CIVIL SOCIETY

Is civil society in the Arab world beingrepressed by authoritarian regimes?

Viewpoint: Yes. Civil society in the Arab world has become a last refuge forrepressed populations rather than a foundation for political development.

Viewpoint: No. Civil society in Arab states is much more prominent than pop-ularly perceived and in the near future could be a dynamic foundation for thegrowth of political liberalization.

Civil society has become something of a "buzzword" in the field of MiddleEast studies (and in political science in general) over the past decade, espe-cially as it has become linked to the prospects of democratic growth in theArab Middle East, which is composed primarily of states that are in someform or fashion autocratic. Although the term civil society dates back to theGreco-Roman period, its modern construction, as defined by eighteenth-century political theorists from Georg Hegel to Thomas Paine and cited byThomas Carothers, is as "a domain parallel to but separate from the state—arealm where citizens associate according to their own interests and wishes."

In the aftermath of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc,democracies seemed to be emerging globally in the 1990s. Because of thispolitical shift, the nature of civil society, without which a sustainable democ-racy cannot be created nor survive and that also provides a kind of dialecticalfoundation to the institutional structures of democracy, was studied moreclosely as a possible index of democratic formation. As such, the accoutre-ments of civil society, especially nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—such as advocacy groups concerned with the environment, human rights,women's issues, freedom of the press, election monitoring, and so forth—became subjects of debate and examination. Civil society incorporates muchmore than just NGOs, however, also including student groups, trade unions,professional organizations, sports clubs, community groups, and cultural andreligious organizations—in other words, all of the associations that exist out-side of the state.

With U.S. involvement in the Middle East growing exponentially since theend of the Cold War, and as a result of the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991),presidential administrations have been compelled to encourage democraticgrowth in the Arab world if only to make the U.S. presence in the region morepalatable to an American public that has traditionally been squeamish aboutsupporting autocratic regimes. At a time when Israel, as a viable democracy,is often contrasted with the Arab states and when questions after the attacksof 11 September 2001 revolve around the facilitating environment for terror-ists created by repressive regimes and the growth of Islamic extremist move-ments in the Arab world, the issue of civil society and the extent to which itexists in various Arab countries has become a salient one.

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Viewpoint:Yes. Civil society in the Arabworld has become a last refuge forrepressed populations rather thana foundation for politicaldevelopment.

The concept of civil society and its relationswith democracy has been prominent in the discus-sion of state-society relations in the Middle Eastand elsewhere in the developing world. Civil soci-ety broadly refers to the existence of organizedgroups that through organized activities empowerthe individual in society; in theory, civil societychecks the power of the state and thus improvesprospects for democracy. Furthermore, broadusage sometimes makes civil society seem indistin-guishable from society as a whole, and the precisecomponents of civil society supposedly causing orcorrelating with democracy's emergence are left tospeculation. Moreover, there is an understating ofhow the state can spoil prospects for democratiza-tion. The influence of the state on society is asimportant—or more important—as the influenceof society on the state.

The Arab world has been stigmatized withpolitical stagnation for much of the latter half of thetwentieth century. Despite rapid socio-economicchanges, political systems in most Arab countriesremain parochial, dominated either by family rul-ers and patrimonial leadership and/or a power-ful elite, military personalities, and entrenchedtraditional, clerical, bureaucratic, or technocraticinterests. Arab states have, through regulationsand bureaucratic control, coercion, and corrup-tion, dampened the emergence and the develop-ment of civil society and its agents. Civil societyhas remained at the mercy of the state and itsdominant elite, despite increases in wealth, literacyrates, and the rise of educated technocrats andprofessionals across the Arab world. Civil soci-ety remains for the most part ineffective andunable to challenge the hegemony of the Arabstate.

States in the Middle East share similar char-acteristics with states in other developing coun-tries. Thanks mainly to petrodollars, foreignmilitary and financial support, and the weaknessof local political opposition, Middle Easternstates have expanded their power. States in theregion dominate the society and economy to theextent that they have become centers of tremen-dous wealth and prestige. Even the local bourgeoi-sie, in theory a major historical force behinddemocratization in the West, is highly dependenton the state for financing, contracts, employment,and protection. Indeed, the weakness of the mid-dle class—and its economic dependence on the

state—is a key factor in the continuing power ofthe state. The decline in financial capability of thestate in the Middle East in the 1980s and 1990sforced it to give a freer hand to the private sector,with the state cutting back its involvement in suchareas as education, health, and welfare. The state,however, remains authoritarian and unwilling togenuinely share political power.

