CMH_Pub_10-5 Corps of Engineers - Construction in the USA.pdf

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The Technical Services

THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: CONSTRUCTION IN THE

UNITED STATES

by Lenore Fine

and Jesse A. Remington

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHING TON, D.C. , 1989

Foreword

In World War II the Corps of Engineers superintended the largest con-struction program in the nation's history, providing the home base for aUnited States Army that grew to more than eight million men and women.The Corps-related construction work included development of the facilities formaking atomic bombs. In telling the story of these herculean efforts theauthors set unprecedented standards: no detailed and scholarly history onthe subject of construction has ever before been undertaken in this country.

Other aspects of the domestic contributions of the Army Engineers inthe war have been covered in the first volume of this subseries to be pub-lished, Troops and Equipment, and a second told the story of the Engineereffort overseas in the war against Japan. A final volume still in preparationwill relate the activities of Engineers in the Mediterranean area and Europein the war against Italy and Germany.

While this volume presents the story of military construction during thewar primarily from the point of view of the Corps of Engineers as revealedin its records and by its participants, it does justice also to the work of theQuartermaster Corps from which the Engineers inherited responsibilityfor military construction in the United States in 1940 and 1941. This bookshould be welcomed by both the thoughtful citizen and the military studentfor its readability as well as for its instructive value in describing withauthority a variety of activities that collectively were a significant foundationof victory in America's most gigantic conflict.

Washington, D.C. JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.15 April 1971 Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

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Lenore Fine, a member of the Engineer Historical Division since 1945,has an A.B. degree from Goucher College and an M.L.A. degree from TheJohns Hopkins University. She has done additional graduate work in historyat the latter institution.

Jesse A. Remington, who holds a Ph.D. degree from the Universityof Maryland, joined the Engineer Historical Division in 1947 and has beenchief historian since 1958. During World War II, he served in the HistoricalSection, Headquarters, China Theater.

The Authors

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Preface

A vast homefront construction effort by the U.S. Army undergirdedmobilization and combat in World War II. Started by the QuartermasterCorps and carried to completion by the Corps of Engineers, this buildingprogram embraced more than 27,000 projects, large and small, and cost$15.3 billion, roughly $59 billion in 1970 prices. (See Appendix.) Amongits major features were camps and cantonments to house 5.3 million troops;plants to mass-produce explosives, ammunition, tanks, and planes; hospitalsproviding nearly half a million beds; a huge network of ports and depots;improvements to principal waterways and flood protection for vital industries;bomber bases which entailed a whole new technology; the mammoth Penta-gon Building; and facilities for the epochal Manhattan Project. Our book isa history of this undertaking.

It is also a history of people: of military leaders and their staffs; of civilianengineers, contractors, suppliers, and equipment dealers; of dollar-a-yearmen and expert consultants; of industrialists and union organizers; of states-men and politicians; of patriots and profiteers; and of the faceless multitudeworkers, GI's, small businessmen, dispossessed property owners, and citizensof every stripe who participated in or felt the impact of the program. Through-out we have tried to show how individuals and groups influenced events.

Ostensibly a diffuse technical subject, an untempting prospect for his-torians, construction proved a rewarding field of inquiry. High-level planning,site selection, land acquisition, engineering design, contractual arrangements,procurement methods, labor relations, and day-to-day operations in thefieldall were illuminating studies. Gradually a story emerged of publicindifference and military myopia, of unprecedented challenges and initialunpreparedness, of cruel disappointments and serious mistakes, of remedialmeasures and sweeping reorganizations, and of prodigious efforts and crown-ing success. Because many World War II developments had their roots inWorld War I and the two decades that followed, the narrative begins in 1917and, more or less following a chronological scheme, proceeds through eighteenchapters to August 1945. The final chapters discuss two extraordinaryachievementsairfields for heavy bombers and the atomic bomb.

We are deeply grateful to all those persons who aided in the preparationof this volume. Special thanks are owing to our past and present colleaguesin the Engineer Historical Division whose advice and assistance eased ourtask. Dr. O. J. Clinard, who launched us on the undertaking, was a source

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of inspiration and encouragement. Dr. Karl C. Dod offered many valuablecomments and suggestions. Miss Dorothe M. Grand gave us the benefit ofher discriminating editorial judgment. Mr. Eugene V. McAndrews was athoughtful critic. Miss Blanche D. Coll did research and drafted sections onlabor relations; Miss G. Louise Marr, on real estate. A study of the Man-hattan Engineer District by Dr. Ralph F. Weld provided the groundworkfor Chapter XX. Many participants, nearly all of whom are named in thevolume, gave generously of their time and knowledge, helping to illuminatethe written record and correcting factual errors. We are particularly gratefulto the officers who read and commented upon the entire manuscript: Lt.Gen. Leslie R. Groves; Maj. Gen. John R. Hardin; Lt. Gen. Eugene Reybold;Col. Lloyd C. Ritchie; Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr.; and Lt. Gen. WalterK. Wilson, Jr. To Generals Groves and Sturgis, who worked closely with usfor many years, our debt is exceptionally heavy. Mr. Thomas B. Pringle andMr. Harry B. Zackrison were invaluable advisers on technical subjects.

General acknowledgments are due to Mrs. Lois Aldridge, Mrs. VirginiaM. Nester, Mrs. Mary K. Stuart, Mr. John E. Taylor, and Mrs. Mae E.Walker, whose archival assistance was indispensable; to Miss Agnes M.Dutkevich and Mrs. Ruth E. Steers, who typed the final draft of the manu-script and verified quotations and names; and to Mr. Robert L. Collins, Jr.,who did artwork for maps and charts.

We are also obliged to members of the Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory, especially to Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, and Mr. Joseph R.Friedman, Editor in Chief, for their practical advice and constructive criti-cism. Mr. David Jaffe, Chief of the Editorial Branch, demonstrated rareskill and admirable diplomacy in the final editing. Mrs. Marion P. Grimeswas the copy editor. Mrs. Muriel Southwick prepared the index.

Finally, we wish to express our warm appreciation to Mr. Robert W.Blakeley, Lt. Col. Frank E. Burk, Brig. Gen. Curtis W. Chapman, Jr., Mr.Logan O. Cowgill, Brig. Gen. Ira A. Hunt, Jr., Mr. August J. Karasek,Mrs. Bessie S. Rubin, and all the other members of the Engineer family whoeffectively supported our effort.

For the facts presented and the conclusions drawn in this volume, theauthors alone are responsible.

Baltimore, Maryland LENORE FINE15 April 1971 JESSE A. REMINGTON

Contents

Chapter Page

I. LEGACY OF WORLD WAR I . . . . . . . . . . 3A Backward Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Mobilization: 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8Congress Investigates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6The Compromise o f 1920 . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

I I . LEAN YEARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2The Construction Service, 1920-1938 . . . . . . . . . 43Preparedness a n d Public W o r k s . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6Mobilization Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5

III. COMING OF THE EMERGENCY . . . . . . . . . 74T h e Expansion Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4The Quest for Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77Questions o f Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4Quartermaster Plans and Preparations . . . . . . . . . 93Construction Gets Under Way . . . . . . . . . . . 100The Period of the Phony War . . . . . . . . . . . 108

IV. FIRST STEPS TOWARD MOBILIZATION . . . . . . IIIT h e Defense Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I IEarly Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 5Creating a n Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3Site Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 0Mounting Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 3

V. LAUNCHING DEFENSE CONSTRUCTION . . . . . . 152Policies a n d Policymakers . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 5Engineering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 2Real Estate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 4Selecting Contractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 4Negotiating Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 2

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Chapter Page

VI. THE FIRST CAMPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198T h e Administrative Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 1Preliminary Work a t Camp Sites . . . . . . . . . . 205Lumber and Other Materials . . . . . . . . . . . 213Construction Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 8Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 0Management a n d Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 1Nearing t h e Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 9

VII. THE REORGANIZATION OF LATE 1940 . . . . . . 244T h e Engineers' Predicament . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 4Growth of the Engineer Mission . . . . . . . . . . 246A Separate Corps? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 2Reorganization a n d Restaffing . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 9Transfer of Air Corps C o n s t r u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . 267

VIII. COMPLETING THE CAMPS . . . . . . . . . . 273T h e Deficit Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 3Additional Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 6Winter Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 0Closing O u t Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 7Maintenance a n d O p e r a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 2

IX. CREATING A MUNITIONS INDUSTRY. . . . . . . 309Status of the ProgramDecember 1940. . . . . . . . . 310Dollars Versus Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 3Demands f o r Greater Speed. . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 1T h e Steel Shortage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 7Completing the First-Wave Plants . . . . . . . . . . 335

X . PLANNING AHEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 2Advance PlanningCamps and Cantonments . . . . . . . 342A New ApproachMunitions Projects . . . . . . . . 354A Stronger Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 3The Building Trades Agreement . . . . . . . . . . 366

XI . THE PUBLIC IMAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . 372Publicity a n d Public Relations . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 3Congressman Engel Investigates. . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 8House and Senate Committee Investigations. . . . . . . . 381

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Chapter Page

XII. REAL ESTATE: A FRESH DEPARTURE. . . . . . . 393The Case of the Brokerage Contracts . . . . . . . . . 393Changes in Organization and Procedures . . . . . . . . 401

XIII. TOWARD A FOUR-MILLION-MAN ARMY. . . . . . 408Budgetary Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 8Contractual Refinements a n d Reforms . . . . . . . . . 4 1 9T h e Pentagon Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3 1

XIV. T H E TRANSFER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 0A Test for the Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . 440Reaching a Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 0T h e "Madigan Bill" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 7Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 2

XV. THE IMPACT OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 477T h e All-Out Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 7The War Construction Command . . . . . . . . . . 485T h e B i g Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 9Peak Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 9

XVI. THE MATERIALS BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . 522Bare Essentials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 2Procurement Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 6Lumber Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 5T h e Last Ounce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 3

XVII. WARTIME CONTRACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 2Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 3Modified Fixed-Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 9Competition a n d Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 3Renegotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 7

XVIII. CUTBACK AND CONTINUATION . . . . . . . . 586Curtailment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 6Topping O u t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 9 3Late Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0 3

XIX. AIRFIELDS FOR VERY HEAVY BOMBERS . . . . . 614T h e Technological Barrier . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1 4Breakthrough and Advance, 1942-1944 . . . . . . . . 623N e w Horizons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4 4

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Chapter Page

X X . ATOMIC MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 0MED: Origins and Early Efforts . . . . . . . . . . 651Clinton and Hanford . . . . . . . . . . . . . 668Zia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9 3

APPENDIXARMY CONSTRUCTION IN THE CONTINENTALUNITED STATES, 1 JULY 1940-31 AUGUST 1945 . 703

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 0 4

LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1 0

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1 9

Tables

No.

