Constitutional Law I Case Doctrines

- 1 -

ATTY. CANDELARIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

ARTICLE I: NATIONAL TERRITORY

BASELINES

I. Introduction A. Baseline

• line from w/c the outer limit of the territorial sea & other coastal State

zones is measured • forms the boundary bet. internal waters & territorial sea • demarcation bet. that maritime area where other States enjoy no general

rights (internal waters), and those maritime areas where other States do enjoy certain general rights (territorial sea & other zones)

B. Art 3-11 & 13: set out the current law dealing w/ baselines

• not only binding, but are also considered as rules of customary international law

II. Straight Baselines A. Customary Rules

• Norway used as a the baseline a series of straight lines connecting the

outermost points on the skaergaard (countless islands, islets, rocks, reefs) • UK objected to this method because it extended farther seawards the outer

limit of the Norwegian territorial sea, thus reducing the are of high seas open to fishing by British vessels

• International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the Norwegian straight baseline system was in conformity w/ IL

Conditions governing the drawing of straight baselines:

1. must be drawn so that they don’t depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast

2. must be drawn so that the seas lying w/in these lines are sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters

3. it is legitimate to take into account certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality & importance of w/c are clearly evidence by long usage

B. Conventional Rules

• The court’s judgment was widely regarded as a piece of legislation

Territorial Sea & Law of the Sea Conventions o a system of straight baselines MAY be used in localities where the coastline

is deeply indented & cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast I its immediate vicinity

o a state has a choice as to whether it uses straight baselines or not

Conditions governing the way straight baselines may be drawn: 1. must not depart t any appreciable extent from the general direction of the

coast, & the sea areas lying w/in the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters

2. straight baselines may not be drawn to & from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations w/c are permanently above sea level have been built on them

3. A state may not draw straight baselines in such a way as to cut off form the high seas the territorial sea of another state

4. a state utilizing a straight baseline system must clearly indicate the lines on charts to w/c ‘due publicity’ must be given

Art. 7(2) – deals w/ exceptional geographical situation

o where because of the presence of a delta & other natural conditions the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points ay be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line

o not very well drafted o no state appears to have drawn straight baselines utilizing this provision

C. State Practice

• States have drawn straight baselines along or part of their coasts • 14 states have adopted enabling legislation to draw straight baselines but

have not yet drawn them • The rules governing the use of straight baselines laid down in customary &

conventional law are relatively imprecise, thus allows States a considerable latitude in the way they draw straight baselines

Some states have gone beyond the spirit & vague wording of these rules

o some have drawn straight baselines along coasts w/c are not deeply indented

o the drawing of a straight baseline along coasts w/c posses some offshore islands but w/c do not form a fringe in the immediate vicinity of the coast

o to draw a straight baseline w/ depart to a considerable extent from the general direction of the coast

o baselines are sometimes drawn so that the sea areas inside the lines are insufficiently closely linked to the land to be subject to the regime of internal waters

o Some states accept the use of low-tide elevations as base points, regardless of whether lighthouses have been built on them

o some haven’t followed the obligation not to draw straight baselines in such a way as to cut off the territorial sea of another state from the high seas or EEZ

o in spite of the obligation to publicize baselines, some have drawn the outer limit of their territorial sea in a way w/c presupposes that it is measured from straight baselines, even though such lines haven’t been published

o some states have located base points for straight baseline in the sea

• The effect of drawing straight baselines is often to enclose considerable bodies of sea as internal waters

- 2 -


III. Bays

A. Pre-1958 customary rules

• Customary IL recognized that the baseline could be drawn across the mouth of bays, enclosing them as internal waters

Customary IL failed to provide clear rules on 2 essential points:

1. criteria by w/c an indentation of the base would be recognized as a bay 2. the max length of the closing line across the bay

B. Conventional Rules Geometric test to establish whether an indentation is a bay:

1. line should be drawn bet. the natural entrance points of the indentation 2. semicircle having the diameter of this line should be constructed & its area

measured 3. the area of water bet. the line across the indentation & the low-water mark

around the indentation should be calculated (if the area of water is larger than the are of the semicircle, the indentation is a bay, thus a closing line can be drawn across it

4. if the length of the line bet. the natural entrance points of the bay is less than 24 miles, this line is the closing line, & therefore the baseline

• Main difficulty: often it isn’t obvious w/c are the ‘natural entrance points’

of an indentation • Even where the application of Art. 7 of the Territorial Sea Convention (TSC)

is free from difficult, some sates parties t the Convention have still failed to act in conformity w/ it

C. Historic Bays

• Are not dealt w/ by either the TSC or the LOSC • The general IL does not provide for a single regime for ‘historic waters’ or

‘historic bays’ • A state may validly claim title to a bay on historic grounds if it can show

that it has for a considerable period of time claimed the bay as internal waters & effectively exercised its authority therein, & that during this time the claim as received acquiescent of other states

• Where title to an historic bay has been acquired, a closing line may be drawn across the mouth of the bay w/c will then form the baseline

• Developing states argue that its impossible for them to produce evidence of an uninterrupted exercise of authority

• Theory of ‘vital bays’ – vital security or economic interests would justify title to a bay independently of any true historic title

• The question of whether a state has acquired good title to a claimed historic bay is likely to depend largely on whether other States have acquiesced in its claim

D. Bays bordered by more than one State

• Are also not dealt w/ by either the Territorial Sea Convention or the LOSC

• They cannot be closed by a line drawn across their mouth • Instead the baseline is constituted by the low-water mark around the shores

of the bay IV. River Mouths

• If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline shall be a straight line across the mouth of the river between points on the low-water line of its banks

• No limit is placed on the length of such a river closing line A. Estuaries

• Art. 13 & 19 apply only to rivers that flow directly into the sea • Most large rivers don’t flow directly into the sea, but enter into it via

estuaries – question of the baseline should be governed by the provisions concerning bays

B. Deltas

• Art. 13 & 19 are unlikely to be applicably where a river enters the sea via a delta

• Instead the baseline is likely to be constituted by the low-water mark or in some cases by straight baselines

• The provisions on low-tide elevations & islands will be applicable in many instances

V. Harbour Works

• Outermost permanent harbour works w/c form an integral part of the harbour system are to be regarded as forming part of the coast & hence can serve as the baseline

• Harbour works must be attached to the coast if they’re to be used as baselines

VI. Low-Tide Elevation

• Naturally formed area of land w/c is surrounded by & above water at low tide but submerged at high tide

• “drying rocks” or “banks” • Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly/partly at a distance not

exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland/an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea

• Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island it has not territorial sea

• In limited cases, low-tide elevations can be used as basepoints in constructing a straight baseline system

- 3 -


VII. Islands

• A naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, w/c is above water at high tide

• Every island has a territorial sea, no matter what its size A. Archipelagos

• Archipelagic Baselines - straight lines may be drawn around the

outermost points of the archipelago itself; such archipelagic baselines form the baseline from which the territorial sea & other zones are measured

B. Artificial Islands

• No artificial island is entitled to a territorial sea, or therefore, to serve as a basepoint

• Art. 11 – the offshore installations & artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent harbour works and therefore do not form part of the baseline

• Art. 60(8) & 80 – artificial islands & installations constructed in the EEZ or on the continental shelf have no territorial sea of their own

• The prohibition on states from subjecting any part of the high seas to their sovereignty prevents the establishment of any maritime zones around artificial islands on the high seas

VIII. Reefs

• Coral reefs may be continuously submerged or, if exposed at low tide, may be situated from the islands of the atoll at a distance greater than the breadth of the territorial sea: in neither case could such reefs serve as the baseline

Art. 6 – the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-water line of the reef

o it isn’t limited in its application to atolls or coral reefs o it suggests that only reefs exposed at low tide & not wholly submerged

reefs, may be used as baseline o it isn’t clear how far from the island the fringing reef may lie before it

ceases to be eligible to serve as the baseline o many atolls form part of archipelagos

IX. Charts & Publicity

• Straight baselines - the only baselines w/c the coastal State is required to indicate in charts & publicize

• Under the LOSC, this was extended to the closing lines across river mouths & bays

• Obligation to deposit a copy of chart showing baselines to the UN Sec. Gen. • List of baselines to be indicated in charts & publicized not extended to the

low-water line & low-tide elevations - such features are constantly changing because of tides & currents

• Requirement of publicity - help to reduce past abuse of straight baselines & river mouth & bay closing lines

X. Present-day customary int’l law relating to baselines

• Today, the customary rules on baselines are identical w/ the conventional rules

• Only a dozen have legislation w/c refers to most or all of the types of baseline dealt w/ by the Territorial se Convention (generally in accordance w/ the Convention’s provisions)

• Majority of states simply refer in their legislation to the low-water mark and/or straight baselines

XI. Validity of baselines

• The coastal State’s action in exercising its discretion & constructing lines remains subject to I.L.

• Delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect • Validity of the delimitation w/ regard to other States depends upon I.L. • A baseline is invalid when it is contrary to I.L.

ARCHIPELAGOS

I. Dev’t of a special regime for archipelagos

• 1985 conference – deals with ‘coastal’ archipelagos • It is possible to draw straight baselines around the outermost points of a

coastal archipelago & ‘tie’ it to the mainland coast • In general terms, its easy to see the difference between ‘coastal’ & ‘mid-

ocean’ archipelagos, but it is difficult in practice to apply the distinction • The great geographical diversity of archipelagos, even win each broad

group, ha made it difficult to draw up a set of agreed rules of general application

• Main advocates of a special regime for archipelagos: Indonesia & Philippines o The 2 States announced that they would enclose the whole of their

archipelagos by straight lines & treat the waters this enclosed as internal waters

o Reason for claims: security & to stress unity & integrity of its vast & heterogenous island territory

• Principle opposition: major maritime states • feared that such a regime would result in areas w/c had previously been

high seas or territorial seas becoming internal waters, w/ the consequent loss of navigational rights for both their naval & commercial vessels

• Since 1958, may archipelagic states have become independent, thus increasing the pressure for adoption of a special regime for mid-ocean archipelagos to meet the interests of archipelagic states

o Interests: economic (fishing & the control of inter-island traffic), political (promoting the unity of the archipelago), security, preventing smuggling & illegal entry, control of pollution

• Essential features of the new regime:

- 4 -


o permits straight ‘archipelagic baselines’ to be drawn around the outermost islands of archipelagos, thus meeting the wishes of archipelagic States

o it creates a new legal concept of ‘archipelagic waters’ for the waters thus enclosed of such a nature that it should accommodate the navigational interests of maritime States

II. Definition of an archipelago & an archipelagic state

• Archipelago – a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters & other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters & other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic & political entity, or w/c historically have been regarded as such

• Archipelagic State – a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands

• Only an archipelagic state can draw archipelagic baselines around an archipelago

• Archipelagic states do not include mainland States w/c possess non-coastal archipelagos (Denmark, Ecuador, Norway & Portugal)

• Definition embraces a number of States w/c do not normally consider themselves t be archipelagic States (Japan, New Zealand, UK)

• States have an option as to whether they draw archipelagic baselines • An archipelagic States MAY draw straight archipelagic baselines • There are 25-35 states w/c fall w/in the definition of an archipelagic State

but no do not consider themselves to be as such III. Archipelagic baselines

• Art. 47(1) – an archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago

o these lines serve as the baseline from w/c the breadth of the archipelagic State’s territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone & continental shelf is measured

Drawing of archipelagic baselines is subject to a number of conditions:

1. ratio of land to water w/in the lines is not more than 1:1 (maximum ratio prevents archipelagic States w/c consist predominantly of one large island or a few large islands close together from drawing archipelagic baselines) and not less than 1:9 (minimum ratio prevents archipelagic baselines being drawn around very distant islands in an archipelago or being drawn at all around widely dispersed archipelagos consisting of small islands)

2. Must not exceed 100 miles in length, except that up to 3% of the total number of lines maybe between 100 & 125 miles in length

3. Main islands of the archipelago must be included w/in the archipelagic baselines

4. It is the archipelagic baselines themselves, by being drawn around the outermost islands of the group, which largely determine the configuration of the archipelago

5. shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses permanently above sea level have been built on them

6. must not be draw in such a way as to cut off the territorial se of another State from the high seas or its exclusive economic zone

7. the archipelagic state must clearly indicate its archipelagic baseline system on charts of an adequate scale (a copy of each chart must be deposited w the UN Sec. Gen)

• An archipelagic states can consist of a number of archipelagos, hence

archipelagic baselines can be draw around each of the archipelagos making up the archipelagic State

IV. Archipelagic waters

• Comprise all the maritime waters w/in archipelagic baselines • Neither internal waters nor territorial sea • An archipelagic state has sovereignty over its archipelagic waters, including

their superadjacent air space, subjacent sea bed & subsoil, & the resources contained therein

• This sovereignty is subject to a number of rights enjoyed by third states: o 1st - must respect rights enjoyed by third states deriving from

existing agreements o 2nd – must recognize traditional fishing rights & other legitimate

activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring states in certain areas falling w/in archipelagic waters

o 3rd – respect existing submarine cables laid by other States and passing through its waters w/o making a landfall. An archipelagic state shall permit the maintenance & replacement of such cables upon receiving due notice of their location and the intention to repair/replace them.

o 4th – there are the navigational rights of other states . the ships of all states enjoy in archipelagic waters the same right of innocent passage as they enjoy in the territorial sea. This right may only be suspended, temporarily and in specified areas, for security reasons.

o the Convention in its provisions on pollution gives the coastal state addition enforcement jurisdiction in respect of pollution over foreign vessels in its territorial sea & straits (but this doesn’t apply in archipelagic waters)

• If an archipelagic state doesn’t designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through routes normally used for international navigation

V. Recent State practice

• DIVERSE • not always in accordance w/ the LOSC

o 1st – several archipelagic states have drawn archipelagic baselines & accorded the enclosed waters the status of archipelagic waters in accordance w/ the provisions of the Convention (Antigua & Barbadua, Fiji, Papa New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sao Tome e Principe)

o 2nd – there are 3 states w/c have enacted legislation for an archipelagic regime whose provisions appear to be in conformity w/ the Convention as regards the status of archipelagic waters but

- 5 -


which have not yet drawn the necessary archipelagic baselines (Kiribati, St. Vincent, Tuvalu)

o 3rd - some archipelagic States have adopted archipelagic legislation w/c is not in conformity w/ the Convention (Cape Verde, Comoros, Indonesia, Mauritius, Philippines)

o 4th - some archipelagic states haven’t utilized archipelagic baselines in their recent maritime zones legislation

o 5th – some states not falling w/in the definition of archipelagic states claim to draw baselines enclosing mid-ocean archipelagos (Denmark, Ecuador, Spain, Australia); while some rejected the opportunity, when enacting maritime legislation, to draw lines enclosing mid-ocean archipelagos (US, New Zealand)

• an archipelagic claim will be valid vis-à-vis those states that acquiesce in the claim or definitely accept it; the claim will not be valid as against states w/c have persistently objected it

• Hodgson & Smith – question whether the concept of an archipelagic state is really necessary w/ the introduction of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) because the use of archipelagic baselines will only marginally increase the size of the EEZ, & the gain in the waters enclosed by baselines becoming archipelagic rather than territorial sea or EEZ may be more psychological than real

THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS UNDER THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION ON PHIL. TERRITORIAL

SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS INTERNAL WATERS

BY: AILEEN SARAH TAPIA TOLOSA ABSTRACT

• To protect its claim over waters, the Philippines campaigned for the international acceptance of the “archipelagic principle”

• After 3 UN conventions, the int’l community consented to giving them the right to draw straight baselines connecting the outermost points of their outermost islands

• Contrary to Phil. claim, the Convention classified the waters w/in the baselines as archipelagic waters and NOT as internal waters

• Archipelagic waters are subject to the twin rights of innocent passage & archipelagic sealane passage

• Phil. Constitution: claims that all waters w/in these baselines are internal waters & all alien vessels may pass through these waters only w/ prior permission from Phil. Govt

• Result: conflict between the Phil. constitution & the 3rd Convention on the Law of the Sea

• Solution most beneficial: for Phil. to adopt the regime of archipelagic waters by amending its constitution, but be very vigilant to effectively control the entry of vessels into Phil. waters

I. THE PHIL. ARCHIPELAGO

A. Delimitation of the Phil. Archipelago

• Archipelago: group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting

waters & other natural features w/c are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters & other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic, & political entity, or w/c have historically regarded as such

• RA 3046 (amended by RA 5446): establish the baselines w/c embrace the Phil. archipelago

• 8175.8974 miles: total length of the Phil.’s 80 archipelagic baselines • PD 1596: considers the Kalayaan Island Group part of Phil. territory by

virtue of historic title & effective occupation • PD 1599: establishes the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to be

measured from the baseline • Treaty of Paris: Spain ceded to the US the archipelago, “Phil. Islands”. A

line was drawn around the whole archipelago w/c now marks the outer limits of the territorial sea of the Phil.

• Treaty of Washington: Spain clarified all ambiguities in the Treaty of Paris, & other islands lying outside the lines drawn were included in the Phil. territory

• Treaty bet. US and UK: used the same method of delimiting the boundary bet. Phil. & North Borneo

B. Phil. Waters as Shipping Routes

• Philippines: “Pearl of the Orient” – strategic geographical location • Waters between its islands play a significant role in global affairs • Waters of the Phil. act as trade routes bet. Japan and NE Asia, Australia, &

New Zealand • A number of major normal shipping routes through the SE Asian region run

through the waters bet. the islands of the Phil. archipelago II. THE DEV’T OF THE ARCHIPELAGIC PRINCIPLE

• International acceptance of the “archipelagic principle” • Allows archipelagic states to draw imaginary lines connecting the outermost

islands, thus forming a single entity

A. Studies of International Bodies

• Have no legal force but are essential because they provide the framework & foundation for the principles governing the regime of archipelagos

1. Institute de Droit International 2. Int’l Law Association 3. American Institute of Int’l Law 4. Harvard Research in Int’l Law

B. The Hague Codification Conference of 1930

C. The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case

- 6 -


D. 1st UN Conference on the Law of the Sea

1. Preparatory work 2. The Conference Proper, 1958

E. The 2nd UN Convention o the Law of the Sea, 1960

F. The 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea

1. Preparatory Work 2. Response of regional groups 3. objections to the Archipelagic Principle 4. Philippine Position on the Proposals

G. The Informal Negotiating Text & the Proposed Amendments of the Phil

1. Length of Baselines • Max length of the baselines: 80 nautical miles • a certain percentage of the baselines may reach until 125 nautical

miles

2. Innocent Passage • The amendment submitted by the Phil. stated that the innocent

passage of ships may not be enjoyed over the archipelagic waters as a whole, but shouldn’t be limited to all routes used for int’l navigation

3. Archipelagic Sealanes

• Philippines sought to limit the passage through sealanes designated by the archipelagic state

4. Overflight

• Phil. proposed to limit this passage to creation classes of aircraft • Intended that vessels w/c are potentially dangerous to the security,

environment or other interests of the archipelagic state shall be confined to sealanes designated by it

H. The Final Text

• w/ the approval of the archipelagic principle came the creation of the archipelagic waters w/c are the bodies of water located inside or w/in the archipelagic baselines

• internal waters – located w/in the archipelagic waters

1. Mouth of Rivers

• If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline shall be a straight line across the mouth of the river between points on the low-water line of its banks

2. Bays

• Bay: a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters & constitute more than over a mere curvature of the coast

3. Ports

• The final text of the Convention didn’t reflect all the amendments submitted by the Phil

• Members of the int’l community struck a balance between the demands of the major maritime powers & the needs of the archipelagic states

• Although not all of the proposals submitted by the archipelagic states were accepted by the int’l community, the Phil. still signed & ratified the Convention

• concept of “package deal” – encouraged each state to bargain for provisions in the Convention that were most desirable

III. THE PHIL. RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION

• EO 738 – Pres. Created a Cabinet Committee on the Law of the Sea

composed of men who were experts in their respective fields • w/o the archipelagic principle, the Philippines in the eyes of the int’l

community would be a dismembered nation due to the pockets of high seas in between its islands

• w/ the creation of the regime the Phil. is now a unified whole • additional benefit: the EEZ is bigger than the territorial sea

A. Declaration of the Phil.

• In approving the final text of the Convention, the framers were aware that

some of these provisions were contrary to municipal law • Framers provided a mechanism (embodied in Art. 309 & 310) by which a

signatory may draft reservations for the purpose of harmonizing its own laws w/ the rules set forth in the Convention

• Cabinet Committee reached a general assessment that the benefits to be gained from adopting the Law of the Sea treaty far outweigh the obligations arising from it

• Resolution No. 633: endorsing the Law of the Sea & further recommending that it be approved w/o amendment

B. Proceedings at the Batasan

• Members of the Batas expressed their concern: Phil. stands to lose a part of

the territorial waters embraced w/in the limits prescribe by the Treaty of Paris due to the non-acceptance by the int’l community of the historic waters of the Phil

• Members eventually understood the benefits & obligations embodied it he Convention. Their doubts & fears were laid to rest by the exhaustive discussions & speeches delivered by Tolentino

• The ratification made by the Batasang Pambansa embodied & contained the declaration earlier made by the Phil. delegation upon signing the Convention

- 7 -


C. Objections to the Declaration Made by the Phil. Upon Signing the Convention

• Several nations claimed that the declaration contravenes & is incompatible

w/ Art. 310 of the Convention • Australia: “This indicates, in effect, that the Philippines does not consider

that it is obliged to harmonize its laws w/ the provisions of the Convention. By making such an assertion, the Phil. is seeking to modify the legal effect of the Convention’s provisions.”

• Objecting nations expressly announced that the declaration of the Phil. cannot be considered as valid & as having any legal force & effect

• It can be argued that the Phil. declaration doesn’t necessarily imply a non-conforming conduct

IV. THE PHIL. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON PHIL. WATERS & THE 3RD U.N.

CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

• It is not the constitution w/c definitely fixes the extent of Phil. territory • The constitution is a municipal law & is only biding w/in the territorial limits

of the sovereignty • A constitutional definition of territory does not have the effect of legitimizing

a territorial claim not founded on some legal right protected byIL • Binding power of the constitution is limited only to its domestic/local

affairs/controversies A. The 1935 Constitution

• Absence of an express declaration on the status of the waters w/in the Phil.

archipelago • 1935 Convention included an article on national territory to use the

Constitution as an int’l document binding on the US • Tydings-McDuffie Law: the effectivity of the Phil. constitution depended

partly on the acceptance of its provisions by the US • Treaties: Treaty of Paris, Treaty in Washington, Treaty bet. US & Great

Britain B. The 1973 Constitution

• Debate on whether the upcoming Constitution should contain a definition of

Phil. territory • Delegate Voltaire Garcia: argued for the deletion of the entire article on

National Territory because the territorial definition of the Phil. was a subject of int’l law, not municipal law

• Delegate Sorsogon: advocated “nationalistic” arguments; the mention of the Treaty of Paris was a reminder of the indignity of the Philippines’ colonial past

• Delegate Gunigundo: inclusion of that provision will only legitimize an otherwise illegal act of Spain

• Delegates Roco & Nolledo: Definition of the national territory was necessary for the preservation of national wealth, strengthening of national security, protection of natural resources & manifestation of solidarity of Filipino People

• Delegate Quintero: it must be expressly agreed upon that the def. of the Phil. territory must be embodied in the Constitution itself

• Def. of the national territory was necessary to claim ownership over the pockets of waters w/in & connecting the islands of the Phil. archipelago

• A claim that the waters w/in the archipelago are considered internal waters was of utmost importance

C. The 1987 Constitution

• The “nebulous” definition of the Phil. internal waters contributed to the

reason why Commissioner Nolledo endorsed Committee Report No. 3 w/c “decided to adopt the definition of the national territory…”

• The framers of the 1987 Constitution didn’t take into consideration the concept of archipelagic waters introduced by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and insisted that even after the 1982 Law of the Sea, the waters w/in the Phil. archipelago remain to be internal waters

D. Internal Waters under the 1987 Constitution vs. Archipelagic Waters

Under the Law of the Sea

• Philippines: the provisions of the Law of the Sea governing archipelagic waters are wholly unacceptable & therefore cannot be embodied in its municipal law

• Int’l Community: objected to the non-conformity of the Phil w/ the Law of the Sea

• Internal Waters: no overflight rights, no freedom of navigation, requirement of prior authorization

• Archipelagic Waters: overflight rights, right of innocent passage V. THE TWIN RIGHTS: INNOCENT PASSAGE & ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES

PASSAGE A. The Right of Innocent Passage

• Allows states to pursue their various policies of national sovereignty, while at the same time, maintaining global freedom of navigation by w/c other nations may pursue their economic & political objectives

1. Definition

PASSAGE – navigation through the territorial sea for any of the ff. purposes: traversing that sea w/o entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal waters; or proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility o GR: requires that the movement of the vessel be continuous &

expeditious o Exceptions: (when stopping/anchoring is permitted)

1. it is incidental to ordinary navigation 2. its rendered necessary by force majeure or distress 3. assistance is essential to persons 4. ships/aircraft are in danger or in distress

- 8 -


• Passage is considered INNOCENT when it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the archipelagic state

• Right of innocent passage: grants any type of foreign ship unhampered passage through archipelagic waters w/o prior authorization from the archipelagic state. This is available at all times to ships of all states & cannot be denied/impaired by the archipelagic state

• The right of innocent passage cannot be made dependent on the discretion of the archipelagic state.

• Strict & literal application of the Convention leads to the conclusion that in exercise of the right of innocent passage, no distinction is made between commercial or merchant ships, oil tankers, warships, submarines, nuclear-powered vessels & those carrying nuclear or dangerous materials

• While merchant vessels are neutral in character, warships are identified as belonging to the naval forces of the State and may pursue an “aggressive policy”

• The major maritime powers are strong proponents adhering to the strict interpretation

2. How “innocent” should innocent passage be?

• The burden of identifying & proving the non-innocent act lies w/ the enforcement authority, the coastal state

• The Law of the Sea provides a framework w/c aids states in determining whether the passage through their waters is truly innocent

• Convention prescribes that in archipelagic waters, submarines & other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface & to show their flag

Non-innocent activities of foreign ships:

1. Exercise/practice w/ weapons of any kind 2. Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense/security of the coastal

State 3. The launching, landing or taking onboard of any aircraft 4. The launching, landing or taking onboard of any military device 5. The loading/unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the

customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws & regulations of the Coastal state

6. Any act of wilful & serious pollution contrary to this Convention 7. Any fishing activities 8. The carrying out of research/survey activities 9. Any act aimed at interfering w/ any systems of communication or any other

facilities or installations of the coastal state 10. Any other activity w/c doesn’t have a direct bearing on passage

B. Responding to Non-Innocent Passage

• The archipelagic state may take the necessary steps to prevent the non-

innocent passage through its archipelagic waters

Protective measures 1. demand that the guilty vessel leave the archipelagic waters 2. settle through diplomatic or other agreed means 3. third party settlement 4. the archipelagic state may, w/o discrimination in form or in fact, suspend

temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if it is essential for the protection of its security

• settlement of disputes shouldn’t be made through the use of force (i.e.

“bumping” the guilty vessel) C. Environmental Pollution

• Increasing concern over the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes,

goods & materials • Greatest source of tanker-related pollution is the discharge of tank washings • Main concern of the Phil: vulnerable & valuable marine resources w/c

coexist w/ the occurrence of pollution or its threatened occurrence • Basel Convention- regulates the export of hazardous wastes & ensures that

states of import have appropriate mechanisms to deal w/ the disposal of such wastes upon arrival

• There is very little int’l law that actually regulates vessels that are shipping hazardous cargoes

• Art. 19 of the Convention: denies the archipelagic State the legal authority to prohibit passage of vessels actually discharging pollution unless the discharge is “willful”

• However, pollution presents a threat w/c can occur w/o any element of intent

• “serious” standard – before action may be taken against pollution, the pollution must be serious (ambiguous and dangerous because it doesn’t provide a precise definition of the adjective “serious”)

• The passage may be denied only when the threatening “activity” actually occurs

D. Response to the Threat of Pollution

• Strengthen & make more effective the laws & regulations for the prevention,

reduction and control of pollution but must never impair the right of innocent passage

E. The Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage

• Clarified that submarines & other underwater vehicles be given the right to pass through the archipelagic waters in their normal mode, meaning, submerged

• Submerged passage of submarines & the flight of military aircraft in archipelagic waters are permitted provided that these activities are don w/in the designated archipelagic sea lanes

1. Designation of Archipelagic Sea Lanes

- 9 -


• Archipelagic states have the right to designate archipelagic sea lanes accdg to the guidelines set by the convention, but the power given is superficial

o the guidelines to be followed are so numerous & detailed that little choice is left

o the failure of the archipelagic state to designate sea lanes allows foreign submarines & military aircraft to exercise the passage through routes normally used for int’l navigation

o the choice of sea lanes by the archipelagic state is subject to approval of the competent IO (IMO)

2. Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage vs. Transit Passage

Point of

Difference Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage Transit

Passage Regulation The archipelagic stat has the right to make rules

& regulations, including special requirements for nuclear & hazardous substances

No restrictions may be imposed

Passage Continuous, expeditious, & unobstructed Continuous, expeditious, & unimpeded

Manner of Delimiting Lanes

Sea lane must be indicated on a chart, w/ an axis & a max width of 50 nautical miles & must be approved by the Int’l Maritime Org.

