Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch Space … 8 Concepts of Operations for a Reusable...

Chapter 8

Concepts of Operations for a ReusableLaunch Space Vehicle

Michael A. Rampino

The objective of NASA’s technology demonstration effort isto support government and private sector decisions by theend o f t h i s decade on deve lopmen t o f an opera t iona lnext-generation reusable launch system.

The objective of DoD’s effort to improve and evolve currentE L V s i s t o r e d u c e c o s t s w h i l e i m p r o v i n g r e l i a b i l i t y ,operabil i ty , responsiveness, and safety.

The United States Government is committed to encouraginga viable commercial U.S. space transportation industry.

US National Space Transportation Policy5 August 1994

IntroductionOn 18 May 1996, the Uni ted States took another smal l s tep

toward matur i ty as a space-far ing nat ion. Under the scorchingsun of the New Mexico desert , an at tent ive media corps read-ied their cameras. Ground and f l ight crews monitored con -soles and waited for the latest global posit ioning updates to bereceived and processed. At 0812:02, a small , pyramid-shapedrocket, the McDonnell Douglas Aerospace (MDA) DC-XA, rosefrom its launch mount on a column of smoke and f ire. Unliketoday’s operational spaceships, this one landed on i ts feetafter a 61-second fl ight with all i ts components intact . Thisninth fl ight of the Delta Clipper experimental rocket was nogiant leap for mankind given the limited capabili t ies of the

This work was accomplished in partial fulfillment of the master’s degree require -ments of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,1996.Advisor: Maj Bruce M. DeBlois, PhDReader: Dr Karl Mueller, PhD

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vehicle , but i t proved once again that reusable rockets are areality—today.1

The US mil i tary must be prepared to take advantage ofreusable launch vehicles (RLV) should the National Aeronauti-cal Space Administration (NASA)-industry effort to develop anRLV technology demonstrator prove successful. 2 The focus ofthis s tudy is an explanat ion of how the US mil i tary could useRLVs, by describing and analyzing two alternative concepts ofoperations (CONOPS).

The most recent National Space Transportation Policy as -signed the lead role in evolving today’s expendable launchvehicles (ELV) to the Department of Defense (DOD). It as -signed NASA the lead role in working with industry on RLVs.3

The United States Air Force (USAF), as the lead space liftacquisi t ion agent within the DOD, is an act ive part icipant inRLV development but with l imited responsibil i ty and authoritysince it is a NASA-led program.4 USAF leadership has main -ta ined in te res t in the p rogram but has focused on ensur ingcont inued access to space without incurr ing the technical r iskof relying on RLV development. The USAF’s initiation of theevolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV) program reflectsth i s approach .5

As of this writing, the USAF, on behalf of DOD, is formulat-ing and defining DOD requirements for an RLV in an effort toplan for a possible transition from ELVs to RLVs. Specifically,the NASA-USAF integra ted product team (IPT) for SpaceLaunch Activities is currently examining “operational RLVDOD requirements .”6 In addition, the USAF’s Phillips Labora -to ry s t a r t ed a Mi l i t a ry Spacep l ane App l i ca t i ons Work ingGroup in August 1995 which may indirect ly help ident ifyDOD’s RLV needs.7 This research is intended to contr ibute tothe ongoing process by describing how the US military shoulduse RLVs.

To help remedy the lack of specific DOD requirements for anoperational RLV, this study identifies CONOPS for mili tary useof such a vehicle. Obviously, identifying CONOPS requires ad-dressing other issues along the way. For instance, the at t r ib -utes of an operational RLV must first be identified to facilitatedevelopment of the alternative CONOPS. If there are new mis -

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s ions enab led by the veh ic le ’ s reusab le na ture , miss ionswhich are not feasible using ELVs or the Space TransportationSystem (STS) (also known as the shutt le) , they must be identi-fied as well. Given the timeline of the RLV program, the year2012 is a reasonable est imated date for the f ielding of anoperational system. This date will serve as the basis for analy-s is in this s tudy.

Four assumpt ions a re wor th ment ioning a t the outse t . F i r s t ,the estimate that RLV technology could become operationallyfeasible by 2012 is reasonable. Second, a fiscally constrainedenvironment will continue. Third, the US government will con -t inue to support growth and development of the US commer -cial space l i f t industry and encourage dual-use, or perhapstriple-use, of related facil i t ies and systems.8 Four th , the USgovernment’s national security strategy will continue to em -phasize in ternat ional leadership and engagement to fur therAmerican political, economic, and security objectives.

Given the assumptions of f iscal constraint and a govern -ment policy of cooperat ion with and encouragement of the UScommercial space lift industry, any military RLV acquisitionstrategy will do well to take maximum advantage of possibledual-use or t r iple-use opportunit ies and economies of scale.For instance, the US mil i tary could pursue development of amilitary RLV which would share design similarities (i .e. , hard-ware components) with commercial RLVs to the greatest prac-t ical extent , minimizing mil i tary-unique design requirementsand thereby lowering costs . Such an approach would a lso takeadvantage of the economies of scale possible if the commercialspace l if t industry were to operate an RLV similar to the onemanufactured for the mil i tary . Of course , th is assumes thereis a need for a mili tary-unique RLV—not just mili tary use of acommercially produced and operated RLV.

Military RLV Requirements

One answer to the research quest ion proposed ear l ier mightbe that the DOD does not need RLVs. There may be no re-quirement for them. One way to confirm or deny this assert ionis to examine the re levant requirements documentat ion.

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Space Lift Requirements. An Air Force Space Commandbriefing on mission area plan (MAP) alignments and defini-tions lists four functions for a “reusable spacecraft for militaryops”: s tr ike, t ransport , space recovery, and reconnaissance.9

However, the most recent space lift MAP takes a more conser -vative approach. Using the strategies-to-tasks methodology,the MAP documents five tasks of space l if t derived through themiss ion area assessment process : launching spacecraf t , em -ploying the ranges to suppor t these launches , per formingt ransspace opera t ions , recover ing space asse ts , and p lanningand forecast ing government and commercia l launches .1 0 Pri-oritized space lift deficiencies are determined through missionneeds analysis. These nine deficiencies are mainly cost-relatedconcerns but also include two capabili ty related deficiencies:“cannot perform transspace operations,” and “no DoD capabil -i ty to perform recovery and return.”1 1 The mission solutionanalysis concludes that the EELV is the number one pr ior i tyin the midterm (within 10 years) al though RLVs, orbital t rans-fer vehicles (OTV), and a space-based range system are desir -able in the long term (within 25 years). 1 2 The five key space liftso lu t ions are developing the EELV, comple t ing range up-grades, cooperating with NASA in their RLV program, develop-ing advanced expendable and reusable upper s tage sys tems,and f ielding space-based range systems. 1 3 Although potentialRLV appl icat ions in other mission areas such as reconnais -sance and s t r ike are d iscussed , these are seen as long- term(10–25 years) capabilities.

The fact that the USAF’s MAP for space lift (DOD’s by de-fault) does not aggressively pursue the potential of RLVs is notsurpris ing. Being based on the s trategies- to- task framework,the MAP process will not identify a deficiency or state a re-quirement when there is no existing higher-level objective ortask call ing for that capabil i ty. Further, the National SpaceTransportat ion Pol icy clear ly ident i f ies NASA as the leadagency fo r RLV technology demons t ra t ion , no t the DOD(USAF). Final ly , the USAF’s low-risk approach is under -s tandable given the very real need to ensure cont inued accessto space in support of nat ional securi ty requirements . The lastt ime our country put al l of i ts space l if t eggs in one basket , the


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STS, major disrupt ions in access to space for nat ional securi typayloads resul ted when the basket broke. The 1986 Chal-lenger accident combined with our national policy to empha-size use of the STS over expendable launch vehicles created asituation USAF space lift leaders never want to see repeated.1 4

Given these factors, it is laudable that the space lift MAPident i f ies t ransspace operat ions and recovery and re turn ascapability deficiencies and foresees the use of RLVs in recon -naissance and strike missions. These two deficiencies will notbe satisfied by EELV development, but they could be used toderive requirements for military use of an RLV.

Commander in Chief, USSPACE Command Desires. It isinterest ing to note that a different approach to generat ingrequirements , a revolut ionary p lanning approach, has ident i -fied RLVs as promising for broader military applications andsparked the interest of America’s most senior mili tary spacec o m m a n d e r .1 5 In a 1995 message discuss ing implementat ionof the conclusions and recommendations of the Air Force Sci-entific Advisory Board’s New World Vistas s tudy, Gen JosephW. Ashy, commander in chief of United States Space Com -mand (CINCSPACE) and commander of Air Force Space Com -mand, ident i f ied reusable launch vehicles as one of the mostimportant technologies cited in the findings of this revolution -ary planning effort.

General Ashy identified the capabilities to “take-off on de-mand, overfly any location in the world in approximately onehour and re turn and land wi th in two hours a t the take-of fbase” as desirable . He fur ther suggested reconnaissance, sur-vei l lance, and precision employment of weapons as potentialRLV applications.1 6

Requirements Ident i f ied . For the purpose of explor ingmilitary RLV concept of operations, this study identifies space-craft launch and recovery, t ransspace operat ions, s t r ike ( inand from space) , and reconnaissance as potent ia l RLV tasks.The first two tasks flow from the space lift MAP.

The second two tasks are not ident i f ied as tasks for spacelif t in the MAP, probably because of the inherent near-termemphasis of the MAP, but may prove feasible with RLVs. Fur-

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ther , as shown above, they have been ident if ied as potent ialRLV applications by the CINCSPACE.

Project Overview

Before developing and analyzing CONOPS for military use ofRLVs, current RLV concepts and attributes a re summar izedand hypothetical attributes of a notional RLV for use in mili -tary applications are suggested in the next section. Identifyingthese not ional RLV at t r ibutes is a necessary s tep in the proc -ess of answering the research quest ion; they are not intendedto be the final word on military RLV design.

Following the discussion of RLV concepts and attr ibutes,another sect ion presents two CONOPS. The two operat ionsconcepts are in tended roughly to represent mil i tary spaceplane advocates’ visions in the first case and to be a logicalextension of the current RLV program’s goals in the secondcase. An analysis of these concepts of operations is provided.The cri teria used in the analysis include capabil i ty, cost , op-erations efficiency and effectiveness, and politics. The last sec-t ion in th is chapter summarizes s ignif icant conclus ions andrecommends a course of act ion for the US mil i tary to pursuewith respect to RLVs.

RLV Concepts and Attributes

To facil i tate CONOPS development and analysis, this chap-te r summar izes cur ren t RLV concepts and a t t r ibu te , and sug-gests hypothetical attributes of a notional RLV for use in mili -t a ry app l i ca t ions . These no t iona l RLV a t t r ibu te s a re no tintended to serve as the f inal word on RLV design, as anendorsement of any part icular company’s concept , or as arecommendation regarding whether an RLV should take off orland vertically or horizontally. Describing the attributes of anRLV is s imply required to provide a basis for the subsequentanalys is .

Before s tat ing these at t r ibutes , this sect ion f i rs t presents anoverview of the three RLV concepts proposed by LockheedAdvanced Development Company (LADC), MDA, and RockwellSpace Systems Division (RSSD), as well as the Black Horse


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transatmospheric vehicle (TAV) concept made popular by AirUniversity’s SPACECAST 2020 project. Next, RLV attributesare discussed in terms of the requirements int roduced ear l ier .Finally, this chapter presents the at tr ibutes of a notional RLVto be used for fur ther analys is .

Representative RLV Concepts

Def in i t ions . The lexicon associated with RLVs can be con -fusing. Often, the term RLV i s used in terchangeably wi thterms l ike SSTO , for single-stage-to-orbit ; TAV, for t ransat-mospheric vehicle ; and M S P, for military spaceplane . Unfortu -nate ly , there doesn’ t appear to be a consensus tha t theseterms are interchangeable. RLV is not interchangeable withSSTO. A one-piece expendable rocket might also achieve orbitwith a single stage, and a completely reusable mult is tage vehi-cle could be constructed. TAV tends to be used in connectionwith winged, aircraft-l ike vehicles that operate substantially inthe atmosphere while maintaining some capabi l i ty to reachorbit . MSP appears to be more general , including RLVs andTAVs used for military applications. For the sake of clarity,RLV is used here to refer to a completely reusable vehiclewhich is capable of achieving earth orbit while carrying someuseful payload and then returning.

RLV Concepts. Three companies are current ly par t ic ipat ingin Phase I of the NASA-industry RLV program, the conceptdefini t ion and technology development phase. One of thesethree will be selected to continue developing its RLV conceptin Phase II of the program, the demonstrat ion phase. NASAhas scheduled source se lect ion to be complete by July 1996.1 7

The winner of this source selection will develop an advancedtechnology demonstration vehicle, the X-33, which will beused to conduct f l ight tests in 1999. The focus of this secondphase wil l be to demonstrate aircraft- l ike operations and pro -vide enough evidence to support a decision on whether or notto proceed with the next phase in the year 2000. Phase III ofthe RLV program would include commercial development andRLV operations.1 8 The decision to enter Phase III will be acomplex one. It will depend on Phase II results as well asmany other contextual fac tors bear ing on decis ion makers a t

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the turn of the century . In keeping wi th the recommendat ionsof NASA’s Access to Space Study, all phases of the RLV pro -gram are to be “driven by efficient operations rather thanat tainment of maximum performance levels .”1 9

All the RLV concepts are currently focused on satisfying therequirement to deliver and retrieve cargo from the Interna-tional Space Station, Alpha (ISSA). This, perhaps artificially,drives a certain payload requirement (table 35). 2 0 All threeconcepts use cryogenic propellants, l iquid oxygen and liquidhydrogen (LOX/LH 2), to achieve high specific impulse. 2 1 Othercommon attributes are based on objectives of the RLV pro -g ram, such a s the miss ion l i f e and ma in tenance r equ i re -men t s . 2 2 The required thrust-to-weight ratio (F/W), specificimpulse (I sp) , and mass f ract ion are based on current es t i -mates and ana lys is . 2 3 Current cost es t imates are based onpaper s tudies . The est imates vary widely and are affected bythe s ize of the RLV, the number bui l t , whether or not they arecertified to fly over land, the basing scheme, other aspects ofthe concept of operations, and the acquisi t ion strategy, toname just a few of the factors involved. 2 4 For example, asmaller, l ighter, and less capable (with respect to payload)RLV would presumably prove cheaper to build and face lesstechnical r isk in development.2 5

Where the three RLV concepts diverge is in their propulsionsys tems and takeoff and landing concepts . Lockheed Ad -vanced Development Company’s RLV would be a lifting bodyusing l inear aerospike rocket engines as opposed to more tra -ditional rocket engines with bell-shaped nozzles. 2 6 The vehiclewould take off vertically and land horizontally (VTHL). McDon -nell Douglas Aerospace’s RLV would be a conical reentry bodyusing tradit ional bell-shaped nozzle rocket engines. The vehi-cle would takeoff vertically and land vertically (VTVL). Rock-well Space System Divisions RLV would be a winged bodyusing tradit ional bell-shaped nozzle engines.2 7 Like the Lock -heed concept, Rockwell’s is a VTHL vehicle (see fig. 11 for anartist’s concept of all three vehicles).

Black Horse. The Black Horse TAV concept was identifiedby Air University’s SPACECAST 2020 a s the mos t p romis ingspace l i f t idea evaluated by the team.2 8 The Black Horse is


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included here for comparison because i t cont inues to be ofinterest to mili tary spaceplane advocates and provides an in -terest ing contrast to the concepts being explored under theNASA-led RLV program. However, this is comparing applesand oranges to a grea t ex tent .

The Black Horse does not come close to achieving the RLVpayload capability (see table 35). 2 9 Also, some analysts havedoubts about i ts technical feasibil i ty. 3 0 Even if Black Horsew e r e t e c h n i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , t h e m a r k e t f o r s m a l l p a y l o a dlaunchers is highly competi t ive and includes the most opera -tionally responsive of all expendable vehicles.3 1 This wouldlikely limit Black Horse’s utility to only military missions, andperhaps jus t a subse t of those .

Discuss ion of Requirements

Officially stated requirements for the RLV concepts c u r-rently being proposed do not include conducting mili tary op-e ra t ions such a s r econna i s sance and s t r i ke ( i n and f romspace). As discussed earlier, there is growing support for de-

Figure 11. Current RLV Concepts

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veloping a system that is capable of accomplishing these mis -sions. I t wil l be a great challenge to identify a system that canmeet these mil i tary requirements , does not require a greatincrease in the military space budget, and also satisfies civil(non-DOD government) and commercial needs.