1. National Army Cantonments, 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . 162. National Guard Camps, 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . 163. Appropriations for Maintenance and Repairs . . . . . . . . 544. Construction Workers in the United States, June 1 9 4 0 . . . . . 1215. Schedule of Minimum Fees for Construction Services . . . . . . 1956. Schedule of Average Fees for Architect-Engineer Services . . . . . 1967. Schedule for Housing National Guard Divisions . . . . . . . 1998. Revised Induction Schedule for Fall 1940 Quota of Selectees . . . . 2009. Reserve Officers on Active Duty With Construction Division, 13 Decem-

b e r 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 410. Number of Persons Employed on Projects Under Jurisdiction of Con-

struction Division, OQMG, July-December 1940 . . . . . . 22211. Cost of Air Corps Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27112. Summary of Quartermaster Projects Completed and Under Way, 5

December 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 713. Revised Schedule of Fees for Architect-Engineer and Construction

Services, 23 June 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42414. Division Engineer Service Command Assignments . . . . . . . 49715. Status of Projects, 15-31 March 1942 . . . . . . . . . . 51116 . Hospital Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52917. Breakdown of Delaying Factors, 31 May-31 October 1942 . . . . 53718. Lumber Purchased by CPA, 1942-1945 . . . . . . . . . . 55319. Variations in Barracks Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . 55820. Unfinished Construction, January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 607

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Charts

No. Page

1. Organization of Construction Division of the Army, April-November1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2

2. Volume of New Construction in the United States, 1925-1939 ... 1203. Organization of Construction Division, OQMG, June-November 1940 . 1244. Organization of Engineering Branch, Construction Division, OQMG,

September 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 45. Organization of Fixed Fee Branch, Construction Division, OQMG,

November 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 26. Organization of Construction Division, OQMG, 16 December 1940 .... 2617. Organization of Office of Assistant Chief of Engineers, December 1940. . 2698. Organization of Operations Branch, Construction Division, OQMG,

January t o March 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2819. Rate of National Guard Inductions . . . . . . . . . . . 296

10. Rate of Selective Service Inductions . . . . . . . . . . 29611. Progressive Improvements in Divisional Cantonment Layouts. . . . 35212. Value of Work Placed by Month on Quartermaster Construction Program,

1 July 1940 to 30 November 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . 41613. Comparison of CostsQuartermaster Construction Program, 1 April to

1 5 December 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 814. Organization of Defense Projects Branch, Construction Section, OCE,

April 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 215. Construction by the Corps of Engineers at Air Corps StationsU.S. Army 45816. Position of Corps of Engineers in War Department After 9 March 1942 . 49217. Organization of Construction Division, OCE, April 1942 . . . . . 49418. Value of Work in Place, Monthly Additions . . . . . . . . . 52019. Organization of Engineering Branch, Construction Division, OCE,

Spring 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 420. Dollar Value of Work Placed During 1943 . . . . . . . . . 59921. Field Employment During 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . 59922. Organization of Military Construction, Civil Works, and Real Estate

Divisions, OCE, December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . 60423. Value of Work Placed on War Construction Program, Continental

United States, June 1940-August 1945 . . . . . . . . . 60624. Tentative Design Curves for Flexible Airfield Pavements . . . . . 62725 . Design Storm Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63426. Wheel Loads as Columns of Concrete 3 Feet 8 Inches in Diameter . . . 64627. Organization of Manhattan Engineer District, April 1943 . . . . 678

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Maps

No. Page

1. Inland Zone and Five Strategic Areas . . . . . . . . . . 1362. Quartermaster Construction Zones . . . . . . . . . . . 2643. Boundaries of Engineer Divisions, December 1942 . . . . . . . 4984. Clinton Engineer Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6705. Hanford Engineer Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 675

Illustrations

Camp Custer, Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3Tents at Camp Wheeler, Georgia, 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . 15Barracks and Lavatories, Camp Dix, New Jersey . . . . . . . . 17Brig. Gen. Richard C. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Old Hickory Powder Plant, Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . 26Chanute Field, Illinois, Showing Dilapidated Structures . . . . . . 47Post Chapel, Randolph Field, Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Officers' Club, Fort Belvoir, Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . 50Camp on Levee, Arkansas City, Arkansas, During 1927 Flood . . . . . 57Col. Charles D. Hartman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69USS Houston Passing Through Panama Canal . . . . . . . . . 78Barracks Burning at Hickam Field After Japanese Attack . . . . . . 85Maj. Gen. Julian L. Schley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Equipment Arriving at Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico . . . . . . . 105Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108Ferdinand J. C. Dresser, Forrest S. Harvey, and Francis Blossom . . . . 126Barksdale Field, Louisiana, in Late 1930's . . . . . . . . . . 132Excavation at Fort Devens, Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . 142Robert P . Patterson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 4Harry W . Loving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 7Capt. Leslie R . Groves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158Michael J . Madigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 9Frank E . Lamphere. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 3Mess Hall, Camp Grant, Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Hangar Construction, MacDill Field, Florida . . . . . . . . . 170Site of Plum Brook Ordnance Works, Ohio . . . . . . . . . . 179Cantonment Construction, Camp Edwards, Massachusetts . . . . . 197Clearing Swamps at Camp Blanding, Florida . . . . . . . . . 206Railroad Bridge Over Big Piney River, Camp Leonard Wood, Missouri . . 208

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Page

Camp San Luis Obispo, California. . . . . . . . . . . . . 210Building Barracks, Camp Leonard Wood, Missouri . . . . . . . 232Prefabricating Yard and Sawmill, Camp Blanding, Florida . . . . . . 234Standard Chapel, Exterior View . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237Standard Chapel, Interior View . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239Bonneville D a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 5Col. Brehon B. Somervell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256Col. Wilhelm D. Styer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262Maj. Clinton F . Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262Col. Edmund H. Leavey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Robins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268Camp San Luis Obispo After Heavy Downpour. . . . . . . . . 283Pouring Concrete in Subzero Weather, Pine Camp, New York . . . . . 284Camp Blanding, Florida, Late November 1940 . . . . . . . . . 292Men of the 29th Division at Camp Meade, Maryland . . . . . . . 294Barnes General Hospital, Vancouver, Washington . . . . . . . . 295Spillway Under Construction, Camp San Luis Obispo . . . . . . . 299Aerial View of Camp Jackson, S.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 303Frank R . Creedon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 3Construction at Indiana Ordnance Works, 1940. . . . . . . .. 315General Grant (M3) Rolls Off Assembly Line . . . . . . . . . 320Night Shift at Work, St. Louis Ordnance Plant . . . . . . . . . 326Constructing Standard Igloo Magazine . . . . . . . . . . . 334Somervell Addressing Construction Force . . . . . . . . . . 337Morgantown Ordnance Works, West Virginia . . . . . . . . . 340Experimental Steel Barracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 5Lake City Ordnance Plant, Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . 359James P . Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 7Flag Raising at Radford Ordnance Works, Virginia . . . . . . . 375Fitzpatrick Cartoon on Senator Truman . . . . . . . . . . . 386John J . O'Brien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 2Pentagon Building, Main Entrance . . . . . . . . . . . . 432Cartoonist's View of Controversy over Pentagon Site . . . . . . . 436Concrete Drainage Culvert at Brookley Field, Alabama . . . . . . 445Paving Runway, Lowry Field, Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . 446Bradley Field, Windsor Locks, Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . 449Fort Worth Aircraft Assembly Plant, Texas . . . . . . . . . . 459Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465Transfer Proposal Approved by the President . . . . . . . . . 466Hutments, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, July 1942 . . . . . . . . . . 483Maj. Gen. John R. Hardin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487Col. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504Pentagon Under Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 2

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Page

Heart Mountain Relocation Center, Heart Mountain, Wyoming . . . . 515Brig. Gen. James H. Stratton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525Harry B . Zackrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526Bachelor Officers' Quarters, Sioux Fails Army Air Force Base, South Dakota . 527Corbetta Beehive Magazine Under Construction . . . . . . . . 530Wood Truss Construction, Pennsylvania Ordnance Works . . . . . . 534Col. Fred G. Sherrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545Airmen on Grounds of Stevens Hotel . . . . . . . . . . . 557Double-Decker Bunks in Permanent Barracks, March Field, California . . 559Winter Construction at Mountain Home Air Base, Idaho . . . . . . 595Holston Ordnance Works, T e n n e s s e e . . . . . . . . . . . . 596Work in Progress on Tulsa Bomber Modification Center . . . . . . 597Conference at Stockton Test Track, California . . . . . . . . . 630240,000-Pound Pneumatic Roller . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647Brig. Gen. James C. Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651Col. Kenneth D. Nichols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653General Groves as Head of the Manhattan Project . . . . . . . . 661Mrs. Jean M. O'Leary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 662Cemesto Houses on Black Oak Ridge. . . . . . . . . . . . 671Y-12, Electromagnetic Process Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . 685First Pile Area at Hanford, June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 688S-50, Thermal Diffusion Plant Under Construction. . . . . . . . 689K-25, Gaseous Diffusion Plant Nearing Completion . . . . . . . 691Separation Building at Hanford, Summer 1944 . . . . . . . . 692View of Los Alamos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699

Illustrations are from the following sources:

E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc.: page 26.National Archives: pages 78, 108, 386, 515.AGC, Carolinas Branch: page 147.United Press International, Inc.: page 159.Charles T. Main, Inc.: page 197.Leeds, Hill and Jewett, Inc.: pages 283, 299.St. Louis Post-Dispatch: pages 326, 337.Library of Congress: page 436.Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.: pages 530, 534.J. A. Terteling & Sons, Inc.: page 595.Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc.: page 597.Atomic Energy Commission: pages 671, 685, 688, 689, 691, 692, 699.