No such requirements

3. Security Dimension

• This right cannot be suspended • Possible solution to the security problem is the establishment of a

nuclear-free zone in SE Asia VI. THE PHIL. RESPONSE TO THE LAW OF THE SEA A. Philippine Senate Bill No. 206

• Sponsored by former Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani • Most significant move of the Phil. towards harmonizing its laws w/ the

Convention • The bill sought to delineate the archipelagic baselines in accordance w/ the

special mode set forth in the Convention • Was met w/ opposition by some gov’t agencies, especially the DFA • DFA objects because it totally abandons the Treaty of Paris to conform w/

the Convention of the Law of the Sea, meaning our territorial sea will only be 12 nautical miles & not 250

• Shahani Bill was archived and has remained a mere proposal ever since B. National Marine Policy

• A “developmental & management program” designed to respond to the obligation set forth by the Convention

Philippine National Marine Policy: 1. emphasize the archipelagic nature of the Phil in dev’t planning 2. view coastal marine areas as locus of community, ecology & resources 3. Implement UNCLOS win the framework of the Nat’l marine Policy 4. coordinate & consult w/ concerned & affected sectors through the Cabinet

Committee on Maritime & Ocean Affairs 5. Address the ff. priority concerns:

a. extent of the national territory b. protection of the marine ecology c. management of the marine economy & technology d. maritime security

• Expansion of powers of the Cabinet Committee on the LOTS (w/c was

renamed as the Cabinet Comm. On Maritime & Ocean Affairs • Expanded powers: formulation of practical & viable policies & addressing

the various concerns w/c affect the implementation of the UN Convention on the LOTS & other marine related matters

• DFA conducted consultations asking citizens for suggestions on how to resolve the conflict

• Majority said the Treaty of Paris shouldn’t be set aside because it is the national heritage of the Filipino People

• A balance of interests of both the Filipino people & the int’l community should be maintained

C. Requirement of Prior Permission & Illegal Entry Report

• There have been cases of illegal entry into the Phil. internal waters, and

most of these apprehended illegal entrants used force majeure as their defense

• There have been instances when vessels w/o prior authorization have successfully passed through the Phil. internal waters & have evaded arrest

• The Phil. appears to conform in practice w/ the navigational regime set forth in the Convention by allowing foreign warships/ships to pass w/o notification/authorization

• As early as the time when the US Bases Agreement was in force, the Phil allowed the Americans to navigate through Phil. internal waters w/o need of prior authorization

• clear derogation of Philippine sovereignty • The Phil. doesn’t regard the status of its internal waters as something to

perpetually fight for as the end all and be all of Phil. territory VII. AN EVALUATION OF THE PHIL. SITUATION A. The Phil. Declaration

• Fails to harmonize Phil. Law w/ the Convention by stating that the Phil.

maintains its present Constitutional Law & reserves the right to amend the provisions of the Convention to conform to its municipal law

• Ignores the rights established under the Convention • Objections filed by Russia, Australia, Bulgaria & others are VALID, and their

pronouncement that they will treat the waters w/in the archipelagic baseline of the Philippines as archipelagic waters, is binding on the Philippines

- 10 -


• With regard to said states, the Declaration has no legal effect B. The Phil. Ratification

• The Phil, as a ember of the int’l community, is required to comply w/ its

obligations established under the system of laws regulating the relations of the members of the int’l community w/ one another

• The Convention is a system of law w/c the Phil. must comply with • The Phil. ratification of the Convention was the formal act by w/c it

manifested its consent to the provisions & promised to adhere to the responsibilities found therein

• The Phil. cannot plead its own law or deficiencies in that law as an excuse for non-compliance or as a justification for a breach of the Convention

2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT W/C DOMINATE THE RELATIONSHIP OF MUNICIPAL & INT’L LAW:

1. MONISM – asserts the supremacy of int’l law over municipal law even w/in the domestic sphere

2. DUALISM – believes that int’l law & municipal law differ in the fact that the 2 systems regulate diff. subject matter (int’l law is a law bet. sovereign states while municipal law applies win a state &regulates the relations of citizens w/ each other & w/ the executive)

• The Phil can insist o its claim of internal waters, but cannot compel the

other states to honor such claim • The Phil. must observe the principle of pacta sunt servanda (every treaty in

force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith) & must amend/repeal its laws in order to conform to the Convention

• Continued failure to do so will amount to bad eventually amount to bad faith • Continued non-compliance may amount to a material breach of the

Convention • Net effect: bodies of water between & surrounding the islands of the Phil will

be treated as high seas & all foreign nations will have the freedom to exploit & explore the natural resources of the Phil.

C. Phil. Response to the UN Order

• Prof. Haydee Yorak, Philippine Candidate to the Int’l Tribune on the Law of

the Sea, announced to the int’l community that the Phil. is taking steps towards the harmonization of its laws w/ that of the Convention

• She requested that due to complexities & the highly-sensitive issues involved, the Phil. be given more time in achieving the task set before it

D. Theories on How to Resolve the Conflict Most popular view: Phil. cannot be compelled by the int’l community to adopt the regime of archipelagic waters due to delimitation of Phil. waters established under the Treaty of Paris

o The US adheres to the 3mile limit of territorial sea. The Treaty of Paris didn’t transfer any waters, only land areas.

o The Phil cannot claim more than what the US had possessed

o The Treaty of Paris cannot be invoke in claiming the present delimitation of the internal & territorial waters of the Phil

• Another theory suggests that the conflict bet. the Phil. Constitution & the

Convention is merely superficial based on the phrase “may draw straight archipelagic baselines” (merely directory and not mandatory

Conservatives: the ratification made by the Phil. is null & void since it ran contrary to the Phil. constitution, hence the Phil exists on its own & loses instead of gains more rights

• Others opt to abandon the Convention & rely on customary int’l law wherein each island will have its own 12mile territorial sea

o an abandonment of the Convention will give other countries reason to pull out their investment

o reliance on the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries doctrine w/c considered as internal waters the waters w/in the baselines

o non-applicability of the doctrine o Norway – coastal archipelago – those situated so close to

mainland they may reasonably considered as part & parcel thereof o Phil. – outlying archipelago - groups of islands situated out it the

ocean to be considered independent whole rather than forming part of the mainland

Liberalists: propose an amendment to the Constitution & other Phil. laws

o w/o the Treaty of Paris to rely on, the present claim of the Phil over its internal & territorial waters is no more than an empty right based only on municipal law bereft of legal force b4 the int’l community

o It is wiser for the Phil to sacrifice a part of its sovereignty by classifying its present internal waters into archipelagic waters & subjecting them to the rights of innocent passage & archipelagic sea lanes passage, than risk losing a large portion of said waters by having pockets of high seas between the Phil. islands

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

• The framers of the 1987 Constitution weren’t ready tot abandon the convention

• Since the Phil. isn’t willing to relinquish its rights under the Convention, it has no other option but to comply w/ the obligations established therein

• The Phil. must stop skirting the issue and meet the problem head on • This continuous hesitation to face the problem has led to inconsistent

practices adopted by the Phil • The Phil must take a firm stand by taking into consideration the interests of

both the Filipino people & the int’l community • It is proposed that the Phil, at an opportune time, should amend its present

constitution & adopt the regime of archipelagic waters • The amendment should provide thus: “The waters around, between, &

connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth & dimension, form part of the archipelagic waters of the Philippines, and w//in these archipelagic waters are the internal waters delimited in accordance w/ the rules set by international law.”

- 11 -


• The Phil. stands to gain more by adhering to the Convention • Giving more navigational & maritime rights to foreigners doesn’t necessarily

& automatically deprive the Phil. of sovereignty over its waters • The Phil is permitted to enact rules & regulations concerning the twin rights

of innocent passage & archipelagic sea lanes passage. To have a very effective enforcement mechanism, committee should be formed to study the rules & regulations imposed, and to implement said rules.

• Phil. should enter into agreements w/ other SE Asian nations concerning measures to prevent pollution of their waters & enforce their individual legislations re: environmental & security concerns

• IL is not sacrosanct, nor static. It is open to developments & amendments • What may be applicable today may not necessarily be applicable tomorrow

ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES

Section 1: Philippines as a Democratic and Republic State

People Territory Government

Functions of Government

Bacani v NACOCO

• “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” (used in sec 2 Revised Administration Code) refers only to that government entity through which the function of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, included those arms through which political authority is made effective (whether municipal, provincial, or other local gov’t). These are the municipal corporations. They do not include government entities with corporate personality governed by Corporation Law separate and distinct from the government.

• Functions of Gov’t: CONSTITUENT and MINISTRANT. • Constituent-compulsory functions which binds the society (keeping order,

protection) COMPULSORY. • Ministrant-optional functions, what to do for public welfare, better equipped

than private individual or groups. OPTIONAL. ACCFA v CUGCO

• Agricultural credit and cooperative financing administration versus Confederation of Unions in Government corporations and offices.

• ACA (formerly ACCFA) is a government office engaged in governmental duties geared in the implementation of the Land Reform program of the State as a government instrumentality.

• As a government office, its personnel are subject to Civil Service Laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, and therefore, any doubt to its governmental character disappears.

PVTA v CIR • Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration performs governmental and not

propriety functions. • Court of Industrial Relations determine labor controversies by gov’t-owned

or controlled corporations. • Eight hour labor law applies both to private and government employees. • Function of government to provide for general welfare, seeking to realize

the common good of its members. • The growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional

classification of the functions of the gov’t (constituent and ministrant) are obsolete.

Republic v Judge CFI of Rizal • Regarding corporations, the Rice and Corn Administration is a government

agency without a distinct separate legal personality from that of Republic of Philippines.

• The mercantile activity of RCA in buying and selling palay and corn is ONLY • INCIDENT TO ITS PRIMARY GOVERNMENT FUNCTION which is to carry out

its declared policy of subsidizing and stabilizing the price of palay and corn to make it accessible to average consumers as part of gov’t objective of serving the well-being of people.

• RCA is exempt from paying legal fees and posting of appeal bond.

VFP v Reyes • It is crystal clear that our constitutions explicitly prohibit the regulation by

special laws of private corporations, with the exception of government-owned or controlled corporations. Hence, it would be impermissible for the law to grant control of the VFP to a public official if it were neither a private government entity or GOCC. Said constitutional provisions can be read to prohibit the creation itself of the VFP if it were neither of the three mentioned above.

MIAA v CA • MIAA is NOT a GOCC but an instrumentality of the Nat’l government and

thus exempt from local taxation • A GOCC must be an organized stock or non stock corp. • MIAA is NEITHER • MIAA has no capital stock to divide into shares. • MIAA has NO members • MIAA remits 20% of its annual income to the gov’t • It is an instrumentality of the Gov’t • INTSRUMENTALITY – any agency of the National Gov’t not integrated

within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate power.

• Sec 234a of LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by RP.

• Real properties of MIAA are owned by RP, exempt from real estate tax.

Ramiscal v Sandiganbayan • Crimes committed by public officers and employees in relation to their

offices penalized under anti-graft law DO NOT EXCLUDE prosecution for felonies defined and penalized under RPC & vice versa

- 12 -


• Determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is a function of the Office of the Ombudsman as it is empowered to determine whether probable cause exists.

• Courts should not interfere with the ombudsman in its investigatory power in determining presence of probable cause.

Alzaga v Sandiganbayan • AFP-RSBS is a gov’t owned and controlled corp. • It was established by virtue of PD 361 (1973) providing for armed forces

retirement and separation benefits system. AFP-RSBS is imbued with public interest, a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds. Under RA 9182AFP-RSBS is a GOCC.

De Jure and De Facto Government Co Kim Cham v Valdez Tan Keh

• Based on legal truism and Intl’ law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, exec, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. Philippine executive commission during the Japanese regime was a de facto government being established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy.

• De Facto government o its existence is maintained by active military power with territories,

and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful gov’t.

o that while it exists it was necessarily obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by obedience in the submission to such force, do not become responsible for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful gov’t.

• Powers and duties of De Facto gov’t is regulated in Sec 3 of Hague Convention of1907 that provides “the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”

• According to well-known principles of int’l law, all judgments and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion, of the de facto government during the Jap military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into power as a sovereign.

• Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as military occupation take place, in practice the invaders does not usually take the administration in their own hands but continues the administering of the laws of the country unless absolutely prevented.

• As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of gov’t.

• Kinds of De Facto govt: o Gov’t gets possession and control by force or by voice of majority o Established and maintained by invading military forces o Established as an independent gov’t by inhabitants of a country

who rise in insurrection against the parent state

Letter of Associate Justice Puno • A revolution is a complete overthrow of the established government in a

state or country by those who were previously subject to it or a “sudden, radical fundamental change in the government or political system usually affected with violence or at least some act of violence”.

• The right to revolution is defined as “inherent right of the people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government institutions by force or a general uprising when legal and constitutional methods of making change are inadequate or unavailable.”

• Though Aquino’s rise to presidency was unconstitutional, it was met by little resistance.

• Aquino can still disregard, modify or repeal any part of BPB129 in her exercise of the joint power of the executive and legislative during her revolutionary government.

• Gov’t under Cory was DE JURE since it was established by authority of legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a revolutionary gov’t by being in defiance of 1973Constitution.

Sovereignty

People v Gozo • Phil has jurisdiction even if there was a treaty agreed by US and Phil (US

naval base)US has preferential jurisdiction but not exclusive. • Doctrine of Auto-limitation–any state may, by its consent, express or

implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights: o a state has exclusive capacity of legal-determination and self-

restriction o a state may choose to refrain from the otherwise is illimitable

competence o there is at most diminution of jurisdictional rights, NOT

disappearance

Section 2: International Law and Philippine Municipal Law

Adoption of International Law and the Doctrine of Incorporation Tañada v Angara

• Principles in ART II are not intended to be self-executing principles, used by judiciary as aids for judicial review.

• Doctrine of Incorporation–the country is bound by generally accepted principles of int’l law which are automatically considered as part of our own laws.

• A treaty creates legally binding obligation on the parties. Inherent in its nature, it limits the absoluteness of sovereignty.

• Nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits.

• The SENATE by giving its consent to the WTO agreement, it makes it part of the law of the land as a legitimate exercise of its sovereign power and duty.

- 13 -


Bayan v Zamora • Senate has power to ratify treaties. 2/3 vote. • “Recognized as a treaty”–means that the other contracting party accepts or

acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. • US treats VFA only as an executive agreement because under int’l law, the

executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. Thus in int’l law, there is no difference between treaties and exec agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as negotiating functionaries have remained in power.

• In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of the executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Congress.

Lim v Executive Secretary • Balikatan exercise rooted in Mutual Defense Treaty. • VFA permits the US to engage in “activities” but not in activities inconsistent

with the spirit of the agreement (mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting, and training are allowable).

• The word “activities” is used to give both parties leeway in negotiation for non-military activities.

• US participants may not engage in combat except in self-defense.

Adherence to Peace, Freedom, Amity

Section 3: Civilian Supremacy IBP v Zamora

• The deployment of the Marines doesn’t constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy. The calling of the Marines in this case constitute permissible use of military assets for civilian enforcement. The order was to deploy the Marines to aid the PNP in patrolling the metropolis and thus applies to the term “call out” as stated in the Constitution. It must be noted that no other order other than aid was stated in the LOI and that main authority was vested in the PNP and not the Marines in this order thus, limiting the role of the Marines as an aid in civilian affairs. The order was for the aid of the Marines in assisting civilian affairs and nothing more. Such orders resemble the functions of aid by the armed forces already present and existent within the functions of society such as elections, national examinations, relief and rescue operations and projects of the Red Cross.

• The deployment of the marines to assist the PNP doesn’t unmake the civilian character of the police force. The Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there an be no “insidious incursion” of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause. What we have here is MUTUAL SUPPORT & COOPERATION bet. the military & civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy. Moreover, not a single citizen has complained that his political and civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines.

Section 4: Duty of the Government to the People

Section 5: Maintenance of Peace and Order

Kilosbayan v Morato • The charter of the PCSO does not absolutely prohibit it from holding or

conducting lottery in “collaboration, association or joint venture” w/ others or “by itself.” Pursuant to RA No. 1169, the PCSO has the authority to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries & similar activities, and/or to invest—whether by itself or in collaboration, association or joint venture w/ any other person, association, company or entity—in any health & welfare-related investments, programs, projects & activities w/c may be profit oriented except w/ competing activities.

Section 6: Separation of Church and State

Section 7: Independent Foreign Policy

Lim v Executive Secretary • The VFA permits US personnel to engage in “activities”, but not in activities

inconsistent w/ the spirit of this agreement, & in particular, from any political activity. The use of the word “activities” is meant to give both parties leeway in negotiation, and US forces can engage in non-military activities in the Philippines. Combat-related activities—as opposed to combat itself—are indeed authorized.

• The US exercise participants may NOT engage in combat except in SELF-DEFENSE.

Section 8: Freedom from Nuclear Weapons

Bayan v Zamora

• In both provisions of Sec. 21, Art. VII and Sec 25, Art. XVIII, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid & effective. However, Sec. 21, Art VII specifies the requirement of at least 2/3 of the Senate to make the treaty valid & binding. A special provision or law prevails over a general one.

• This Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts/acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. There is no difference between treaties &executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned. We have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even w/o the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.

• The President in ratifying the VFA & submitting it to the Senate for concurrence, acted w/in the confines & limits of the power vested in him. The negotiation & ratification of the VFA are exclusive acts w/c pertain solely to the Pres. He merely performed a constitutional task.

Section 9: Social Order

Section 10: Social Justice

Section 11: Personal Dignity and Human Rights

Section 12: Family Life, Mother, Unborn

- 14 -


Family

Unborn

Roe v Wade • State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that exempt from

criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother’s behalf w/o regard to the stage of her pregnancy &other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, w/c protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman’s health and the potentiality of human life, each of w/c grows & reaches a “compelling” point at various stages of the woman’s approach to term.

Rights and Duties of Parents, Aid from Government

Meyer v Nebraska • • Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded

as harmful. Granted, the state of Nebraska enacted this law to “promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals” because they are being reared in the US. However, the law infringes upon one’s fundamental rights and is, therefore, not justified. The protection of the Constitution extends to all – to those born with English on the tongue and those who speak other languages as well. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. The statute, as applied, is arbitrary & w/o reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign language is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the ordinary child.

Pierce v Society of Sisters • The Compulsory Education Act unreasonably interferes w/ the liberty of

parents/guardians to direct the upbringing & education of children under their control. Rights guaranteed in the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation w/c has no reasonable relation to some purpose w/in the competency of the state.

• The respondents as corporations have business & property for w/c they can claim protection. These are threatened w/ destruction through the unwarranted compulsion w/c the appellants are exercising over present & prospective patrons of their schools. Appellees asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property. The suits were not premature. Their interest is clear and immediate and injury was not a mere possibility in the remote future. The inevitable result of enforcing the act would be the destruction of appellees' primary schools, and perhaps all other private primary schools in the state of Oregon. In addition, they are engaged in undertakings that are useful and meritorious and there is also nothing that indicates that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students, or the state.

Wisconsin v Yoder • The State’s interest in universal education is not totally free from a

balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment & the traditional interest of parents w/ respect to the religious upbringing of their children.

• The Amish have introduced convincing evidence that accommodating their religious objections by foregoing 1 or 2 additional years of compulsory education will not impair the physical/mental health of the child. Nor will it result in an inability to be self supporting or to discharge the duties &r responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society.

Ginsberg v New York • The statute DID NOT invade the area of freedom of expression

constitutionally secured to minors. The parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of society. The legislature could properly conclude that parents who have this primary responsibility for their children’s well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility. The State has an interest to protect the welfare of children & see that they’re safeguarded from abuses w/c might prevent their growth into free & independent well-developed citizens.

Section 13: Vital Role of the Youth

Section 14: Role of Women and Equality of Men and Women

Section 15: Right to Health

Section 16: Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology

Oposa v Factoran • The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right – the right to

a balanced &healthful ecology which is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. This right carries w/ it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its power & functions under EO No. 192 & the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect & advance the said right.

• Timber license is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. The non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

LLDA v Court of Appeals • The power of the LGU’s to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for

revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of LLDA to grant permits, fish cages, & other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region & for lake quality control & management. It partakes of the nature of police power w/c

- 15 -


is the most pervasive, the least limitable, & the most demanding of all the State powers, including the power of taxation.

• The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory & quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases w/ authority to issue a “cease & desist order” and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fish pens, fish cages, & other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.

• When there is a conflict bet. a general law & a special statute, the latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special statute is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. A special law cannot be repealed, amended, or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.

Section 17: Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports Section 18: Labor Protection

Standard Chartered Bank Employees v Confessor

• Art 248(a) of the Labor Code considers it an unfair labor practice (ULP) when an employer interferes/restrains/coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining. Substantial evidence is required to support the claim that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code.

• Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating w/o any legal intent to reach an agreement. The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at & away from the bargaining table, w/c tend to show that it didn’t want to reach an agreement w/ the Union or to settle the differences between it & the Union. Admittedly, the parties weren’t able to agree & reached a deadlock. However, the duty to bargain doesn’t compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. Hence, the parties’ failure to agree didn’t amount to ULP under Art 248 for violation of the duty to bargain.

• The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. The Union based its economic proposals on data of rank &file employees & the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Phil & other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.

Section 19: Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy

Garcia v BOI • BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the

petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas & authorizing the change of fuel from naptha only to naptha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. In doing so, it failed to consider Section19 of Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “The state shall develop a self reliant& independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos”. Its decision was contrary to the development plan of having an export-processing zone in Bataan.

• Practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own 1st choice for reasons. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer.

• It is the duty of the state to regulate & exercise authority over foreign investments w/in national jurisdiction & in accordance w/ its national goal & priorities (Sec 10, Art XII).Investors will raise greater portion of capital FROM LOCAL SOURCES BY WAY OFLOAN. Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if BPC did not have to buy new land and if they did not have to use LPG & does not have to be imported. If the plant is maintained in Bataan, PNOC will be a partner in the venture which, in turn, would benefit the government.

Section 20: Role of Private Sector

Section 21: Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy

Section 22: Promotion of Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities Section 23: Community-Based Private Organizations

Section 24: Vital Role of Communications

Section 25: Local Autonomy Section 26: Equal Access to Political Opportunities & Political Dynasties

Pamatong v COMELEC

• There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office, but merely a privilege subject to limitations. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executing, and is not a judicially enforceable right, but merely a guideline for legislative or executive action.

• The limitations set by COMELEC, found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates” and its Resolution 6452 are valid. As long as the limitations apply to everybody without discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated.

• The rationale behind prohibiting nuisance candidates is obvious. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, & orderly. For one, the more candidates there are, the greater the logistical strain. The COMELEC has been given the authority to conduct elections, and hence has the authority to also adopt means and methods to promote free, orderly and honest elections. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment & discrimination.

Section 27: Honesty and Integrity in Public Service Section 28: Full Public Disclosure

- 16 -


ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1: Legislative Power Grant of Quasi-Legislative Power

Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro

• Provincial Governor Morente issued Res.25, relocating the Mangyan tribe for permanent settlement to sitio of Tigbao. Rubi challenged the validity of this resolution stating that the governor has no power to issue such resolutions. It was held that local government units also have quasi-legislative power as it is traditionally lodged to them – immemorial practice.

Antipolo Realty Corp. v NHA • Mr. Yuson stopped paying his monthly instalments for the house he

purchased from ARC because the latter failed to abide by clause no.17 of the contract regarding the beautification of the subdivision. Upon complying with the clause, ARC demands for the payment of the instalments including the accrued account covered by the beautification period. Yuson argues that the accrued period should not be paid and thus, should only cover the period before and after the compliance of clause 17. ARC threatened to forfeit the instalments and so Yuson filed a petition to NHA. NHA held that Yuson is correct. ARC filed a petition to the SC contending that NHA has no jurisdiction. It was held that NHA has been vested exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business (PD 957)

PITC v Angeles • Remington (manufacturing tools and machinery) and Firestone (bricks)

assert that LOI 444 and PD 1071 was already repealed by EO 133 and thus, PITC has no power to demand guarantee from the said company for the goods they export to China. It was held that EO 133 did not repeal LOI 444 for it covers only non-traditional products. Also, it was held that PITC has the exclusive jurisdiction with regard to this matter.

Atitiw v Zamora • Petitioner contests the validity of sec.1 of the Gen. Appropriations Act 2000,

asserting that the decrease of CAR’s budget was a means to abolish the CAR and thus, repealing EO 220, the law creating CAR.. It was held that the budget was not a means to abolish CAR and that the legislation could only do so by promulgating or enacting a law. SC could not pass questions of political nature with regard to the budget.

Valid Delegation

People v Rosenthal • The Blue Sky Law or Act No. 2581 requires those who sell speculative

securities to have the latter inspected and approved by the Insular Treasurer. A question of valid delegation was raised as there was allegedly no specific standard to be followed.

• The authority of the Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest”. Such is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on the matter pertaining to issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.

Araneta v Gatmaitan • Executive Order No. 22 is an issuance by the President that prohibits trawl

fishing in San Miguel Bay, made in accordance with the Fisheries Law. • If the act is a law unto itself, and within itself, and it does nothing more

than to authorize the delegate to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no undue delegation.

• The Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent.

People v Maceren • Administrative Order No. 84 from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources prohibited electro fishing in all Philippine waters. • The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to

declare what acts constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of penalty provided in the law itself.

• “To declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency.”

• The (rule-making) power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.

Agustin v Edu • Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos directed motor vehicle

owners to equip their cars with early warning devices. Land Transportation Commissioner Edu issued a Memorandum Circular in pursuance of the LOI.

• The test of delegability is expounded on: “To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard which implies at the very least that the legislative itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy…A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations…”

Free Telephone Workers v Ministry of Labor • The constitutionality of the delegation of power in labor disputes causing or

likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest to the Minister of Labor was questioned in this case.

• With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules and to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation”.

- 17 -


Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA • The widow of an OFW sought to claim death compensation from Eastern

Shipping Lines. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 expressly provided for death benefits, and prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by employers of Filipino seamen. Such memorandum’s validity was assailed, on the grounds that it was violative of the principle of nondelegation of legislative power.

• The ruling of subordinate legislation was reiterated. • NOTE: In class, Sir mentioned that this case is important in the sense that

even in the absence of a contract between Saco (OFW who died) and the shipping company, the law still favored in its application Saco so as to adhere to the standard of “fair and equitable employment practices”.

• Related case: Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v POEA

Tablarin v Gutierrez • Petitioners sought admission into colleges of medicine. However, they either

did not take or failed the NMAT required by the Board of Medical Education. • Similar doctrine of delegates non potest delegare, or what has been

delegated may not be further delegated, such pertaining to legislative powers.

• The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and abstract. “The standard does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.” (quoted Edu v Ericta)

Guingona v Carague • General Appropriations Act of 1990 allocated P 86.6 Billion to debt service,

only P 27 Million to education by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 81 and other pertinent laws providing for auto-allocation to debt service.

• No undue delegation to the president. The intent of the law is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country. Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by legislative parameters provided in the decrees.

Osmeña v Orbos • A law created a trust fund that was supposed to abate the worsening deficit

of the country to oil suppliers. • For there to be valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law

delegating the power must be: 1. complete in itself: that is it must set forth the policy to be

executed by the delegate, and 2. it must fix a standard: limits of which are sufficiently

determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform.

Viola v Alunan • Petitioner is assailing that the addition of positions by the Liga ng mga

Barangay is in excess of those provided in the Local Government Code.

• The LGC expressly provided that the board of directors may “create such positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapters.” This embodies a fairly intelligible standard. Moreover, the creation of the National Liga of the positions…in line with Art. 210 (g)(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 to the Barangay National Assembly to “formulate uniform constitution and by-laws applicable to the national liga and all chapters.”

Marcos v CA • Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank mandated those who habitually earn or

receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or abroad to submit reports of such. Among the people concerned is Imelda Marcos.

• Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty.

Fernandez v Sto. Tomas • A resolution was passed & implemented w/in the CSC that reorganized &

restructured its internal offices. Such is the object of complaint of the petitioner.

• Legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out “changes in the organization,” “as the need [for such changes] arises”. Such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such authority are set out in the Administrative Code.

Chiongbian v Orbos • What is assailed is the validity of a provision that authorized the President

to “merge” by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region.

• “While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has been traditionally lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of power of general supervision over local governments.” There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.

• As to standards, the Congress provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of power—to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals…improve the service in the transaction of national business.

Rodrigo v Sandiganbayan

• Petitioner was charged with graft and corruption. Alleged that there was undue delegation of legislative powers resulting in the executive branch, through the DBM, determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

• “Filling in details” elaborated: Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature without the assistance of the delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to lead to neglect of equally important business. Delegation is commonly indicated where the relations to

- 18 -


be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation requires a course of continuous decision.

Abakada v Ermita • RA 9337 pertains to the VAT system. The Act contains a proviso that

authorizes the President to raise the rate of VAT upon the occurrence of any of two conditions.

• The Congress did not exercise undue delegation in assigning the Secretary of Finance to look into the conditions that will enable the President to increase the rate. It is merely a power to ascertain facts. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of conditions as the basis of taking into effect a law.

Beltran v Secretary of Health • RA 7719 seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting

voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. • The power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the

Secretary may effect a period of extension for the said phase-out can be delegated. The Secretary did not do beyond he powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act. (Same premise as Abakada—discretion as to the execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law may be delegated.)

Bayan v Ermita • Batas Pambansa No. 880 is a law on the calibrated preemptive response

that revolves around the “no permit, no rally” rule. • As to the delegation of the powers to the mayor to issue permits, the law

provides a precise and sufficient standard—the clear and present danger test stated in the law.

Undue Delegation

People v Vera • Probation Act 4221 is incomplete because it did not law down rules or

standards by which the administrative officer maybe guided. It gave the provincial board the discretion whether or not to implement the law.

United States v Barrias • The bureau of customs apprehended Barrias for transporting goods across

the Pasig river without the use of any mechanical or external power which is in violation of Circular No. 397. However, the law did not specify the punishment for the said act and left Customs to determine the fine to be imposed. It was held that the penalties for such rules and regulations are matters purely in the hands of the legislature.

United States v Panlilio • Panlilio’s carabao said to have acquired the rinderpest disease and under

Act 1760 (Bureau of Agriculture), it has to be quarantined. However, Panlilio still used his carabao for tilling the soil inside the hacienda. He was charged but no violation of Act 1760 could be found and the penalty was not

determined. Hence, we was charged under Art.558 of the RPC and not under RA 1760.

People v Dacuycuy • Teachers were convicted in violation of RA 4670, Magna Carta of Public

School Teachers. However, the said act did not specify the term (min and max) of imprisonment for the violation and gave the court the discretion. Therefore, the said RA was invalid but the teachers were still charged under RA 3828 and the court remanded the case to the MTC of Leyte

Cebu Oxygen v Drilon • RA 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage. In pursuant to this,

DOLE issued implementing rules which its sec.8 prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increase negotiated under CBA against such wage increase. Cebu Oxygen was then remanded to pay its employees additional compensation. The company appealed to the SC. SC held that DOLE cannot provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement. Hence, sec.8 was held invalid.

Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court • EO 626 was issued to prohibit the inter-provincial transportation carabaos

and orders the outright confiscation thereof. The confiscated carabaos shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission sees it fit. SC held that this is invalid in so far as it violates the right to due process and the law was incomplete and gave the chairman the discretion to distribute confiscated goods to anyone who he deemed ‘fit.’

Executive Misapplication

Tatad v Secretary of Energy • RA 8180 sets two standards for the President to fully deregulate the oil

industry – declining price of oil in the world market and appraisal of the Philippine Peso. However, to accelerate the deregulation, the President used the depletion of the OSF funds as another standard to deregulate the oil industry. The executive misappropriated his power in using the depletion of the OSF to deregulate the oil industry. In the end, the whole law was struck down because it runs contrary to the purpose of the law which is to encourage the entry of new players in the oil market.

Section 2: Composition of Senate Section 3: Qualifications of Senators Section 4: Terms of Senators Section 5: Composition of the House of Representatives Apportionment and Representation

- 19 -


Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC • Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the

mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. According to Section 11(b) of RA 7941, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

• In imposing a 2% threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations & coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. The 3-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.

Ang Bagong Bayani v COMELEC • The purpose of the party-list provision in the Constitution was to give

genuine power to our people in Congress. Section 2 of RA 7941 mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, who lack well-defined constituencies, but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.

AKLAT v COMELEC • To qualify for party-list candidacy, a party or sector must represent the

marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by-laws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. Aklat has no track record to speak of concerning its representation of marginalized and underrepresented constituencies considering that it has been in existence for only a month prior to the filing of its petition for re-qualification.

Tobias v Abalos • The Constitution clearly provides that the House shall be composed of 250

members “unless otherwise provided by law.” This means that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 is not unconstitutional

• Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.

Mariano v COMELEC

• According to the Constitution, a city w/ a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may

still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

Samson v Aguirre • Every statue is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed

through regular congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and unmistakably.

Montejo v COMELEC • The Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of

legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. The COMELEC, however, was given the power to make minor adjustments i.e. there would be no change in allocations per district.

Herrera v COMELEC • Under COMELEC Resolution No. 2950, the towns of Buenavista and San

Lorenzo were grouped together to form the first district and the second district is composed of the municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag. RA 7166 requires that each district must cover a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory. The municipalities of Buenavista and San Lorenzo touch along boundaries and are connected throughout by a common border.

Section 6: Qualifications of District & Party-List Reps. Citizenship

Bengzon v Cruz

• Repatriation consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines & registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry. Repatriation reinstates the original citizenship of the person being repatriated.

Domicile and Residence

Aquino v COMELEC • The abandonment of original domicile should be proven and not merely

asserted. The absence of clear & positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions in the instant case w/ the area & the suspicious circumstances under w/c a lease agreement was effected all belie petitioners claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.

Marcos v COMELEC

• Domicile of origin is not easy to lose. Although Imelda resided in different places during her marriage to Marcos, she has always returned to the place where she grew up, & therefore, has not lost her domicile of origin.

Domino v COMELEC • The ownership of a residence in a certain place is not sufficient proof of

domicile. Intent to stay and/or return and physical presence must be satisfied to run.

- 20 -


Perez v COMELEC • Once there has been established proof that one has a domicile in a certain

place is not easy to disprove. The lack of domicile should not be merely asserted but should be proven as fact. Lack of evidence to disprove domicile means that the will of the electorate should and must be upheld.

Section 7: Term of Representatives

Dimaporo v Mitra • Once an elected official files a Certificate of Candidacy for another position

other than the one he is holding, it means that he is resigning from his present office, notwithstanding the results of the elections. Term of office is different from tenure. The term means that time that the law attaches to his office. Tenure, on the other hand pertains to the length of time he hold office

Section 8 Section 9: Filling-in Vacancies Lucero v COMELEC

• There are two requisites for the holding of special elections under Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code:

1. that there is a failure of election, and 2. That such failure would affect the results of the election. This

“result of the election” means the net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect the result of the election; hence, a special election must be held.

Tolentino v COMELEC

• In case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, COMELEC is required to call a special election, in this case concerning a Senate seat, simultaneously with the next national elections. The non-announcement of the special election does not nullify the results.

Ocampo v HRET • Only the candidate garnering the highest number of votes in an election

contest has the right, given by the electorate, to assume public office. In case of a disqualification after the elections have ended, the second-placer cannot assume public office because this would undermine and disenfranchise the will of majority of the electorate. No matter which way you look at it, losers are just that – losers.

Section 10: Salary of Senators and Representatives

Section 11: Immunities and Privileges

Privilege from Arrest

People v Jalosjos • In cases where the penalty is more than six months or in criminal conviction

as in the case at bar, not even Representatives are exempt from the law. In this case, everyone is deemed equal.

Parliamentary Freedom of Speech and Debate

Jimenez v Cabangbang • A Representative’s speech is privileged only when done in consonance with

his public duties. This is to make sure that the members of Congress have all the leeway to do their work and to pass laws that would benefit their constituents.

Section 12: Finance and Business Interests

Section 13: Disqualifications

Section 14: Prohibitions for lawyer Legislators/Conflict of Interests Puyat v De Guzman

• Intervention, in this case, is equated to appearing as counsel, which is prohibited by the Constitution. Even to appear as intervenor is not allowed because doing so would just negate the logic behind this provision.

Section 15: Sessions of Congress

Section 16: Officers and Internal Business

Officers of Congress

Defensor-Santiago v Guingona • Majority – number of greater than half or more than half of any total. (In

this case, the number of Senators) • Minority – smaller number of votes compared to the majority. The Senate

President must obtain the votes of more than one-half of all the senators. While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will NOT vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority”, who could thereby elect the minority leader.

Meaning of “A Quorum to do Business” and “Compulsion to Attend”

Avelino v Cuenco • This case pertains to the controversy which arose during a session when the

Senate • President along, with six other senators walked out of the hall, leaving only

12 senators to do business. • The Senate President was replaced during the session continued by the 12

senators. A question of Quorum is raised.

- 21 -


• The court held that there is a quorum. “When the Constitution declares a majority of ‘each House’ shall constitute a quorum, ‘the House’ does not mean ‘all’ members. Even a majority of all the members constitute ‘the House’…There is a difference between a majority of ‘all members if the House’ and a majority of ‘the House’, the latter requiring less number than the last. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of the quorum.”

People v. Jalosjos • Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a

position. • The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by

imprisonment more than 6 years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

• Jalosjos absence from sessions is a legitimate one. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all.

Internal Rules and Discipline

Arroyo v De Venecia • This petition challenges the validity of RA 8240 as its deliberations were

“railroaded”, due to the fact that Sen. Arroyo’s comments were not heard. • “Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and therefore,

they are judicially enforceable. The courts cannot declare an act of legislature void on account of mere compliance with rules of procedure. In the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of a private individual, the courts do not have the power to inquire into allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules.

Osmeña v. Pendatun • Parliamentary immunity of members, not absolute, it does not protect him

from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

• For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison, suspended, and even be expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan • Sec 13 of RA 3019 does not state that the public officer must be suspended

only in the office where he is alleged to have committed that acts with which he has been charged – the term “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which stands accused.

• Therefore, Miriam is not excluded.

Duty to Keep Journals and Records United States v Pons

• The courts of the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is and, to enable them to determine whether the legal

requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with; it is their right, as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals.

• No such thing as ignorance of the law, think Official Gazette. • In this case, any objections to the validity of a statute must have sufficient

proof. Pons’ counsel has the burden of proof to prove that the legislative session did not pass Act No. 2381 before 12mm.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v Gimenez • The enrolled bill is conclusive upon courts as regards to the tenor of the

measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

• Remember it is urea formaldehyde (by product of urea AND formaldehyde) and not urea and formaldehyde.

Morales v Subido • In all cases, the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are

certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires MUST be entered on the journal of the house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the Supreme Court cannot now decide. With respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Astorga v Villegas • The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to the coequal

and independent departments”, which requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated.”

• Certification made by the presiding officers is merely a mode of authentication. The certification does not affect the validity of the bill, nor does it cure any DEFECT already present upon its passage.

• It is the approval of the Congress, and not the signatures of the presiding officers which is essential.

• Both the President and the Congress withdrew their signatures after knowing that the copy sent to the President was not the one approved by Congress.

Philippine Judges Association v Prado • Sec 35 of RA 7354 is unconstitutional as it was passed after the third

reading. • Three readings on separate days, think Statutory Construction. No

amendment must be made on the third reading! The Philippine Postal Service they can’t take out the Franking privilege.

Abakada v Ermita • The case revolves on the passing of RA 9337, or the VAT Law. • Issue on journals?

Section 17: Senate & House of Rep. Electoral Tribunal

- 22 -


Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal

Angara v Electoral Commission • The conflict in this case is determining the jurisdiction of the Electoral

Commission and the Legislature, wherein both independent bodies have powers vested in the Constitution.

• The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly”

• The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

• The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned by the Constitution. All intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ.

• The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and impaired as if it had remained originally in the Legislature.

• The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei (necessary) the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the date set by the Electoral Commission for the last day of filing Election protests (Dec. 9) is valid since it is NECESSARY for them to exercise their exclusive power.

Vera v Avelino • Election contest, “relates only to statutory contests in which the

contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the office”

• Alejandrino Doctrine – a senator appointed by the Governor-General cannot be suspended, in this case, the court exceeded its jurisdiction as it believed that the suspension is legally wrong because Senator Alejandrino was appointed. *related to the case as the Court disputes W/N the Alejandrino case should be applied. The Court said NO, it can no longer be applied.

• Senate has the authority to defer oath-taking of any member against whom protest had been lodged.

• Senate needs to take action to make sure that its prestige and dignity is preserved and that Democratic institutions are filled with people who are mandated by the people and not those who gained their seat through coercion, violation of the law and lastly form contradicting the principle of freedom of choice.

Chavez v COMELEC • Pre-proclamation controversy – any question pertaining to or affecting

the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate before the Board or the Commission or any matter raised under Sections 223, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,

receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns [Section 241, Omnibus Election Code].

• For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. HOWEVER, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

Aquino v COMELEC • The Electoral Tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative

to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House of Representatives only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Perez v COMELEC • The COMELEC no longer has jurisdiction over the complaint of Perez as

Aguinaldo has already been sworn in as the representative of the third district of Cagayan Valley.

• HRET has exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of Aguinaldo’s “ineligibility”.

Garcia v COMELEC

• The cash deposit required in quo warranto (by what warrant; that requires the person to whom it is directed to show what authority he has for exercising some right or power he claims to hold) cases is fixed 5,000 php, and is required to be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed.

• The HRET may dismiss a quo warranto petition for failure to pay the required cash deposit – it is the judgment call which is clearly authorized under its Rules. The exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.

Rasul v COMELEC • The Court ruled in Pangilinan v. COMELEC that, “where the candidate has

already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.”

Guerrero v COMELEC • COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of

candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET).

• Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s

- 23 -


jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Villarosa v COMELEC • The HRET then committed no error in not applying in favor of VILLAROSA

Rule 13, Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code (use of nickname) • Therefore, the JTV nickname of Amelita is to be considered as stray votes

since they do not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom the votes are intended.

Aggabao v COMELEC • HRET has jurisdiction in this case since Miranda has already been

proclaimed.

Barbers v COMELEC • Election, returns and qualifications – should be interpreted in its totality

as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. • “Election” referred to the conduct of polls, including the listing of voters,

the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes • “Returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the

winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns.

• “Qualifications” to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

• SET has SOLE jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete.

Composition

Abbas v Senate Electoral Tribunal • The SET cannot function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators

and no amendment of Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

• Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But this doesn’t mean he can DISQUALIFY himself from the Tribunal.

Pimentel v HRET • The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the

prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its districts and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and CA.

• The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

Independence

Bondoc v Pineda • The Electoral Tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court

although 2/3 of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians.

• To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

• As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence – even independence from the political party to which they belong. Therefore, DISLOYALTY TO PARTY and BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.

• In expelling Cong. Camasura from the HRET for having cast a CONSCIENCE VOTE in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of votes by the tribunal, HRET committed grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. ITS RESOLUTION OF EXPULSION AGAINST CONGRESSMAN CAMASURA IS, THEREFORE, NULL AND VOID.

• Membership in the HRET is co-extensive.

Action/Decision

Robles v HRET • Mere filing of a motion to withdraw election protest, without any action on

the part of the electoral tribunal, did not divest the latter of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction once acquired, is not lost upon instance of the parties, and continues until the case is terminated.

• HRET has the authority to deny or grant the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted.

• The Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant’s (ROBLES) motion to withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained.

Arroyo v HRET • The rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counter-protestant

must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of statutory period for filing of protest or counter protest. In this case, Syjuco filed his protest after the sufficient time period which is 10 days. This is under RULE 16 of the HRET Rules.

• A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another and see to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same form or on appeal.

• Syjuco’s PRECINT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED ANOMALIES/EVIDENCE THEORY – this is to locate most relevant electoral documents used not only during the actual balloting/voting stage, but also those availed of even much earlier, as early as the time of the registration of voters. Syjuco argues that the ballots themselves bear only incidental significance in our chosen approach, because, in our world of cause and effect, the ballots are

- 24 -


mere effects of the document-based anomalies. (In this case, this theory was not accepted because it undermines traditional means which have been tested through years of experience and there must be uniformity of procedure (rules) which is essential to procure truth and exactness in elections.)

• Two mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns by the Electoral Tribunal, based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism, namely 1) that more than 50% of the total number of votes in the precincts were involved, and 2) that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or terrorism.

Lerias v HRET • In an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes is

involved, the best evidence and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. Where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence.

• It has to be duly determined that actual voting and election by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting disfranchisement of the votes, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of voting.

Sandoval v HRET • Judicial guidance is appropriate where jurisdictional issues are involved or

charges of grave abuse of discretion are presented, in order that they may vindicate established claims of denial of due process or correct veritable abuses of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.

• Compliance with the rules on the service of summons is both concern of jurisdiction as it is of due process.

• It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or dependent must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuse to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If however, efforts to find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, by leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by leaving copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

• Section 18: COA - Composition, Nature, Functions

Daza v Singson

• If the representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House can declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the commission on Appointments held by members of Said house affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with Constitution.

• Internal disagreements within a party are to be expected in a political party. It may not be deduced that a party with internal disagreement is merely temporary.

• Changes in the composition of the Commission on Appointments must be permanent and do not included the temporary alliances or factional divisions.

Coseteng v Mitra • The provision on proportional representation is mandatory in character. • The Constitution does not require that the Commission on Appointments

include 12 Senators and 12 Congressmen in order to function. What it requires is that there is at least a majority of the entire membership. The Commission on Appointments may perform its functions even if only 10 senators are elected as long as a quorum exists.

Guingona v Gonzales

• The support of other representatives from a different party does not qualify a lone member of a political party to sit in the Commission on Appointments simply because they are not members of the lone member’s party.

Section 19: Electoral Tribunals & COA – When Constituted

Notes on Section 9

• Commission on Appointments • 25 Members elected on the basis of proportional representation

- Senate President (ex-officio Chairman) - 12 Senators - 12 Members of the House of Representatives

• Although formed by the two houses of Congress, it is independent of Congress. Its powers do not come from Congress, but directly from the Constitution.

• Functions are purely executive in nature - Confirm nominations or appointments submitted to it by the President

• (Executive Heads, Ambassadors, Public Ministers, Consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces, etc.)

Note! The Ombudsman & SC Justices do not need confirmation by the CA. • The Judicial Bar Council prepares a list of nominees and the President

appoints someone from the list. • Formed within 30 days after the election of the Senate President and

Speaker of the House • May meet only while congress is in session

Section 20: Access to Records

Section 21: Legislative Investigations Power of Inquiry

Negros Oriental Electric Coop v Sangguniang Panlungsod

• Contempt and Subpoena power cannot be implied from delegation of powers.

• Local legislative bodies such as the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Dumaguete cannot correctly claim to possess contempt power for the same reasons that the national legislature does. Contempt power attaches not to the discharge

- 25 -


of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.

• Local Legislative bodies may only invite resource persons who are willing to supply information relevant to a proposed ordinance.

• No provision in the Constitution or in the Local Government Code granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish nonmembers for contempt.

• Contempt power if possessed may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee • The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation is not absolute or unlimited. The exercise must be “in aid of legislation”, “in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries shall be respected.”

• The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to its exercise of power found in the Constitution such as to legislate and to expel a member.

Senate v Ermita • Attendance in aid of legislation is compulsory as compared with attendance

during question hour (Article 6, Section 22) which is discretionary. • Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized

exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the tradition of “executive privilege”.

• Executive Privilege – the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.

• State secrets privilege – information that upon disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives.

• Informer’s privilege – privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law.

• Generic privilege – for intragovernmental documents reflecting opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

• A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information to the public, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. It should not be likely invoked. It must be supported by precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality.

• The legislative inquiry is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking.

• The aim of legislative inquiry is to obtain information that may be used for legislation.

Gudani v Senga • As the commander-in-chief, the President has absolute authority over the

persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers.

• Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust.

• The President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief.

• If the Congress seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President, a judicial order may compel the attendance of the military officer.

• Where a military official is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.

Power to Punish a Person Under Investigation

Arnault v Nazareno • The power to punish is essential to the legislative function • No person can be punished as a witness before either House unless his

testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.

• Once the inquiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body, the committee has power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the inquiry.

• The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.

• There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

Sabio v Gordon • Senate committees must carry all powers necessary to be able to obtain the

knowledge and information to base legislation. • When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of

powers, it must have intended each department’s authority to be full and complete, independently of the other’s authority or power. How could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith.

Section 22: Congress and Heads of Departments

Senate v Ermita • Attendance in question hour is discretionary as compared with attendance

during a legislative inquiry (Article 6, Section 21) which is mandatory. • In the context of the parliamentary system of government, the question

hour is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government.

• The objective of the question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

Section 23: Declaration of the Existence of a State of War

- 26 -


Delegation of Emergency Powers

Sanlakas v Executive Secretary • The power of the president to declare a state of rebellion is not limited to

those provided under Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution. • Calling out power of the Armed Forces by the President does not require a

declaration of a State of Rebellion because it is in the exercise of the President of his power as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

• The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.

• The powers of the commander-in-chief are broad enough more so when take together with his executive powers.

• The President serves as Chief of State, commander-in-chief, Chief of Foreign Relations, Chief of Public Opinion.

Section 24: Origin of Money Bills, Private Bills and Bills of Local Application

Bills of Local Application - Origin

Guingona v Carague • The automatic appropriation of debt service in the 1990 budget which is

authorized under the PD 81. PD 81 or “Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act 4860 as amended by PD 1177 entitled, “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society” and by PD 1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising Out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For the Purpose” issued by President Marcos provides that “all expenditures for… (b) Principal and interest on public debt, (c) national government guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon are automatically appropriated…”

• The decrees as petitioners pointed out are inconsistent with Section 24 of Article 6 of the

• Constitution, whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize the said automatic appropriations.

• Section 24 of Article 6 of the Constitution refers to bills that are yet to be passed by Congress after the enactment of the present Constitution and not those that have been passed before its enactment.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance • RA 7716 or the Expanded Value-added Tax Law seeks to widen the tax base

of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. H. No. 1197 is the version of the RA 7716 which originated from the House of Representatives but not passed by the Senate.

• It was simply consolidated with the Senate version, S.No. 1630, in the Conference Committee that produced the bill which was signed by the President as a law.

• Though the said bill was did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives, the bill is nevertheless valid. This is because it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” from the House of Representatives.

• The bill originating from the House of Representatives may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be rewriting of the whole. As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced.

• To insist that the bill originated from the House of Representatives must be substantially be the same as the enacted law would deny the Senate’s power to concur and to propose amendments. It would violate the coequality of the legislative power of both houses of Congress.

Alvarez v Guingona • RA 7720 or “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an

independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago” did not originate exclusively in the House because the Senate version of the Act, which was a substitute bill, was passed as an enrolled bill.

• RA 7720 is valid even though it did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives because the filing of Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of the receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that the bill of local application should originate in the House of Reps for as long as Senate does not act on thereupon until it receives the House bill.

• The initiative for filing the bills must come from the Representatives on the theory that elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Senators on the other hand are expected to approach the same problems from the National perspective.

Southern Cross Cement v Philippine Cement • RA 8800, also known as the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA) provides the

structure and mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures including tariffs to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.

• Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from the or is unravelled by the four corners of the statute and not only a particular provision thereof should be considered.

• Such legislative intent should be given full force and effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is a delegated power, the power of taxations, by nature and by command of the fundamental law, being a preserve of the legislature.

• The power of taxation being legislative, all the incidents are within the control of the legislature. It is said in Article 6 Section24 that all revenue or tariff bills must originate exclusively on the House of Reps and amended by the Senate

Pascual v Secretary of Public Works

• The RA 920, entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works” contained a provision that appropriates “P85,000 for construction, reconstruction, repair and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals.”

• The land which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person and that appropriation made by Congress for that purpose is null and void.

• The legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax and not the

- 27 -


magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.

Section 25: Rules on Appropriation Limits on the Power to Appropriate

Brillantes v COMELEC

• The COMELEC Resolution contravenes the Constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

• The electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results as projected under Resolution 6712 is unofficial in character, meaning “not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or the government body. Any disbursement of public funds to implement this project is contrary to the provisions of the 2003 GAA.

• Neither can the money be taken from the savings of COMELEC, if any, because it would be violative of Art 6 Section 25(5) of the Constitution. The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. No law authorizes that COMELEC can transfer savings from other item in its appropriation to fund the assailed resolution.

Prohibition to Increase

Prohibition of “Riders” in Appropriation Bills

Garcia v Mata • Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the

Philippines is unconstitutional because it is an insertion of a non-appropriation item in an appropriation measure, therefore a rider.

• While RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1857, the said paragraph refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty and reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in AFP. This is entirely irrelevant to the Republic Act which is inconsistent with Sec 25(2).

Atitiw v Zamora • Paragraph 1 in the 2000 GAA, which discusses the use of funds wherein the

amounts appropriated for CAR “will be used to wind up activities and operations of the region, including the payment of separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials”, is not a rider.

• A rider is a provision which is not germane or is alien to the subject or purpose of the bill in which it is incorporated.

• Section 25(2) of Article 6 says that “no provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation...”

• In order that a provision in a general appropriations bill may comply with the test of germaneness, it must be particular (relates to a distinct item in appropriations bill), unambiguous (application/operation is apparent on the face of the bill) and appropriate (subject matter does not have to be treated in a separate legislation).

Fariñas v Executive Secretary • Section 14 of RA 9006, “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,

Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections” so far as it repeals section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is not a rider.

• An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Transfer of Funds

Demetria v Alba • Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 being repugnant to Section 16(5) of

Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution (Sec25 (5) Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution) is null and void because it unduly over extends to the privilege granted under the said provision in the Constitution.

• It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made.

Liga v COMELEC • The COMELEC scheme, if there was any, which is to augment the

appropriated amount by sourcing from the executive and legislative departments to defray the cost of holding the said elections is allowed by Sec. 25(5) of Article 6 of the Constitution.

• As long as there is a law that authorizes such, the transfer of funds is valid. Sections 17 and 19 of the General Appropriations Act of 1994 authorize such transfer of funds.

PHILCONSA v Enriquez

• The Special Provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund of the AFP violates the Section 25(5) of Article 6 of the Constitution.

• Such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.

Section 26: Subject & Title of Bills — Prohibition of Riders Cordero v Cabatuando

• If the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices that reference be made to the legislation to be amended. There is no need to state the precise nature of the amendment, the title not being obliged to be a complete index.

PHILCONSA v Gimenez • The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is

not a mere rule of legislative procedure directory to the Congress. It is

- 28 -


mandatory. It is the duty of the courts to declare void any statute not conforming to the constitutional provision of the prohibition of riders.

Alalayan v NAPOCOR • Where the title is comprehensive enough to reasonably to include the

general object which the statute seeks to effect without each and every means necessary for its accomplishment, mere details need not be set forth.

Insular Lumber Company v CTA • The proviso in Section 5 (exemption to additional taxation) of RA 1435

(additional taxation) has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, and is not deviation from the general subject of the law.

Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board • An act having a single general subject indicated in its title may contain any

number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Philippine Judges Association v Prado • A repealing clause need not be included in the title as long as the content is

germane to the subject. This is because repealed statutes are the effects and not the subject of a statute.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance • The title need not mirror, fully index, or catalogue all contents and minute

detail of a law. Section 5 (b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Tobias v Abalos • The separation of Mandaluyong and San Juan is the logical, natural, and

inevitable consequence of the creation of the City of Mandaluyong.

De Guzman v COMELEC • Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is

relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers.

Cawaling v COMELEC

• The creation of the City of Sorsogon is the logical, natural, and inevitable consequence of the merger of the municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. Therefore, the merging of the two said municipalities is not a rider in this case.

Abakada v Ermita • The “no-amendment rule” refers only to the procedure to be followed by

each house of Congress with regards to the bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other House for

concurrence or amendment. Thus, Article 6, Section 26 (2) cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both Houses of Congress is prohibited.

Section 27: Procedure in Law-Making

Passage of Bills

Arroyo v De Venecia • What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of RA 8240 are

merely INTERNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE of the House rather than the Constitutional requirements for the enactment of law. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies (such as the House) are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver by the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely PROCEDURAL, and with their observance, the Court has no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will NOT invalidate the action, when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

• The constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, and absolutely beyond the challenge of any other body. The failure to regard the rule is NOT a subject matter of judicial inquiry. A legislative act will not be declared invalid for non compliance with internal rules. No court has ever declared an act of the legislature void just because of non-compliance with rules of procedure made by itself.

