consti cases.doc

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IICASE DIGEST

FINALS

PP VS DY

158 SCRA 111

FACTS: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder

before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant

guilt of the accused.

HELD: In view of the documentary evidence on record, the defense lost its credibility before

the court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar.

The rule on res gestae is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.


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MAGONCIA VS PALACIO

80 PHIL 770

FACTS:ZacariasMagoncia was arrested for the crime of robbery by a band committed at the

homeofHilarioEnovejas in Pangasinan. The police chief ordered 4 policemen to go to Magoncia's home. These policemen, without a search warrant, entered Magoncia's house where Magoncia's wife scolded them for searching their home while Magoncia was not around. The policemen found a paltik, a hand grenade, a box containing 42 rounds and some pieces of cotton cloth owned by HilarioEnovejas.

A complaint of robbery by a band and illegal possession of firearm were filed against the accused. For the complaint of illegal possession of firearms, Magoncia filed a motion asking the trial court to order the return of the illegally seized effects and to order the Fiscal (Palacio) to desist from using such effects as evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant now comes to the Supreme Court on certiorari and requests to revoke the order of the trial court judge and to order the fiscal to desist from using the seized items as evidence for the reason that they have been illegally seized. ISSUE:

WON the defendant is entitled to the return of the items seized HELD:

No.Republic Act No. 4 prohibits the possession of firearm; the mere possession is a crime. Possession ofcontraband is punishable by law. The Constitution does not guarantee immunity to a smuggler.Return of the items to the defendant and to prevent them from being presented as evidence is toexonerate the crime punished by RA No. 4.

There is a wide distinction between the seizure of property lawfully within the possession of aperson and the seizure of property held and used in violation of law. Thus contraband articles andthose things which under the law one has no right to possess, for the purpose of issue ordisposition, are not embraced in the protection of the constitutional guaranty. Indeed, anindividual in the possession of such goods is entitled to no protection whatsoever, for such goodsare not subject to ownership, and may be forfeited or destroyed. They are, therefore, subject tosearch and seizure.


FINALS

PP VS MIRANTES

249 SCRA 179

FACTS:Appellant and a certain GuarbertoBalolong were charged with having conspired and

confederated in wilfully and feloniously selling, transporting and delivering two sticks of marijuana cigarettes.

At the arraignment, appellant Mirantes pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. Curiously, the records do not disclose the specific participation of accused GuarbertoBalolong, except as hereinafter noted in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and the certification in said information merely states that "accused GuarbertoBalolong y Chin could not be contacted and his whereabout(s) could not be ascertained." No warrant for his arrest appears to have been issued and it was only at the penultimate hearing of the case that the trial court ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest upon being informed by the trial fiscal that said accused was still at large.

After trial, appellant was found guilty as charged by the court a quo which rendered the assailed judgment. He now comes to this Court for the reversal of said verdict, contending that the trial court erred in (1) giving absolute credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which are inherently improbable, inconsistent and unbelievable; (2) appreciating the seizure receipt of property signed by him without the assistance of counsel during custodial investigation; and (3) convicting him despite the existence of overwhelming doubts.

ISSUE:WON there was a violation of the rights of the accused in the case at bar.

HELD:Yes. The oft-cited presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions

cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an accused, particularly when the prosecution's evidence is weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong enough to pierce the shield of this presumptive innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And where the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to overcome this presumption, necessarily, the judgment of conviction of the court a quo must be set aside. The onus probandi on the prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the innocence of an accused, but by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt.


FINALS

PP VS DUHAN

142 SCRA 100 ; 1986

FACTS:From the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila finding them guilty of violating

Section 4 in relation to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, Jose Duhan, Manuel Recla and Roger Reyes, have appealed to this Court. Appellants Duhan and Recla.They were all charged under an information reading as follows:

“That on or about the 29th day of June, 1982, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any

prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly jointly sell or offer for sale to the public the following: dried marijuana leaves wrapped in an aluminum foil and one

stick of marijuana cigarette, which is a prohibited drug.”Upon the other hand, the appellants contend that the evidence on record does not

justify the Trial Court's findings, but on the contrary, demonstrates the existence of a quite different version of the facts, for which reason they are entitled to an acquittal at least on reasonable doubt. They invoke the familiar doctrine that "an accused should be convicted on the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution and not on the weakness of his defense."

