COMPL OF WORKS1

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About Me 1 Bachelors Degree in Mechanical Engineering -Graduated in 1992. 24 years experience in Oil and Gas Industry. Presently working as Head of Mechanical Static in PETRONAS Carigali in the Production International Division. Technical Authority of International Operations in various part of the world. Worked in Various Capacities - Mechanical Design Engineer, Project Execution & Commissioning Experienced in Piping, pipeline, pressure vessel, tanks and mechanical static equipment Won various innovation Awards & HSE Award. Following are some of the works done over the years

Transcript of COMPL OF WORKS1

About Me

1

Bachelors Degree in Mechanical Engineering -Graduated in 1992.

24 years experience in Oil and Gas Industry.

Presently working as Head of Mechanical Static in PETRONAS Carigali

in the Production International Division.

Technical Authority of International Operations in various part of the

world.

Worked in Various Capacities - Mechanical Design Engineer, Project

Execution & Commissioning

Experienced in Piping, pipeline, pressure vessel, tanks and mechanical

static equipment

Won various innovation Awards & HSE Award.

Following are some of the works done over the years

Prior to commencing operation activities, an operation meeting was held at 0630 to

discuss JHA & Permit to Work (PTW). As per operation log there were 10 PTW opened for

activities on that day. One of the activities were Startup Gas Compressor Train(GTC).

Control room operator started up GTC and continued to increase speed and put on

load. At full load status , the field operator heard the sound of gas leak above the after-

cooler train and confirmed the gas leak from the incoming flange of the after-cooler

train.

Control room operator activated Plant Shutdown manually and the GTC was

immediately stopped – the pressure immediately was reduced to 0 psi.

As a result of this incident, 3 flange gaskets of inlet cooler GTC were damage in normal

operating condition.

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Carried out Axisymmetric contact flange leak analysis- Finite Element Analysis and Caesar II analysis to

identify deficiencies in design - FEED phase to implementation of the project

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3 Underlying CausesDesign Engineering (DE):

• Failed to conduct a proper review of the stress analysis report and failed to recognize

the importance of the differential thermal load on dissimilar nozzle material.

• Failed to review standards during detail engineering. Data sheet of the insulating

gasket is incomplete and does not have the process design data.

• In the detailed engineering material selection did not follow manufacture standard for

the insulating gasket as Neophenolic can only installed in piping flanges of 300# or

below and temperature less than 107deg

Incompatible Goals (IG):

• Failed to communicate important issues on design (stress analysis & process

parameter) from detailed engineering to PCIC contractor.

• Failed on the part of management to bridge between detailed engineering phase and

PCIC phase

Error Enforcing Conditions (EC):

• Management Failed to review Special Item. The Insulation Gasket are special items,

however, these were treated as bulk material by the PCIC contractor.

• Verify Bolt tensioning calculation by the contractor. Bolting by the specialist flange

management contractor on critical test limit tie-in flanged joints were carried out

without proper calculations and review.

• Insufficient resources to conduct proper Line Design Review(LDR)

Hydrostatic load on vertical vessel Skid

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Usually the hydrotest of vessels during the fabrication

is not carried out on the skid. Temporary arrangements

are made in the workshop and the vessel is

hydrotested before painting.

Due to this, the vessel’s skids and the supporting

arrangements are not particularly designed for

hydrostatic test loads.

Careful calculations should be done to check the

components and their suitability to handle these

occasional loads.

Below is a check done on a vertical pressure vessel

which was going to be subjected to hydrotest load at

field and a potential incident was avoided.

Location of High stress

and local failure expected

2015

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• This is a loss of containment incident due to a ruptured Utility Gas

Heater -an Electrical heat exchanger.

• The incident occurred during the process of starting-up of the Vapor

Recovery Compressor (VRC)

• The incident resulted in total damage of the shell and local damage to

nearby lighting, fitting, insulation and cladding.

• The exchanger was replaced with a newly designed one.