Other photographs came from Department of Defense files and through thecourtesy of private individuals.

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THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS:

CONSTRUCTION IN THE

UNITED STATES

Legacy of World War I

CHAPTER I

Reviewing the lessons of World WarII, Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves declared:"Mobilization was decisive and con-struction generally controlled mobiliza-tion."1 In 1939, when hostilities beganin Europe, the United States was illprepared to counter threats to its se-curity. To be sure, the Navy, the firstline of defense, ranked with Britain'smighty fleet. But the Army was barelymore than a token force, and the countryhad virtually no munitions industry.Before the nation could realize its hugemilitary potential, it had first to builda vast complex of camps, plants, air-fields, hospitals, and depots. As Presi-dential adviser Sidney Hillman pointedout in 1941:

Construction is not only the biggest singlepart of defense, it is also the first step in de-fense. Before we can produce guns and planesand tanks, we must build defense plants oralter non-defense plants to new produc-tion . . . . Similarly, if we are to trainour Army well, our soldiers must be providedwith proper living conditions in camps andcantonments.2

Construction was the first major industryto attain large-scale defense and warproduction in World War II. A 15.6-billion-dollar Army construction effort

set the pace for mobilization and laidthe foundations for victory.

A Backward Glance

The nation's early wars told a dif-ferent story. Before the 20th century,mobilization necessitated little con-struction. In the American Revolution,the War of 1812, the Mexican War, andthe Civil War, armies were raised bymustering small units, which went almostimmediately on active service in thefield. There, bivouacked in tents orsheltered in crude huts of their own de-sign, troops received such training astime permitted. In the Spanish-AmericanWar, regiments assembled at fairgrounds,race tracks, and armories and movedrapidly to tent cities at Chickamauga,Tampa, and other points in the South-east, whence they embarked for Cuba assoon as ships were available. For weap-ons and ammunition, the ContinentalArmy relied on imports and on theproducts of small foundries, smithies,and the like. During the 19th century,American forces were armed and sup-plied with explosives by federal andstate arsenals and by private manu-facturers, principally Remington, Win-chester, Colt, and DuPont. Until the ageof modern mass armies, constructionpresented no serious wartime challenge.

Throughout most of the country'shistory, responsibility for military con-

1 Comments of Lt Gen Leslie R. Groves on MS,Construction in the United States, 1955, I, I. Citedhereinafter as Groves Comments.

2 S Sp Comm Investigating the National DefenseProgram, 77th Cong, 1st sess, Hearings, Part 8, p.2493. Cited hereinafter as Truman Comm, Hearings.

CONSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES4

struction was shared by various branchesof the Army. At the outbreak of theRevolutionary War, Congress, followingBritish and Colonial practice, assignedto the Chief Engineer the work of build-ing bridges, roads, and fortificationsand to The Quartermaster General thetask of quartering the Army. Thus itwas established early that the Corps ofEngineers would perform combat con-struction and the Quartermaster Corpswould see to sheltering troops. The di-vision of authority did not end there.The Ordnance Department erected ar-senals; the Signal Corps, after its found-ing in 1863, built some of its own fa-cilities; and most of the other branches,at one time or another, also engaged inbuilding work. Nevertheless, the twoagencies most closely associated withmilitary construction were the Quarter-master Corps and the Corps of Engineers.

The Quartermaster Corps was a multi-functioned organization concerned withservice and supply. Provision of trans-port, shelter, clothing, and equipagewere its principal functions. In dis-charging his construction duties, TheQuartermaster General over the yearsencountered little difficulty. A handfulof small posts sufficed to house the Armyin the early days of the Republic. Asthe westward movement gained mo-mentum, hundreds of garrisons werebuilt on the frontier by the occupyingtroops. Most of these outposts were tinyand most were of rude design. In timemany of them outlived their usefulnessand were abandoned, but scores wereretained as part of the regular establish-ment. At permanent stations, buildingsof brick and stone gradually replacedthe log and frame structures of earlier

days. Utilities became more elaborate;and maintenance work assumed greaterimportance. From time to time, a largeproject cropped up, for example, theJeffersonville Depot in Indiana and thequarters for the Hawaiian Division atSchofield Barracks. But the volume ofwork was never large. Between 1865and 1900 Congress seldom authorizedmore than 150 new buildings a year.3

Quartermasters General carried outconstruction with a minimum of or-ganization. In the Office of The Quarter-master General in Washington an officeror two and a few civilians took care ofbudgetary and other administrative mat-ters. Most officers on construction dutyin the field were temporarily detailedfrom the line. Their work, in most in-stances, was supervised not by TheQuartermaster General but by localand departmental commanders. In theearly days, construction not performedby troops was usually accomplishedunder a system known variously as daylabor, force account, or purchase andhirean arrangement whereby the of-ficer in charge drew whatever planswere needed, purchased materials, hiredworkmen, and oversaw the, work. Astime went on and structures becamemore elaborate, master builders enteredthe picture. By the 1850's the Quarter-master Corps had begun to utilize theservices of contracting companies whichwere then springing up in cities. After1861 contracts with such firms cameunder a law of that year which requiredadvertising except when "public exi-gency" demanded immediate per-

3 Annual Reports of The Quartermaster Generalto the Secretary of War.

LEGACY OF WORLD WAR I 5

formance. By 1900 the QuartermasterCorps had constructed 120 permanentposts and stations with capacity for34,000 men. The largest of these instal-lations, Fort Riley, Kansas, could ac-commodate 1,300 troops; the smallest,Fort Ontario, New York, could house40.4 With only a small amount of workto do, oriented toward supply ratherthan toward construction, composedlargely of detailed officers, few of whomhad any technical background, andforced to rely more and more on privatebuilders, architects, and engineers, theQuartermaster Corps was unable todevelop anything approaching the con-struction capability of the Corps ofEngineers.

A combat branch and a public worksconstruction agency, the Corps of En-gineers was a unique organization. His-torically, June 16th, 1775, the date ofthe Corps' founding, was barely moresignificant than March 16th, 1802. Onthat day President Jefferson signed abill providing for a Corps of Engineersseven officers and ten cadetsto bestationed at West Point, New York, andto "constitute a military academy."Jefferson's main object was a nationalcollege of engineering, and he designedthe new academy not to train officersof the line but to educate engineers forpublic service. The first engineeringschool in the United States, West Pointwas the leading one until the Civil War.The Army Corps of Engineers, com-

posed almost exclusively of top academygraduates, was the only sizable group oftrained engineers in the country. As thedemand for internal improvements roseand federal projects multiplied, thegovernment turned to the Engineers.Rivers and harbors improvements, sur-veys and explorations, roads, canals,lighthouses, and public buildingstheCorps' responsibilities came to encompassall of these. By the time the civil en-gineering profession came of age inAmerica, the Corps' role in civil worksconstruction was firmly established.

Peacetime construction experience,plus first-rate technical education, fittedEngineer officers for wartime combat,logistical, and command assignments.West Point Engineers, who after gradua-tion had gone on to build seacoast de-fenses, made a brilliant record in theWar of 1812. Not one fortification de-signed by them fell to the enemy. His-torian Henry Adams wrote of theirperformance: "Perhaps without exag-geration the West Point Academy mightbe said to have decided, next to theNavy, the result of the war." Adamscredited West Point Engineers withdoubling the Army's capacity for resis-tance during the campaign of 1814.5

The Corps' experience in organizingsizable labor forces and in directinglarge construction enterprises was ofgreat importance in later wars. Not onlydid Engineer officers perform the tra-ditional duties of military engineersimpeding enemy advances and assistingmovements of friendly troopsbut they4 (1) Ibid. (2) Testimony of Maj Gen Edmund B.

Gregory, TQMG, 30 Sep 41. In H Comm on MilAffs, 77th Gong, 1st sess, Hearings on H R 5630,p. 82. (3) 12 Stat. 220. (4) Statement by OQMG,13 Nov 1900, sub: Capacity of Posts. Doc 15827OQMG Doc File, 1800-1914.

5 Henry Adams, A History of the United States ofAmerica, 1930 ed. (New York: Albert and CharlesBoni, 1930), IX, 336.


also occupied high staff and commandpositions. In the Civil War the Army'stop logistician was an Engineer:Montgomery C. Meigs; Robert E. Leeepitomized the Engineer commander.The defenses around Washington, thecrossings of the Rappahannock underfire, and the bridging of the James ex-emplified the Engineer support of theUnion Army. By employing the Corpsin time of peace, the government con-tinued to assure that competent militaryengineers would be available in theevent of war.

As time went on, as the westwardmovement accelerated and the countrygrew, the construction capability of theCorps of Engineers was enhanced. Al-though control of West Point passed tothe Army-at-large in 1866, engineeringand mathematics continued to form thecore of its curriculum, and its top gradu-ates consistently chose careers in thebranch that offered superior opportuni-ties for public service. To supplementthe West Point education of Engineerofficers, the Engineer School was foundedat Willet's Point, New York, in 1885.Meanwhile, during the great expansionfollowing Appomattox, Congress focusedgreater attention on internal improve-ments, and civil works programs bulkedlarge. From 1866 through 1900, federalexpenditures for rivers, harbors, and floodcontrol totaled $333 million. Duringthis period, a permanent, nationwideorganization came into being. In 1888the need for a formal field structure ledthe Chief of Engineers, Brig. Gen.Thomas L. Casey, to remake the En-gineer Department by creating fivedivisionsone west and four east of theRocky Mountains. Later more divisionswere added and districts, or subdivisions,

were established.6 At the turn of thecentury, the Army Engineers had a con-struction organization that was by farthe largest, best trained, and most ex-perienced in the country.