ISSUE:WON there was a violation of the rights of the accused in the case at bar.

HELD:Yes. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under

investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.


FINALS

PP VS MARTI

193 SCRA 527

FACTS:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo.

Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.

ISSUE:

WON there was an invalid search and seizure in the case at bar.HELD:

There was none. The evidence seized herein is admissible in evidence. Also, there was no violation of the right of privacy of the accused.

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.

It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.


FINALS

MANALILI VS CA

280 SCRA 400 ; 1997

FACTS:

Narcotics officers were doing surveillance and chanced upon the accused in a cemetery who seemed to be high on drugs. He tried to resist the police officers and upon inquiry, found that the accused was possessing what seemed to be crushed marijuana leaves.

HELD:

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. It has been held as one of the exceptions to the general rule against searches without warrant.

MANALILI VS CA


FINALS

280 SCRA 400 ; 1997

FACTS:The Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police was conducting surveillance in front

of the Kalookan City Cemetary due to reports of drug addicts frequenting the area. They observed Alain Manalili in the area, with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, signs of being high on drugs. They stopped Manalili and asked for the contents of his hands, which turned out to be a wallet. Inside the wallet, police officers found what later on turned out to be crushed marijuana. He was charged with Illegal Possession of Marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Manaliliclaimed the charges were “trumped up” and that the police officers had blackmailed him. In addition, petitioner asserts that the evidence seized was inadmissible against him, as fruits of an illegal seizure.

On the otherhand, the Solicitor General counters that the search and seizure was valid, but regardless of its validity, its defense had been waived by petitioner since it was not raised in the lower court.

ISSUE:WON the search of Manalili and seizure of marijuana valid

HELD:Yes. The General Rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by

a judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional. However, there are exceptions to the rule: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, 3) seizure in plain view, 4) customs search and 5) waiver by the accused.

The court added another exception, the stop-and frisk, which is the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons. This is for the safety of police officers and the general public. Of course, the stop-and-frisk must be grounded on probable cause that the accused has committed an offense. As such, the court ruled that the search and seizure was valid and admissible as evidence. In addition, Manalili had effectively waived the defense of an invalid search since this issue was not raised during the trial. Such issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal


FINALS

PP VS MALMSTEDT

G.R. NO.91107 ; JUNE 19, 1991

FACTS: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The bus where accused Malmstedt, a Swedish National, was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on the waist of the accused. Suspecting the bulge on the waist of the accused to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

ISSUE: WON there was unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD: None. The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under the law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Also, the offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) the receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately present his passport.


FINALS

receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately presenthis passport.


FINALS

PP VS MALMSTEDT

G.R. NO.91107 ; JUNE 19, 1991

FACTS:Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was found, via a routine NARCOM

inspection at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay Mountain Province, carrying Hashish, a derivative of Marijuana. RTC La Trinidad found him guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the reversal of the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because there was no search warrant.

ISSUE:WON there was an illegal warrantless arrest.

HELD:None. The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a

person without a warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) thereceipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately present his passport.


FINALS

PP VS SALVATIERRA

276 SCRA 55

FACTS: While Charlie Fernandez was walking towards Quiapo, appellant and the two accused

lunged a pointed instrument at Charlie, hitting the latter at the left breast which eventually resulted to his death.

On Nov. 15, 1990 the police received a complaint that appellant was creating a commotion. He was thereafter taken in custody. Appellant put up the defense of alibi alleging that he was having merienda with his wife and children when the incident occurred. He also alleged that he had an altercation with a woman on that day who caused his arrest for the crime of malicious mischief, wherein he was detained after. Then, when the police arrived, they brought him to the Homicide Section where he was investigated for the stabbing of Fernandez. Appellant claimed that the arrest was made almost 3 months after the commission of the crime and no warrant had been obtained during the 3-month intervening period between the commission of the crime and his apprehension, thus making the arrest illegal.

