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Confronting the ÒdeathÓ of art criticism

by

Laurie Rojas

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Arts

Graduate Program in New Arts Journalism

The School of the Art Institute of Chicago

2012



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Confronting the ÒdeathÓ of art criticism

Introduction

The crisis of art criticism is undeniable. Rigor, commitment, narrative and

judgment have become dirty, antiquarian, and authoritarian words. Art criticism has

almost disappeared from newspaper columns. Historical awareness of the discipline fades

further with every new online journal or blog. Art criticism with a persuasive voice,

poetic aspirations, dedicated to new evaluative criteria for quality, and that attempts to

critique an artwork is a rare, endangered species. With the proliferation of Ph.D. studio

art programs and the expansion of the art world and global art market, it is neglected. For

some, art criticismÕs crisis has turned into a terminal disease with no cure in sight.

The turn of the 21st century has seen a plethora of articles, conferences, and

publications devoted to the crisis in criticism. Publications include Critical Mess: Art

Critics on the State of their Practice (ed. Raphael Rubenstein, 2006), and James ElkinsÕ

What Happened to Art Criticism? (2003). The most recent and comprehensive accounts

of the dilemmas confronting art critics today are included in The State of Art Criticism

(eds. James Elkins and Michael Newman, 2008) and Judgment and Contemporary Art

Criticism (eds. J. Khonsary and M. OÕBrian, 2010). The latter endeavors to build upon

the problems posed by ElkinsÕ and NewmanÕs book. In seeking to understand the crisis,

both are driven to reexamine the relationship of art criticism to other disciplines (like

curating, art history, and philosophy), the role of judgment in art criticism, and the

challenges to art criticism posed by the emergence of certain critical art practices (or

Conceptual art).



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This thesis is motivated to approach the problem of the lack of historical self-

awareness and continuity of the discipline of art criticism. The aim is to present the

historical conditions of the crisis of art criticism as it was understood in the last decade,

with priority given to questions raised by a rejection of judgment in art criticism. The

other task for this thesis is to determine the deeper historical causes of the crisis. First, I

will situate this crisis within the early history of art criticism and, especially, with respect

to the interrelationship between critique and crisis. Following this, I will flesh out what

this crisis looks like in the art world today, and review how this crisis has been registered

by those currently writing about art, particularly with respect to large-scale

transformations in the art market. The objective, here, is to specify what kind of criticism

has become practically obsolete, grasp how this process of obsolescence unfolded, and

reflect on the broader implications of the implausibility and apparent anachronism of art

criticism in the present. In so doing, I hope to clarify the significance of what art critic

and historian Benjamin Buchloh called Òdeath of art criticism.Ó1

On earlier modes of art criticism

To better understand the explanations of the current crisis, let us briefly revisit the

emergence of criticism itself. Reinhart KoselleckÕs Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment

and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (1988) elaborates on the significance of criticism

and crisis in the 18th

century. For Koselleck, criticism is an 18th

century catchword; he

1 Buchloh, ÒRound Table,Ó October , 200-228. The participants of the October ÒRound Table: The Present

Conditions of Art CriticismÓ included art historians, artists, critics, and curators, most of whom wore more

than one of these hats: George Baker, Rosalind Krauss, Benjamin Buchloh, Andrea Fraser, David Joselit,

James Meyer, Robert Storr, Hal Foster, John Miller, and Helen Molesworth.



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describes countless volumes published during this period with the term ÒcriticismÓ or

ÒcriticalÓ in their titles. On the other hand, the term crisis was rarely used in the 18th

century and cannot be considered a central concept in this period. The etymology of the

words ÒcriticismÓ and ÒcritiqueÓ are at the root of his investigations. He points out that

the word ÒcritiqueÓ is derived from the Greek Òkrinein,Ó which means Òto judge,Ó while

the Greek ÒkrisisÓ means Òdiscrimination and disputeÓ to Òselect, judge, decide.Ó Thus

ÒcrisisÓ also meant decision, in the sense of final judgment or appraisal, which today

extends into the category of criticism. In Greek, a single word encompassed concepts that

today would usually be seen as separate: ÒsubjectiveÓ criticism and ÒobjectiveÓ crisis.

Later in the 20th

century, this notion of the affinity between crisis and critique is

recognized and elaborated in the discourse around the crisis of literary criticism. In Paul

de ManÕs 1964 essay the ÒCrisis of Contemporary Criticism,Ó crisis and criticism are very

closely linked; much like the ideas presented by Koselleck, although he moving beyond

the issue of a shared etymology. De Man addresses the moment in which literary

criticism is said to have entered a crisis because of the influence of French structuralist

theory. In response he argues, Òall true criticism occurs in the mode of crisis.Ó

Furthermore, Òin periods that are not periods of crisis, or in individuals bent on avoiding

crisis at all cost, there can be all kinds of approaches to literature: historical, philological,

psychological, etc., but there can be no criticism.Ó2 If we agree with Koselleck and de

Man, and consider crisis a constant element of art criticism, then claims about the death

of art criticism imply an abandonment of the problems posed by crisis.

2 de Man, ÒCrisis of Contemporary Criticism,Ó 8.



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The notion of critique was central to Enlightenment thinkers, as in the writings of

French polymath Denis Diderot (1713Ð1784), who is said to embody the birth of art

criticism in his Salon writings, and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724Ð

1804), whose conception of critique motivated three major works: the Critique of Pure

Reason (1781), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Critique of Judgment

(1790).

DiderotÕs Salons, produced between 1759 and 1781, were written for the

Correspondance littŽraire, manuscript newsletters edited by Melchior Grimm and

circulated to individuals who did not attend the Paris Salon that had opened to the public

in 1737. Since illustrations were not included, DiderotÕs Salons are largely dedicated to

embroidering the artwork with a story. His descriptions are often theatrical: Diderot

speaks of his experience in the space, of walking through the galleries and even the

people he encountered. One of the most significant aspects of DiderotÕs Salons is how he

integrates dialogue with an interlocutor and establishes both a relationship with the

(absent) reader and a sense of a public. The intimate and conversational mode of address

also fosters such a relationship between the reader and the text. Writing in his Salons as a

visitor who is neither an artist nor an organizer of the exhibition itself, Diderot begins to

formulate the point of view of the critic, and thus presents himself (and his reader) as part

of a public. His work marks the birth of art criticism to the extent that it anticipates the

emergence of Òthe bourgeois public sphereÓ by seeking to bridge a surrogate point of

view of the Ògeneral publicÓ and the individual, subjective, ÒprivateÓ response of the art

critic.



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DiderotÕs writing strove to foster a public space for once-private critical

conversation, but it is Kant, rather than Diderot, who theorized the full critical

significance of criticism. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant elaborates the relationship

between the particular and universal in judgment, which allows him to hypothesize the

possibility of the universality of reflective aesthetic judgmentsÑa theory that lays the

foundations for modern aesthetics and 19th

century art criticism. In the ÒFirst

IntroductionÓ Kant explains that judgment was a faculty Òfor thinking the particular under

the universal.Ó Judgment was described as having two roles, ÒdeterminingÓ and

Òreflecting.Ó In its determining role, judgment subsumes particulars under concepts of

universals, which are already given. In the reflecting role, judgment is concerned with

Òfinding the universal for the given particular.Ó3 Aesthetic judgments, in their reflective

role, were about a communicable, shareable, i.e. potentially universal, idea about a

particular experience of art.

Later in the mid-19th

century, the critic, as beholder, not only represented the

standpoint of the public that Diderot anticipated, but also represented something for the

public and artists as well. In this authorÕs view, they provided reflective aesthetic

judgments of artworksÑa role remarkably embodied by French poet Charles Baudelaire

(1821-1867), whose prowess as satirist, wordsmith, and committed critic are all evidence

of his irrevocable influence over the art criticism that followed him. What is less obvious,

perhaps, is how BaudelaireÕs criticism builds upon the critics that preceded him. His

influences are so often exposed throughout his writings that, under present criteria, they

would border on plagiarism. The casual and conversational tone of the writing

demonstrates the influence of Diderot. Additionally, much like Diderot, Baudelaire is

3 Kant, Critique of Judgment , 179.



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unapologetically dismissive of paintings and artists he does not like. An equal

determination to validate the greatness of artists they liked is seen in both as well. Others

who have closely studied Baudelaire have pointed out how he would reproduce whole

paragraphs, Òidea for idea,Ó of what Stendhal had written. Baudelaire, however, was not

without clarity of purpose. In one of his essays on Constantine Guys, Baudelaire lucidly

lays out his purpose: to discuss the painting of his contemporary social scene. But he

specified what this meant and why it mattered. For him, Òthe pleasure we derive from the

representation of the present is due, not only to the reality it can be clothed in, but also to

its essential quality of being the present.Ó

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Baudelaire regarded what surrounded the art of his day as a significant factor to

properly define and comprehend it. He even gave us the definition for that historical

context: ModernityÑit is, on the one hand, the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; but

on the other, it is the eternal, the immovable. He also upheld this principle to the

recognition of beauty in the art of his contemporaries. It was precisely in the recognition

of and the insistence on the value of recognizing what was Modern, the essential quality

of his own moment, that is of most value for contemporary critics. Although several of

BaudelaireÕs criteria for judgment are not applicable today, what matters was his

insistence on engaging the criteria of his day. He identified whether some criteria of good

art had become antiquarian, whether they were entrenched in traditions or at a standstill,

and whether some criteria were failing to recognize the advances in the art of the time.

The fruitfulness of the instrument of judgment in art is perceptible in Baudelaire.

His rigid positions strengthened his critique, and made it useful for subsequent

4 Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life, 1.