By the early 1900's, sentiment wasgrowing in favor of placing all militaryconstruction under the Engineers. Atthe time the General Staff was con-stituted, such a change was consideredbut was not effected.7 The question cameup again and again. In 1910 a high-ranking proponent of the Engineers ex-plained his position:

It may, I believe, be asserted without fearof challenge that construction work in thearmy under present conditions leaves muchto be desired. . . . Construction re-quires technical knowledge of a high order.Such knowledge is possessed by only a smallpercentage of the officers of the Quarter-master's Department, while in the Corps ofEngineers every officer receives special train-ing along those lines.8

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, Chief ofStaff from 1910-1914, took the samestand. During his term the issue washotly debated but no decision wasreached.9 The Quartermaster con-struction organization continued along

6 (1) W. Stull Holt, The Office of the Chief of Engineersof the Army: Its Non-military History, Activities, andOrganization (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,1923), PP- 11-17. (2) H Doc 330, 80th Cong, 1stsess, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945:A Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of the UnitedStates (Washington, 1949), p. 169. Cited hereinafteras Historical Statistics of the United States, 17891945,(3) Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army,1889 (Washington, 1889), Part 1, p. 16. (4) Paul W.Thompson, What You Should Know About the ArmyEngineers (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,Inc., 1942), pp. 194-198.

7 S Doc 421, 57th Cong, 1st sess, 23 Jun 02.8 Rpt, TIG to SW. In WD Annual Rpts, FY

Ending 30 Jun 10. OCE Doc 81599.9 (1) OQMG 1800-1914, Doc 494615. (2) OCE

Docs 93454, 99428.


as before. Meanwhile, Engineers werebuilding the Panama Canal.

Serious obstacles barred the way to atransfer. Maj. Gen. James B. Aleshire,the prestigious officer who was TheQuartermaster General from 1907 to1916, was unalterably opposed.10 Manyofficers in other branches resented theproud bearing of the Engineer elite andthe Corps' close relationship with Con-gress. Moreover, powerful oppositionexisted within industry. Since the 1870's,a movement had been under way amongcontractors and civil engineers to estab-lish a Federal Department of PublicWorks and to assign to it the Engineers'civil functions.11 Any step which wouldstrengthen the Corps was certain toprovoke determined resistance frombackers of this proposal. The organiza-tion was left unchanged.

As the holocaust of World War Iengulfed Europe, the old idea persistedin the United Statesa million menwould spring to arms overnight. Thisbelief was outmoded. The days of takingthe flintlock off the wall and going offto fight were beyond recall. A new dayhad dawned, a day of large-scale mobili-zation, systematic training, and tech-nological warfare. Camps to house wholedivisions; plants to mass-produce weap-ons and ammunition; warehouses, de-pots, and terminals to handle hugequantities of matriel; and myriad otherfacilities had become sinews of war. Ina country which had no sizable standingarmy, no munitions industry to speak of,

and few facilities to support a mightymilitary effort, construction had becomethe key to preparedness.

Mobilization: 1917

Like most of the War Department,the Construction and Repair Division,Office of The Quartermaster General(OQMG), was thrown into confusionby the declaration of war against Ger-many in April 1917. Following theneutral course set by President WoodrowWilson, who continued to discouragemilitary planning even after the diplo-matic break with Berlin in February1917, the Army had made few prepara-tions to mobilize. One man who visitedconstruction headquarters shortly afterhostilities began described the scene asnear bedlam: "There were a couple ofArmy officers and stenographers. . . .Every contractor in the country washere. All those men did was to stand infront of the desk and shake hands allday. . . . Paper was stacked highon the desk and there was confusiongalore."12 The uniformed handshakerswere Col. Isaac W. Littell, the divisionchief, and his two assistants, Capt.William H. Oury and Capt. RichardC. Marshall, Jr. Littell, an 1883 WestPoint graduate, was an officer of the oldschool who preferred to do things by thebook. Oury, his executive, was a Signalofficer, nearing the end of a four-yeardetail with the Quartermaster Corps.The live wire of the organization was"Puck" Marshall, a Coast Artillery of-

10 Memo, TQMG for TSW, 4 Mar 14. OQMG1800-1914, Doc 494615.

11 (1) S Commerce Comm, 50th Cong, 1st sess,Hearings on S 1448, Apr 1888, pp. 3-74. (2) SReport 1848, 50th Cong, 1st sess, 18 Jul 1888, pp.64-69.

12 Transcript of Conv, W. A. Starrett with G. B.Clarkson, 9 Aug 17. In H Subcomm of the SelectComm on Expenditures, 66th Cong, 1st sess, Hearings,II, 2525. Cited hereinafter as Conv, Starrett withClarkson.


ficer, serving his second Quartermasterdetail. Scion of a prominent Old Do-minion family, an honor graduate ofVirginia Military Institute and a formermathematics professor there, he displayeda rare blend of boyish charm and ag-gressive leadership. Word had gone outthat a million men would be called toarms. A big construction effort seemedimminent, but Littell and his officersdid not know what role they would havein it.

Their resources for handling a largeemergency program were meager, andtheir claim to such responsibility wasweak. In the spring of 1917, the Con-struction and Repair Division had threeofficers and fifty-three civilians in Wash-ington and a handful of constructingquartermasters in the field.13 Except forblueprints of barracks and mess hallsprepared for use on the Mexican borderby the Punitive Expedition of 1916,Littell had no plans for temporary struc-tures. Nor did he have any plans fororganizing and directing a huge, high-speed construction effort.14 Providingtemporary shelter had long been a dutyof commanders in the field. When theUnited States entered the war againstGermany, many assumed that the com-manding generals of the six regionaldepartments would build whatever campswere necessary. Some, among themGeneral Leonard Wood, advocated thatthe work be done by the Corps of En-gineers. But despite Littel's lack of prep-aration and despite the availability of

the Engineer Department, the GeneralStaff on 7 May ordered The Quarter-master General to complete thirty-twodivisional cantonments by I September.15

Among the prominent industrialistswho hastened to Washington to volunteertheir services after war was declaredwere William A. Starrett, president ofStarrett & Van Vleck, architects of NewYork City; Morton C. Tuttle, generalmanager of the Aberthaw ConstructionCompany of Boston; and Clemens W.Lundoff, vice president of Crowell,Lundoff and Little of Cleveland. Latein April Secretary of War Newton D.Baker asked these men to form the Com-mittee on Emergency Construction underthe General Munitions Board. Starrettchaired the committee. Frederick LawOlmsted, the famous landscape archi-tect, joined the group. Leonard Metcalf,one of the country's foremost designersof water and sewerage systems, and twoleading consulting engineers, GeorgeW. Fuller and Asa E. Phillips, agreedto act as a subcommittee on engineering.16

Taking the situation in hand, the Starrettcommittee charted the course war con-struction would follow.

To Starrett and his colleagues, themagnitude of Littel's task was appalling.Time was short, and the QuartermasterCorps was unfamiliar with high-speedbuilding operations. A quick survey ofthe Construction and Repair Divisionconvinced the committee that "the ma-chine would collapse; that it would notaccomplish anything." Urging swift

13 Report of the Board of Review of Construction To TheAssistant Secretary of War, August 31, 1919 (Washington,1920), p. 99. Cited hereinafter as Blossom Report.

14 (I) Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 21 Mar 17, and 1stInd, same date. AG 2540178. (2) Ltr, TQMG toTAG, 9 Apr 17. AG 2570158.

15 1st Ind, TAG to TQMG, 7 May 17, on Memo,Chief, WCD GS for CofS, 4 May 17. AG 2593945.

16 Min of the Gen Mun Bd, 27 Apr 17, p. 61;

10 May 17, p. 81; 22 May 17, p. 99. In Sp CommInvestigating the Mun Industry. S Comm Print 7,74th Cong, 2d sess.


action, Starrett told Munitions BoardChairman Frank A. Scott to get Littellout of the War Department, "as it is nofit place for a man to try to do business,"and to "get him space and some peoplearound him." Scott agreed: "All right,we will get him out this afternoon." Heput through a call to Secretary Baker,who promised to move Littell's officeright away to the Munsey Building indowntown Washington.17

On 19 May Baker established theCantonment Division with Littell aschief. Nominally a part of the Quarter-master Corps, the new organization was,for all practical purposes, separate. Littellwould report directly to the Secretaryof War. He would appoint and assignhis own officers, issue travel orders onhis own authority, and communicatewith department and division com-manders without reference to TheQuartermaster General.18 Littell had asingle missionto complete thirty-twocantonments estimated to cost $90 mil-lion by September 1917. Writing tohim in May Starrett emphasized the"magnitude of the undertaking":

In 16 weeks you are expected to havesuitable quarters ready for the training of1,100,000 men.

You must be building in 32 places at once.Most of the sites for the cantonments havenot yet been chosen. When they have beenfixed a group of engineering problems offirst importance must be settled. The watersupply for each camp must be carefullystudied. Failure to supply abundance of purewater may jeopardize the whole undertaking.Proper sewerage must be provided if the

danger of epidemic is to be forestalled. Heat-ing, lighting, refrigerating, and laundryfacilities must be furnished. The solution ofthese engineering problems will be differentin every locality.

The planning alone for construction workof each of the camps would normally takeas many weeks as is given you for the comple-tion of both the engineering and the building.

