leader and thenvice-president Hamzah Haz (39 per cent for SBY, with just 26 percent stickingwithHamzah).The tablemakes two interestingpoints.First,aglanceatthetablewouldpredictanelectionvictoryforSBY.Second, voters were not solidly behind parties and their respectivepresidential candidates, reflecting a weak rooting in the population.It is interesting to wonder whether the SBY/saviour phenomenoncontributed to this weakness or whether the weakness contributedto the rise of the SBY phenomenon.

Legitimacy of Parties and elections

Acceptance of the system of parties and elections is key to theinstitutionalizationof thepartysystem. If thepartiesor theelectoralsystem, for example, are not widely considered legitimate by the

05 Paige p88-114.indd 103 6/12/06 10:35:27 AM


population,instabilitycanbeexpected.Legitimacy,though,isprobablyalsoaresultoftheinstitutionalizationofthepartysystem.Long-lived,stable systems that are regularly able to deliver governing solutionsaremuchmorelikelytobeacceptedbycitizensandthusconsideredlegitimate.

In Indonesia the issueof the legitimacyofparties andelectionspresents, as elsewhere in the article, contradictory trends. Ingeneral, parties are ill trusted, but the elections themselves are wellrespected. Polls since 1998 have repeatedly found parties as amongthe least trusted social/political institutions. In this vein, an LP3ES(Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi Sosial)poll conducted in early2004 found that respondents felt thepartiesto be out of touch and self-seeking.13 The horse trading that partiesengage in, the corruption, the lack of attention to or ability to solvethenation’smostpressingproblemsallseemtoweighdownpopularsentimentstowardsthecountry’spoliticalparties.Theparliamentaryelection results, with large drops for the major parties, particularlythePDI-Pof thenpresidentMegawatiSoekarnoputri, and the riseofnew powers, such as Demokrat and PKS, also seem to demonstratepopular dissatisfaction with politics as usual, and the parties are abigpart of that.

Widespread antipathy towards the parties is echoed in andreinforcedbycommentsbypublic intellectualson thesubjectof theparties.ArbiSanit,apoliticalscientistattheUniversityofIndonesia,observes that the “[p]arties have failed to carry out their duty andfunctioninaqualitymanner”.Theleadersareorientedtowardstheirown ends “as a result of [their] egoism”. The party leaders havenot “developed abilities as statesmen, politicians, and technocrats”.According toArbi, thepartypoliticiansuse thecheapandeasywayto motivate their followers, playing on values and primordial ties(Sanit 2003, pp. 1, 10, 12, 13).

Abd. Rohim Ghazali seconds many of Arbi’s sentiments. Asshown by the 2004 parliamentary elections, the parties, rather thanchannelling the people’s aspirations, have become “the stage for thebetrayal of the people’s aspirations”. According to him, the partiesare just a “Trojan horse” to get the party elites into power (Ghazali2004).AnothercynicalviewcomesfromFransMagnusSuseno,fromtheDriyarkaraSchoolofPhilosophy.“Thoughthereistheperceptionthatallof the24parties [runningintheparliamentaryelections]arebad, pick the one that is the best of the worst!” (Koirudin 2004, p.80).Thatseems tobeabackhandedmeansofencouragingpeople touse their right to votedespite thepathetic offerings.

05 Paige p88-114.indd 104 6/12/06 10:35:28 AM


Frans’ comment leads us from attitudes towards the parties toattitudestowardtheelections.Turn-outhashistoricallybeenhighinIndonesianelections.DuringtheSoehartoyears,votingwascompulsoryandaveragedalmost92percentacross thesixNewOrderelections.Turn-out in 1999 at 93 per cent was typical of New Order electionsandhighevenby the standardsofmany“euphoric”first-democraticelections. Turn-out across the three elections in 2004 declinedcontinuously. Turn-out for the parliamentary elections in April was84 per cent. For the first round of the presidential elections in July,turn-outwas78percent.Forthefinalroundofthepresidentialpollsin September, turn-out was just 75 per cent (IFES, undated). Manyexplanationsmaybeofferedforthedecliningturn-out:theconfusingballot and new voting system for the April parliamentary elections(peoplewereallowedtochoosebothapartyandacandidate);peoplefeelingfreenottovote;fatiguewiththeseeminglyincessantelectionsof2004;therelativecertaintythatSBYwouldwinthesecondroundpresidentialcontest,asdemonstratedbyopinionpollingbeforevotingday; and the last, lack of feeling of efficacy on the part of voters. Itis this last sentiment that would be most important to know. Didvoters not turn out to vote because they felt unable to influence thesystem?Didtheybelievethemachinatingpartypoliticianscouldnotbe brought to heel by ordinary voters? These are, at this time, stillunknowns.Examiningtheearlyroundsofelectionsforregionalheadsheldinmid-2005showsaturn-outrateofabout70percent(Jakarta Post,8July2005).Risesinvoteralienationwouldbeillharbingersforinstitutionalizationof theparty systemand, potentially, democracy.