ISSUE:WON the arrest herein made is violative of the constitutional rights of the accused.

HELD:No. Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he

never raised it before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, objection is deemed waived.


FINALS

SPOUSES SING VS CHOA-CHUY

G.R. NO.179736 ; JUNE 26, 2013

FACTS:

This case involves two families that owned adjoining properties in Mandaue City, Cebu. The Choachuys built an auto repair shop in their premises. Later, the Hings began to construct a fence around their property which was being used as a business office.

The Choachuys went to court to demand that their neighbor be ordered to desist from constructing the fence because it allegedly did not have a valid permit and that it would destroy the wall of their shop that was adjacent to the fence. The court denied the petition for failure to substantiate the damages claimed. Smarting from this defeat, the Choachuys installed in their shop two video surveillance cameras facing their neighbor’s property to record the construction of the fence.

The Hings resented the installation of the cameras and, invoking invasion of their right to privacy, asked the court to order the removal of the CCTVs and illegal surveillance.

ISSUE:WON there is a violation of petitioners‘ right to privacy.

HELD:

Yes, there is. In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the ―reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.

In this case, considering that petitioners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.


FINALS

RAMIREZ VS CA

G.R. NO.93833 ; SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

FACTS:

A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of R.A. 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.”

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of right to privacy in the case at bar.

HELD:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.


FINALS

SALCEDO ORTANEZ VS CA

G.R. NO.110662 ; AUGUST 4, 1994

FACTS:Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for

annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

ISSUE:WON there was a violation of right to privacy in the case at bar.

HELD:Yes. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other

Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.


FINALS

BOARD OF EDUCATION VS ALLEN

392 US 236

FACTS:The New York's Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks

free of charge to all students in grades seven to 12, including those in private schools. Appellant school boards sought a declaration that the statutory requirement was invalid as violative of the State and Federal Constitutions, an order barring appellee Commissioner of Education from removing appellants' members from office for failing to comply with it, and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial students.

ISSUE:WON the statute in the case at bar is violative of the law on the separation of the church

and the State.

HELD:No. The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of educational

opportunities for the young, and the law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.

Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian function, perform the task of secular education, and, on the basis of this meager record, the Court cannot agree with appellants that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious, or that the intertwining of secular and religious training is such that secular textbooks furnished to students are, in fact, instrumental in teaching religion.

Since appellants have not shown that the law coerces them in any way in the practice of religion, there is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.


FINALS

ENGEL VS VITALE

370 US 421

FACTS:

A New York State law required public schools to open each day with the Pledge of Allegiance and a nondenominational prayer in which the students recognized their dependence upon God. The law allowed students to absent themselves from this activity if they found it objectionable. A parent sued on behalf of his child, arguing that the law violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

ISSUE:

WON school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public schools violates the freedom to religion

HELD:

Yes. The majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The majority stated that the provision allowing students to absent themselves from this activity did not make the law constitutional because the purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent government interference with religion. The majority noted that religion is very important to a vast majority of the American people. Since Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate for the government to endorse any particular belief system.


FINALS

NEAR VS MINNESOTA

283 US 697

FACTS:

The Saturday Press (the Press) published attacks on local officials. The Press claimed that the chief of police had “illicit relations with gangsters.” Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the publishing of the Press newspaper under a state law that allowed this course of action. The state law authorized abatement, as a public nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, or other periodical. A state court order abated the Press and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press (Defendants), from publishing or circulating such “defamatory and scandalous” periodicals.

ISSUE:

WON the statute authorizing such proceedings is consistent with the conception of theliberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed

HELD:

No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact that the liberty of press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not affect the requirement that the press has immunity from previous restraints when it deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with the constitutional privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing such proceedings is not consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and guaranteed and is thus, unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is published with good motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to a complete system of censorship. Thus, the statute is a substantial infringement on the liberty of the press and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

Dissenting Opinion:

This statute does not operate as a previous restraint on publication within proper meaning of that phrase.

Discussion:

The Supreme Court of the United States in this case extended the presumption against prior restraint in the licensing context to judicial restraints as well.