The total cost of the building of the PanamaCanal was approximately $375,000,000. Thisoperation covered a period of 10 years, andthe largest amount expended in any singleyear in the construction of the Canal was$49,000,000, but little over one-half of thesum that you are asked to expend in 16weeks.19

Part of the staff of the Construction andRepair Division moved to the MunseyBuilding; part remained behind to takecare of maintenance and repair work.Clearly, Littell would need reinforce-ments.

The Starrett committee assembleda high-powered staff for the Canton-ment Division. Calls went to the coun-try's leading construction firms: send usyour best men. Frank M. Gunby, apartner of Charles T. Main, Inc., arrivedfrom Boston to take charge of engineering.Dabney H. Maury, past president ofthe American Water Works Association,agreed to serve as Gunby's assistant.Milton J. Whitson, general superin-tendent of Grant Smith & Company ofSt. Paul, assumed direction of con-struction operations. Peter Junkersfield,president of the Association of EdisonCompanies, joined Whitson's staff.Robert E. Hamilton, general purchasingagent of the Stone & Webster Engineer-ing Corporation, took on the job ofbuying materials. Wall Street lawyer

17 (1) Min, Gen Mun Bd, 15 May 17, pp. 88-89.(2) Conv, Starrett with Clarkson, p. 2525. (3) Intervwith Morton C. Tuttle, 15 Aug 56.

18 Memo, TAG for Littell, 19 May 17. QM 020(Constr) 1917.

19 Memo, Starrett for Littell, 25 May 17. AG2612346.


Evan Shelby appeared in CaptainMarshall's office wearing striped trou-sers, frock coat, and spats to announcehimself the division's legal adviser.Shelby promptly exchanged formalattire for Army khaki, as he and theothers were quickly commissioned. Re-cruitment went forward rapidly. Morecivilian construction experts donned uni-forms, the Civil Service Commissionwaived the requirement that employeesbe hired from its registers, and soon 250persons were on the division's rolls.20

After about two or three days andnights of "solid conference," the mem-bers of the Starrett committee and thenew officers of the Cantonment Divisionreached agreement as to how the buildingprogram should be handled. With theaid of Fuller, Metcalf, and Phillips,Major Gunby would prepare typicalplans and layouts. Major Whitson, asconstruction manager, would direct thefield forces, while six assistant managers,one for each Army department, wouldfollow day-to-day operations at the jobsites; six traveling supervisors wouldpatrol the projects, watching for signsof trouble and giving on-the-spot help.Major Hamilton would procure all build-ing materials, maintaining close contactwith the various supply committees ofthe Munitions Board. Accountants, bothin Washington and in the field, wouldcheck expenditures. In direct charge ofeach of the thirty-two cantonments wouldbe a Constructing Quartermaster (CQM),who would have a staff of engineers,

draftsmen, auditors, inspectors, andcheckers to assist him. On 22 May theplan went to Littell. Two days laterhe approved it.21

Meanwhile, Starrett and his colleagueswere seeking the answer to a crucialquestionwhat method of contractingwas best suited for emergency work. Inpeacetime the government used com-petitive agreements exclusively, for theold law of 1861 required advertisingexcept "when immediate delivery orperformance is required by the publicexigency."22 Advertised fixed-price con-tracts were awarded to the responsiblecontractor who submitted the lowest bid.The successful bidder agreed, withincertain time limits, to furnish materialsand complete construction in accordancewith detailed plans and specifications.Where the agreement defined the scopeof the project, the contractor received alump-sum payment. Where the contractcalled for an indefinite quantity of cer-tain specified items of work, such assquare yards of paving, he received aunit price for each unit delivered. Innormal circumstances, advertised fixed-price contracts offered several advantageson government work. Realistic competi-tive conditions tended to hold down bidprices. Advertisement obviated suspicionof favoritism and afforded every quali-fied and responsible bidder an oppor-tunity to secure contracts for publicwork. Nevertheless, fixed-price contractscould be used only when complete plansand specifications were available. Even

20 (1) Ltr, Pres CSC to Baker, 8 Jun 17, in BrigGen Richard C. Marshall, Jr., Hist of the ConstrDiv of the Army, 1919, Book II. Cited hereinafteras Hist of Constr Div. (2) Interv with Brig GenRichard C. Marshall, II Apr 57. (3) Conv, Starrettwith Clarkson, p. 2526.

21 (1) Conv, Starrett with Clarkson, p. 2526. (2)Memo, Comm on Emergency Constr for Littell,22 May 17. Hist of Constr Div, Book II. (3) CantonDiv Office Orders, 24 May 17. QM 020 (Constr)

22 12 Stat. 220.


then, these agreements could not beused effectively unless materials andlabor markets were relatively stable.Furthermore, advertisement was timeconsuming. The Starrett group saw thatthis method was far too slow and cum-bersome for a situation where time wasof the essence.23

On 12 April 1917 Secretary Bakerinvoked the emergency provision of the1861 law. Advertisement generally gaveway to negotiation throughout the WarDepartment. Fixed-price contracts weresuperseded by cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost, whereby the government agreedto foot nearly all the bills and to paycontractors a percentage of the cost ofthe work. The Starrett committeeadopted a modified form of this agree-ment, the "cost-plus with sliding scaleand fixed maximum fee." Under it thecontractor's fee represented a percentageof cost, but the percentage decreased,from 10 to 6 percent, as the cost ad-vanced and the maximum allowablefee was fixed at $250,000. This agreementavoided the worst features of percentagecontracting and preserved the best:construction could begin at once, with-out detailed plans and specifications;and changes in the scope of a projectcould be made easily and at any time.24

As Starrett saw it, contractors werethe key to success in the operation. Onthe big cantonment jobs, planning anddesign would have to be carried out atthe same time as construction. Even"the best engineering organization inthe world," the committee held, could

not handle such a task "without blun-ders."25 Construction would have to beplaced at a rate of $500,000 per week.26

From long experience in the "buildinggame," members of the Starrett com-mittee knew who the best contractorswere. As a check on their own judgment,they sent a confidential questionnaireto nearly 2,000 architects and engineersrequesting them to appraise the or-ganization, efficiency, and integrity ofcontractors with whom they had donebusiness. At the same time, the com-mittee asked architect-engineers andconstructors to submit performancerecords, together with data on theirorganizations, personnel, and financialstatus. As replies came in, the committeeclassified firms according to geographicareas and graded them on the basis ofsize and experience. By early June,Starrett was in a position to recommenda top-flight company for each canton-ment project.27

After the enactment of selective ser-vice legislation on 18 May 1917, severalhighly placed officers showed signs ofdeveloping cold feet. Shortly after thePresident signed the bill, Captain Mar-shall received a message from Brig. Gen.Joseph E. Kuhn, chief of the War Col-lege Division of the General Staff, andBrig. Gen. Enoch H. Crowder, whowould have charge of the draft. Theydoubted if the draft could be called inSeptember. According to Marshall, theystated "that construction could not becompleted in time" and that they "would

23 (1) Memo, Comm on Emergency Constr forGen Mun Bd, 9 May 17. Hist of Constr Div, Book III.(2) Min, Gen Mun Bd, 12 May 17, p. 86.

24 (I) WD Orders, 12 Apr 17. (2) Blossom Report,pp. 41-43.

25 Memo, Starrett for Littell, 25 May 17. AG2612346.

26 Conv, Starrett with Clarkson, p. 2531.27 (1) Memo, Comm on Emergency Constr for

Gen Mun Bd, 12 Jun 17. Hist of Constr Div, BookIII. (2) Min, Gen Mun Bd, 6 Jun 17, p. 126.


like to be able to advance that as a rea-son." Marshall replied that the canton-ments would be completed on schedule.Should the draft be postponed and con-struction blamed, he would give thewhole story to the newspapers.28

Marshall's superior, Colonel Littell,took a different position. Called toKuhn's office late in May and asked ifthe cantonments could be completedby September, he said it would be"physically impossible." On 29 MaySecretary Baker approved an order de-ferring construction of cantonments forsixteen National Guard divisions. Workon cantonments for sixteen NationalArmy divisions would be started at theearliest possible date. For these projects,the September deadline held.29

Meanwhile, the Cantonment Divisionwas assuming the character of a bigengineering firm. In their own eyes, thenewly commissioned officers of the di-vision were heads of an enterprise thatdiffered from ordinary civilian under-takings only in size and urgency. Thedivision corresponded to the companyhome office. CQM's, handpicked byMajor Whitson for their experience withlarge projects, would have roles equiva-lent to general superintendents. Almostto a man, the civilians in uniform wereimpatient with military discipline, chan-nels of command, customs of the service,and the caution displayed by old-lineofficers. Soon after Shelby took chargeof the Contracts Branch, someone handedhim a thick volume containing the ArmyRegulations. He tossed it into the waste-

basket. He and his associates adoptedfour rules: build a team; throw awaypeacetime yardsticks; substitute the dayfor the dollar; and get the job done.30

During June the tempo quickened.On the 8th Chairman Scott of the Muni-tions Board and Colonel Littell ap-proved the final draft of the new emer-gency contract. A few days later, Secre-tary Baker informally OK'd it.31 Withthe help of civilian engineers recruitedby Olmsted, site selection boards ap-pointed by department commandersmade rapid progress. By the 14th Bakerhad approved locations for twelve of thesixteen cantonments.32 As sites wereselected the Starrett committee nom-inated leading construction firms,among them George A. Fuller, Thomp-son-Starrett, Stone & Webster, Bates &Rogers, and Mason & Hanger, to buildthe cantonments. The subcommitteechose top professional organizations, suchas Black & Veatch, Frank A. Barbour,Samuel A. Greeley, and Alvord &Burdick, to serve as architect-engineers.Littell and Baker approved the selec-tions.88

On the morning of 11 June Shelbydelivered the first two contracts forLittell's signature: the total estimatedcost was nearly $13 million. Returninga short time later to find the colonelporing over the fine print, the attorney

28 Ltr, Marshall to OCMH, 30 Mar 55. See alsoarticle from New York World, June 19, 1917, re-printed in 55 Cong. Rec. 5187.

