Communism in Burma 1949

8/14/2019 Communism in Burma 1949

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Catalogue Reference:CAB/129/34 Image Reference:0002


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T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T Y S G O V E R N M E N T

Printed for the Cab inet. Ma rch 1949

S E C R E T Copy N a 3C P . (49) 7224th March 1949

CABINET

C O M M U N I S M I N C O U N T R I E S O U T S I D E T H E S O V I E T O R B I TNOT E BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AF FA IR S

I circulate herewith, for the information of my colleagues, a survey ofCommunism in countries outside the Soviet orbit, which brings up to dateand supersedes the survey circulated w ith C P (48) 223, except the section onChina.

E . B .

Foreign Office S. W. 1,2 4 a March 1949.


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S U R V E Y O F C O M M U N I S M I N C O U N T R I E SO U T S I D E T H E S O V I E T O R B I T

Reports on the fol lowing countries are a ttach ed: Argentina .. . Page18 Japa n ... Page39Belgium Kore a (South) . . . . . . 40Bol ivia . . . . . . ... 19 Leban on . . . . . . 30Brazil ... ... ... ... .. . 19 Luxembourg 8Burma ... . . . 34 M exico . . . . . . 22Central America . . . 20 NetherlandsChile .. . . . . 20 N orw ay . . . . . ... 15China ... ... . . . . . . . . . 37 Palestine .. . . . . 27Colombia . . . : . .. ... 2 1 . - Pan am a ... . . . . . . 23Cuba .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 . Paraguay .. . . . . ... ... 23Denm ark ... . . . . . . 15 Persia ... ... ... 33Dom inican Republic . . . . . . 22 Peru .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Ecuador .. . . . . . . . 22 Philippines .. . . . . . . . . . . 42Egypt .. . . : . . . : . . . 25 Portug al . . . 10Ethiopia ... . . . 26 Siam ... . . . . . . 43Finland .. . Spain ... ... ... 9France. . . . . . . S u d an . . . . . . . . . 26French Indo-China ... 37 Sweden .. . . . . 16G reece . . . . . .. . .. . ... .. . . 13 .. Syria ... ... , ... ... ... 2 9Hayti . . . . .. 2 2 T ra nsjo rd an . .. . . . . . 2 9Iceland . . . ... ... ... 17 Trieste ... ... 12Indonesia ... . . . . . . 38 Turkey .. . . . . ... ... 25Iraq ... . . . . . . . . . 32 Uruguay . . . . . . ..: ... 24Italy ... . . . 10 Vene zuela 2 4

2. The infor m ation in the reports is in the form, where applicable, ofanswers to the following questionnaire Is there a legal Communist Party?What is its actual membership?What is its percentage of the total population? .What is its percentage of the electorate?Has it members in the national Parliament, and what percentage?Has it members in the national Government?What votes has it recorded in recent elections, national or local?What is the extent of its influence in the armed forces?What is the extent of its influence in the police?What is the extent of its influence in the Civil Service?What is the extent of its influence in the trade unions?Are there any known contacts between its leaders and Soviet Russia?Are there any known contacts between its leaders and Communists in neighbouringcountries?W hat are its pote ntialitie s as a fifth-column?


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F R A N C E1. The Comm unist Pa rt y in Fra nce is legal. It is, in fact, the largest singleparty in the elected Chamber, the Assemblee Nationale (Lower Ho use), andtherefore it is unlikely that, short of a war with Russiaor a near catastrophicsituation lead ing to a dissolution and a de Gau lle dictato rship the legalityof the Party will be questioned.Un der the stress of wa r conditions, it is true, the Pa rt y was outlaw edon 26th September, 1939, by the Daladier Government, which ordered its dissolution with the concurrence of the other groups represented in the Chambre desDeputes. A t the same time the Government placed a ban on the pub lication anddistribution of all Communist propaganda material.2. Mem bership of the Party. Figures of the actu al mem bership of theParty, as distinct from the Communist-controlled C.G.T., are not easily available.A t the end of 1946 the estimated figure wa s 815,000 app roxim ately. It is possiblethat the figure of militants to-day (the end of 1948) has decreased somewh at.There are, of course, several we lfare and charitable org anisa tions of a fellow

traveller character controlled by Com mun ists, and a small section of the So cialistParty (S.F.I.O.) might, in certain circumstances, co-operate actively with theP.C.F. Parti Communiste Franoais). D urin g Janu ary 1949 the Union Republi-caine et Resistante, num bering eig ht De pu ties, and affiliated to the Com mun ists,have decided to act as a separate party, with possibly a less intransigent policy.3. Percentage of the Electorate. 28-2 pe r cent, (see 6 infra).4. Num ber of Members in the Assemblee, Nationale is 168 out of a tota lof 621 D epu ties. In the Conseil de la Republique (Upp er Hou se) , the party 'srepresentation has been cut down during the recent elections of November 1948from 84 (out of 315 ), coun cillors to 21 (out of 32 0). Th e decrease is, how ever,largely due to the substitution of a majority vote for P.R. in many electoraldistricts , an alteration which penalised the Communists who were unwil l ing toform electoral alliances. They still probably control about 20 per cent, of theelectorate, but a change in the electoral system might reduce their representationin the Assembly also.5. Com munist M inisters were bowed out of the qua drip artite c oalitionGovernment of M. Ramadier in May 1947, when Communist Deputies , includingthe Ministers, chose to vote against the Government on economic policy and aisoon the G over nm ents pol icy in Indo-China. In the present Government underthe Co nstitu tion, the Co mm unists wo uld be offered po sts in a caretaker Govern

ment, formed after dissolution of the National Assembly until a new Assemblyis electe d. / \ ...6. V ot in g strength in the general election of November 1946 was 5,475,955(Metropo litan France only). Overall results of the jn un icip al elections of October1947 gave the Comm unists no more than 6 -9 per cent, of the seats. A t thesecond ballot, in many cases, they forfeited nearly 25 per cent, of their municipalcouncillorships and a majority of the mairies previously held by Comm unists.7. Influence in the Armed Forces. In the first two and a ha lf yea rs afte rthe Liberation the Communists exerted considerable influence in the armed forces.This was due partly to the prominent position they had acquired during theResistance period, partly to the strong position they occupied then in the politicalsystem. It has to be borne in m ind tha t, in the coalition Governments to whichFrance ap peared to be comm itted indefinitely by the electoral law, M inis trie sare largely party strongholds. General de G aulle 's coalition Governments, theGouin and Bid au lt Adm inistrations of 1946, as wel l as the quadripartite coal i t ion,after the general elections of November 1946, all contained Communist Ministersthrough whose influence Communists were infiltrated into key-positions.M. Tillon, Minister of Armaments, was able to secure control over the arsenals.But the extrusion of Communist Ministers from the Ramadier Government inMay 1947 put a very different complexion on the matter. To-da y, while Com munistagents are perhaps more active than ever in their attempts to gain a hold overthe serving soldier by propagandathe Central Committee of the Party is knownto attach great importance to propaganda in the forces which is under the chargeof M. Raoul GalasCommunist influence in the direction of Armed Forces, Army,


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Na vy or A ir Force ha s been reduced considerably. It shou ld be noted, however,that scientific and armament research, and production are penetrated by avowedCommunists, an outstanding example being that of Professor Joliot-Curie, incharge of Atomic Research.8. Influence in the Police. In the imm ediate po st-w ar period, similarly,Com mu nists held m any imp orta nt positio ns in the police. Bu t recent Governments,w ith Com mu nists exclud ed, have been able to effect considerable pu rgin g y.i.e., pensioning off of persons who obtained high appointments, outside the normalhiera rchy , at the time of the Liber ation. To-day, even in the P ar is police,Communists are probably not much more than 20 per cent.9. Influence in the Civil Service. The same trajec tory is to be observed.But the strength of Communist influence in the civil service is still substantial,particularly in the nationalised industries, although efforts have been made inthe departments, especially the Ministry of Labour, to prevent Communistsholding important posts.10. Influence in the Trade Unions.The princip al trade union federation,the C.G.T., Confedera tion Genera le dn Travail, -which is Communist-controlled,numbers some 2,500,000, although this figure may have been considerably reducedby the violent tactics adopted by C P dur ing the min ers' strike, wh ich alienatedmany workers. Com munist representation is strong on the join t factorycommittees which are compulsory in all enterprises employing more than50 worke rs. Si nc e December last year, wh en the failu re of the strikes show edthat the rank-and-file of French workers were f e d u p w ith being draggedinto polit ical agitation, Communist leaders have done their utmost to revive theso-called Com mun ist frac tions in the trade union s. Bu t they have not beenaltoge ther successful. Com mu nist influence in the trade unions, w hile it willcontinue strong, has probably passed its mer idian. A n estimate by M. Ben noit-Frachon, Secretary-General of the C.G.T., early in 1948 that the number of payingmembers of the C.G.T. would shortly be in the region of five million is a sheerflight of fancy.11. Contacts between French Comm unist Leaders and Soviet Russia.Maurice Thorez, Secretary-General of the Communist Party since before the War,is Moscow-trained and is reported to have got on particularly well with Stalin.He spent some years in Russia during the War, after deserting from the FrenchArm y. W hile he does his best to follow the party l inee.g., the noticeable shiftof tactics follow ing the Co m info rm m eeting in September 1947, of wh ich his

speeqh on 29th October at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party wasthe reflectionhe is said to have snown rather too much independent spirit tobe comp letely in the good grace of the Kr em lin. Other leaders more under thethumb of Moscow like MM. Marty and Casanova have nothing l ike the prestigeor ability of Thorez.12. Contacts with Leaders in Neighbouring C ountries. There is no evidencethat French Communist Party leaders depend from day to day or week to weekon instru ction s from Moscow. In the recent coal strike, December 1948, thereappear, however, good grounds for assuming that they were being both advisedand subsidised by Moscow. They are well tr a in e d -a n d there is alwa ys theRu ssia n press and wir eless. Some attem pt wa s made late 1948 to synchronisetactics and developments with the Italian Communist Party, and in late NovemberTo gliat ti was though t to have visited France to check up on the possibil ityof relating military and sabotage operations in South-Eastern France with similardevelopments in North-West Italy; but on the whole, the French Communist Partyhas few links with other Communist Partiesexcept, of course, through membership of the Com inform. A t tim es Moscow seeks to use the Frenc h C omm unistParty as the main outpost of Communism in Western Europe e.g., for directivesto the parties in the Low Countries.13. Military Organ isation of the Party.-As to the po ten tialit ies of theP.C .F. as a F i f t h Colum n, exagger ated ideas are held on this. The best

estim ate of unde rgroun d m ilita ry strength is between 100,000 and 150,000. Ofthose wh o vote Com mun ist in the elections not all wou ld, in fact, in the eventof a war between the Soviet Union and the West, go out and fight for, or indeedgive any sort of aid to, So viet Ru ssia. B ut the proba bility of effective fif thco lu m n activ ities should not be ligh tly dism issed. In an all-out efforth the