• In this case, there is no rule in the House which specifically requires that in approving the Bicameral Conference Committee Report, the Chair must restate motion and conduct nominal voting. The manner by which the report was approved has a basis in LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE.

• The Constitution does NOT require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time the House has to vote. Only in the following instances were yeas and nays are mandatory:

a. last and 3rd reading of a bill; b. request of 1/5 of the members present; c. repassing of a bill over the veto of the President.

Abakada v Ermita

• The final output from the bi-cameral conference committee can be completely different from the versions of the house and the senate. The SC also held that it is without power to declare whether or not the bicameral committee exceeded its powers, because such powers are governed by the internal rules of the Congress, whose violation can only be determined by Congress itself.

• As long as the house of representatives passes a revenue bill, the Senate, even if the house has not yet transmitted the approved house revenue bill, can already pass its own version. To say otherwise would curtail the power of the Senate to introduce amendments.

Presidential Veto

- 29 -


CIR v CTA • An “item” in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a

particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax & enumerates the persons liable therefore with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word “item” as referring to the whole section would tie the President’s hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the President the power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile.

Gonzales v Macaraig • Sec 27 of the Constitution Paragraph 1 refers to the general veto power of

the President. If exercised, it would result to the veto of the ENTIRE BILL. • Sec 27 of the Constitution Paragraph 2 refers to the ITEM VETO power or

LINE VETO. It allows the exercise of veto over particular items in an APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL. The power given to the President to disapprove any item in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

• The terms ITEM and PROVISION are different. An ITEM refers to the particulars, details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is the indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It obviously means an item which in itself is a SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION of money, not some general provision of law, which just happens to be put in an appropriation bill.

• The claim of the petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be subject of a separate veto, but also overlooks the constitutional mandate that any PROVISION in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular provision therein, and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

• In short, a PROVISION in an appropriation bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation, and DOES NOT RELATE TO THE ENTIRE BILL. The President may veto provisions.

• Even assuming that provisions are beyond veto powers, Sec 55 may still be vetoed following the DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS. That is, if Sec 55:

a. is a provision that does not relate to any particular appropriation; b. the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the

face of the bill; c. the vetoed sections are more an expression of Congressional policy

regarding augmentation powers rather than a true budgetary appropriation.

• Sec 55 is thus an inappropriate provision that should be treated as ITEMS FOR PURPOSES OF VETO POWERS.

• It cannot be denied that Legislature has the power to provide qualifications and conditions in Appropriation Bills as to limit how the money shall be spend, etc. Also, it cannot be denied that the Executive is not allowed to

veto a condition or qualification but allowing the appropriation itself to stand. However, for these to apply, THERESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE SUCH IN THE REAL SENSE OF THE TERM, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or Conditions must exhibit a CONNECTION WITH MONEY ITEMS IN A BUDGETARYSENSE IN THE SCHEDULE OF EXPENDITURES.• Thus the test is one of APPROPRIATENESS. Section 55 appears to be a condition but actually they are GENERAL LAW MEASURES more appropriate for a substantive, separate legislation.

Bengzon v Drilon • The general fund adjustment is an ITEM which appropriates P500M to

enable government to meets its obligations. The general fund adjustment is the item itself. This was not vetoed by the President. What were vetoed were METHODS AND SYSTEMS placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials (such as retirement pensions) would be paid as they fall due. The vetoed portions are NOT ITEMS, they were PROVISIONS. There was no specific appropriation of money involved. It can be seen that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts.

• The general rule is that the president must veto the bill in its entirety. The exception is that in appropriation, revenue & tariff bills, item-veto is allowed to avoid riders being attached to appropriations measures, but only a particular item may be vetoed (ITEM refers to particulars, details, the distinct and severable parts). The constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

• Additionally, the President cannot set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment by the Court through the exercise of veto power.

PHILCONSA v Enriquez • The general rule is that the President has to veto the entire bill, and not

merely parts thereof. The exception is the power of the President to veto any particular item (item veto) in an appropriations bill. Here, the president must veto the entire item.

• A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation whose content is limited to specified sums of money. Because the Constitution requires that provisions in an appropriation bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriation to which it relates, any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which extends its operation beyond the item will be considered an INAPPROPRIATE PROVISION, which can be vetoed separately.

• Thus the scope of this item veto (inappropriate provision) should be any provision:

a. which does not relate to any particular item b. which extends the operation beyond the item of appropriation; and c. an unconstitutional provision which are intended to amend other

laws. Section 28

- 30 -


Tan vs Del Rosario • All subjects/objects of taxation similarly situated are to be taxed or treated

equally: A.) standards used are substantial, not arbitrary B.) categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose C.) law applies to both present and future conditions D.) classification applies equally well to all belonging in the same class CIR vs Lingayen Gulf Electric Company

• RA 3843 is not unconstitutional and discriminatory in providing the company a different tax rate as contended by CIR because it merely transferred Lingayen Electric to another class in which a different tax rate is imposed.

Abra Valley College vs Aquino

• The term “exclusively for educational purposes” also extended to those circumstances that are for the institution’s incidental use as well. Thus, since only the second floor of the building was used for said purpose (house of the director) then the assessed tax would only be half of the original amount which includes the payment for the first floor of the building leased for commercial purposes.

John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim GR 119775, October 24, 2003

• Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. It must be expressly granted in a statute and stated in a language too clear to be unmistaken. Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed. If it were the intent of the legislature to grant the John Hay SEZ the same exemption and incentive given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in RA 7227.

Southern Cross Cement vs. Philippine Cement GR 158540, July 8, 2004

• After the GATT & WTO membership, the Philippines enacted the Safeguard Measures Act along with the Anti-dumping Act & the imposition countervailing duties to protect local industries. The power of the executive to impose safeguard measures is actually just delegated by the legislature in its exercise of taxing power. The congress may impose limitations & guidelines to the exercise of these measures which must be complied with by the executive in its implementation. In this case, it must have the positive factual determination of the Tariff Commission before it can be imposed. In the absence of such and for other causes, the DTI is enjoined from enforcing. The DTI must follow the guidelines laid down by the legislature in its enforcement, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.

Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City GR 144104, June 29, 2004

• The lot owned by the petitioner and its hospital building are subject to assessment for purposes of real estate tax. Petitioner claims that they are a charitable institution. The SC held that it has parts which are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes, hence, those are not exempt. Only portions of the hospital which are used by the patients are

exempt from real estate tax. Dominant use and principal use can’t be substituted for used exclusively.

Abakada vs. Ermita 469 SCRA 1 (2005)

• RA 9337 is a consolidation of 3 legislative bills which amends secs 106 to 108 of the NIRC. It also contains a uniform proviso authorizing the president, upon recommendation of the Sec of Finance to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% after any of the two conditions of the law has been satisfied. The issue is WON RA 9337 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power as it constitutes an abandonment of congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Art 6 § 28 ¶ 2. The SC held that, while power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of power shall be let to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends. The preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function but is simple auxiliary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity that the legislature may delegate to others to perform.

Constantino vs. Cuisia GR 106064, October 13, 2004

• The petitioners are questioning an agreement that was entered into by the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team. The agreement is characterized as a multi option financing package. Petitioners alleged that even prior to the execution of the program, respondents had already implemented its “buyback component”. The issue WON the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program are beyond the powers granted to the president under § 20 art. 7 of the constitution. The SC held that it is within the power of the president to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. The only restriction, aside from the concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to the limitations provided by law.

Republic vs. City of Kidapawan 477 SCRA 324 (2005)

• The City sent PNOC-EDC a notice of delinquency for non payment of real property tax and warrant of levy against MAGRA. PNOC filed for injunction which was granted, but the RTC held that PNOC-EDC is not exempt from real property tax. The land which they occupy is of public domain but the improvements (MAGRA) on it are subject to tax. PNOC’s exemption was withdrawn by the LGC. Only congress can grant tax exemptions. DOE cannot grant it even if it was provided in the contract.

Section 29: Restrictions on Use of Public Fund Fiscal Powers of Congress Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works 110 PHIL. 331 (1960-61)

• Sen. Zulueta owns a subd. in Rizal w/c he said he will donate to the provincial govt. RA 920 appropriated funds for road construction inside that subd. Petitioner filed a petition to enjoin the respondent from constructing the said road. The SC held that congress cannot appropriate funds which is

- 31 -


not for public purpose. Mere incidental interest to the public will not justify such use of public money for private interest. It also violates the prohibition against legislators to have any interest in govt contracts.

MIAA vs. Mabunay GR 126151, January 20, 2000

• MIAA entered into a security contract with Lanting Security Agency. When PASSCOR was organized, MIAA terminated their contract with Lanting. Lanting challenged the termination alleging that it violates the procedure on public biddng. MIAA invokes Sec 68 of the GAA w/c allows govt to enter into service contracts through public bidding or negotiated contracts. The SC held that nothing in the said provision allows the govt to do away w/ bidding requirement. The bidding requirement is a mechanism to avoid anomalies in the execution of contracts and disbursement of funds.

Guingona vs. Carague 196 SCRA 221 (1991)

• GAA of 1990 allocated P86 billion for debt servicing and only P27B for education by virtue of PD 81 and other related laws for auto debt service. The consti provision which states that education will receive the highest budget is not self executing. PD 81 and other laws concerning auto debt service was not repealed by the new consti. Further, the consti provision which states that all appropriations & bills authorizing public debt, etc must be passed again by congress is untenable. This provision pertains to future debts to be contracted and not those which are already in effect.

COMELEC vs. Quijano GR 151992, September 18, 2002

• Private respondent want to enforce the contract it entered with COMELEC for the computerization of the elections, although congress did not provide adequate funds. COMELEC wants to reengineer the project which private respondent opposes. Private respondent filed a petition for mandamus in order to compel the petitioner to enforce the contract. The SC held that mandamus can’t be used at the case at bar because the contract was not perfected, illegal and against public policy. The contract is not binding and considered void. Art. 6 § 29 states that no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Special Funds Gaston vs. Planters Bank 158 SCRA 626 (1988)

• Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus before the SC, w/c seeks the transfer & distribution of their shares of stock in RBR. Respondent answer is that no trust was entered & the money was used for the stabilization of the sugar industry, hence it is now govt fund. The shares of stock belongs to the govt. Stabilization fees are specials funds. The excess will be transferred to gen. funds of the govt. To allow the transfer will be a clear violation of the constitution.

Osmena vs. Orbos 220 SCRA 703 (1993)

• PD 1956 created the OPSF fund w/c was designed to reimburse oil companies from resulting world oil price adjustments. Additional ad valorem taxes, duties on imported petroleum and other increase in taxes was imposed. They are taxes collected in the exercise of police power. The state converted the fund into t “trust liability account” by virtue of EO 1024 and

was released through the ministry of energy. The OPSF is not a trust fund but is actually a special fund & was established to protect consumers. Payments for losses and under recovery from sales was sustained but not the reimbursement w/c is not authorized by law.

Section 30 First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA (1994)

• SC issued Circular no. 1-91 which is a procedural rule regarding the jurisdiction of CA over appeals from the decision of the BOI and for that petitioner contends that said circular cannot supersede Art. 82 of Omnibus Investment Code because it is a substantive right which cannot be modified by rule of procedure.

• The appealing procedure provided for in Art. 82 of Omnibus Code which states that appeals can be made to the SC is unconstitutional because it violates Sec 30 of Art 6 because no consent was acquired regarding the increase in appellate jurisdiction.

Fabian v. Desierto (1998)

• Fabian was major stockholder for PROMAT, a construction company, on the other hand private respondent Agustin was incumbent District Engineering. They had a relationship which resulted to the project giving gifts. After misunderstanding, Fabian filed complaint against respondent for violating Ombudsman Act RA 6770. Same law provides that a direct appeal can be made directly to the SC for decisions of the OMB.

• Court held that said law was unconstitutional as it violates the power of the SC by increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC. However the SC may transfer the appellate jurisdiction to the CA regarding appeals from administrative decision as it is merely procedural only, these is shown through rule 45 of the rules of court. The OMB is not independent that it can make its own independent rule especially that of the appellate jurisdiction of SC. CASE REMANDED

Villavert v. Desierto (2000)

• The case is about petitioner being dismissed as a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets, petitioner Villavert incurred a total of P997,373.60 worth of unpaid PCSO tickets. He was dismissed from his job by the Ombudsman thus this questioned appeal.

• Following the case of Fabian which provided appeal by way of petition for review from a decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999 shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals but must be forthwith DENIED or DISMISSED, respectively. The case was filed prior to such deadline finding thus it is still triable. Case remanded to CA.

Tirol v. COA (2000)

• Petitioner is the incumbent Regional Director of DECS, he and other officials where charged with the violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 for entering to contracts in acquiring school equipments grossly

- 32 -


disadvantageous to the government. Audit conducted and showed that there was overpricing. Petitioner argued it was for emergency.

• Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Also this is also an appeal under Section 27 of the of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 which was declared unconstitutional by the SC and even if it was not unconstitutional section mentioned that “all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.” Case will not prosper because it is a criminal case.

Cabrera v. Lapid (2006)

• Petitioner was seeking for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Ombudsman declaring her fishpond a nuisance per se thus it was destroyed, petitioner was contesting that the destruction of the fishpond was done in bad faith by the respondent. Petitioner appealed it to the SC invoking Sec 27 of RA 6770 which allowed direct appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 was declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto.

• However petitioner is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Section 31 Section 32 SBMA V. COMELEC 1996

• Republic Act No. 7227 provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone and created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed an “ordinance” complying with the requirements of the RA. Respondent petitioned for the annulment of the said “ordinance” but was only given assurance that petition was being studied by the government already. Not satisfied with the respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code. COMELEC denied the initiative, instead prepared for a referendum.

• In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. COMELEC cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.

• Initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.

Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC (1997)

• PIRMA was initiated to gather signatures to amend the Constitution. However people’s initiative in amending the Constitution provided for by Section of Art. 17 of the Constitution was not self-executory, such right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain effectiveless until the Congress provides for its implementation

Lambino v. COMELEC

• These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the COMELEC denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. Lambino group started to gather signature they alleged that they were able to acquire the required number of signatures by the Constitution. It was denied by the COMELEC on the ground that there was lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. Cited case of Defensor vs. COMELEC.

• Failed to comply with the requirement because they failed to present the proposed amendment to the people to inform them before they sign the initiative. Also the proposed “amendment” was already a revision which the Constitution provides for specific people and procedure which will enable a revision to take place.

ARTICLE VII: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1 Executive Power Philconsa v. Enriquez

• General Appropriations Act of 1994 RA 7663 was passed and approved by Congress. This Act authorizes members of Congress to propose and identify projects in “Pork Barrels”, allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Petitioners assail the Constitutionality of the Act because it gives the Congress the power to augment (such power is vested in the President). The Court states that the proposals and identifications made by Congress are merely recommendatory. The President must still examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the President who shall implement them.

Webb v. de Leon

• Vizconde Massacre case, Witness Protection Program (RA 6981), power of the DOJ to discharge state witness (immunity from prosecution). Jessica Alfaro was not included in the information based on RA No. 6981 w/c mandates non-inclusion of state witness in the criminal complaint & grants immunity from prosecution. It grants the DOJ the power to determine who can qualify to said program & become immune from suit. Not an intrusion of

- 33 -


the judicial prerogative to discharge an accused as a state witness. The power to prosecute crimes is vested in the Executive Branch in its power to implement & execute the laws. The power to execute the law includes the power to prosecute; hence RA No. 6981 w/ its affirmation of executive discretion is valid.

Marcos v. Manglapus

• Marcos’ return to the Phils. After being deposed & exiled to Hawaii, Pres. Marcos, in his deathbed, signified his desire to return to the Phils & die in his country. Circumstances during that time include frequent coup d' etats, economic problems, etc. Pres. Aquino deemed such return to be dangerous to the safety of the nation. Right to return to one's country not expressly granted by the Bill of Rights but recognized in Int'l Law. Powers of the Pres. are not restricted to those expressly granted by the Consti such as appointing power, commander-in-chief powers, pardoning power, treaty-making power, etc. but includes such inherent & residual unstated powers necessary to the exercise of executive power & implicit to the paramount duty to protect the people. In this case, the residual power of the Pres. to serve & protect the general welfare of the people is exercised as mandated by the Constitution.

Laurel v. Garcia

• Roponggi Case and E.O. 296 (authorize sale to non-Filipino citizens/entities. The Philippines acquired some properties through reparations from Japan after WW2 under the Reparations Agreement and listed under the “Government Sector.” Petitioners are asserting that E.O. 296 is unconstitutional since it authorizes the sale of government properties to non-Filipino citizens/entities. Said property is of public domain outside the commerce of man. It is dedicated for the public use & cannot be appropriated or alienated w/o a formal declaration from the government to convert it to patrimonial property. E.O. 296 does not have force of law because Pres. Aquino has already lost her revolutionary powers by then. There must be a law authorizing its conveyance; the concurrence of Executive & Legislative is necessary.

Djumantan v. Domingo

• Muslim wife case and Deportation power of Executive. Bernard Bañez is an OCW to Indonesia and married to Marina Cabael. Then, he married Djumantan in Indonesia & had 2 children. He brought them to Phils. and pretended to be friends (show his appreciation for the kindness shown to him in Indonesia and have them as guests only) & passed immigration through such misrepresentation. Cabel, upon discovering that Djumantan is her husband’s mistress and is living at her husband’s house, filed for concubinage but was dismissed. His son Leonardo filed complaint before the Ombudsman. Djumantan was later detained at Commission on Immigration & Deportation. The deportation proceedings ensued. The President's power to deport is as absolute & unqualified as the power to prohibit entry into the country. Alien's admission is a matter of pure permission, not as a matter of right. Likewise, an alien does not possess right to an indefinite stay. However, the deportation of Djumantan is barred by prescription (5 yrs +) accdg. to Immigration Act of 1940.

Chavez v. PCGG • Compromise Agreement with the Marcoses to recover the ill-gotten

wealth. PCGG’s Compromise Agreement with the Marcoses contains the following Constitutional infirmities: • It compromises BOTH civil & criminal liability. EO No. 14 allows the

grant of immunity for witnesses only, but not for the principals of the crime. The Marcoses are principal defendants before the Sandiganbayan.

• It exempts from all forms of taxes the properties retained by the Marcos heirs. The power to tax & to grant tax exemptions is vested in Congress.

• It binds the Gov't to dismiss the cases before the Sandiganbayan. This is a clear encroachment upon the judiciary. Dismissal of the case is at the discretion of the court.

• The Gov't waives any claims, whether past, present, or future, mature or inchoate, against the Marcoses. This violates the Civil Code provision that an action for future fraud cannot be waived. It is a license to perpetuate future fraud and crime w/ immunity.

• It does not provide for a period w/in w/c the Marcoses must satisfy their prestations & lays no standards as to what assets are to be retained by them and those forfeited to the Gov't.

• It lacks the approval of the President FVR.

Pontejos v. Ombudsman • Power of Ombudsman to grant immunity to state witnesses. Pontejos

charged with estafa and direct bribery for exacting money from Aquino in order to obtain a favourable decision of a case against Roderick Ngo. Atos, a subordinate of Pontejos and acted only upon the prodding of Pontejos, was given immunity for testifying against Pontejos. Her testimony was necessary to build a case against Pontejos. The OMB is granted with the power to grant immunity from prosecution persons whose testimony or in whose possession and production of document or other evidence that may be necessary in the proceedings of the case, under such terms and conditions as it may determine.

Executive Privilege US v. Nixon

• General Executive Privilege/Privilege Communication of the President (President’s need for confidentiality). Pres. Nixon was charged for conspiracy to defraud the United States & obstruction of justice. Pursuant thereto, the court issues sub poena duces tecum for the production of taped conversations bet. Nixon & other exec. officials. Nixon invokes the General Executive Privilege, protection of communications among high government officials & those who advise & assist them in the performance of their duties. He also invokes the separation of powers. Both cannot sustain absolute, unqualified Presidential Immunity. He must allege it on the basis of military or diplomatic secrets. President’s generalized assertion of privilege in confidentiality will not hold against the demands of due process & fair administration of criminal justice.

- 34 -


Almonte v. Vasquez • Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau case and ghost

agents. Ombudsman received anonymous letter, presumed to be from employee of EIIB alleging corruption w/in such as ghost employees, anomalous disbursement of public funds, etc. Ombudsman investigates & issues sub poena duces tecum to Accounting Division & Records Section of EIIB requiring production of documents relating to Personal Service Funds. Supra. Nixon. The Court also stated that EIIB’s fxns are confidential in nature but not their documents. • In both cases, even if the documents or testimonies of public officials

are treated as presumptively privileged, their confidentiality will not be prejudiced for they will be examined in camera (closed-door trial/session); thus, their non reproduction will not be tolerated.

Senate v. Ermita

• E.O. 464 case. supra Nixon (leading case). The Court ruled that the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favour of disclosure. The privilege extends only to matters necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.

Immunity from Suit Soliven v. Makasiar

• President’s prerogative whether or not to avail of the immunity. Luis Beltran and other petitioners who are also writers/columnists were charged with libel by Pres. Aquino. Beltran argues that the presidential immunity from suit carries with it a correlative disability to file suit because she may have to be a witness for the prosecution & subjected to pain of perjury; hence, circumventing the said principle. The court ruled that the immunity may only be invoked by the President, not by anyone else in her behalf. Should she so desire, she may shed the immunity, but it is her prerogative to do so. Privilege works to protect the Pres. from being hampered in the performance of duties & functions by lawsuits & allows the Pres. to give governance her undivided attention.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald

• Presidential aides’ claiming derivative immunity. Bryce Harlow & Alexander Butterfield are aides of Pres. Nixon who conspired to have Earnest Fitzgerald removed from his employment in the White House, allegedly violating his constitutional rights. Fitzgerald files suit for damages. Presidential aide does not enjoy the same degree of immunity. He must establish that his office performs such sensitive functions that would require immunity & that the act alleged was in the performance of said functions. The case also laid down the two tests namely the objective test: must have reasonable knowledge & respect for basic rights and the subjective test:

must not demonstrate malicious intent. Both must be present. Case was remanded for further proceedings based on the standards laid down.

Clinton v. Jones

• Clinton’s sexual escapade and claiming immunity. Paula Corbin Jones was working w/ Arkansas Industrial Development Commission. State Police Officer Danny Ferguson orders her to leave desk to visit then Governor Bill Clinton in his hotel suite where the latter made "abhorrent" sexual advances upon her w/c she rejected. She was later treated in a hostile manner at work. She filed suit for damages. Federal Trial Court deferred trial until expiration of term of Clinton as President of the US. The President's immunity from suit does not extend to acts committed outside of official duties. The rationale of the rule is to allow the Pres. to perform his DUTIES w/o being hampered. The protected action must be related to the immunity's purpose. Unofficial acts do not fall w/in the privilege of immunity from suit. The Federal Court erred in deferring due course & must assume jurisdiction to try the case. The non granting of immunity does not violate separation of powers. Case is remanded.

Gloria v. CA

• DECS reassignment case and complaining about reassignment. DECS Sec. Ricardo Gloria recommended to the Pres. the re-assignment of Bienvenido Icasiano from being Schools Div. Superintendent of QC to Superintendent of Marikina Inst. of Science & Technology (MIST) to fill up a temporary vacancy. Such was approved by FVR. Icasiano sues for violation of security of tenure due to indefinite duration of assignment. Presidential immunity from suit is not violated because it is directed against Sec. Gloria & not the President. Even so, presidential decisions may be assailed in court if there is grave abuse of discretion. The reassignment clearly violated security of tenure.

Estrada v. Desierto

• Impeachment of Estrada and invocation of immunity from prosecution under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court considers Estrada to be resigned on the basis of the totality of his acts and the attending circumstances present during the volatile period. Pres. Arroyo was sworn into office and was considered by the SC as the incumbent President because of the confirmation of Congress as a co-equal branch was given great weight. Pres. Estrada was then prosecuted by the Ombudsman based on the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 15 thereof provides that separation or cessation of a public official from office is not a bar to prosecution under this Act. In this case, the impeachment proceedings became moot due to resignation of the President. The proper criminal (plunder, bribery, graft & corruption) & civil actions may proceed against him in ordinary courts. Conviction in Impeachment is not a requisite to criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman. Unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State; hence they stand on the same footing as any other trespasser. They are not protected by Executive Immunity from suit.

- 35 -


David v. Arroyo • PP 1017 and implead President as respondent. The Court held that it is

not proper to implead the President as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil and criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of the State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

The Cabinet Constantino v. Cuisa

• Financing Program and Secretary of Finance as alter ego of the President. The Financing Program was formulated during the term of Pres. Aquino in order to manage the country’s external debt problem through negotiation-oriented debt strategy involving cooperation and negotiation with foreign creditors. The petitioners are contending that it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these contracts and such power may not be delegated. The Court ruled that the Secretary of Finance is authorized by law, with the approval of the President of the Philippines, after consultation with the Monetary Board, to borrow on the credit of the Phils. and to issue therefore evidence of indebtedness of the Philippine Government. The law allows the Sec. of Finance to act as alter ego of the President in order to have a sound and efficient management of the financial resources of the Government.

Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Election of the President and VP Term of the President and VP Anson-Roa v. Arroyo

• Incumbent Arroyo runs for Presidency. Senatorial candidates Elisa Anson-Roa & Amina Rasul-Bernardo challenge her candidacy & allege use of public funds for campaign. According to the Constitution, the President shall not be eligible for RE-ELECTION. No person who has succeeded the Pres. & has served for more than 4 yrs shall be qualified for election to the same office anytime. Arroyo was not elected as President & has not served for more than 4 yrs. She does not have to resign & can run w/ all the concomitant powers & duties of the Presidency. COMELEC has jurisdiction. Alleged use of funds is question of fact, not of law.

Congress as National Board of Canvassers Brillantes v. COMELEC

• RA 8436 (Authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), unofficial count, and Congress as

the sole and exclusive authority to canvass the votes for the election of the President and Vice-President. The resolution directly infringes the authority of Congress, considering Sec. 4 thereof allows the use of third copy of the Election Returns for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, intended for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced precinct results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.

Pimentel v. Joint Committee

• Joint Committee to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates following the adjournment of Congress. The petitioners contend that “all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of … Congress.” The Court ruled that even though the legislative functions of the Congress may have come to a close, this doesn’t affects its non-legislative functions, such that of being the National Board of Canvassers. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn until it has accomplished its constitutionality mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered to be functus officio. Its membership may change but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.

Breaking Presidential or Vice-President Tie Presidential or Vice-Presidential Controversies Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos

• Miriam files election protest for presidency but while case is pending, files cert. of candidacy as senator and won. Such act of Miriam is tantamount to withdrawal/abandonment of her claim to the Presidency. It is a political contract w/ the electorate to serve her constituency for the term for w/c she was elected. Only 3 yrs left in the Presidency, 6 yrs to serve as Senator. The action becomes moot upon the expiration of the contested term. She also waived the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots signifies intent to abandon her claim.

Tecson v. COMELEC

• Questioning the eligibility of FPJ to run for Presidency; not natural-born. The “contest” is in reference to a post-election scenario. According to the law, only the registered candidate for President, Vice-President of the Philippines receiving the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or Vice-President; thus, the jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited only to returns, qualifications of the “President”, “Vice-President” and not of “candidates.” The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would not include cases directly brought before it questioning qualifications of a candidate for presidency because the character of a contest is to dislodge the winning candidate from office.

Section 5 Section 6

- 36 -


Section 7 Section 8 Estrada v. Desierto

• Estrada’s overt acts leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned. In the light of this finding that petitioner has resigned before 12 o’clock noon of January 20, 2001, the claim that the office of the President was not vacant when Arroyo took her oath at half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.

Section 9 Section 10 Section 11 Estrada v. Desierto

• Supra. Estrada on Sec.7-8 Section 12 Section 13 Prohibition against Holding Another Office or Employment Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control Board

• Creation of Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board and appointments to the Embroidery Board case. RA No. 3137 created the Embroidery & Apparel Control & Inspection Board, Sec. 2 thereof defines membership: representatives from Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Dept. of Commerce & Industry, Nat'l Econ. Council as ex-officio members, & member from the private sector from Assoc. of Embroidery & Apparel Exporters of the Phils. The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the Pres. upon w/c no limitations may be imposed except by the Com. on Appointments. No new appointments were made, they were merely designated new duties as ex-officio members in addition to their original duties. Hence, it does not infringe upon the appointing power of the President.