29 Memo, with Incls, Actg CofS for TAG, 29 May17. QM 020 (Constr) 1917.

30 (1) Blossom Report, pp. 18-19. (2) Interv withEvan Shelby, 17 Aug 56; Interv with Frank M.Gunby, 15 Aug 56.

31 (1) Min, Gen Mun Bd, 8 Jun 17, p. 29. (2)Hist of Constr Div, Exhibits, Part 3.

32 Memo, Littell for TQMG, 14 Jun 17. QM 600.1(Gen).

33 (1) Memo, Starrett for Gen Mun Bd, 12 Jun 17.Hist of Constr Div, Book I. (2) Conv, Starrett withClarkson, pp. 2528-31. (3) War Department, AnnualReports, Report of the Chief of the Construction Division,1918 (Washington, 1919), p. 59.


CAMP CUSTER, MICHIGAN, UNDER CONSTRUCTION, 1917

protested that the papers had to go outthat afternoon. Littell sat back a mo-ment and then explained that he alwaysread every word before he signed hisname. Forty years in the Army hadtaught him to be cautious. To elucidatehe told a story. Some years before, whilehe was serving in the Philippines, a halterfor which he was accountable slipped offa mule and fell into a well. When effortsto retrieve it failed, Littell was orderedto make good the loss, $1.40. He re-fused. The debt still stood and he wouldhave to pay it before he could retire.Signing Shelby's contracts, he shook hishead; the old army, he observed, didthings differently.34

As soon as agreements were executed,sometimes even before, contractors has-tened to the job sites. On 13 June anadvance party from Fred T. Ley & Com-pany arrived at Ayer, Massachusetts,to start building Camp Devens, a can-tonment for 30,000 men. The followingday, Stone & Webster commenced workon Camp Travis, near San Antonio,Texas, and Irwin & Leighton beganstaking out Camp Dix, near Wrights-town, New Jersey. By July construc-tion was in full swing at all sixteen can-tonments. Land was cleared, roadsgraded, and railway spurs brought inwith record speed. Barracks, mess halls,latrines, hospitals, and storehouses wentup fast. At Camp Upton, near Yaphank,New York, Thompson-Starrett erectedsawmills and turned out prefabricated

34 (1) Blossom Report, p. 142. (2) Shelby Interv,17 Aug 56.

14 CONSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES

building sections. Several other con-tractors adopted the same method. Eventhe installation of utilities, usually slow-moving work, went forward rapidly.Speed was virtually the only criterion.Where there was a question of time ormoney, contractors spent.35

Shortages of materials slowed progressoccasionally but not for long. The firstwar agency to enter the market for con-struction supplies, the Cantonment Di-vision made the most of its advantage.As fast as Gunby could complete billsof materials, Hamilton wired concernsall over the country, placing orders forwallboard, roofing, window glass, fur-naces, and nails. He purchased lumberthrough lumber manufacturers' as-sociations, which set up offices in Wash-ington. The plumbing industry alsoestablished headquarters in the capitalto assist Hamilton in his work. The de-mand for nails, pipe, and lumber soonoutran supplies. By bringing pressureto bear on producers, substituting woodstave pipe for cast iron, and acceptinggreen lumber, Hamilton managed tofill requirements. Daily, 30,000 tons ofsupplies moved to the sixteen job sites.When a shortage of freight cars de-veloped, Captain Marshall, trading dol-lars for days, sent toilet fixtures southfrom New Jersey by Pullman.36

By mid-July 1917 an army of 160,000workers was laboring to build the can-tonments. Each project had a hastilyassembled force of 8,000 to 14,000 men.

Although trained electricians andplumbers were needed, the big job,carpentering, was mainly one of nailingboards together, and for that handymen sufficed. Pay was good. Under anagreement between Secretary Baker andSamuel Gompers, president of the Amer-ican Federation of Labor (AFL), unionwage scales and working rules appliedon cantonment projects. Men workedovertime, Sundays, and holidays at timeand a half or double time rates. Therewere no serious strikes. Supervision wasoften weak and organization inadequate.Results were obtained through sheerforce of numbers. When one contractorsaid he could increase production 25percent by doubling his work force, hisCQM told him to go ahead.37

In the midst of the drive to completethe cantonments, Littell got orders toprovide sixteen camps for the NationalGuard. The directive came on Friday,13 July. The first contingent of the Guardwould arrive on I August. At a Saturdayconference, Gunby, Whitson, and severalothers took stock of the situation. TheGuardsmen had tents, so they wouldnot need barracks. The Guardsmen hadfield kitchens, so they would not needcook shacks. The Guardsmen had toolswith which to dig latrines. Water wouldhave to be provided for them. That, saidGunby, meant pipe, lots of pipe. Heknew just the man to turn to for help.An important pipe manufacturer fromYoungstown, Ohio, was in town thatday. Gunby located this man on a golfcourse, called him into the office, andpersuaded him to telephone Youngs-

35 (1) Camp Devens, National Army Cantonment,published by Fred T. Ley & Co, Inc., 1917. (2) WarDepartment, Annual Reports, Report of the Chief of Con-struction Division, 1918, p. 59. (3) Blossom Report, pp.116, 152.

36 (1) Blossom Report, p. 133. (2) Benedict Crowell,America's Munitions, 1917-1918 (Washington, 1919),pp. 536-37. (3) Marshall Interv, II Apr 57.

37 (1) Memo, Littell for TQMG, 28 Nov 17. Hist ofConstr Div, Book V. (2) QM 020 (Constr) 1917.(3) Blossom Report, p. 35.


TENTS AT CAMP WHEELER, GEORGIA, 1917

town and start pipe moving south. ByMonday CQM's were on their way tothe job sites. On Tuesday and Wednes-day Littell signed fifteen contracts. Be-fore the week was out work was underway on ten of the camps; by the 25thall sixteen were building.38

At the thirty-two camp and canton-ment jobs, contractors pushed furiouslyahead, their eyes on the calendar. Bymid-August accommodations were readyfor 54,000 Guardsmen; by 1 Septemberthe camps could take 295,000. The

"Guard business," said Gunby, was "thejewel of the whole thing."39 Meanwhile,cantonment deadlines were being met.Housing for 287,300 draftees was readyon 4 September. Considerable workremained when the troops moved in,but no soldier went without a bed. FromSeptember on, construction ran aheadof schedule. More than a million menwere housed by late 1917.40

The cost totaled $179,478,978,

38 (1) Memo, Chief WCD GS for CofS, 9 Jul 17.AG 2619836. (2) Memo, Actg CofS for TAG, 13 Jul17. Hist of Constr Div, Book I. (3) Gunby Interv,15 Aug 56. (4) Min, Gen Mun Bd, 13, 16, 17, 24 Jul17- (5) Blossom Report, pp. III, 143.

39 (1) Memo, Littell for TQMG, 26 Aug 17. Histof Constr Div, Book III. (2) Blossom Report, p. 143. (3)Gunby Interv, 15 Aug 56.

40 (1) Memo, Littell for Chief Admin Div OQMG,23 Aug 17. (2) Rpt, Canton Div, n.d., sub: TpsHoused at NA Cantons on 4 Sep 17. Both in Hist ofConstr Div, Book III. (3) Report, Chief of the Con-struction Division, 1918, p. 39.


TABLE 1NATIONAL ARMY CANTONMENTS, 1917

Source: Canton Div, Total Estimated Cost for Constr of National Army Cantons, 1917. EHD Files.

TABLE 2NATIONAL GUARD CAMPS, 1917

Source: Canton Div, Total Estimated Cost of Camp Constr, 1917. EHD Files.


BARRACKS AND LAVATORIES, CAMP Dix, NEW JERSEY

$140,726,472 for the National Armycantonments and $38,752,506 for theNational Guard camps. The averageper capita costs were $215 and $88,respectively. (Tables 1 and 2) To buildersof the cantonments, the Army paid$4,000,000 in fees, or 2.84 percent ofthe total cost. Every one of these con-tractors received the maximum fee of$250,000, a sum less than would havebeen earned under straight cost-plus-a-percentage agreements. Proportion-ately the fees for camp constructionwere higher, amounting to $2,638,524,or 6.8 percent of the total cost. Becausenone of these contractors had attainedthe maximum fee, their earnings repre-sented straight percentages of cost.

Huge quantities of materials andprodigious efforts had gone into con-struction. Close to 1 billion board feetof lumber, 80 million square feet of

roofing paper, 34 million square feet ofwall board, 1 million feet of wood stavepipe, 468,000 feet of cast iron pipe,105,000 kegs of nails, and 314,000 bar-rels of cement had been purchased forthe cantonments alone. A total of 105,358freight cars had been used to haul ma-terials to the 32 mobilization projects.41

A total of 212,172 workmen had beenemployedan average of 8,400 at eachof the cantonments and of 2,750 at eachof the camps. It was the largest force ofconstruction labor ever assembled in theUnited States.

The training centers for the NationalArmy and the National Guard wereveritable cities, complete with roads,walks, power lines, and water systems.The largest of the cantonments, Camp

41 Incl with Memo, Littell for TQMG, 28 Nov 17.Hist of Constr Div, Book V.


Lee, Virginia, accommodated 45,512men; the smallest, Camp Custer, Michi-gan, 34,045. Each of the tent camps helda Guard division of 27,152, except CampShelby, which housed 30,762. Nearly allthe comforts of large urban communitieswere provided for the troopshospitals,infirmaries, bakeries, laundries, theaters,clubhouses, gymnasiums, and more. Inthe cantonments, troops lived in 250-man barracks, heated by steam orwarmed by stoves, with modern lava-tories nearby. Guardsmen were quarteredin snug, floored tents, equipped withstoves or heaters. Their sanitary facilities,though crude, were adequate. Neverbefore had American soldiers been sowell housed in wartime.