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generations to gauge and judge back upon him the eternal qualities of his transient and

subjective positions. Baudelaire outlined his own criteria for a truly modern artist in his

passages praising Eugene Delacroix;5 likewise, his ideal critic needed to be

unapologetically "partiale, passionnŽe, politique.Ó By following the standards of the

former he could fufill the latterÕs aims. The most significant contributions Baudelaire left

subsequent generations of critics are to be found in ÒWhat is the Good of Criticism?Ó

where he declares: ÒTo be just, that is to say, to justify its existence, criticism should be

partial, passionate, and political, that is to say, written from an exclusive point of view,

but a point of view that opens the widest horizons.Ó

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As will be elaborated later in this

essay, it is the kind of critical relationship to art endorsed by Baudelaire that has fallen

into crisis, thus posing the question: what sort of relationship between art and criticism is

warranted today?

Art criticism and transformations in the art world

The rise of art fairs, international biennials, and international art auctions has

greatly transformed the shape and dynamics of the art world in the last three decades. In

2002, a highly influential survey conducted by Columbia University's National Arts

Journalism Program (NAJP), The Visual Art Critic, asked 230 art critics of mainstream

newspapers whether popular news media provided sufficient coverage of the dynamic

and expanding world of the visual arts.7 The reportÕs main finding was that Òcriticism has

5 Baudelaire, Art in Paris 1845-1862, 52-68. 6 Baudelaire, Art in Paris 1845-1862, 44.

7 Sz‡nt—, The Visual Art Critic: A Survey of Art Critics at General-Interest News Publications in America.

(Note: only a total of 169 art critics responded.)



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been struggling to keep up with the swift evolution of the art world.Ó8 Almost a third of

the critics (32 percent) agreed, Òthere is too much art being produced today.Ó When asked

if ÒtodayÕs art criticism offers reliable guidance and evaluation for working artists,

curators and galleries,Ó the criticsÕ responses were mixed. They recognized that their role

is limited or somehow deficient when it comes to addressing the art being made: ÒTwo

out of five art critics (41 percent) disagreed with the claim that art criticism offers reliable

guidance to todayÕs art.Ó Art critics are not confident in the ability of their discipline to

serve as a guide to contemporary art.

One main reason for this is that the art world critics engage with today is much

larger and more intricate than it was just three decades ago. Even the kinds of events that

have become commonplace, like the international fair Art Basel, leave many critics

perplexed. The survey also found that Òthe majority (58 percent) of alternative weekly

writers [as against 35 percent of daily critics] believe that todayÕs art criticism fails to

bring clarity to the activities of the world.Ó Concerning the art fair, one of the most

widespread activities in the world of art today, New York Magazine critic Jerry Saltz

pointed out in 2005, Òfew are further from the epicenter of action than an art critic at an

art fair.Ó9 Art fairs made Saltz feel Òexistentially adrift.Ó Why canÕt a critic with a trained

eye and sharpened pencil confidently take a stab at some of the works on display? There

are certainly heaps of art to scrutinizeÑto be compelled by, to loathe, to feel ambivalent

about. Perhaps every critic feels a little Òexistentially adriftÓ when surrounded by

thousands of art works that have no self-conscious cohesion. It may be the case that art

fairs are not the most appropriate way to view art: crowded hallways, desperate dealers,

8 Ibid, 6.

9 Saltz, ÒFeeding Frenzy,Ó Village Voice.



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tense assistants, awkward smiles, tired feet. But the experience of art in fairs is not

necessarily more alienating and overcrowded than 18th

and 19th

century Salons.

Something, however, is different : Unlike the mid-19th

century, it is clear and unavoidable

today that the critics are not driving the discourse around art. Art fairs would continue if

critics were not present, but would enter their own crisis if collectors failed to cash out.

Glossy art magazines like Artforum, Frieze, and Art + Auction10

have addressed

this expansion of the art market, which has not only grown in terms of profit but has also

come to play a more decisive role in the discourse surrounding art. The auction price of

an Andy Warhol, a Jeff Koons, or a Damien Hirst were the occasion for art-related

headlines in both art magazines and wide-circulation newspapers. Market value became,

perhaps, the most common means by which to grapple with the social conditions of art in

the present. Quite often, as in the case of a special Artforum issue in 2008 on ÒArt and its

Markets,Ó these artistsÕ works become an occasion to unpack the problematic question of

the ÒvalueÓ of a work of art. Such registrations of the ÒproblematicsÓ notwithstanding, the

fact that the auction price of a work has become the dominant means of engaging and

understanding the trends in contemporary art contemptible. Reporting and commenting

on the art market is, no doubt, essential in tracking trends in sales, which is one way that

art publications have been able to keep up with the Òswift evolution of the art world.Ó11

Thus, rather than art criticism, it has primarily been arts journalism, with a focus on

reporting the going rates of exchange, that has been better able to keep pace. However,

such an approach is not well equipped to make qualitative assessments of the significance

10 The magazine was acquired in 2003 by Louise Blouin Media, which also publishes Modern Painters and

owns artinfo.com, one, if not the largest online art news websites.11

Sz‡nt—, The Visual Art Critic, 6.



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of changes in the practices of artists. Art criticism, the discourse that traditionally

addressed such questions, has fallen behind to such a degree that art critics themselves

are skeptical of its ability to keep up.

A comparison of the traffic for sites like artnet.com, which tracks market trends

for artists and hosts online auctions featuring over 2,200 galleries, with the website of

Artforum, one of the oldest and most influential international art magazines, provides

another case in point. According to the online information aggregator, Compete,

artnet.com had 348,979 unique visitors in the month of January 2011, while

artforum.com had only 9,487.

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At their most active month of the year, July 2010,

artnet.com had over 512,625 while Artforum had 23,472. It should be noted that

artnet.com does publish articles by art critics, and Artforum does publish articles focused

on market-specific news. Nevertheless, the two websites have very different foci. The

content on artnet.com, for good or for ill, quite clearly appears to have satisfied a larger

need, in the context of an expanding, market-driven, and globalizing art world, in a way

that Artforum, with its focus on criticism, interpretation, and concern for art theory, has

not.13

A terrifying thought motivates the argument ahead: Compared to dedicated,

substantive engagement with art works, it is much easier simply to learn the tricks of the

trade, keep informed of the latest catchwords-posing-as-discourse, and succumb to the

12 See http://siteanalytics.compete.com/artnet.com+artforum.com+artinamerica.com/?metric=uv#13

On June 25th, 2012, while this thesis was in its last stages, Artnet Magazine posted a closing notice on

the frontpage of its website, which stated: Òthe first and best-known art magazine to be published solely onthe internet, is ceasing publication, effective immediately. This difficult decision is an economic one, and

reflects the fact that during its 16 years of digital life, the magazine was never able to pay its own way. At

present, plans call for Artnet Magazine to remain available in an archive on Artnet.com.Ó Since the rest of

artnet.com continues its functions, it demonstrates the constraints the market imposes over art journalism

and criticism. Accessed on August 27, 2012. http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/frontpage.asp.



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idea (candidly expressed by Raphael Rubinstein) that Òeveryone would be happier if you

just drank the Kool-aid and relegated yourself to smoothing the way of new art into the

market.Ó14

Critics, the four dozen or so who might have full-time jobs as writers, or work

as regular columnists, are still practicing a profession.15 They still need to fulfill their

editorial directives, and follow the standards of either journalism or academia in order to

write for a reputable publication. These publications have rigorous deadlines and limited

space. During the last decade, art and culture sections have been the first to be eliminated

in the dwindling newspaper industry. Understandably, any writing that steps outside the

norm of an already marginal subject, any writing that fails to sustain a diminishing

readership, is liable to be treated as unnecessary baggage, if not downright irresponsible.

Although standards and deadlines in publishing have been around for over a century,

somethingÑeven if just the desire to critique artÑseems to have been lost. What is

expressed in BaudelaireÕs famous dictum from ÒOn the Heroism of Modern LifeÓ rings

true even today: ÒIt is true that a great tradition has been lost and that the new one is not

yet established.Ó16

Focusing on a similar set of problems, the preface to Judgment in Contemporary

Art (2010)17 states, "while the economy of contemporary art seems to demand rigorous

critique, art writing functions solely in the service of an expanding, unregulated art

market.Ó18

In a period characterized by a quickly evolving art world, art criticism as a

form of practice has struggled to sustain influence. Similarly, the first sentence of ElkinsÕ

14 Rubenstein, Critical Mess, i.

15 Sz‡nt—, The Visual Art Critic, 20. The NAJP survey listed 40 (out of 169) critics as having a full time

staff position.16

Baudelaire, Art in Paris 1845-1862, 116.17

O'Brian and Khonsary (eds.), Judgment and Contemporary Art Criticism.18 Ibid, 6.



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What Happened to Art Criticism? is not shy to declare, ÒArt criticism is in a worldwide

crisis. Its voice has become very weak, and it is dissolving into the background clutter of

ephemeral cultural criticism.Ó Elkins quickly adds:

But its decay is not the ordinary last faint push of a practice that has run its

course, because at the very same time, art criticism is also healthier than ever. Its business is booming: it attracts an enormous number of writers, and often benefits

from high quality color printing and worldwide distribution. In that sense artcriticism is flourishing, but invisibly, out of sight of contemporary intellectual

debates. So itÕs dying, but itÕs everywhere. ItÕs ignored, and yet it has the market behind it.

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This contradiction, of Òmassively produced and massively ignored,Ó of a state of

Òvigorous health and terminal illness,Ó as Elkins describes it, might not be so obvious to a

generation for whom writings on art, music, and film are to be found everywhere you

turn or click. The problem is not lack of venues for art criticism. Yet writings on art and

culture, despite becoming a broad spectrum of Òliterature,Ó have lost their critical weight.

Art criticism hasnÕt disappeared from the art world, but its influence both on the social

scene surrounding art and on art practices themselves, has greatly diminished. This has,

in turn, affected the development of the practice itself.