FINALS

KINGSLEY BOOKS VS BROWN

354 US 436

FACTS: A New York state law authorized the legal counsel for a municipality to seek an

injunction against and the destruction of material deemed by the courts to be obscene. Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, sought such an injunction against several bookstores. The process of review that followed was a civil, rather than criminal procedure, and the courts ultimately granted the injunction and sought to destroy the obscene material.

ISSUE:WON the civil procedure as laid out by New York statute violate the booksellers' rights

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by not allowing for a criminal trial before imposing an injunction and destroying the obscene material

HELD:

No. In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that the civil procedure complied with the requirements of due process. Justice Frankfurter noted that the procedural safeguards were not significantly different from many state criminal misdemeanor procedures, nor were the penalties any more severe. The opinion also reaffirmed the existing notion that the constitutional protection of speech does not extend to obscene material.


FINALS

GROSJEAN VS AMERICAN PRESS CO.

297 US 233

FACTS:

A Louisiana law imposed on publishing companies a license tax of 2% of the gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in advertising in newspapers, magazines or periodicals if their circulation is more than 20,000 copies per week. Nine Louisiana-based publishers of newspapers, with circulations of more than 20,000 copies per week each, filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement against them of the said provision. They assailed the validity of the act on the ground, inter alia, that it abridges the freedom of the press in contravention of the due process clause contained in the FourteenthAmendment of the U.S. Constitution.

ISSUE:

WON the statute abridge the freedom of the press in contravention of the due process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment

HELD:

Yes. A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that “the act imposing the tax in question is unconstitutional under the due process of law clause because it abridges the freedom of the press”.

The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would be presented. It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.


FINALS

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS CA

259 SCRA 529

FACTS:

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “AngIglesiani Cristo” of the religious group Iglesiani Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offended and constituted an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “AngIglesiani Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “AngIglesiani Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the freedom of religion and freedom of speech of

appellant herein.

HELD:Yes. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesiani Cristo simply

because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil.


FINALS

PRIMICIAS VS FUGOSO

80 PHIL 71

FACTS:

An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government.

The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order

ISSUE: WON there is a violation of the freedom of speech in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify

suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.


FINALS

SCHENCK VS US

249 US 97

FACTS:During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that

the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment.

ISSUE: WON the actions (words, expression) of appellant herein are protected by the free

speech clause of the First Amendment

HELD:

No. The Court concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished.


FINALS

TERMINIELLO VS CITY OF CHICAGO

337 US 1

FACTS: Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic speech in

which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression guaranteed by the First

Amendment

HELD: Yes. The Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance unconstitutionally

infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "the vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."


FINALS

BAYAN MUNA VS ERMITA

488 SCRA 226

FACTS:

Petitioners in this case come in three groups :BayanMuna et al, Jess del Prado et al, and Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) et al. Their rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiolabridge. Police officers blocked petitioners herein along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed causing injuries upon some of them while others were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the Calibrated Pre-emptive Response Policy adopted by the administration against public rallies. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy.

On the other hand, respondents herein aversthat neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-pronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open alternative channels for communication of the information.

ISSUE:

WON B.P. 880 and the CPR is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The petitions herein are granted in part. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.

However, the so-called Calibrated Pre-emptive Response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void. Respondents are enjoined to refrain from using it and to strictly observe the requirements of maximum tolerance.


FINALS

SANTIAGO VS SC

A.C. NO.7399 ;AUGUST 25, 2009

FACTS:

After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not considered for the position of Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council, she delivered a speech on the Senate floor and was quoted as saying:

I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my

middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another

environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. . .

In a sworn letter complaint dated December 22, 2006, a certain Antero J. Pobre asked the Supreme Court to undertake disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary action against Senator Santiago on the ground that her statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.

In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny making the statements. However, she explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.

ISSUE:

WON Senator Santiago’s act are protected by her constitutional rights.

HELD:

Yes. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution.

Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.


FINALS

SORIANO VS MTRCB

G.R. NO.165636

FACTS:

Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesiani Cristo’s minister and regular host of the TV program AngTamangDaan):

“Lehitimonganak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!]Gagokatalaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asaholka pa saputangbabae[,] o di ba[?] [‘]Yung putangbabae[,]

anggumaganalangdoon[,] [‘]yungibaba, dito kay Michael[,] anggumaganaangitaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa saputangbabae [‘]yan. Sobraangkasinungalingan ng mgademonyongito.”

