Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment –...

29
Complex Systems Engineering The Air Transportation Case Study Sergio Torres, PhD Leidos March 28, 2017 1

Transcript of Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment –...

Page 1: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Complex Systems Engineering The Air Transportation Case Study

Sergio Torres, PhD

Leidos

March 28, 2017

1

Page 2: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Outline

• Complex systems

• Transportation system case study

• Agent-based solution to air traffic

• Bayesian networks

2

Page 3: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

3 https://www.crcpress.com/Case-Studies-in-System-of-Systems-Enterprise-Systems-and-Complex-Systems/Gorod-White-Ireland-Gandhi-Sauser/p/book/9781466502390#googlePreviewContainer

• Commerce • Culture • Environment • Finance • Health Care • Homeland Security • Military • Transportation

Page 4: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Enterprise

Comparative Analysis of Systems

4

Complex systems

System of systems

System

Degree of difficulty

Page 5: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

System of Systems (SoS)

• A set of several independently acquired systems, each under a nominal systems engineering process

• These systems are interdependent and form in their combined operations a multi-functional solution to an overall coherent mission

• The optimization of each system does not guarantee the optimization of the overall SoS

(Stevens 2009)

5

Page 6: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Complex? Complicated?

6

Page 7: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Complex systems • Complex ≠ complicated

• Made up of a large number of parts that have many interactions

• Autonomy

• Autopoiesis

• Self-organization

• Adaptation

• Hierarchical organization

• Emergent properties

• Non reducible (behavior of each component depend on behavior of others)

• Vast parameter space (not optimizable)

• Networked causality

• Reduced predictability (not deterministic)

• Disturbances may propagate to a global context

7

Top-down approaches do not work with complex systems

Page 8: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Problem Statement

8

The air transportation system is inefficient

Inefficiency costs will grow (non-linearly) with increased traffic load

NextGen (the solution?)

In 2007 there were 4.3 million hours of flight delay in the US which raised airlines’ operating costs by US$19 billion and

consumed about 740 million additional gallons of fuel (Joint Economic Committee, Majority Staff 2008).

NextGen is an unprecedented overhaul of the U.S. air transportation infrastructure and represents the largest investment ever made in civil

aviation. Between US$29 billion and US$42 billion for equipment, software and training by 2025 (Huerta 2011)

In the U.S. civil aviation creates 10 million jobs and contributes 1.3 trillion dollars to the U.S. economy.

Page 9: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Problem Statement (II)

9

• NextGen does not introduce radical changes or new paradigms

• NextGen concepts rely on scaling capabilities hoping that modern automation will increase capacity and efficiency

• The problem is that air transportation system is a complex system that does not scale linearly with demand

Page 10: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Air Transportation – How did we get here?

10

First US controller, Archie Leage, 1920 Technology: a red flag (hold), checkered flag (go)

WWII Radar

June 30, 1956: TWA Lockheed Constellation and United Airlines DC-7 collided over the Grand Canyon

1958, FAA

Page 11: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Current Air Traffic System – Context Diagram

11

Page 12: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Control Loops in the National Airspace System

12

Flight Schedules Fleet management

Flight Monitor FOC

Ground Delay Program

Miles-in-Trail weather reroute

Flight plan execution

TFM

ATC

Flight Crew

Long Term Planning horizon

Pre-departure tactical Strategic

Operational Domain

Metering & Arrival management

Dispatcher operations

• Clearances • Interim altitudes

Arrival management

• Descent advisory

Separation management Pre-departure

clearance

CATM

• Slots • Capacity constraints

• Slow down • Path stretch

Page 13: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Limits of Predictability in the NAS

13

• TBO is predicated on the assumption of improved prediction accuracy, however there is a limit to the predictability of the NAS: • Air traffic is a stochastic process

• Weather uncertainty

• Guidance and Pilot options

• Human behavior

• Fidelity of mathematical models

• Accuracy of aircraft performance models

• Uncertainties in aircraft state

• Unknown aircraft intent

• Unpredictable tactical interventions

Page 14: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Traffic Flow Network Optimization

14

O-D pair

O-D pair (linked)

Arr/Dep Queue

NAS model as a network of queuing servers • Large Parameters space

Multi-objective optimization for a problem with exceedingly large dimensionality leads to

combinatorial explosion

Page 15: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Trajectory Prediction Accuracy

15

Mass Group

• Varying one parameter at a time

Source: Torres, S., "Trajectory Accuracy Sensitivity to Modeling Factors", 15th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference (ATIO), Aviation Forum 2015, 22-26 June, 2015, Dallas, TX.

