Phillip Clark Clark 1

Professor John Dedie

Comparative Politics & Government

November 19th, 2012

Condoleezza Rice: A Broker and Diplomat With Few Regrets

No Higher Honor is a political memoir written by Condoleezza Rice. Rice was the

National Security Advisor, and subsequently, Secretary of State during President George W.

Bush’s two terms in the Oval Office. Born in segregated Alabama during the mid-1950’s, Rice

would rise to transcend the circumstances of her birth. She would go on to become a respected

academic in foreign policy at Stanford University, and eventually serve a president with

capability and vigor for the respective positions which she held. The years during which

Condoleezza Rice served President Bush were some of the most tumultuous that the nation has

witnessed since its inception. In the court of public opinion, the Bush administration has been

judged harshly, for an ill-calculated and prolonged war on a country that had little to do with the

terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, and for a perceived inability to hear the expressed

desires of American citizens – as well as the international community – when it came to

determining the course the nation would take in terms of domestic and foreign policy. With

eloquence and recourse to detail, Condoleezza Rice offers her vantage point as one of the most

crucial insiders of the Bush administration. Compellingly, she makes the case that the court of

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popular opinion will not have the last word on the legacy of George W. Bush’s presidency. In

fact, many courses of action taken by the administration that have been viewed through a

universal lens of denunciation were in actuality, much more nuanced and complex.

Condoleezza Rice was first acquainted with the Bush family when she had been sought

out as a Soviet specialist for President George H. W. Bush’s National Security Council (Rice 1).

Rice was first introduced to George W. Bush when she was invited by the family to visit their

vacation residence on the seacoast of Maine in August of 1998. George W. Bush was currently

the Governor of Texas and was preparing to run re-election. He mentioned that if he was

successful in this bid he would begin to form a campaign to run for the presidency of the United

States. During the course of her visit Condoleezza Rice and the Governor would discuss a

plethora of foreign, as well as, other policy initiatives. Governor Bush would go on to win re-

election later on that year and promptly launched his campaign for the American presidency

(Rice 2).

As the 2000 presidential campaign drew to an end, its conclusion would be defined by the

controversial recount saga that was waged over a discrepancy between the popular vote-count,

which had been garnished by presidential candidate Al Gore, and the tally of the Electoral

College, which was won by Governor George W. Bush. The U.S. Supreme Court would

ultimately have to put an end to the dispute. Following this debacle, President Bush would name

Rice as his National Security Advisor (Rice 11).

In great detail, Rice reflects on the unique duties and obligations of the National Security

Council. Although it is a component of the president’s Cabinet, the NSC is not a designated

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department within the Executive Branch. It does not possess troops, diplomats, or a budget. It is

solely used as an advisory office to the president. The office is involved intensely with policy

matters but never enforces them directly. Operational concerns in terms of policy are left to

Cabinet secretaries who are confirmed by the Senate (Rice 14). The main task of the National

Security Council is to “coordinate” the intricacies of policy among various government agencies

(Rice 18). Rice once remarked to President Bush that working to get the secretaries of other

departments to do what the president wants them to do in terms of policy is like “using a remote

control” (Rice 18).

Early on in the first term, a clear illustration is given of how the conventional portrayal of

George W. Bush as an unintelligent, heartless, conservative may be somewhat unfair. The close

proximity of the state of Texas to Mexico led President Bush to make engaging and building a

relationship with Latin America a key part of his foreign policy agenda. This partnership would

be carried out by “emphasizing strong ties to Mexico, renewed promotion of hemispheric free

trade, and sustained support for freedom and democracy across the Americas” (Rice 25). The

President’s first trip abroad would be to Mexico in 2001. The underlying theme of the journey

was to highlight the importance of Mexico to President Bush. Following his election to the

presidency, Bush, along with Mexican President Vicente Fox, constructed an initiative of

cooperation in which trade was strengthened, the borders between the United States and Mexico

were modernized, comprehensive immigration reform was pursued, and an advocacy of a free-

market approach was taken up throughout the region (Rice 25). George W. Bush’s personal

commitment to immigration reform has been a subject that has been lost to the wider American

public. Because of his close ties to Mexico as Governor of Texas the political, geographic,

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and demographic conditions that characterized the lives of those who lived on both sides of the

border caused President Bush to have a deeper investment in this issue than few other presidents

have. Perhaps the absence of this degree of familiarity that George W. Bush brought to the table

in confronting this issue has been why realizing a solution to this problem has proven so elusive.