One can walk into one of the largest international book fairs, Printed MatterÕs NY

Art Book Fair in September 2011, and see hundreds of international periodicals,

booksellers and publishing houses in the art world. Quantity and diversity are

unquestionable. There are, according to the guide book, artistsÕ books as well as

magazines and monographs dedicated to Òcultural production,Ó Òpromoting

photography,Ó Òart theory,Ó Òdialogue between cultural research and the social sphere,Ó

19 Elkins, What Happened to Art Criticism? 2.



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Òthe examination, development and definition of art and culture in the world,Ó

Òencouraging dialogue between visual art and writing,Ó and so on.20

Even Artforum, once

widely recognized as a publisher of art criticism, described itself at its booth as

Òexploring contemporary visual culture by the best contributors of our time.Ó

Surprisingly, not a single participant in the fair claimed to be publishing or doing art

criticism. The closest to criticism found at the book fair was a panel discussion titled,

ÒFurthering the Critical Dialogue,Ó aiming to Òdiscuss and evaluate select publications,Ó

which in this case were artistsÕ books, Òrather than speculate on the state of criticism per

se.Ó

21

The amount of materials available at the yearly fair is overwhelming, and this

material is far from being ignored. Yet there is a noticeable absence of criticismÑart

writing that is not only critical of the art but also defines itself as art criticismÑeven

when one actively seeks it.

There is an even a larger of amount of Òephemeral cultural criticismÓ being

produced online since Elkins published What Happened to Art Criticism? This is not to

sayÑthough it has often been claimedÑthat the emergence of the Internet is the cause of

the death of criticism. The concern that writing has become impoverished in the face of

an overabundance of information, infotainment, and Search Engine Optimization (SEOs)

is misguided. Similar anxieties attended the rise of the printing press.22

Advances in

communication technology do transform the way we receive and share information, but it

is reductive to blame technological innovations for larger, historic shifts. There is nothing

inherent in new media technologies preventing them from being utilized for the

20 Ò2011 NY Art Book Fair guide book,Ó back cover.

21 In 2011 NY Art Book Fair website. Accessed August 28, 2012.

http://nyartbookfair.com/archive/2011/conference22 John Palattella, ÒThe Death and Life of the Book Review,Ó The Nation, June 2, 2010.



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proliferation, deepening, and elaboration of art criticism. What must be explained is why

such technological advances appear to have blindsided certain practices and discourses,

but not others. Cultural and social practices have their own immanent development; they

undergo crises and evolve. If anything, the Internet has opened up new avenues, however

underused at present, for art criticism to develop and broadcast itself. The massive

growth and transformation of the art world, including art publishing, are not external

threats to a hermetically sealed practice. Rather, such changes indicate precisely that

criticism itself, as a form of practice, was already in crisis.

But what does it mean to say that a form of practice is in crisis? The emphasis

here is on the usefulness and purposefulness of art criticism in new socio-historical

contexts. As the previous examples demonstrate, art criticism itself was unable to make

sense of the changes happening in the art world and, instead, was hard pressed into

producing broad Òephemeral cultural criticismÓ (Elkins), or art writing that solely

functions to Òsmooth new art into the marketÓ (Rubinstein). The critic somehow failed to

evolve along with the art world, or, conversely, evolved all too easily, without knowing

itself to be evolving, such that the writing became unrecognizable as criticism. Thus it

has also become useful to not merely call this situation a crisis, but recognize it, at least

potentially, as a death of art criticism. Consciously or not, the practice of art criticism has

been cast aside, left behindÑperhaps buried in Clement GreenbergÕs tomb. (The

allegations against the often-despised American art critic will be elaborated in the section

on Òthe flight from judgmentÓ below.) For now it will suffice to keep in mind a very

important question the above section raises: What are the real conditions that make

possibleÑor impossibleÑthe qualitative assessments about contemporary works of art?



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The demise of the criticÑthe rise of dealers, collectors, and curators

As the conversation about the crisis of art criticism reached a fever pitch with the

global economic crisis of 2008, one thing that became clear was the extent to which that

conversation had come to accept and even naturalize the protracted Òstate of emergencyÓ

of art criticism. In a 2009 Village Voice article addressing the effects of the 2008

downturn entitled ÒWhat Crisis? Some Promising Futures for Art Criticism,Ó23 Martha

Schwendener writes, Òart writing already experienced its own sort of crash. The days of

power critics like Clement Greenberg or Harold Rosenberg ended decades ago; writers

have been eclipsed by globe-trotting curators, mega-dealersÑeven, in recent years,

collectors.Ó That art criticism Òcrashed,Ó and that this means the kind of criticism

represented by Greenberg is simply over and done with, have become something of a

potted history. While Schwendener emphasizes the demise of the critic as a public

personality in relation to the ascent of curators, dealers, and the art market, she also

alludes to an internal problem of the disciplineÑÒart writing [had] already experienced

its own sort of crash.Ó There is a considerable length of time between Òthe days of power

criticsÓ like Greenberg and Rosenberg and the current reign of globe-trotting curators and

mega-dealers. This section will breakdown how the dealer, the collector, and the curator

have, apparently, replaced some of the roles held by art critics.

One of the most influential actors in the market-driven art world is,

unsurprisingly, the dealer, which was one half of the old Òdealer-criticÓ system that

dominated up to the middle of the 20th century. An examination of an early relationship

23 Schwendener, ÒWhat Crisis? Some Promising Futures for Art Criticism.Ó



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between critics and dealers in the art world is found in Harrison and Cynthia WhiteÕs

sociological study Canvases and Careers: Institutional Changes in the French Painting

World (1965), which seeks to diagnose and understand the emergence and evolution of

the Òdealer-criticÓ system.24 In WhitesÕ account, dealers entered the scene at the moment

of a different structural crisis in the mid-19th

century: that of the demise of the long-held

hegemonic power of the Academy, in Paris. The Òdealer-criticÓ system materialized with

the support of new forms of patronage. The perfect case study for the authors was the

development of Impressionism, an artistic movement that established itself by hosting

independent exhibitions that broke formally from the Academy, and that, with the support

of independent dealers and critics, slowly became autonomous from the system of

recognition and patronage of the Academy. With the decline of the predominance of the

Academy, and in partnership with critics, emerged the dealer. Together they tightened the

relationship between the production of meaning in the work and the production of its

economic (exchange) value. As the WhitesÕ main argument indicates, this epoch, when

the origins of the Òart marketÓ were established, necessitated a shift from promoting

canvasses to endorsing careers.25

In the Òdealer-criticÓ system, both the dealer and the critic were publicists of sorts,

with the critic producing symbolic value or meaning for the work, while at the same time

speculating on the potential promise of artists or movements. But this entailed a shift

away from the traditional role of the critic, who had previously been concerned with

identifying stylistic innovation and idiosyncrasy in the context of a pictorial traditionÑ

the kind of criticism represented by Diderot and, later, in a different way, by

24 White and White, Canvases and Careers.

25 Ibid.



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BaudelaireÑbut who now came to serve, in addition, as a pedagogue and publicist. In

WhiteÕs narrative, the dealer then was concerned with creating not only a new public for

the art, but also new collectors and investors. The fact that critics also engaged in this

process, then and even more so today, might be seen as inappropriate in light of the

disinterestedness to which criticism traditionally aspired. Nevertheless, this role has

inexorably become part of what it means to be a critic, since at least the 19th

century. In

this narrative, regardless of the exact division of labor between the critic and the dealer,

both were essentially fulfilling similar functionsÑnamely, of bringing new artists into

prominenceÑbut through different means.

Today, however, instead of a dealer-critic system, the Òdealer-collector-curatorÓ

system is in full force. It is in the context of such changes that art criticism seems to have

lost its grasp on the present and its influence over the discourse around art. Artists are

recognized not so much by the words of a critic, but by the dealers that represent them,

the collections they belong to, and the museums where they exhibit. The demand for art

is high and, thus, the demand for finding emergingÑand potentially cheaper artists likely

to return better dividends upon investmentÑis also higher. Rubinstein traces how one

significant function that the critic shared with the dealer has been entirely taken up and

mastered by dealersÑsupposedly leaving critics marginalized. In an interview for the

Australian radio show, The Book Show, on the July 26, 2006, Rubinstein explains, ÒWhat

has happened is that [the] power that critics seemed to have [had] for a few decades in the

Õ50s and Õ60s has begun to be leached away, and part of it has gone to the art market. The

market is just so powerful, and I think art dealers and collectors have become so

sophisticated and so alert to catching the newest thingÉ they're really finding artists even



19

before the critics do.Ó26

The drive to identify salable art as early as possible means that

Òdealers and critics now go to the graduate shows of MFA programs at art schools and at

universities to try and grab the artist before they even have their diplomas,Ó27

though here

again, the dealers and collectors have been the trailblazers, with critics lagging behind. In

short, Rubinstein concludes, ÒI think it's very hard now for a critic to make or break a

career.Ó28

There is something deeper at issue when it appears as though dealers, in

particular, have replaced critics. In the October ÒRound Table,Ó Rosalind Krauss argues

that there has been a shift in the need for art criticism to create a discourse around an

artist:

Dealers, I think, used to feel that the work of art didn't exist in a discursive

vacuum, that it was given its existence in part by critical discourse, and thereforethere was a need for catalogs with serious essays by critics. That perceived need,

on the part of both the artist and the dealer, seems to have diminished in the lastten years, to the point where the institution of those catalogs has for the most part

disappeared. And what seems to have replaced it is simply the fact that the artist ishaving shows regularly at an established gallery and that is enough. This sense

that there is a kind of discursive space within which the artist has to be placed inorder for the work to take on a certain kind of importance has pretty much

vanished in established art magazines as well.29

Critics are no longer driving the discourse, but more to the point, critics have become

superfluous, displaced by the increasing significance given to the frequency of

exhibitions, a realm controlled by dealers, collectors and curators. Dealers are, of course,

concerned with sales first and foremost. Collectors are concerned with social status and

26 Koval interviews Rubenstein, The Book Shop, July 26, 2006.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Krauss, ÒRound Table,Ó 202.