Payload. The payload capabi l i ty required of an RLV is avery impor tan t a t t r ibu te . De te rmin ing the des i red pay loadwe igh t and s i ze capab i l i t y based on an t i c ipa t ed r equ i r e-ments for del iver ing and re t r ieving sa te l l i tes and other cargoto and f rom orbi t , f ly ing reconnaissance payloads to spaceand back , and de l ive r ing weapons on the o the r s ide o f theea r th i s no t enough . De te rmin ing the des i red pay load we igh ta n d s i z e m u s t a l s o b e t e m p e r e d b y t h e t e c h n i c a l r i s k s ,mone ta ry cos t s , and opera t iona l cos t s which migh t be in -cur red as a r e su l t o f e s t ab l i sh ing the pay load requ i rement .The payload requirement dr ives the vehicle’s physical s ize ,eng ine pe r fo rmance r equ i r emen t s , deve lopmen t cos t , ando the r a t t r ibu tes . There i s gene ra l , a l though no t comple te ,consensus tha t a smal le r RLV than cur ren t ly conce ived byNASA may be more feas ible . An argument for the smal lerveh ic le can be made based on th ree fac to r s .3 2

First , the National Research Council’s 1995 assessment ofthe RLV Technology Development and Test Program indicatedthat scaleabili ty of structures from the X-33 test vehicle to afull-scale RLV is an area of uncertainty. 3 3 The report also con -cluded that “an increase of 30 percent or more” in currentrocket engine performance will be required for the full-scaleRLV.3 4 The X-33 engine will not satisfy full-scale RLV perform -ance requirements, so development of a new engine will berequired. The report est imates i t wil l take a decade to de-velop.35 The report does not comment on the feasibili ty ofdeveloping a full-scale RLV but identifies the necessary enginedevelopment as a “difficult challenge.”3 6 These conclus ionssuggest that developing an RLV closer in size to the X-33would minimize potential scaleabil i ty problems and reduce therequi rement for increased engine per formance . The resul twould be less technical r isk.

Second, incurring less technical r isk may also directly con -tribute to incurring less financial risk. If RLV development c a n

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avoid the need to develop engines with thrust-to-weight ratiosof more than 75, then nonrecurr ing cos ts may be reduced.Cost is an important considerat ion for both government andcommercial funding. Reducing the cost of access to space, notperformance, is the primary driver for the RLV program.

Third, the greates t demand for launch services is not in thearea of delivering 40,000-pound payloads to low earth orbit(LEO). Recent forecasts show the greatest demand to be in them e d i u m a n d s m a l l p a y l o a d c l a s s , n o t m o r e t h a n 2 0 , 0 0 0pounds to LEO, and less than 10 ,000 pounds to geosynchro -nous transfer orbit (GTO). 37 These forecasts may indicate thatsizing an RLV to compete in this market is more likely toresult in a successful commercial development. Developing aless expensive vehicle that can satisfy commercial require-ments as wel l as the major i ty of government requirements hasthe greatest potential for economic development. Of course, alarger RLV could deliver smaller payloads, perhaps more thanone at a t ime, but i t i s not a t a l l c lear that using the largerRLV would be more efficient. The Titan IIIC, a large space lifteror ig ina l ly des igned to suppor t launches of the Dyna-Soarspaceplane, never qui te caught on as a commercial vehicle .The Ariane 5 was or iginal ly designed to launch the Europeans’Hermes spaceplane which has s ince been canceled.3 8 It re-mains to be seen if the heavy-lift Ariane 5 c a n b e c o m e acommercial success wi thout government ass is tance.3 9

An argument against developing a smaller vehicle can bemade based on the fact that it would not satisfy all the govern -ment’s requirements. For instance, it might not be able to deliverthe necessary cargo loads to the space stat ion or launch thelargest national security payloads. Some suggest that even com -mercial payload size is on the increase.4 0 This deficiency couldbe addressed in several ways. First, a large RLV could be devel-oped after the smaller version, allowing more time for technologymaturation and the development of an experience base with thesmaller RLVs. In the interim, the large government payloadscould be delivered using existing systems or the heavy-lift ver -sion of DOD’s EELV projected to be available in 2005. 4 1 Second,the large payloads could, in theory, be made smaller, by takingadvantage of miniaturization or by assembling modular compo-


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nents in orbit . Making payloads smal le r may not be a pana-cea, especially for space-station loads, but there is some evi -dence that the DOD is moving in this direct ion.4 2 Third, atechnique referred to as a pop-up maneuver may be used todeliver large payloads with a smaller RLV. This would entailflying the RLV on a suborbital trajectory to deploy larger pay-loads into LEO than it would be possible to deploy if the RLVitself had to achieve orbit .4 3 The pop-up maneuver requi res thephysical dimensions of the payload bay in the smaller RLV tobe sized to accommodate the largest payloads the vehicle isplanned to fly. It also forces the RLV to land downrange andbe f lown back to the primary operating base.

Cargo area dimensions for an RLV are under s tudy, andrecommendations vary considerably. NASA’s Access to SpaceS t u d y considered payload bay lengths of 30 and 45 feet—largeenough for space stat ion cargo but s t i l l too small for somenat ional secur i ty needs .4 4 The USAF’s Phillips Lab has pro -posed a 25-foot-long payload bay to satisfy military require-men t s . 4 5 One RLV competitor, Rockwell, believes a 45-footpayload bay is needed even to accommodate “future genera -t ions of commercial satel l i tes and their upper stages.”4 6

Propulsion and Mass Fraction . Propuls ion and mass f rac-t ion are important a t t r ibutes of an RLV but are not s ta ted asdesired attr ibutes here. The appropriate f igures would resultfrom design of an RLV to meet other requirements.

Takeoff and Landing Concept. An RLV’s methods of take-off and landing are significant to the extent that they affect i tsoperat ions. Obviously, the need for a runway l imits basingand delivery access options. The VTHL vehicles will also re-quire some means for erect ion pr ior to launch. On the otherhand, even a VTVL vehicle will require some unique basingsuppor t , such as a 150-foot square gra te . 4 7 Both approachesrequire cryogenic fuel facilities which are not typically avail -able a t most a i r f ie lds . Perhaps more important than whetheran RLV lands vertically or horizontally is the overall ease andsimplicity of operations achieved through its design.

Cross-range Capability. The term cross-range capability , a sused here, refers to the ability of an RLV to maneuver withinthe a tmosphere upon i t s re turn f rom space . This does not

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include the abili ty of an RLV to change its orbital path whilein space. 4 8 The abili ty of an RLV to maneuver within the at-mosphere can be a s ignif icant advantage during cont ingenciesrequir ing an abor t whi le ascending or a change in landinglocation while returning from a mission. This capability couldalso prove useful in military applications. For ascent contin -gency purposes, 600 nautical miles (NM) is adequate.4 9 If thevehicle must land at the same base from which i t took off afterone revolut ion around the ear th , then a cross range on theorder of 1,100–1,200 NM is required. 5 0 The cross-range capa -bil i ty requirement for certain mili tary missions could poten -tially be higher.

Turnaround Time. For commercial and civil ian applica -tions, this attribute is primarily an efficiency question. It willcontr ibute to determining how many RLVs are needed and thenature of launch base facil i t ies. For mili tary missions, thisattribute is not only related to efficiency but effectiveness aswell . Reconnaissance and str ike missions in part icular couldbe faci l i ta ted by shorter turnaround t imes.

Rela ted to turnaround t ime is the issue of responsiveness ,how long it takes to prepare an RLV for launch. Again, mili -tary missions are l ikely to demand quicker response t imes.

Mission Life. This attribute is closely related to costs. Giventhe current uncertain state of RLV technology, i t is hard topredict what a reasonable mission l ife would be, so the f igureof one hundred has been es tabl ished. Some th ink a f ive hun-dred-mission l i fe is a reasonable expectat ion.5 1 The frequencyof required depot maintenance is also difficult to anticipate. 5 2

Other Attributes. There are several other at t r ibutes not yetaddressed which can significantly affect RLV operations, suchas the abi l i ty to operate in adverse weather condit ions andcrew size. Today’s space lift vehicles are severely constrainedby weather, from lightning potential , to winds at alt i tude, towinds on the surface . 5 3 Delays due to weather can add to thecost of operat ions and dramatical ly decrease responsiveness.A truly operational RLV, especially one which will conductmil i tary missions, should be able to operate in al l but themost extreme weather conditions. A truly operational RLVshould a lso require smal ler operat ions crews than are re-


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quired by current sys tems. Today, thousands of people areemployed in STS launch base opera t ions a t the KennedySpace Center . Unmanned, expendable launch vehicle opera -t ions at Cape Canaveral Air Force Stat ion require hundreds ofpeople to launch a vehicle. These figures should be well underone hundred for an operational RLV. 5 4 Finally, all payloadsshould use s tandard containers and interfaces to faci l i ta teoperations efficiency and responsiveness. 5 5

Desired Attributes for a Notional RLV

A review of current concepts under s tudy and developmentin support of the RLV program provides reasonable bounds forrequirements or desired at tr ibutes for a notional RLV whichcould be used to support mil i tary missions. At the same t ime,one of the assumptions under lying this s tudy is cont inuedfiscal constraint . This assumption is the basis for a desire tomaximize dual or triple use (i.e., military, civil governmental,and commercial use) of an operational RLV to the greatestextent pract ical . I f more user requirements can be sat isf ied,especially those of commercial operators, i t is more likely thatfunding will be available and that economies of scale can beachieved. Of course, t rying to sat isfy too many requirementswith one vehicle could lead to failure. Defense procurementhistory is f i l led with programs that at tempted to satisfy somany users that they fai led to s tay within budget , s tay onschedule, or deliver the desired operational capability. Withthis caution in mind, the at tr ibutes of a notional RLV to beused as the basis for analysis are described below.

The notional RLV should be able to deliver 20,000 poundsto a circular LEO with an al t i tude of one hundred NM (table36). This payload weight capabili ty should also allow the vehi-cle to deliver commercial communications satell i te-sized pay-loads to GTO, carry reconnaissance payloads on orbital orsuborbital missions, and deliver significantly more weaponspayload than today’s F-16 and F-117 f ighter aircraft or asmuch as an SS-18 heavy intercont inental bal l is t ic missi le(ICBM). 56 I ts propulsion system’s at t r ibutes are not describedor s ta ted as requirements , but based on current RLV conceptsthe assumption is that cryogenic rocket engines wil l be used.

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The method of takeoff or landing is also not specified. Toprovide a basis for analysis, i t will be assumed that any RLVoperat ing base wil l need no longer than a 10,000-foot runway.If a VTVL vehicle is pursued, this requirement might still existin practice if i t is necessary or desirable to supply an operat-ing base rapidly using large transport aircraft . In any case,th is assumpt ion should not const ra in choices of opera t ingbases too severely. An RLV used for military applications musthave shor te r tu rna round and response t imes than wha t migh tbe necessary or desired for commercial and civil applications,but a nominal one-day turnaround, 12 hours for cont ingen -cies , and a s ix-hour response t ime do not seem unreasonablebased on cur rent concepts . S tandard payload conta iners andinterfaces would be used for all missions. Finally, mission lifeand costs are essent ial ly accepted from the current conceptswith one exception. Given the choice of an RLV with less

Table 36

Summary of Attributes of a Notional RLV

Attribute Value

Payload Size and Weight 20K lbs. to 100 NM circular orbit (due east)30-foot-long cargo area

Propulsion As necessary (LOX/LH2 propellant rocket engines based on current concepts)

Mode of Takeoff and Landing

As necessary (assume 10K foot airfield required at any RLV base)

Required Runway Length 10K feet maximum (if necessary at all)

Cross-range Capability 1,100 NM minimum

Turnaround Time 1-day nominal, 12-hour contingency (6-hour response)

Mission Life 100 minimumDepot maintenance after 20+ missions

Development Cost $4–13B

Cost Per Mission Annual Costs: $0.50B for 4 RLV squadron <$1Klb.


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payload capabil i ty, the cost f igures are est imated to be in thelower end of the range established for a full-scale RLV.

RLV Concepts and Attributes Summary

The concepts being proposed for a full-scale RLV under theNASA-indus t ry RLV program are d r iven by requ i rementswhich may not be completely compatible with requirementsfor a military RLV. The large, full-scale RLV may not target thespace lift market in the most economically viable way. Giventhe potent ial to reduce technical r isk, save money, and moreeffectively target the vast majori ty of user requirements, theseattributes for a notional RLV can serve as a basis for CONOPSdevelopment and fur ther analys is .

Concepts of Operations

This section presents an outl ine of two concepts of opera -tions. The first concept, CONOPS A, is intended to be repre-sentative of military space plane advocates’ visions. It uses thenotional RLV described in table 36. CONOPS A makes thefullest military use of the roughly one-half scale RLV to ac-complish not only tradi t ional space l i f t missions but also thea d d i t i o n a l m i s s i o n s o f r e t u r n i n g p a y l o a d s f r o m o r b i t ,t r ansspace opera t ions , r econna i ssance , and s t r ike ( in andfrom space). The second concept, CONOPS B, is intended torepresent a logical extension of the current RLV programs’goals. It is based on the full-scale vehicle concepts currentlybeing proposed under the RLV program (table 35). CONOPS Balso makes expanded use of RLVs. The capabili t ies of eachRLV used for analysis are summarized in table 37. 5 7

New systems, weapons, and technologies are usually fieldedwithout the ult imate uti l i ty or best application (CONOPS) hav-ing been elaborated—the RLV may show its greatest applica -t ion to have been unanticipated. An RLV may have to be buil tand operated for some time before i ts greatest uti l i ty is appre-ciated or the best methods of employment are discovered.5 8 Inspite of this reality, describing a CONOPS for RLVs at thisearly stage is vital. Without defining how an RLV force is to befielded, organized, and operated, i ts development is bound to

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be unguided by practical considerat ions and i ts ut i l i ty is guar -anteed to be l imited.

Each concept of operat ions is intended to conform to thes a m e f i s c a l e n v i r o n m e n t s i n c e t h e y b o t h h a v e t h e s a m ebudget . Due to th is constra int , and as a resul t of cost es t i -mates presented earl ier , the two concepts of operat ions havedifferent numbers of RLVs available. Since CONOPS A usesthe half-scale RLV developed with less technical and financialrisk, six are available for employment. Since CONOPS B usesthe larger RLV developed with more technical and financialr isk, four are available for employment. These f igures arebased on the development cost es t imates presented ear l ier( tables 35 and 36). 5 9

Each concept of operations is described in terms of i ts mis -s ion, systems, operat ional environment , command and con -trol, support, and employment. The missions of space lift ( toand f rom orbi t ) , t ransspace operat ions , reconnaissance, andstrike ( in and from orbit) contribute to the broader mili tarymissions of space superiori ty, precision employment of weap-ons, global mobili ty, and achieving information dominance.6 0

The systems description includes not only the RLVs but alsothei r associa ted ground sys tems and payloads . The opera -t ional environment addresses threats and survivabi l i ty issueswhile command and control deals with command relat ion -

Table 37

CONOPS A and B RLV Capabilities

RLV Fleet Size Turnaroundtime (hours) Payload Sorties/day 20K lb.

weapons/day

CONOPS A 6Nominal: 24

Contingency: 12Response: 6

20K lbs. toLEO 12 96

CONOPS B 4Nominal: 48

Contingency: 24Response: 12

40K lbs. to LEO 4 64


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ships as well as authority and responsibil i ty for the missionand the people . Suppor t addresses the numerous ac t iv i t iesrequired to conduct successful operations. Finally, the em -ployment discussion i l lustrates concepts of how the systemsmay be used throughout the spectrum of confl ic t , f rom peaceto war and back to peace .