Unfortunately, the optimistic prospects of the trip were overshadowed by an unexpected

development in Iraq. White House press secretary Ari Fleisher interrupted the meeting to ask,

“Why are we bombing Baghdad?” (Rice 27). It turned out that American planes had “flown too

close” to the air space of Iraqi defenses and had consequently set off air raid sirens throughout

the city and the immediate radius of the area. A press release was issued noting that the United

States was fulfilling its obligations under the armistice terms that had ended the Persian Gulf

War in 1991. Regular air patrols were carried out to prevent Saddam Hussein from using his

aircraft against his own people or his geographical neighbors – thus enforcing a no-fly zone

mandated by the peace agreement (Rice 27). Unfortunately, as it was highly unexpected and

alarming in nature, this incident undermined the potential that could have existed in the

relationship between President Fox and President Bush.

Not all in the administration viewed this occurrence as a setback. Vice President Dick

Cheney let it be known that he thought the development rightly showed that the United States

was being tough on Saddam Hussein. The following morning, the New York Times quoted the

Vice President as saying, “The air strikes had sent a timely signal that the new administration

would not shy away from using force to contain any new Iraqi military threat.” However,

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Condoleezza Rice felt that this action would only be perceived as the United States behaving

arrogantly, particularly towards their Mexican hosts (Rice 28). Even if it was an embarrassing

faux pas on the President’s first foreign trip, Rice still saw this episode as evoking the

implications of a larger trajectory:

The incident in Mexico was a reminder of the festering problem of Saddam

Hussein’s Iraq and its threat to our national interests. Almost from the very

beginning Iraq was a preoccupation of the national security team. Our focus was

not, as common wisdom now has it, on the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Rather, the early efforts were aimed at trying to strengthen the containment

regime that had been put into place after the Gulf War. That war had ended

inconclusively with Iraqi forces expelled from Kuwait but the regime still in

power. The assessment of the George H. W. Bush administration in 1991 that

Saddam was so weakened that he would either fall from power or stay in his box

turned out to be wrong. (Rice 29)

Thus, even if the notion of Iraqi invasion was not planned at the outset, Rice reveals that some

sort of military confrontation was always viewed as being inevitable when it came to engaging

and negotiating with the regime of Saddam Hussein. She goes on to mention that no-fly zones

were just one method used in a network of tactics that the international community was using to

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negate the probability of the dictator attacking his neighbors and to prevent him from obtaining

weapons of mass destruction (Rice 29.)

In the wake of the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 an aggressive

strategy was sought by the Bush administration to combat the extremist agendas of Islamic

jihadists that had prompted the strike against the security of the United States, and to prevent it

from ever occurring again. Abu Zubaydah, a key al-Qaeda operative who had helped plan and

carry out 9/11, was discovered in Faisalabad, Pakistan on March 28, 2002 hiding in a safe-house

(Rice 116). A gunfight erupted in the process of capturing him and he was shot three times. Rice

notes that his survival was due completely to the efforts of an American physician who had been

flown in directly by the CIA. She further asserts that his death would have had negative

consequences in the efforts to thwart al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations (Rice 117). Zubaydah

managed a plethora of duties during the time that he spent with the extremist organization. He

was the chief recruitment officer who reviewed the stream of incoming militants in terrorist

training camps in Afghanistan. It was he who would impart orders to these men as they would

leave the facilities. Zubaydah had even authored the manual that detailed how to resist

interrogation techniques if the militants were ever caught (Rice 117). This latter reality was a

challenge to gaining as much information as possible on the ideas that al-Qaeda was planning at

the time. The situation lead those within the CIA who had been tasked with interrogating

Zubaydah to seek authorization to use particular procedures that were referred to as “enhanced

interrogation techniques.” When presented with this proposition, Rice recalls President Bush

asking two questions, “Would the interrogation program be legal? Would it be necessary?” (Rice

117).

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In discussions with the then-Director of the CIA, George Tenet, he opined that the

techniques were “safe and effective” because they were the very same techniques “that had been

used in the military training of thousands of U.S. soldiers.” (Rice 117). Still, President Bush

directed Tenet not to approve the interrogations until the Justice Department had confirmed their

legality. The Department did so, and the procedures – most notably waterboarding – would

commence from that point on. Rice attests that as a result of these steps Abu Zubaydah ended up

being an invaluable source of information. This information would lead to the capture of Khalid

Sheikh Mohammed. This man was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, the al-Qaeda

operational commander for North America, and knew what was coming next as well as who

would be in charge of planning it within the organization. He would also confess to being the

executioner of Daniel Pearl, the late journalist of the Wall Street Journal who was kidnapped and

heinously slaughtered before the lens of a video camera (Rice 118).