Contemporaries marveled at the speedwith which this vast undertaking wasaccomplished. Historians agreed thatconstruction of the camps and canton-ments in so short a time "constitutedone of the great achievements of themobilization effort" in 1917.42 In thewords of Frederic L. Paxson, "It was atriumph of skill and energy to have thecamps as nearly ready as they were; atriumph for W. A. Starrett of the Emer-gency Construction Committee andBrigadier-General I. W. Littell of theQuartermaster Corps." 43

Centralization

In the spring and summer of 1917,while Littell's division was buildingcamps and cantonments, other military

construction programs were startingunder different auspices. Soon after thedeclaration of war, the Corps of En-gineers began work on several depotsand an office building; the Signal Corpsbegan construction of a dozen schoolsfor training pilots and technicians; andno fewer than five divisions of the Ord-nance Department began erecting fa-cilities for their own use. Competitionfor labor and materials caused trouble.Lack of uniformity in contracting meth-ods encouraged builders to play oneagency against another. The arrange-ment was illogical and uneconomical.As the camps and cantonments nearedcompletion, and the work for whichLittell's organization had been createdwas concluded, the Starrett committeeproposed that all Army constructionbe placed under the men who had per-formed so well in meeting mobilizationdeadlines.

On 5 October 1917, upon the com-mittee's advice, Secretary Baker orderedall military construction except forti-fications, centralized in the CantonmentDivision. On the l0th he transferredThe Quartermaster General's organiza-tion for maintenance and repair, to-gether with its chief, Maj. Charles O.Zollars, to the Cantonment Division.44

Early in November Capt. Charles D.Hartman, a 1908 West Point graduatewho had recently joined the Quarter-master Corps, became Zollars' assistant.Hartman's debut as a construction of-ficer marked the beginning of an activecareer that would span nearly a quartercentury. Under him and Zollars, main-

42 Lt. Col. Marvin Kreidberg and 1st Lt. Merton G.Henry, History of Mobilization in the United StatesArmy, 1775-1945, DA Pamphlet 20-212 (Washington,1955). P. 311.

43 Frederic L. Paxson, America at War 1917-18(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1939), p.107.

44 (1) Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 5 Oct 17. QM 020(Constr) 1917. (2) OQMG Office Order 106, 10Oct 17.


tenance and repair meshed smoothlyinto the work of the Cantonment Di-vision. But other construction activitiesremained where they were, in the Ord-nance and Engineer Departments andin the Signal Corps.

Baker's centralization order met stiffresistance. The Chief Signal Officerasked for a blanket exemption. Writingto the Chief of Staff on 15 October, heargued that the Signal Corps con-struction program was closely tied inwith production of planes and trainingof flyers. Howard E. Coffin, the Detroitindustrialist who headed the AircraftProduction Board, opposed making achange. Swayed by these men, Bakergave ground. On the 20th he agreed tostudy the matter thoroughly and to pollthe other bureau chiefs affected by hisorder. Until then, he advised Coffin,the Signal Corps would continue tobuild.45

Early in December representativesof the Cantonment Division, the Corpsof Engineers, the Signal Corps, theOrdnance Department, and the Starrettcommittee met to try to reconcile theirdifferences. Two plans were offered fordiscussion. Under the first, the variousservices would continue to build; theStarrett committee would co-ordinatetheir efforts. The second plan called forstrict adherence to Secretary Baker's5 October order. After two days of de-bate, the conferees were hopelessly dead-locked. The Engineers, the Signal Corps,and the Ordnance Department held outfor the first plan; the Cantonment Di-vision and the Starrett group, for the

second. On 8 December Starrett informedthe General Staff that efforts to reach anagreement had failed.46

Meanwhile, the tide was turning infavor of centralization. During OctoberStarrett, Tuttle, and Marshall persuadedone of Baker's advisers that a centralizedconstruction agency would be "in thepublic interest" and in conformance with"sound business principles." 47 In Novem-ber Benedict Crowell, a former partner ofLundoff, became Assistant Secretary ofWar. Crowell joined the members ofthe Starrett committee in urging Bakerto abide by his first decision. On 22December the Secretary announced thathis order of 5 October would stand.48

During the fall of 1917, Littell tooksteps to strengthen the CantonmentDivision for larger tasks ahead. A num-ber of changes appeared to be necessary.More men with experience in industrialconstruction would have to be recruited.To push the new program to comple-tion, the division would need all of thepowers and authorities given to it by theSecretary back in May, plus some newones. On 9 October, the day he becamea brigadier general, Littell asked Bakerfor authority to communicate directlywith bureau chiefs, to commission ci-vilians, to promote his principal assis-tants, and to make certain adjustmentsin his organization. The Secretary re-ferred the matter to Maj. Gen. John

45 (1) Memo, Actg CSigO for CofS, 15 Oct 17.(a) Ltr, Coffin to WDGS, 20 Oct 17. Both in Hist ofConstr Div, Book I.

46 (1) Memo, Gunby for Starrett, 6 Dec 17. Hist ofConstr Div, Book III. (2) Memo, Starrett for Col P.E. Pierce, WDGS, 8 Dec 17. CE Doc 115946. (3)Memo, Starrett for Maj W. W. Taylor, WDGS, 8Dec 17. QM 020 (Constr) 1917.

47 Memo, Stanley King for Baker, 26 Oct 17. Histof Constr Div, Book I.

48 Memo, OCofS for TAG, 22 Dec 17. OCS6374-333.


Biddle, an Engineer officer who wasActing Chief of Staff.49

Littell's requests involved him in anacrimonious dispute with Biddle, forthe two men held conflicting viewsabout the Cantonment Division. Littellregarded his organization as a specialoutfit, responsible only to the Secretary.Biddle, on the other hand, looked uponthe division as a subordinate elementof the Quartermaster Corps; and hefelt that LittelPs proposals ought to beconsidered in the light of overallQuartermaster organization and poli-cies. On one occasion, Biddle warnedLittell that he could not continue tobypass his superior officer, The Quarter-master General. Early in January 1918,Biddle turned the problem over to thenewly appointed Acting QuartermasterGeneral, Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals,the Engineer officer acclaimed as thebuilder of the Panama Canal.50

To Goethals the solution was obviousplace all military construction underthe Corps of Engineers. He gave noreason for his recommendation, perhapsfeeling that none was necessary.51 How-ever, others believed some explanationwas required. In a study of Goethal'sproposal undertaken at Baker's request,Col. Daniel W. Ketcham of the WarDepartment General Staff pointed outthat efforts to transfer construction fromthe Quartermaster Corps to the Corpsof Engineers had been made in the past,but that arguments advanced in favorof the change had "never been strong

enough to prevail." A shift in responsi-bility, Ketcham argued, should be madeonly after conclusive evidence had beenpresented that gains in efficiency oreconomy would offset time lost in re-organization and readjustment. Goethalshad offered no such evidence. In Ket-cham's opinion, the Cantonment Di-vision was doing a splendid job. Tomake "unnecessary changes in personnel,organization, and methods" in the midstof war, he concluded, "would be a gravemistake."52

The Cantonment Division was inserious trouble. Even if Goethals' maneu-ver failed, the division faced the prospectof working under an officer who favoredits absorption by the Corps of Engineers.Recognizing that they had an impossiblesituation on their hands, Baker andCrowell acted to remove Littell fromGoethals' jurisdiction. To a War De-partment order of 9 February 1918dealing with the organization of theGeneral Staff they added a paragraphcharging the Operations Division with"the supervision and co-ordination ofcamp sites, cantonments, army posts,hospitals, sanitation, construction plansand projects as the same relate to allbranches of the Army."53

Littell was unaware of this develop-ment. He received no copy of the WarDepartment order and had no inklingof its content. Testifying on 11 Februarybefore the Senate Committee on MilitaryAffairs, he said he expected the worst:

Senator Chamberlain. Are you buildingfor the Signal Corps in addition to the workof construction that is in hand?

49 Memo, Littell for Baker, 9 Oct 17. QM 0120(Constr) 1917.

50 OGS 10394.51 Memo, Goethals for Baker, 16 Jan 18. OCS

10394-6.

52 Memo, Ketcham for CofS, 23 Jan 18. OCS10394-6.

53 WD GO 14, 9 Feb 18.


GENERAL MARSHALL.(Photograph taken in 1918.)

General Littell. We have taken over theirwork.

Senator Chamberlain. When was thatorder issued?General Littell. That was October 5.

Senator Chamberlain. Is there not a morerecent order that takes the construction workfrom you and turns it over to the Engineer-ing Department?

General Littell. That is in contemplation,as we hear it.

Senator Chamberlain. You have not gotan order?

General Littell. We have been told thatthe Cantonment Division would be trans-ferred to the Engineer Corps.54

The next morning Littell was back onthe Hill for another session with thecommittee, when his long military ca-reer ended abruptly. At Crowell's direc-tion, orders were cut retiring Littell andnaming Marshall his successor. Thereasons for Littell's relief were obscure.Later, some pointed a finger at Goethals;others, at Starrett. Reportedly, Marshallonce styled himself the "self-appointed"Chief of Construction.55 To the membersof the Cantonment Division, the dynamicand aggressive "Puck" Marshall pre-sented a sharp contrast to the gentle-hearted Littell. The cousin of a formerChief of Engineers and a personal ac-quaintance of Secretary Baker, Marshallknew his way around the War Depart-ment.56 The aging and kindly Littell

had to step aside for the politically astuteyoung officer.

The effects of Colonel Marshall'sleadership were soon apparent. A WarDepartment order of 13 March 1918changed the name of the organizationto the Construction Division of the Armyand allotted it 1,407 officers and 1,137civilian employees.57 On 19 AprilMarshall reorganized the division, cre-ated several new branches, and madechanges in personnel. (Chart /) WithCrowell's backing, he took on additionalduties. On 10 April the ConstructionDivision became responsible for pre-paring plans, specifications, and esti-mates for all military construction proj-ects. Encroaching on the jurisdiction

54 S Comm on Mil Affs, 65th Cong, 2d sess, Hear-ings, Investigation of the War Department, Part 4, p.2405.

55 (1) Memo, Biddle for TAG, 12 Feb 18. OCS10394-10. (2) Intervs with Col L. C. Ritchie, 26, 27Apr 56; Shelby Interv, 17 Aug 56. (3) H Rpt 816,66th Cong, 2d sess, I Apr 20. (4) Interv with Mrs.Mary B. Pagan, 8 Mar 57.