Despite a declining turn-out, public perception of the electionshas generally been quite positive, as demonstrated through opinionpollingbytheInternationalFoundationforElectionSystems,orIFES(2004).Thattheelectionswereveryorsomewhatwellorganizedwasagreed to by 90 per cent of respondents after the first round of thepresidential contest and 96 per cent after the second round.14 Weretheelectionsfair?Afterthesecondroundofthepresidentialcontest,when,assumingallthreeelectionswereinrespondents’minds,97percent considered the elections mostly or completely fair. Eighty-ninepercentofrespondentsfeltthattheelectionmonitoringorganization,Panwaslu, was effective at supervision of the polls; just 7 per centdisagreed. Election rules were not well enforced in 1999. In 2004,electionoversight seems tohave improved.

Inadditiontoviewingattitudestowardpartiesandelections,wemay look to theembeddednessof thepoliticalparties in thecurrentpoliticalsystemtoattempttoseepublicrecognitionofthelegitimacy

05 Paige p88-114.indd 105 6/12/06 10:35:28 AM


of their role.Embeddednessalonecannotbe seenasanunmitigatedpositive for institutionalization. We must look at embeddedness inconjunctionwithotherattitudestowardslegitimacy,andhereiswhy.Parties that are strongly embedded in the political system withoutbeingviewedaslegitimate,aswasthecaseupto2004,mayactuallybearecipefordissatisfaction.Itisthisdissatisfactionthatcouldleadto alienation from thedemocratic systemandpotential instability.

The parties have been strongly embedded in Indonesia’s post-Soeharto system of government; some would say the parties havea stranglehold on the political process. Only parties (and parties ofa certain size) can nominate candidates for parliament at all levels,the presidency, and province/district heads. Attempts to mitigatethe parties’ power, such as by moving from a closed to open-listproportional representation system and creating a new party-lessRegional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD),have changed the situation little. Fewer than 50 per cent of voterstookadvantageoftheopen-listfeature(whichwouldbreakthepartycentres’ control over who enters parliament through their controlof list rankings) (“Report on Discussion” 2004, p. 26). In the 2004parliamentaryelections,fewconteststurnedonthisfeature.TheDPDis also a weak cousin to the party-dominated parliament and eventhis notionally party-less body is not devoid of strong connectionsbetweenmembers and the existingpolitical parties.

stable Rules and structures

Thelastcriterionofpartysysteminstitutionalization,stablerulesandstructures, is the most “organizational”. In order to be consideredinstitutionalized, parties need to have developed their capacitiesas “organizations”. First, party organizations should be relativelyindependent:havingsufficientandregularfunding,freeofthedictatesofanysponsoringorganization,andnotpersonalistic.Secondly,partiesshould be internally disciplined. They should have the capacity tovote as a bloc in legislative bodies. They should also be relativelyfree of faction. Parties should also control processes of candidateselection. Lastly, parties should be routinized as organizations, withsystemness, or inter-connectedness, among the various parts as wellas regularizationof internalprocesses.

Duetothemanycriteriaatissueinconsideringthedegreetowhichthepartieshaveestablishedstablerulesandstructuresaswellasthepoor information available on the topic due to lack of transparencyon the part of the parties, in this section, I will be forced to speak

05 Paige p88-114.indd 106 6/12/06 10:35:28 AM


inbroadbrushstrokeson the issueofpartyorganizationandofferamore extended discussion on a few key issues such as personalismandfactionalizationintheparties.Thepresidentialelectionsbroughtthe issueofpersonalism inparticular to the fore.