Despite the provocative nature of these techniques, and the scathing criticism they would

receive in following years, Rice stands by and defends the utilization of such methods during the

Bush administration (Rice 120). She boldly states, “…In the aftermath of the attack on the Twin

Towers and the Pentagon, I do not regret the decisions we made. I would never have engaged in

– or encouraged the President to undertake activities – that I thought to be illegal. That was why

the Justice Department was front and center in the assessment of the policies…” The

sanctimonious claim of having steadfast recourse to legal parameters in crafting policy initiatives

has been made numerous times by occupants of the Oval Office. Yet, is this really the case?

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Does the White House thoroughly examine the necessary legal authorizations to conduct its

policy endeavors, or does the president merely dictate the outcome behind the scenes? Even as

many hailed the decision, one merely has to look at President Barack Obama’s recent shift in

policy regarding the Defense of Marriage Act. His administration assumed office defending the

federal law – enacted by Congress in 1996 – which barred any recognition of same-sex

marriages by the U.S. government. As more federal courts interpreted DOMA as being

unconstitutional and an increasing number of states would legalize the aspiration of same-sex

couples to marry, the President has directed the Justice Department to cease defending the statute

in court. So, does legal precedent truly serve as the foundation for policy decisions, or, does

politics determine the end result – using the “law” as a means to achieve this end?

Nonetheless, Rice rationalizes all concerns by honestly stating, “I could not have forgiven

myself had there been another attack. And had that happened, there would have rightly been a

different kind of second-guessing as Americans asked, ‘Why did you not do everything in your

power to keep it from happening again?” (Rice 120-121)

In 2004, Rice would testify before the 9/11 Commission in Congress to answer for the

decisions she had made as national security advisor when the attacks had taken place (Rice 260).

She felt that her testimony was crucial because other Cabinet secretaries had testified only from

the context of their own departments. Her thoughts and recollections as national security advisor

would gave a fuller picture of the steps that had been taken across the Bush administration in

response to 9/11 (Rice 260). During the course of her testimony, she noted that the failure to

prevent 9/11 was not the fault of any particular administration. It was rather a “structural”

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mishap. The main problem was that intelligence resources were not being shared

comprehensively among various government agencies. There was also a gap in knowledge

between what was known about foreign and domestic terrorist threats (Rice 263). Rice affirms

that, “Better integrating intelligence would be critical to preventing the next attack” (Rice 263).

The issue of intelligence and how it is gathered is still a hot topic in today’s political climate.

The ongoing saga of U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice (who has no relation to Condoleezza Rice)

and her response to this year’s terrorist attacks on America’s embassy in Benghazi, Libya

continues to underscore this point. The question in this instance being: did Ambassador Rice

simply act on the intelligence she had been given or did she respond in spite of this information,

misleading the American public?

Despite being a driving catalyst of these controversial positions, President George W.

Bush would name Condoleezza Rice as his Secretary of State following his re-election in 2004.

Human freedom and a respect for the inherent dignity of all individuals would form the

foundation of Bush’s foreign policy initiatives during his second term in office (Rice 325).

Secretary Rice makes the case that only stability and democracy will help preserve the interests

of the United States abroad (Rice 326). She compares this approach of confronting the world

after September 11th to that which was taken in the aftermath of the Second World War. The

Secretary mentions that President Roosevelt had not entered World War Two with the intention

of democratizing Germany and Japan. In fact, his closest ally, Winston Churchill of Great

Britain, was content with allowing the nation of Germany to return to its weak, pre-1871

condition after Hitler’s defeat. However, President Truman, General Marshall, and other key

political and military players at the time contended that if a change in the fundamental structures

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of the regimes that had been defeated were made towards democracy the balance of power in the

world would be improved in relation to America’s interests. She also highlights how the United

States had a center role in drafting Japan’s constitution. Secretary Rice goes on to describe and

summarize the vision that undergirded all of these actions:

This was an early political manifestation of a belief that would later emerge in an

academic theory called the “democratic peace.” Historically, it can be

demonstrated that democracies have not fought one another. Therefore

democracy and stability – both within states and between them – can be mutually

reinforcing. (Rice 326)

The State Department would implement the “Freedom Agenda” to pursue these same goals in

today’s world (Rice 328). New international programs were formed, such as the “Broader

Middle East and North Africa Initiative” and the “Forum for the Future” in 2004. The latter

group gathered representatives of civil society and governments throughout the Middle East to

reflect upon and discuss topics such as individual rights, women’s empowerment, and economic

development. American and European officials would join their counterparts from Arab

monarchies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Even participants from dictatorships like Syria

would take part in these sessions centered on human rights and democracy. The main objective

of these meetings was to focus on the many aspects of Middle Eastern society while

simultaneously pressuring governments to change (Rice 328).