As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a “G” rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan.

ISSUE:WON Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious

discourse and within the protection of the freedom of speech.

HELD:No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case and considering the adverse effect of

petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.


FINALS

BORJAL VS CA

301 SCRA 1

FACTS: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and

Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of the published articles.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.

HELD:There are none. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be

identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.


FINALS

BORJAL VS CA

301 SCRA 1

(Constitutional Law – Right to Free Press, Newspaper Commentaries is Privileged Communication)

FACTS:

Private respondent filed for damages against petitioners for the series of articles written by the latter in a newspaper column, which dealt with alleged anomalous activities without naming or identifying private respondent. Petitioners contend that the right to free press is a privilege communication.

ISSUE:

WON commentaries on matters of public interest are privilege.

HELD:

Yes. No culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the freedom of the press.


FINALS

IBP VS ATIENZA

G.R. NO.175241 ; FEBRUARY 24, 2010

FACTS:

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thru its president Jose Anselmo Cadiz filed a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 to 5:30 PM, before the Office of the City Mayor of Manila, Mayor Jose Atienza. The latter granted a permit but changed the venue to Plaza Miranda, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. The IBP, Attys. Harry Roque, Joel Butuyan, and Anselmo Cadiz then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Action. Having been unacted within 24 hours from its filing, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which it denied because of the pendency of the CA petition. The rally pushed thru on June 22, 2006 at the foot of the Mendiola Bridge, despite the Manila Police District barring them from doing so. After the rally, they voluntarily dispersed. On June 22, 2006, the MPD filed a criminal case against Atty. Cadiz for violation of the Public Assembly Act for staging a rally not indicated in the permit, which he answered.

ISSUE:WON the Public Assembly Act violates the right to assembly.

HELD:Yes. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of

discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be “abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.


FINALS

REYES VS CA

G.R. NO.182161 ; DECEMBER 3, 2009

FACTS: Fr. Reyes was among of those who were arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege, 30th of November, 2007 and they were temporarily held at Camp Crame. A Hold Departure Order (HDO) for the petitioner and to the other accused was issued by the DOJ upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government. Probable cause was found during investigation and petitioner was charged with rebellion. The RTC however dismissed the charge against him but the HDO was still in effect. Petitioner requested that HDO should be lifted in view of the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner argued that a writ of amparo should be issued against the respondents, violating the whole breadth of rights enshrined in the Constitution, specifically, his right to travel.

ISSUE: WON the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

HELD: No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. A person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.


FINALS

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS

G.R. NO.88211 ; SEPTEMBER 13, 1989 & OCTOBER 27, 1989

FACTS:After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to

Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

ISSUE: WON the President’s act violates the constitutional right of the Marcos.

HELD:No. The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

ADMU VS CAPULONG


FINALS

222 SCRA 644

FACTS:

On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.

ISSUE:

WON the Ateneo Law School has violated the students’ right of association.

HELD:

No. Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the school which includes: a. freedom to determine who may teach; b. freedom to determine what may be taught; c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught; d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.


FINALS

IN THE MATTER OF IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY. MARCIAL EDILLONA.M. NO. 1928

84 SCRA 554 ; AUGUST 3, 1978FACTS:

This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.

ISSUE:

WON the assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent.

HELD:

No. The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.


FINALS

CLEMONS VS NOLTING

42 PHIL 702


FINALS

LIM VS REGISTRAR OF DEEDS

46 OG 3665


FINALS

LOVING VS VIRGINIA

388 US 1

FACTS:

In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).

ISSUE: WON Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the equal protection clause

HELD:

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."


FINALS

ZABLOCKI VS REDHAIL

44 US 674

FACTS:

Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support. Redhail filed a class action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON the Wisconsin statute violates the equal protection clause

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the Wisconsin's statute violated the equal protection clause and reaffirmed that marriage was a fundamental right. The Court emphasized marriage as part of the right to privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment. While the state has an interest in ensuring that child support obligations were fulfilled, this statute only regulated those who wished to be married and did not justify the restriction on the right to marriage.