Indonesia’s party organizations generally wither in the absenceof elections; this, of course, suggests a lack of stable structures andsystemness and thus a lack of institutionalization. Perhaps, of allthe parties, only the upstart PKS has worked to develop a solidorganization based on rigorous cadre development, discipline, anddemocratic participation. In general, due to strong concentration ofdecision-making authority at the party centre and the magnetic roleofparty leaders, other armsof theorganizationdonotdevelop; thisis rational in that otherparts of theorganization areneitherwantednor needed. It would be superfluous or even counter-productivefrom party leaders’ perspectives to develop highly involved partycadres if party strategy relies on the motivation of followers basedoncharismaalone.Thoseinvolvedcadresmightwantinputintotheparty’sdirection,deprivingthecentreofitspowertosetpartypolicyunobstructed.

ThepersonalismofIndonesia’spartiesisthemostremarkeduponorganizationalconcern.Educated,urbanpoliticalobserversdecrythatparties’relianceonwhatareseentobeirrational,primordialsentimentsand personality to obtain votes. William Liddle and Saiful Mujaniin their study of voting behaviour found that the most importantfactor in determining Indonesians’ vote in both the presidential andparliamentary contestswas attachment to an individualparty leader(Liddle and Mujani 2005). Because the parties have the ability tomanipulate voter sentiments through charismatic leaders, it actuallydoes not make sense to invest heavily in organization building. Forthisreason,asidefromthePKSexception,mostpartiesare“rational”and relyon “irrationality”, thus resulting inweaker organizations.

OneIndonesianobservernotedthatIndonesia’s“media-democracywasleavingpoliticalpartiesatthemarginofpoliticalactivity”(Prasojo2004,p.223).Thenatureoftheentirecampaignfromparliamentarytopresidentialelectionswashighlypersonalistic.Boththeparliamentaryand presidential campaigns were largely focused on the parties’respectivepresidentiables(toborrowatermfromthePhilippines),inaddition to an array of stars from the worlds of television, movies,and music. According to Andi Mallarangeng, the personalisticnatureofthecampaignsuggestedthat“[p]oliticalleadersdon’tthinkpeople are smart enough or rational enough to look at the issues”(Slate.com, 28 June 2004). Issues were treated only vaguely in the

05 Paige p88-114.indd 107 6/12/06 10:35:29 AM


campaign.Candidateswerebigon identifying thenation’sproblems:unemployment and corruption, for example, but were much weakeron how these problems would be overcome. Presidential campaignswererunbysuccessteamsfocusedonthecandidatesthemselvesandnot thepoliticalparty.15

Oneimportantindicatorofthedegreetowhich2004wasaseriesofcontestsaboutpersonality rather thanpartywas the failureof thepartiestodelivertheirvoterstotheirrespectivepresidentialcandidates,asdiscussedabove.AsIndraJ.PiliangoftheCenterforStrategicandInternational Studies observed, a “political rebellion took place atthegrassroots level” ( Jakarta Post,6October2004).Voterschose forthemselveswhowouldbethemostappealingpresidentialcandidate,taking fewcues frompartyorganizations or other bodies.

Asfarasinternaldisciplineisconcerned,thepartiesareobviouslystrongly divided. While parties can control parliamentarians due totheirpowerofrecall,partysplitsareubiquitous.Thelackofinternaldemocracy in the parties and all-powerful natures of the partycentresalmostmakethesesplitsinevitable,asthereissmallroomforchallenge, reform, and leadership renewal. Between 1999 and 2004,most of the major parties, including Golkar, PDI-P, PKB, PPP, PAN,andPBB,experiencedsignificantsplintersandinternalfactionalization,some of the parties experiencing multiple, significant divisions. Inthe wake of the 2004 elections, Megawati’s leadership of the PDI-Pwaschallengedbya reformmovement in theparty seeking to fosterinternaldemocracyandholdMegawatiresponsibleforherfailuresinofficeandasacampaigner; theattempts failed.UnlikePDI-P,Golkarwasable to react to theoutcomeof the2004elections,mostnotablySBY’svictory.Theanti-SBYwingofthepartywassoundlydefeatedinleadershipelections,asnewVice-PresidentJusufKallatookcontrolofthepartyandplacedhisownpeopleintheparty’sleadingpositions,presenting amoreunifiedorganizational front.