Page 16: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Time-Based Traffic Flow Management Insights from Queue Theory

16

• Estimated queue wait time as a function of Demand/Capacity ratio (ρ)

AAL77

UAL49

DAL480

-10-5

05

-10-5

05

-10-5

05

time

ETA uncertainty

Tails of prediction uncertainty distributions overlap

Arrival Sequence

In steady state the expected delay time in queue (TW) increases with demand and variance of the arrival

stream

Cv = coefficient of variation (= σ/avg)IATD

λ = arrival rate

µ = airport acceptance rate (AAR)

τ = service time

TW diverges as 1/0 For ρ=λ /µ 1

Demand/Capacity

Page 17: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Time-based Traffic Flow Management Efficiency Curves

17

• Rapid grow for ρ < 1:

ρ=0.9 ρ=1.2

DES Low 54 77

CRZ Low 62 103

Uniform (15s) 33 42

Highlighted Measurements (delay in seconds)

(ρ=λ0/AAR)

Source: Torres, S., Nagle, G., "Analysis of Prediction Uncertainty in Interval Management", 16th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference (ATIO), Aviation Forum 2016, 13-17 June, 2016, Washington, D.C.

Demand model: KATL

Average delay time computed for delayed flights. Average of Monte Carlo realizations

Page 18: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Complexity and Information Flow

18

Scaled solutions based on prediction and central

planning are not effective to manage complex systems

Swarm systems in nature exhibit remarkable efficiency in solving optimization problems. This is possible by: 1. Providing complete and accurate

information flow between actors 2. Letting swarm members act as

autonomous agents

(… on the other hand)

Page 19: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Agent-based Solution to Manage Air Traffic Flow

19

Air traffic is a multi swarm system

Provide pilots with complete and accurate information

Delegate separation to the pilot

Pilots become goal seeking agents that (like in a swarm) promote optimality of the system as a whole

The flow of information between members of the swarm is necessary to drive the emergent behavior towards non-chaotic, coherent flows

Central control is replaced by self agents that respond to market forces, thus creating conditions for a swarm emergent behavior (autonomy, distributed functioning and self organization) that naturally tends towards optimality

Page 20: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Agent-based Solution to Manage Air Traffic Flow

20

AOC 2. Operator plans

according to user preferences and airspace availability

Courtesy: B. Avjian

4D-Grid

weather

restrictions & constraints

traffic

1. Provide complete and accurate information regarding available airspace

3. Build FMS trajectory according to plan

5. Fly FMS trajectory

ATC

4. Obtain 4D-clearance

The business preferred trajectory closes the information loop

6. Populate 4D-Grid with FMS trajectory

Page 21: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Agent-based Solution

21

Page 22: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Agent-based Solution to Air Traffic Management

22

Torres,S. 2014,"US Air Traffic System: Autonomous Agent-Based Flight for Removing Central Control", in Case Studies in System of Systems, Enterprise Systems, and Complex Systems Engineering, Edited by Alex Gorod, Brian E. White, Vernon Ireland, S. Jimmy Gandhi, Brian Sauser, Taylor & Francis/CRC Press, 2014, pp. 701-729. Torres, S., "Swarm Theory Applied to Air Traffic Flow Management," Procedia Computer Sciences, Elsevier (Ed. C.H. Dagli), Vol. 12, pp.463-470, 2012, Complex Adaptive Systems Conference, November 14-16, Dulles, Virginia Torres, S., Delpome, K.L., "An Integrated Approach to Air Traffic Management to achieve Trajectory Based Operations", 31st Digital Avionics Systems Conference, October 14-18, 2012, Williamsburg, Virginia

References

Page 23: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Bayesian Network (BN) Analysis

23

Bayesian inference engine

BN Model

Prior probabilities

Measures of risk

Page 24: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Bayes Theorem

24

Tool to update ‘belief’ based on conditional probabilities

Page 25: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Bayes Theorem

25

Tool to update ‘belief’ based on conditional probabilities

In a chest clinic, 5% of all patients who have been to the clinic are ultimately diagnosed as having lung cancer, while 50% of patients are smokers. Records of all patients previously diagnosed with lung cancer show that 80% were smokers. A new patient comes into the clinic. The patient is a smoker. What is the probability that this patient will be diagnosed as having lung cancer.

Problem

Page 26: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Bayes Theorem

26

Tool to update ‘belief’ based on conditional probabilities

In a chest clinic, 5% of all patients who have been to the clinic are ultimately diagnosed as having lung cancer, while 50% of patients are smokers. Records of all patients previously diagnosed with lung cancer show that 80% were smokers. A new patient comes into the clinic. The patient is a smoker. What is the probability that this patient will be diagnosed as having lung cancer.

Analysis H (hypothesis) = “patient has lung cancer” E (evidence) = “patient is a smoker” Prior belief: P(H) = 0.05 P(E) = 0.5 We want to update our belief in H given evidence E = P(H|E)

Problem

Source: Fenton & Neil (2013)

Page 27: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

27

http://www.bayesianrisk.com/

Page 28: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

Bayes Theorem

28

P(H|E) =

P(E|H) x P(H)

P(E)

Page 29: Complex Systems Engineering - UMDide/data/teaching/amsc663/16fall/To… · Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain

The Air Traffic Bayesian Network

29

Pax behavior

TSA Check

Airport Ops

Boarding

Local weather

Other departures

Flying Time

En-Route Weather

Arrival Demand

Local Weather

Controller actions

Dept Time Arrival Capacity

Time of Arrival

Risk assessment – decision making using updated probabilities Explicit causal connections Nodes = uncertain variables (conditional probabilities) Node Probability Tables (NPT) – expert inputs, historical analysis, etc.