CLU v. Exec. Secretary

• Can’t hold two positions case. EO No. 284 promulgated by Pres. Aquino (revolutionary legislative powers) stating that "members of the Cabinet, under-secretary, asst. secretary, other appointive officials of the Exec. Branch may not hold more than 2 other positions in the Gov't." According to the Constitution, Art. 7 unless provided in the Consti, Pres, VP, Cabinet, deputies & assistants may not hold ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT during tenure. However, under Art. 9 states "Unless otherwise allowed BY LAW or the primary functions of his position xxx" Intent of the Consti was to impose stricter prohibition on the Pres, his official family, in so far as holding public position.

• Art. 9 applies to appointive officials in the Civil Service (Asst. Secretary & below) as a general rule, but as for Cabinet Members, Pres, & VP, they may only hold other office when the Constitution itself so provides. It does not include positions held in an ex-officio capacity & w/o additional compensation for services rendered in such ex-officio capacity they are not other offices but merely other duties part of their principal office. EC No. 284 is declared NULL & VOID.

De la Cruz v. COA

• Alternatives not entitled to additional compensation case. NHA Resident Auditor disallowed payment to petitioners of their representative allowances and per diems. Power of the petitioners is merely derivative The Court held that the acts of alternates are considered to be acts of principals; thus, if the principal is not entitled to compensation then the agent is also not entitled to compensation. The agent can never be larger than the principal. In addition, ex-officio positions being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.

Bitonio v. COA

• Supra De la Cruz. National Amnesty Com. v. COA

• Supra Bitonio (regarding ex-officio positions). Other Prohibitions Doromal v. Sandiganbayan

• Indirect interest of Public Official case. Quintin Doromal, as Commissioner of the PCGG & at the same time, president / shareholder of the Doromal Int'l Trading Corp. entered into the bidding process for supply of equipment for the DECS & Nat'l Manpower & Youth Council. Preventively suspended pending litigation by the Sandiganbayan (ordered lifted bec. it exceeded the 90 day duration under Civil Service Law). As an incorporator / director of family business, he was at least, INDIRECTLY INTERESTED in the transaction. Art. 7 Sec. 13 of the Consti: "The Pres, VP, members of the Cabinet, deputies or assistants xxx shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly xxx participate in business w/ or be interested in any contract or franchise granted by the Gov't. Remanded to Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.

Section 14 Section 15 Appointments by Acting President Temporary Appointments In re Appointment of Valenzuela

- 37 -


• Midnight appointments case. Mateo Valenzuela appointed to the RTC of Bago City, while Placido Vallarta to RTC Cabanatuan City w/in the period of ban on appointments 2 months before elections accdg. to Art. 7 Sec. 15 of the Consti. Exception: appointments to vacant EXECUTIVE positions when the public safety so demands. Pres. also demanded the nominations of the JBC for the vacancy on the SC resulting from the retirement of Assoc. Justice Ricardo Francisco, but the Chief Justice (Chair of the JBC) refused on the basis of said prohibitory period. Note: Under Art. 8 Sec. 4 & 9, vacancies in the Judiciary must be filled w/in 90 days from occurrence upon recommendation of the JBC. Conflict is resolved as follows:

General Rule: vacancies must be filled (Appointment of judicial officials falls here) Exception: the ban on appointments upon 2 months prior to date of election. Exception to the exception: appointment of EXECUTIVE officials when public safety requires

• The intent of the Consti is to prevent "midnight appointments" as well as influence of appointments upon elections. 2 months prior to election, the Pres is deprived of appointing power subject to the only exception. Hence the appointments of Valenzuela & Vallarda are NULL & VOID.

Section 16 Nature of the Appointing Power Government v. Springer

• Appointment for GOCC's case. The Nat'l Coal Co. became Gov't-owned (more than 99% of shares of stock); it was created under Act. NO. 2705 as amended by Act No. 2822 w/c created a Voting Committee composed of Senate Pres, Speaker of the HR, & the Gov. Gen. w/c proceeded to vote in favor of 5 persons as directors of said company in absence of the Gov. Gen. who challenges constitutionality of voting committee. Organic Acts vest supreme executive power on the Gov. Gen. & appointment is an executive function. Legislature has power to create the office, define it powers, & annex compensation but has nothing to do w/ the man to fill the office. Such vestige of power in Voting Committee is a violation of separation of powers. Administration of GOCC's is not germane to legislative function.

Bermudez v. Exec. Secretary

• Recommendation of DOJ case. Vacancy for the office of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac emerged. Oscar Bermudez was recommended by DOJ Sec. Teofisto Guingona, while Conrado Quiaoit was recommended by Rep. Jose Yap of 2nd Leg. Dist. of Tarlac. Quiaoit prevailed; Bermudez challenges citing Revised Admin. Code of 1987 w/c provides that "Provincial & city prosecutors & their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres upon recommendation of the Secretary. Lack of recommendation is not fatal to the appointment & is merely persuasive & discretionary but NOT mandatory. Appointment entails DISCRETION on the part of the appointing power. Personality of the Sec. of Justice is merely extension to that of the President.

Kinds of Presidential Appointments Pimentel v. Ermita

• President issued appointments then made ad interim appointments; Congress not in session “daw.” The power to appoint is executive in nature and the legislature may only prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. The President’s appointment of acting secretaries doesn’t need COA’s approval (acting appointments don’t exceed 1 year). Congress can’t impose who the President may appoint because EO 292 vests in the President that power to temporarily designate an officer already in the government or any other competent person to perform the fxns of an office in the executive branch. Also, acting appointments may anytime there is a vacancy and don’t need the approval of COA. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices.

Scope of the Power of the COA Sarmiento III v. Mison

• 1st Sentence case. Appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague as Sec. of the Dept. of Budget assailed on the basis of lack of approval of the Commission on Appointments. Consti provides as follows:

• 1st Sentence: The Pres shall nominate & with the consent of the Com. On Appointments, appoint heads of the Exec. Dept, ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment is vested in him in this Constitution.

• 2nd Sentence: He shall appoint all other offices of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, & those he may be authorized by law to appoint.

• 3rd Sentence: Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other lower officers in the Pres alone, in the courts, heads of depts., agencies, commissions, or boards.

• Only those in the 1st Sentence require consent of the Commission on Appointments. Word "alone" in 3rd Sentence is a mere lapse in draftsmanship. Intent of the Const is to strike a middle ground bet. the 1935 (very restrictive) and 1973 (very permissive) Constitutions. Appointment of Mison & Carague fall under 2nd Sentence, hence no approval is necessary from Com. on Appointments.

Bautista v. Salonga

• CHR 1st Sentence case. Mary Concepcion Bautista appointed to the CHR w/o approval of Com. on Appointments (COA). COA summons her to present credentials for review, but refuses to submit to its jurisdiction. Pres. Aquino appoints Hesiquito R. Malilin as ad interim Chair of CHR pending MaryCon's dispute w/ COA. Position of Chair of CHR falls under 2nd Sentence (xxx those he [Pres] may be authorized by law to appoint xxx), just as in Sarmiento vs. Mison, hence, no approval of the COA is necessary. CHR is a constitutionally created body, w/c the Pres appoints the Chair w/o express condition of prior COA approval. Bautista cannot be removed from office w/o just cause & is affirmed as the true appointed Chairman of CHR.

- 38 -


Quintos-Deles v. CA

• Sectoral reps. confirmation case. The following. are appointed by Pres. Aquino as Sectoral Reps. for the HR during recess: Teresita Quintos-Deles (Women), Al Ignatius Lopez (Youth), Bartolome Arteche (Peasant), & Rey Magno Teves (Urban Poor). Pres. submitted their appointment to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, but they refused to submit themselves to its jurisdiction. Oath taking was suspended by Speaker Mitra. Appointment of Sectoral Reps is vested in the Pres. by virtue of the Consti & falls under 1st Sentence w/c requires COA approval. Sarmiento vs. Mison doctrine was reiterated. Moot due to COA approval.

Pobre v. Mendieta

• PRC Chairman appointment case. PRC Chairmanship becomes vacant upon expiration of term of Julio Francia. Assoc. Commissioner Hermogenes Pobre appointed by Pres. Senior Assoc. Commissioner Mariano Mendieta challenges such appointment argues succession by operation of law citing PD No. 223 & also argues for required COA approval. It falls under 2nd Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 (He shall appoint all other offices of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, & those he may be authorized by law to appoint) w/c requires no prior approval of the COA. The argument of succession by operation of law is untenable as the Pres. could not have enacted said PD to curtail his own powers of appointment. History of the PRC reflects that filling up of such vacancies upon expiration of term are filled up by appointment.

Flores v. Drilon

• Olongapo Mayor as SBMA Chair case. RA No. 7227 (Bases Conversion & Dev't Act) w/c provides that for the 1st year of effectivity, the Pres. shall appoint the Mayor of Olongapo (Gordon) as Chairman & CEO of SBMA. Art 9-B Sec. 7 of Consti: No ELECTIVE official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Only appointive officials may be authorized to hold other offices in an ex-officio capacity when allowed by law or the primary functions of his office. Congress stipulated APPOINTMENT, not ex officio capacity hence it violates the Consti. It falls w/in the 2nd Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 (those whom the President may be authorized to appoint by law) however, the power of whom to appoint is the prerogative of the appointing power Congress deprived the Pres. of discretion bec. only 1 person qualifies for said office. He must 1st resign his post before he can be appointed to other office. Public policy: his previous acts as SBMA Chair are not necessarily null & void as he acted as a de facto officer whose acts redounded to the benefit of community.

Rufino v. Endriga

• BOD to appoint officers. EO 1058 was created increasing the number of trustees to 11. The Court ruled that the law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Since the law provides that the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards; thus, the presidential

decree authorizing BOD to appoint officers is unconstitutional. The President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.

Appointment of Officers “Lower in Rank” May Congress require other appointments to be confirmed by the COA Calderon v. Carole

• COA approval of NLRC appointments case. RA No. 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law) amended Labor Code & provides that the Pres. shall appoint the Chairman & other Commissioners of the NLRC SUBJ. TO CONFIRMATION BY COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Labor Sec. Drilon issues Admin Order No. 161 s. 1989 pursuant thereto designating assignments. Said law is unconstitutional bec. it expands the powers of the COA. It falls w/in the 2nd Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 such other officers that he (Pres.) may be authorized by law to appoint. Only those in the 1st Sentence (Heads of the Exec. Dept, ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment is vested in him in this Constitution) exclusively require COA approval. It attempts to amend by legislation the Constitution, hence said provision is NULL & VOID.

U-Sing v. NLRC

• Another NLRC appointment case. Fortunato Naya worked as maintenance man for U-Sing, who stopped working & died of illness. His wife Cecilia Naya sues for separation pay & incentive leave & alleges underpayment. U-Sing alleges indebtedness of Naya as well as contributions for sickness & death. NLRC dismisses underpayment but grants separation pay. U-Sing challenges jurisdiction of NLRC alleging that the appointment of Commissioners was not approved by the Commission on Appointments. Appointment of NLRC Commissioners falls under 2nd Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 of the Consti (those whom the President may be authorized to appoint by law) w/c does not require approval by the COA. Hence, their acts are valid. Estoppel applies for they already submitted to jurisdiction of NLRC. Termination pay due to illness granted by the SC.

Tarrosa v. Singson

• Banko Sentral appointment case. Gabriel Singson was appointed as Gov. of the Banko Sentral by FVR w/o confirmation by the COA as required by RA No. 7653. As Jesus Tarrosa does not claim entitlement to the said office, he has no locus standi. Congress cannot, by law, expand the confirmation powers of the COA as provided in Art. 7 Sec. 16 of the Consti. Only those in the 1st Sentence (Heads of the Exec. Dept, ambassadors, other public ministers & consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose appointment is vested in him in this Constitution) require COA approval.

Manalo v. Sistoza

• PNP appointments case. RA No. 6975 was enacted creating the DILG w/c provides that the Pres. shall appoint the PNP Chief from among the senior officers down to the rank of chief superintendent, as well as Senior Superintendent & Deputy Director Gen. subject to approval by the

- 39 -


Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Exec. Sec. Drilon promoted 15 police officers to the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director in a permanent capacity but w/o approval of the COA. Only appointees falling w/in the 1st Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 require approval of the COA, hence said provisions extending the scope of appointing power of the COA are VOID. The PNP cannot fall under the classification of Armed Forces under the 1st Sentence bec. the PNP is an entity entirely separate & distinct from the AFP. Hence it falls under the 2nd Sentence & does not require COA approval. Under RA No. 6975, no element of the police force shall be military, nor shall any position thereof be occupied by members of the AFP.

Soriano III v. Lista

• Phil. Coast Guard appointments case. PGMA appoints 8 persons to diff. positions in the Coast Guard w/o approval of the Commission on Appointments. History of PCG: under PD No. 601, PCG was placed under DND, by EO No. 292, placed under Phil. Navy, by EO No. 475 placed under DND, then later to the DOTC. It is no longer part of the Armed Forces hence no longer subj. to the 1st Sentence of Art. 7 Sec. 16 of the Consti (xxx officers of the armed forces w/ rank of colonel or naval captain xxx) w/c requires approval by the COA. It refers to military officers alone the PCG is now under the Office of the President. Petitioner likewise has no standing to sue.

Section 17: Power of Control Power of Control Lacson v. Magallanes

• Executive Secretary Pajo, by the authority of the President decided the controversy involving a parcel of land, modifying the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It was held that the Executive Secretary has the power to do so, acting by the authority of the President. This power is defined to “the power to alter, modify, nullify, or set aside a subordinate’s action and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

Ang-Angco v. Castillo

• the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. But this power cannot extend to those in the classified service. President’s power to suspend or remove extends only to presidential appointees, or those not belonging to the classified service. This case should be referred to the CSC. To allow the president to dismiss those in classified service would defeat the aim of the service system – security of tenure.

NAMARCO v. Arca

• Arrive was dismissed from service (Manager of the Traffic-Storage Department of NAMARCO) and appealed to the President for reinstatement, which was acted upon favorably. Although it was true that the NAMARCO charter did not mention any appeal to the President, this did not take it out of the executive power of the President. NAMARCO was a GOCC and as such, the President has the power not only to supervise but also to control.

Drilon v. Lim • The Secretary of Justice declared Manila Revenue Code null and void for

non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances. Such power to do so was vested to the Sec. under the LGC. It was held that the provision in the LGC is not violative of the local autonomy of LGUs. The action of Drilon was not an act of control but of mere supervision. Hence, he can only determined if the officials were performing their functions in accordance with the law and not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.

Joson v. Torres

• DILG conducted an investigation on the charge that Gov. Joson barged into the municipal hall and threatened the Sanggunian members who were apparently not in favor of the loan he was proposing. The DILG Secretary found him guilty based on position papers submitted by both parties and suspended him for 6 months. However the SC ruled that the petitioner has the right to a formal investigation since he is an elective official. The power to investigate is given to the DILG while the authority to discipline is lodged to the President.

Domingo v. Zamora

• EO 81, transferring sports programs and activities of the DECS to the Phil. Sports Commission (PSC) and Memo #01592 reassigning all Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) to other offices within DECS, were held valid. The subsequent enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the issue moot since the law abolished BPESS and transferred the DECS’ functions relating to sports to PSC. Likewise, the PSC is already attached to the Office of the President and hence, he has the power to reorganize its activities.

DENR vs. DENR Region 12 employees

• The DENR Secretary, as the alter ego of the President, has the authority to transfer DENR XII Regional Office from Cotabato City to Koronadal South Cotabato. As was held in EIIB v. Zamora, the President has the authority to carry out the reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department.

KMU v. Dir. Gen. of NEDA

• “National ID System.” EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID system and issue ID cards pursuant to regular function under existing laws. It does not establish a National ID System as the petitioners are assailing as usurpation of legislative functions, but merely make existing sectoral ID’s uniform, reliable, efficient, and user friendly.

Section 18 Commander-in-Chiefship Lansang vs. Garcia

• Proclamation no.889 which suspended the writ of habeas corpus for person detained and those who would be detained for insurrection or rebellion is valid. The Supreme Court has the power to check whether the decision of

- 40 -


the Executive to issue such is grounded on the 2 conditions provided in the constitution (existence of invasion/insurrection/rebellion and public safety requires it). In this regard, the SC clarified that its function was merely to check, not supplant the President’s decision.

Aberca vs. Ver

• The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not bar civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by the military and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the constitution.

Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary

• During the oakwood mutiny, several petitioners argued that the president’s declaration of a state of rebellion is void in so far as it disregarded the constitutional power of the Congress to declare such. SC held that it is under the power of the President to declare such and call out the armed forces as enshrined in her in this article of the constitution as the commander-in-chief.

David vs. Arroyo

• SC held that none of the petitioners has shown that PP1017 has no factual basis and that the calling out of the armed forces is under the full discretionary power of the President. However, GO #5 was held unconstitutional for it has failed to define what terrorists are and at the same time it order the armed forces to implement decrees promulgated by the President which she apparently cannot do because such would tantamount to usurpation of the legislative’s function.

Section 19 Purpose of Executive Clemency Cristobal vs Labrador 71 PHIL 844 [1991]

• Teofilo Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. With the enactment of RA 357 (Election Code) which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been convicted of crimes against property. Santos was granted conditional pardon wherein he shall receive his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment on to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility. Petitioner Cristobal assails the pardon granted by the Executive.

• The court denied the petition. It was held that imprisonment is not the only punishment which law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.

• Constitutional Limits on Executive Clemency 1. cannot be exercised over cases of impeachment 2. amnesty must be given with concurrence of a majority of the

Congress 3. Art 9, Sec 5 – no pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of

sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall

be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC.

Llamas vs Orbos 202 SCRA 581 [1995]

• Mariano Un Ocampo III was convicted of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and imposed a penalty of suspension for 90 days. Ocampo was then granted executive clemency and resumed office without any notification made to the incumbent vice governor (Llamas). Petitioner then assails the power of president to grant executive clemency on administrative cases.

• The court denied the petition. The constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit.

People vs Salle 250 SCRA 581 [1995]

• Ricky Mengote was convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson. One of the appellants filed an appeal although Mengote was granted conditional pardon by the President. Mengote has not filed any motion to withdraw the appeal nor acceptance of the conditional pardon. The issue raised is the enforceability of a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from judgment of conviction by the trial court.

• The requirement of after conviction operated as one of the limitations on the pardoning power of the president. The court held that an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court. There could be a risk not only of failure of justice but also of a frustration of the system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate court.

Drilon vs CA 202 SCRA 378 [1991]

• In 1973, Rodolfo Ganzon was convicted of double murder before the Military Commission. Ganzon served the sentence and placed under house arrest. In 1988, the administration changed and directed a new preliminary investigation for the above murders. Ganzon stated that he had been given absolute pardon by President Marcos and he, having been previously convicted cannot be tried anew.

• Pardon if granted after conviction, removes all the penalties and disabilities attached thereto and restores the felon to all his civil rights. It makes him a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity. Therefore, the court cannot tolerate a new investigation.

Torres vs Gonzales 152 SCRA 272 [1987]

• Wilfredo Torres was convicted of 2 counts estafa and was granted conditional pardon by the President on the condition that Torres would not “violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.” However Torres was again charged with wide assortment of crimes. The petitioner states that a conviction of a final judgment of a court is necessary for the violation of his conditional pardon.

- 41 -


• A convict granted conditional pardon, MUST be convicted of a final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offenses. However the Executive Department has 2 options: to proceed against him under sec 64 of the revised administration code and revoke his pardon or using Art 159 of the RPC.

• With the case at bar the President chose the executive prerogative (Sec 64 of the Revised Administration Code.)

People vs Casido 269 SCRA 360 [1997]

• William Casido and Franklin Alcorin was granted conditional pardons however the court ruled that these pardons are void for having been extended during the pendency of their instant appeal. The accused-appellants then filed for amnesty under the National Amnesty Commission and was granted the said amnesty. The court ruled that the amnesty is valid.

• Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does “not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects Monsanto vs Factoran Jr. 170 SCRA 190 [1989]

• Monsanto was convicted of the complex crime of estafa and was granted absolute pardon. She would like to be reinstated to her former position as assistant treasurer.

• The issue is then whether or not an absolute pardon, given to a public officer, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without a new appointment.

• Pardon does not blot out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved. He should be treated as if he were innocent. Pardon albeit full and plenary cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk or who is unsuitable by reason of pardoned conviction. The pardon granted removed her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. Furthermore civil liability arising from crime is governed by the revised penal code. In order to extinguish one’s civil liability it is through payment of loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Garcia vs COA • COA denied Garcia for his claim of backwages after being reinstated to the

service pursuant to an executive clemency. Thus this petition. • Pardon has been generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of

guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense does not operate for all purposes. Unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves him from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

Section 21 Senate concurrence in international agreements Gonzales v. Henchanova

• May not enact executive agreements contrary to law. Executive Sec. authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales, a rice planter, contends that such is violative to RA 3552 which prohibits importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Admin or any other gov’t agency. The President may not, by executive agreements, enter into a transaction indirectly which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Const., the main function of the Executive is to enforce the laws enacted by Congress. He may not defeat legislative enactments by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer

• Romulo-Snyder Agreement of 1950. Pres. Quirino thru Central Bank Governor proposed to US officials the retention of the $35M as a loan. According to the SC, exec agreements may fall under these two classes: (1) agreement made purely as exec acts affecting external relations and independent of or needs no leg authorizations (Presidential agreements); (2) agreement entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress (Congressional Exec Agreements. The Agreement in this case may fall under any of these two. The Congress granted authority to the President to obtain loans and incur indebtedness with the Gov’t of the US. Even assuming that there was no leg authorization, the agreement may still be entered into purely as exec acts (which usu. Relates to money agreements for settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens). Senate Resolution # 15 admitted the validity and binding force of the agreement. The act of Congress appropriating funds for the yearly installments (under the Agreement) constitute ratification thereof.

- 42 -


Tanada v. Angara • WTO Agreement. Senate was well aware of what it was concurring in as

shown in the deliberations. What was submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act but the Agreement on the WTO as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services. Also, the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda applies in this case.

Bayan v. Zamora

• The concurrence of Senate is made mandatory before any foreign military, troops, or facilities be allowed to enter in the Phils. The nature of the agreement is that of a treaty.

Section 22 Section 23

ARTICLE VIII: JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1 Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803)

• Commissions appointing Marbury et al. as justices were withheld by Madison, Marbury requested him to deliver them their commissions. Madison did not comply. The SC cannot issue a mandamus to delver the commission. SC’s does not have original jurisdiction over the issuing of mandamus.

Santiago v. Bautista 32 SCRA 188 (1970)

• Committee on the rating for students awarded Santiago 3rd honors. The committee of teachers do not have a judicial function. The exercise of judicial function means to determine what the law is and what the legal right of the parties are.

Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transit Co. 57 Phil. 60 (1932-1933)

• The SC may not sit as a board of arbitrators pursuant to Act No. 1146. Only judicial power is exercised by SC. It cannot exercise any other power or duty not related to the administration of justice. Being a board of arbitrators is not a “court.”

Noblejas v. Teehankee 23 SCRA 405 (1968)

• Noblejas was alleging that as the Commissioner of the Land Regulation, he enjoyed the privileges as a Court of First Instance Judge. The SC and judiciary can’t exercise as non-judicial functions.

Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado 36 Phil. 429 (1950)

• Clerk of SC purchased teletalk & telegraph speakers that were denied by the Auditor General. The courts independence is not limited to the exercise of judicial function because security against interference not only to

adjudication of cases but all matters necessary in the administration of justice.

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta 148 SCRA 382 (1987)

• Ilustre filed a complaint against some members of the court before the ombudsman which Atty. Laureta circulated to the members of the press. The complaint was regarding the “unjust” minute resolution. SC can take disciplinary action against Laureta to preserve its honor against the attacks of an irate lawyer. Lawyers are primarily officers of the court, lack of respect exposes the judiciary to ridicule. The lawyers’ primary duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.

In Re: Joaquin Boromeo 341 SCRA 405 (1995)

• Boromeo who is not a lawyer has been suing people left and right. He circulated flyers, “circulars,” leaflets attacking members of the court and its judgment as “ignorant, corrupt, oppressors and violators of the constitution.” Boromeo can be cited for contempt of court due to gross disrespect. His actions degraded the administration of justice. His incessant suing is wasting the time of the courts.

Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio 33 SCRA 494 (1970)

• Ang Cho Kio has been convicted of various offenses and sentenced to imprisonment but was granted a conditional pardon. He violated the pardon by entering Manila and was recommitted to prison. The CA affirmed the decision to recommit him in prison and recommended to be allowed to leave the prison. The CA cannot make recommendations to the Executive. Recommendatory power of judiciary limited to “acts deemed proper to be repressed.” The recommendation violates the separation of powers.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999

• The SC can restrain the execution of Echegaray. The court is not changing the final decision of the courts. The court in restraining the execution is not amending or altering the decision. The postponement of the execution is within the jurisdiction of the SC. Power to control execution of its decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. The suspension of the death sentence is a judicial function and not an executive function.

PCGG v. Desierto G.R. No. 132120, February 10, 2003

• Disini was charged of bribery and violation of Anti-Graft Law for his participation in the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. The Ombudsman exonerated Disini of the crimes. The SC can review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman. The investigatory and prosecutory powers of the ombudsman is not absolute. The constitution has tasked the SC to determine w/n any branch of government has acted in GADLEJ.

Domingo v. Scheer 421 SCRA 408 (2004)

• Scheer, a German citizen who has permanent resident status is being deported by the Bureau of Customs, it also seeks to cancel his permanent residence visa and to be blacklisted relying solely on its speculation that the German embassy will not issue him a new passport for allegedly committing “insurance fraud and illegal activities” in Palawan. The Supreme Court may review the actions of the Bureau of Customs because it is vested with the

- 43 -


power to resolve questions whether or not a judgment has been made with GADLEJ.

Justiciable Controversy Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 Phil. 134 (1936)

• Ynsua and Angara were candidates in the 1935 National Assembly elections. The National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of Angara. Judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies. Judiciary does not pass questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. There was an actual controversy between the National Assembly and the Electoral Commission.

U.S. v. Nixon 418 US 683 (1974)

• Pres. Nixon was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with his aides and advisers regarding the Watergate Scandal. According to Nixon, the issue is non-justiciable because it is an “intra-executive” conflict and the judiciary lacked the authority to review the president’s assertion of executive privilege. Contrary to his position, the dispute between the president and the special prosecutor presents a justiciable controversy. The issue of production vs. non-production of evidence is a justiciable controversy. Both officers being officers of the executive branch is not a barrier to justiciability.

Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

• Marcos signified in his deathbed that he wished to die and return to the Philippines. Art. 8 Sec. 1 empowers the courts to determine whether there ahs been a GAD on the part of any branch of government. The exercise of powers of the president as “protector of the peace” vs. the alleged right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and International Law presents a justiciable controversy.

Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496 (1989)

• 24 members from the Liberal Party joined the LDP which resulted to a political realignment in the House of Representatives. The issue is not beyond the jurisdiction of the SC because what is involved is the legality and not the wisdom of removing Daza from the Committee on Appointment.

Garcia v. Board of Investments 191 SCRA 288 (1990)

• The Board of Investments allowed the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant fro Bataan to Batangas. There is an actual controversy in the case because the BOI in yielding to the investors and not the national interest resulted to GAD. There was GAD because there was no cogent advantage to the government resulting from the transfer.

Djumantan v. Domingo 240 SCRA 746 (1995)

• Banez a married man went to Indonesia as an OCW. After converting to Islam he married Djumantan and brought him to the Philippines. The SC may review deportation proceedings. A marriage by an alien to a Filipino does not exclude here from immigration laws because the entry of aliens is not a matter of right. An alien has no right to an indefinite stay.

Mariano v. COMELEC 242 SCRA 211 (1995) • Makati was converted from a municipality into a highly urbanized city.

According to Mariano the new corporate existence of the new city restarts the term of present officials in particular Binay. The challenge of constitutionality on the act converting Makati into a city is not based on actual controversy. It is based on occurrence of contingent events such as Binay running again. Because the events are purely hypothetical there is no actual controversy.

Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. COMELEC 244 SCRA 272 (1995)

• COMELEC wrote letters to various newspaper publishers to provided free print space for the dissemination of candidates qualifications and other election information. PPI has failed to allege that it has sustained actual or imminent danger. Not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC 262 SCRA 492 (1996)

• Congress enacted Bases Conversion Development Act. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan wanted to join the Subic SEZ and passed Pambansang Kapasyihan Blg. 10 expressing their concurrence. COMELEC denied their petition for a local initiative and promulgated a resolution providing for rules for referendum and proposal to annul PK Blg. 10. A resolution at proposal stage cannot be challenged for being unconstitutional. It is not a law yet and a mere proposal. Courts may only decide on actual controversies.