Conclusion: Implications for Indonesian Democracy

Scholars Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully pointed to the levelof party system institutionalization as the key difference betweendeveloped and developing country politics. In the Latin Americansystems the authors studied, low levels of institutionalization ofthe party system were accompanied by low levels of accountabilityand unstable governance. I have used the authors’ framework ina different, Asian, context, and in a situation of recent transitionfrom authoritarian rule. I view the party system institutionalization

05 Paige p88-114.indd 108 6/12/06 10:35:29 AM


frameworkasalenswhichhighlightsimportantareasinconsideringIndonesia’sdemocratization.

On balance, I find that Indonesia’s party system hasdeinstitutionalized slightly since 1999, particularly with the focusonindividualsratherthanpartiesbecauseofthepresidentialcontest,continuingintotheracesforregionalheadsaroundthenation.SBY’svictory inparticularcanbeseenasa triumphover theparties.Still,the parties exhibit conflicting signs of institutionalization, strong insome areas and weak in others. In many ways the parties’ strengthsmake theirweaknessesworse.There is a silver lining, however.

Intherealmofinter-partycompetition,weseeadecliningshareofthevotetotheestablishedpoliticalpartiesandariseintheeffectivenumber of parties in the system. Volatility at more than 28 is high,butonparwithsomeothercountriesintransition.ThePDI-P’slargeswingdownwardexplainsagreatdealofthevolatilityinthesystem.In2004, rulesof campaigningwerebrokenwildly, suggesting a lackof decorum in the parties’ inter-relationships, but that these rulesbroughtdownsanctionsincontrastto1999’sutterrulelessnesscouldbeseenasastrongpositive.Ideologicalpolarizationhasdeclinedsince1998–99 as all parties have attempted to reach across the old socio-culturaldividesinthepopulation.Infact,collusivecompetitionnowseemsa largerdanger thancombativecompetition.Wecanexpect tosee furtherflux inparties’ vote shares in future.

Parties do seem to have established either on-Java or off-Javasupportbases. Inaddition, there seems tobea splitbetweenpartiesof the urban, educated, and relatively wealthy (Demokrat and PKS),in contrast to parties of the rural, less educated, and relatively poor(Golkar,PDI-P,PKB).Also,thepartieswinningthelion’sshareofthevotearelongerlivedthanIndonesia’syoungdemocracymightsuggest.Evidently, the parties have established a core of support that canbe counted on from one election to the next. There are weaknesses,though. Parties were unable to deliver their parties’ parliamentaryvoters to particular presidential candidates, nor were they able tohold them unambiguously from 1999; these would be two markersof greater rootednessof theparties in thepopulation.

The parties are widely seen as corrupt and self-seeking; this isaffected and reinforced by public intellectuals’ commentary on thepartysystem.Thedeclineinturn-outthrough2004mightalsospeaktovoters’decliningsenseofefficacy.Or,thedecliningturn-outmightbe seen simply as acceptance of a foregone conclusion. The partiesare strongly embedded in the system as shown in laws on partiesandelections(qualifyingasapartyismoredifficultandonlyparties

05 Paige p88-114.indd 109 6/12/06 10:35:29 AM


of a certain size can participate). Attempts to minimize the parties’centres’ power by implementing an open-list form of proportionalrepresentation had minimal impact. The new party-less RegionalRepresentatives Council is also by design no match for the party-dominatedDPR.Thevote in2004, though, shouldbe seenasavoteagainst politics as usual. The upturn in vote for PKS and Demokrataswell asSBY’svictory in thepresidential racewere indicationsofa desire for change and thus a lack of legitimacy for existing waysofdoingbusiness.

Lastly, the parties’ rules and structures are weak. Partyorganizations, outside the centre, collapse into nothingness outsideof election periods. Personalistic parties still dominate the politicalsystem, nowhere better demonstrated than in the failure of PDI-Preformers to bring Megawati to heel in their challenge to her at the2005PDI-PCongress.Partieshaveindeedbehavedrationallyinbettingontheelectorate’s irrationality.Whybuildstructureswhencharismacan work just as effectively and much more cheaply? The partiesexperiencedanearthquakeofschismsinthe1999–2004intervalandare strongly factionalized.