LOSS OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (LOPC)

INCIDENT AT UTILITY GAS HEATER

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6• Fortunately, there was no one near the equipment during the incident or

it could have resulted in a more severe impact as the incident involved a

high-pressure release of natural gas at 90 BarG.

• It was also fortunate that the release was stopped through manual

activation of Emergency Shut Down (ESD) before it could get in contact

with any source of ignition.

• This study was trigger by photographical evidences of the site which had

a heat exchanger with missing bolts on the support.

LOSS OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (LOPC)

INCIDENT AT UTILITY GAS HEATER

Offshore Crash/Rescue Fire Trainer – Helicopter Simulator

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UAE’s First Offshore Crash/ Rescue

Helicopter Simulator

Complete with Helideck

Features of the Simulator:

The helicopter simulator will be placed

on the steel Helideck structure as this

will give the offshore fire fighting team a

realistic simulation

The simulator will be gas fired as it will

have HSE advantage over the oil fired

simulator.

Future:

It can be used to Train Other companies offshore Fire fighting Teams, and this concept can also be

used by other companies to train their personnel.

The Simulator will be used to simulate engine fire, cockpit fire, baggage/ compartment fire and pool fire

Used to Train Offshore Fire Fighting Teams and external fire fighting teams.

In-house design - Built to international Standards

Introduction

Innovations of 2013

Buckling Analysis on Tank with Distortion-2011

8Background

Tank was built in 1980 and has been in

operation for 31years

Service was sour oily water

Tank was used as Surge tank in the sour

water treatment plant

The tank was built to BSI – 2654 version

1973 & NACE

Introduction

Tank was under major overhaul in Jan 2011

Cause of this distortion was not known

Inspection revealed distortions on both the

Shell and Dome

A fitness for service evaluation of the flaw

was required to be carried out to put back

the tank into operation

Buckling Analysis on Tank with Distortion -2011

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Assumptions made

There was no thickness loss/variation - as

inspection reports did not reveal any such defectThe tank has a suitable monitoring / inspection

program

Concerns Raised Resolution

The original design

data and

calculation were not

available

A finite element model of the

design case (without any

flaw/base case) was generated

to look at the maximum stress at

the relevant part and compare

with the flaw assessment

No established

standard to carry

out buckling analysis

for tanks built to BSI

standards.

Above Base Case Model help in

looking at the compatibility with

API620 & API 579 was used for

Fitness for Service assessment.

Effect of nozzle load on the shell was not

considered as no data is available. (Note : There are

no piping attachments on the dome.)It was not the basis of this study to identify the root

cause of the buckling - as no information was

provided to carry out such a study

Buckling Analysis on Tank with Distortions

10 Analysis Procedure

STEP 1 – Flaw and Damage Mechanism Identification

STEP 3 – Data Requirements

STEP 2 – Applicability and Limitations of the FFS Assessment Procedures

STEP 4 – Assessment Techniques and Acceptance Criteria

STEP 5 – Remaining Life Evaluation

STEP 6 – Remediation

STEP 7 – In-Service Monitoring of the Flaw

STEP 8 – Documentation

Methodology as per API579

Applicability and Limitations of the FFS Assessment Procedures was to be

established

Data Requirements for the FFS was to be established

Available Original Equipment Design Data required

Required Data/Measurements for a FFS Assessment.

Assessment Techniques and Acceptance Criteria’s were to be established

Based on the above, carry out buckling analysis of the distortions.

Provide Recommendations.

Buckling Analysis in Tank with Distortion

11Assessment to API579 – Level 3

Base Case Model (model without any distortion)

Buckling Analysis on Tank

12Assessment to API579 – Level 3

Limit-Load Analysis Method (refer B1.2.3

of API579)

This technique used in determining

the maximum vacuum/external

pressure required to reach the

minimum yield stress i.e. to

determine the load required to

reach the plastic deformation.

The base case established that a

vacuum/external pressure of

0.04N/mm2 was required to be applied

uniformly on the tank at 37degC to

cause the yield point to be reached

Buckling Analysis in Tank

13 All the four flaw locations were mapped with a grid of 100 x 100mm

The grid were plotted with the use of Autocad and transferred to Algor.