CONOPS A

Missions. The missions of the RLV force are to conductspace l i f t , t ransspace, reconnaissance, and s t r ike operat ions .Space l i f t operat ions include deployment , sustainment , andredeployment of on-orbit forces—earth-to-orbit , orbit-to-earth,and int raspace t ransporta t ion. Transspace operat ions involvedel iver ing mater ia l th rough space , f rom one poin t on theear th’s surface to another . Reconnaissance miss ions are notl imited to the earth’s surface, but include inspection of adver -sary space systems as wel l .6 1 Similarly, the str ike mission maybe accomplished against surface, air , or space targets . Str ikeswithin space will likely be accomplished with directed energy,high power radio frequency (HPRF), or information weaponsrather than explosive or kinetic impact weapons to minimizethe chance of debris causing fratr icide.6 2

In peacet ime, rout ine launch and recovery of spacecraft andreconnaissance will be the primary occupations of RLV forces.Exercises, t raining missions, and system tests wil l a lso beaccomplished. During contingencies, requirements for respon -s ive launch, t ransspace opera t ions , and more f requent andresponsive reconnaissance are l ikely. 6 3 Contingencies may alsoinclude the need for heightened readiness to accomplish s tr ikemissions. During wart ime, the ful l range of missions must beanticipated. Actions to achieve control of the space environ -ment , such as reconna issance and s t r ike aga ins t adversa ryspace sys tems, as wel l as surge launch and t ransspace opera -tions will be conducted.6 4 RLVs may be called upon to accom -plish prompt str ikes against surface targets early in a confl ictin an at tempt to disrupt an adversary offensive.6 5 Once hostili -t ies have passed the opening stages, RLV operations wouldcontinue, complementing the capabili t ies of forces from otherenvironments. For example, str ikes from space may enable

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at tacks on targets which would otherwise be beyond the reachof air , land, and sea forces. Strikes from space may also en -able at tacks against targets deemed too heavily defended fornonspace forces. Once hosti l i t ies have ceased, RLV forces maybe cal led upon to conduct reconnaissance miss ions and pro -vide a deterrent force so air , land, and sea forces may rede-ploy. RLV str ike readiness could be maintained to ensure aprompt response i f an adversary decided to take advantage offorce redeployment and resume hosti l i t ies.

S y s t e m s . Six RLVs with the at tr ibutes described earl ier areavailable (tables 36 and 37). Payload capabilit ies include awide range of systems al l us ing a s tandard container andinterface. 6 6 Spacecraf t , reconnaissance payloads , and weaponsd i spensers use the same s tandard con ta ine r to ensure s im -plici ty and ease of RLV operations. For surface attack, weap-ons opt ions include maneuverable reentry vehicles which mayconta in a var ie ty of muni t ions and guidance sys tems depend-ing on the nature of the targets to be s t ruck.6 7 For str ikeswithin space, weapons options include directed energy, HPRF,and informat ion muni t ions .

In-flight vehicle operations and control may be affected re-motely; however, the vehicle is capable of executing all missionsbased on programs loaded prior to takeoff. The ability to operateautonomously helps minimize the force’s vulnerability to elec -tronic warfare and enhances in-flight security. Communicationfor purposes such as in-fl ight operations and control and pay-load data transfer is available throughout the mission primarilythrough space-based tracking and data relay spacecraft , thoughline of sight communication with ground stations is possible.

RLV self-defense capabilities include its ability to use ma-neuver and speed to avoid threats , and onboard electronic andopt ical countermeasure systems which can operate autono-mously and through remote control . The vehicle’s thermal pro -tect ion system gives i t some inherent passive defense againstlasers. As with vehicle operations and control , in-fl ight pay-load operat ions and control may be affected remotely. Thepayload funct ions can a lso be executed based on programsloaded prior to takeoff.


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The two primary operating bases are located in Florida andCalifornia.6 8 Four al ternate bases may be used as necessary.Two of the alternate bases are located on the coasts—one eachon the East and West Coasts. The other two alternate bases arelocated in the US interior. The alternate bases may be used inthe event of contingencies such as those related to system mal-function, extremely severe weather, or threats to primary basephysical security. RLV units and personnel also have the capa -bility to establish a contingency base at virtually any airfield inthe world with a runway length capable of accommodating largejet-powered aircraft. Other space systems necessary for RLVoperations besides the tracking and data relay satellites alreadymentioned include communications satellites, warning satellites,and space surveil lance systems.

Operational Environment. The operational environment ofthe RLV currently contains few direct threats. However, theproliferation of technology, particularly rocket, spacecraft, anddirected-energy technology, combined with the increasing im -portance of space operat ions to war-fighting success indicatesthat more threats are l ikely to develop. It would be tempting tofollow Giulio Douhet’s example from the 1920s and predictthere wil l be no way to defend against an RLV attack, but thisis not l ikely to be the case. 6 9 The world’s leading space-faringnations, the United States and the former Soviet Union, havealready demonstra ted the capabi l i ty to a t tack spacecraf t us ingground-based and a i r - launched k ine t ic impact weapons aswell as coorbital kinet ic impact systems. Lasers and otherdirected energy devices may also present threats in the RLVsoperat ional environment. 7 0

When in flight, the RLV’s onboard defensive systems andinherent maneuverabil i ty and speed make i t diff icult for ad-versary weapon systems to prevent miss ion accomplishment .The fact that an adversary has to detect the RLV’s launch,predict i ts orbit , pass that information on to i ts defense force,and then execute an ant i-RLV mission would require a highdegree of technological sophistication and operational capabil -ity. Striking an RLV will be more complicated than a typicalantisatellite (ASAT) mission where the spacecraft’s orbit is wellestablished, predictable, and less l ikely to be altered.

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However, even if an RLV in flight poses a difficult target for anadversary, i ts associated command and control centers, commu-nications links, and bases are very vulnerable to enemy attack.This vulnerability drives the need for warning and other intelli -gence support, an autonomous operations capability, active andpassive operating base defenses, and redundant systems. Se -cure, antijam, low-probability-of-intercept, communications con -nectivity provides some measure of protection for in-flight vehi-cle and payload operations and control when autonomy is notacceptable.7 1 Assuming vehicle autonomy and security measuresfor necessary communication links are achieved, the system’sgreatest vulnerability will be at the operating base. The existenceof alternate bases and the capability to establish contingencybases mitigates this vulnerability when combined with activeand passive base defense measures.

Command and Control . RLV forces are divided betweenmil i tary and commercia l organizat ions . During peacet ime,four of the six RLVs available are operated by a commercialorganization engaged primarily in providing space lift services.This company also provides commercial remote sensing serv-ices. The remaining RLVs are operated by the US mili taryunder the combatant command (COCOM) of the commanderin chief , United States Space Command.7 2 The military RLVsconduct very li t t le space lift during peacetime to avoid any realor perceived competition with the US commercial space liftindustry . 7 3 They primarily conduct reconnaissance while train -ing for and exercis ing their s t r ike and t ransspace missions.

During t imes of heightened tension or war, the NationalCommand Authorities may direct mobilization of some or all ofthe commercial RLV fleet based on exist ing government-indus-t ry agreements .7 4 These RLVs may then be modified as neces -sary to conduct military missions. This mobilization of com -merc ia l RLVs i s necessary to avoid requi r ing commerc ia lorganizat ions and their employees to accept the increasedrisk, hardship, and discipline required of military RLV mis -sions. In a war, RLVs used in direct military action or insupport of mili tary operations, along with their associated sys -tems, facilities, and personnel, will l ikely be targeted by theenemy. When CINCSPACE is acting as the supporting com -


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mander in chief (CINC) to a geographic CINC, RLV forcesmay be put under the tact ical control (TACON) of the jointforce commander (JFC) to ensure the most e f fec t ive use ofthese sys tems in d i rec t suppor t o f the thea te r campa ignp l a n .7 5 For a i r and sur face s t r ike miss ions , the jo in t force a i rcomponent commander wi l l normal ly d i rec t the use of RLVforces .7 6 CINCSPACE directs the use of RLV forces support-i n g t h e c a m p a i g n f o r s p a c e s u p e r i o r i t y a n d c o n d u c t i n gt ransspace miss ions . RLV forces may be used to he lp wage acampa ign fo r space super io r i ty by conduc t ing s t r ikes andreconna issance wi th in space , space l i f t , and s t r ikes aga ins tsur face-based e lements of an adversary’s space force . TheJFC reso lves any d i spu tes over appor t ionment and a l loca -tion of RLV forces.

Support. Intelligence support for RLV forces covers a broadrange of requirements . Operat ing base threats must be as -sessed and threat information provided continuously. Such in -formation will drive defense status and relocation from prime toalternate bases or deployment to a contingency base. RLV sur-face strike missions will require extensive intelligence support,similar to that required to accomplish precision strikes withtoday’s air forces or missiles. Strikes in space will require exten -sive space surveillance support. Some space surveillance infor -mation may actually be collected by the RLV itself, but it willrequire support from systems or a network with broader andcontinuous coverage of the near-earth environment. Missionplanning will require not only the information just described butvery capable computer hardware and software to process plan -ning information inputs and to generate mission programs forin-flight payload and vehicle operations.

Secur i ty of opera t ing bases i s paramount . The grea tes tthreats may come from terror is ts or an adversary’s specialforces. In this regard, security requirements will be similar totoday’s requirements to protect h igh-value assets a t DODbases in the cont inenta l Uni ted Sta tes except tha t the threatswill have evolved by the year 2012. Logistics support is simpli -fied to the greatest extent practical. Organizational-level main -tenance ac t ions a t the opera t ing bases are accompl ished bymil i ta ry enl i s ted maintenance technic ians organic to RLV

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units . The pr imary RLV base on the East Coast is home toRLV uni t headquar ters .7 7

Employment . During contingencies and war, RLV opera -t ions consis t of three phases: readiness planning, missionplanning, and execut ion. Readiness planning requires beingresponsive to world events and direct ion from higher head-quarters to maintain a specif ied readiness posture . At thehighest s tate of readiness, RLVs may be maintained on aler t torespond within six hours for surge space l i f t , t ransspace, re-connaissance , or s t r ike miss ions .

The RLV force’s ability to execute specific missions withins ix hours may be cons t ra ined by fac to r s beyond the con t ro lof the RLV force. For instance, orbi ta l dynamics may dictatean appropr i a t e l aunch t ime fo r a pa r t i cu la r spacec ra f t de-p loymen t , space s t r i ke , o r space r econna i s sance mi s s ionthat fa l l s beyond the s ix-hour response t ime—the RLV mayb e a v a i l able, but physics will require waiting longer to exe -cute the miss ion. Mainta in ing a ler t a t the h ighes t s ta te ofreadiness impacts RLV availabil i ty to conduct routine mis -s ions. Mission planning is conducted once a hypothet ical oractual mission tasking is received. Mission planning is con -ducted by the RLV unit , nominal ly within one hour for anymission, taking ful l advantage of the support out l ined above.Mission planning includes payload select ion and generat ionof mission programs to be loaded pr ior to takeoff , assumingthe speci f ied miss ion has not been previously planned andstored for la ter use.

The execu t ion phase o f RLV ope ra t i ons i nc ludes f i na llaunch preparat ions, launch, f l ight operat ions, and recovery.Recovery is normally at the base from which the sortie gener -a ted . Sys tem mal func t ions , ex t remely severe wea ther , o rthreats to base securi ty may drive recovery at another base.Transspace operat ions may require establ ishment of a contin -gency base and operations from that location. RLV recovery isfol lowed by immediate preparat ion for subsequent missions.Deployment to an al ternate or cont ingency base may be di-rected by higher headquarters or the local RLV unit com -mande r .


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CONOPS B

Missions. The missions of the RLV force are to conductspace l i f t , t ransspace, reconnaissance, and s t r ike operat ions .The CONOPS B RLV force of four full-scale vehicles is com -mercially operated. Given the full-scale RLV’s longer turn -around time relative to the notional CONOPS A RLV, its utilityfor reconnaissance and s t r ike missions during cont ingenciesand war is diminished but not e l iminated. Further , i t s com -pletely commercial operation complicates use of the RLV fleetin direct military actions. 7 8 Nevertheless, this CONOPS includestrike operations for completeness and to provide a basis forsubsequent ana lys i s .

During peacet ime, rout ine launch and recovery of space-craft and remote sensing wil l be the primary occupation of theRLV fleet. During contingencies, requirements for responsivespace l i f t , t ransspace operat ions , and surface reconnaissanceare l ikely. Actions to achieve control of the space environment,such as reconna issance and s t r ike aga ins t adversary spacesystems, are also l ikely to be required. During war, surfaces t r ike mis s ions may be conduc ted . Once hos t i l i t i e s haveceased, RLV forces may be called upon to conduct reconnais -sance missions and maintain some level of s t r ike readiness .

S y s t e m s . Four RLVs with the at tr ibutes described earl ierare available ( tables 35 and 37). Payload capabil i t ies are simi-lar to those described for the CONOPS A RLV in that they alluse a s tandard conta iner and in ter face , but the weight andsize of CONOPS B payloads is larger. In-flight vehicle opera -t ions, communicat ions, self-protect ion systems, and payloadopera t ions are the same.

The basing scheme includes the same two pr imary operat-ing bases . There are no des ignated a l ternate bases , but theoperators have the capabil i ty to establish a contingency oper -ating base at virtually any airfield in the world with a runwaylength capable of accommodating large jet-powered aircraft .

Operational Environment. The operational environment ofthe RLV is much as described under CONOPS A, except i t isless host i le . The apparently civi l ian, and thus less threaten -ing, nature of peacetime RLV operations would minimize the

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provocation of hostile action against the vehicles by potentialadversaries.

Refraining from exercising the RLV fleet in strike operationsduring peacet ime could help to de-emphasize any potent ialmilitary applications. Exercising strike operations would obvi -ously hurt the RLV fleet’s peaceful appearance, although itwould undoubtedly improve the operators’ proficiency to exe -cute the mission. Unfortunately, regardless of whether or notthe RLV fleet is used for strike missions, threats from ASAT-like systems as described above for CONOPS A are still likelyto exist. Further, as long as the RLV fleet is used in evenindirect support of mili tary operations (e.g. , surge launch ofspacecraft used to support mil i tary surface or air operat ions) ,it will be a potential target of enemy action.

Command and Control . The RLV force is owned and oper -ated entirely by a commercial organization.7 9 The companyprovides space l if t and remote sensing services for governmentand commercia l cus tomers .

US government agreements with the RLV operator include ameasure of mil i tary oversight and involvement to ensure theRLV force is ready and available to conduct missions in sup-port of nat ional securi ty object ives in peace and in war. Thesystems are never operated by mil i tary personnel , but mobil i -zation agreements allow for close military direction of activitiesduring contingencies and war. The secretary of defense (SEC-DEF) may approve mobilization of the RLV fleet during contin -gencies and war for the purposes of conducting space l i f t andtransspace operat ions in support of nat ional securi ty require-ments. The president must approve any use of the RLV fleetfor strike missions. When mobilized, CINCSPACE exercisesCOCOM over RLV assets. CINCSPACE also retains operationalcontrol (OPCON) and TACON of all RLVs given the fleet’s highvalue and few numbers .8 0 When s tr ike operat ions are to beconducted, mil i tary personnel must be present to provide ameasure of positive control.

Support . Intell igence support to RLV forces is much thesame as under CONOPS A. Logis t ics support requirements areless s tr ingent due to decreased readiness required for deploy-ment and miss ion accompl ishment . Maintenance ac t ions are


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accomplished entirely by civilian personnel. There is no re-quirement for military personnel to be trained and certified inmaintenance or operat ions tasks. Mil i tary personnel s implydevelop tasks and oversee their execution by the commercialcivilian operators.

The only exception is with respect to strike missions. Mili -tary personnel working with RLV operators must be trainedand proficient in implementing posit ive control measures forRLV str ikes. Mil i tary personnel are assigned to a detachmentcollocated with the RLV operator’s headquarters.

Employment . During contingencies and war, RLV opera -t ions will be responsive to national security requirements. Ifdirected by the secretary of defense, the RLV fleet will bemobil ized to conduct surge space l i f t and transspace opera -t ions a t a cost that compensates for los t commercial revenues.These opera t ions would be conducted in the same fashion aspeacetime RLV operations, but with close military coordina-tion. SECDEF mobilization of the RLV fleet will require thecivi l ian operators to meet cont ingency turnaround and re-sponse t imes of 24 and 12 hours, respectively.

CINCSPACE will direct tasks and priorities for the fleet oncemobilized. CINCSPACE, in conjunction with the supportedCINC if CINCSPACE is playing a supporting role, will deter -mine whether or not RLV str ike operat ions are warranted andrequest presidential approval as appropriate. If use of the RLVfleet for str ike missions is approved, measures will be taken toensure mili tary control of these operations.

Summary of CONOPS A and B

This section presents an outl ine of two concepts of opera -t ions. The first concept, CONOPS A, attempts to make thefullest military use of the roughly half-scale notional RLV toaccomplish not only tradit ional space l if t missions but alsothe addi t iona l miss ions of re turn ing payloads f rom orb i t ,t r ansspace opera t ions , r econna i ssance , and s t r ike ( in andfrom space) . CONOPS A is intended to represent mil i taryspace plane advocates’ visions.

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The second concept, CONOPS B, based on the full-scalevehicles currently being proposed under the RLV program,also at tempts to make expanded use of RLVs, but their appl i -cation is inhibited by design attr ibutes and completely com -mercial operation. CONOPS B is intended to represent a logi-cal extension of the current RLV program’s goals.