Astheabovesynopsissuggests,Indonesia’spoliticalpartiesareincertainwaysverystrong.Thepositiontheyaregiveninthepoliticalsystem by virtue of the country’s laws on parties and elections isstrong. The proportional representation electoral system strengthensthe parties, and the party central leaderships particularly. Opposingthe“Westernpractice”ofvoting,thepartyleaderships,inconsultationwithoneanother,areabletoshepherdmostofparliament’sbusinesswithbarely awhimper from the country’sparliamentarians.

Indonesia’spartiesarealsoweak.Thepartiesaredivorcedfromthepopulation,almostuniformlyelite-ledcreationswhich,whilehavingasomewhatstableconstituency,havenostablepopular involvementindecision-making.Inaddition,manyofthepartiesarepersonalistic,trading on the charisma of prominent persons for votes. Finally, thepartiesareunderdevelopedasorganizations.Theyhavestruggledwithalackof internal rules,party splits, and unprofessional management.

Theparties’strengths,then,maketheparties’weaknessesworse.Because theparty central leaderships are in a strongposition in thelegislature and the parties are personalistic, party leaders have littleincentivetodeveloptheirorganizations.Becausethepartiesarestrong,theyhavebehavedwith relative impunity to thispoint.Theparties’startling weaknesses have contributed to a climate in which theirlegitimacy is dissipating. In many ways, this explains the ex nihilosuccessofDemokratandPKSin2004aswellasSBY’sdramaticrise

05 Paige p88-114.indd 110 6/12/06 10:35:30 AM


to the presidency, drawing votes from across Indonesia’s politicalspectrum.

Akey criticismof Indonesia’sdemocratization to thispointhasbeentheweaknessofaccountability—and,importantly,thisisoftenassociatedwithweakpartysysteminstitutionalization.Withapresidentcoming to power on the back of a grand coalition, as was the casewithAbdurrahmanWahidandMegawatiSoekarnoputri,whoistobeheldresponsible,intheend,forpolicysuccessesandfailures?Withalegislaturethatdisdainsvoting,shepherdingitsbusinessthroughtheconsensus of faction leaders, where, too, is accountability? The keylesson of 2004 is that the anvil of accountability can come crashingdown, and this is the silver lining for those hoping for democraticconsolidation in Indonesia. According to Thamrin Amal Tomagolaof the University of Indonesia, “[f]rom now on, leaders will haveto reckon with the people” (Associated Press, 21 September 2004).Indeed, Golkar and PDI-P have little to relish in their parliamentary“triumphs” in2004.Movementshavestirred inbothparties to reacttothepopularverdict.SBYwaselectedasanon-partisanfigurewho,itwashoped,couldsave thenation,buthehasnotactedasapartydestroyer.Whilewecancontinue to expect to see shifts in levelsofsupport for the parties in future, the people cannot be written outof theequation,andthat is thehealthiestnewsofall for Indonesia’sdemocratization.

NOTES

*Anearlierversionof thisarticlewaspresentedat theAssociationforAsianStudiesAnnual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, in April 2005. Thanks to fellow panellists DwightKing, Bill Liddle, and Allen Hicken. Brantly Womack also offered comments on anearlierdraft.Theauthormonitored the2004first roundofpresidentialelectionswithJakarta’sHabibieCenter.She is grateful to theCenter and its kind staff.

1 In the Third Wave, Huntington actually highlights a “two turnover test”, whichrequired not just two sets of elections but two peaceful changes of governmentfollowingelectionsasindicationthatdemocracywasbecomingestablished.Thisis often telescoped to a two-election test. SeeHuntington (1991,pp. 266–67).

2 Criticisms of Mainwaring and Scully that accuse the scholars of melding theideas of party institutionalization and party system institutionalization haveinformed theauthor’sanalysisof the Indonesiancase.SeeRandall andSvasand(2002).