20

building the exhibition value of the artists in their collections. A reciprocal dynamic

occurs between the dealer and the collectors in which each empowers the other.

This is not to say that art criticism no longer has any place whatsoever, but that, as

a practice, criticism has been in large part subordinated to the interests of collectors and

dealers. From a dealerÕs perspective, reviews are helpful, if not crucial, in promoting an

exhibition. Outside of reviews, dealers still use art critics to support their artists and

exhibitions. Dealers cannot, however, singlehandedly get their artists into art history

books, and, as Larry Gagosian has put it, a place in history is Òthe bottom line for my

artists.Ó

30

KraussÕs claim that dealers no longer need critics to create discourse around the

artist is only partially true. A recent example can be seen with the collaboration between

Buchloh and Marian Goodman for the 30th

anniversary of the gallery in 2007.31

The

critic, who in the case of the Buchloh-Goodman collaboration also functioned as a

curator, must have assisted in the selection of the works for the exhibition and more

importantly wrote a comprehensive text for the catalogue. Even if merely for a publicity

stunt, Goodman needed Buchloh to give greater meaning (symbolic value) to the

artworks, even if only to create greater economic (exchange) value for her set of artists.

The collector is the other art-world actor to gain prominence during the same time

period in which the critic has been displaced. Where symbolic value has largely lost its

30 Quoted in ÒRound TableÓ by Fraser, 204.31The exhibition "30/40, A Selection of Forty Artists from Thirty Years at Marian Goodman Gallery, was

divided in two parts. ÒPart One," was on view from Sept. 10 to Oct. 13, 2007, and "Part Two" from Oct. 23

to Nov. 24, 2007. Both took place at Marian Goodman Gallery, 24 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y.

10019. The press release states: ÒThe exhibition, titled 30/40 will be curated by Benjamin H.D. Buchloh

and will be accompanied by a comprehensive, illustrated catalogue to honor the artists' careers and to

highlight major works. The catalogue will include a comprehensive text by Benjamin H. D. Buchloh;

interviews by Jean-Fran•ois Chevrier and by curator Lynne Cooke; a chronology of exhibitions over the

past thirty years; and biographies and bibliographies of the artists.Ó



21

autonomy from commercial value, those who have the financial resources have the most

influence. Private collectors do not merely rely on positive criticism, but rather employ

critics to curate exhibitions and promote their collections in publications. The ascendancy

of market sales by auction houses means most works never even encounter a general

public and, consequently, the very space in which art criticism once operated, as a kind of

mediation between the public and the art world, has eroded. It is also more likely for a

contemporary artwork to be bought than to be mentioned in a review. Exposure to the art

being made and shown globally has become increasingly important. Collectors can travel

to Kassel, Venice, Basel, and Miami, and probably see a vastly larger amount of

contemporary art than working critics in New York or S‹o Paulo can.

The London collector Charles Saatchi, Òthe man who remade the British art

market three times,Ó32 was among the first to pioneer this powerful role, as early as the

1980s. SaatchiÕs influence is described in a profile in The Observer : ÒHe showed

[Damien Hirst and Sarah Lucas] in 1992 in his show Young British Artists, from which

the YBA term datesÉ the buzz around these artists persuaded Norman Rosenthal to put

on a show at the stuffy old Royal Academy, consisting entirely of their work, called

Sensation.Ó33 The show proved to be among the most memorable and cited group

exhibitions in Britain from the last three decades. SaatchiÕs achievement as a collector

was that Ò[h]e invented a new movementÑsomething every critic and curator dreams of

doing. Just as Apollinaire came up with cubism and Breton with surrealism, Charles

coined YBAs.Ó34

Today, emerging artists in MFA programs in LondonÑ

32

Lewis, ÒCharles Saatchi: the man who reinvented art.Ó The Observer , July 10, 2011.33

Ibid.34 Ibid.



22

understandablyÑrather than hope to be mentioned in a review, instead wish for Saatchi

or someone like him to buy their art, as he often does in MFA shows.

Even trends in exhibitions register tectonic shifts of power. It has become increasingly

popular for group exhibitions at museums to be organized around collectors rather than

themes created by curators. For example, in 2010, the artist Jeff Koons curated the

exhibition ÒSkin Fruit: Selections from the Dakis Joannou CollectionÓ at the New

Museum in New York. This demonstrates, if anything, the interchangeability of roles, the

disciplinary flexibility towards curating, and the importance given to having a

recognizable figure play curator for the promotion of the exhibition. In 2012, the

Metropolitan Museum of Art hosted a popular exhibition titled ÒThe Steins Collect:

Matisse, Picasso, and the Parisian Avant Garde,Ó with more than 200 works

demonstrating the influence of Gertrude Stein and her brothers. Quite differently than the

Dakis Joannou Collection, the Steins, as collectors, can claim an influence over the

progression of art in the 20th

century to a degree that few critics could ever claim.

Magazines seem to favor collectors rather than critics as well. Artnews has a yearly list of

top 200 collectors, with an infamous top ten list. Arte al Dia, a Latin American art

magazine, has made special issues on the top twenty-five collectors of Latin American

Art. This trend is only growing; the summer 2011 issue of Modern Painters, a magazine

whose publishers also produce the periodical Art + Auction, features a Ò50 under 50Ó

headline, for their ÒYoung Collectors Issue.Ó

The power of collectors, however, is not particularly new. Ever since the collapse

of the influence of the Academy, and the growth of art patronage through the art market,

collectors have wielded influence over the art world. Baudelaire recognized, albeit in a



24

demonstrated that many argued that primarily because of the increasing importance of the

curator criticism has been displaced. According to this argument, the curator now serves

to mediate between art and the public, a role traditionally performed by critics.

Consequently, the curator has also become the preeminent actor in creating the meaning

(value), or the discourse, around the artist. In the October ÒRound Table,Ó Buchloh

contends that Òthe traditional assumption that artistic practices supposedly generate a

critical if not a utopian dimension of experience has withered away.Ó Instead, ÒWe were

left with a sense of the primacy of institutional and economic interests. The judgment of

the critic,Ó Buchloh continues, Òis voided by the curatorÕs organizational access to the

apparatus of the culture industry (e.g., international biennials and group shows) or by the

collector's immediate access to the object in the market or at auction.Ó This distinction is

further elaborated by Buchloh when he states, Ò[c]riticism, as a voice that had

traditionally been independent of both institutions and markets and that had mediated the

various segments of the public sphere of avant-garde culture, was obviously the first

thing to go (and the traditional functions of the museum were the next).Ó But the problem

that emerged from these changes were much greater: ÒBoth of these elements of the

public sphere of art have become mythical and obsolete, since nobody really wants to

know and nobody has to know any longer what the context, the history, the intentions,

and the desires of artistic practice might have been.Ó36

For Buchloh, and he is not alone in

this assessment, the last fifty years have witnessed the complete disintegration of the role

of the critic along with the disappearance of the public sphere.37

The experience of art

36 Buchloh, ÒRound Table,Ó 202

37 The disappearance of the public sphere is another aspect of the crisis of criticism that accounts for a

deeper historical problem. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the emergence of art criticism in

Diderot and his anticipation of the public sphere would be a good starting point for further considerations.



25

changed so drastically in this time that the sort of aesthetic experience traditionally

encouraged by the critic had become defunct.

Although the curator emerged in this new context, and indeed has thrived in it, we

canÕt understand the situation merely in terms of the replacement of the critic by the

curator. The claim that the curator has replaced the critic as mediating public reception of

the art assumes the presence of a public to be mediating. Yet, if we follow BuchlohÕs

argumentÑthat the public sphere for art is considered purely mythicalÑthen the

curatorÕs role is entirely self-enclosed, in terms of function, aspirations and its own self-

understanding. Without a public the critic solely operates as a technocrat within an art

institution, or as another cog in the culture industry. This underscores how curators are

quite distinct from critics, both in the past and today. Thus, greater attention should be

paid to how the critic has developed a critical standpoint towards art. To the degree that

curators have, in the context of the contemporary art market, come to fulfill functions

similar from those of art criticism, there has not actually been a replacement; rather, the

appearance of replacement masks the loss of a purpose that was once served.

If we grant that the curator has established him- or herself as the main arbiter

between art and the public, how does the curator go about this mediation? Is not the

curatorÕs task, as organizer of exhibitions, quite different than that historically embodied

by critics? The choices the curator makes as to what to include in a permanent exhibition

often assume a cohesion and relationship between the artworks, a role more traditionally

akin to the art historian. Critics, on the other hand, have primarily been concerned with

guiding the critical reception of the work at the level of the viewerÕs experience, in light

of art history and contemporary artworks. Critics were not only supposed to address the



26

historical or thematic cohesion presented by the curator/dealer/institution, they were also

meant to raise critical, even radical, questions about the nature and quality of the work.

(As we will see, art criticism would be denounced for precisely these fundamental

assumptions of its practice.) Critics were supposed to have an engaged, intimate, yet

disinterested relationship to the work. Ideally, a distance was created that, although

bound to the criticÕs individual subjectivity, offers if not Òobjectivity,Ó at least a point of

view distinct from that of the exhibition organizer or curator. The difference is the

standpoint taken towards the artwork. The critic must be able to take a position againstÑ

or in relation toÑthe artwork or the exhibition as a whole. The critic, unlike the curator,

can adopt and, indeed, often fashion the standpoint of the public, which is distinct from

simply acting in the role of a mediator. Contrary to Buchloh and others who think of

curators as having usurped the ÒmediatingÓ function of criticism, much criticism

understood its own ideal not in terms of mediating between the artwork and the public,

but in terms of providing a perspective, to which a certain kind of ÒdistanceÓ is logically

necessary. It would be self-defeating if the curator took anything but an affirmative

relationship to the work, however qualified and cautious the affirmation.