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Comm unist Pa rty could dislocate nationa l l if e for a period and a chieve an effectiveif only temporary stoppage of any war effort.In a country like France with a long-standing political tradition it is inconceivable that the electoral strength of the Communist Party should indicate thatthe nation is hell-bent for a journey along the Moscow road. I t is an im porta ntfact, however, which should never be overlooked, that the Communist Party hasestablished itself firmly in France as the workers' party (particularly but notexclusively industrial workers), supplanting the S.F.I.O., which, after supportinga series of coalition Governments, has abandoned in some measure the traditionalprinciples of French socialism, and thus compromised itself with many of thewo rking class. W hatever hap pens in the Par liam entar y arena, this pos ition isunlikely to chan ge: this La bo ur ism , which gives French Communism its

B E L G I U MI. Ye s. The Comm unist Pa rty is legal.2. Mem bership of the Party.100,000 at the beg innin g of 1948 (108,000 inSeptember 19 45 : 10,000 before the war). The Pa rty machine is under goin gthorough overhaul, necessitated by this ten-fold expansion; and it^was hoped torecruit 5,000 branch secretar ies by the end of 1 948. These, in tur n, wer e exp ectedto recruit some 50,000 militants surs et devoues. Of the present Party total,it is almost certain that an appreciable number have not paid their dues.3. Percen tage of Total Population. 1 2 per cent, (the population is

approximately 8,300,000).4. Percentage of the Electorate.Electorate figure unk now n; but the P ar typolled 12-7 per cent, of the total votes-2,365,638cast at the General Electionof February 1946.5. Represen tation in Parliament.23 Dep uties in the Chamber of R epr esentatives (9 before the war) out of a total of 202, or 11-4 per cent.; and17 Senators in the Sena te (3 before the war) out of a total of 167, or 10 -2 p er cent.6. Mem bership of Government.N ot since M. Sp aak took office w it h aChrist ian Socia l-Social ist coal i tion in March 1947. The left-wing Cabinet ofhis predecessor, M. Hu ysm ans, included 4 Communists. The present C abinet,

formed by M. Spaak in November 1948, retains its two-party basis.7. Voting Strength.300,099 votes were polled for Communist cand idate sat the General Election of February 1946.8. Influence in the A rmed F orces.No evidence of any influence.9. Influence in the Police.Very small influenceperhaps negligible.10. Influence in the Civil Service.Unknown; but the impression is tha tit is inconsiderable.I I . Influence in Trade U nions.Comm unist penetration of Tra de U nio ns ,* previously estimated to be about 30 per cent., has since declined considerably.There is no Communist influence whatsoever in the Christian (Catholic) TradeUnion Confederation; and present strength of Communism in the (Socialist)Belgian Confederation of Labour is estimated at not more than 15 per cent, oftotal mem bership. A s the result of determ ined efforts to deny them influen tialpositions, Communists now hold no places either on the National Secretariat oron the General Council. Only five of the num erous Comm unist U ni on s (Syndicatsuniques) formed du ring the occup ation contin ue to ex ist. A ll are affiliated t othe Be lgian Federation of Labour. W ith the exception of the Quarrym en'sSyndicat unique, their influence is small. In the other U nio ns of the Belg ianFederation of Labour, a few subordinate official posts are held by Communists.This is a concession to the principle of Trade Union unity; but, in any case, theseCom mu nist officials are under continuo us supe rvision by reliable Socia lists. Thesystematic elimination of Communists from official posts in the Metalworkers'Union and the Public Services Federationthe two largest Unions affil iated tothe Federation of Labourhas much reduced the Pa rty 's influence in them. I t


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was in these two Unio ns tha t, not very long ago, C omm unist influence wa s greatest.These setbacks in the Trade Unions have not, however, dissuaded them fromtak ing every opp ortun ity to make cap ital out of the wor kers' grievanc es. It isknown that during 1948 the Party was instructed to begin immediate infi l trationof the building and electrical industries (including power-stations), using themethods wh ich proved so successful in Czechoslovakia. Those engage d in theseactivi t ies were i ssued with a document known as Le Cornet de V Hom me deConfiance, which is bel ieved to be identical with a document issued to militantsin Czechoslovakia. Infi l tration of other industries was also to be gin ; but so farthese have not been specified.

12. Contacts between Belgian Com mun ist Leaders and Soviet Russia .-Unknown.13. Contacts with Leaders in Neighbouring Coun tries-There was ameeting on 4th January, 1948, between two members of the Central Committeeof the Be lgian Comm unist Pa rty Ju l ien Lahaut, Pres ident of the Pa rty, and

Jean Bertrand, National Secretaryand an unnamed delegate from the FrenchComm unist Pa rty . The me eting wa s held for the purpose of pla nn ing concertedaction in the event of international confl ict; and it is bel ieved.that the selectionof points along the Franco-Belgian frontier at which French or al ien Communistrefugees could enter Be lgium secretly and form a maquis on the Belgian side,and the question of supplies for the proposed maquis, were among the subjectsdiscussed.14 . Military Organ isation of the Party.W hile there is some sig n of paramilitary activity, the Belgian authorities are of the opinion, that the BelgianCommunist Party is not in a position to initiate any revolutionary action in thenear future. Ea rly in 1948, however, French and B elg ian Com munist elemen ts

were reported to be smuggling arms and explosives by rail from France toBelgium . Of the former Resistan ce group s, the Com mun ist-dominated Front deVIndependance remains the most hig hly organised and most vocal; i t is not know nwhether it is armed.

T H E N E T H E R L A N D S1. The Comm unist Pa rty is legal . (Established in 1909.) It is cal ledCommunistische Parti] Nederland (CP. ,N.) .2. Pa rty leaders announced the membership as 53,000 on 1st September, 1947.A recent estimate suggests that i t has fal len to about 50,000.3. M emb ership represen ts about .54 per cent, of the total popu lation .4. To tal of electorate 5,444,735 (Ju ly 1948). Com mu nist poll at the Gen eralElection of July 1948 was 7 74 per cent, of a total poll of 4,933,735 (10 6 per cent,of a total poll of 4,760,711 in M ay 19 46).5. Th ere are eigh t members in the Second (Low er) Chamber out of 100, or8 per cent. (10 in May 1946; 3 before the war).6. N o Communist has ever served in a Du tch Cabinet.7. Th e Par ty polled 381,953 votes at the General Election of Ju ly 1948(502,963 in May 1946).8. Influence in Arm ed Forces is bel ieved to be nil . Un successfu l a ttem ptswere made by the Communist Pa rty to persuade troops to desert on the eve of theirdeparture for the Netherlands East Indies in 1946.9. Influence in the Po lice is believed to be very sm all.10 . Th ere is no infor m ation a s to influence in the Civil Service.l i . A t one time Comm unist penetra tion of the trade unions wa s estima ted a tabout 30 per cent.; but recently the Party has lost much groundeven in the socal led U nit y Trade Un ion , which i t founded soon after the wa r and wh ich i tdom inates. Th is union hoped to capture waverers and malcontents from thepowerful Catholic and Social ist Unions, but in this i t was mainly unsuccessful;a l t h o u g h - u n t i l t h e coup in Czechoslovakiaits ranks included a certain number


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of left-w ing S ocialist elements and others. These have since broken away and thestrength of the Unity Union is now principal ly derived from the Rotterdam andAmsterdam dock-workers, who, in any case, provided its original membership.The Communist trade-union strength has recently been estimated at 100-120,000as against 850,000 in the non-Communist unions.

12. The General Secretary of C.P.N., Pa ul de Groot, visited Ru ssia in 1935and 1946; the Secretary, Johannes Pieter Schalker, visited Russia before 1940, andthe second Secretary, Jan Halken, travelled through the Soviet Zone of Germanyin 1947 and attended the S.E .D. Con gress in Berlin. Pa ul de. Groot attended theCommunist Party Congress in England in 1947 and Jan Halken the FrenchCommunist Congress in the same year. Dockers' delegates from Rotterda mand Antwe rp met in Belg ium in October 1947 to discuss the mean s of d efea ting asecret agreement reached between the shipping companies in these two parts forunloading ships in one port in the event of the others being paralysed by a strike.(The only serious strikes in the Netherlands since the war have involved dockers.)13. Dockers' delegates from Rotterdam and A ntw erp met in Belgium inOctober 1947 to discuss the means of defeating a secret agreement reached betweenthe shipping companies in these two ports for unloading ships in one port in theevent of the othe r's bein g paralyse d by a strike. (The on ly serious strikes in theNetherlands since the war have involved dockers.)

14 . The dock workers m igh t prove troublesome in case of a conflict w ithRu ssia. Isola ted acts of sabotage m igh t also occur.