3 LinzandStepandescribefive“arenas”inwhichtheconsolidationofdemocracytakesplace.Consolidationrequiresavibrantcivilsociety,anautonomouspoliticalsociety,theruleoflaw,ausablestate,andaneconomicsociety.Formoreonthearenas, see the introductory chapter ofLinz andStepan (1996).

05 Paige p88-114.indd 111 6/12/06 10:35:30 AM


4 According to the revisedelection law (2003),partiesneeded2per centof seatsintheexistingDPR,3percentofregionalparliamentseats(DPRD)inhalfofallprovinces,or3percentofseatsinregencyormunicipal-levelcouncils(DPRDII)inhalfofallthecountry’sregenciesandcitiestoqualifytotakepartautomaticallyin the elections. Parties not fulfilling the criteria could merge with an existingpartyor attempt to create anewpartymeeting the criteria.Newpartiesneededexecutive committees and permanent offices in two-thirds of the provinces andtwo-thirds of the regencies/cities in those provinces and 1,000 party members(or1/1000thof thepopulation,whichever issmaller) ineachregency/citywheretheparty is organized.

5 AsPartaiKeadilan,PKShadcompetedin1999,achievingjustunder1.4percentof thevote.PartaiDemokratwas awhollynewparty.

6 Itisinthistypeofstabilitythatsomesuggestthathighdegreesofinstitutionalizationcanactuallybestultifying toapoliticalsystem.Newpartieshavemanyhurdlestrying to break in to theUS system.

7 Volatility is the sum of the changes from one period to the next divided bytwo.

8 PDI-P’s swing has been interpreted as PDI-P members not showing loyalty tothe party. We do not have the data to support this conclusion. A more likelyinterpretationis thatvotesbroadlyintendingtowards“reform”wenttoPDI-Pin1999. These were frustrated by PDI-P alliances with status quo politicians andMegawati’srelativeinactivityinofficefrom2001.PDI-Phadnolong-termclaimtothesevotes, and theyhavemoved elsewhere in an attempt to seek satisfaction.

9 On the rulelessnessof the1999campaign,personal interviewwithHikmahantoJuwono,amemberoftheJakartaPanwas,Jakarta,11February2000.Onthe2004elections, see thePanwasluwebsite athttp://www.panwaslu.or.id/.

10 Theauthoracknowledgesthatreasonablescholarsmaydifferonhowtoestablishtheparties’ages.Wherecontinuityinpersonalities,symbols,ideology,orfacilitieswas clear, such as with Golkar, PDI-P, and PPP from the Soeharto era, I havecounted these contemporaryparties as continuationsof the earlier incarnations.Wheresignificantbreaksoccurred,suchasfromthePartaiNUoftheparliamentarydemocracyeratothePKBoftoday,thepartyhasbeendatedtoitspost-Soehartofounding. However exactly the parties are dated, the point would remain thesame.Despitethe48notionally“new”partieswhichcontestedthepollsin1999and the 24 in 2004, the bulk of the vote went to parties with longer histories.Theseparties thusprovidemorestability to thesystem than itsnew-nessmightsuggest.

11 The Javaprovinces include Jakarta,Banten,West Java,Central Java,Yogyakarta,andEast Java.

12 Parties such as Golkar and PPP defy easy categorization within the traditionalstreams.Golkarisprimarilyasecular-nationalistpartybutwithimportantIslamiccurrents.PPP is an Islamicparty that takes inbothmodernist and traditionalistelements.

13 N = 5,592. LP3ES survey preceding the parliamentary elections (LP3ES March2004).

14 The national-level election organizing body, the KPU, has since been rocked byscandal as several of its members, including its head, have been arrested and

05 Paige p88-114.indd 112 6/12/06 10:35:31 AM


chargedwithcorruption.Itisnotclearhoworwhetherthishasimpactedpopularattitudes towards the conduct of the elections.

15 This is similar to the US party system. Despite US parties’ long-livedness, USparties arenotoriouslyweak alongmanyother criteria of institutionalization.

REFERENCES CITED

Abd. Rahin Ghazali. 2004 “Putus Hubungan Partai dengan Rakyat”. Kompas, siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004. Jakarta:PenerbitBukuKompas.

AsiaFoundation.2003.Democracy in indonesia: a survey of the indonesian electorate 2003. Jakarta:AsiaFoundation.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.Norman,Oklahoma:University ofOklahomaPress.