56 Gunby Interv, 15 Aug 56; Marshall Interv, 11Apr 57.

57 Ltr, TAG to OIC Canton Div, 13 Mar 18.QM 020 (Constr) 1918.


of the Corps of Engineers, Marshallundertook construction in the theaterof operationsthree meat storage andice-making plants in France.58

Recognizing the defects in currentcontracting methods, Marshall adopteda new form of emergency agreement.Although contracts used during the firstten months of the war had in every casefixed a maximum allowable fee, therestill existed an incentive for unscrupulouscontractors to increase costs to the pointthat gave them the largest allowableprofits. Since a contract under whichcontractors made the most money whencosts were high was obviously not to thegovernment's advantage, the use of per-centage contracts was discontinued inFebruary 1918, when Marshall switchedto an arrangement very like the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract ofWorld War II. Fees were henceforthbased on original estimates rather thanon actual costs. The new method hadall the speed of percentage contractingbut avoided offering rewards for in-efficiency and extravagance.59

Beginning in the spring of 1918,Marshall had to devote more and moreof his energies to fending off attacks onthe division. About the first of May adisturbing rumor reached him: a para-graph calling for the transfer of the Con-struction Division to the Corps of En-gineers had found its way into the Armyappropriation bill then before the HouseCommittee on Military Affairs. Marshallimmediately conferred with Crowell andthe new Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. PeytonC. March.60 When the news reached

him, Secretary Baker tried to have thepassage deleted. Appearing before thecommittee on 6 May, March declaredthat the Secretary was perfectly satisfiedwith the existing arrangement for con-struction. And so was he. "If there isany legislation in the appropriation billrelating to this subject in connectionwith the Engineer Corps," said March,"we want it stricken out." 61 The billreported out by the committee containedno such provision.

Marshall lost no time in striking back.On 16 May, at his prompting, SenatorHarry S. New of Indiana introduceda bill to create a permanent constructioncorps. The proposed corps would beheaded by a major general and staffedby 570 officers, two-thirds of whom wouldbe drawn from the officers of the presentdivision. But the bill went further, forMarshall had included a provision totake rivers and harbors work away fromthe Engineers and assign it to the newConstruction Corps.62 The bill went tothe Committee on Military Affairs,which forwarded the measure to theWar Department.

The task of commenting on the billfell to Brig. Gen. Lytle Brown, directorof the War Plans Division of the GeneralStaff and an Engineer officer. On 29May, Brown wrote General March:"Consideration of this measure mightlead to the belief that it is a scheme formaking permanent provision for certainofficers who have received temporarycommissions in the Construction Corpsand in this respect seems to be largely aplan for personal preferment." He found

58 (1) Ltr, TAG to OIC Constr Div, 10 Apr 18.Hist of Constr Div, Book I. (2) Blossom Report, p. 302.

59 Blossom Report, pp. 192-93.60 Marshall Interv, 11 Apr 57.

61 H Comm on Mil Affs, 66th Cong, 2d sess,Hearings on Army Appropriation Bill, 1919, vol. 2, pp.27-28.

62 56 Cong. Rec. 6575.


the portions of the bill that dealt withthe Engineers' civil functions particularlyobjectionable. "The War Plans Di-vision," Brown protested, "is of theopinion that it is beyond the power ofthe human mind to solve in time of war,a question which pertains to a basis ofpeace." He drafted, and on 15 JuneSecretary Baker signed, a letter to thecommittee chairman opposing the bill.63

Senator New's measure posed a direthreat to the Corps of Engineers. Formore than forty years a group within theconstruction industry had labored toconsolidate all federal construction, in-cluding rivers and harbors work, intoone government department. Men iden-tified with this movement dominatedthe Starrett committee and the Con-struction Division of the Army. Leaguedwith them was Assistant Secretary of WarBenedict Crowell. To Maj. Gen. WilliamM. Black, the Chief of Engineers, thebill appeared to be part of a fine-spunplot which was beginning to unfold. Thetime for a showdown had come. TheEngineers had either to crush the separatecorps or to risk being crushed by it.

On 27 May, Black tried to persuadethe Chief of Staff that the ConstructionDivision should be turned over to theCorps of Engineers. He reminded Marchthat the Corps had done constructionof every type in discharging its militaryand civil duties. "Since the outbreak ofwar," he pointed out, "in the UnitedStates it has constructed the first com-plete system of embarkation points theArmy now possesses . . . and isnow in charge of all construction workof all character in France." Many En-

gineer Reservists were members of theConstruction Division. "I now find thatthe continued separation of the Construc-tion Department has resulted in embar-rassment to this Department . . . . ,"Black informed March. In conclusion, hedeclared:

Difficulties would disappear were theConstruction Department made a part ofthe Engineer Department and placed underthe control of the Chief of Engineers. Therewould be need for but one purchasing de-partment. Since there is a great variety inthe work now assigned to the ConstructionDepartment as well as to the Engineer De-partment, the best experts for any particularclass of work could be selected from eitherdepartment were the Construction Depart-ment under the control of the EngineerDepartment, and the number of expertsrequired reduced. Without a doubt, an in-creased efficiency and economy would re-sult. The present organization is anomalous,and the Construction Department really nowconstitutes an independent bureau of theWar Department. It is submitted that theexisting conditions are not those compatiblewith good organization and greatest effi-ciency.64

March sent Black's proposal to the Con-struction Division the following day.

Replying on 6 June, Marshall at-tempted to refute Black's arguments.The Engineers had not built the em-barkation depots, he declared; creditfor that accomplishment belonged toCantonment Division. Moreover, theEngineers had detailed only nine Reser-vists to him and Littell. Marshall dis-missed Black's statement about compe-tition by saying that there was none.He argued that a tradition-bound mili-tary organization could not be effectivein a war situation. Engineer officers

63 (1) Memo, Brown for March, 29 May 18. (2)Ltr, Baker to Chm S Comm on Mil Affs, 15 Jun 18.Both in OCS 10394-14.

64 Memo, Black for March, 27 May 18. Hist ofConstr Div, Book II.


"accustomed to the usually slow-pro-gressing and permanent work of forti-fications, military roads, and river andharbor improvements" were too in-flexible to cope with emergency con-ditions. The Construction Division hadwhat the Corps of Engineers lacked:top-notch men, unhampered by tradi-tion and unfettered by red tape andmilitary protocol. The division and theusing services were working as a team."To change or substitute for this team-work spirit, the necessarily fixed ideasand strivings for perfection of an olderdepartment," Marshall warned, "wouldresult in those conflicts of ideas and longdrawn out discussions which have pro-duced such adverse results in some ofthe other governmental activities."65

Marshall lined up powerful support.He went first to Crowell, who agreed tothrow the weight of his influence behindthe Construction. Division. Marshall thentook up Black's proposal with the Chiefof Staff and the Secretary. March wasagainst it, and so was Baker, who wantedno further changes in the wartime con-struction setup.66 On 14 June The Adju-tant General issued a terse order: "TheSecretary of War disapproves the recom-mendation for the transfer of the Con-struction Division to the Engineer De-partment."67 Two weeks later Bakerraised Marshall to one-star rank. Hence-forth the Chief of Construction wasknown to his comrades as "GeneralPuck."

The struggle between Marshall andthe Engineers was just beginning. In

August 1918, General Goethals, whohad been named director of the Purchase,Storage and Traffic Division (PS&T)of the General Staff, submitted a planfor reorganizing the Army's supply sys-tem, which put construction underPS&T. March approved the plan exceptthe part dealing with construction. Anattempt by Crowell and Marshall tomake the Construction Division per-manent by means of an Executive Orderfailed when Baker withheld approval.68

Two months later, Marshall learnedthat Goethals had centralized many ofthe Army's procurement and fiscal ac-tivities. Indications were that the supplyand finance functions of the Construc-tion Division would soon go to PS&T.Marshall and his associates consideredthe idea preposterous. Building materialscould not be divorced from buildingoperations. Writing to the Chief of Staffon 2 November 1918, Marshall stated:

Construction consists of the completefunctions necessary for delivering at the siteof a project materials and labor and [for]organizing, inspecting, accounting and pay-ing for the same . . . . To omit anyof these functions in a construction operationwould produce a decided destructive effectupon a construction program. The loss oftime and money would be too great to per-mit of using the word "organization" in con-nection with it.69

Nine days later the war ended.Under Marshall's direction, the Con-

struction Division had compiled an im-pressive record. At the time of the armis-tice, shelter for approximately 1,736,000men had been provided at 32 camps

65 Memo, Marshall for March, 6 Jun 18. Hist ofConstr Div, Book II.

66 Marshall Interv, 11 Apr 57.67 Ltr, TAG to OIC Constr Div, 14 Jun 18. QM

600.1 (1918-41).

68 (1) Memo, March for Goethals, 26 Aug 18. (2)Memo, Marshall for Crowell, 2 Aug 18. Both inQM 600.1 (1918-41).

69 Memo, Marshall for March, 2 Nov 18. QM600.1 (1918-41).


OLD HICKORY POWDER PLANT, TENNESSEE, nearing completion, 1918.

and cantonments, 4 ports of embarkation,22 special training centers, and numerousother posts and stations. In addition,work was completed, or nearly so, on77 airfields, schools, and other facilitiesfor the Division of Military Aeronautics;49 base and 40 general hospitals for theMedical Corps; 30 supply bases anddepots for the Quartermaster Corps;an

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