G R A N D D U C H Y O F L U X E M B O U R GI. The Comm unist Pa rty is legal.2. There is no informa tion rega rdin g its actual membership.3. See 2 above. (The total po pu latio n on 31st Decemb er, 1947, w as 286,786 , with some 4,000 persons stil l out of the country owing to the war.)4. Total of electorate unknow n. (In any case, election figures in Lux em bourg are very misleading owing to the system of plural voting, as well as proportional representation, employed, which often gives the various parties a pollappreciably in excess of the country's popu lation. A s an add itional comp lication,half the Chamber is elected every three years.)5. There are five Com mu nist mem bers in the Ch am ber (none before the wa r)out of fifty-one, or 9- 8 per cent. (The las t General Elec tion w as held in October1945, wh en, for the first time, Com m unists were elected. A partial election,affecting the southern half of the country, took place in June 1948, when four ofthe five Communist seats were contested; but there was no change.)6. There wa s a Comm unist M inister of H ea lth in the first post-w ar Cabinet(of N atio na l U nio n ). H e die d in office, and w as replace d by another Communist, who held the portfolio until the Cabinefs fall in March 1947, since when

there have been no Communist appointments.7. N o information regarding Communist vo tes: cf A above. Bu t, i n thepartial election already mentioned (June 1948), the Party is known to have lostabout 15 per cent, of its votes to the Socialists.8.-10. N o informa tion has been received regar ding Com munist influence inthe Armed Forces, the police or the Civil Service.I I . A t the beginn ing of 1945 Soc ialists and Com mun ists separated to formindependent unions. Comm unist membership wa s then about 16,000, Socialistabout 5,500. By the end of 1948, how ever, So cia list membership had risen to about

12,000 (exclusive of railwaym en), while Comm unist mem bership had fa llen to about10,000perhaps lower. If railwa ym en be added (these, in the case of Comm unists, are represented by a sma ll number of fellow -trav ellers ), the gra ndtotals are : Soc ialists, 18,000 ; Com mu nists, 10,350. Th e steel ind ustr y, the mostimportant in Luxembourg, has, of course, the largest membership10,000Socialists and 8,500 Comm unists. The Ca bi ne fs policy of pe gg ing wa ges is aparticular grievance with railwaymen, whose almost exclusively Socialist Union


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has apparently forbidden strike action. Althou gh this has been a disapp ointm entto the Communists, they are making every effort to foment unrest among railwaymem and are devoting one page a week of their paper, D Zeitung, in attempts toconvince railwaymen that their interests are being mishandled by the Socialists.12. Al tho ug h there is no definite proof of contacts w ith the Sov iet Un io n,it is strongly suspected that the Party is receiving financial aid through themedium of the Soviet Embassies in Paris and Brussels, without which the Partyorgan, D Zeitung, wou ld have been unable to continue to appea r. A s it is,.D Zeitung ha s recently been con du cting a door-to-door canva ss for subsc riptio ns-Lists are prepared, which are presented to shopkeepers, caf proprietors andothers, who are invited either to subscribe or to take out an insurance for thefuture. W averers are told, in veiled terms, that the time m ight come wh en the ym ight have reason to regret their refusa l to subscribe. It is reported tha t th isthreat has proved mod erately successful. (Subscription to D Zeitung is a cond ition of actual Party membership.)13. -14 . No information is available regarding contacts wit h Communists inneighb ouring countries, or of the possib ility of a nucleus being formed for fiftitcolumn activities.

S P A I NIn Spain the Communist Party is an illegal and clandestine body, existing

precariously under the ever wa tch ful eye of the Franco police. The H ead qua rtersof the Party is in France, where its Executive Committee (under the Secretary-General, Dolores Ibarruri) works in close touch with the French Communist Partyand through the latter has contact with the Russian Central Communist Party.There have, of course, been no free parliamentary elections since the civilwar. Befo re the advent of the Rep ublic in 1931 the Com munist Pa rt y w asinsignifican t and was not represented in the Cortes. Indeed , the first and secondParliaments of the Republic1931 and 1933-each contained only one CommunistDe pu ty (not the same perso n); and it wa s not until the Po pu lar Fron t G overnmentin 1936 that the Communist Party, by previous arrangement between the parties,was allotted sixteen seats.At the.time of the Popular Front Government it was estimated that therewere in Sp ain about 50,000 Com mu nists. The number wa s probably much largerby the end of,th e civil war. H is M ajesty 's Ambassador i n M adrid reported on7th January, 1947, that the estimated number of Communists at that time wasaga in 50,000. H e reported, also, tha t there were definite signs that the P ar tywas gaining ground in Andalusia, Extremadura and the south of Spain generally(agricultural areas), though this was not so in other regions, where the CommunistPa rt y could count only on a sm all m inority of the workers. A more recent report,dated May 1948, confirmed that the strength of the Communist Party in the twoindustrial areas, the Basque Provinces and Catalonia, was in the first casenegligible and in the second not much stronger.It seems fairly certain, however, that individual Communists have infiltratedinto the ranks of the clandestine political organisations such as the U.G.T. (theSoc ialist trade union) and the C.N.T. (the An arch ist trade union). The Communists have also made a definite attempt to secure control of the guerrillas, toun ify them and to use them as Comm unist shock troops. The guer rillas havethree main centres, in southern, central and north-west Spain, which receiveguidance from Toulouse, where many of the leaders have received preliminarytra ini ng in sobatage, c, before infiltrating into Sp ain. De spite intensiv e effortsto recruit more guerrillas, however, the numbers and activities of the latter havedecreased, and clandestine Communist propaganda is no more than intermittentas a result of effective police action . Ju d gi ng from the scope and app eal of i t spropaganda and the acts of terrorism which it perpetratesand there is at

present no other mode of assessment-the potential effectiveness of the presentCommunist force as a fifth column would not be so great as to constitute a seriousmenace, whilst the present regime continues, though its nuisance value could, ifnecessary, be considerably expanded.


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P O R T U G A LThere is in Portugal a small, well-organised and disciplined CommunistP ar ty of some 250 to 500 members. It is an il legal and clandestine party,

op era tin g under extreme difficulty. It s origin al founder, Jose de Sou za, w as sentto Tarrafal penal settlement in the Cape Verde Islands many years ago andreleased under the 1945 amnesty, returning to Po rtug al. (H e is reported to havebecome disil lusioned w ith the Pa rty.) Dr . Alva ro Cunhal, one of the presentleaders, w as reported to have recently paid a vis it to Moscow. The Pa rty isthou ght to have affiliations w ith the Braz ilian org anisation, the MovimentoUnificador dos Trabalhadores which in turn is said to be subsidised from Russia.The Portuguese police attributed the rather un-Portuguese efficiency in thedire ction of the strikes in the Lisbon dockyards in A pr il 1947 to foreig n influence.-There has been evidence of Government disquiet at the undergroun d activ itiesof the Com munist Pa rty. A com munique issued on 24th A pr il , 1948, allegedCommunist penetration of the anti-Government parties grouped in the M.U.D.(Movement of Democratic Unity), a respectable organisation grouping elementsin opposition to Dr. Sala zar's Government. The nam es of some.47 persons weregiven who were said to have confessed to belonging both to the M.U.D. and theCom munist Par ty. M any of the liberal elements in M.U .D. were shocked by therevelation and left the orga nisation. In Augu st some 107 persons were tried ona charge of subversive activities on behalf of the Comm unist P ar ty ; 39 wereacqu itted and the rest sentenced to varying terms of imprisonmen t. TheProsecution appealed against the sentences, but no record of any subsequentdevelopment has been seen.

I T A L Y1. There is a legal Com munist Par ty.2. Mem bership on 15th December 1947: 2,330,887*3. Percentage of the 1947 Population: 5.4. Percentage of the Electorate : 8 2.5. Num ber of Mem bers of the Cham ber of Deputies

Communist Party : 132, 23 per cent.Pro-Comm unist Socia l ist: U p to 48.Number of Members of the Senate : 66 , 19 per cent.6. Mem bers in the National Governmen t: None.7. Votes recorded in the Nationa l Elections of 18th April 1948 : 5- 9 m illion tapproximately.8. Influence in the A rmed Forces.Since the expulsion of the Extrem e Le ftfrom the Government, the latter has attempted to purge its influence from theArmed Forces (including Carabinieri) and the General Staff is now confidentthis purge has been sufficiently well carried out to ensure against disloyalty in an

emergency. Co nd itions of service are being improved. The P .C .I. is, nevertheless,stil l on the watch for opportunities to penetrate and disrupt the loyalty of theArmed Forces, in particular by attacks on the officer class and certain seniorofficers, and by agitation through the C.G.I.L. designed to create dissatisfactionw it h cond itions of service, pensio ns, c.9. Influence in the Police.A similar purge has been carried out in thePu blfca Sicurezz a, involving not less than 13,000 out of a total of 7 0,000 ; itsloya lty is also consid ered sound. Ce rtain categories of local police are dependen ton municipal administrations, which in some cases are under Communist domination, but they are not trained or equipped to suppress public disorders.

* 2,330,887 was the number of membership cards announced at the Party Congress, Milan,January 1948. A n independent source gave the number as only 1,200,000.t Th e exact number o f vote s received by the Com mu nist Party is not know n. Votesreceived by the Pop ular Front (Comm unists and Nen ni Socialists together) were 8,025,990. OfPopular Front seats in the Chamber, 132 are held by Communists: the.votes have been divided inthe same proportion as the seats.


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10 . Influence in the Civil Service. Communists introduced into Gov ernm entoffices while the Communist Party was in the Government have largely beenremoved, and though an appreciable number stil l remain, Communists' attemptsduring October to exploit by strike action the lower Civil Serviced legitimateeconomic grievances had little success. Pronoun cements by lead ing Pa rty mem berssuggest, however, that the Civil Service is considered an important objective forCommunist penetration, and that attempts to foment discontent will not beabandoned. The strike of Government employees on 20th December w as on lypartially carried out in spite of a genuine economic grievance.11. Influence in the Trade Unions The Com mun ists dominate the It al ia nGeneral Confederation of Labour, more particularly since the secession of theCh ristian Dem ocrat Trade Un ion leaders in Ju ly 1948. The So cialists of bothtendencies, and the Republicans, remain within the C.G.I.L. and exercise am odera ting influence. Th e M echanical En gin eer ing Confederation is Com mu nistcontrolled, and is more disciplined than the Confederation of Agricultural

W orkers, wh ich is also controlled by the Comm unists. The Ital ian F ree G eneralConfederation of Workers (L.C.G.I.L.) initiated in September 1948 is anti-/Communist, and although open to all parties and beliefs, is mainly supported'by Ch ristian Democrats. It s strength has stil l to be assessed, but appears tobe grow ing. Ap art from the Mechanical Engine ering F ederation, the workersin Italy are not well disciplined in Trade Union matters, and are as susceptibleto economic and fear motives as to political issues.12. Contacts between P C I and Soviet Union.Regular conferencesbe tween P .C .I. leaders arid So viet E mb assy officials do not app ear to be held,nor, so far as is known, do Embassy officials give direct instructions to the P.C.I.