Imawan,Riswandha.2004.“TheLonelyWinners”.Kompas.siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004. Jakarta:PenerbitBukuKompas.

InternationalFoundationforElectionSystems(IFES).Undated.Electionguide.“ResultsSummary” for Indonesia Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. http://www.ifes.org (accessed1March2005).

———.2004.“ResultsfromWaveXVIIIofTrackingSurveys”,19October2004.http://www.ifes.org/searchable/ifes_site/reg_activities/indonesia_surveys.html#surveys.

King,DwightY.,AniesBaswedan,andNicolausHarjanto.2005.“TheRelativeImportanceofSocial-basedVotinginthe2004IndonesianElections.”PaperpresentedattheAssociation forAsianStudiesAnnualMeeting,Chicago, Illinois.

Koirudin.2004.Profil Pemilu 2004: evaluasi Pelaksanaan, hasil dan Perubahan Peta Politik nasional Pasca Pemilu Legislatif 2004.Yogyakarta:PustakaPelajar.

LembagaPenelitian,PendidikandanPeneranganEkonomiSosial(LP3ES).April2004.Pemilih PDiP Beralih ke Partai Demokrat, suara PPP dan Pan Bocor ke PKs.7April 2004. http://www.lp3es.or.id.

———.March2004.“NotWho,butWhattheVotersWant”.Laksamana.net. 18March2004. http://www.laksamana.net.

Liddle,R.William,andSaifulMujani.2005.“Comparingthe1999and2004IndonesianLegislative Elections”. Paper presented at the Association for Asian StudiesAnnualMeeting,April 2005.

Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: southern europe, south america and Post-communist europe.Baltimore: JohnsHopkins.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1998. “Party Systems in the Third Wave”. Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3: 67–81.

———. 1999. Rethinking Party systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.

Mainwaring,Scott,andTimothyR.Scully.1995.Building Democratic institutions: Party systems in Latin america. Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.

05 Paige p88-114.indd 113 6/12/06 10:35:31 AM


NationalDemocraticInstituteforInternationalAffairs(NDI).2004.“ThePeople’sVoice:Presidential Politics and Voter Perspectives in Indonesia: Report on a Series ofFocus Groups Conducted during May in Seven Indonesian Provinces Ahead ofthe July2004 PresidentialElections”, 6 June2004.

Norden, Deborah L. 1998. “Party Relations and Democracy in Latin America”. Party Politics 4, no. 4: 423–43.

O’Donnell,Guillermo,andPhilippeC.Schmitter.1986.Transitions from authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.

Prasojo,Eko.2004.“MediokrasidalamPemilu2004”.Kompas,siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004. Jakarta:Penerbit Buku Kompas.

Randall,Vicky,andLarsSvasand.2002.“PartyInstitutionalizationinNewDemocracies”.Party Politics 8,no. 1: 5–29.

“ReportonDiscussion:CoalitionPoliticsonPresidentialElections:PlatformCommonalityor Expansion of Support Base? The Habibie Center, 18 May 2004”. Postscript, June2004.

Sanit,Arbi.2003.“PembaharuanMendasarPartaiPolitik”.InMenggugat Partai Politik,edited by Mahrus Irsyam and Lili Romli. Jakarta: Laboratorium Ilmu Politik,Fackultas IlmuSosialdan IlmuPolitik,Universitas Indonesia.

Sartori,Giovanni.1976.Parties and Party systems: a Framework for analysis.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Slater,Dan.2004.“Indonesia’sAccountabilityTrap:PartyCartelsandPresidentialPowerafterDemocraticTransition”.Unpublishedmanuscript. 29 July2004,p. 3.

Tomagola,TamrinAmal.2004.“PasanganPresidensial2004”. Kompas.siapa Mau Jadi Presiden? Debat Publik seputar Program dan Partai Politik pada Pemilu 2004.Jakarta:PenerbitBukuKompas.

Paige JohNsoN taN is currentlyAssistantProfessor in theDepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofNorthCarolina,Wilmington,UnitedStates.

05 Paige p88-114.indd 114 6/12/06 10:35:31 AM

Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006), pp....

Documents

Transcript of Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006), pp....