The traditional role of art criticism has become obsolete, problematized, or

abandoned, in part because dealers, collectors, and curators have been able to fulfill some

of the criticÕs historical roles. However, they have not been able to do so entirely.

Because criticismÕs usefulness has never been to comment on market trends, but to create

an audience for art and guide the reception of the work, and offer reflective aesthetic

judgments, the purpose and, thus potentially, the need for art criticism has not become

obsolete even if, as a practice, it is almost obsolescent. And yet, we have seen how a



27

critical discourse around the crisis of criticism has erupted just at this moment of apparent

obsolescence. As Schwendener suggests, this also offers potential. The question is

whether the potential for either clarification or for reinvention of art criticism is actually

possible.

The flight from judgment and the dawn of descriptive art criticism

The main argument in ElkinsÕ What happened to art criticism? stresses the

significance of another major finding in the NAJP survey: judging art has become the

least popular goal among American art critics, with the most popular goal being to

describe art. Elkins states that ÒArt writing that attempts not to judge, and yet presents

itself as criticism, is one of the fascinating paradoxes of the second half of the twentieth

century.Ó38 The puzzling nature of this development consists, first of all, in the fact that

judgment was an uncontested goal of art criticism up to mid-20th

century, and, secondly,

as Elkins points out, a ÒpurelyÓ descriptive style seldom escapes judgment, anyway.

Elkins names multiple critics who practice descriptive criticism: Michael Kimmelman of

the New York Times and James Yood for Artforum, with special consideration also given

to the October critics, including Hal Foster, Krauss and Buchloh. For Elkins, this kind of

criticism seems to have a Òyawning gulfÓ separating it from what art criticism had been.

While distancing himself from any calls to ÒreformÓ art criticism, or revert to

traditional critical practices, Elkins maintains that what counts is trying to understand

what he terms Òthe flight from judgmentÓ and Òthe attraction of description.Ó This section

will outline the development of these phenomena, which conditioned what is referred to

38 Elkins, What Happened to Art Criticism? 35.



28

as the Òturn to theory,Ó and characterize the basis and the obstruction to the present dialog

around the crisis of art criticism. What the death of art criticism represents is not only an

abandonment of judgment in art criticism, but also a particular way of understanding a

ÒcrisisÓÑnamely, as merely one step away from a (presumably deserved) death. The

result is an impoverished understanding of what conditions such a crisisÑessential to

criticism. In other words, these developments cannot be wished away, they must be

worked through.

Returning to the October ÒRound Table,Ó David Joselit essentially argues against

the idea that criticism is dead: Òcriticism does still exist as an interpretive mode, but what

is hard to maintain today is criticism as a mode of judgment that carries weight.Ó39

He

thus recognizes that criticism, as a practice concerned with judging a work of art, has

become inconsequential, and this is, essentially, part of the problem. This suggests that

what has been abandoned is the interest in and eventually the consciousness of criticismÕs

correlation with judgment. Foster does not reject this either, but responds to Joselit by

saying, ÒOne of the projects of my generation of criticsÑwhich is yours tooÑwas to

work against this identification of criticism with judgment. That was the part of the long

reaction against Greenberg.Ó40 Indeed, a great part of the driving force behind Òthe flight

from judgmentÓ was motivated by a rejection of Greenberg, the art he promoted (mostly

abstract painting), and the formalist methods of his criticism.

In her introduction to The Originality of the Avant Garde and Other Modernist

Myths (1986), Krauss positions herself against the ÒhistoricistÓ (or inexactly termed

ÒformalistÓ) tradition of Greenberg, and champions a kind of criticism that exposes

39 Joselit, ÒRound Table,Ó 203.

40 Foster, ÒRound Table,Ó 209.



29

Òthose choices that preceded and predetermine any judgment.Ó Krauss explains the

reasoning behind the denial of judgment by arguing that art criticism should be

considered primarily a forum for the examination of art rather than of its judgment. For

Krauss, GreenbergÕs critical work presented Òabove allÓ a system through which to think

the field of modernist art, pejoratively. Krauss takes issue with the historical criteria

developed by Greenberg, such as Òkitsch,Ó Òavant-garde,Ó Òflatness,Ó and Òabstraction.Ó

But GreenbergÕs categorizations were imbricated with his approach to the concerns of the

larger project of modernism in the 20th

century, with which Krauss fundamentally

disagrees. KraussÕs negation of GreenbergÕs ÒcriteriaÓ is really the vehicle by which she

rejects the notion of modernist art; if it were just about the Òcriteria,Ó as such, nothing in

the modernism exhibited by Greenberg prohibits new historical criteria from challenging

and supplanting previous ones. However, the whole Òflight from judgmentÓ tendency

takes issue with the formation of criteria of judgment, per se, not merely with a particular

set of criteria. Krauss had to reject the entire notion of the historical development of art in

modernism. What motivated her rejection of ÒcriteriaÓ and ÒmethodÓ was that it was

Òprofoundly historicist.Ó She explains, ÒGreenbergÕs method conceives of the field of art

as at once timeless and in constant fluxÓ when he claims: Òmodernist art develops out of

the past without gap or break, and wherever it ends up it will never stop being intelligible

in terms of the continuity of art.Ó41

In KraussÕs words, Greenberg meant to specify the

role of criticism by arguing that, ÒArt as a universal calls forth and is completed by

judgment as another universal capacity of consciousness.Ó42

But these ÒuniversalÓ notions

were deployed by Greenberg out of concerns with maintaining a sense of historical

41 Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde, 1-2.

42 Ibid.



30

continuity in art, one that facilitated the intelligibility of new art as much as criteria for

judgment.43

That is to say, these were not merely universal , they were particular as well,

i.e. historical , and conditioned by the consciousness of particular historical contexts.44

In

other words, what mattered for Krauss, was a rejection of GreenbergÕs notion of

modernism that presupposed artÕs unity with judgment itself.

What Elkins describes as the Òflight from judgmentÓ emerges in the 1970s,

deriving from skepticism toward a certain understanding of art history, on the one hand,

and as a reaction against what had been taken to be the difference between critical

thought and artworks. The skepticism toward art history is multifarious, but one aspect is

certain: rejected was the assumption that art underwent transformations in a historically

specifiable tendency exhibiting an inner logic, which posited a utopian vision of art in

which the development of art is seen, first of all, as a development Ñas an ongoing

elaboration of, and struggle to grapple with, historically comprehensible difficulties. One

narrative that Greenberg posits in ÒModernist PaintingÓ for example, is that painting had

been moving, ever since the Renaissance, towards Òflatness,Ó meaning that painting was

moving, albeit not without tension or countertendencies, from three-dimensional

representation to an emphasis on the two-dimensional awareness of the canvas. Another

example is Michael Fried, whose entire critical work centers on a narrative of

ÒabsorptionÓ and the rejection of Òtheatricality,Ó as in his essay Art and Objecthood .45

On

this basis, he critiqued Minimalism (which he referred to as ÒliteralismÓ) because it

43 This perspective is what frames his argument in the essay ÒModernist Painting,Ó in The Collected Essays

and Criticism, Volume 4: Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969, 85-93. 44

See the earlier discussion of Kant, in the section ÒOn earlier modes of art criticism.Ó 45 Fried, Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews, 1-74.



31

emphasized theatricality as opposed to absorption. Theatricality worked against his

narrative of the increasing self-consciousness of painting expressed in absorption.

In other words, what the Òflight from judgmentÓ means, is that such Òmaster

narrativesÓ in Greenberg and Fried, and also the act of Ònarrativizing,Ó have become

contentious. The recognition of this as a problem is not without legitimacy. Such

narratives can make it appear as if art is merely an instrument through which timeless

principles can find their expression, about which art criticism can then craft a cunning

story. However, skepticism towards so-called Òmaster narrativesÓ also erodes the idea

that art criticism can legitimately identify its own objects of inquiry, and unravel their

historical meaning. Arguably, this process is not simply reducible to Òputting the artwork

in its proper historical context,Ó nor to making art merely the instance of an a priori

history, but rather clarifying whether and how art actively participates in a real historical

development.

In the preface to Judgment and Contemporary Art Criticism (2010), the editors

identify this correlation and explain how the larger poststructuralist project paralyzed the

historical development of criticism:

For many, the end of the twentieth century witnessed a mitigation of the

importance of critical judgment initially established by Enlightenment principlesand strengthened within high modernist principles. Described by critic James

Elkins as Òone of the most significant changes in the art world in the previouscentury,Ó this Òebb of judgmentÓ developed out of a larger poststructuralist project

that actively resisted the ostensibly closed space of individual valuation. Instead,many critics argued for a more open dialogue between texts and objects, pursuing

modes of critique that allowed for the exploration of ambiguity and interpretation,thus detaching art writing from the question of quality.

46

46 Khonsary and OÕBrian, Judgment and Contemporary Art Criticism, 2.



32

What has come under scrutiny is the whole idea that the purpose of criticism is to

critique artworks based on notions of value and quality. As Joselit succinctly put it in the

ÒRound Table,Ó Òone of the crises of criticism might arise from the fact that the concept

of quality has lost its legitimacy for people like us.Ó47 The new generation of

postmodernist art critics like Krauss and Foster threw out the idea that art criticism is an

autonomous sphere of activity intended to make judgments upon the other autonomous

sphere of activityÑmodernist art. Instead, they encouraged critics to question the

legitimacy of their own viewpoints in order to make their analysis politically efficacious

and to accelerate a process of self-criticism.