On the other hand it is reported that instructions to the P.C.I. from the RussianCommunist Party are transmitted via the Soviet Embassy, from where theyare norm ally collected by To glia tti's personal priva te secretary. V is it s of P .C .I.leaders to the Soviet Embassy are reported to be few, though Togliatti's wifeand Giuliano Pa jet ta are said to be fair ly frequent callers. Con tacts betweenTogliatti himself and Soviet officials in Italy are reported to be infrequent, incontrast to the practice up to about 1946. The Soviet Am bassador w as repor tedto have held conferences with Togliatti in Party Headquarters before and afterthe A pr il elections. N o visits of leadin g Ital ia n Comm unists to Moscow havecome to light, though Nenni (P.S.I.) was there on a short visit in the autumn.During the spring and summer Giuliano Pajetta in Belgrade, Reale in Warsaw,and Togliatt i and Secchia in Roumania, had contact with Russian Communistofficials in connection with Cominform business.

13. Known Contacts with Comm unist Parties elsewhere.At the meetingsreferred to in the last sentence of paragraph 12 above contacts were undoubtedlyriiade w it h some, and in the case of the m eeting i n Ro um ania, all the Com mun istParties adhering to the Cominform (excepting, in the last case, the YugoslavCom munist Pa rty). A n unconfirmed report states tha t D i Vittor io, the TradeUnion leader, conferred with leading French Communists in Paris in the autumn :a more reliable report states that a representative of the French O C T is ho ld in gregular conferences in Rome with P.C.I. leaders on the co-ordination of French,and Italia n Com munist policy w ith regard to strikes and agita tion s. Rea le isalso reported to have attended a m eeting of the French Comm unist Pa rty 's Inte rnationa l Po licy Comm ittee in Pa ris in A pr il . The P.C .I. also sent delegates tothe Congresses of the Belgian and Swedish Communist Parties in May, Spanogoin g to Bru ssels and Do nini to Stockholm. I t is reported indep ende ntly thatrelations between representatives of satellite Communist Parties in Italy andthe P.C.I. have been growing closer since the formation of the Cominform (thoughrelations between satellite diplomatic missions as such are said to be discouragedby the Ru ssians). It is reliably reported that at the begin ning of 1948 directcontact was started between the Polish Embassy and the P.C.I.: the P.C.I. issaid to have provided the Embassy with good information on Italian industry,and to assist wit h propaganda among Polish D.P .s . In Jan uary 1949, M. C achin,the French Communist leader, visited and spoke in various Italian townsemphasising the U.S.S.R.'s policy of peace and collaboration.

14 . Fifth Colum n Potentialities. -These are very difficult to assess in acountry where the hold ing of a Com mu nist P ar ty membership card does no t36805 c 2


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necessarily imply strong Pa rt y convictions. A t the broadest the C omm unistscan count on perhaps 6 million votes, but only one-third, and perhaps even less,are members of the Pa rty . Of these in turn only a com paratively small p ropo rtioncan be trained and prepared in an emergency to commit themselves beyondcompromise to real insurrectional action, and the strength of this group woulddepend on a large number of imponderables, e.g. promptness of Government action,direct fore ign milita ry support, &c. On any calcu lation it is clear, however, th atwithout being able to put an organised force into the field, the Communists couldnevertheless cause serious trouble from the purely military point of view, andthrough the Trades Unions which they control hamstring the country's war effortby. strikes and sabotage. Sm all arms are available in gre at quan tities, bu t itis unlikely that the Communists could, in fact, mobilise as many as the 245,000men w ith rifles and a high proportion of automatics, &c , which w as the Ita lia nGeneral Sta ff s estimate of Comm unist stren gth at the time of the elections. Thesepotential fighting groups consist largely of ex-partisans, who, despite the Governmenfs measures of last February against para-military bodies, have retainedtheir local cadres, and orga nisa tion . A t the time of the elections the Fore ignOffice estimated that the number which could be raised at short notice as am ilitary formation would not exceed 40,000. There has been no later inform ationeithe r to supp ort or refute th is figure. The G overnment has had some successi n bringing to ligh t Communist store of arms. It is reported tha t the P ar tyDirectorate has agreed on the need to reorganise its undergound Military Forcesand to entrust this reorganisation to Signor Longo, the leader of the nationalisticand hotheaded elements in the Party.15. The Present Situation.The Comm unist Pa rty received a serioussetback in the National Elections in April from which it hopes to recover by

intensifying the political education of its weaker members and strengtheningleadership of local Communist organisations rather than by p u r g i n g themt o make a small and more reliable body. In the face of the increased stren gthof the forces of law and order the Party is unlikely to attempt to seize powerby violence, except as part of a broader scheme involving perhaps an invasionof the north-east frontier, though the events following the attempt on Togliatti'slife showed that the Government^ margin of safety was less than had beentho ugh t. It is probable th at the P. C .I. wi ll (as it has been at pain s to convincepublic opinion) work to broaden its grip on the country and strengthen itsparliamentary position by constitutional means, i.e. through alliances with otheranti-Governm ent elements and through constant labour agita tion. The latter,however, will probably be designed to strike a balance between the demands ofthe Cominform for co-ordinated labour agitation to wreck E.R.P. and the riskof alienating popular sympathy by causing undue distress among a working-classill-equip ped to sustain lengthy strike periods (as occurred last win ter). Du rin gthe last two months of 1948 there were a number of strikes including that ofGovernment employees on 20th December, but emphasis has been rather on whatthe Italians call non-co-operation, i.e. ca'can ny methods. The first results ofthis Communist policy should be seen in the communal elections scheduled forSpr ing 1949. Since the demise of the Pop ular Front, Communist propag anda ha semphasised the P.C .I. 's wi lling nes s to co-operate w ith any tr u ly democraticforces. Th e pact of un ited action w it n the P .S .I . ha s thus been kep t in force,and mention has been made of a De m ocr atic Al l i an ce which, however, hasnot so far taken any concrete form. The Com mu nists' present reliance on amoderate policy can naturally be reversed overnight.

T R I E S T EThe attack of the Cominform on Tito in June 1948 resulted in a neworientation of the Trieste Commu nist Pa rty. U p till that time it had been pro-Slav, and although officially autonomous it was in fact a branch of the YugoslavComm unist Party. The Com inform onslaught was imm ediately followed by a

split on national lines between the Italian Communists led by Vittorio Vidali,who adopted a policy of unconditional solidarity w it h the Comm unist Pa rti eswh ich adhere to the Co m inform , and the Slav C omm unists led by the SloveneBabic, who was at that time secretary of the Party and also Secretary of theItalo-Slav An ti-Fa scist Un ion (U.A .I .S.) . A general Congress of the Pa rty


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-was called on 21st and 22nd August and a new Central Committee and Executive-appointed con sisting of Com inform supporters. The V id al i group is much thelarger of the two and controls the daily II Lavoratore and the Sinda cati U nic iin the United Kingdom/United States Zone, but was for some t ime hard pressedfinancially as Ba bic had control of the P ar ty Eund s. It s finances were , however,assured after a visit made by the Party leaders in October to Rome, which hasnow taken over the role of banker of Belgrade.The Communist Party, while now itself violently nationalist ic, is nowconstantly bringing fierce accusations of nationalism against the Slav Communists.A great deal of the t ime of the Party Congress in August was spent in indietinents of the policy followed in Trieste by the Yugoslavs from the time whenthey took control of the local Communist Party and the Working Class Movementin general during the winter of 1943.In September the new E xecutive of the Italo-Slav Anti-F ascis t U nio n wa sselected, and former Slav members were eliminated, with the result that theTito Comm unists are almost excluded from P arty activit ies i n the U nite dK in gd om /U ni te d States Zone. On the other hand, there has been a purge ofCommformists in the Yugoslav Zone, which caused bitter attacks in II Lavoratoreon the behaviour of the TitOrCommunists in Istria. V id al i has classed Tito -Communists with Ital ian reaction and United States imperial ism as the threechief enem ies of the dem ocratic mov eme nt.The Trade Unions The Sin da cat i U ni ci, the union wh ich include s most ofthe wor kers in the heavy indu stries , is Com informist. In September Erne stR ad ich , former Pr eside nt of the Sindaca ti U nici , who w as forced to resign in1946 owing to his opposition to Yugoslav political interference, was co-opted onto the Exec utive and by the end of the month had taken over direction . Th eCamera del Lavoro, which is pro-Italian and non-Communist, is afraid that theSindacati Unici wil l now get the ful l support of the Ital ian Communist Party,-and of the Com mun ist-dominated G eneral Con federation of Labour (C .G.I.L.).The Sindacati Unici Congress of 4th and 5th December expelled its pro-Titoleaders. Th e Labour Office of A .M .G . has estimated that in the U ni ted St at es /United Kingdom Zone, which contains the great majority of organised workers,the Sindacati Unici has about 30,000-35,000 members, the Camera del Lavoro-about 60,000.