Analysis

The criteria used to analyze the concepts of operations de-scribed in this study include capability, cost, operations effi -ciency, operations effectiveness, and politics. Capability analysisincludes all the required mission areas: space lift, reconnais -sance, s t r ike, and t ransspace operat ions. Cost analysis ad-dresses operating base, ELV augmentation, and transspace op -erations costs, as well as the potential for technology maturationto reduce development costs. Operations efficiency and effective -ness analysis emphasizes the impact of using cryogenic propel-lants, deployment operations, and overall system reliability.Political analysis examines the suitability of each CONOPS inboth the in ternat ional and domest ic environments .

Capability

Each concept of operation was intended to satisfy all RLVmission requirements: spacecraft launch and recovery, recon -naissance , t ransspace opera t ions , and s t r ike ( in and f romspace). Each CONOPS meets these requirements but, as a resultof the differences in the attributes of the vehicles used in eachCONOPS and the way in which they are organized, deployed,and employed, their capabilities in each mission area vary tosome degree. This variation in the extent to which each CONOPSsatisfies mission requirements is examined below.

Space Lift . Both CONOPS provide dramatically improvedspace l if t capabili ty from a responsiveness perspective. Themost responsive of today’s space l if ters requires a minimum oftwo months f rom cal l -up to launch compared wi th less than aday for either RLV described here. 8 1 However, when consider -ing space lift payload capability the two RLVs are not equal.The half-scale RLV used in CONOPS A (RLV-A from here for -


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ward) may not necessari ly meet al l users’ needs from a pay-load weight and size perspective. If a smaller RLV is devel-oped, an a l ternat ive l i f t means might be required, such as aheavy ELV, if a particular payload cannot be downsized.

At 8.5 meters (28 feet) long and 2,724 kilograms (kg) (about6,000 pounds) unequipped, the US components of the ISSAwould fit within the dimensions of RLV-A. Not to mention thatthey will have already been deployed long before the first opera -tional flight of an RLV. 82 However, NASA is concerned aboutminimizing the number of visits to the space station to avoiddisrupting microgravity materials processing work. NASA alsohas concerns about accommodating the crew module envisionedfor transporting US astronauts to and from the station. Theseconcerns appear to be driving a desire for the large payloadcapability of current RLV program concepts.8 3 Another factorbehind the large payload requirement is the desire to capturethe large national security payloads that currently fly on theTitan IV expendable rocket in the interest of pursuing furtherreductions in life-cycle costs.8 4 It is diffi cult to predict whetheror not these payloads wil l be l ighter and smaller in the future.However, if we plan on building vehicles big enough to carrythe largest payloads, i t is easy to predict that payload design -ers will take advantage of the capability.

If large national security payloads cannot, or will not, bedownsized, they could be lifted on the heavy version of theDOD’s EELV, predicted to be available in 2005. If large space-station payloads cannot, or will not, be downsized, they couldbe lifted on the heavy version of EELV as well. Large Russianrockets could also be used. 8 5 In fact , launching into the ISSAorbit from the Baykonour cosmodrome in the former Sovietrepublic of Kazakstan instead of Cape Canaveral , the plannedlaunch base for American ISSA missions, provides more thana 35 foot-per-second velocity advantage to the relatively high-inclination orbit , 51.6 degrees. 8 6 This higher-inclination orbiti s the same as tha t cur ren t ly used by the Russ ian spaces ta t ion Mir, which was launched and i s resuppl ied out ofBaykonour . Another a l te rna t ive might be launching la rgespace s ta t ion payloads on the Ariane 5. The Europeans p lanto develop their own manned crew transfer vehicle as part of

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their participation in ISSA. 8 7 The Ariane 5 will be able to lift18,000 (about 39,600 pounds) to LEO, which is comparable tothe payload capacity of the Titan IV. 8 8

A final, but not least significant, consideration is the need tore tu rn l a rge pay loads f rom orb i t . Whi le the Russ ians o rFrench might happily provide return from orbit services usingtheir Soyuz capsule or crew transfer vehicle, respectively, willthey be large enough for the loads coming back from thestat ion? As stated above, they might i f we plan on using thesevehicles and size the return payloads from ISSA appropriately,but certainly won’t if we plan to use a larger vehicle.

Reconnaissance . Some may ques t ion the need to use anRLV for reconnaissance given the US abili ty to perform space-based reconnaissance of the ear th’s surface using satel l i tes .8 9

However, there may be t imes when the element of surprise isdesired and not l ikely to be obtained using on-orbit assets. I tis conceivable that a potential adversary might have enoughinformation about US space-based reconnaissance systems toeffectively implement operations security measures and avoiddetection. 9 0 Another motivation for using an RLV for recon -naissance might be the need for responsiveness . For a fastbreaking contingency, RLVs may provide a quick response notat ta inable with on-orbi t spacecraf t , manned aircraf t , or un-manned aerial vehicles (UAV). For instance, a low-orbiting re-mote sensing spacecraft might not have a given location onthe earth’s surface within its field of view until several orbitshave passed. Manned aircraft and UAVs may not allow over -flight of a location deep within the target country’s territory.

With respect to reconnaissance within space, one mightpose a similar question about the uti l i ty of RLVs. There areundoubtedly other systems which can perform space survei l -lance. Paul B. Stares, in The Militarization of Space , claimsthat the USAF attempted to develop a satel l i te inspection sys -tem (SAINT) in the earliest days of the space age.9 1 I t wascanceled in 1962, but Stares suggests the US abi l i ty to surveyspace was not degraded s ince advances in ground-based sen -sors made by the mid-1960s faci l i tated the gathering of agreat deal of data. This may be true, but on-orbit reconnais -sance may allow for more detailed as well as active inspection


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of spacecraft in LEO. Reconnaissance of payloads in higherorbits , such as geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) or Molniyaorb i t s , may requ i re r educ ing the r econna i s sance pay loadweight or may have to be conducted from a greater dis tance.This reconnaissance capabil i ty might also support s tr ike mis -s ions in space with prest r ike target informat ion and posts t r ikeba t t l e damage as sessmen t inpu t s .

Strike . Accomplishing strikes using RLVs is technicallyfeasible. However, to be militarily useful, the vehicles shouldbe able to deliver significant weapon payloads. With respect tosurface strike, i t appears RLV-A can deliver as much payloadas a typical modern fighter. RLV-B can deliver as much weap-ons payload as a B-2 Spir i t s tea l th bomber . 9 2

Obviously, there are addit ional considerat ions besides pay-load weight when analyzing surface s t r ike capabi l i ty . Re-sponse and turnaround t imes have a dramat ic ef fec t on theusefulness of RLVs for surface strike missions. Both RLVscould deliver initial strikes earlier than B-2s. Due to RLV-A’squicker response t ime and shor ter turnaround t ime, i t com -pares favorably with the strike capabili ty of a cost-equivalentnumber of B-2s conducting str ikes over a two-day period eventhough RLV-A’s payload capability is roughly half that of theB-2 (table 38 and fig. 12).9 3 RLV-B, on the other hand, cannotcompare as favorably through this same period despi te i tsrelatively large payload capability. The B-2’s strike capabilityexceeds that of both RLVs over a three-day period. Strike inspace using RLVs is also technically feasible.

Both concepts include the capabi l i ty to s t r ike adversaryspacecraft . The means used and type of str ike are only l imitedby the creative development of strike mission payloads. Forinstance, RLV space s t r ikes might be accomplished in a man-ner which minimizes debris and affects only a specific subsys -tem on board the target spacecraf t . Informat ion s t r ikes caus-ing disrupt ion of adversary communicat ions and commandand control , or aimed at deception, might also be conducted.Str ikes against spacecraf t in high ear th orbi ts , such as GEOor Molniya orbits , may require reducing the str ike payloadweight or be conducted from a greater dis tance.

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Figure 12. Cumulative 2,000-Pound WeaponsDelivery within Three Days

Table 38

Cumulative 2,000-Pound Weapons Delivery within Three Days

Time(hours)

RLV-A(6 RLVs)

RLV-B(4 RLVs)

B-2 Spirit(10 B-2s)

6.75 48 0 0

12.75 48 64 0

20.25 96 64 0

21 96 64 160

33.75 144 64 160

38.25 144 128 160

47.25 192 128 160

60 192 128 320

60.75 240 128 320

63.75 240 192 320

72 240 192 320


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Transspace Operations . The requirement for this capabil i tyis not very well defined.9 4 One might easily doubt its feasibilityexcept that any RLV capable of recovering and returning pay-loads from orbit will have an inherent capabili ty to delivercargo from one locat ion on the earth to another .

Putt ing aside cost considerat ions for the moment, a majorfactor in assessing the feasibil i ty of transspace operations isthe abi l i ty to establ ish an RLV operat ions base at the pickupand del ivery points . Experience with the subscale, suborbitalMcDonnell Douglas Aerospace DC-X can only hint at what anoperational RLV operating base might look like. The base es -tablished for DC-X (now called the DC-XA in its modified form)operations at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in -cludes propellant facilities, electrical power facilities, vehiclecontrol systems, and connections. The propellant facilit ies in -clude l iquid oxygen, l iquid hydrogen, gaseous helium, andgaseous ni t rogen s torage tanks, t ransfer l ines and control sys -tems. The vehicle control systems include ground control sys -tems and a “real-time data system” to collect, store, and dis -play vehicle data centrally before, during, and after flight. Thereal-t ime data system also provides a means for operator in -tervention, if necessary, and allows for receipt, processing,and loading of autonomous f l ight operat ions programs.9 5

While an operational RLV design should include operationsefficiency considerations, any RLV operating base will cer -tainly require very large propellant facilities and associatedequipment. Given that a full-scale RLV, such as RLV-B, willrequire about 100 t imes more propel lant than the DC-X, thepropellant facilities will not necessarily lend themselves toquick and easy t ransport . In this sense, RLV-A may havesome advantage in tha t i t s p ropel lan t fac i l i t i es would besmaller than RLV-Bs. Obviously, RLV-A also has less payloadweight capabili ty. Without a clear definit ion of requirementsfor transspace operations, i t is difficult to evaluate this trade-off between the two CONOPS.

Cost

Operating Base Costs. CONOPS A is sensitive to operatingbase costs. CONOPS A includes two primary and four al ter -

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nate bases as well the capabil i ty to establish a contingencybase. CONOPS B simply has two primary bases with a capa -bil i ty to establish contingency bases.

Launch base costs for today’s fleet of expendable rockets maynot be a good indicator of future RLV launch base costs giventhe objectives of the RLV program. This is fortuitous since to-day’s launch bases are expensive to operate. Operating the US’slargest and busiest launch base, Cape Canaveral, and its associ-ated range, costs about $160 million a year. Experience with theDC-XA is also difficult to use as a basis for estimation since thevehicle is very much smaller and less capable than an opera -tional RLV. The DC-XA launch base also uses existing facilitiesand equipment at the White Sands Missile Range. 9 6

Nevertheless, industry sources est imate i t wil l cost roughly$50 mil l ion to setup an RLV operat ing base, a t a minimum.Using this figure, CONOPS A’s operating base costs may beest imated at $200 mil l ion more than CONOPS B’s.

ELV Augmentation. CONOPS A may also require ELV aug-mentation if large space station and national security payloadsare not downsized. The Moorman Study reported that simplyshrinking the size of the RLV payload bay from 45 to 30 feet mightcost an extra $26.6 billion in ELV costs through the year 2030.9 7

Employing foreign heavy lift vehicles could reduce this cost.Transspace Operations. I t is unclear that transspace opera -

tions will be economical. If one accepts the program goal ofdelivering payloads to orbit for $1,000 per pound, then the sameestimate may be used for the cost per pound of delivering cargofrom one point on the earth’s surface to another using an RLV.Costs for sending cargo internationally, say from New York toSeoul, using an express package delivery service range fromabout $50 per pound for a one-pound box to $5.70 per poundfor a 100-pound box.9 8 Sending loads by military airlift is lessexpensive, but takes longer. For example, shipping a 20,000-pound load on military airlift from Dover AFB, Delaware, toRamstein Air Base, Germany, will cost $1.079 per pound andtake 3.1 days, if the cargo is given the highest priority.9 9

Such costs make it unlikely that RLV cargo delivery will beeconomically attractive. Whether or not RLV cargo delivery willbe mil i tar i ly useful remains to be seen.


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Technology Maturation. A recurring theme in studies relatedto the RLV program is the idea that program costs can be re-duced through technology maturation.1 0 0 A technology develop-ment program targeted against specific high-risk areas executedbefore system development and acquisition can mitigate thetechnical and financial risks. Advancing the technology readi-ness of a system from “concept design” to “prototype/engineer -ing model” prior to entering full-scale development can lowerdevelopment costs by more than 40 percent.1 0 1 Phase I of theRLV program is intended to include demonstration of the matur-ity level of candidate technolo gies.1 0 2 The X-33 flight demon -st ra t ions a t the end of Phase I I represent an a t tempt to dem -onstrate technological maturity levels.

However, the major recommendations of the National Re-search Council’s recent review of RLV technology indicate aneed for more vigorous development of propulsion technol-ogy. 1 0 3 There is a government-industry effort currently underway that can help address this issue. The integrated highpayoff rocket propulsion technology (IHPRPT) program hasgoals for booster, orbit transfer, spacecraft , and tactical pro -puls ion sys tems. Noteworthy booster cryogenic propuls iongoals include achieving a “mean time between removal” or“mission l ife” of 20 for reusable systems by the year 2000, animprovement of 3 percent in Isp by 2010, and an increase of100 percent in the thrust- to-weight ra t io by the year 2010. 104

Unfortunately, funding levels for this program have not in -creased in spite of the start of the RLV program and recom -mendations by high-level s tudies to increase funding in thisarea . 1 0 5 Given the cri t ical nature of propulsion technology de-velopment to the success of the RLV program and US spacelift competitiveness in general, i t is surprising IHPRPT fundinghas not been ra ised to the recommended levels .1 0 6

Operations Efficiency and Effectiveness

Cryogenic Propellants. Cryogenic propellants a re not idea lfor operations efficiency and effectiveness. A good historicalbasis for this assert ion is the Atlas missile’s short l ife as anICBM. It was relegated to a space lift only role in 1965 afterbeing an operational ICBM for less than six years because i t

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was not well sui ted to the responsive operat ions and rel iabil i tyrequired of an ICBM. The extreme caution needed in fuelingthe missile immediately before launch kept i t from ever meet -ing its required 15-minute reaction time. It also suffered froma host of reliabili ty problems, many related to i ts propulsionsys tem.1 0 7 The Atlas was quickly followed by the Titan andMinuteman. The Titan ICBM, using hypergolic propellants,could stay propellant loaded since hypergolics did not needconstant refr igerat ion. The Minuteman, using sol id propel-lants , provided outstanding responsiveness and rel iabil i ty. 1 0 8

The legacy of the Atlas missile’s operational life as an ICBMmay provide a caution when contemplating the development ofan operational RLV with a goal of high reliability and low opera -tions costs. It may be even more relevant when considering themilitary use of an RLV that drives quicker turnaround and re-sponse times. Today’s Atlas space lift vehicle outfitted with acryogenic Centaur upper stage requires cryogenic propellantloading about two hours prior to launch, well within the re-sponse time specified for either RLV-A or RLV-B. 109 During testflights in July 1995, the DC-X required a similar time line forpropellant loading and was prepared to demonstrate an 11-hourturnaround t ime.110 While these time lines seem to bode well foran operational RLV, there is no denying the relative complexityof cryogenic propulsion systems compared with hypergolic orsolid alternatives. This complexity will make achieving RLV op -erations efficiency and effectiveness goals a challenge.

Deployment . The na tu re o f c ryogen ic p rope l l an t s a l sodrives complexity in the RLV operating base. This complexitywill challenge designers and operators faced with the problemof how to build, deploy, and operate an RLV contingency base.Ideally, such a base will be deployable by air. This is particu -larly true in CONOPS A, where dispersion for security andincreased responsiveness for mil i tary missions is required.T h i s c o n t i n g e n c y b a s e c a p a b i l i t y w i l l a l s o b e a k e y t ot r ans space ope ra t i ons . Power and p rope l l an t sy s t ems a relikely to comprise the majority of the weight and bulk requiredto be moved. Lessons may be learned from efforts within theUSAF to develop multifunction support equipment for aircraftma in tenance .1 1 1


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Being able to reduce the number of opera t ing base suppor tequipment pieces, as well as their size, could ease mobili tyrequirements . I t could a lso lead to a decrease in the numberof personnel required to deploy and reduce the cost of outfit -t ing a contingency RLV operating base. Winston Churchillonce said, “except in the air [the Royal Air Force] is the leastmobile of all the armed services.”1 1 2 If the deployability of theRLV force is neglected, it might suffer a similar criticism.