This is precisely where the breakdown of the distinction between critical thought

and artworks, theory and practice, occurs. The paradox is that the understanding of

ÒModernist PaintingÓ that Greenberg had developed, in an early essay of the same title, of

an increasingly self-critical tendency in painting grounded by Kant, the father of

modernism and the first to criticize criticism itself, is actually followed to the point of

exacerbation, as a result of the impetus to reject it. The project of the Enlightenment that

propelled modernism, and critics like Greenberg, was entirely jettisoned in the

dissolution of the distinction between theory and practice, a move by both artists and

critics as a Òturn to theory.Ó Art critics, in their turn to theory, abandoned art as its object

of critique. Instead of producing a reflective judgment about critical tendencies within art,

and elucidation of its potential, critics turned back onto their own practice and questioned

their own ability to practice critique, or even the fundamental conditions of possibility of

criticism itself. Meanwhile art, conceptual or avant-garde, turned aggressively to the

project of the critique of the institutions of art and of the aesthetic autonomy implicit in

47 Joselit, ÒRound Table,Ó 209.



33

much modernist art. In the turn to theory both art criticism and artÑfalsely, and

problematicallyÑdissolved their ÒunityÓ to each other, and absorbed aspects of each

other to compensate. ÒThese developments since the late 1960s,Ó Newman explains,

Òneed to be understood in relation to the historical transformation of relations between

modernism, the avant-garde and mass culture.Ó48

Critics were uninterested or unable to

judge avant-garde artÕs success or failure to become absorbed into the culture industry.

Pluralism was encouraged, historical definitions of art were forsaken, and judgments of

quality were untenable.

Boris GroysÕs essay ÒCritical ReflectionsÓ explains the shift that occurred

between critical thought and artworks as follows:

In place of the critic in the name of society arose social critique in the name of art:

the artwork doesnÕt form the object of judgment but is instead taken as the pointof departure for a critique aimed at society and the world. The art critic of today

inherited the older public office along with the avant-garde betrayal of this office.The paradoxical task of judging art in the name of the public while criticizingsociety in the name of art opens a deep rift within the discourse of contemporary

criticism.49

This is a historical problem that has not been superseded in the Òcrisis of art criticism,Ó

but rather has grown and deepened, while the purpose of art criticism has become

obfuscated.

To attempt to explain further why and how Greenberg, modernist art, and the

unity of the arts and judgment became so widely and deeply implausible is beyond the

scope of this paper. What is clear, however, is that the question of whether the crisis of

art criticism can be overcome, or whether criticism is (or can be) possible, desirable, or

48 Newman, ÒSpecificity and the Need for Philosophy,Ó 30.

49 Groys, State of Art Criticism, 63.



34

necessary in the present, is strictly bound to the question of whether judgment is possible,

desirable, and necessary. Criticism itself as a form of practice has been indicted. The

depth of the existential crisis of judgment is marked not simply by the fact that judgment

has been called into question, but by the discourse from such questioning. Judgment is so

often flatly reduced to a qualification of art as Ògood or bad,Ó that the role that judgment

playsÑand may have to playÑin a critical approach to art, tends to be elided.

The historical disintegration of art criticism is expressed in its bifurcation and its

absorption by other discipline (a wider problem expressed in other disciplines like art

history and art theory as well). During the October ÒRound TableÓ Buchloh explains that

there has been a splintering of the critics into the artist-critic, the academic-critic, and the

journalistic-critic. (The very need to distinguish amongst the three is perhaps another

expression of criticismÕs decay and disorientation.) The intention and function of all three

types went unspecified and undisputed within the roundtable discussants. What this

splintering of criticism means, among other things, is that none of the new disciplines

have attempted to address judgment as a problem in art; rather, this question was

abandoned somewhere in between. This further disintegration of the concerns of art

criticism have driven the crisis of criticism ever since the 1970s, whereas the absorption

of criticism into other disciplines should be understood primarily as the denouement of

this crisis: an indication of the death of art criticism. The crisis of art criticism has been

marked above all by the obfuscation of what is meant by critique, criticism, and crisis.

There are several convincing arguments, after all, that modernism in art, rather

than a dogma to be upheld or rejected, was itself the most acute expression of a historical

crisis. Hegel scholar Robert Pippin expounds on several of these arguments, particularly



35

how they Òcompete withÓ HegelÕs own conception in ÒWhat was Abstract Art? (From the

Point of View of Hegel).Ó Pippin outlines some established explanations for the crisis of

art in modernism as follows:

the Marxist claim about the dissolving coherence of late bourgeois culture

reflected in the self-images expressed in such art, or the neo-Marxist claim aboutthe active negation of that culture by an art produced so that it could not be

assimilated, consumed (or even understood) within it. (A link between modernismin the arts and resistance to the cultural logic of capitalismÑnot just expressive of

it and its failure to make senseÑis also characteristic of the sophisticated newaccount by T.J. Clark.) [HegelÕs conception] competes as well with more so-

called essentialist or reductionist accounts, like GreenbergÕs: how painting,threatened with absorption by the mass culture and entertainment industries,

retreated (or advanced, depending on your point of view) to the ÒessenceÓ of painting as such, flatness and the composition of flat surface, an insistence on

artÕs purity and autonomy as a way of resisting such absorption or colonization byother, especially narrative, art forms.50

Pippin has delineated the methods in which the problem of a so-called crisis of

modernism in art had been understood and the ways in which art historians and critics

have attempted to resolve and explain it. According to Pippin, Hegel offers the best

account of the Òlimitations of a traditionally representationalist notion of

intelligibilityÉand the consequences of this development for the status of visual art in

our culture.Ó51

Putting aside the question of the superiority of HegelÕs explanation, the

concern that art was going through meaningful changes, that it became crisis-ridden in

modernism, is of great consequence. It reveals that the contemporary crisis of art

criticism is not merely a byproduct of the expansion of the art market, nor the shift to a

Òdealer-collector-curatorÓ system; it has developed ever since the mid-19th

century, along

50 Pippin, ÒWhat was Abstract Art? (From the Point of View of Hegel),Ó 5.

51 Ibid.



36

with the crisis in modernism and philosophical judgment, but has intensified during the

last five decades with the attraction to poststructuralist theory.

The so-called death of art criticism, then, coincides with the increasing

plausibility of postmodernist and poststructuralist accounts of art, such as those applied

by the critics of the October journal. When Buchloh claims the death of art criticism, it is

a declaration of the total abandonment of the concerns of art criticism, in particular

judgments of quality and value, but also more broadly, as seen with Krauss, the

modernist project as a whole. The abandonment of judgment in art criticism coincides

with an inability to see modernism itself as crisisÑinstead, it is seen flatly, as a

monolithic orthodoxy to be resisted, and rejected. Putting aside the question of actual

historical succession, what else does the term Òpost-modernismÓ imply, if not that

modernism has come to an end? The best that can be concluded here is that with the

rejection of the concerns of modernism a deeper understanding of the notion of crisis was

lost. The present deathÑbut really a standstillÑof criticism was first conditioned by the

occlusion of the question of judgment, but what delimits the ability to really understand

the ramifications of that, and move beyond the present standstill, appears to be an

impenetrable obscurity as to what really conditions the crisis.

During the October ÒRound TableÓ Robert Storr said, ÒIf criticism is not being

taken seriously, part of the fault may be that the things being said, or at least the language

and style that are used to say them, are no longer effective and useful.Ó52

Storr, a curator

besides a critic, is perhaps referring to the present day criticism Elkins calls Òpopular

cultural criticism,Ó which often adopts an ironic attitude in order to evade serious issues

in contemporary culture. StorrÕs quote could also be understood to refer to effects

52 Storr, ÒRound Table,Ó 203.



37

stemming from the prevalence of poststructuralist theory in criticism, something that is

exemplified in his animosity with KraussÕs work. He might also be referring to an earlier

historical moment, to an era in which critics were unable to register or address the new

art that was emerging. Perhaps ÒformalistÓ criticism encountered a roadblock the moment

art practices became interdisciplinary, ephemeral, dematerialized, because the old criteria

of formalist art criticism became inapplicable.

I do not intend to speculate on the meaning of StorrÕs point, but instead on its

usefulness in working through the problem. It is a formal point, but also one that may be

oddly hopeful: In offering a view of the death of art criticism as the failure of art

criticism, Storr points to the possibility that something could be learned negatively from

the last forty years of art criticism. This something might point toward a future in which

criticism has discoveredÑor, perhaps, recovered Ña purpose that resonates with the

needs of the contemporary art world.

Conceptual art defies art criticism

A major argument presented in many of the texts cited here is the following:

Criticism was challenged and encountered its first objective historical crisis with the rise

of artistic practices in the 1960s, particularly conceptual art, whose purpose is

the critique of art (as objects) and its institutions. This section will focus on how critical

art practices, like conceptual art, undermined criticismÕs role by incorporating writing, art

theory, and criticism into the work itself, and how this undermining has been digested in

art theory.



38

The turn against criticism, Buchloh argues, was Òpartially initiated in the context

of Conceptual art.Ó Furthermore, Òit is from the purview of the most radical artistic

practices of the sixties and their subsequent developments that not only the commodity-

status of the work of art and its institutional frame are targetedÑone of the targets of this

work was also the secondary discursive text that attached itself to artistic practice.

Criticism and all secondary discourse were vehemently attacked .Ó53

Moreover, Buchloh

suggests that this is a positive change: These developments allow us to Òconstruct a more

dialectical image of the contemporary situation by saying that readersÕ competence and

spectatorial competence had reached a level where the meddling of the critic was

historically defied and denounced.Ó54

For Buchloh, the whole generation of artists, from

Joseph Kosuth to Andrea Fraser, has contested the viability of the role of the critic.