G R E E C EK K E Strength The Greek Comm unist Pa rty (K.K.E.K omm ounistikonKomma Ellados) was founded in 1920, was suppressed but thrived undergroundduring the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-41), and took a leading part in theresistance movement during the occupation. It has tried to overthrow the GreekGovernment since the liberation, and was outlawed by the Government inDecember 1947 . I ts youth organisat ion (E .P .O .N .- E n ia ia Panel ladike OrganosisNeon) was dissolved by court order in February 1947, when strength was estimatedat 185,000, exc lud ing those fighting i n the mou ntains. It is reported that E .P.O .N .has reappeared (clandestinely) under the title Eamike Panellenike Organosis

Ne olaias, but no figures of its mem bership are available. The strength of K .K .E .as a whole cannot be calculated, although detailed statistics are available ofindividual cells and satellite organisations; but it is estimated (January 1949)that between 25,000 and 28,000 rebels are fighting against the Greek Army inthe mo untains. Of these some 7,000 are regarded by the Comm unist Pa rty asrel iable.Commun ists in Governm ent There are no Com munists in the Greek Government as there are none in the Chamber of Depu ties. A t the last General E lection(March 1946) the Left-wing parties abstained from voting, but an analysis madeby the Allied Mission which observed the elections gives some indication of thepo ten tial Com mu nist vote. Th e mission, reported that, of 40 per cent, of th eelectora te w ho did not vote, 25 per cent, abstain ed because of sickness, ph ysica lincapacity, indifference, or similar causes which seemed to have no relation toany po litic al polic y, an d only some 15 per cent. (280,000 persons) abstain ed forp a r t y reasons. A gain , not al l of these were Communists. The 280,000abstainers also included the E.L.D. coalition (the Union of Leftist Democrats),a small group of former Liberals, and three or four smaller groups of the Left-Centre.


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In the mountainous parts of Greece controlled by the rebels, the Communistsin Decemb er 1947 set up a Pro vision al De mo cratic Governm ent of Free Greeceunder the premiership of G en er al M arkos (Markos Vafiades). Th is Ju nt aw as not recognised by any G overnment but it w as welcomed by. Com mun ists everywhe re and representatives were sent to Yu gosla via and Bulgar ia. In the FreeGov ernm ent^ territory a form of local government and legislature were setup, and local elections held.Communist Penetration.It is difficult to assess the degree of Com mu nistpenetration of the services, the police, the civil service, the trade unions or thenon-Communist pol i t ical parties , but est imates can be attempted as fol lows:a) T he A rmed Forces and PoliceThe Communist Organisation of the Army and Security Corps(K.O.S.SA .K omm ounistike O rganosis Stratou Somaton Asfa leias) w asformed in February 1945. Its aims ar e: to incite disobedience and riots inthe armed forces; to collect intelligence on such subjects as order of battleof Government forces, military intentions, defence works, officers' personalrecords and intelligence obtained by Greek Government; to encouragedesertion to the Rebel Ar m y. I t is virt ua lly impossible to obtain r eliablefigures of K.O.S.S.A.'s strength but, at the end of November 1948, Communistsources estima ted it a t 3,285 (1^ per cent, of th e total streng th of the Greekarmed forces).

(6) Civil ServiceIn March 1947 K.K .E. records showed 11,250 Comm unists in Governmentdepartments and 315 in natio nalist organisations of civi l servants. A t th attime it was estimated that 7 per cent, of K.K.E. were civi l servants; certainlyone of the 16 K.K.E. sections in Athens was formed entirely of civi l servants.Since December 1947, however, it has been impossible for any avow edCommunist to hold any civil service post and most of them have beendismissed ; but i t is impossible to guess how many crypto-Comm unists rem ain.c) Trade UnionsThe Workers' Anti -Fascist League (E.R.G.A.S.Ergatikos Anti fasistikos Syndesmos) is the workers' association through which theCom munists hope to penetra te the Greek trade unions. In Mar ch 1946 :E.R.G.A.S. managed to secure five seats on the Executive of the GreekConfederation of Labour as against four for its combined opponents, but inJuly their election was declared invalid and a provisional executive wasappointed to act until fresh elections could be held at a congress in March

1948. From this Congress a predom inantly right-w ing executive emerged,and it seems that E.R.G.A.S.'s influence in the trade unions is decreasing;but their numbers are unknown.d) Non-C omm unist Political PartiesEstimates of Communist penetration of the other political parties areattempted from time to time, but no reliable figures are available.

Known Contacts with Communists Abroad.Z achariades (the leade r ofK.K.E.) and Porfyrogenis make regular visits to Moscow and the Central Europea n coun tries. Moreover, pra ctically every ca pita l in Europe, inclu ding Londo n,and New York have their Committees for Aid to Democratic Greece, which sendfinancial an d ma terial aid to the Greek Comm unists. In addition, U nit ed N atio nsobservers have witnessed the logistical support given by Albania, Bulgaria and.Yugoslavia to the rebels.Potential Fifth Column.It is un safe to assume that the numbers quotedabove represent a pot ential fifth column. Some believe that nine-tenth s of theGreek rebels and their supporters are at heart Greeks first and Communists second,who would not hesitate to join the Greek Army against any foreign invader.Others, however, point out that during 1948 the hard core (say, 7,000) of the-Rebel Army has established a much greater esprit de corps than the rebelshave had before and believe that these 7,000 would follow their present leaders,,whatever they did, if there were a Slav invasion.


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D E N M A R KI. Dan mark s Kom munist iske Pa rti .2. Ab out 28,000.3. Le ss th an 1 per cent. 0- 7 per cent.).4. Pa rty membership constituted 1-1 per cen t, of the 1947 electorate.5. It holds 9 seats of a total of 148, rep resen ting 6 -1 per cent.6. There are no Com munists in the N atio na l Government.7. I t recorded 141,094 votes in the elections to the Fo lke ting in 1947. Th efigure represented 6-8 per cent, of the poll.8. It s influence is very small in the actu al Services, but somew hat greaterin the Hom e Guard. Lately the Com mun ists have lost ground also in the Hom eGuard, and the vast majority of the Force is fully reliable.9. It is sligh t.10. It s influence is very small. There is no know n org anise d penetr ation ofGovernment Departments or Civil Service organisations.I I . W ith in the trade union movement as a whole Communist influence isnot great. Th ey are, however, fair ly strong in certain unions in. Copenhagenand have shown themselves capable of fomenting and sustaining unofficial strikesin opposition to the trade union leadership.12. N o regular open contact is m aintain ed. Com munist leaders payoccasional visits to the Soviet Union and satellite countries.13. Danish Communist leaders frequently meet their Swedish andN orw egia n opp osite numbers. Contact w ith Swed en appears to be more frequentthan with Norway vide also under Finland).14. A s a fifth-column, it s po ten tial ities are probably not very grea t, butmany Communists gained experience of underground work during the occupation.A considerable quantity of arms is still at large in the country, and of these asubstantial proportion may well be in Communist hands.

N O R W A YI. Norg es Kom mun istiske parti .2. 17,600 in February , 1949).3. Ab out 0- 6 per cent.4. Ab out 0- 8 per cent.5. I t hold s 11 seats out of 150, rep rese nting 7 -3 per cent.6. Ther e are no Com mun ists in the N ati on al G overnment.7. a) It recorded 167,704 votes in the Storting election s of 1945. TheCommunist vote represented 11 per cent, of the total poll.6) It recorded 143,205 votes in the local elections held in November 1947.This represented 10-4 per cent, of all votes, as the poll was smaller than in theStorting elections.8. It s influence in the armed forces is negligib le.9. It s influence in the police is very small.10 . It s influence in the Civ il Service is very small. There is no kno wnorganised penetration of Government Departments or Civil Service Organisations.I I . It s influence in the trade un ion movement is small. Com mu nists controlonly about one-seventh of the Representative Council of Trade Union Confederation and no distr ict Trades Council. Nevertheless, the Pa rty ha s shown itselfable to fom ent local unofficial strikes in imp ortan t ind ustrie s. The C om m unistsmust be expected to make a special effort among the seamen.


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12 . There is no regular open contact, w ith the Sov iet U ni on . Com munist,leaders pay occasional visits to that country and satell ite States.13. Period ical me etings with Swedish and Da nish Comm unists are held..

Finnish Communists frequently also participate vide also under Finland).14. No rw egia n Com mun ists gain ed considerable experienc e of undergroun dwork during the occupation, but it is doubtful whether even any great numberof Party members would be prepared to fight against their own countrymen.Communist fifth-column activity is l ikely to be strongest in northern Norway,,but the Pa rty s pote ntia lities are probably lower than those of the Dan ish a n dSwedish sister parties.

S W E D E NI. Sveriges Kom mu nist ika parti .2. Ab out 50,000.3. Le ss tha n 1 per cent, (about 0- 9 per cent.).4. Ab out 1-2 per cent.5. In the indire ctly elected Fir st Chamber of 150 members the Com mun ists,hold 3 seats, rep res en ting 2 per cent. In the direc tly elected S econd Cham ber the-Com mun ists hold 8 seats out of a total of 230. Th is represents less than 3 -5 per

cent. The Comm unist percentage of the R iks da g as a wh ole is below 2 9.6. There are no Communists in the Na tion al G overnment.7. I t recorded 244,81 2 votes represe nting 6 31 per cent, of the total poll3,879,098 in the Gen eral Election held on 19th September, 1948. De spit e an .increase of 792,794 votes over the total poll of 1944, the Com mu nist Pa rty received73,654 fewer votes than in that year.8. Its influence in the armed forces is neg ligible. The m ilitary autho rities. ,moreover, keep a close watch on known Communists during their conscript service.9. It s influence in the police is very sma ll. I n Stock holm a Comm unist,.Set Persson, presides over the Police Committee of the City Council , but thatbody does not exercise control over police activities.10. In the Civ il Service the P ar ty s influence is also very small . A certa in,number of Communists must be assumed to have entered the Civil Service, butthere are no indications of organised penetration in any Government Departmentor in Civil Service organisations.I I . The Comm unists are strong in certain trade unions, notably in thebranches of the M etal Work ers Un ion, and their influence is d ispropo rtionatelylarge to their numbers. Nevertheless they only constitute a small , thou gh w ellorga nised m inority. Du ring recent months their impo rtance has furth erdecreased.12. There is no overt regular contact w ith the Soviet U nio n. Com mu nistleaders pay occasional visits to that country and to Soviet satell ite co untries.13 . Frequ ent m eetings take place between Sca nd inav ian Comm unist leaders.Rep resenta tives of the Fin nish Communist P ar ty are also often present. T h eexistence of a Sca ndin avian Comm unist Bu reau has been rumoured. It is saidthat it formerly had its location in Oslo but that it was moved to Gothenburgdu rin g the sp rin g of 1948 . The police in th at city have been unab le to confirm

these reports vide also under Finland).14. It s po ten tia lities as a fifth-column should not be over-rated. The va stmajority of party members would probably shrink from taking an active partag ain st their own country in case of war. Th e Commu nist leaders wou ld almostcertainly be rounded up by the police very rapidly, but a certain amount of sabotagem igh t be expected, in all probability directed chiefly aga inst comm unications,,power installations and shipyards.