Reliability . Air Force Space Command’s Draft Operational Re-quirements Document (ORD) for the EELV, dated 31 March 1995,defines reliability as “the ability of the space lift system to suc-cessfully accomplish its intended mission.”1 1 3 The ORD definesthe terms reliability of the schedule or dependability separatelyas “the ability of the system to consistently launch . . . whenplanned.”1 1 4 The Moorman Study identified three factors whichaffect space lift system reliability: complexity, flight rate, anddesign stability. 115 After considering these factors, one can seeevidence of their impact in today’s space lift systems. The DeltaII, the least complex system, has the highest reliability, 100percent over the last five years, compared to 84.2 percent and85.7 percent for the Atlas and Titan, respectively.1 1 6 The Deltaalso has the highest flight rate and the most stable design oftoday’s expendable systems. The message for RLV developmentis clear: keep system complexity down, flight rate up, and designstable. The second item, flight rate, may be achieved by captur-ing the largest share of the launch market practical and/orcapitalizing on military applications. The third item, design sta -bility, is aided by requiring standard payload containers andinterfaces. Happily, current RLV program competitors alreadyinclude a standard payload container and interfaces as a keydesign element.1 1 7

Unhappily, the National Research Council’s warning aboutthe need for vigorous propulsion system development may indi-cate danger ahead for RLV reliability. One of the reliability prob -lems today’s space lifters face is their lack of performance mar -gin.118 A robust design approach in the RLV program could avoidthis pitfall and lead to increased reliability. Rather than focusingon eliminating variation in performance, a requirement whenoperating a system with no performance margin, a robust design

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approach would minimize the effects of variation in perform -ance. If the RLV is designed to be a high-performance systemwithout any performance margin, then the operators will be inthe same position as today’s space lift operators: reliabilitygoals simply will not be achieved. This would seem to indicatethe desirability of building a system with plenty of propulsionpower for its intended operations. As current RLV conceptsplan on milking existing engine (SSME or RD-0120) deriva -tives for their last ounce of capability, this will result in field -ing a full-scale RLV always operating at its performance lim -i t s .1 1 9 In this respect , RLV-A may offer some advantage, as thesmaller vehicle is not l ikely to push propulsion performancerequirements to the same extent as a ful l-scale vehicle.

Any potential lack of reliability is also directly related to costin that the cost of failure is typically high in the space liftbusiness. The abi l i ty of an RLV to abort and land back at i tsbase during ascent or descent may minimize the cost of fai lurein flight. However, any unreliabili ty can cause delays whichincrease costs , a l though they do so less dramat ical ly than acatastrophic in-flight failure. If an in-flight RLV failure doesoccur, i ts cost will be considerably higher than that of losingone of today’s expendable space l ifters.

Finally, as highlighted by the Atlas missile’s ICBM experi-ence, reliabili ty is a key attribute of mili tary weapon systems.As much as cost, reliabili ty will determine whether or notRLVs can successfully perform mili tary missions.

Polit ical Considerations

International. No RLV capabilities or operations described ineither CONOPS A or B would violate international treaties. Tosome, this may be surprising. Since the dawn of the space age,the popular image of space activities has been that they arepeaceful and nonmilitary. This image has been reinforced bygovernments, including the US government, to help guaranteethe use of space for unimpeded reconnaissance. As such, thereare international laws and treaties such as the Nuclear Test BanTreaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and the Treaty onthe Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) Treaty(1972), which restrict military space activities. However, RLV


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forces can live within these treaties as long as they are notused to carry weapons of mass destruction, conduct ABMtesting, deployment, or operations, or interfere with “nationaltechnical means (space intelligence systems)” which are beingused to verify treaty provisions during peacetime.1 2 0 This is notan exhaustive list of prohibitions, but h ighl ights the main areasof caution for RLV military applications.

Treaties and law are not the only international political con -cerns related to RLVs. Developing such a dramatic new militaryweapon capability could appear threatening to other states. It isconceivable that other nations would resent the US’s ability tostrike from space or within space with little or no warning. Theymight respond to this threat by developing similar capabilities orby developing ASAT or anti-RLV weapons. If deployment of anRLV force were perceived as an attempt to extend Americanglobal hegemony, it could encourage other states to form alli -ances against the United States. Political scientist, Stephen M.Walt suggests that this sort of balancing mechanism led to afavorable balance of power for the United States during the coldwar. The Soviets appeared threatening to other states, whichdrove them into the US camp.121 Given its completely commer -cial operations and more inhibited use in strike operations,CONOPS B might prove less threatening and minimize the ap-pearance of US aggressiveness relative to CONOPS A.

On the plus s ide, RLVs could be used for conventionals t r ikes with the range and nearly the promptness of ICBMs,but without the nuclear baggage. Assuming the RLV forcewould never tes t or employ nuclear weapons, there should beno internat ional concern about the s tar t of a nuclear confl ic twith the launch of an RLV.

Domest ic . Domest ical ly , one concern which must be ad-dressed is the potential US poli t ical concern associated withASAT deployment.1 2 2 While this would certainly not prohibitRLV development and use in space l i f t , reconnaissance, andtransspace operat ions, i t might complicate development of astrike capability. If the prohibition stands, strikes in space willnot be possible. Surface str ikes might be al lowed under theban, but Congress would have to be convinced that the sys -tem would not operate in an ASAT role.

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On the executive side of the government, NASA headquartersdirection that the RLV must replace the space shuttle comesacross loud and clear. While this is understandable, viewing anRLV as a shuttle replacement can be detrimental in three ways.First, it can be detrimental if it limits the designers’ and plan -ners’ imagination. Second, it could be detr imental i f the shutt lereplacement paradigm leads s imply to swapping RLVs forspace shut t le orbi ters , but re ta ining the same dated conceptof operations and support facili t ies. Third, i t could be detri-mental if i t forces the RLV to accommodate the same largepayload s izes and weights as the space shut t le wi thout anobjective evaluation to consider if there are better options. 1 2 3

Outside of the government, industry requires profi t to sur-vive. NASA leaders have experienced frustration in their at-tempt to get the private sector to fund a signif icant share ofRLV development costs. NASA administrator Daniel Goldinrecently crit icized the X-33 contractors for their “lack of cour-age to s tep up to the p la te and make i t happen.”1 2 4 The two-stage X-34 demonstrat ion vehicle program has already been acasual ty in the effor t to encourage industry to fund reusablelaunch vehicle technology. The contractor team of Orbital Sci-ences and Rockwell International “withdrew from developmentof the X-34 launch vehicle after determining i t would not becommercially viable.”1 2 5 The reality of industry’s motivation forprofi t should not be surpris ing. I t indicates that unless gov-ernment is willing to fund the RLV program completely itself,the design will have to be commercially viable.

It is not l ikely that the government will completely fund theRLV program. The current budget environment is severelyconstrained and is expected to remain this way for the fore-seeable future . Both the publ ic and the Congress want a f ru -gal government. The NASA budget in particular is on a down -ward trend. In f iscal year 1995, the programmed NASA budgetfor the year 2000 was $14.7 billion. The fiscal year 1997program cut NASA’s year 2000 budget down to $11.6 bil -l ion.1 2 6 The DOD budget has suffered f rom the same t rend andthe future appears to offer little relief. 1 2 7 In shor t , support i snot likely to be found for an expensive RLV development effortr emin i scen t o f co ld -war -e ra space and de fense p rograms .


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RLVs will have to be developed with industry contributions.Again, commercial viability will dictate development invest -ment and t ime l ines .

Summary of RLV Concepts Analysis

Using capability, cost, operations efficiency and effectiveness,and politics as a framework for analyzing RLV concepts of opera -tions yields several insights. First, capability analysis indicateseither RLV can be used as a multirole space superiority weapon.Each CONOPS provides for spacecraft deployment, spacecraftsus ta inment , reconnaissance of the space rea lm, and s t r ikewithin space as well as to the surface—key capabilit ies forcontroll ing the space environment. CONOPS A may requireaugmentation with large ELVs given its use of the smallerRLV-A. CONOPS B may provide less flexibility and strike util -i ty given i ts longer response and turnaround t imes. CONOPSA may have the advantage in t ransspace operat ions given thepotential for RLV-A requiring smaller propellant facilities andthe accompanying relaxation of mobili ty requirements.

Second, cost analysis indicates advantages and disadvantagesfor each CONOPS. CONOPS A will be sensitive to operating basecosts, and may require the additional expense of maintainingaccess to space for heavy payloads using ELVs. It is difficult toimagine either CONOPS providing economically competitivetransportation from one point on the earth’s surface to another,but there may be some military utili ty for such missions in thedistant future. CONOPS B may suffer in development costs be-cause RLV-B is more likely to push the limits of technology, thusfailing to take full advantage of the cost reductions possiblethrough technology maturation. Related to this observation isthe final conclusion of cost analysis—funding for propulsiontechnology development should be increased.

Third, operations efficiency and effectiveness analysis indi-cates cryogenic propellants will present a challenge to design -ers and operators. While these propellant systems offer highspecific impulse, they do not lend themselves to simplicity andease of operations. Fortuitously, today’s cryogenically pro -p e l l e d s y s t e m s m e e t t h e r e q u i r e d t i m e l i n e s f o r e i t h e rCONOPS. Deployability will be a challenge as well. Power and

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propulsion systems for RLV forces will likely be physicallylarge. Efforts to decrease the size and amount of supportequipment will ease the deployment burden. Reliabili ty is per -haps the most important a t t r ibute within the operat ions eff i -ciency and effectiveness category. Conclusions drawn from theanalysis indicate RLV-A may have the advantage of wider per -formance margins and greater re l iabi l i ty assuming no majorpropuls ion technology breakthroughs are made.

Fourth, pol i t ical analysis indicates a tougher environmentat home than internationally for RLVs. Neither CONOPS vio -lates internat ional t reat ies or laws, a l though i t might be in theUnited States’s best interest to soften the RLV’s military ap-pearance, perhaps an advantage for CONOPS B. Domestical ly,the congressional ASAT ban would prohibit the use of RLVsfor s t r ike miss ions in space and compl icate a t tempts to usethem for str ikes to the surface as well . The domestic f iscalenvironment poses the greatest difficulty for RLV development.NASA cannot afford to foot the entire bill for an RLV fleet, andindustry wil l only fund what market analysis indicates is aprofitable venture. The DOD is also unlikely to fund RLV de-velopment independently.

Conclusions

Our safety as a nation may depend upon our achieving“ s p a c e s u p e r i o r i t y . ” S e v e r a l d e c a d e s f r o m n o w t h eimportant battles may not be sea battles or air battles, butspace battles, and we should be spending a certain fractionof our national resources to insure that we do not lag inobtaining space superiority.

—Maj Gen Bernard A. Schriever

The United States and the Western World has an excit ingand vital future in space activities of all kinds, the key tot h a t f u t u r e , b e i t i n s e c u r i t y a c t i v i t i e s , i n s c i e n t i f i cexp lora t ion or in commerc ia l exp lo i ta t ion , the key i sresponsive and cost effective space transportation.

—Lt Gen James A. Abrahamson


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Maj Gen Bernard A. Schriever, commander, Western Develop -ment Division, a powerful force behind early developments in USmilitary missile and space capabilities, was premature in pre-dicting the importance of space battles, in a speech at SanDiego, California, February 1957, although the future may provehim correct. Given the increasing importance of space supportto recent battles on the land and sea, as well as in the air, hisemphasis on achieving space superiority may be more appropri-ate today. However, it is ironic to read Lt Gen James A. Abra -hamson’s words when he was director, Strategic Defense Initia -t ive Organizat ion of a lmost 30 years la ter (Congress ionalTestimony, 23 July 1985). These remarks reflect the view of thetop leader in development of the largest and most lethal spaceweapon system ever seriously considered for deployment. Yet hechose to emphasize the need for responsive and cost-effectivespace transportation, not weapons, as the key to future spaceactivity of any kind. It is also interesting to note that the pro-gram which may be credited with inspiring the current pursuitof reusable rockets, the McDonnell Douglas DC-X, was startedby General Abrahamson’s organization.

Having derived RLV requirements, described RLVs and theirattributes, elaborated two concepts of operations, and analyzedthose CONOPS, conclusions may now be drawn in attempt toanswer the initial research question. These conclusions are fol-lowed by recommendations and a summary of the research.

RLVs Have Military Potential. I t is clear from both theCONOPS and the subsequent analysis that RLVs have poten -tially important military applications . In many ways , they canprovide a multirole tool to help achieve the space superiori tyGeneral Schriever discussed almost 40 years ago. An RLV’spotential for accomplishing str ike missions, especially to thesurface , wi l l be higher i f turnaround and response t imes areshor ter . Increas ing the tempo of opera t ions can make theforce appear larger. Military missions also benefit from RLVswith greater cross-range capabili ty allowing the kind of opera -tions described by General Ashy. 1 2 8

Taking full advantage of RLVs’ space lift capabilities may re-quire a paradigm shift in spacecraft design, deployment, andsustainment. The launch on demand strategy possible with an

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RLV is not in fashion today. Successful implementation ofsuch a strategy will support space superiority but will requirespacecraft ready to launch on short notice and ready to oper -a te immediate ly upon deployment in orbi t . These require-ments could motivate development of cheaper, single-missionsatell i tes since i t may not be feasible to build and store bil l ion-dollar multimission satell i tes, or to expect them to be opera -t ional immediately upon deployment. 1 2 9 Capital izing on theRLV’s ability to recover and return payloads, or to servicet h e m o n o r b i t , w o u l d s i m i l a r l y r e q u i r e s a t e l l i t e d e s i g nchanges .1 3 0

RLV Design Is a Determinant of CONOPS. The potent ia limpacts of RLV siz ing have been addressed throughout th iss tudy. There is no unanimity regarding the proper s ize for anoperat ional RLV. Never theless , many argue that the currentsize identified for a full-scale RLV as part of the NASA-ledprogram involves high technical r isk which means high f inan-cial r isk as well .

This study has suggested that derivatives of current propul-sion systems will not deliver the performance levels required, orif they do deliver, there will be no performance margin andreliability will suffer. This assessment may be supported orproven false by further technology development and demonstra -tions. But due to the limited objectives of the X-33 flight tests,even these demonstrations may fail to give developers and inves -tors the necessary confidence to go full scale. Perhaps the bestcourse of action with respect to this issue is to ensure marketinganalysts, developmental engineers, and operators remain in theclosest contact to ensure the best RLV size is chosen.

The choice of RLV size must also be informed about thenegat ive consequences and opportuni ty costs associated withe a c h o p t i o n . T h i s s t u d y s u g g e s t s t h a t c h o o s i n g s m a l l e r ,cheaper RLVs can provide savings to apply towards a largerf leet and more bases . With such a force s t ructure we canaccomplish militarily significant activities to an extent not al-lowed by the choice of a smaller fleet and fewer bases. How -ever, choosing a more militarily useful RLV design and forcestructure could resul t in negat ive consequences for commer -cial and civil operators. A more militarily useful RLV design


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might include increased thermal protect ion system require-ments to facil i tate the greater cross-range capabil i ty needed totake off and land at the same base af ter one orbi t . I t may alsorequire the additional weight and cost of onboard self-protec-t ion systems. Meeting these requirements will not be cost free.Whether the costs are in dollars, weight, or space, trade-offswill have to be made.

Propulsion Technology Development Is Required. O n eway to mitigate some of the challenges faced in developing afull-scale RLV is to pursue propulsion technology developmentmore vigorously. Regardless of the size chosen for an opera -t ional RLV, advances in thrust- to-weight rat ios such as the100 percent increase sought in the integrated high payoffrocket propulsion technology program can dramatical ly de-crease technical and f inancial r isk.

Such efforts should be funded at the full level recommendedby the Moorman Study. An investment of $120 million per yearpales in comparison to the potential cost of developing an RLV.A lack of investment in propulsion technology development upfront is bound to prove penny-wise and pound-foolish.

Top Priority Must Be Cheap and Responsive Space Ac -c e s s. While RLVs have tremendous potential to perform mili -tary missions well beyond simply conducting space l i f t , anobjective evaluation of priorit ies leads to other conclusions.The US mil i tary possesses t remendous s t r ike and reconnais -sance capabi l i t ies through exis t ing and planned land, sea ,and a i r sys tems .1 3 1 Space-based reconnaissance has a l so beenconducted s ince the dawn of the space age. What the USmil i tary , and the ent i re nat ion, does not possess i s cheap andresponsive space access .