In The State of Art Criticism, NewmanÕs essay, ÒSpecificity and the Need for

Philosophy,Ó argues a slightly different point. He agrees that conceptual art took up the

project of the 20th

-century avant-garde, but he believes this happened because Òart theory

replaces criticism as the appropriate way of mediating the practice, and is often carried

out by the artists themselves.Ó His contextualization of the moment emphasizes how

conceptual art challenges art theory and art criticism: ÒDuring the second half of the

1960s, the border between criticism and artistsÕ writing became porous. Dan Graham,

Robert Smithson and others started to use the magazine page as a medium. In Fox and

Art & Language, artists pursued critique and a philosophy of art of sorts. And Victor

Burgin and Mary Kelly functioned as theoreticians as well as art practitioners.Ó55

53 Bucloh, ÒRound Table,Ó 205. Emphasis mine.

54 Ibid.

55 Newman, State of Art Criticisim, 187.



39

Newman, however, doesnÕt believe that Òcriticism was Ôpre-emptedÕ by all this, but

[instead] it was challenged to become something different.Ó56

The entire body of work produced by the collaboration authored as Art &

Language and their journal Art-Language, can be cited to support both BuchlohÕs and

NewmanÕs claim. In the editorial introduction to Art-Language, artist Terry Atkinson

explains that conceptual art is motivated to do away with the notion of Òart-objectÓ and

develop the idea of Òart-work.Ó He sees conceptual art as evolving Òin such a manner that

their relationship to visual art conventions has become tenuous.Ó Most of these artworks

are presented as objects; however, Òthey are governed by the conventional signs of

written language (in this case English).Ó Aware of the potential mischaracterization

involved, he explains, Òmany people would judge that this tendency is better described by

the category name of Ôart theoryÕ or Ôart criticismÕÉ there can be little doubt that works

of Ôconceptual artÕ can be seen to include both the periphery of art criticism and of art

theory, and this tendency may well be amplified.Ó57

Atkinson goes on to claim that works

of art theory, or in the same vein art criticism, cannot claim to have been doing

conceptual art, but, conversely, it is precisely the intention of conceptual artists Òto count

various theoretical constructs as artworks.Ó58

What might more easily illustrate this tendency is the work of Kosuth, who was

once also an editor of Art-Language. Kosuth represents the double move of conceptual

art. First and foremost, and in line with BuchlohÕs point, Kosuth claims in an editorial for

Art-Language the intentions of conceptual art: ÒThis art both annexes the function of the

56 Ibid.

57 Harrison and Wood, Art in Theory 1900 Ð 2000, 885.

58 Ibid.



40

critic, and makes a middleman unnecessary.Ó59

Kosuth and Art & Language are

compelled to defy criticism because of their frustration with what they saw as art

historyÕs reductionist view that separates the artistÑthat is, his intentionsÑfrom his art.60

The material published in Art-Language often conflates the notions of art criticism, art

theory, and art history, in order to, in a single blow, reject the authority of these

disciplines, as hitherto constituted, over the creation of discourse around their work.

Their means of going about confronting this problem is to use theoretical writing about

art that, at the same time, lays claim to the status of art. They reject the criticÕs silencing

of the artist by absorbing the role of discourse and, thus, producing their own art theory.

Criticism becomes the self-criticism of art.

For Kosuth, ÒConceptual art, simply put, had as its basic tenet an understanding

that artists work with meaning, not with shapes, colors, or materials.Ó He continues:

ÒAnything can be employed by the artist to set the work into playÑincluding shapes,

colors, or materialsÑbut the form of presentation itself has no value independent of its

role as a vehicle for the idea of the work.Ó61 A representative example of KosuthÕs work

is One and Three Chairs (1965). In this context, it seems appropriate to use the artistÕs

own writing of how this work is representative of this move:

I would cite my work from 1965Ð66, the Protoinvestigations, of which One and

Three Chairs would be a representative example. This work, using deadpanÒscienti!c-styleÓ photographs which were always taken by others, also employed

common objects and enlarged texts from dictionary de!nitions. The elementswere never signed, with the concept of the work being that this Òform of

presentationÓ would be made and remade. The reason for this was an important part of my intention: eliminate the aura of traditional art and force another basis

for this activity to be approached as art, conceptuallyÉ The art itself, which is

59 Kosuth, ÒIntroductory Note by the American Editor,Ó Art-Language, 3Ð4.

60 Kosuth, ÒIntention(s),Ó 407-412.

61 Kosuth, ÒIntention(s),Ó 407.



41

neither the props with which the idea is communicated, nor the signed certi!cate,is only the idea in and of the work. As it was for other artists at that time, the

issues of modernism were rapidly becoming opaque. One effect of this work wasto Òsum upÓ modernism for me, and once that was visible I was able to use that

view to get past it, as the work which followed shows. Thus, for me, this work

was both a ÒsummationÓ of modernism and the way out of it.

62

Joseph Kosuth, One and Three Chairs, 1965

One and Three Chairs is a three-part artwork. An image of an installation at MOMA

shows a generic wooden folding chair placed a few inches from the wall. Mounted on the

wall to its left is a life-sized black-and-white photograph of an identical chair, likely in

the same location, and to the right of the chair, placed at the same height of the

photograph, there is a mounted photographic enlargement of the dictionary definition of

Òchair.Ó Kosuth leaves no room for doubt that the work is self-referential. The work does

not defy criticism, but it poses several challenges to a critic. It is not a matter of whether

62 Ibid, see footnote 2.



42

or not it is possible to critique One and Three Chairs, but a matter of on what grounds it

ought to be critiqued. The claims of the artist, so forthrightly put at the forefront of the

work, could not be ignored in any criticism of the artwork. The possibility that criticism

could ignore the claims of the artist is precisely what Kosuth aspires to circumvent in his

art. Kosuth forced an approach by which the artistÕs intentions were indispensible to a

serious engagement with the work.

Conceptual art practices were experienced, and spoken of, as being empowering

for artists, but the development of these practices had a major disorienting effect for art

criticism, art theory, and art history. The influence and limitations of this development

were described during the second round table discussion in The State of Art Criticism

(2005). Lynn Cooke brings up the 1967 summer issue of Artforum, the notorious

Òsculpture issue,Ó to point out that the contributions were mostly from artists; they

included Sol LeWittÕs manifesto ÒParagraphs on Conceptual Art,Ó Robert SmithsonÕs

ÒTowards the Development of an Air Terminal Site,Ó and Robert MorrisÕs ÒNotes on

Sculpture, Part 3,Ó along with art critic-turned historian Michael FriedÕs ÒArt and

Objecthood.Ó Stephen Melville explains that Òone of the reasons artists were so

prominent in Artforum is that the relation between criticism and self-criticism was right

there in a way that no longer seems the case.Ó Cooke responds by noting exactly what we

have seen with Kosuth, that the relationship between criticism and self-criticism

Òincluded devising the critical frameworks for the interpretation of their workÉ Not only

taking over the voice that art criticism had occupied, but taking over the discourse



43

itself.Ó63

The role of criticism, as artists and critics understood it at that time, had been

intentionally bypassed by artistsÕs self-criticism, through critical art practices.

In many cases, the artistÕs writing surrounding conceptual art becomes more akin

to art theory, or reflective thought experiments motivated by and motivating the art.

These texts are published artworks of sorts: written elaborations of the artistÕs ideas about

art, of art as idea. As Art-Language editorial stated, they intended to appropriate art

theory and Òlegitimatize itÓ as, and thus transform it into, artwork. However, it should not

be assumed that critical art practices simply replaced art criticism, despite the language of

ÒannexationÓ and absorption that Kosuth and others deployed in trying to make sense of,

and carve out a space for, their own and othersÕ art. Part of the task that art history, art

theory, and art criticism alike have set for themselves is precisely to understand new

developments in art. The rise of art critical practices certainly posed a problem to these

disciplines, but not one of competition (or ÒreplacementÓ) so much as self-clarification:

In the face of art critical practices, art history, theory, and criticism needed to further

specify what was unique about the role they played in the art world, and what role they

could play in the future. But this has, for quite some time, been the relationship of artistic

practice to criticism: the former develops, as part of its own dynamic, new forms, means,

and products of artistic creation, which in turn challenge the critic in new ways. Art

criticism was not replaced by art critical practices so much as it failed, on the whole, to

compellingly justify itself anew, in light of these practices.

In KosuthÕs One and Three Chairs the need for a critic to interpret the work for

the viewer is removed. But that assumes the role of the critic is encompassed by a rather

narrow mode of interpretation and education of the public. Then, what is a critic to do

63 State of Art Criticism, 186.



44

with such an artwork? How should critics, as ÒexpertÓ viewers, respond? The critic could

ask: How well does the artwork actually succeed in defining the nature of conceptual art,

in light of the artistÕs other attempts to do soÑas well as other artistsÕ attempts? Are the

boundaries of what is considered art being pushed further? Is the current

conceptualization of art being reinforced, reduced, or reified? Or, is there any real value

in trying to pursue an art that tries to eliminate the critic/mediator? Regardless of

conceptual artÕs intentions to contest the criticÕs role, and even produce disorientation

about the nature of criticism, such practices do not foreclose the practice of art criticism

entirely, because in positing a kind of critical practice, such art, inevitably if only

implicitly, enters into a dialog with critical discourse. Rather than naturalize the notion

that conceptual art replaced art criticism, one can equally point to an unrealized

possibility inherent to the rise of art critical practices, which can be seen as potentially

liberating art criticism from the notion that it serves only to mediate, in the most mundane

sense of the word, between the artwork and the publicÑin the way a middleman passes

messages between two parties. The challenge posed, as often is the case with new art, is

to make sense of the general nature of the artwork as art . Conceptual art strives

immediately to force this question upon the viewer/beholder/public. That is how it

attempts to remove the need for the critic as a mediator.