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F I N L A N DI. Suomen Kom m unistinen Puo lue (S.K .P.).2. Ab out 35,000.3. Le ss tha n 1 per cen t (about 0- 9 per cent.).4. Ab out 1-3 per cent.5. Th e Comm unist P ar ty holds 33 seats out of a total of 200, representing1 6 -5 per cent. To this, however, m ust be added 5 seats held by fellow trav ellerswho have joined with the Communists in the Finnish People's Democratic Union(S.K .D.L.). The S.K.D .L. invariably votes and acts as a single body. It s38 members, accordingly, constitute 19 per cent, of Parliament, and it is thisfigure which should be regarded as effective Communist strength.6. The re are no Com munists in the N ati on al Government.7. I t polled about 360,000 votes put of a total poll of 1,772,505 in the Ge nera lElection held in Ju ly 1948. Th is represents 2 0- 3 per cent. The figures are inrespect of the votes recorded on the joint lists of the S.K.D.L.8. It s influence is no t very great. M ost officers have fough t aga inst t heSoviet Union and regard Communism with implacable hostility.9. In December 1948 the Communist-penetrated Secret State Police

; (V .A .L .P.O .) wa s disband ed by the Government. It s officers were either dism issedor placed in employment where they are comparatively harmless. Th e Di strictForces are not penetrated and the Police, as a whole, is completely loyal to thePresident and the Government.10. Some penetr ation, albeit on a minor scale, has been effected in th eM inistr ies of Supply and Ed ucation. Comm unists hold important posts on theSchool Board and in the administration of the State Broadcasting Corporation.The Government is aware of this latter danger and has already taken steps to curbtheir activities.I I . T hi s is fa irl y considerable. Ro ugh ly, two-fifths of the Council of theCentral Fed eration of Trade U nio ns (S.A.K.) is Comm unist-controlled. Th eCommunists dominate ten out of thirty-eight affiliated unions, including theim por tant unio ns of transp ort workers, timber workers and forestry and floating

workers. Th ey have a considerable nuisan ce value in the movement, but, despit eseveral attempts, have shown themselves unable to cause a general strike.12. Mm e. H ert ta Kuusinen-L eino, the Com munist leader, as a d utifu ldaughter, often visits her father, Otto Kuusinen, of Terijoki notoriety, whooccupies an important position in the Krem lin hierarchy. She may well be themain link between the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties in Finland andthe Scandin avian countries. The Finn ish Min ister in Moscow is a near Comm unist.13. Mm e. H ert ta Ku usinen-L eino frequen tly visit s Stockholm and Oslovide 12 above).14. In view of Fin lan d's exposed posit ion the fifth-column danger mu st berated hig hly . O wi ng to the strong resistance of the remainder of the pop ulationit is, nevertheless, unlikely that the Finnish Communists would be able to carryout a coup on the Czech model without full and open Soviet intervention.

I C E L A N DThe Soc ialistaflo kk ur (comm only called the Com munist Pa rty ).No accurate assessment is available, but it is probably not less than 4,000.Based on the above figure, about 3 per cent.Based on the above figure, over 5 per cent.It holds 10 seats of a total of 52, representing over 19 per cent.There are no Communists in the National Government.

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7. In the gene ral election in 1946 the Com mu nists received 13,000 votes orabout 20 per cent, of the total poll.8. Icela nd ha s no armed forces.9. Ex ac t det ails of penetratio n of the police are not known , but the influenceis probably moderate.10. In all probab ility it s influence in the Civ il Service is again only moderate.11. In the trad e unio ns, however, it s influence is very considerable. U p tillthe autumn of 1948 the Communists held an absolute majority in the CentralFed eration of Trade U nio ns . They have now lost tha t m ajority but still constitutethe largest sing le part y. They also control num erous trade union branches atvarious centres, the most imp ortant of these being the Re ykja vik Labourers' U nio n.12., Re gula r contact w ith the Sov iet U nio n is not openly m aintain ed, but,nevertheless, liaiso n certainly exis ts. Certa in Icelan dic Com mun ists are employedin the Soviet Legation, and the Legation has taken an active part in circumventingcurrency and import restrictions in order to supply the Communists with literature.13. Iceland ic fratern al delegates have attend ed Comm unist conferences inScan dinav ia, but contact appears to be less frequent th an between the parties of theother Scandinavian countries .14. It s fifth-column pote nt ialit ies are probably fai rly grea t. Strik es an dunderground propaganda could probably be conducted on an extensive scale, andwere the Communists to obtain arms they would constitute a very grave danger in

Tiew of the absence of any armed forces at the disp osa l of the Government. .TheCommunist leaders certainly possess the organisational abilities to engineer a coup

A R G E N T I N AI. The Comm unist Pa rt y w as lega lised in October 1945 after fifteen yearsof repression.2. Its mem bership is not know n, but estim ated at 53,000.3. The Comm unist vote is of the order of \ per cent, of the popu lation.4. In March 1948 the vote w as under 2^ per cent, of the electorate.5^-6. Th ere are no Com m unist De pu tie s or Sen ato rs in Con gress, orMinis ters .7. In March 1948 the Comm unist poll w as about 84,000 out of 2,313,000votes cast. Of this total 45,100 votes came from the Federal Capital, where theCom mu nist prop ortion reached 7-g per cent. In M end oza the Com mu nists took7,250 out of 98,000 votes and won three places in the provincial legislature.8- 10 . Th e army is probably quite clear of comm unism, and so is the police.There is no evidence of penetration in the civil service.I I . Al tho ugh the greater part of the trade union movement is harnessedto President Per6n's Secretariat of Labour, there is considerable and increasingCom mu nist activity . Trad es in w hich thi s is strongest are the build ing indu stry,petroleum, metallurgy, textiles, market-gardening and the frigorificos.12. Ar gen tine Comm unist intel lectuals have vis ited Europe. The Slavimm igrants i n Ar gen tina are organ ised into a Slav U nion , said to number 270,000,which is closely connected with the Soviet Embassy and is believed also to be in

contact with the Argentine Communists .13. Buenos Air es is said to have become the centre for Sou th Am erica.14. W hile the Arg entin e Com munist Pa rty appears to be in no conditionto defy the Argentine authorities or even the Peronista organisation, it is possiblethat any general dis i l lus ionment with Per6nism might swell the Communistranks. From the B riti sh point of view the m ain dang er is to the meat supply.


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1 49B O L I V I A

I. There is no purely Communist Pa rty. A so-called Communist P a rt yformed in 1946 was a Government-sponsored device for splitting the Opposition.The Left-wing Revolutionary Party (P.I .R.) is a Marxist party whose leaderDr . Arc e is probably a Comm unist. It was heavily diluted w ith non-Comm unists,many of whom appear to have separated themselves from it because of Dr. Arce's;attitude to Russia.2. P .I.R . wa s estim ated in 1946 to have 15,000 members and 10,000 activesympathisers.3. T hi s is an insignifican t proportion of the total pop ulation (estimated3f million).4. Th e pop ulation of gen uine Com munists in P.I.R . is difficult to ascertain;:in January 1947 P.I.R. probably accounted for a third of the votes cast, or a

quarter of the electorate.5. In March 1947 P.I .R. ha d six Sena tors out of twenty-seven, and th irty nin e De pu ties out of 111. Th e proportion of Com mun ists is difficult to ascer tain .6. A member of P .I.R . wa s in the Cabinet for a short wh ile.7. Ther e is no pure Comm unist vote. The most recent inde x is the voteof 13,900 out of 72,000 cast in La Paz in December 1947 (for the Peopled Party).8. Th e army is probably free of Comm unists.9-1 0. Insufficient inform ation.I I . There has been considerable labour unrest in Bolivia, and the P .I .R .have certain ly encou raged some of. the strikes. * Th eir p reponderance in them inin g areas has been rather shaken by the revival of the F a sc is t M .N.R.The miner's leader Lechin, a free-lance, might embrace communism if it wereto his interest.12-13 . Dr . Ar ce visite d Europe in 1947, and w as seen w ith Soviet officials.He,is , or wa s, in contact w ith Chilean and Peru vian Communists.14. Th e prin cipa l dan ger in Bolivia is to the supp ly of tin.

B R A Z I LI. The Bra zil ian Comm unist Pa rty (P .O B .) wa s declared i l legal in 1935 ,went underground, was legalised in 1945, and became illegal again in May 1947.2. It s leader boasted it rose from 4,000 members in 1945 to 130,000 in 19 46 ;other estimates halve the latter figure.3. The total pop ulation is 46 million.4. The electorate is about 7 million.5. In 1945 the Com munist Pa rty had 16 seats in the Lower Hou se ou t

of 216; and one Senator out of 63; a second seat in the Senate was won in 1947..The mandates were annulled in January 1948; but two Communists continuedto sit as Socialists.6. I t ha s never he ld any offices.7. In 194 5 it received 500 ,000 votes, or 7 per cent, of the electorate. Itfaile d to improve on these figures in 1947. Its local strength is in the Fed eralDistrict (where it held about a third of the seats on the Municipal Council),Pernambuco and Sao Paulo.8- 10 . A t one time it had cells in the army and civil service; steps have

been taken to eradicate them, but it cannot be said whether they have beeneffective.I I . Com mu nists influence in the trade unions wa s formerly gre at. T heGovernment now controls the unions through the Ministry of Labour.12. Lu is Carlos Pr estes (among others) has visited the U.S .S.R .