General Abrahamson’s words quoted earl ier were prophet ic .Less than a year af ter h is address , the Uni ted Sta tes’s spaceaccess program li teral ly crashed as a result of poor policychoices and a s t r ing of accidents that lef t the Uni ted Sta teswith a grounded STS f leet and a l imited and unrel iable ELVfleet . Talk of achieving space superiori ty is cheap. We mustf i rs t have access to the space realm before we can begin togain superiority.

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Recommendat ions

Three recommendations are offered here. First , the US mili -tary, especially the USAF, is already a participant in the RLVprogram, but i t should become more act ive in this area. I f , asthis s tudy assumes, today’s f iscal ly constrained environmentcontinues, the US military will not have the luxury of develop-ing an RLV fleet independently. Accordingly, the US militarywill have to blend i ts requirements with those of other users topursue mili tari ly significant applications. The current focus ofthe RLV program appears to be on NASA and commercialrequirements . There is an impl ic i t assumption that whateveris developed will spin on some military capability. 132 If the USmili tary is a passive part icipant in the RLV program, then theassumed spin-on capabi l i t ies may be l imited or nonexis tent .Mil i tary requirements must be defined and stated if the UnitedStates is to develop a t r iple-use, ra ther than merely dual-use,RLV fleet. If the current fiscally constrained environment doesnot cont inue, then act ive par t ic ipat ion in the current programis still warranted. An investment in defining military RLV re-quirements now wil l reap dividends should the t ime comewhen a military-unique RLV force can be developed.

Second, whether or not the United States develops a dual-use or triple-use RLV fleet or two fleets with one being mili -tary-unique, i t should not do so before the technology isready. If this study’s assumption that RLV technology willbecome operationally feasible by 2012 does not prove valid,then the i r development should not be pursued unt i l the tech -nology matures. The current RLV program appears to includethis tenet , but NASA may be tempted to seek high-risk devel-opment to acqui re a shut t le rep lacement . For tha t mat te r ,mil i tary space plane advocates may desire a s imilar approachin pursuit of a seemingly invincible weapon. Both part ies un-doubtedly have the US’s best interests at heart , but could leadus to squander our t reasure in pursu i t o f a d ream not ye tready to be realized. Careful evaluation of progress at eachstep in the program is the prudent course. The ear l ies t oppor -tunity, confidently to assess the merits of developing an opera -tional vehicle, will not come until the turn of the millennium.


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Third , regard less of the embryonic s ta te of reusable rockettechnology, i t i s not too ear ly for the US mil i tary to th inkdeeply about the implicat ions of RLV operat ional use. I f op -erat ional RLVs become a real i ty , there wil l be ser ious impli-ca t ions for war- f ight ing s t ra tegy, force s t ruc ture p lanning,t ra in ing , and doc t r ine . Concep ts o f opera t ions should bedeve loped in more dep th and b read th than th i s s tudy cou ldach ieve . In th i s regard , the ana ly t ica l c r i t e r ia used in th i ss tudy may prove to be a usefu l f ramework for eva lua t ingnew RLV CONOPS. Another way to suppor t preparat ion forthe bi r th of operat ional RLVs is to keep mil i tary people ac-t ive in the f l ight test programs. Today’s DC-XA fl ight testsinclude uniformed personnel f rom the USAF’s acquis i t ionc o m m a n d . 1 3 3 I t i s no t too soon to inc lude opera to r s andmaintenance personnel in th is ac t iv i ty . One of the of tenheard object ives of the RLV program is to develop aircraft-l ike opera t ions . An exce l len t way to pursue th i s wor thy goa lwould be to leverage the exper ience of seasoned mil i taryai rcraf t mainta iners . A handful of senior crew chiefs workingwi th RLV developers and tes t t eams may provide he lpfu ladvice on how to es tabl ish eff ic ient RLV generat ion and re-covery sys tems and p rocedures . At the same t ime , thesecrew chiefs would also be developing a knowledge base forfu tu re mi l i t a ry p l ann ing and ope ra t ions .

Final Summary

The US mi l i t a ry mus t be p repared to t ake advan tage o freusable launch vehic les should the NASA-led effort to de-velop an RLV demonst ra tor prove successful . The focus ofth is s tudy was an explanat ion of how the US mi l i ta ry coulduse RLVs by descr ibing and analyzing two concepts of op -e r a t i o n s . F o u r a s s u m p t i o n s w h i c h g u i d e d t h e r e s e a r c h a r eworthy of ment ion. Fi rs t , the es t imate tha t RLV technologywil l become operat ional ly feas ible by 2012 is reasonable .Second, a f i sca l ly cons t ra ined envi ronment wi l l cont inue .Thi rd , the US government wi l l con t inue to suppor t g rowthand development of the US commercia l space l i f t indus t ryand encourage dua l use , o r pe rhaps t r ip le use , o f r e l a tedfac i l i t i e s and sys tems . Four th , the US government ’ s na t iona l

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secur i ty s t ra tegy wi l l cont inue t o e m p h a s i z e i n t e r n a t i o n a lleadersh ip and engagement to fu r ther i t s po l i t i ca l , economic ,and secur i ty objec t ives .

Before developing and analyzing concepts of operations formil i tary use of RLVs, requirements were s tated as space l i f t ,r econna i ssance , t r ansspace opera t ions , and s t r ike ( in andfrom space). Then, to provide a basis for CONOPS develop -ment and ana lys i s , cur ren t RLV concepts and a t t r ibu tes weresummar ized , and hypothe t ica l a t t r ibu tes o f a no t iona l RLVfor use in mil i tary appl icat ions were suggested. Fol lowingdiscuss ion of RLV concepts and a t t r ibu tes , two concepts o fope ra t ions were p re sen ted and subsequen t ly ana lyzed . Thecr i te r ia used in the ana lys i s inc luded capabi l i ty , cos t , opera-t ions eff iciency, operat ions effect iveness, and poli t ical con -siderat ions ( table 39).

Four major conc lus ions resu l t ed f rom the ana lys i s . F i r s t ,RLVs have mil i tary potent ia l . Second, design choices for anoperational RLV will have effects on risk, cost , capabil i ty,and operat ions eff ic iency and effect iveness , the choice of alarger vehic le being accompanied by more r isk . Third , in -c reased inves tment in p ropu ls ion t echno logy i s war ran ted .Four th , the top pr ior i ty for the RLV program, even f rom theDOD perspec t ive , shou ld remain cheap and respons ive ac-cess to space .

Three recommendat ions were offered. Fi rs t , the US mil i -ta ry should become a more ac t ive par t ic ipant in the RLVp r o g r a m . S e c o n d , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d n o t p u r s u e d e-ve lopment o f opera t iona l RLVs before the t echno logy i sready. Third , i t i s not too ear ly for the US mil i tary to th inkdeeply about the implicat ions of operat ional RLVs for war-f i gh t ing s t r a t egy , fo r ce s t ruc tu re p l ann ing , t r a in ing , anddoctr ine.

The smal l s teps be ing taken by the DC-X Del ta Cl ipperexper imental in the New Mexico deser t today may be recog -n ized in coming yea r s a s hav ing warmed and s t r eng thenedour musc les for the g ian t leap in to an “exc i t ing and v i ta lfu ture in space ac t iv i t ies of a l l k inds .”1 3 4 The Uni ted Sta tesand i t s mi l i t a ry mus t be p repared fo r tha t fu tu re .


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Notes

1. Maj Michael A. Rampino, personal observations of DC-XA flight testnumber nine, White Sands Missile Range, N.Mex., 18 May 1996. The DC-XAcould hardly be called a spaceship given its l imited altitude capability—theninth flight only went to 800 feet and it never climbed above 10,000 feet. It

Table 39

Summary of Analysis

Analytical Criteria CONOPS A CONOPS B

Capability Spacelift

Reconnaissance

Strike to Surface Strike to Space (LEO) Transspace

Responsive, cannot lift all payloadsCapable and responsive

Capable and responsiveCapable and responsive

Capable—advantage of smaller propellant facilities

Responsive, lifts all payloads

Capable, but less responsive

Capable, but less responsiveCapable, but less responsive

Capable—disadvantage of large propellant facilities

Cost Operating Base (nonrecurring cost)

ELV Augmentation

Transspace

Technology Maturation

At least $350 million

$26.6 billion through year 2030Not economically viable

Decreases development costs—moderate requirement

At least $150 million

None

Not economically viable

Decreases development costs—essential

Operation Efficiencyand Effectiveness Cryogenic Propellants

Deployment

Reliability

Complicates operations

Challenging—benefits from smaller propellant facilitiesGood—lower propulsion performance requirement

Complicates operations

Challenging—suffers from large propellant facilitiesPoor—lack of performance margin

Politics International

Domestic

Lives within treaties and law—potentially threatening

ASAT ban prohibits space strikeFiscal constraints drive triple use

Lives within treaties and law— less-threatening appearanceASAT ban prohibits space strikeFiscal constraints drive triple use

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also lacks any payload carrying capabil i ty. However, i t does prove a pointabout the feasibil i ty of performing reusable rocket operations.

2. For an overview of the program, see the following sources. “RLV Pro-gram Overview,” Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., October1995, n.p., on-line, Internet, available fromhttp://rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/RLV_ HTMLs/RLVOverview.html. “A Draft Coop -erative Agreement Notice, X-33 Phase II: Design and Demonstration,” Mar-shall Space Flight Center, 14 December 1995, on-l ine, Internet , availablef rom h t tp : / /p rocure .msfc . nasa .gov/ p u b / s o l i c i t / c a n _ 8 _ 3 / .

3. Office of Science and Technology Policy, National Space TransportationPolicy Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: White House Press Release, 5 August1994), 3–4.

4. Maj Victor Villhard, staff officer, secretary of the Air Force, SpacePolicy Office, telephone interview with author, 27 November 1995. Accord -ing to Major Villhard, the USAF and NASA have an ongoing cooperativeeffort with seven IPTs examining areas for improved efficiency in spaceoperations. One of these teams, the space lift activities IPT, has a panel forthe express purpose of interchange and cooperat ion on the subject of reus-able launch vehicles.

5. Col Eric Anderson, director of space lift acquisition, assistant secre -tary of the Air Force for acquisition (SAF/AQSL), Pentagon, interviewed byauthor during visit to Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., 11December 1995.

6. Integrated Product Team for Space Launch Activities, “Terms of Refer -ence,” draft , undated. USAF officers on the IPT encouraged this researcheffort to help satisfy the very real need to identify DOD requirements.

7. “Air Force Forms Study Group on SSTO,” Military Space 13, no. 2 (22January 1996) : 4 .

8. Michael K. French, “Industry Officials Cautiously Applaud Tax-BreakBill,” Space News 7, no. 10 (11–17 March 1996): 15. The term d u a l u s erefers to the idea of government and commercial enti t ies using the samesystem or facility. The term triple use is of more recent origin and hasbecome popular to emphasize that both civil and defense government agen -cies use a system or facili ty along with commercial entit ies. A recent mani-festation of this government policy was a proposal to create tax breaks forcommercia l space ventures .

9. Directorate of Plans, Air Force Space Command, “FY96 MAP Align -ments and Defini t ions,” briefing, Air Force Space Command Headquarters ,Peterson AFB, Colo. , 23 January 1996.

10. Directorate of Plans, Air Force Space Command, Space Lift MissionArea Plan , 1 December 1995, 20–23 and 28. Transspace opera t ions asdescribed in the MAP “are those that occur in the boundary regions betweenthe atmosphere and space.” These operat ions involve moving people andmaterial to and through space. See also Glenn A. Kent, A Framework forDefense Planning, R-3721-AF/OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1989), 1.Strategies to task is “a force planning process that focuses on the building


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blocks of operational capability . . . clearly linking national security objec -tives to the t imely procurement of hardware.”

11 . Space Lift Mission Area Plan, 32. The cost-related deficiencies are thehigh recurr ing operat ions and maintenance costs of launch vehicle infra-s t ructure and the ranges; the operabi l i ty concerns s temming from spacel if t ’s manpower intensiveness and long launch preparat ion t imes; long-range turnaround t imes; the poor supportabi l i ty resul t ing f rom nonstan-dard ranges; the ranges’ inabi l i ty to support a l l users; and the diff icul tyDOD has in identifying and validating the growing commercial sector re -qu i remen t s .

12 . Space Lift Mission Area Plan, 36 and 85. Space-based range sys temrefers to replacing the ground- and air-based radar , te lemetry receivers ,t racking, and command systems now used in support of space l i f t opera-t ions with space-based systems. For example, some space l if t operat ionsdepend on support from aircraft to collect telemetry when the launch vehi-cle is not in view of a ground stat ion. I t may be possible to use a satel l i te tocollect this information. Using a satelli te instead of the aircraft may becheaper, more reliable, and more flexible.

13 . Space Lift Mission Area Plan , iii.14. This accident is a theme consis tent ly heard by the author dur ing

discussions with USAF officers involved in space lift policy, operations, andacquisi t ion business. At least one author has claimed the USAF’s emphasison expendable launch vehicles has more to do with i ts organizational es -sence and intercontinental ball is t ic missi le heri tage. If there is any truth tothis i t would certainly be hard to prove. It would be even harder to prove itsrelevance given the strong evidence of rational reasons for the USAF topursue its current course. See Maj William W. Bruner III , “National SecurityImplications of Inexpensive Space Access” (master’s thesis, School of Ad -vanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., June 1995).

15. USAF Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and SpacePower for the 21st Century, Summary Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAFScientific Advisory Board, 15 December 1995). The USAF Scientific AdvisoryBoard’s recently published New World Vistas study is one example of revo -lutionary planning effort. It was specifically designed by the USAF as anexternal complement to the USAF modernizat ion planning process due tothe recognized l imitat ions of a s trategies-to-tasks approach to acquisi t ion.

16. Message, 221435Z DEC 95, commander , Air Force Space Command,to vice chief of staff, USAF, commander, Air Force Materiel Command, andcommander , Air Combat Command, 22 December 1995.

17. “Latest News, Official Announcements,” Marshall Space Flight Cen-ter, Huntsville, Ala., n.p., on-line, Internet, 19 February 1996, availablefrom ftp://rlv.msfc.nasa.gov/RLV_HTMLs/ RLVNews.html.

18. “A Draft Cooperative Agreement Notice, X-33 Phase II: Design andDemonstration,” Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., on-line,Internet, 14 December 1995, available fromht tp : / /procure .msfc .nasa .gov/ pub/ so l ic i t /can_8_3/ , A-2–A-3.

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19. Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, Access toSpace S tudy , J anua ry 1994 , 61 , 69 .

20. The data in table 35 came from a number of sources. Data on RLVpayload capability, propulsion, mission life, and costs came from the follow -ing documents: Report of the Moorman Study, Space Launch ModernizationPlan , 5 May 1994; National Research Council , Reusable Launch VehicleTechnology Development and Test Program (Washington, D.C.: NationalAcademy Press, 1995); “Executive Review, RLV Technology Program,” NASAHeadquarters, 24 May 1995, n.p. , on-l ine, Internet , available fromht tp : / / r lv .msfc .nasa .gov/RLV_HTMLs/LIBGen.h tml . Compet ing cont rac-tors’ cost est imates are at the lower end of the spectrum but are not ci ted asthey are proprietary and may also prove to be optimistic. The cost figuresalso ignore what the unit production costs might be after technology devel-opment. Data on RLV takeoff and landing methods, operat ions base re -quirements , c ross-range capabi l i t ies , and turnaround t imes came f rom thefollowing telephone interviews: Mike Pitman, Rockwell RLV/X-33 systemsengineer , te lephone in terviews wi th author , 21 and 26 February 1996;David Urie, former Lockheed RLV/X-33 program manager, telephone inter -view with author, 22 February 1996; Paul Klevatt , McDonnell DouglasRLV/ X-33 program manager , te lephone interview with author , 20 February1996. Data on the Black Horse TAV came from Robert M. Zubrin andMitchell Burnside Clapp, “Black Horse: Winging It to Orbit,” Ad Astra 7 , no.2 (March/April 1995): 40–43; “Space Lift: Suborbital , Earth to Orbit , and onOrbit,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 42–64; and Capt MitchellB. Clapp, USAF Phillips Laboratory, telephone interview with author, 26February 1996.

21. George P. Sutton, Rocket Propulsion Elements, An Introduction to theEngineering of Rockets (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), 21–22. Spe -cific impulse, Is p o r Is , is defined as the total impulse per unit weight ofpropel lant . Total impulse, It , is the thrust force, F (which can vary withtime), integrated over the burning t ime t . According to Sutton, Is p has “unitsof newton-second3 /ki logram-meter. Since a newton is defined as that forcewhich gives a mass of 1 kilogram an acceleration of 1 meter/second2 , theu n i t s o f Is p can be expressed simply in seconds. However, i t is really athrust per unit weight f low.”