Tanada v. Angara 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

• The DTI Sec. signed in Marrakesh the final act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of the WTO. The case presents a justiciable controversy because it involves an action of the legislature which is alleged to have infringed the constitution. The judiciary is the final arbiter whether or not a branch of government has acted in GADLEJ. Court will not review wisdom of entering into the WTO, just GADLEJ.

Arroyo v. De Venecia 277 SCRA 268 (1997)

• Joker Arroyo seeks to declare unconstitutional RA 8240 on “sin taxes” for violating the rules of the house. The Judiciary does not have power to inquire on allegations in enacting a law. There was no violation of constitutional provision or fights of private individuals.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos 277 SCRA 617 (1997)

• RTC declared inoperative and without force provisions of Tariff and Customs Code based on a study on position paper on tax rates on jewelry in other Asian countries. The RTC judge cannot declare a law as inoperative and without force and effect on the basis of the wisdom of the law. Using the studies as basis encroaches on matters within a legislative function.

Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio 278 SCRA 337 (1998)

• Florencio Rueda underwent a surgical operation and subsequently died from complications. According the NBI autopsy, Florencio’s death is due to lack of care by the anesthesiologist. It was raffled to several judges. Garcia-Rueda filed graft charges against the prosecutors with the Ombudsman which

- 44 -


dismissed it for lack of evidence. The SC can review the Ombudsman’s findings.

Defensor-Santiago v. Gunigona G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1997

• Fernan won for the Senate Presidency and with the agreement of Senator Santiago, Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader explaining that those who had voted for Fernan comprised the majority. The court has jurisdiction over the case because it is within its jurisdiction and power to inquire whether the Senate or its official committed a violation of the Constitution or acted in GADLEJ.

Tatad v. DOE 281 SCRA 330 (1997)

• Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RA8180 “An act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and for Other Purposes.” The Courts can review RA8180 because they are the guardians of the constitution and have inherent authority to determine whether a statue transcends constitutional limits.

TELEBAP v. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337 (1998)

• COMELEC required radio and television to give them free time. The petitioner’s rights are not violated because airwave frequencies are limited and have to be allocated. Any franchise or right granted may be subject to amendment of congress. It is a mere temporary privilege which may be burdened by the grant of some form of public service.

Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603 (1999)

• RA8528 converted Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city. Respondents assail that the courts do not have jurisdiction because it is a political question. The SC said the courts have jurisdiction because it is a purely justiciable issue. The rights involved in this case are the right to approve or disapprove RA8528. The requisites of a purely justiciable issue are:

(1) a given right legally demandable (2) an act violative of that right (3) remedy for breach of right.

Cutaran v. DENR 350 SCRA 697 (2001)

• Relatives of Cutaran applied for Certificates of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) over the land they occupy inside Camp John Hay. Cutaran sought to enjoin DENR from processing the application for ancestral land by another party. There is no actual controversy in this case because the CALC of the other party has not been issued yet. The SC cannot rule based on speculations of being evicted. Because Cutaran has not suffered under law, no relief may be granted to him.

Estrada v. Desierto G.R. No. 146740-15, March 2, 2001

• Estrada questions the constitutionality of the assumption of Arroyo. The case involves interpretation of the constitution in order to settle the matter and to establish the legality of her assumption. Hence, it presents a justiciable controversy o f the most paramount nature that the SC must resolve as a matter of duty.

Cawaling, Jr. COMELEC G.R. No. 146319, October 23, 2001 • Estrada signed RA8806 creating the City of Sorsogon by merging the

municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. Petitioner submits that there is no “compelling” reason for merging the municipalities. This argument goes into the wisdom of the law. The judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.

Montesclaros v. COMELEC G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002

• Petitioners claim that they are in dancer of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections if RA 9164 is passed. RA 9164 has yet enacted into law, hence the petitioners cannot attack its constitutionality.

John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003

• Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PP420 creating a SEZ in Camp John Hay. There is an actual controversy in the case there being a real clash of interests arising from PP420. The other insists that such proclamation contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise.

Velarde v. Social Justice Society G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004

• A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It failed to allege n existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the respondents. It d also did not state what specific legal right was violated.

Panganiban v. Philippine Shell, G.R. No. 131471, January 22, 2003

• Panganiban entered into a sublease and dealer agreement with shell. He later received a letter from Shell that the agreement would soon expire. There is no actual controversy in the case because the abuse of right is a feared hypothetical abuse.

Smart v. NTC G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003

• The National Telecommunications Commission promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services and measures to minimize the incidence the stealing of cellular phone units. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency excises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. In cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer it to a competent agency. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of special knowledge, experience and services.

Buac v. Comelec 421 SCRA 92 (2004)

• Plebiscite of Taguig regarding its conversion to a city was conducted but petitioners wanted to annul the results because of fraud. The plebiscite does not involve any violation of any legally demandable right and just the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate. The enforcement and administration of plebiscites is under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

- 45 -


Information Technology v. COMELEC 460 SCRA 291 (2005) • COMELEC seeks permission to use the Automated Counting Machines in the

ARMM elections. The previous decision by the SC voided the contract entered by COMELEC with Mega Pacific. There is no actual controversy in the motion because there is no assertion of a legal right, no parties with adverse legal interests, no clash of legal claims and is a mere request of advisory opinion which the court has no jurisdiction to grant.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169659, April 20, 2006

• Arroyo promulgated E0464 requiring heads of departments to secure her consent first before appearing before the legislature. According to respondents, there is no controversy because there is no showing that Arroyo withheld her consent. The officials merely said the they “have not yet secured consent.” Respondents claim that is based on an unfounded apprehension that the president will abuse its power. There is an actual controversy in the case. Because the implementation of EO464 had already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings.

David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

• Arroyo promulgated PP1017 and GO No. 5 declaring a state of emergency. The case is moot and academic but during its implementation officers violated rights of individuals. “Moot and Academic” does not bar course in resolving a case if:

1) it violates the constitution 2) of exceptional character or situation and paramount public interest is involved 3) constitution issue requires formulation of guide 4) case may be repeated

Macasiano v. NHA 224 SCRA 236 (1993)

• Macasiano seeks to declare unconstitutional the Urban Development and Housing Act. He said the sections contain “ripening controversies” that serve as drawbacks to his tasks regarding demolition of illegal structures. The court cannot determine the constitutionality of a state unless the question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary for its determination.

• The essential requisites of a declaratory relief are: 1) there must be a justiciable controversy 2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse 3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy

Tano v. Socrates 278 SCRA 154 (1997)

• Tano et al. were criminally charged for violating an ordinance which banned the shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa. 77 fishermen wanted to declare unconstitutional the ordinance. Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.

Section 2

Mantruste Systems v. CA 179 SCRA 136 (1989) • Mantruste Systems seeks the annulment of the decision and resolution of

the CA. Generally, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court will not be interfered with.

Malaga v. Penachos 213 SCRA 516 (1992)

• PD 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government. The court cannot judge controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. These matters could not be because it would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Issues outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by PD 1818 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

Section 3 Re: Clarifying and strengthening… the Philippine Judicial Academy 481 SCRA 1 (2006)

• The Department of Budget and Management downgraded several positions and their corresponding salary grades. The authority of the DBM to review SC issuances relative to court personnel on matters of compensation is limited. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. It contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.

Section 4 Fortich v. Corona G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999

• Only cases where the required number of votes is not obtained are referred to the Court en banc. The ruled does not apply where the required 3 votes is not obtained in the resolution of a MR. The 2nd sentence of the 3rd paragraph speaks only of “case” and not “matter” because it pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. If a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a MR, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure to get the necessary vote for the reconsideration.

People v. Dy G.R. No. 115326-37, January 16, 2003

• Dy and Bernardino were found guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. He contends that the decision of the SC is merely recommendatory because the Supreme Court has to sit en banc over cases of death penalty. The decision of the divisions of the SC are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts. Decisions considered in the divisions of court are decisions of the same court.

Section 5 Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority 224 SCRA 326 (1993)

• Justiciable Controversy distinguished from declaratory relief

- 46 -


• Requisites for Judicial Review 1. The existence of an actual case or controversy/ ripe for

adjudication 2. Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party/ locus

standi 3. It must be raised at earliest opportunity 4. The resolution of the constitutionality must be necessary for the

decision/ Constitutionality is the very lis mota Essential Requisites of a Declaratory Relief

1. There must be a judicial controversy 2. Controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse 3. Party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy

Note: an action for declaratory relief does not fall within the jurisdiction of the SC 1st Ripe For Adjudication PACU vs. Secretary of Education (hypothetical scenarios) 97 PHIL 806 (1955)

• School owners contend that requiring previous governmental approval before they could exercise their right to own and operate a school amounts to censorship of prior constraint and deprivation of due process and liberty. Is there a Judicial Controversy?

• HELD: None. As a general rule the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the parties concerned. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might under the law withdraw the permit of the petitioners does not constitute justiciable controversy

The court does not entertain hypothetical scenarios Tan vs. Macapagal (Also Taxpayer’s suit) 43 SCRA 678

• Assailing the validity of the Laurel Leido Resolution • Held: The rule is “any person who impugns the validity of the statute must

have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has or will sustain direct injury from the enforcement”

• There is no room for judicial review when the Constitutional Convention only did was merely to propose an amendment

Solicitor General vs. MMA GR NO. 102782

• Confiscation of License and plate by its municipal ordinance in contravention with PD 1605A municipal ordinance must bit contravene the constitution or any statute

• Validity of the law must be attacked directly and not collaterally; except if it is of “Transcendental importance”

Militante vs. CA (expropriation) GR NO. 107040

• Petitioner filed for Prohibition and Mandamus with declaration as Inexistent and Unconstitutional PD 1315 with the Court of Appeals

• HELD: He is not entitled to Mandamus or Prohibition • The procedure for assailing unconstitutionality of PD 1315 is flawed since he

himself admitted that his principal concern is the relocation of the squatters

and that if he could attain his aim there may not be a need for declaring PD 1315 null and void. He has no privilege to assail the constitutionality of PD 1315 to serve his own petty purpose

Pimentel vs. HRET (supra Art. 6 Sec. 17) GR NO. 14189

• Only if the house fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to SC under its Judicial Review

Constantino vs. Cuisia (supra Art. 6) 472 SCRA 505

• Transcendental Importance. From the viewpoint of civil law, what petitioners present as the Republic’s “Right to repudiate” is yet a contingent right which cannot be allowed an anticipatory basis for annulling debt relief contracts

Senate vs. Ermita (EO 464) 488 SCRA 1

• The senate including its legislative members, has substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the validity of EO 464. Legislators have legal standing to maintain inviolate prerogative, powers and privileges vested by Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators

• Party List members are allowed to sue as it infringe on their constitutional rights and duties as members of the congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation

• The allegations that EO 464 hampers a political party’s legislative agenda is vague and uncertain and at best is only “generalized interest” which it shares with the rest of the political parties; Concrete injury whether actual or threatened is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution

David vs. Arroyo (PP 1017) 489 SCRA 162

• Yes Petitioners have legal standing. Transcendental Importance • Locus Standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a

given question” • Taxpayers – must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds • Voters – must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the

election law in question • Citizens – there must be a showing that the issues raised are of

transcendental Importance • Legislators – there must be a claim that official action complained of

infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators 2nd “Standing” Legislators and Government Officials Gonzales vs. Macaraig jr. (Presidential Veto) 191 SCRA 452 Read with Philconsa vs Enriquez 235 SCRA 506, Del Mar vs. PAGCOR GR NO. 138298, Sandoval vs. PAGCOR GR NO. 138982, and Jaworski vs. PAGCOR 419 SCRA 420

- 47 -


• There is an actual case or justifiable controversy between members of the executive and legislative may be taken by this court. Where the 2 branches acting within the limits of its own authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere but in cases where their acts are beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare void what the other branches of government assumed valid

• In Del Mar case (Jai-alai case) the court adopted a liberal policy regarding locus standi when constitutional issues are raised. As members of the House of Representative they have legal standing.

• In Jaworski Case (internet gaming) the court brush aside technicalities considering the petition involves legal questions that may have serious implications on public interests

SANLAKAS vs Executive Secretary (Oakwood mutiny case) GR NO. 159085

• Only petitioners Rep. Suplico and Sen. Pimentel as members of the congress has legal standing

• Taxpayers may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from Taxation

• Citizen only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government

Farinas vs. Executive Secretary (Fair Elections Act) GR NO. 147387

• A person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has or will sustain direct injury from the enforcement

Transcendental Importance Province of Batangas vs. Romulo (GAA 1999, 2000, 2001 and LGSEF) 429 SCRA 736

• Province of Batangas through their Governor clearly has “a plain, direct, and adequate interest” in the manner and distribution of funds among LGU. Petitioner has locus standi

Disomangcop vs. Datumanong 404 SCRA 203

• Assailing Constitutionality of RA 8999 and DO 119. Creation of Marawi Sub- District Engineering office. Petitioners have locus standi as two offices is endowed with the same functions and is in danger of being eased out of their duties

CHR-Employees vs. CHR 444 SCRA 300

• CHR upgrading and reclassification scheme. They would have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has or will sustain direct injury from the enforcement.

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary 462 SCRA 622

• Rome Statute – International Criminal Court • Senator Pimental has legal standing “to the extent the powers of Congress

are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.” Infringes their prerogatives as legislators

Pimentel vs Ermita (midnight appointments) 472 SCRA 587 • Members of Congress has no legal standing • The power to appoint is purely an Executive act and may not be interfered

by an other branch of government unless the Constitution provides • It is the Commission on Appointments which has Legal Standing since this

may infringe their power to appoint Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works (feeder roads) 110 PHIL 331

• Requirements of Taxpayer’s Suit 1. That he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure if money

raised by taxation 2. That he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the

questioned statute Gonzalez vs. Marcos (CCP) 65 SCRA 624

• EO 30 trust fund with the view to establish the CCP pursuant to the agreement with US

• NO legal standing since the money raised was not raised by taxation but from contributions of US banks and war damage funds by US.

Gonzales vs. Narvasa (Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform by ERAP) GR 140385

• No legal standing as a taxpayer as the case does not involve the taxing or spending power of Congress

Information Technology Foundation vs. COMELEC (adopt automated election system) GR 159131

• Yes Petition has legal standing as they seek to restrain respondents form implementing the contract and making unwarranted expenditure of unwarranted funds

Velarde vs. SJS 428 SCRA 283

• No. there is no allegations in the case that taxpayer’s money was illegally disbursed. The allegedly keen interest of its “thousands of members who are citizen-taxpayers-registered voters” is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence

Brillantes vs. COMELEC (automated elections system) 432 SCRA 269

• Same as Information Technology Foundation Domingo vs. Carague 456 SCRA 450

• COA providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. Divested of designation/rank as Unit head, team leader, or team supervisor without just cause and deprivation of RATA.

• No legal Standing. They have not shown any direct and personal interest • They also admitted that they do not seek any affirmative relief not impute

any improper or improvident act against the respondents and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain

- 48 -


Republic vs. Nolasco 457 SCRA 400 • No Legal Standing since DPWH being a government agency enjoys immunity

from suit and also cannot be sued without its consent Constantino vs. Cuisia (supra Art. 6) 472 SCRA 305

• Taxpayer-citizen has no legal standing since the rule allowing taxpayers to assail executive or legislative acts has been applied only to cases where constitutionality of a statute is involved

Citizens Legaspi vs. CSC (access to records) 150 SCRA 530

• Has legal standing. Citizens has the right to information to access the records of employees (sanitary) of the CSC to see if they are qualified and has passed the examinations

Oposa vs. Factoran (supra Art. 2) 224 SCRA 792

• Minors represented by their parents have legal standing since every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full employment of a balanced and healthful ecology, together with this right is the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment

PASEI vs. Torres(recruitment agencies) 225 SCRA 417

• Can EO 450 repeal LOI 1190 – yes • The court views the proliferation of recruitment agencies as a means to

compel agencies to seek better terms and conditions for overseas workers as a result of stiffer competition

Joya vs. PCGG (ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, Master paintings and silverware) 225 SCRA 568

• Only the true owners of the artworks may have legal standing in the case and as taxpayer also no legal standing since there are not illegal disbursement of public funds but only disposition of public property

Kilosbayan vs. Morato (Contract lease bet. PCSO & PGMC) 246 SCRA 540

• Petitioners states that in the previous case (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona) they were given legal standing and should also have legal standing in the present case. The court disagrees. No stare decisis. The parties are the same but the case is not. Hence, it is not a continuation.

Tatad vs. Garcia (BLT for EDSA Light Rail Transit) 243 SCRA 436

• Courts ruled that petitioners have standing to file present suit as taxpayers. Prevailing Doctrines is to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by National Government or GOCC’s allegedly in contravention of law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved.

Board of Optometry vs. Colet 26O SCRA 88

• No Legal standing so not have the requisite and substantial interest to since COA and ACMO are not registered associations and two president are not registered optometrist

• Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action

Anti Graft League of the Phil vs. San Juan 260 SCRA 250

• No illegal disbursement and unlawful spending. They are also not a privy to the contract.

• The disbursement that was made was only in 1975 and petitioner never referred the purchase as illegal disbursement

TELEBAP vs. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337

• They are only given temporary privilege to use airwaves and frequencies so it can be burdened by grantee government. They also have no interest as registered voters or taxpayers since this does not concern the right of suffrage or taxation

Chavez vs. PCGG (validity of compromise agreement by PCGG and Marcoses, enforcement of a public right) GR NO. 130716

• The court held that there being no Motion for Reconsideration filed by the proper party, the PCGG, the decision has become final and executory. They were also only incidental parties and not indispensable parties to the suit involving the authority of the PCGG to enter into a compromise agreement that violates the law

IBP vs. Zamora GR NO. 141284

• No legal Standing, IBP anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and constitution. Did not satisfy the specific and substantial interest. Transcendental importance

Bayan vs. Zamora GR NO. 138570

• Same as IBP vs. Zamora, Transcendental Importance Cruz vs. Sec of DENR (Indigenous Peoples’ Right Act) GR NO. 135385

• Transcendental Importance. The said lands to be granted to the indigenous peoples are lands of public domain and can be argued as falling within the purview of public property the disposition of which may be questioned by the taxpayer

Lozano vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (legality of the Presidency) GR NO. 146579

• No legal standing since they haven’t shown any direct or personal injury as a result of President’s Arroyo oath taking

Lim vs. Executive Secretary (Balikatan Exercises) GR NO. 151445

• Under Section 5 of Article VIII the SC is authorized to nullify a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the Fundamental Law but also when it runs counter to an act of Congress

Chavez vs. PEA GR NO. 133250

• Petitioner has standing because the citizens has a right to information on matters of public concern and provision ensuring the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos

- 49 -


Tolentino vs. COMELEC 420 SCRA 438 • The Court gave a relaxed requirement of standing and exercised discretion

to give due course to voters’ right of suffrage. Transcendental Importance Agan vs. PIATCO (BOT NAIA IPT III) 420 SCRA 575

• Legal standing is not purely a procedural issue but also involves a preliminary consideration of the merits of the case. Employees with legal standing because they will sustain a direct injury upon implementation of the contract.

Tichangco vs. Enriquez 433 SCRA 324

• Legal Standing validity of the two 2 titles may still be impugned but petitioners does not have legal standing because they are not claimants over preferential rights over the land

AIWA vs. Romulo 449 SCRA 1

• No legal Standing not as taxpayer or citizen. The scope of authority of the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. And Administrative in nature the subject does not pass beyond the limits of the departments to which it is directed hence it has not created any rights in third persons

David vs. Arroyo(PP 1017) 489 SCRA 162

• Yes Petitioners have legal standing. Transcendental Importance • Locus Standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a

given question” • Taxpayers – must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds • Voters – must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the

election law in question • Citizens – there must be a showing that the issues raised are of

transcendental Importance • Legislators – there must be a claim that official action complained of

infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators Purok vs. Yupico 489 SCRA 382

• Associations has the legal personality to represent its members and the outcome of the case that will affect their vital interests

Holy Spirit vs. Defensor 497 SCRA 581

• Associations have legal standing even if petitioner Association recognized association of homeowner in NEC. They may benefit or be injured by RA 9207

Henares vs. LTFRB 505 SCRA 104

• The Court held that the writ of mandamus is unavailing because it is available only to compel the performance of an act specifically provided for by law as a duty. The petitioners were unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ, the Court said. It added there is no law that mandates respondents LTFRB and DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.

Francisco vs. Fernando (wet flag scheme) 507 SCRA (2006) • As an exception to the standing requirement, the transcendental importance

of the issues raised relates to the merits of the petition. • A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that

he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury.

Other Rules: 3rd and 4th: “Raise at Earliest Opportunity” & “Constitutionality is the Very Lis Mota” People vs. Vera 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937

• What is assailed is the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, a law on probation. The general rule of raising the issue of constitutionality at the earliest opportunity was expounded on. It was ruled that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raise by the pleadings, ordinarily it may be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. Exceptions to the rule are as follows: (a) in criminal cases, the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings; (b) in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to the decision of the case; and (c) where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below.

Political Questions; Requisites Baker vs. Carr 369 US 169 March 26, 1962

• The plaintiffs argue that the apportionment in Tennessee is unconstitutional because of a gross disproportion to the voting population. It was argued if this issue was a political question or not. The Court resolved the issue by defining political questions. A political question involves a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment form multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

“Textually Demonstrable Commitment” International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja 190 SCRA 130 September 28, 1990

• ICMC and IRRI are international organizations afforded immunity by the executive. Their respective unions filed a complaint because the organizations allegedly violate labor laws. The issue in this case is whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC and IRRI extends to immunity from the application of the Philippine labor laws. The

- 50 -


Court rules that under the system of separation of powers, the grant of immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and where a plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of government, then it is the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity.

“Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards” Liang vs. People 355 SCRA 125 March 26, 2001

• The case involved a criminal complaint against Liang, an ADB official, for oral defamation. Appeal was made to the political character of Liang as an agent of international organization. The Court ruled that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB was not absolute but limited to acts performed in an official capacity and could not cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.

Effect of Unconstitutionality; par. 2(a) De Agbayani vs. Philippine National Bank 38 SCRA 429 April 29, 1971

• Because of the Moratorium Law, PNB was not able to collect from De Agbayani. However, the Moratorium Law was declared unconstitutional. The application of the law and rights vested by it are discussed in the case. The Court ruled that the actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial decision. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects—with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.

Automatic Review, par. 2(d) Garcia vs. People 318 SCRA 434 November 18, 1999

• Garcia was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Garcia argued that there was no need for him to apply for an appeal because his case ought to be a subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that it is only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review of the conviction.

Question of Law; par. 2(e) Cebu Woman’s Club vs. De la Victoria 327 SRA 533 March 9, 2000

• For the construction of a building, the petitioner entered into an agreement with CAMSAC, which entered into a sub-contract agreement with Senoron. But Senoron sought to enjoin the petitioner to release money to CAMSAC. The issue was whether the allegation of fact in the petitioner’s complaints are baseless. As to questions of law, the Court ruled that a party may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts distinguished

from a question of fact which occurs when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.

Change of Venue; par. 4 People vs. Gutierrez 36 SCRA 172 November 26, 1970

• The issue is whether the transfer of the case from one court to another is valid. The courts “can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government”. One of the incidental and inherent powers of courts us that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.

Power to Promulgate Rules; par. 5 Bustos vs. Lucero 81 Phil 648 (1948)

• It was expounded that the Supreme Court has no power to alter substantive rights. Substantive rights are those which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer.

Lina v. Purisima 82 SCRA 344 April 14, 1978

• The petitioner was dismissed from her job because of the president’s LOI. The Court decided on the matter ruling in favor of the petitioner, however, the procedural validity is assailed. The Supreme Court under certain conditions may, at its option, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding a case to the lower court for trial on merits, and instead, render final judgment thereon.

In Re: Cunanan, et al. 94 Phil 534 March 18, 1954

• The Bar Flunkers’ Act was passed by the Congress—such will admit those who failed the bar examination into the Bar during the post-war period due to several circumstances then. The Court, however, ruled against it. It said theta the Congress did not have the power to do so. This is because in the judicial system the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably judicial function and responsibility.

People vs. Vera (exception to the rule on earliest opportunity, Probation Act) 65 PHIL 56

• Exception to the rule on earliest opportunity • Courts in the exercise of sound control, may determine the time when a

question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented • In Criminal Cases – it is said that the question may be raised for the first

time at any stage of the proceedings either in the trial court or in appeal • In Civil Cases – it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on

the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal if it

- 51 -


appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case

• And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time where it in involves the jurisdiction of the court below

Mirasol vs. CA 351 SCRA 44

• The CA correctly ruled that the issue of PNB’s obligation to render an accounting can be determined without having to rule on the constitutionality of PD 579. In fact, there is nothing in the PD 579 which is applicable to PNB’s refusal to give an accounting. The governing law should be the law on agency, given that PNB acted as petitioner’s agent. The Requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is absent

Matibag vs. Benipayo (ad interim appointment) 380 SCRA 49

• Raised at the earliest possible opportunity • The earliest possible opportunity is to raise it in the pleadings before a

competent court that can resolve the same such that, “If it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at trial, and if it cannot be considered on trial , it cannot be considered on appeal

• Constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case • The legality of Petitioner’s reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of

Benipayo’s ad interim appointment and assumption of office unless there are resolved; the legality of petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the law department cannot be determined. Clearly it is the lis mota of the case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner

La Bugal vs. Ramos 421 SCRA 148

• The 3rd requisite or raise at the earliest opportunity should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after execution of the act. It was actually filed after 2 years

Arceta vs. Mangrobang 432 SCRA 136

• Did not satisfy both 3rd and 4th requisite of judicial review • Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act

in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the lower court

• Constitutionality is the lis mota. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality and to justify its nullification, there must be clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative

Estarja vs. Ranada 492 SCRA 652

• Constitutionality raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of Ombudsman Decision. Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions or constitutionality of the law.

Political Questions; requisites Baker vs. Carr 369 US 169

• Cases which are political in nature are marked by:

1. “Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;” as an example of this, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers, arguing that cases involving such matters would be “political questions”

2. “A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;” 3. “The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a

kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;” 4. “The impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;” 5. “An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already

made;” 6. “The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by

various departments on one question.” Textually Demonstrable commitment Osmena vs. Pendatun (privileged speech, serious imputations of bribery against the president) 109 PHIL 863

• The House can discipline is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction but the matter depends mainly on factual circumstance which the house knows best.

• There is no provision authorizing the courts to control, direct, supervise or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers functions of the legislative department.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia (Sin taxes) 277 SCRA 268

• The court cannot intervene in the case because the matter of formulating house rules and implementing those rules has been textually conferred to the by the Constitution on Congress itself and because of Separation of Powers.

• The SC cannot encroach upon the Congress to look into its internal proceedings for as long as no apparent constitutional violations are committed. It is pursuant to Separation of Powers

Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona GR NO. 134577

• There is nothing in the Constitution that it states how minority leader is selected. The SC has jurisdiction (1) to inquire if the senate committed GADLEJ, (2) over questions on the validity of the legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, (3) for the interpretation of the court as final arbiter

ICMC vs. Calleja (Immunity) GR NO. 85750

• The Secretary of Labor did not committed GAD in affirming the grant of specialized agency status to ICMC and IRRI by agreement with the Government and PD 1620 and granting immunity from legal process. Also, each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement dispute. The grant of immunity is textually conferred by the law.

Tanada vs. Angara (GATT-WTO) 272 SCRA 18

• The Phils. entered into the WTO w/c was concurred with by the Senate for the purpose of promoting globalization. It was assailed on the basis of the state principles & policies w/c the court held to be non-self executing, as

- 52 -


well as on the basis of an undue limitation upon the national sovereignty. Still, where acts of the Senate are assailed on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, no doubt a justiciable controversy arises & it is the duty of the courts to settle the dispute. However, the court cannot look into the wisdom of the acts but merely to its legality to safeguard that they do not contravene the Constitution. There is, of course, still a strong presumption of constitutionality as a law is the enactment of a co-equal branch of government. The courts must be careful but vigilant in the exercise of judicial review.

Garcia vs. Corona (full deregulation of the oil industry) GR NO. 132451

• The judiciary cannot render judgments based on the wisdom of legislature. The said RA 8479 was enacted because of the very evils of unfair competition and oligopoly. Whether or not this was the best course of action to take for the legislature is not for the courts to decide

Judicially discoverable and manageable standards Liang vs. People (Immunity from suit) GR NO. 125865

• Immunity is not absolute. Only acts done in official capacity are covered by the immunity. Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by immunity.