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13. Since M ay 1947 he is reported to have taken refuge in U ru gu ay ; contact-with other Latin American Communists appears to have been regularly throughUruguay .14. In case of emergency, the Br azilia n Com mu nists could possibly be verytroublesome: in 1948 there were several reports of sabotage which may not have

been with ou t foundation . There have been, reports of a spl it among B ra zi l ia nCommunists since May 1947, and it is difficult to tell how far their organisationl a s survived this.

C E N T R A L A M E R I C AI. Comm unism wa s legal in Costa Ric a t i l l 1948,; when the P o p u la r.Va ngu ard chose the losing side in the civi l wa r. In El Salvador, H ond ura san d Nica rag ua, i t is i l legal . In Guatemala no organised Communist Par ty i s

known to exist, though there are fellow-travellers in the present Left-wing regime,and there is non-indigenous labour agitation.2- 4. In Costa R ica the Pop ular Vang uar d contained Social ists andCom mun ists, but w as led by a Com munist. Th e number of Comm unists isunascertainable.5-6 . In Costa R ica the Pop ular Va ngu ard had six De puties out of f if ty-sixbefore the civil war.7. I n Costa R ic a the V an gu ard ha d 8,000 votes out of 100,000 cast i n 1946,but candidates were not presented in all parts of the country.8-1 0. Info rm ation insufficient: it may be assumed tha t the armies are clear,except perhaps in Guatemala.I I . The trade union s are susceptible to Comm unist influence but it isdoubtful i f penetration has gone far except in Guatemala and Costa Rica.12. A G uatem alan fellow-traveller w as for some time m inister in Moscow.13. Con tact is gene rally through M exico.14. The Central A m erica n Comm unists have little significance as a fifthcolumn : they are perhap s most dangerous in Gua temala.

C H I L E1. The Com mun ist P ar ty was legalised in 1938 when it joined the Po pu larFront. It wa s made i l legal again in July 1948, though its Dep uties and Sen atorsretained their seats.2. It s mem bership is not known : see question 7. Com mun ist sym pathisershave been estim ated at 200,000. Nam es struck off the vot ing registers under the*' De fence of D em ocracy '' L aw number 20,000.3. The vo ting strength was 1 per cent, of the pop ulation in M arch 1948.4. V ot in g strength wa s nearly 12 per cent, of the electorate in M arch 1948.5. The Ch ilean Com mu nist Pa rt y had 16 D epu ties out of 147 and 5 Senatorsout of 46.6. I t w as giv en three sea ts in the Cabinet as a result of the electoral sup po rtit gave to Pr esid ent G onzalez V idela in 1 94 6: the portfol ios were lost inMarch 1947. The Chilean is the only Latin Am erican Communist Pa rty to haveattained office.7. The last record of its voting streng th wa s 80,000 in March 1948.8-1 0. Befo re its proh ibition the Chilean Communist P ar ty ha d cells in thearmy, am ong teachers and in the public service. Efforts to deco ntam inate thearmy have probably been successful, and anti-Communist measures have beenapplied throughout the public service.


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11. The m ain Com munist strength lay in the unions, where the P ar ty^exercised an influence dispr opo rtiona te to it s num erical streng th. Strenuou sattempts have been made to break the authority of the Communist leaders byrelegatin g th e m away from their ow n districts, but the P ar ty probably retainsa subterranean hold on the miners and nitrate-workers.12. A number of intellectuals have visit ed Europe.13. Contacts exist through Ur ugu ay and M ex ico : the Par ty fosteredCommunism in Peru and Bolivia.14. Un der the emergency laws the Government has the situatio n well inhand, but the Chilean Communist Party has deep roots and can find plenty ofopportunity among a polit ically conscious working-class ex ist in g in un satisfactory social cond itions. From a stra teg ic po int of view the main danger isthe sabotage of copper and nitrate production.

C O L O M B I AI. There wa s a legal Communist Pa rt y ( The Social Democratic Pa rty )which sp lit in to three parts in 194 6-47 : there is also Comm unist infiltration inthe Left-wing of the Liberal Party.2. The Social Dem ocratic Pa rty had 12,000 members. :3. T hi s is an insign ificant proportion of the total populatio n.4. In 1947 the Comm unist vote fe ll to 1 per cent, of the electorate.5. The Com mu nists ha d formerly 5 sea ts in Congress, w hic h were al l lostin 19 47 : they have only one seat in the departm ental assemblies. Th ey hadformerly about 38 seats on municipal bodies.6. Ther e are no Com mu nist M inister s.7. In 1944 the Com mu nists had 30,000 votes this dropped to 12,500 in 1947.8- 9. Th e army and police are probably now clear.10. There has been some penetr ation in the M inis trie s of Com municationsand Public Works.I I . Com mun ists are prepon derant in the Colombian Labour Feder ation,which is by far the largest body of organised workers in Colombia.12. Insufficient info rm atio n: contact w it h Ru ssia appears to be throughMexico.13. There is close contact wi th M exico and Ha vana,14. Th e Comm unists could do serious damage in the oilfields.

C U B AI. The Comm unist Pa rty has legal rights.2. The membership of the Cuban Comm unist Pa rty i s sai d to be about150,000.3. Th is corresponds to 3 per cent, of the total pop ulation .4. . And to about \ per cent, of the electorate.5. It ha s 9 De pu ties out of 118, and no Senators.6. It has no members in the Government.7. The Cuban Comm unist Pa rty had 116,000 votes or ju st over 5 per cent,of the electo rate in 1944 and 130,000 or per cent, in 1948.8-1 0. Insufficient evidence, probably some penetration .I I . The Cuban trades unions are organised int o the Cuban Labour Confederation (C .T.C.). Th is Was Com mun ist-controlled unt il 1947, when a spl it


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took place, and there are now two bodies with the same name, the one Communist,,and the other official. The anti-C om m unist C.T.C . is itself split .12. Leaders have visite d Po land and the U.S .S.R .13. There is close contact w ith Mex ico.14. If Cuba lost it s present prosp erity, the Com mu nists could probably ca us eserious difficulties.

D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I CThere is no legal Communist Party, nor is there likely to be while GeneralT ru jill o is in the saddle. There are some Labour agita tors , and it is probabletha t a number pf Trujillo 's political exiles have embraced Communism. B u tthere is virtually none in the country.

E C U A D O RI. There is a small Comm unist Pa rty, whic h w as outlawed in 1936, but nowfunctions openly.2. Its membership is not known among the oil workers at Ancoh there are250 members and 200 subscribing sympathisers.3. Unk now n, but very small.4. Unk now n, but small.5. There appear to be no Com munist deputies.6. There are no Com mu nists in the Government.7. In for m ati on insufficient.8-10 . A ttem pts to penetrate the army are reported to have failed.I I . The Ecuador ean union s are not very strong, but there is C omm unistactivity , especially on the Coast. The Ahcdn oil strike o f Ju ly 1948 wa s due t oCommunist workings, but only 20 per cent, of the workers were said to favoura general strike.12, The Secretary-General, Pared os, has visited Ru ssia.13 . Contact appears to be throu gh Bog ota, and possibly also M exico an d

Havana .14. A tte m pt s have been made to spread Comm unism in the oilfields, with :partial success.H A I T I

1. A small Comm unist Pa rty was formed before the last presiden tial elections, but w as later disband ed. It s leaders were giv en scholarsh ips abroad.2. It s active mem bership did not exceed 200.

M E X I C O1. The Com munist Pa rty is a legal political party ; Senor LombardoToledan o's Peo ple's Pa rty also contains many known Comm unists.2. For this it required to register 30,000 members and 1,000 in each S ta te ;thi s has probably been arra nge d. I t had reached 17,000 members in 193 8-4 0, .but dropped to 3,000 in 1943.3. The mem bership is an insignifica nt percentage of the total pop ulation.4. Info rm ation insufficient.5-6 . There are no Com munist De puties or M inisters.


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7. There has been no separate national Comm unist vote.8-10. Ther e app ear to be cells in various w alk s of life, but there is no cohorete evidence of the extent of penetration.11. Th e m ain stren gth of the M exica n Com mun ists lies in labour circlesand in the intelle ctua ls. The Con federation of M exican Labour w as the poin tof departure for the Latin-American Confederation of Labour led by Sr. Lombardo Toledano ; this is pro-Com mu nist, as is Lom bardo's W orkers' Un ive rsit y.12. Lombardo has several times visited Comm unist Europe.13. M exico appears to be a favourite grou nd for exchang es between otherLatin American countries and Moscow.14. Th e Communist P ar ty as such is not very dangerous but the Peop le'sParty might in time come to disrupt the Government bloc

P A N A M A1. The Com munists are not a lega lly recognised political party, but are notillegal. Com munists vote w it h Soc ialists.2. Mem bership is unknow n, but estimate d at 500.3 - 4 . Inf orm ation insufficient.5. One member of the Cons tituen t Assemb ly of 1945, elected as a Socia list,was a Communist.

There are no Communist Ministries.7. The Com mu nist vote app ear s to be insepa rable from the Socialist.8-10 . Info rm ation insufficient.11. Th e Fede ration of Pa nam an ian Workers is par tially led by Comm unists,as is the United Public Workers' Union.