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In 2005, the prime minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, along with twenty-two other

individuals, was killed by a car bomb (Rice 337). In response to this development, the U.S.

ambassador to Syria was recalled. Syria’s military occupied portions of Lebanon at the time and

had a long history of interjecting itself into Lebanese politics. Many within the State Department

suspected that Syria was involved with the assassination (Rice 338). On March 5th, Syria

removed all of its troops from Lebanese territory. Secretary Rice credits this occurrence to

allowing a pro-Western movement to emerge in Lebanon, in the wake of Prime Minister Hariri’s

murder (or martyrdom, as it would be seen by his supporters) that would be led by his son, Saad

(Rice 340).

In the same year, Secretary Rice would visit Sudan. A “Comprehensive Peace

Agreement” had just been reached and signed on Janurary 9th, which had put an end to a civil

war that had ravaged the nation for two decades. However, a new crisis was brewing in a region

called Darfur (Rice 386). Two contingents of rebel forces, the Sudan Liberation

Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality movement (JEM) carried out attacks

against government military posts. This was in protest to what was seen as the Muslim-

controlled central government neglecting and ostracizing the region’s black African ethnic

groups. To quash these outbursts, the Sudanese government assembled makeshift militias

(known as Janjaweed) to combat these revolts. These forces would end up slaughtering, and

practically exterminating, a massive number of civilians. Whole villages were destroyed with

grotesque brutality. When these acts were understood as an expression of genocide on the part of

the Sudanese government, U.S. policy changed from merely implementing the terms of the

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Comprehensive Peace Agreement to an initiative to save the people of Darfur (Rice 387). This

was what would necessitate the Secretary’s visit.

After confronting and being in the presence of many refugees who had been displaced by

this violence, particularly female victims of rape, the Secretary was moved to take action. She

would develop the Women Leaders’ Working Group to bring about awareness of this atrocity

and to promote a greater access to education, political and economic participation, and justice for

all women (Rice 391). This venture would reach its peak as numerous female foreign ministers

of various states would confront the United Nations on the subject of rape being used as a

weapon of war. On June 19, 2008, Secretary Rice chaired the American presidency of the

rotating Security Council and Resolution 1820 was passed. This measure would forever

designate rape as a weapon of war as well as criminalizing all acts of sexual violence, allowing

them to be punishable under war crimes statutes (Rice 392).

Another key component to Rice’s tenure as Secretary of State would be her policy of

“Transformational Diplomacy.” This stance emphasized sending American diplomats to spots

around the globe where they were most needed, such as: China, India, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, or

South Africa. The State Department would make it conditional for all diplomats to serve stints in

hardship locations (such as in volatile destinations throughout Africa or the Middle East) and

accrue knowledge in two specific global areas. Speaking at least two languages would also

become a requirement (Rice 653). Secretary Rice would further work to focus efforts of the

Department on finding regional solutions to terrorism, in addition to other issues like drug

trafficking and diseases (Rice 655). A personal priority for the Secretary would be engaging

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other countries on a bilateral basis to help strengthen their infrastructures and decrease their

dependency on American foreign assistance. She would create the position of “Director of

Foreign Assistance” to review and streamline the dissemination of foreign aid in the future (Rice

656).

All in all, Condoleezza Rice’s book was a riveting read. Taking the time to see from her

own perspective what her experiences in Washington were like only confirms the respect I have

always held for her. Coming from a center-left political context, I do vehemently disagree with

many of the policy positions that she, and the Bush administration collectively, took during their

eight years in office – particularly their stances on torture, and the notion of what warrants a

military invasion into another sovereign country. Yet, the honesty and clarity with which Rice

wrote created within me a new respect for the great lengths the administration did go to in order

to keep the United States safe following the 9/11 attacks on the country. Even if it did not make

me agree with all of these steps, I can now better understand in what light, and from what train of

thought they were taken. I have also gained a more objective and full perspective on George W.

Bush as a man. I see him less as an unenlightened, brutish Texan, than as a leader who possessed

a sincere sense of compassion, yet struggled to balance these feelings with his core political

convictions.

As only the second woman to occupy the post of America’s highest diplomat, Secretary

Rice did much during her tenure to carry out her deepest held beliefs while also promoting and

advancing the interests of the United States on the global stage. Her resolute example of

leadership should be an inspiration to whoever may be called upon to fill the office when

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Secretary Clinton’s duration as top diplomat has ended. The phrase No Higher Honor describes

perfectly what the opportunity to serve the president of the United States while simultaneously

promoting America’s foreign policy abroad must be like.

Work Cited

Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. New York: Crown

Publishers, 2011. Print.