This critical artwork in no way eclipses the art criticÕs ability to critique. Ever

since the 19th

century, artists have been involved in aesthetic disputes through literary

means, even the Òprimacy of the objectÓ had been contested by artists before conceptual

art; the course of 20th-century artÑin generalÑposed several interpretive and theoretical

challenges to criticism. But what is unique is that artists in the late 1960s were strongly



45

compelled to do art theory, and to make claims to art-as-idea in order to undermine

traditional assumptions of art criticism. The general assumption in these books is that art

criticism, in this regard, was either unable or unwilling to take up the challenge posed by

new art practices. A notable exception is the work of Michael Fried, who, as cited above,

was one of the art critics in ArtforumÕs ÒSculpture issue.Ó His critique of minimalism in

ÒArt and Objecthood,Ó has become part of any rigorous conversation about minimalism.

Regardless of how much Òminimalist artistsÓ contested and denounced his critique, they

were unable to marginalize it. What sustained Fried as an art critic, however, largely

stems from his mastery of art history.

The identity between criticism and self-criticism that dominated artistic

production and art writing in the late 1960s and 1970s, and that deepened the crisis in art

criticism, no longer exists. For many commenters, this marked a decline in both criticism

and art. It is common to claim that contemporary art has become less focused, less

ambitious, and less interesting in the aftermath of conceptual art. But as Newman argues

in ÒThe Specificity and Need for Philosophy:Ó ÒTo say that the decline in criticism has

resulted from the decline in quality of its object, works of art, is too simple, as this

presumes what needs to be called into question: first, that criticism is merely an extrinsic,

descriptive supplement to its object; and, second, that the nature of its object is not itself

reflective and critical.Ó64

For Newman, the problem of art criticism is better understood

as redundancy:

[W]hen changes in art practice, notably conceptual art, displaced criticism from

its role in relation to the avant-garde by incorporating critiqueÑincluding thecritique of the descriptive, objectifying epistemologyÑinto the practice itselfÉ

[a]rt theory replaces art criticism as the appropriate way of mediating the practice,

64 Newman, State of Art Criticism, 30.



46

and is often carried out by the artists themselves. In this context, the role left tothe critic is either to become himself a writer or artist, or the meta-critique of this

move, of the turn to theory.65

This turn Òto theoryÓ is largely seen as the motivation behind the October journal, and the

work of Krauss and Buchloh. This turn is also embodied in the work of artists like Victor

Burgin, Dan Graham, Daniel Buren, Robert Smithson, and Jeff Wall.

Artists and critics alike did not overcome the challenges posed in the turn to

theory; the deeper problem of the relation between art and the necessity for criticism was

left unresolved. What this might offer, however, is the recognition that although the

historical trajectory of art is implicated in the crisis of art criticism, this crisis is not to be

resolved in and through art alone. In other words, a shift in art (conceptual or otherwise)

that certainly can claim to have propelled a crisis by challenging certain traditional roles

of criticism, does not solely explain criticismÕs Òdeath,Ó nor does it make that death

warranted. On the contrary, all that can be claimed is that with the abandonment of the

problems and tasks posed to art criticism by these historical developments art criticism

ceases to be in crisis only by virtue of its death.

Death versus crisis: is redemption possible?

This thesis was initially motivated by an eagerness to comprehend the death of art

criticism after several theories of its decay and disorientation were published. Along the

way, however, the narrative of decay and death became unsatisfactory. The claim about

the death of art criticism went from matter of fact, to metaphoric, to entirely questionable.

What first challenged the notion of its death, however, was the paradox offered by Elkins,

65 Ibid.



47

that art criticism seemed both vigorously healthy and terminally ill. Art criticism,

uprooted in Òthe flight from judgment,Ó was a dying discipline insofar a generation of

writers abandoned certain historical problems imminent to art criticism. As outlined in

the sections Òthe demise of the criticÓ and Òconceptual art defies criticism,Ó the notion of

the death of art criticism suggests that particular roles of art criticism have become

defunct, where new roles, or old ones in a new context, could develop. In other words,

there seems to be an element of possibility, of openness, to the death of art criticism. As

with the many Òdeaths of art,Ó for me the death of art criticism could allow for a positive

outlook, a clearing of the path to its potential rebirth. The notion of the death (or end) of

art is helpful to the extent it is not absolutely terminal; it signals an eclipse in the

comprehension of the concept of art, or as Hegel would have it, an indication of the

transformation of how art matters. But when the realization that the death of art criticism

was genuinely the term given to the self-liquidation of a practice, what becomes clearer is

the necessity of recovering the practice of art criticism as a crisis, in order to reassess a

new future for art criticism.

The whole topic of the crisis of art criticism, on the other hand, feels overwrought

and, for some, overdetermined. It has become a fashionable subject, yet the state of our

understanding remains underdeveloped. Many writers continue to emphasize that art

criticismÕs obsolescence is due to external forces like Òmarket imperialism,Ó while others

argue Òthat criticism never has been as strong as it is today, since it is now part of a

knowledge based economy.Ó66

Oddly enough, few have concluded that art criticism itself,

as a form of practice, was already inÑor more profoundly, has always been conditioned

byÑcrisis. As I have argued, what appears to be overlooked is how crisis and criticism

66 Graw, ÒPreface,Ó Canvases and Careers Today, 6.



48

have gone hand-in-hand historically in very fruitful, dynamic ways. The complex idea of

crisis is exactly what is shied away from today and precisely what needs to be worked

through. If crisis is a persistent aspect of art criticism then the task is to understand the

nature of the crisis in deeper waysÑhow art criticism is conditioned by crisis and how

the crisis expressed in art poses the need for art criticism. This could entail further

investigation into what conditioned the crisis of criticism in the late 1960s and early

1970s, looking at the difficulties art criticism faced earlier in the 20 th century, or

researching how disciplines like art history or literary criticism addressed similar

historical challenges. All of these might offer insights with which to tackle the crisis of

art criticism we face today; because if anything defines the present, it is the sense of not

knowing how to move forward.

By and large, art critics recognize that criticism, as a discipline, has forgotten

where it was going. This amnesia, whether self-inflicted or contingent, is an obstacle. As

Elkins points out, the lack of an updated history of art criticism has been a key factor in

perpetuating its deep incoherence.67 Since the current crisis of art criticism is bound up

with the problem of a lack of self-consciousness of its history, its historical development

must be investigated and redeemed. The lack of disciplinary history has produced two

major problems that need to be resolved: methodological anarchy and absence of

purpose. The best way to productively redeem the history of art criticism is through a

reinvigorated interest in (re)articulating its raison dÕetre.

The call for redemption should not be misconstrued as merely a romantic or

nostalgic call for the days (and methods) of Greenberg and Rosenberg. Rather it

recognizes that their work, and that of scores of their predecessors, can be profoundly

67 Elkins, Judgment and Contemporary Art Criticism, 156.



49

useful in explaining the present standstill. As Benjamin remarked in his essay ÒOn the

Concept of History:Ó ÒAre we not touched by the same breath of air which was among

that which came before? Is there not an echo of those who have been silenced in the

voices to which we lend our ears today?Ó68 Art criticism is centuries old; the forms it has

taken in the last fifty years are not the only resource for exploring new approaches. If it

has been necessary for painters and sculptors to study Òold masters,Ó precisely in order to

empower themselves to create something new, it may be necessary to reopen a dialog

with the Òold mastersÓ of art criticism. If one believes the meaning of artworks is not

limited by its own historical moment, one must believe that neither is the meaning of art

criticism.

As a thought experiment, let us consider what fruits history has to offer. To be

critical, in the Kantian sense of the word, means to be aware of the conditions of

possibility attendant to the object of investigation and of the conditions for the

comprehension of that object. Following Kant, in this sense, Hegel arrives at his often-

cited formulation: philosophyÕs task is to comprehend its own time in thought. Under the

rubric of this notion, artÕs task would then be to comprehend its own time in form.

Broadly speaking, this perspective proposes that criticism comprehend the forms (art,

literature, film) of its own time, in thoughts. Of course, these suggestions or other Òpaths-

not-takenÓ that we discern in the history of art criticism do not offer simple models of art

criticism unproblematically ÒavailableÓ to us todayÑthe empirical state of art writing

indicates at least this much. To take for granted that such paths were not taken, however,

affirms the course of history, a tendency to whom even those writers most skeptical of

68 Benjamin, ÒOn the Concept of History,Ó accessed online.

<http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm>



50

modernism should be skeptical. What is needed is a reevaluation of what it means to be

critical of art today. No critic can afford to lose contact with the situation of art in its

time. Rather, as most of those discussing the current crisis of art criticism point outÑ

including those whose aim is to diminish such a crisisÑthe art world that we confront

today is hyper -mediated, and yet in a manner that makes the accessibility of art, indeed

the very possibility of a public engaged with contemporary art, more precarious than

ever.

One must, then, seriously consider whether or not the institutions and disciplines

that were so widely called into question, in terms of their being ethically and politically

compromised, have actually been ÒovercomeÓ in a manner that we can label progressive

and laudable. If not, we must consider the possibility that in the context of hyper-

mediation and usurpation of the art world by the art market, these institutions and

disciplines have simply decayed. All that is ÒnewÓ and ÒcontemporaryÓ is not always an

indication of progress. It may not even be new.

As Theodor Adorno once wrote, ÒThe theorist who intervenes in practical

controversies nowadays discovers on a regular basis and to his shame that whatever ideas

he might contribute were expressed long agoÑand usually better the first time around.Ó69

This is not to say that there can be no new ideas about contemporary art expressed in art

criticism. I wish only to complicate the assumption that the ÒdeathÓ of criticism means

that we simply have a Òblank slate,Ó so to speak. One often discovers that what

contemporary artworks are trying to do has already been attempted before, and so the

69 Adorno, ÒSexual Taboos and the Law Today,Ó 71.



51

history of a certain practice, along with its critical response, can illuminate art in the

present. The challenge then is to grasp if and how contemporary artworks are different.

Being ambitious about art criticism is really about trying to grasp what has not been

grasped. The apparent death of criticism may mean that the recovery of its history is

actually more urgent than everÑeven if only to allow for a proper burial of the dead by

the living.



52

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