12. In for m atio n insufficient.13. There is contact w ith Mexico.14. A very small force could, in view of Pan am a's strategic importance, do

very great damage.P A R A G U A Y

I. The Communist Pa rty was legal from Au gu st 1946 to January 1 947 :since fighting on the losing side in the civil war, it has been suppressed2. It s mem bership w as estim ated at 2,000 to 2,500 at the end of 1946.3. A t 2,500 less tha n J per cent.4. No information.5- 6. It has had no represen tation.7. No record of any votin g.8-1 0. I ts influence in the pub lic service is probably neg ligible.I I . P ar t of the trade union movement is probably still fundam entallyCommunist: the Communists controlled the Workers' Council, with perhaps50,000 members, before the civil war of 1947.12-13. Contacts appear to be through Urug uay .14. A t the moment, the Comm unist Pa rty seems to be endeavouring to reform

after its crushing defea t in the civil w ar. Its present situation is uncertain, butweak.P E R U

1. The Communist P ar ty was legal from May 1945 until November 1948,when it was proscribed.


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2. It s stren gth w as adm itted to be only 9,000 in 1948, or 15,000 w ith isympathisers.3. Th is stren gth is less than \ per cent, of the pop ulatio n.4. I t represents rather less than 3 per cent, of the electorate.5. The Com m unists returned one D ep uty in 1939, and five in 1945, out of127; they had no Senators, with the military revolution of October 1948 theirrepresen tation was lost. E ig ht more De pu ties and three Senators weresympathisers.6. There has been no represen tation in the Governm ent.7. In 1945 the total Comm unist poll w as about 30,000 .8-9 . There is probably little penetr ation in the army or police force.10. Info rm atio n insufficient.11. Comm unism in Peru , as elsewhere in L ati n Am erica, derives most o f

i ts s trength from the trade unions; but of the large Social is t Party, A.P.RA., .w as entirely anti-Com mu nist. Both are now il legal.12 . N o inf or m atio n: the founder of the Pe ruv ian Communist Part y,.Mariategui (d. 1930), was trained in Europe.13 . There is contact through Chile and Mexico.14. The suppression of both A .P .R .A . and the Comm unist Par ty may tellrathe r in favo ur of the latter. The militar y regime may be expected to do theirbest to eradicate Communism and it is unlikely that the Communists will beable to attem pt overt action . Influence among the dockers at Callao has b een,

strong and sabotage there cannot be ruled out,U R U G U A Y

I. The Comm unist Pa rt y is legal.2. It s mem bership is unk now n; but its votin g strength has reached 32,600.3. B y vo ting stren gth, it is about \ \ p er cent, of the total popu lation.4. It s vote wa s about 5 per cent, of the tota l electorate in 1946.5. I t ha s 5 seats out of 99 in the Chamber and 1 out of 30 in the Sen ate..6. It has no repres entation in the Government.7. In 1942 the Com m unists polled 14,300 vote s; in 1946 32,630, an increase

of 130 per cent.8-1 0. Insufficient evidence.I I . The Com m unists dom inate the trade unions.12 . The veteran leader, Sr. Gomez, visited Com mu nist Eur ope in 1948.13 . There are contacts w ith all the neighbouring countries, w ith Chile and

with Mexico, Uruguay is something of a centre for South American Communists.14. The Com m unists are well entrenched in labour organ isation, and couldsabotage Uru gu ay s export trade.V E N E Z U E L A

1. The Com munist Pa rty was legalised in October 1945.2. It s mem bership is unk now n; but its votin g stren gth reached 55,000 in1946 and fell to 45,000 in December 1947. Some Com mu nists, however, were

registered in the Democratic Action Party.3. V ot in g stren gth in 1946 wa s 1^ per cent, of the total population..4. In terms of the electorate, votin g stren gth w as \ per cent.


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5. In 1946 the Comm unists had two seats in Congress out of 1 60 ; these dis appeared with the military revolution of November 1948.6. There have been no Com mu nist M inisters.7. The Ven ezuela Comm unist Pa rty had 55,000 votes in 1946.8. Th e arm y is probab ly clear or alm ost clear.9.-1 0. Info rm ation insufficient.11. The Ve nezu elan Comm unists are strongest among intellectua ls and theoilfield workers.12. The founder of the Ven ezuelan Pa rty was Ru ssian trained.13. There is contact w ith M exico.14 . The Ven ezue lan oilfields are of gre at strategic importance, and even anundergrou nd Com mun ist movement could d o vital d ama ge.

T U R K E YGeneral feelin g in Turkey is extremely strong again st Comm unism. Th eCom mu nist Pa rty is illega l. The only Comm unist grou p suspected to exis t is confined to a few intellectuals in large towns, who are vigorously and efficiently suppressed by the Police.

E G Y P TI. There is no lega l Com mun ist Pa rty , but an illega l body called the Dem ocratic Movement of Na tion al Liberation (Hara ket al Dim okra tiya l i l Tahrur alW atan i) is Comm unist in word and deed. Ano ther i l legal Comm unist group, LaLigu e Juive contre le Sionism e, is closely connected w ith it .2. It is impossible to make any estimate of the total strength of these grou ps,or to distinguish between individuals who are genuine Marxists and those who aremerely, self-seek ing agita tor s of va ryin g shades of po litical pink. Genu ine Communists probably number not more than a few hundreds, perhaps a thousand at the

very most.3.-7 . Not applicable.8.-9 . The armed forces and, perha ps, the police are Com mu nist-penetratedto some exten t. The D.M .N.L . has a police and army section, wh ich was active inmid-1948, but there is no reliable information on the extent of its present membership. A body formed in the summer of 1948, T h e Unio n of armed forces inthe army and the po lice, will doubtless be used to ven tilate the widesp read d issatisfaction with the conditions of service which has been growing in both forcesdur ing the past year. W hether it has any Communist connexions is not known.The lowered morale of the army, caused by the Palestine campaign, may also beexploited by the Communists.10. There is no evidence of Comm unism in the Civ il Service. Civil Servantswould be particularly careful to keep any such sympathies secret.I I . There is, as yet, little real Comm unism in the trad e unions, but organisedlabour has, nevertheless, proved a receptiveperhaps the most receptiveseedbedfor Comm unist prop agan da. Several imp ortan t strikes, par ticular ly that at theMehalla al Kubra textile factory in September-October 1947, undoubtedly had adegree of Communist insp iratio n behind them. Mohammed Yu suf al Mud arik,one of the Egy ptia n representatives to the W.F .T.U . C onference at Prag ue in 1946,

heads a body called the Dem ocratic Comm ittee for the Libera tion of Labo ur,believed tp be closely tied to the D.M .N.L . Pr act ically no thin g is know n of i tscomposition.11A. The students, particularly those of the Cairo and Ale xan dria universities, have also proved a receptive field to Comm unist seed. The D.M .N.L . isbelieved to be in touch with Communist-minded students, but it must be emphasised36805 E


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that in most cases these sympathisers are merely giving expression to a frothyxenophobia and cannot be described as genuine Uommunists.12. The Soviet Le ga tion in Ca iro is probably in closer touch w it h theD.M .N.L . (and wit h its leader, H enr i Curial) than recent reports show. Certainhigh-level members of the Wafd Party are known to have been in contact with the

Lega tion. In the past the satell ite m issions (particularly the Yugoslavs) app earto have been mainly responsible for directing Communist activities in Egypt.13. The Soviet Le ga tion in Beir ut is believed to be the m ain centre fromwh ich instru ctions are issued to other M iddle Ea st countries. So far, however,there is no evidence of any links between Egypt and Lebanon, or even Palestine andIsra el po tentia lly much more likely sources of infec tion . Th e only confirmedlink is w ith the Sudan. The D.M .N.L . is known to be in contact w ith the SudaneseNational Liberation Movement, and is believed to have a section dealing exclusivelywith Sudanese elementsparticularly visit ing students.14. The Eg yp tia n m asses are eas ily rouse"d, and there is mu ch smo uldering

discontent which could well be exploited, but at present there is no strong party orprominent leader who could gain the support of the mob, the armed forces and theciv il adm inistration . Com munism in E gy pt is thus unlikely to exte nd its influencefa r beyond its present lim its. Th e Greek comm unity in Cairo certain ly containssome Communists, but they have so far kept outside the orbit of the Egyptian movem ent. Since the outbreak of hos tilitie s in Pales tine the police have made wid espread arre sts of Com munist susp ects (particular ly J ew s) wi th the result, tha t theIXM .N.L . has now been stifled almost out of existence. The re are reports that i tis breaking up into small, separate groups.

T H E S U D A N1. There is no legal Com munist Pa rty in the Sudan, but a body known asthe " Sudanese Movem ent of Na tion al L iberation " has C omm unist tendencies.2 The few members (all Sudanese) are mainly students from the GordonCollege in Khartoum and are unim portan t as individ uals. There are not l ikelyto be more than a hundred of them.3-7 . No t applicable.8 - 1 1 . The armed forces, police, civi l service and trade union s all app ear

to be clear.12. There are no know n links between the " M ov em en t" a nd any Sovietconsular or diplom atic officials. The "M o v e m e n t" wa s, however, mentionedapprovingly by Moscow Radio in October 1948.13. The "S ud an es e Movement of Nation al Libera tion " is undoubtedlyl ink ed'w ith the Eg yptia n D.M.N.L Du ring the past year several s tudents atEgyptian universities have taken part in Communist activities, and a body inEg yp t known as the " General Un ion of Sudanese Students " is Comm unistdominated.14. The influence of the Sudanese " M ovement " is extrem ely limited , andlike ly to rem ain so in the foreseeab le futu re. A s as po ten tia l fifth-column, therefore, it need not yet be given serious consideration.

E T H I O P I A1. There is as yet no know n Comm unist Pa rty or grou p.2- 7. No t applicable.8- 11 There does not app ear to be any Com mu nist influence in the armedforces; police, or civil service. Trad e union orga nisat ion is virt ua lly no n-existent.12 Com mu nist pro pag and a, some of wh ich reaches Som alia and even theBeleian Congo, is undoubtedly disseminated from the Soviet Legation, but so^tarthere is no evidence that this m ission is directing Comm unist activities anywhere


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in A fric a. A S oviet hosp ital in A dd is Abab a, opened in 1947, provides a goodcover for underground activities.13. The Somali Youth League, a vociferous Na tionalist organisation, wasreported in December 1948 to harbour a small Comm unist cell. There are a few

thousand members of the League in Ethiopia.14. So fa r the Eth iopia ns have proved unresponsive to Comm unist propagand a, an d are likely to rem ain so. The Greek comm unity (which is com parativelylarge) presen ts the only fert ile field for Comm unist seed. The Le ft-w ing sectionis believed to be organised into Communist cells, and in December 1948 some fortysuspects were under observation.P A L E S T I N E

1. The Pa lest ine C omm unist P ar ty is recognised as a political party by thepresent Jew i

Communism in Burma 1949

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