Algor software was used for the refined mesh generations and final

assessment of the flaws

Elastic Stress Analysis Method was used in the buckling analysis.

The equivalent stress equal to the von Mises equivalent stress was used.

Assessment to API579 – Level 3

Carry out repair on location-3 and location-4 on the Dome

Recommendation were issued on how to avoid vacuum

load.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Hawser Incident Investigation– Dynamic Analysis -2011

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The Failure of Mooring Hawser

at SPM-February 2011

No personal injuries and no oil spill / pollution

Property Damage resulted: Parting of the mooring

hawser and damage to the thimble eye on the SPM

side

A multidiscipline team was formed to investigate the

incident.

Introduction

Hawser Incident Investigation– Dynamic Analysis

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Dynamic Analysis

The load on the hawser was plotted against the

actual load on the hawser at the time of the

incident to simulate the actual scenario.

A realistic model was created to look at the snatch

effect on the hawser.

Load Cell Reading at the berth at the time of the incident

Dynamic Simulation Load Input

84 sec – 130.8ton & 90 sec – 400ton

Inspection revealed no anomalies for this

particular hawser.

The hawser was loaded 53 (75% of normal

uses) out 70 times with 1117hrs working (93%

of operational life span of 1200 hrs) & 4month

19days since installation

Static Analysis

A static analysis was also carried out on the

hawser with two case

Case with a load of 130t

Case with a load of 250t

Discussion

Hawser Incident Investigation– Dynamic Analysis

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Hawser Incident Investigation– Dynamic Analysis

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In Conclusion the Immediate cause:

Ship Approach during the Berthing Operation:

The final approach was not conducted as per standard approach which created transverse motion and

high rate of turn that consequently resulted in heavy snatch load effect on the hawser.

Hawser Incident Investigation– Dynamic Analysis

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Hawser Incident Investigation– Dynamic Analysis

19 Load=130ton

Innovation -2009GRE Piggable Pipeline – ASME B31.4

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Barred TeeBarred Tee

Introduction:

First GRE piggable pipeline to ASME B31.4

Features of the Line:

The 20” pipeline will consist of GRE Barred tee for branch Connection upto 8”.

The bends used will be piggable.

Line will be buried except at tie-in locations.

Criss-cross poly foam will be used for pigging the line.

Resistance to Corrosion thereby extending the life of the pipeline.

Lead the Stress Analysis to find a suitable solution to

avoid shutdown of the platform.

Gas Leaks on bellow convolutions were identified -

with one out of three trains forced to shutdown and

another train was running under continuous

monitoring with leak from cracked convolutions.

No spare available of the bellows in stores.

Provide engineered solution to run both trains till

replacement bellows arrives from abroad.

Performed static analysis of the 16” x 10” discharge

piping Gas compressor & Dehydration Trains of Gas

Compressor to find a suitable alternative temporary

solution

Gas Compressor bellow Leak (year 2007)

Introduction

The condition of the train at the start of the analysis was

Train A was shutdown with one upper vertical Gimbal bellow and the horizontalHinged bellow found leaking.

Train B was running with a leaking bellow (crack on Horizontal Bellow).

The life cycle(7000cycles) of the bellows have exceeded and no spare bellowsavailable.

Avoid shutdown

Purpose of Analysis

to check the feasibility of replacing the leaking vertical Gimbal & hinged bellows witha rigid pipe spool piece.

Carry out static stress analysis to ASME B31.8 & check reaction at the compressornozzle (discharge side - are within the allowable of API617) with the existing pipingconfigurations

Conclusion and Recommendation:

The stress analysis is valid for the proposed modification of utilizing Cold Spring to enablethe operation of Train A and B on a temporary basis till the replacement bellow areavailable in 3 week time.

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Gas Compressor bellow Leak (year 2007)

Discussion

FINITE ELEMENT ANALYSIS -2002FITNESS FOR SERVICE

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Scaled Acad Model of Spheroid

Drawn by Bijoy

Featured article & Picture from Company

Magazine

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