22. “Executive Review, RLV Technology Program,” n.p.23. National Research Council , Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology De -

velopment and Test Program (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,1995), 1–8, 21, and 73. Mass fract ion, a lso known as mass rat io or MR, isdefined to be the final mass of a vehicle (after propellants are consumed)divided by the init ial mass (before the propellants are consumed); andSut ton, 23 .

24. The potential cost impact of overland flight certification was high -lighted by Paul Klevatt, McDonnell Douglas’s RLV/X-33 program managerduring a telephone interview with author, 20 February 1996. The impor -tance of this issue was echoed by Dennis Smith, Marshal l Space Flight


488

Center, RLV program assistant for technology, telephone interview withau thor , 23 Februa ry 1996 .

25. There is not complete consensus on this i ssue, and i t i s addressedlater .

26. Sutton, 63. The l inear aerospike engine is a class of plug nozzleengine. A plug nozzle engine has a center body and an annular chamber ,unlike the traditional bell-shaped or contour nozzle common on today’sexpendable rockets and STS. An aerospike nozzle is a plug nozzle wherelow-velocity gases (e.g., from a separate gas source) are injected in thecenter and replace the center body. This al lows a very short nozzle hard -ware configuration, which is desirable for a compact vehicle design.

27. Rick Bachtel , RLV program manager, Marshall Space Flight Center,te lephone interview with author , 22 March 1996. Both the MDA and theRSSD concepts will most l ikely use engines derived from the space shuttlemain engine or the Russ ian RD-0120.

28. “Space Lift; Suborbital , Earth to Orbit , and on Orbit ,” 42–64.29. To be fair to the Black Horse advocates on the SPACECAST 2020

team, they did not intend to suggest great payload capabil i ty for the BlackHorse. Their concept included revolutionary reductions in satell i te size andweight and a greater focus on missions other than del iver ing payload toorbi t .

30. Analysis conducted by the Aerospace Corporat ion and discussed atthe 15 February 1996 meeting of the USAF’s Military Space Plane Applica-t ions Working Group in Colorado Springs, Colo. , indicates the Black Horseas descr ibed by the SPACECAST 2020 group is not feasible. With a changefrom aluminum to composi te material s t ructure and a s ignif icant increasein size, the vehicle might be able to achieve orbit , but just barely. Phill ipsLab’s Black Horse experts are in the process of rebutting this AerospaceCorporation analysis .

31. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security), Department ofDefense, Industrial Assessment for Space Launch Vehicles , J a n u a r y 1 9 9 5 ,ES-4 and ES-12–ES-13.

32. The belief that a smaller vehicle is more feasible was the consensusof participants at a meeting of the Military Space Plane Applications Work -ing Group held in Colorado Springs, Colo. , on 15 February 1996. Thepart icipants included NASA personnel , one of whom had worked on theagency’s Access to Space Study and c la imed the ana lys i s beh ind th i s s tudysupported the conclusion that developing smaller RLVs involves less techni-cal r isk. This perspective is also shared by Dr. Len Worlund, director oftechnology for the RLV program at Marshall Space Flight Center, althoughhe was also quick to point out that a smaller vehicle wil l not necessari lymeet the requirements of all the users, such as NASA. David Urie, recentlyret ired RLV/X-33 program manager for Lockheed Advanced DevelopmentCompany, te lephone in terview with author , 22 February 1996, represent inga contrary view, suggested a smaller vehicle size was actually less feasiblethan the full-scale RLV envisioned by NASA. Like Dr. Worlund, he was also

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quick to point out that a smaller vehicle would not meet al l user require -ments .

33. National Research Council , 3 .34. Ibid., 8.35. Ibid. , 73.36. Ibid.37. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security), II–2. Earlier

s tudies reached a s imilar conclusion. For example, see National ResearchCouncil, From Earth to Orbit, An Assessment of Transportation Options(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992), 4.

38. “French Launcher Design: Evolved Ariane,” Military Space 13 , no . 5(4 March 1996): 3–5.

39. The f irst two scheduled Ariane 5 launches wil l carry European SpaceAgency, not commercial, payloads. Craig Covault, “Cluster to InaugurateAriane 5 Flights,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no . 13 (25 March1996): 48–50; and Craig Covault, “Reentry Flight Test Set for Second Ariane5,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 March 1996): 51–53.

40. “News Briefs, Satellite Launch Review,” Space News 7, no. 10 (11–17March 1996): 17. According to the Arianespace consortium, the averageweight of a communications satell i te will increase from the current 2,400 to3,200 within the next four years then level off after that. This average doesnot include the satell i te constellat ions for mobile communications. Theseweigh less than 1 ,000 each .

41. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security), IV–3.42. Ibid., I–12.43. Lt Col Jess Sponable, briefing to Military Space Plane Applications

Working Group, Colorado Springs, Colo. , 15 February 1996. The pop-upmaneuver is essent ia l ly a nonopt imum staging maneuver in which the pay-load, with an appropriate upper stage, is deployed only a few thousand feetshort of orbit . This maneuver can significantly increase the payload capabil-ity to orbit (or into an intercontinental ballistic trajectory).

44. Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, 56.45. Lt Col Jess Sponable, briefing to Military Space Plane Applications

Working Group, 15 February 1996.46. Bruce A. Smith, “Rockwell Completes Design of Key X-33 Compo-

nents ,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 March 1996):56–57.

47. Maj Michael A. Rampino, personal observations during DC-XA flighttest number nine, White Sands Missi le Range, N. Mex., 18 May 1996. Basedon the 18 May 1996 DC-XA flight test , this requirement may change. Dur-ing this test , McDonnell Douglas used the grate and t rench system for thefirst t ime with poor results . Instead of rel ieving thermal stress on the baseon the vehicle, i t actually focused the DC-XA’s exhaust flame back uptoward the rocket causing a f ire.

48. An RLV’s ability maneuver in space is a function of its propulsionsystem and available propellant . To some extent , an RLV may be able to


490

trade payload weight carried for fuel increasing its abili ty to change itsorbital path. However, given the mass fractions required of an RLV, tradingall the payload capacity may sti l l translate into very li t t le out-of-plane ma-neuverability.

49. Dr. Len Worlund, RLV program technology director, telephone inter -view with author , 22 February 1996.

50. Wiley J . Larson and James R. Wertz, eds. Space Mission Analysisand Design (Torrance, Calif.: Dordrecht, 1992), 135–36 (equation 6-10). Thegreater cross-range requirement necessary to suppor t landing a t the base oforigin after one revolution is driven by the fact that the earth will haverotated some 22.5 degrees by the t ime the RLV completes one 90-minuteorbit. After circling the earth once, the RLV will find its orbital path is westof where it started. P = 4(360o – ∆L), where P is the orbital period, and ∆L isthe change in longitude that the satel l i te goes through between successiveascending nodes in degrees. For this example, 90 = 4(360 o – ∆L), and ∆L =337 .5 .

51 . David Ur ie , former Lockheed Advanced Development CompanyRLV/ X-33 program manager , te lephone interview with author , 22 February1 9 9 6 .

52. Joseph C. Anselmo, “NASA Confident of Shuttle Backups,” AviationWeek & Space Technology 144, no. 15 (8 April 1996): 54. Drawing onanalogies with today’s space shuttles would not be helpful. The orbiter withthe most f l ights, Discovery , has f lown only 21 t imes. One could also assertthat depot-level maintenance is required after every fl ight. If this kind ofperformance is repeated by RLVs, there is no hope for achieving the neces -sary efficiencies.

53. For insight into how weather affects current launch operat ions, seeJ. T. Madura, “Weather Impacts on Space Operations,” July 1992 (AirUniversi ty Library number M-U 44059, no. 92-02) and 30th and 45th SpaceWing, “Space Lift Concept of Employment,” draft, 1 October 1994.

54. Urie. According to Urie, Lockheed plans on an RLV crew size be -tween 50 and 60 people, with a total launch organizat ion of 150 people,including administrative and logistics support personnel. NASA’s Coopera-tive Agreement Notice for the X-33 Phase II requires demonstration of “atleast three X-33 landing-to-ref l ight turnarounds with a ground crew ( touchlabor) of less than or equal to 50 personnel.” “A Draft Cooperative Agree -ment Notice,” B-11.

55. Smith, 57. Rockwell plans on this type of arrangement for their RLVconcept . There is a ref lect ion of a broader t rend in the space industry toadopt common s tandards . In the space launch indus t ry , DOD is funding aneffort to develop standards to benefit the defense, civil , and commercialsectors. See also Jennifer Heronema, “Space Industry Officials AdvocateAdopting Standards,” Space News 7 , no. 8 (26 February–3 March 1996): 10.

56 . Paul Jackson , ed . , Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft (London: Jane’sInformation Group Limited, 1995), 567–76. A nominal weapons load for anF-16 consis ts of s ix 500-pound or two 2,000-pound bombs in addi t ion to

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external fuel tanks and air- to-air missi les . The greatest pract ical bomb loadfor the F-16 consis ts of 12 500-pound bombs or four 2 ,000-pound bombs,assuming no external fuel tanks are carr ied. The F-117 can carry two2,000-pound bombs. The former Soviet Union’s SS-18, the ICBM with thegreatest throw weight, could deliver 16,700 pounds. Max Walmer, An Illus -trated Guide to Strategic Weapons (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1988), 12.These f igures obviously do not account for enhanced weapons effects due tothe method of delivery.

57. The capabil i t ies described in this table are based on the discussionof RLV attributes in the previous chapter. CONOPS A capabilities reflect thedesired RLV attributes described in table 36. CONOPS B capabilit ies reflecta composite of the attr ibutes currently conceived by the three RLV programcompeti tors . In the case of turnaround t ime, this table actual ly ref lects theshortest t ime of any of the concepts ra ther than an average. Table 37 alsoassumes al l RLVs are completely mission capable—none undergoing main -tenance, lost in accidents, or lost to enemy activity. Finally, the RLVs willrequire some form of weapons dispenser . Based on examination of theUSAF’s most recently developed bomber, the Northrop-Grumman B-2 Spiri t ,i t i s es t imated that e ight 2 ,000-pound weapons may be carr ied on onerotary launcher assembly (RLA), and that each RLA weighs 4,000 pounds.Paul Jackson, ed . , Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft (London: Jane’s Informa-t ion Group Limited, 1995), 614–17.

58. This sent iment is echoed in the New World Vistas study. “The firstat tempt to apply new concepts is a necessary, but not suff icient s tep. Inmili tary systems, the second step in the development of a radically newconcept must be determined after operat ional deployment. The warfighterswill use the system in innovative ways not described in the manuals.” USAFScientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the21st Century, Summary Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advi -sory Board, 15 December 1995), 13.

59. This is a very conservative estimate of the development cost savingspossible with the smaller RLV—it could well be twice as cheap. But thisconservat ive est imate adds more balance to the two CONOPS and may helphighlight tradeoffs. One premise for the lower cost estimate on developmentof the smaller RLV is that a major new engine development program is likelyto be required to support the full-scale RLV large payload capacity and size.The National Research Council’s RLV program review supports this premise.National Research Council , Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology Develop -ment and Test Program (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995).

60. The terms space superiority , precision employment, global mobility ,a n d information dominance are used to describe four of the five USAF corecompetencies. They are not used to imply the USAF must own or operateRLVs for mili tary applications, but to i l lustrate the connections between thecapabil i t ies and a larger mission area or s trategy. For example, the abil i ty toquickly launch nat ional securi ty spacecraft in response to some contin -gency in addition to the abil i ty to reconnoiter and strike enemy spacecraft


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as necessary can provide the basis for affecting control of the space environ -ment for friendly exploitation while denying the environment to an adver -sary—the essence of space superiori ty.

61. In the earl iest days of the space age, the USAF proposed satell i teinterceptor project (SAINT), involved using an orbital vehicle to inspectpotentially hostile spacecraft. The USAF also hoped to develop SAINT intoan ASAT system. The project was canceled on 3 December 1962 for anumber of reasons. I t contradicted the US government’s desire to emphasizethe peaceful nature of i ts space program, and i t experienced technical ,conceptual, and financial difficult ies. According to historian Paul Stares, bythe mid-1960s ground-based systems were capable of a great deal of infor -mation gathering without the added expense and potential poli t ical prob -lems of an orbital system. Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space ( I thaca,N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 112–17.

62. The USAF’s Scientific Advisory Board’s New World Vistas study dis -cussed the uti l i ty of these types of weapons for space control. USAF Scien -tific Advisory Board, 46–47.

63. Joint Publicat ion 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Militaryand Associated Terms, 23 March 1994, 88. A contingency is “an emergencyinvolving mili tary forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists , subversives,or by required mil i tary operat ions. Due to the uncertainty of the s i tuat ion,contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to en -sure the safety and readiness of personnel , ins ta l la t ions , and equipment .”

64. At least one theorist writ ing about future war predicts space will be“a strategic center of gravity in any future war. Both sides will want spacecontrol.” Col Jeffery R. Barnett, Future War: An Assessment of AerospaceCampaigns in 2010 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1996), xxv.This predict ion is also made in the New World Vistas study. USAF ScientificAdvisory Board, 11, 46, and 61.

65. Barnet t , xxv. Colonel Barnet t predicts that in 2010, i f the US“chooses to oppose an invasion of an ally, i t must do so during the init ialstages of the attack. Failure to immediately engage the enemy could provedisastrous.” While this passage may contain some hyperbole, i t seems intui-tively obvious that being able to strike an adversary while his offensive isunfolding can be advantageous. The abi l i ty to do this without having todeploy large forces to the theater of conflict would be even more advanta-geous.

66. This s tandard should be the same for EELV.67. Max Walmer, An Illustrated Guide to Strategic Weapons (New York:

Prentice Hall Press, 1988), 12. These maneuverable reentry vehicles mighthave a precision strike capabili ty much like the “Precision-Guided ReentryVehicle (PGRV).”

68. Rockwell has identified two baseline locations for RLV operations,Cape Canaveral , Fla. , and Edwards AFB, Calif . They ruled out VandenbergAFB, Calif., because of concerns about flying over environmentally sensitiveareas when launching to the east . While this type of overflight restriction

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may be lifted by 2012, its reality today drove the choice of coastal primaryoperating bases in this study. If overflight restrictions are relaxed or com -pletely l if ted in the future, then primary operating bases in the interior ofthe CONUS may be a better choice to decrease vulnerabili ty. Bruce A.Smith, “Rockwell Completes Design of Key X-33 Components,” AviationWeek & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 March 1996): 57. Vandenberg isincluded here because of the anticipat ion that polar orbi ts may be desirablefor some military missions.

69. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, t rans . Dino Ferrar i (1942;new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 18–19.Douhet’s words “there is no practical way to prevent the enemy from attack -ing us with his air force” are indicative of his belief in the offensive nature ofairpower and the ineffect iveness of ground-based defense against air at tack.

70. Andrew Wilson, ed., Jane’s Space Directory (London: Jane’s Informa-t ion Group Limited, 1995) , 162–63 and 172–73.

71. It is conceivable that complete autonomy would not be acceptable forstr ike missions when collateral damage or fratr icide concerns are extremelyhigh .

72. Joint Publicat ion 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces , defines COCOMas “the author i ty of a combatant commander to perform those funct ions ofcommand over assigned forces involving organizing and employing com -mands and forces , ass igning tasks , des ignat ing objec t ives , and g iv ingauthoritative direction over all aspects of mili tary operations, joint training,and logist ics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the com -mand.” Quoted in Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Publication 1, TheJoint Staff Officer’s Guide 1993, 2-20–2-21.

73. Lt Col Robert Owen, “The Airlift System,” Airpower Journal 9 , no. 3(Fall 1995): 16–29, proposes four tenets of airl if t . One of these tenets sug-gests the military component of the US’s airlift system should only do whatthe civilian component can’t or won’t do. This tenet might well apply tospace lift , especially if there is a viable military component as described inthis CONOPS.

74. A similar arrangement already exists today with the civil reserve airfleet.

75. Joint Pub 0-2 defines TACON as “the detai led and usually localdirect ion and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplishmission or assigned tasks.” Quoted in AFSC Pub 1, 2-22.

76. According to Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint AirOperations, 14 November 1994, II-2–II-3, the joint force air component com -manders (JFACC) responsibilities do not include space forces. However, ifthe JFACC role is to funct ion as supported commander for s trategic at tackoperat ions , countera i r opera t ions , theater a i rborne reconnaissance and sur-veillance, and the JFC’s overall interdiction effort , as described in Joint Pub3-56.1, then i t may make sense to give the JFACC authori ty and responsi-bility for planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of RLVs used in


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support of a theater campaign plan and to include RLV str ikes on whateverthe air tasking order evolves into by the year 2012.