• Under the Vienna convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised outside his official capacity

Effect of unconstitutionality De Agbayani vs. PNB 38 SCRA 429

• The lower courts decision based on the inflexible view is reversed. A statute prior to determination of its unconstitutionality is an operative fact since every statute enjoys the presumption of validity prior to determination of its unconstitutionality

Automatic Review Garcia vs. People GR NO. 106531

• Automatic review comes in when the penalty imposed is death. Only then must the trial court forward the records of the case to the SC for automatic review.

• According to the primer, such automatic review should now pass to the CA for determination of the factual issues before the case is elevated to the SC

Pearson vs. IAC GR NO. 74454

• The court held that the lower court has no jurisdiction over mining dispute. As a general rule an interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on merits, an exception is made where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief

• The rule is that findings of fact made in the decision of the Minister of Natural resources appealed from will not be reviewed by the SC unless there

has been GAD in making said findings by reason of the total absence of competent evidence in thereof

People vs. Mateo 433 SCRA 640

• Article VIII Sec. 5 gives the SC the power to promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts

• The rule in this case regarding the additional intermediate review by the CA is a procedural matter

• Allowing an intermediate review by CA before the case is elevated to SC on automatic review is a procedural matter within the rule making prerogative of the SC than the law making powers of Congress

Question of Law Cebu Women’s Club vs. De la Victoria GR NO. 120060

• Under the Rules of Court may directly appeal to the SC from a decision of the Trial Court only on Pure Questions of Law.

• A question of law arises when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain set of facts

• A question of facts occurs when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood if the alleged facts

• SC is not a trier of facts Change of Venue People vs. Gutierrez 36 SCRA 172

• There are sufficient reasons to transfer the case in the interest of truth and justice

• AO221 of the DOJ is not mandatory but only directory. • The petitioner wants to transfer the case because the witness would not

give his testimony because his life would be in danger • With AO 221 the accused is not prejudiced by transfer of trial to another

place Power to promulgate rules First Lepanto vs. CA (power to promulgate rules; effects of SC circular) 231 SCRA 30

• Sec. 82 of Omnibus Investment Code is unconstitutional since it contravenes Art. VI Sec 30 as it increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and concurrence

• Circular No. I-91 in pursuant with the rule making power of SC gives the authority of the CA to decided cases appealed to it from BOI must be in accordance with this circular.

Lina vs. Purisima 82 SRCA 344

• The court can disregard its own rules. In the case although there was no trial held in the lower court the pleadings before the SC portray all the vital issues between the parties

• The SC can rule upon the issue with no need to of remanding the case to lower court as it disregarded its own rules

- 53 -


In Re: Cunanan 94 PHIL 534 • SC said that the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of

attorneys is the practice of the profession and their supervision is a judicial function

• Congress may repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgates by this court but the authority and responsibility remain vested in the SC

In Re: Admission to the Bar: Argosino 712, 246 SCRA 14

• Profession of law is not a natural, absolute or conditional it is a personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character with special educational qualification duly ascertained and certified

• SC has the power and function in admission to take the oath Javellana vs. DILG 212 SCRA 475

• Right of a public official to engage in the practice of law while employed in the Government

o Permission from regional director of the DILG o Asked to have a calendar of activities to avoid conflicts of schedule o No conflict of interest

• Provincial Governors and City and Municipal Mayors can not practice profession of law as said officials needs to be focused in running their area

• It is prohibited to o Act as a counsel wherein government is an adverse party o To be counsel in a criminal case involving government employee

• Collecting fees for appearance in administrative cases involving local government

Bustos vs. Lucero 81 PHIL 648

• Defendant cannot as a matter of right, compel witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said in the preliminary examinations before the issuance of the order of arrest.

• Constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses

• He has substantial right to compel witness testify but not during the preliminary hearing

• Substantive Rights – term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations

• Substantive law – is the part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates, or which regulates the rights and duties which gives rise to a cause of action

Santero vs. CFI of Cavite 153 SCRA 728

• The Civil code is a substantive law and such rights were vested by the Civil Code cannot be impaired by the New Rules of Court which is procedural law

• Substantive law prevails over procedural law • The controlling provision of this case is not Rule 83 of the New Rules of

Court but rather Art. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code

PNB vs. Asuncion 80 SCRA 321 • Judge’s reliance on Sec. 6 Rule 86 is erroneous, nothing in the rule prevents

creditors from going after surviving solidary creditors • Art. 1216 of the Civil code prevails over Sec. 6 Rule 86 • A procedural law the Revised Rules of Court cannot diminish a substantive

rule and right, the New Civil Code. Rules promulgated by the Supreme court cannot diminish, increase or modify substantive rights

Damasco vs. Laqui 166 SCRA 214

• Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the state of its rights to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law

• Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code Substantive law strengthened by Sec 8 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural law as it added extinction of offense to general rule regarding failure to assert a motion to quash

Carpio vs. Sulu Resources GR NO. 148267

• RA 7942 is unconstitutional as it increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC

• When the SC in the exercise of its rule making power transfers to CA pending cases involving quasi judicial body decisions such transfer only relates to procedure hence it does not impair ant substantive rights. The aggrieved party’s right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure which the appeal is to be made or decided

• The revised Rules of Procedure shall apply as it states that appeal from quasi-judicial bodies decision are now required to be brought to CA for review

LBP vs. De Leon GR NO. 143275

• RTC as special agrarian courts • A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal is the procedure in effecting an

appeal from decisions of the RTC as SAC in cases regarding just compensations

People vs. Lacson 400 SCRA 262

• Sec. 8 Rule 117 if revised rules of criminal procedure states that the case may be provisionally dismissed following the requisites

• One of the requisites is consent of the accused must be expressed and in writing. Lacson argues that the motion for determination of probable cause tantamount to consent

• Court disagrees. And in assuming Lacson is right, The new rule should be applied prospectively and not retroactively since the new rules benefits both the accused and the State

Planters vs. Fertiphil 426 SCRA 214

• 1997 rules of civil procedure was effected on July 1, 1997 which required the payment of docket fees should not apply to this case since the appeal was already perfected in 1992

- 54 -


Re: 2003 Bar Examinations BAR MATTER NO. 1222 • The court has the power to promulgate rules and to discipline its members

and also disbarring members. • The court resolved the participation on the leakage and would reprimand

and punish those who participated according to the courts findings People vs. Mateo 433 SCRA 640

• Article VIII Sec. 5 gives the SC the power to promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts

• The rule in this case regarding the additional intermediate review by the CA is a procedural matter

• Allowing an intermediate review by CA for review of factual issues before the case is elevated to SC on automatic review is a procedural matter within the rule making prerogative of the SC than the law making powers of Congress

Tan vs. Bauch 478 SCRA 115

• The constitution empowers SC to promulgate riles concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. There are limitations to this rule making powers. The rule must:

o Provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases

o Be uniform to all courts of the same grade o Not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights

Republic vs. Gingoyon 478 SCRA 474

• The court held that if Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply PIATCO would not receive any just compensation

• Appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter • It is well within the powers of legislature to fix the standard which it did in

RA 8974 Tan vs. COMELEC 507 SCRA 352

• Since the election anomalies alleged in the petition should have been raised in the election protest and not is a petition to declare a failure of election

• Election Protest in COMELEC Administrative Supervision of Inferior Courts Maceda vs. Vasquez 221 SCRA 464 (1993)

• The Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not investigate a judge independently of any administrative action of the Supreme Court. The Constitution vests exclusively in the Supreme Court supervision over all courts and court personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of the government may intrude into this power, without running afoul the doctrine of separation of powers.

Diminution of Salary Nitafan vs. Commission of Internal Revenue 152 SCRA 284 July 23, 1987

• The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue to deduct withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers. Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meere and Endencia vs. David do not apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

Security of Tenure Vargas vs. Rilloraza 80 Phil 297 February 28, 1948

• The case arose out of Sec. 14 of the People’s Court Act which disqualified Justices of the Supreme Court who had held any office or position under the Japanese sponsored Philippine Executive Commission from sitting in any case under Sec. 13 of the Act. The question was whether the Congress could create grounds for disqualification other than those already existing. The Court ruled in the negative, saying that what matters here is not only that the Justice affected continue to be a member of the Court and to enjoy the emoluments as well as the exercise of powers and fulfill his duties of his office, but that he be left unhampered to exercise all the powers and fulfill all he responsibilities of said office in all cases properly coming before his Court under the Constitution, again without prejudice to proper cases of disqualification under Rule 126. Note that security of tenure here is not just a guarantee against actual removal, but also of uninterrupted continuity in tenure.

Section 12 Section 13 Section 14 Section 15

ARTICLE X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT

GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 1 Section 2 Local Autonomy

- 55 -


San Juan v. CSC 196 SCRA 69 (1991) (power of governor to recommend) • The DBM may appoint provincial budget officers, only from the list of

qualified recommendees nominated by the governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135 (1994) (supervision)

• Where the Sec. of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax measure enacted by a local government unit to determine if the officials performed their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers under the Local Government Code, the same is an act of mere supervision, not control.

Judge Leynes v. COA G.R. No. 143596, December 11, 2003

• By upholding the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful local autonomy of the LGUs is ensured.

Section 3 Local Government Code Garcia v. COMELEC 227 SCRA 100 (1993) (recall of governor)

• Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The LGC provided for a 2nd mode of initiating the recall process through a PRA which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities.

• There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding.

Malonzo v. COMELEC 269 SCRA 380 (1997) (recall of mayor)

• The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). It just so happens that the personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the (PRA). Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sanggunian Barangay members convened and voted as members of the (PRA) and not as members of the Liga.

Malonzo v. Zamora 323 SCRA 875 (2000) (recall)

• The law simply requires that the matter of adopting or updating the internal rules of procedure be taken up during the 1st day of session. The law does not require the completion of the updating or adoption of the internal rules of procedure before the Sanggunian could act on any other matter like the enactment of an ordinance.

Section 4 The President and Local Governments

Joson v. Torres 290 SCRA 279 (1998) (disciplining v. investigating authority) • Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local

officials is lodged in 2 authorities: the Disciplining Authority (DA) and the Investigating Authority (IA). The DA is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the DILG is the IA, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Sec of DILG is not the exclusive IA. The DA may designate a Special Investigating Committee.

Bito-onon v. Fernandez 350 SCRA 732 (2001)

• In authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the Board of Election Supervisors with the regular courts the DILG in effect mended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgate by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA.

National Liga v. Paredes 439 SCRA 130 (2004)

• President’s power of general supervision, as exercised by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. When respondent Judge appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga to the DILG. The DILG’s authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them.

Section 5 Sources of Revenue Powers of the Local Government LTO v. City of Butuan 322 SCRA 805 (2000)

• LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The power of LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles and to grant franchises for the operation thereof is still subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation and Communications.

Acebedo Optical v. CA G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

• The power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same, and the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions.

• A license or permit to do business is usually granted by the local authorities. It authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality/city is essentially regulatory in nature. On the other hand, a license to engage in the practice of a profession is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession.

- 56 -


• A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry.

Lina v. Pano G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001

• While a policy statement expressing the local government’s objections to the lotto is valid as it is party of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. The power of LGUs to legislate is merely a delegated power from Congress.

PLDT v. City of Davao G.R. No. 143867, March 25, 2003

• The rule is that tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and unequivocal provisions of law expressed in a language too plain to be mistaken. They cannot be extended by mere implication or inference.

Section 6 Share in the National Taxes (IRA) Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000

• Fiscal autonomy means that local government units have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government.

• Local fiscal autonomy does not, however, rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.

• The withholding of 10& of the LGUs IRA pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, although temporary, is equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held back” or withheld, often temporarily,” and contravenes the Constitution.

Province of Batangas 429 SCRA 736 (2004)

• The LGU’s are not required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them from the national coffers – the “just share” of the LGU’s shall be released to them “without need of further action”.

• The entire process involving the distribution and release of the Local Government Service Equalization Fund is constitutionally impermissible – to subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, makes the release not automatic. The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and release of the portion of the IRA, the LGSEF is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution.

Alternative Center v. Zamora 459 SCRA 578 (2005)

• As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive

from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which defines its duties, provided it has the backing of a statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by a statute – a proposition which is patently absurd.

Section 7 Section 8 Term of Local Officials David v. COMELEC 271 SCRA 90 (1997) (term of barangay officials)

• The intent and design of the legislation to limit the term of barangay officials to only 3 years as provided under the LGC emerges as bright as the sunlight.

Borja v. COMELEC 295 SCRA 157 (1998)

• It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive terms in an elective local office – he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Adormeo v. COMELEC 376 SCRA 90 (2002)

• Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms because he did not win the May 1998 elections. His victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3 term disqualification. His loss in 1998 is considered an interruption in the continuity of service.

Socrates v. COMELEC G.R. No. 154152, November 12, 2002

• Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor.

Latasa v. COMELEC G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003

• While a new component city which was converted from a municipality acquire a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality, this does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the constitutional provision on term limits, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.

Ong v. Alegre 479 SCRA 473 (2006)

• After 3 consecutive terms, an elective official cannot seek immediate reelection for a 4th term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition.

• A recall election is mid-way in the term following the 3rd consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the 3rd term.


- 57 -


Creation, division of boundaries Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (1986) (creation of a province)

• A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to the constitutional requirements. When the law says the “plebiscite shall be conducted in areas affected” this means that residents of the political entity who stand to be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have the right to participate in said plebiscite.

Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106 (1986) (metes and bounds)

• The inhabitants of San Juan, which used to be part of the congressional district together w/ Mandaluyong, were properly excluded from the plebiscite on the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city since the matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto.

• Petitioners’ argument that the subject law has resulted in “gerrymandering,” which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favour a particular candidate or party is not worth of credence. Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, w/c development could hardly be considered as favourable to him.

Mun. of Jimenez v. Judge Baz 265 SCRA 182 (1996) (de jure corporation)

• Where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation where its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.

• The plebiscite requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution.

Cawaling v. COMELEC G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001

• The phrase “a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city” is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.

• The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or merger of existing local government units is recognizes under the constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

Section 11 Section 12 Section 13 Section 14 AUTONOMOUS REGIONS

Section 15 Purpose, and how many Autonomous Regions Disomangcop v. Sec. of DPWH G.R. No. 149848, November 25, 2004

• The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. Autonomy, has a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, & even religious diversities.

• Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a particular area or region with at least control and supervision from the central government. The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition & share social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. Regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive means for national integration.

Section 16 Section 17 Section 18 Section 19 Organic Act for the Autonomous Regions Abbas v. COMELEC 179 SCRA 287 (1989)

• A plebiscite will determine: (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, shall compromise it.

• The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units. What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic act in individual constituent units.

• The power to merge administrative regions is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provisions requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

Ordillo v. COMELEC 192 SCRA 100 (1990)

• According to Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution, “There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, & geographical areas…” The keywords – provinces, cities, municipalities & geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The sole

- 58 -


province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Badua v. CBA 194 SCRA 101 (1991)

• The Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. It is not part of the Philippine judicial system and does not posses judicial power. They do not possess judicial power and are only advisory and conciliatory bodies.

Atitiw v. Zamora 471 SCRA 329 (2005)

• The Cordillera Autonomous Region was not abolished, as concluded by the petitioners, with the reduction of the budgetary allocation; what took place was only a discontinuance of its programs and activities.


ARTICLE XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 1 Public office is a public trust Hipolito v. Mergas 195 SCRA 6 (1991)

• “Moonlighting”, although not normally considered as a serious misconduct on the part of a public servant, may amount to a malfeasance in office, considering the nature of the position held by such public servant. In sum, he is bound, virtute officii, to bring to the discharge of his duties that prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.

Bornasal v. Montes 280 SCRA 181 (1997)

• The act of a deputy sheriff of signing the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale apparently for and in behalf of his superior, the Clerk of Court, despite the latter’s earlier advice to the mortgagor to file the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure in the Office of the Clerk of Court that has jurisdiction over the property constitutes a clear case of insubordination and gross misconduct.

• It is well to remind all persons serving the Government through its Judicial Arm that the conduct and behaviour of every person connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, is tasked with a heavy burden of responsibility.

• Sheriffs and deputy-sheriffs, as officers of the Court and therefore, agents of the law, must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and processes and in implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the enforcement of the administration of justice.

Almario v. Resus A.M. No. P941076, November 22, 1999 • To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be serious,

important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. It must also have direct relation to, and be connected with, the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge duties of office.

• A clerk of court is specifically mandated to safeguard the integrity of the court and its proceedings, and to maintain the authenticity and correctness of court records.

Juan v. People G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000

• Under Sec. 13 of RA 3019, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the determination of the validity of the information.

Re: AWOL of Antonio Makalintal A.M. 99-11-06-SC, February, 15, 2000

• By his habitual absenteeism, Mr. Malicantal has caused inefficiency in the public service. Any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Estrella v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 125160, June 20, 2000

• To justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds or property and that he could not account for them or did not have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance for the same. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.

Malbas v. Blanco A.M. P-99-1350, December 12, 2001

• The failure of sheriffs to verify complainants’ allegation that they were not parties to the case in which the writ of execution was issued manifests blatant irresponsibility, for which they must be meted with the appropriate penalty – by their acts, the sheriffs committed grave misconduct, oppression, and conducted themselves in a manner highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

• A sheriff must know what is inherently right and wrong and is bound to act with prudence and caution.

Manaois v. Leomo A.M. MTJ-03-1492, August 26, 2003

• The Code of Judicial Conduct directs a judge to refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of any litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.

Re: Mr. Gideon Alibang A.M. 2003-11-SC June 15, 2004

• An employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, 10 times a month for at least 2 months in a semester or at least 2 consecutive months during the year.

- 59 -


Section 2 Impeachment: Who can be impeached; Grounds for impeachment Office of the Ombudsman v. CA 452 SCRA 714 (2005)

• The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment.

Section 3 Procedure and Penalty In Re: Gonzales 160 SCRA 771 (1988)

• A public officer whose membership of the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office held by him and removable only by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during his membership; Nor can he be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other Court where the penalty is removal.

Romulo v. Yniguez 141 SCRA 260 (1986)

• The Supreme Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct an impeachment trial. The Batasan can always modify its own rules. They do not have the force of law but are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of proceedings before the Batasan. They are merely procedural and not substantive. They may be waived or disregarded by the Batasan and with their observance the Courts have no concern.

Estrada v. Desierto G.R. No. 146740-15 and 146748, March 2, 2001 and MR-G.R. No. 146710-15 and 146738, April 3, 2001

• Judgment in impeachment cases shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted should nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

• The impeachment proceedings were closed only after the petitioner had resigned from presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachment case against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings.

Francisco v. HRET G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

• Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3(5) says, “No impeachment proceedings shall initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year”, it means that no second verified complain may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. “To initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. Once an impeachment complain has been initiated, another impeachment complain may not be filed against the same official within a period of one year.

Section 4

Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433 (1982) (creation of Sandiganbayan)

• The validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan is assailed here for being violative of due process and equal protection. It was held that the Sandiganbayan was provided in the Constitution in response to the problem of dishonesty in public office. Innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court which requires a unanimous vote, failing which “the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority shall be necessary for rendering judgment”. If convicted, SC has the duty, if seek, to review to see if error was committed. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied.

Lecaros vs. Sandiganbayan 128 SCRA 324 (1984) (crimes in relation to public office)

• A mayor was charged for grave coercion for taking over a gasoline station with threat and force. The mayor assails that Sandiganbayan lack jurisdiction and it should be filed on ordinary courts. It was held, citing Art 13 Sec 5 of the Constitution that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction as a special court over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers.

Cunanan vs. Arceo 242 SCRA 88 (1995) (averment of the nature of the crime committed)

• Cunanan, a member of the Philippine National Police fired a warning shot in a fight outside his office which resulted to the death of a person. It was brought to the RTC. The SC ordered that it be transferred to Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan has exclusive and sole jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials where the penalty imposed is prision correcional or higher or a fine of P6,000 or higher.

Binay vs. Sandiganbayan GR No. 120681-83 (October 1, 1991)

• Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan a case against Binay for illegal use of public funds and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act. Petitioner contends that this is outside the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since RA 7975 grants Sandiganbayan the jurisdiction over executive branch officers classified as Grade 27 or higher. The petitioner’s salary was grade 22. SC held that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction since the official’s Grade, considering the nature of responsibility and qualifications required for the position is what defines the salary not the other way around.

Mayor Layus vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 134272 December 8, 1999

• Same with the Binay case about jurisdiction based on salary grade. Abbot vs. Mapayo GR 134102 July 6, 2000

• It is assailed here whether it is the Sandiganbayan or the CA who has jurisdiction on Malversation cases. SC held that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction outlined in PD 1606 that created it and RA 7975. The authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise

- 60 -


of original jurisdiction. Thus such authority has always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law.

Section 5 Section 6 Baluyot vs. Hulganza GR 136374, February 9, 2000

• An officer of the Philippine National Red Cross was complained in the Ombudsman for malversation of funds. The officer assailed that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction since it was not a government owned and controlled corporation. SC held that PNRC is a GOCC. The test to determine if it is a GOCC is whether it is created by its won charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Those with special charter are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and are compulsory members of the GSIS.

Garcia vs. Ombudsman GR 127710 February 16, 2000

• Garcia an officer of the National Development Company availed an early retirement tax-exempt benefit program and NDC approved her application. The disbursing officer of NDC deducted withholding tax. Garcia complained to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman dismissed her complaint because the disbursing officer merely complied with her duty guided by the BIR that provident fund benefits above the employees’ personal contribution were taxable. Furthermore, it was held that there were no violations following RA 3019 that specify the elements for violation:

1) the accused of a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;]

2) the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his/her official duties or in relation to his/her public position

3) that he/she causes undue injury to any part, whether the government or the private party;

4) such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and

5) that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence

Lapid vs. A GR 142261 June 29, 2000

• Lapid was accused of illegal quarrying endorsed in the Ombudsman that ordered a preventive suspension for a period of 6months without pay and afterwards issued a suspension of 1year wihtout pay. It was questioned whether the order was final and executory. The court held that the decision of the Ombudsman was not yet final and executory based on the Ombudsman Act that provides that “directive or decision imposing penalty of public censure or suspension of not more than one month’s salary is final and executory”. It is clear that Lapid’s penalty are not among those mentioned, therefore the decision was not yen final and executory.

Tirol v COA GR 133954 August 3, 2000 • Deputy OMB of Visayas found the petitioner criminally liable for violation of

RA 3019 in not following bidding procedures Mamburao vs. Ombudsman GR 139141-42, November 15, 2000

• A complaint was filed against an officer of Landbank for slander and libel and for the denial of the loan acting in GADLEJ. Ombudsman dismissed the case. SC held that it is the duty of the Ombudsman to find out whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed. Under RA 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and conduct preliminary investigation. Courts will not interfere absent any grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint outright without going through preliminary investigation if it finds the petition to be without merit.

Salvador v. Desierto 420 SCRA 76 (Ombudsman’s discretion whether or not criminal case should be filed)

• Ombudsman has discretion whether or not criminal case should be filed. Same with Mamburao case

Section 7 Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan 160 SCRA 843 (1988) (powers)

• Governor Zaldivar sought to restrain Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding the criminal case against him as it was the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Tanodbayan claims that he remains to be the Ombudsman. SC ruled that Tanodbayan is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to direct filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Tanodbayan never became the Ombudsman inn the first place. Furthermore Art11 Sec7 specifies what is the Tanodbayan.

Quimpo vs. Tanodbayan 146 SCRA 137 (1986) (jurisdiction)

• The issue here is whether or not the Tanodbayan has jurisdiction over companies which were originally privately owned but was subsequently bought by the government. Petrophil although having no special law was bought by PNOCC, a GOCC, using public money. It was acquired by the government to perform functions related to government program and policies in oil. Therefore, its employees are considered as public employees falling within Tanodbayan jurisdiction.

Acop vs. Ombudsman 248 SCRA 566 (1995) (prosecutory powers: distinction in preliminary investigation and duty to investigate)

• This case is regarding the Kuratong Baleleng shootout. Acting Ombudsman ordered Military ombudsman to monitor investigation who ordered PNP director to submit a report. SC held that Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation. It was given authority by the legislature by enacting the Ombudsman Act. It was contended that PNP was a civilian and was therefore outside the power of Military ombudsman. SC held that Ombudsman may utilize his personnel and or designate or deputize any fiscal/prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.

- 61 -


Camanag vs. Guerero 268 SCRA 472 (1997) (powers as ‘provided by law’) • Same with Acop case in the Ombudsman’s power to investigate and

undertake criminal prosecution given by the legislature through the Ombudsman act, specifically in its Sec 15 and Sec 17.

Macalinao vs. Sandiganbayan 376 SCRA 452

• Petitioner, an employee of Philippine National Construction Corp. was charged with estafa in the Ombudsman. The Petitioner moved to dismiss the case since PNCC is not a GOCC. SC help that the petitioner as an employee of PNCC is not a public employee since PNCC has no original charter. OMB can only investigate public officials and employees. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over private individuals only when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valera 471 SCRA 715 (2005)

• In a case where the issue was whether Special prosecutor can order a preventive suspension in connection with administrative case, the SC ruled that Special prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may act only under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Sec 24 of RA 6770 grants the power to preventively suspend only to the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.

Perez v. Sandiganbayan 503 SCRA 252

• The delegation of the power to authorize the filing of information was only made to Deputy Ombudsman and not to Special Prosecutor

Section 8 Section 9 Section 10 Section 11 Section 12 Almonte vs. Vasquez 244 SCRA 286 (1995) (form and manner of complaint – unsigned letter)

• The validity of the Ombudsman to require the production of certain document of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau in response to an anonymous complaint letter is questioned. SC ruled that Ombudsman can ask for this document and respond to the anonymous complaint letter as part of requirement of the Constitution that authorize it to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees

Bautista vs. Sandiganbayan GR 136082 May 12, 2000

• A mayor was charged of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act for hiring casuals for political consideration. The charge came from an unsigned and unverified letter-complaint. SC held that there was no procedural flaw despite the nature of the source of charges since similar to the Almonte

case the Constitution authorizes the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees

Roxas vs. Vasquez GR 114944 June 19, 2004

• Ombudsman was accused of GADLEJ for holding a reinvestigation on a case regarding alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices act. SC held that Ombudsman is not and should not be limited in its review by the action or inaction of complainants. It is clear from Sec 15 of RA 6770 that the Ombudsman may motu propio conduct a reinvestigation to assure that the guilty do not go unpunished.

Kara-an vs. Ombudsman GR 119990 June 21, 2004

• The issue here is whether or not the Ombudsman committed GADLEJ in dismissing a complain regarding certain criminal acts of some members of the Board of Directors of the Islamic Bank of the Philippines, The SC ruled that Ombudsman did not commit GADLEJ since it has the sole power to investigate and prosecute any act or commission of any public officer or employee when such act or commission appears to be illegal or unjust, It is beyond the SC to review the discretion of Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a case filed before it. Sc is not a trier of facts the Ombudsman is.

People v. Sandiganbayan 451 SCRA 413 2005

• Philippine Postal and Savings Bank (PPSB) questions the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in taking cognizance of the case against it. It was held that even if PPSB is created under the Corporation Code, it is still a government-owned or controlled corporation in as much as more than 99 % of its capital stock is owned by the government. GOCC’s, whether created by special law or under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Laxina v. Ombudsman 471 SCRA 542 (2005)

• In this case 2 separate informations were filed against Laxina, one in the Ombudsman and the other one in City Council. The SC ruled that both tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction. This is because LGC grants jurisdiction to the City Council; the Ombudsman Act grants jurisdiction to the Ombudsman.

Section 13 Cruz v. Sandiganbayan 194 SCRA 474 (1991) (concurrent jurisdiction with PCGG)

• This is case is about an Information filed against Cruz, being a subordinate and close associate of former President Marcos, illegally conducted a transaction at the expense of the government. The court ruled that the authority of the Ombudsman over the cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan is not exclusive but concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. The PCGG had the authority to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Nevertheless, in the case at bar, the evidence showed that the alleged violation is not crony related, committed by the petitioner taking advantage of his public office, and was not committed in relation with the ill-gotten wealth being sought to be recovered.