FINALS

SKINNER VS OKLAHOMA

316 US 535

FACTS:

Oklahoma defined a “habitual criminal” as a person who, “having been convicted two or more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude’ either in Oklahoma or another State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a Oklahoma penal institution.” Such habitual criminals could be subject to forced sterilization. The Petitioner had been twice arrested for theft offenses before being arrested and confined for armed robbery. During his third incarceration, the Act was passed and proceedings were instituted against him.

ISSUE:

WON the State may sterilize an individual against his will for being convicted of threefelonies involving moral turpitude

HELD:

No. A unanimous Court held that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since some crimes such as embezzlement, punishable as felonies in Oklahoma, were excluded from the Act's jurisdiction, Justice Douglas reasoned that the law had laid "an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense." Moreover, Douglas viewed procreation as one of the fundamental rights requiring the judiciary's strict scrutiny.


FINALS

MELKIN VS WOLFE

2 PHIL 74


FINALS

US VS DIAZ CONDE

42 PHIL 766, 770 ; 1922

FACTS:On December 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome Oliveros and EngraciaLianco entered

into a contract with the defendants concerning a debt of P300. Oliveros and company were obligated to pay five percent interest per month within the first ten days of every month.

On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde were charged with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120.00 and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of law.

ISSUES:a. WON the Usury Law has a retroactive effect in this case;

b. WON the law impaired the contract in the case at bar

HELD:a. No. The Usury Law, a penal law, cannot become retroactive unless it is favorable to

the person accused. (Art. 21 and 22 Penal Code)b. Yes. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any

subsequent legislation.


FINALS

CALDER VS BULL

3 DALLAS 386, 390 ; 1798

FACTS: Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull, the stated beneficiaries of the will of Norman Morrison, were

denied an inheritance by a Connecticut probate court. When the Bulls attempted to appeal the decision more than a year and a half later, they found that a state law prohibited appeals not made within 18 months of the original ruling. The Bulls persuaded the Connecticut legislature to change the restriction, which enabled them to successfully appeal the case. Calder, the initial inheritor of Morrison's estate, took the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:WON the Connecticut legislation a violation of Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution,

which prohibits ex post facto laws

HELD:No. The Court held that the legislation was not an ex post facto law. The Court drew a

distinction between criminal rights and "private rights," arguing that restrictions against ex post facto laws were not designed to protect citizens' contract rights. Justice Chase noted that while all ex post facto laws are retrospective, all retrospective laws are not necessarily ex post facto. Even "vested" property rights are subject to retroactive laws.


FINALS

US VS JUEVES

23 PHIL 100 ; 1905

FACTS:

The appellants in this case, seven in number, were charged under Section 1 of Act No. 518 as amended by Section 1 of Act No. 1121 with the crime of brigandage or highway robbery, and each sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.

Counsel insist, first, that the court of Tayabas had no jurisdiction to try these appellants for the reason that the territory where the acts complained of were committed belong to the Province of Ambos Camarines at the time of the commission of said acts, although it has since been transferred to the Province of Ambos Camarines at the time of the commission of said acts, although it has since been transferred to the Province of Tayabas;

ISSUE:

WON the assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before jurisdiction was conferred is in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Philippine Bill.

HELD:

No. The assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before jurisdiction was conferred is not in violation of the ex post facto laws of the Philippine Bill. The change of the territory after the crime was committed and before the institution of this action does not touch the offense nor change the punishment. It does not prejudice the rights of the accused.

http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/act518-highway-robbert-or-brigandage-act.html

http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/act518-highway-robbert-or-brigandage-act.html


FINALS

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LIPA VS MUNICIPALITY OF TAAL

38 PHIL 367


FINALS

SANTOS VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATION

G.R. L-16049 ; MARCH 18, 1967


FINALS

LAUREL VS MISA

77 PHIL 856

FACTS:A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino

citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE: WON the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen to the Government becomes

suspended during occupation.

HELD:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government.

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation.

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