77. This is obviously not a critical issue for the CONOPS, but the RLVunit headquarters would be best located where most of the activity is l ikelyto be. With the fall of the former Soviet Union, Cape Canaveral has becomethe bus ies t launch base in the wor ld .

78. Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles (Washington, D.C.: Office of AirForce History, 1990), 103, 208, 252–53. Interestingly, in 1954 the USAFconsidered using civil ian contractor personnel to operate i ts f irst AtlasICBMs to attain an early “emergency operational capability” by 1958. Thisoption, described as a “PhD-type capabili ty,” was never exercised. Instead,the Atlas achieved operat ional s tatus in September 1959 only after a Strate -gic Air Command crew completed a successful t raining launch.

79. The assumption here is that the commercial organizat ion would bean American company. If the operator were to be a mult inat ional corpora-t ion, tasking for mil i tary missions would be more complicated. At the sametime, operat ions by a mult inat ional corporat ion could provide a measure ofdeterrence. Any attack on a multinational RLV might invite a response fromother nat ions as wel l as the Uni ted States .

80. Joint Pub 0-2 defines OPCON as “the authority delegated to a com -mander to perform those funct ions of command over subordinate forcesinvolving the composit ion of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks,the designation of objectives, and the authoritat ive direction necessary toaccomplish the mission.” Quoted in AFSC Pub 1, 2-21–2-22.

81. Report of the Moorman Study, “Space Launch Modernization Plan,”5 May 1994, 12. The minimum time required from call-up to launch fortoday’s expendable launch vehicles is 2–4 months for Pegasus, 90 days forTitan II, 98 days for Delta II , and 180 days for Titan IV . The shutt le requires12–33 months f rom cal l -up to launch.

82. Joel W. Powell, “Space Station Hardware,” Spaceflight 38, no. 2 (Feb -ruary 1996): 54–56.

83. Rick Bachtel , RLV program manager, Marshall Space Flight Center,telephone interview with author, 22 March 1996. Bachtel est imated thecrew module wil l weigh approximately 20,000 pounds and carry a crew ofth ree to four as t ronau ts .

84. Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, Access toSpace S tudy , J anua ry 1994 , 40 and 64–65 .

85. Powell, 54. The current plans for ISSA deployment have the Rus-sians delivering two of the largest components of ISSA, the functional cargoblock a t 19,340 kg and the service module a t 21,020 kg, f rom Baykonourcosmodrome using Proton rockets . Former as t ronaut Buzz Aldrin has sug-gested using the Russians’ largest rocket , the 220,000-pound-to-LEO Ener-gia , to lift ISSA payloads. See Darrin Guilbeau, “International Cooperationand Concerns in Space Logistics,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19 , no . 1(Winter 1995): 25–31. This lift capability is four times that of the Titan IVand could easi ly handle l if t ing the largest planned payloads.

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86. Cape Canaveral is located at 28.5 degrees (28 degrees, 30 minutes)north lati tude, while Baykonour is located at 45.9 degrees (45 degrees, 54minutes) north lat i tude. Wiley J . Larson and James R. Wertz, eds. , SpaceMission Analysis and Design (Torrance, Calif.: Dordrecht, 1992), 680. Oneequat ion used here as the basis for this est imation can be found in Roger R.Bate, Donald D. Mueller , and Jerry E. White, Fundamentals of Astrody -namics (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), 307 (equation 6.4-1). Vo =1 ,524 cos Lo , where Vo i s the speed of a launch point on the surface of theear th , 1 ,524 f t / sec is the eas tward speed of a point on the equator , and Loi s the la t i tude of the launch s i te . For launch out of Baykonour , Vo = 1 ,524cos (45.9) = 1 ,060.6 f t / sec . For launch out of the Cape, Vo = 1,524 cos(28.5) = 1,339 ft /sec. To determine how much of the eastward velocity of thelaunch s i te actual ly may be used to help boost a payload, some basictr igonometry may be used. V1 = Vo cos ∅, where V1 is the velocity advantagein the direct ion of the launch azimuth gained from the rotat ion of the ear th,Vo i s the speed of a launch point on the surface of the ear th , and ∅ i s theangle be tween the launch az imuth and a l ine due eas t of the launch s i te .For a launch out of Baykonour into the ISSA orbit (51.6 degree inclination),V1 = 1,060.6 cos (26.8) = 946.7 f t /sec. For a launch out of the Cape into theISSA orbit, V1 = 1,339 cos (47.12) = 911.1 f t /sec. Thus, for launches intothe ISSA orbit , Baykonour actually benefits more (946.7 – 911.1 = 35.6ft /sec) from the rotat ion of the earth. (Launch azimuths to the ISSA orbitf rom the Cape and Baykonour were provided by the 45th Range Squadron ,Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Fla. , and Ed Faudree of the ANSERCorporation, Washington, D.C., respectively.)

87. Craig Covault, “Reentry Flight Test Set for Second Ariane 5,” 51–53.88. The Titan IV can lift 39,100 pounds to LEO. Ariane 5 data may be

found in “French Launcher Design: Evolved Ariane,” Military Space 13 , no .5 (4 March 1996): 4. Titan IV data may be found in Bretton S. Alexander etal., “1994 Space Launch Activities,” ANSER Aerospace Division Note ADN95–2 (Arlington, Va.: ANSER, 1995).

89. See “National Reconnaissance Office Home Page,” National Recon -naissance Office, n.p., on-line, Internet, available fromhttp:/ /www.nro.odci .gov/, for an official introduction to the US govern-ment’s space-based nat ional securi ty reconnaissance capabil i t ies .

90. There are numerous pr int and e lectronic media sources which con -ta in informat ion about US government space-based reconnaissance sys -tems and provide ephemeris data which could be used to predic t orbi ts andoverfl ight t imes. This author makes no judgment about the accuracy of thispublicly available information. However, if there is any truth to i t , then evenan unsophis t ica ted adversary might thwar t US a t tempts to moni tor themusing reconnaissance satel l i tes in space.

91. Paul B. Stares , The Militarization of Space (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-versity Press, 1985), 112–17.

92 . Paul Jackson , ed . , Jane’s All The World’s Aircraft (London: Jane’sInformat ion Group Limited, 1995) , 617. The B-2 has a maximum weapons


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load of 40,000 pounds—the same as the payload weight capacity of RLV-B.However, when delivering weapons such as the AGM 169 advanced cruisemissile (ACM), the joint direct at tack munition, or the Mk 84 2,000-poundbomb, only 16 of these weapons can be carr ied due to the weight of therotary launcher assembly required to carry and dispense them. Obviously,an RLV will not drop these same weapons. Weapons designed specificallyfor delivery from space will be required.

93 . There a re many assumpt ions under ly ing the numbers in th i s tab le .With respect to the RLVs, assumptions include a 100 percent mission-capa-ble rate, no other missions, such as space l i f t , being accomplished, nolosses , RLA carr ies e ight 2 ,000-pound weapons and weighs 4,000 pounds,miss ion execu t ion t ime i s 90 minu tes to go a round the ea r th and re tu rn tolaunch base while making str ike en route (45 minutes into orbit) . Withrespect to the B-2, assumptions include a cost of $2 bil l ion for each aircraftallowing for a cost-equivalent fleet of 10 aircraft (corresponds to RLV devel-opment budget of $20 bi l l ion) , one-hour response t ime, s ixteen 2,000-pound weapons delivered by each aircraft , f lying out of the continental US(CONUS) with an 18-hour fl ight required to reach the target, recovery at thepoint of origin in the CONUS (Whiteman AFB, Mont.) , and three-hour turn-around t ime. The $2 bil l ion cost f igure for each B-2 is a unit programcost—the total program cost divided by the number of aircraft acquired (seeJackson, 615). A lower cost figure for the B-2 could be used if one onlycounted the current uni t product ion costs , not including program develop -ment costs . But then one could use the same method to arr ive a t a lowercost figure for RLVs as well.

94. At least one writer has suggested using an RLV-like vehicle to deliverUS Marines “From Space” in the 2040 time frame. Maj William C. Redmond,“Campaign 2040: Victory From Space” (master’s thesis, US Marine CorpsSchool of Advanced Warfighting Studies, 1995), 34.

95. Dave Schweikle, McDonnell Douglas Aerospace DC-X/DC-XA pro-gram manager , te lephone interview with author , 2 Apri l 1996, and personalobservations of the author at White Sands Missi le Range, 16–18 May 1996.

96. Ibid., 2 April 1996.97. Report of the Moorman Study, D-14.98. Telephone inquiry to package delivery service, 3 April 1996.99. Daniel McDonald, staff member, Aerial Ports Operations Division,

Air Mobili ty Command, telephone interview with author, 4 April 1996.These cost and t ime f igures averages are based on al l shipments given a“999” priority, the highest possible, shipped from Dover to Ramstein duringthe per iod of October 1995 through February 1996.

100. For two examples, see Office of Space Systems Development, NASAheadquar ters , 70 , and Repor t of the Moorman Study, 27.

101. Report of the Moorman Study, D-10–D-11.102. National Research Council , Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology

Development and Test Program (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,1995), 13.

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103. Ibid. , 9.104. Briefing, OL-AC PL/RKF (USAF Phillips Lab, Fundamental Tech-

nologies Division), subject: Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Tech -nology program, 12 March 1996.

105. Recommendation number eight of the Moorman Study was to “in -crease funding for a core space launch technology program as an enablerfor future investment” (see Report of the Moorman Study, 26). Funding forthe IHPRPT program prior to the Moorman Study report was in the $50–60million range—it has remained at that level since. James Chew, staff mem -ber, Directorate of Advanced Technology, director of Defense Research andEngineering, telephone interview with author, 19 March 1996.

106. The Moorman Study recommended “that the space l i f t core technol-ogy program within DoD be increased from its current level to $120M totalby FY 96” (see Report of the Moorman Study, C-1–3).

107. Neufeld, 208–19 and 234–35.108. A cryogenic propellant is a liquefied gas at low temperature. Cryo-

genics are very high performance propellants (specific impulses as high as450 seconds may be achieved) but are complicated to handle. Hypergolicpropellants are l iquid propellants which spontaneously ignite as the oxidizerand fuel come in contact with each other. Hypergolics l ike those used in theTitan are l iquid at ambient temperature that can be s tored for long per iodsin sealed tanks, easing some of the complicat ions encountered with cryo-genics, but only achieve specific impulses of 300–340 seconds. Solid propel-lants are simple, reliable, and relatively low cost, but have more limitedperformance (specific impulses of 300 seconds or less) . George P. Sutton,Rocket Propulsion Elements, An Introduction to the Engineering of Rockets(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), 147, 175, and 292. Larson andWertz, 644–45.

109. Third Space Launch Squadron Operat ions Checkl is t , AC-74 LaunchManagement Countdown Checklis t, 12 April 1994.

110. Schweikle.111. Edward Boyle, Matthew Tracy, and Lt Col Donald Smoot, “Rethink-

ing Support Equipment ,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19, no. 4 (Fall 1995):28–31.

112. Quoted in Boyle, Tracy, and Smoot, 28.113. Quoted in Capt Sandra M. Gregory, “Improving Space Lift Reliabil-

i ty through Robust Design,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19, no. 1 (Winter1995): 16–18.

114. Ibid., 16.115. Report of the Moorman Study, 10.116. Gregory, 17.117. Smith, “Rockwell Completes Design of Key X-33 Components,”

56–57.118. Gregory, 17.119. The McDonnell Douglas Aerospace and Rockwell RLV propulsion

concepts plan on using SSME or RD-0120 derivative engines. The Lockheed


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RLV concept requires new engine development given its nontraditional lin -ear aerospike engine design. Bachtel , te lephone interview, 22 March 1996.

120. Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JDTTP) 3-14,“Space Operations,” final draft, 15 April 1992, II-18–II-22 and A-1–A-17.

121. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of WorldPower,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–41.

122. Air Force Doctrine Document 4, “Space Doctrine,” draft , 1 August1995, 5 .

123. NASA leaders fear losing the shuttle, so they will take the greatertechnical risk involved with developing a full-scale rocket instead of initiallyshooting for reusability in a smaller-scale vehicle. This is entirely specula -tive but may provide interesting insights into organizational behavior re -lated to the RLV program. I t may also suggest why the DOD would take amore r isk-averse approach. The DOD sees development of an RLV as apotential gain but is confident of its ability to continue using ELVs for spaceaccess . Thus, DOD is less motivated to take a high r isk in the quest for anoperational RLV. DOD pursues the lower-risk approach of incrementallyimproving its ELV fleet through the EELV program.

124. Quoted in Joseph C. Anselmo, “NASA Issues Wake-up Call to In -dustry,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 144, no. 8 (19 February 1996):20 .

125. Ibid., 20.126. Joseph C. Anselmo, “Clinton Budget Chops NASA Again,” Aviation

Week & Space Technology 144, no. 13 (25 March 1996): 23–24.127. Lt Gen Howell Estes, director of operations, Joint Staff, “Operation -

al izing Space,” address to the Second Annual C4I Symposium, USAF Acad-emy, Colo. , 28 March 1996. Paul G. Kaminski , undersecretary for acquisi-tion and technology, “Building a Ready Force for the 21st Century,” DefenseIssues 11, no. 6 (17 January 1996): n.p. , on-l ine, Internet , available fromht tp : / /www.dt ic .mi l /defense l ink/ pubs /d i96/d i1106.h tml . Rep. Ronald V.Dellums, “Toward a Post-Transition World: New Strategies for a New Cen -tury,” SAIS Review 25, no. 10 (Winter–Spring 1995): 93–111. On the plusside, the DOD’s 1997 budget request for space programs is up 12 percent inspite of the gloomy fiscal environment. Jennifer Heronema, “US Military HasLess, But Allocates More to Space,” Space News 7, no. 10 (11–17 March1996): 8 .

128. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, CINCSPACE, identified the capabilit ies to“take-off on demand, overfly any location in the world in approximately onehour and re turn and land within two hours a t the take-off base” as desi r -able. This was used as one basis for RLV requirements at the outset of thisstudy (see chap. 1). Message, 221435Z Dec 95, commander, Air Force SpaceCommand, to vice chief of staff, USAF, commander, Air Force MaterielCommand, and commander , Ai r Combat Command, 22 December 1995 .

129. The USAF Scientific Advisory Board’s New World Vistas report de -scribes a potential future in space where many low-cost single-functionsatell i tes work in cooperative networks to achieve even greater capabili ty

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than that possible with a few high cost multifunction satell i tes. USAF Scien -tific Advisory Board, New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21stCentury, Summary Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific AdvisoryBoard, 15 December 1995).

130. Wally McCoy, “Sustaining Space Systems for Strategic and TheaterOperations,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 19, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 32–33.The feasibil i ty of on-orbit support has been studied within the mili tary, asrecently in 1993 by USSPACECOM, and made a reality by NASA throughuse of the space shutt le. The Hubble Space Telescope is one example of aspacecraft specifically designed for on-orbit servicing.

131. Report of the Moorman Study, “Space Launch Modernization Plan,”5 May 1994, C-1-2-3. If the ability to take off, overfly a target half-wayaround the world within an hour , and land back at the base of or igin withintwo hours of takeoff is strongly desired by America’s military leaders, thenthere may be a better way to obtain that capabil i ty. Scramjet technology,such as that developed as part of the National Aerospace Plane Program(HYFLITE) might be pursued to achieve TAV-like capability. This might alsosatisfy the deficiency in transspace operations as defined in the Space liftMAP.

132. John A. Alic et al . , Beyond Spinoff, Military and Commercial Tech -nologies in a Changing World (Boston: Harvard Business School Press ,1992), 7–8, 73. The term spin on refers to reverse spin-off. With spin on,technologies developed entirely in the commercial sector are used, or areadapted for use, by the defense sector .

133. Maj Michael A. Rampino, personal observations at DC-XA flight testnumber nine, White Sands Missile Range, N.Mex., 16–18 May 1996.

134. Lt Gen James A. Abrahamson, quoted in House , Assured Access toSpace during the 1990s: Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on SpaceScience Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology and theSubcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on ArmedServices , 99th Cong. , 1s t sess . , 1985, 41.

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RAMPINO

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Author’s NotesRampino, Michael A. Discussions at 15 February 1996 Military

Spaceplane Applications Working Group. Colorado Springs,Colo., 15 February 1996.

———. Personal Observations of DC-XA Flight Test NumberNine. White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, 16–18 May1996.


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