- 62 -


Maceda v. Vasquez 221 SCRA 464 (1993) (judiciary, supra art8) • In cases where the person complained of is a judge, the proper tribunal to

hear the case is the Supreme Court, and not the Office of the ombudsman Macalinao v. Sandiganbayan 376 SCRA 452

• This case presents the issue of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. PNCC is not a public corporation- Macalinao is an employee of PNCC- since it was incorporated under the general law on corporations. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the person either as principal, accomplice, or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Honasan v. Panel of Investigators GR 159747, April 13, 2004

• The case of Honasan is about the investigation of the suspects behind Oakwood Mutiny. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice for issuing an affidavit-complaint with subpoena against Honasan et al. The power of the ombudsman is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. In addition, the ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

Preventive Suspension and Imposition of Penalties Buenaseda v. Flavier 226 SCRA 645 (1993) (when to suspend)

• In this case, the petitioner seeks to nullify the order of the Ombudsman directing preventive suspension of petitioners who are employees of the National Center for Mental Health. The court held that in upholding the powers of the Ombudsman, preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. In order for the Ombudsman to conduct investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondents.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole 251 SCRA 243 (1995) (nature of preventive suspension)

• Preventive order of suspension was issued to Mayor, Vice Mayor and Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaue City. Petitioners question the order of preventive suspension which was sustained by Judge Gozo-dadole. They assail that it was granted in GADLEJ since it was ordered without any hearing. The order of the preventive suspension was issued after the filing of the opposition on the motion by the respondent officials and the memorandum of the Mayor. A preventive suspension, not being the nature of a penalty, can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard. It is also considered as a preventive measure in aid of investigation.

Vasquez vs. Hobilla-Alinio 271 SCRA 243 (1995) (not in relation to duties)

• Respondents contend herein that the Office of the Ombudsman had no authority to file the Informations because the crime was not committed in relation to the respondent’s office. The court ruled that the office of the

ombudsman has the authority and this is provided in not just in the Ombudsman Act but in the Constitution as well. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.

OMB vs. CA 491 SCRA 92

• The issue here is whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman can suspend employees of an administrative agency, DENR. The ratio here is that the mandatory character of the Office of the Ombudsman is not usurpation of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned since the power of the OMB to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a SHARED or CONCURRENT authority in respect of the offenses charged.

• * Other cases from OMB v. Madriaga to OMB v. Lucero have similar doctrines with the previous ones.

Jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Natividad v. Felix 229 SCRA 680 (1994) (amount)

• The ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law P.D. 1861 on Sandiganbayan shows that 2 requirements must concur for an offense to fall under its jurisdiction. First is that the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to his office. Second is that the penalty prescribed be higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for 6 years or a fine of P6,000.00. There is no first requisite in this case.

Lastimosa v. Vasquez 243 SCRA 497 (1995) (prosecutor’s assistance)

• The case sis about the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon the government prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so. The ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against the mayor in this case.

Fact-finding distinguished from Preliminary Investigation Raro vs Sandiganbayan GR 108431, July 14, 2000

• Repeat case. Refer to Sec 12. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan. GR 148468, Jan 28, 2000

• Serapio as one of the co-accused of the plunder case against Erap is primarily contesting in this case the Information filed against him before the Sandiganbayan. The court ruled that the information was sufficient and that matters of evidence need not be alleged in the Information. The right to preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute.


- 63 -


Heirs of Gregorio Licaros v. SB GR 157438 Oct 18, 2004 • The case is about the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. The

heirs of Gregario Licaros are contending that the recovery is barred by prescription. The doctrine in this case is that as the 1987 Constitution was promulgated, it was made by the drafters of the constitution that the action to recover ill-gotten wealth is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription. The case made it clear that “ any action involving the recovery of unlawfully acquired properties against Licaros or his transferees may not be deemed to have prescribed.

Section 16 Section 17 Section 18 Sampayan v. Daza 213 SCRA 807 (1992) (foreign citizen)

• Petitioners in this case contest the legitimacy of having elected Daza, as the congressman of the same congressional district of the petitioners on the ground that he is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. Though the case was deemed moot and academic for having been filed 2 months before the expiration of the term of the congressman, another contention to debunk the arguments raised by the petitioner is that the HRET should be the proper tribunal to hear the case. Being a greencard holder is indicative of permanent residency in the U.S.

Caasi v. CA 191 SCRA 229 (1990) (foreign citizen)

• Same as Sampayan v. Daza

ARTICLE XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Section 1 Section 2 Alienation Sta. Rosa Mining v. Leido

• Sta. Rosa Mining Co. questions the constitutionality of PD 1214 so far as it required holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease application within 1 year from the approval of the Decree. Sta. Rosa contends that it violates the Constitution for it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. PD 1214 is constitutional because it is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which Sta. Rosa’s mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. The decree does not cover all mining claims located under Phil. Bill of

1902 but only those claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over affected land or mining claim. It merely segregates the located land from would-be locators. The decree is in accord with Art 12, Section 2 of the Constitution.

San Miguel Corporation v. CA

• San Miguel Corporation seeks the reversal of the CA decision which denied its application for registration of a parcel of land in view of its failure to show entitlement thereto. The CA decision is affirmed. Open, conclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law allows the land to cease as a public land and becomes a private property without judicial declaration of such. Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed properties for more than 30 years must be conclusively established. This quantum proof is necessary to avoid the erroneous validation of fictitious claims of possession over the property in dispute. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land.

Utilization Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran

• Miners Association of the Philippines challenges the validity and constitutionality of the Administrative Orders Nos. 57 and 82 which are the implementing rules and regulations for EO 211 and 279 issued by President Cory Aquino. Miners Association of the Phils contends that the AO’s violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and have an effect of repealing or abrogating existing mining laws, like PD 463, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of EO 279. EO 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and the approval of the applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten the development of mineral resources. EO 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. PD 463 pertains to old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through license, concession or lease which is not allowed by Art 12, Sec 2 of the Constitution. It does not apply retroactively to license, concession or lease granted by the government before the passage of the 1987 Constitution. The effectivity of the Executive Orders applies only to existing mining claims after the passage of the present constitution. The agreements can be modified, altered, or amended by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article 12.

Tano v. Socrates

• Certain fishermen claim that they have rights since they are subsistence fishermen and challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances issued by Acting City Mayor Lucero and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Provincial Governor which required mayor’s permit to carry out a profession or business and

- 64 -


prohibited the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipping of aquatic organisms. Petitioners invoke the right of subsistence fishermen under Section 2 of Art 12 wherein they failed to show they were such. Marginal fishermen are individuals engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering fish. Subsistence fishermen are those whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for their livelihood.

Villaflor v. CA

• It is not difficult to understand that legal basis urged by petitioner does not support his allegation that the contracts to sell and the deed of relinquishment are simulated and fictitious. Properly understood, such rules on interpretation even negate petitioner’s thesis. Failure to pay is not even a breach but merely an event which prevents the vendor’s obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force. Generally, in a contract of sale, payment of the price is a resolutory condition and the remedy of the seller is to exact fulfillment or, in case of a substantial breach, to rescind the contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.

Public Domain Land Management Bureau v. CA GR 112567

• Director of Land Management Bureau questions the CA decision which confirmed and ordered the registration of the land in favor of Carino. The court ruled that possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under a claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State. The phrase, “adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner” are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.

Republic vs. De Guzman GR 105630, February 7, 2000

• Director of Lands not barred to an investigation as to how title has been acquired, if purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such a title.

• We rule that the State can assail a patent fraudulently issued by the Director of Lands. “Where public land is acquired by an applicant through fraud and misrepresentation, the State may institute reversion proceedings event after the lapse of one year.” “The indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.

Cruz v. Secretary of DENR GR 135385, December 6, 2000

• The Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property and the State’s power of dominium. The Public Land Act operated on the assumption that the title to public lands in the Philippines remained in the government and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties. The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and the friar lands. Another act placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under Torrens system.

• The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) grants the indigenous cultural communities (ICC) or indigenous peoples (IP) the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral domains and defines the extent of these lands and domains, and the ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title. There is nothing in IPRA that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over natural resources within their ancestral domain. The inclusion of natural resources in Sec 1, Part II, Rule II of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 of the law and is contrary to Art 12, Sec 2 of the Constitution. The right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domains and does not extend to exploitation and development of natural resources. The limited rights of management and use must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization is expressly allowed in the Constitution.

Chavez v. PRA GR 133250, July 19, 2002 • AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and

submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title II of CA No. 141.

• The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all “lands, territories and possessions” in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.

• Until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands, though any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

• The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood; In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed are of alienable lands of the public domain; The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited are of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual.

• The mere reclamation of certain areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain—there must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.

- 65 -


• Under Spanish Law of Waters, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced.

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association v. Ramos GR 127872, 2004

• The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into these Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State’s power of dominium, which is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property. In its broad sense, the term “jura regalia” refers to royal rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad . These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign.

• The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also to “all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of earth.” The Regalian doctrine and the American system, therefore, differ in one essential respect—under the Regalian theory, mineral rights are not included in a grant of land by the state while under the American doctrine, mineral rights are included in a grant of land by the government.

• The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four modes: The State may directly undertake such activities. (2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations. (3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino-citizens. (4) For the large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

Section 3 Lands of Public Domain Director of Lands v. Aquino 192 SCRA 296

• Petitioners question the validity of the decision of the lower court which granted the application for registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that they are within the forest zone. The District Forester’s failure to object to the exclusion of the area sought to be registered from the forest reserve was not enough justification for registration because under Commonwealth Act 141, the power to exclude an area from the forest zone belongs to the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and not the District Forester or even the Director of Forestry. Forest or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private properties. This is premised on the regalia doctrine enshrined in the Constitution. According to Art 12, Section 2, the land must first be released from its classification as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land in accordance with eh certification issued by the Director of Forestry. This is because the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive

department of the government and not of the courts. A positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agriculture.

Republic v. CA 160 SCRA 228 1988

• This is an application of the Regalian Doctrine which is intended for the benefit of the State and not of private persons. The rule simply reserves the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential” or any purpose other than mining. If a person is the owner of agricultural land where minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

Director of Lands v. IAC 146 SCRA 509

• A judicial confirmation proceeding should at most be limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested.

• The 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights. Thus where land was acquired in 1962 when corporations were allowed to acquire lands not beyond 1,024 hectares, the same may be registered in 1982 although under 1973 Constitution corporations cannot acquire lands of the public domain. There can be no serious question of Acme’s right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be constructed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called “incomplete” or “imperfect” title.

• A corporation that acquired private land in 1962 may have it registered in 1982 despite the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution which cannot be given retroactive effect as to impair vested rights.

Dipidio v. Gozun 485 SCRA 586

• “Taking” under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant of color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

• Power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two.

• A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property interest

- 66 -


is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking.

• In the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the use of private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.

• Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which property was intended such as the establishment of an easement.

Section 4 Section 5 Ancestral Lands and Domain Cruz v. Secretary of DENR GR 135385, December 6, 2000

• Petitioners contend that by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands violate the rights of private landowners

• Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects. They comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting and burial grounds, worship areas, and bodies of water, mineral and other resources. Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions of ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by them under claims of individual or traditional group ownership.

• Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain, they are private belong to the ICCs/IPs. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership which maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It introduces a new concept of ownership, concept that has long existed under customary law. Customary law is a primary and not secondary source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs.

Section 6 Common Good Telebap vs. Comelec 289 SCRA 337

• Art XII Sec 6 of the Constitution provides that the property in question bears a social function and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which the candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know.

Section 7 Private Lands Ramirez v. Vda de Ramirez 111 SCRA 704

• This is an appeal with regard to the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries which include his widow, Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez, a French citizen who lives in Paris. The court ruled that the constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

Halili v. CA 287 SCRA 337

• A land was sold to an American citizen, David Rey Guzman. He then sold it to a Filipino. The petitioners are questioning for its validity. The court ruled that non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.”

Muller v. Muller 500 SCRA 65

• A property inherited by an alien was registered under the name of his Filipina wife. Upon the petition of separation of property, the court ruled that the alien spouse cannot recover or ask for a reimbursement of such property.

• Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

• Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, an alien’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute—not even an ownership in trust is allowed; Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statue and in evasion of its express provision no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of fraud.

• The distinction made between the transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is futile exercise on alien spouse’s part—to allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.

- 67 -


Section 8 Republic v. CA 235 SCRA 567 (1994)

• Spouses who became naturalized Canadian Citizens can still can still register lands which under the Regalian doctrine are public lands according to Art. XII Sec. 8 and also according to BP 185 sec. 2 “ Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Filipino Citizenship and who has legal capacity to enter into contract under the Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land…”

Section 9 Section 10 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997)

• Manila Prince hotel invoking Art. XII Sec. 10 went to SC on the ground since the Manila Hotel is part of the National Patrimony, its ownership should be retained in Filipino hands as much as possible.

• SC held that Art. XII Sec. 10 is self-executing since it is already complete in itself and does not require any establishing legislation. It is also part of the National Patrimony because it had been the site of many historic events in the past. It distinguished between the hotel and ownership of the hotel in the context of Filipino-first policy is hairsplitting

Army Navy Club v. CA 271 SCRA 36 (1997)

• A person may be ejected from a historical landmark property and it will not affect its historical significance. Nowhere in the law does it state that such recognition grants possessory rights over the property. The law merely states that it shall be the policy of the state to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value.

Tanada v. Angara 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

• Art. XII Sec. 10 and 12 should be read with Sec. 1 and 13. The constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine Economy

Republic v. CA 299 SCRA 199

• The provisions of law and equity that not even Government shall unjustifiably enrich oneself/itself at the expense of the other

• It is fervently hoped that after the end of our sojourn in this valley of tears, the court,, for its historic disposition, will be exalted by the future generations of Filipinos, for the preservation of the national patrimony and promotion of our cultural heritage

J.G. Summit Holdings v. CA GR No. 124293, November 20, 2000

• A public utility shall be owned by at least 60% of its capital should be owned by Filipinos and the participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association shall be citizens of the Philippines.

Section 11 Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization 246 SCRA 344 [1995]

• The question is whether PETRON is a public utility. A “public utility” under the constitution and Public Service Law is one organized “for hire or compensation” to serve the public which is given the right to demand its service. PETRON is not engaged in oil refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties.

Albano vs. Reyes 175 SCRA 264

• Even if the MICP be considered a public utility, or a public service on the theory that it is a “wharf” or a “dock” as contemplated under the Public Service Act, its operation would not necessarily call for a franchise from the Legislative Branch. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate

• The Law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities.

• E.O. No. 30 has tasked the PPA with the operation and management of the MICP, in accordance with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations. However, P.D. 857 itself authorizes the PPA to perform the service by contracting it out, or through other means. Reading E.O. No. 30 and P.D. 857 together, the inescapable conclusion is that the lawmaker has empowered the PPA to undertake by himself the operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and management by another by contract or other means, at its option. The latter power having been delegated to the PPA, a franchise from Congress to authorize an entry other than the PPA to operate and manage the MICP becomes unnecessary.

Telebap vs. Comelec 289 SCRA 337

• All broadcasting, whether by radio or television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that “any such franchise or right granted… shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.”

PTC vs. NTC GR 138295, August 28, 2003

• PHILTEL questions the Provisional Authority issue to install, operate and maintain telephone exchanges and public calling offices issued by NTC to International Communications Corporation in locations which have also been issued to PHILTEL. The court ruled that neither NTC nor Congress can grant an exclusive franchise, certificate of any form of authorization to operate a public utility. A franchise to operate a public utility is not an exclusive private property of the franchisee. Under the Constitution, no franchise can demand or acquire exclusivity in the operation of public utility.

Royal Cargo Corporation vs. Civil Aeronautics Board (421 SCRA 21)

• Royal Cargo Corporation questions the validity of Resolution 209(90) by the Civil Aeronautics Board which imposed certain fines and asked for the immediate transfer of the position of the company President to a Filipino before the permit is to be given. Royal Cargo Corporation is a public utility

- 68 -


therefore it is subject to Section 11 of Article 12 which states that “The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.”

Section 12 Tanada vs. Angara 272 SCRA 18

• The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation

• Trade Liberation; “Filipino First” Policy; While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.

• It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the limited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

Section 13 Section 14 Section 15 Section 16 NDC v. PVB GR 84132-33, December 10, 1990

• PD 1717 violates Sec 16 because it was passed to rehabilitate the Agrix Group of Companies which was not a GOCC. As part of the rehabilitation process, the Agrix Group was dissolved by the decree and the decree created New Agrix, Inc. which was not a GOCC as well.

Section 17 Agan v. PIATTCO (420 SCRA 575)

• The right to take over is an exercise of police power which is one of the inherent powers of the State. Police power means “state authority to enact a legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Unlike eminent domain, police power is exercised without the provision for just compensation for his paramount consideration of is public welfare. In relation, Sec 5, 10 Art V of the ARCA (PIATCO shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of temporary takeover by the Government of the Rep. of the Philippines which compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost for the use of

Terminal, and/or Terminal Complex) obligates the government in the exercise of it police power to compensate Heirs of Suguitan v. Mandaluyong City to justify its claim for reasonable compensation for the Government’s temporary takeover of NAIA IPT III in times of national emergency is erroneous. As what is involved in that case is eminent domain and not police power, hence, just compensation was awarded. The Cases at her will not involve the exercises of the power of eminent domain.

David v. Arroyo (Supra. Article 7 Sec 18)

• During existence of state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to give the President, without authority/delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility/business affected with public interest However, since emergency are reposed in Congress, sec 17 (“State”) refers to Congress, not President. If the President wants to exercise such power, it must be delegated by Congress. PP 1017 therefore does not authorize take-over without authority from Congress.

Section 18 Republic vs. PLDT 26 SCRA 620

• The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT’s lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may; in the interest of National welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefore. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.

PLDT. vs. NTC 190 SCRA 717

• PLDT cannot justifiably refuse to interconnect. Rep. No. 6849, or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989, approved on February 8, 1990, mandates interconnection providing as it does that “all domestic telecommunications carriers or utilities x x x shall be interconnected to the public switch telephone network.” Such regulation of the use and ownership of telecommunications system is in the exercise of the plenary police power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. x x x The interconnection which has been required of PLDT is a form of “intervention” with property rights dictated by “the objective government to promote the rapid expansion of telecommunications services in all areas of the Philippines, x x

- 69 -


x to maximize the use of telecommunications facilities available in nation building x x x and to ensure that all users of the the public telecommunications service have access to all other users of the service wherever they may be within the Philippines at an acceptable standard of service and reasonable cost”

• The NTC, as the regulatory agency of the State, merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of telecommunications networks when it decreed interconnection

• Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a much desired improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public utility, to improved technology, fast handy mobile service, and reduced user dissatisfaction.

• State is empowered to decide whether public interest demands the monopolies be regulated or prohibited.

PLDT v. Eastern Telecom 213 SCRA 16

• Eastern Telecom was not allowed to interconnect with PLDT because it had no existing franchise in the Philippines. PLDT has existing gateway facilities which are used by its own domestic telephone subscribers. The records do not show any urgency for another company, especially a non-franchised one, to operate a similar facility for exactly the same people without having spent a single centavo to build up the domestic system. The proposed international gateway will not add a single telephone unit to existing phones in the country. It is not shown that a non-franchised telephone system will improve telephone services in the Philippines through the proposed scheme.

Section 19 Tatad v. Secretary of DENR

• The 3 major provisions of RA8180 (Deregulation Act) intended to promote free trade by encouraging new players in the oil industry proved to achieve the opposite effect. Instead of promoting free trade, the provisions on Tariff Differential, Inventory, and Predatory Pricing, were shown to encourage monopolistic power, in violation of Art.12 Sec.19 of the Constitution. RA 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free competitor were shown achieve the opposite result.

EASCO v. LTFRB 413 SCRA 75

• This is a petition questioning the circulars issued by LTFRB wherein all insurance companies who would like to participate must inform the LTFRB who shall divide such into two groups. The court ruled that the circulars were valid. While embracing free enterprise as an economic creed, the Constitution does not totally prohibit the operation of monopolies. However, it mandates the State to regulate them public interest so requires.

Avon Cosmetics Inc. v. Luna 511 SCRA 377

• This is a complaint to determine the constitutionality of the exclusivity clause of the supervisor's agreement made by Avon Cosmetics, Inc. and Luna. In business parlance, the term "exclusivity clause" refers to an agreement which prohibits the obligor from engaging in "business with competition with the obligee. This critical clause is more often the subject of critical scrutiny when it is perceived to collide with the Constitutional

proscription against "reasonable restraint of trade or occupation." The restraint of trade or occupation embraces acts, contracts, agreements, or combinations which restrict competition or obstruct due course of trade.

• Contracts requiring exclusivity are not per se void - each contract must be viewed vis-a-vis all the circumstances surrounding such agreements in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restrain on competition.

• Public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. Only those arrangements whose probable effect is to foreclose competition in a substantial share of the lone of commerce affected can be considered as void for being against public policy.

Section 20 Section 21 Section 22

ARTICLE XVII: AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Section 1 Imbong vs. COMELEC 35 SCRA 28 (1970)

• This case is regarding the creation of the Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each legislative district. The Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly passed Resolution No. 4 providing that the composition of the Constitutional Convention shall be 320 delegates apportioned among the existing legislative districts. The Congress as a Constituent Assembly has the power to enact implementing details for the Constitutional Convention. So as long as the rules do not clash with any specific provision of the Constitution, they are valid.

Section 2 Lambino vs. COMELEC

• A resolution by COMELEC dated 31 August 2006 denied due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. There are two essential elements before allowing initiative and referendum to amend the Constitution (1) the people must author and this sign the entire proposal. NO agent or representative can sign on their behalf (2) as an initiative upon a petition; the proposal must be embodied in a petition. Therefore, there must be a full text of the proposed amendments FIRST shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Although the Constitution does not expressly provide these elements, the deliberations of the of the Constitutional Commission show the true intent of the statute, the petition to amend must have a full text of the intended amendments. The petition is denied. To uphold direct democracy at the

- 70 -


expense of the fundamental law is to sanction, not a constitutional, but extra-constitutional recourse.

Section 3 Section 4 Gonzales vs. COMELEC 21 SCRA 774 November 9, 1967

• This case is about a petition to stop COMELEC from performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of constitutional amendments which the Congress of the Philippines passed as RA 4913. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose the amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people. Therefore, the Senate and the Congress act not as members of their respective Houses, but as a CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (It is not part of their ordinary plenary legislative power). When the act as such, they derive their authority from the Constitution, and is only under the conditions set in Article 17 of the Constitution.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC 41 SCRA 702 October 16, 1971

• This case is about a petition to stop COMELC from holding a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, at which the proposed constitutional amendment “reducing the voting age” in § 1 of Article V of the Constitution to eighteen years “shall be submitted” for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971. There should be only one “election” or plebiscite for the ratification of all amendments the Convention may propose. In which case, the ruled that if they allowed more than one election or plebiscite for every amendment, then that would result to hundreds, if not thousands of proposals to amend the existing Constitution.

ARTICLE XVIII: TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7 Section 8

MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. 328 SCRA 836 March 27, 2000 • Bel-Air is a village association which owns Neptune St. inside Bel-Air Village

(this is near Kalayaan, former International School side). The Chairman of MMDA asked to open Neptune Street to accommodate Traffic, in the same day, the wall separating Bel-Air from the public roads were also to be demolished. In this case, the petition was dismissed. The Court ruled that the MMDA is not a political unit of the government. Its main role and function is to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration, in essence, a DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.

Section 9 Section 10 Section 11 Section 12 Section 13 Section 14 Section 15 Section 16 Dario vs. Mison 176 SCRA 84 August 8, 1989

• Pres. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, declaring the need for reform, to protect the basic rights of the people and adopting a provisional constitution, for an orderly transition to a government under a new constitution. Total REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT was intended so as to eradicate unjust and oppressive structures.

• The Ministry of Finance as well as the Bureau of Customs was reorganized. Commissioner of Customs Mison issued a memorandum prescribing personnel placement.

• What was envisioned in § 16 is not a remedy for arbitrary removal of civil servants enjoying security of tenure but some form of relief for members of the career service who may have been or may be legally but involuntarily “reorganized out” of the service or may gave voluntarily resigned pursuant to the reorganization policy. The relief offered is the alternative one of either separation pay and other retirement benefits or, at the option of the government, reemployment.

Mendoza vs. Quisumbing 186 SCRA 110 June 4, 1990

• Concern of “Hold-over” status of every single employee of the department as a result of the reorganization (Proclamation No. 3, Dario vs. Mison)

• 400,000 school teachers, janitors, clerks, principals, supervisors etc of DECS were placed on hold-over status.

• Hold-over status defined as, the terms have expired or his services terminated but he should continue holding his office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.

- 71 -


Section 17 Section 18 Section19 Section 20 Section 21 Section 22 Section 23 Section 24 Section 25 Section 26 Joya v PCGG – 225 SCRA 568 [1993]

• When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, paintings and silverware were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be made to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on to the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties – the true owners thereof – whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution.

Republic v Sandiganbayan – 221 SCRA 189 [1993]

• The transfer of management from PIMECO to MPCP made by the PCGG is equivalent to the performance of an act of ownership which the PCGG cannot exercise. The PCGG is merely a conservator or caretaker which can exercise only powers of administration over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over. In the exercise of its functions, it must consistently bear in mind that it can only do acts and things necessary to fulfill its mission to conserve and preserve sequestered assets.

Cojuangco v Roxas – 195 SCRA 797 [1991]

• PCGG has no power to vote the sequestered shares of San Miguel Corporation. Voting sequestered shares is tantamount to exercising acts of ownership, which is clearly not within the ambit of power of the PCGG.

Araneta v Sandiganbayan – 242 SCRA 482 [1995]

• For a penal violation to fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG, the following elements must concur: (1) it must relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) of

the late President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates; (3) who took undue advantage of their public office and/or used their power, authority, influence, connections or relationship.

Romualdez v Sandiganbayan – 244 SCRA 152 [1995]

• The power of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute offenses committed in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth does not extend to other acts or omissions not involving “ill-gotten wealth” penalized by the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.


• The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the corresponding judicial action or proceeding be filed within a definite period as regards orders of sequestration, freezing, provisional takeover, is not difficult to discern. Sequestration, freezing, provisional takeover are fundamentally remedies which are temporary, interim, provisional. They are severe, radical measures taken against apparent, ostensible owners of property, or parties against whom, at the worst, there are merely prima facie indications of having amassed “ill-gotten wealth,” indications which must still be shown to lead towards actual facts in accordance with the judicial procedures of the land. The judicial action or proceeding contemplated to be filed is one for the final substantiation or proof of the prima facie showing on the basis of which a particular order of sequestration, freezing or takeover was issued.


• The PCGG has no authority to issue search warrants in the first place. Only a judge and such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law were empowered by the Freedom Constitution to issue such an order, and the PCGG is neither.


• The powers, functions, and duties of the PCGG amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. The exercise of such functions cannot be delegated by the Commission to its representatives or subordinates.


• In all cases involving alleged ill-gotten wealth brought by or against the Presidential Commission on Good Government, it is the policy of the Court to set aside technicalities and formalities that serve merely to delay or impede their judicious resolution.

PCGG v Sandiganbayan – GR 125788, June 5, 1998

• The suit against certain shareholders cannot be ipso facto a suit against the unimpleaded corporation itself without violating the fundamental principle that a corporation has a legal personality distinct and separate from its stockholders.

Republic v Saludares – 327 SCRA 449

• Where a collection suit is filed against a sequestered company by its supplier, the PCGG evidently could not be the proper party to defend

- 72 -


against such claim, and jurisdiction belongs to regular courts, not the Sandiganbayan.

Jalandoni v Secretary of Justice – GR 115239-40, March 2, 2000

• The Secretary of Justice has the power to review resolutions or decisions of provincial or city prosecutors or the Chief State Prosecutor upon petition by a proper party. The Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and supervision over the prosecutors. He may thus affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify their rulings as he may deem fit.

Antiporda v Sandiganbayan – GR 116941, May 31, 2001

• Complaints for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth which merely identify and/or allege corporations or enterprises to be the instruments, repositories or the fruits of ill-gotten wealth, without more, come within the meaning of the phrase, “corresponding judicial action” contemplated by the constitutional provision referred to. Normally, said corporations, as distinguished from their stockholders or members, are not generally suable for the latter’s illegal or criminal actuations in the acquisition of the assets invested in them by the former.

PCGG v Sandiganbayan – GR 119609-10, September 21, 2001

• A suit against individuals as shareholders in a corporation is not a suit against the corporation. Failure to implead the corporations as defendants and merely annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate personality without a hearing.

Section 27 De Leon v Esquerra – 152 SCRA 602 [1997]

• The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III thereof, to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

This compilation was made by the following sisters:

Aster Ancheta

Eir Antig Kara Chua

Samantha David Sienna Flores

Maryl Go Kae Supnad

Special thanks to the friends of Aleitheia who helped contribute to this compilation of case doctrines:

Marianne Lagasca

PJ Baluyut Mark Calida

AC Castaneda Miguel Ilagan Joseph Pinon

Constitutional Law I Case Doctrines

Documents

Transcript of Constitutional Law I Case Doctrines