Through revenue-raising measures and expen-ditures, governments influence the distributionnot only of income (and wealth) but also of politi-cal power. According to Bruce E. Moon and Wil-liam J. Dixon, through public policies aimed atland reform, education, nationalizing the econ-omy, and "laws governing labor-management andlandowner-peasant relations, the state has thepotential to alter the relative power of variousgroups with implications for their success innon-state political interactions."

In fact, the Arab states have relied on tradi-tional sources of political authority such as reli-gion, charisma, kinship, and family ties tomaintain their hold on power: they have reliedlargely on informal, not institutional, bases ofpolitical power. Personal, family, and group tieshelp sustain the executive power of the rulingelites. The sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf are per-haps the primary examples of extreme personal-ized autocratic rule. Others such as Tunisia,Turkey, and Iran (although the last two arenon-Arab states) show a changing state-society bal-ance, with institutionalization of power relation-ships gradually undermining informal andarbitrary power associations.

The ruling elite in the Middle East, alongwith their allies in top-level positions in institu-tions and agencies of the state, continue to resistpressure for power sharing. The prospects fordemocracy increase only when the growth andstrength of rival social, economic, and politicalgroups pushing for power sharing leaves the weak-ened state with no choice but to loosen its grip onpower. Ultimately, prospects for democracy willincrease when societal pressure on the state opensthe way for political democracy. Of course, thestate might choose to use force on some level tocontinue its monopoly over socio-economicresources and political power, but a continuingcoercive policy can prove more harmful than bene-ficial to the political elite in the long run, espe-cially where the modernization process has led tothe growth of a vibrant, organized civil society.The rise of new social groups and classes (such asbureaucrats, technocrats, business and profes-sional groups, and labor) in the modernizationprocess usually leads to changes in state-societyrelations. The ruling elite either tries to preserveits status by accommodating to some extent thedemand for wider political participation and bet-ter economic opportunities (for example, Turkey,

78 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 14: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, FIRST SERIES

Tunisia, and Jordan), resists any meaningful con-cession to the opposition, increasing the risk foreventual political instability (Oman, Saudi Arabia,the Persian Gulf states, Egypt, Pakistan, and Iranbefore the 1979 revolution), or chooses a policyof oppression (Libya, Algeria, Syria, and Iraq).

Society in much of the Middle East persistsas weak and powerless, and it is thus unable tocheck the power of the state as long as socio-economic structure remains underdeveloped (peo-ple remain illiterate, poor, undereducated, and soon), and opposition to the state, such as by laborunions, remains poorly organized. Structuralchanges within the society can produce demandsfor democratic participation in power sharing,leading to increasing pressure on the dominantelite—inside and outside of the state domain—tolet go of power.

The strength or weakness of the state indeveloping countries must be looked at in thecontext of the position of the state vis-a-vis society.The state might appear omnipresent and strongwhere a society is weak, or the state might appearweak relative to a society well organized into inter-est groups and associations with effective influ-ence in the distribution of socio-economicresources and political power. In advanced indus-trial democracies the primary role of the state isthe preservation of peace, order, and security,along with some redistribution policies (such aswelfare programs). The role of the state in theeconomy remains far less involved where privatebusiness dominates. This arrangement does notprove that the state in developed countries isweak. On the contrary, the state is strong, asshown by its ability to tax and regulate, but thelimits to government power in developed coun-tries arise from groups with tremendous eco-nomic and political power of their own, organizedinto pressure groups.

State power in Middle Eastern countries islargely based on informal rather than institutionalstructures, for it is personal, family, and group tiesthat help sustain the executive power of the rulingelite. The Middle East is not the only area with apattern of patrimonial leadership, as many devel-oping countries display the same phenomenon.The nature of the ruling elite's autocratic powervaries in Arab countries. The Persian Gulf sheikh-doms, including Saudi Arabia, are perhaps the pri-mary examples of highly traditional autocraticrule. Turkey and Tunisia in the Middle East andSouth Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brazil else-where in the developing world are examples onthe other end of the spectrum. The last-namedcountries testify to the changing balance ofstate-society relations in favor of society, as institu-tionalization of independent power relationshipsis gradually undermining informal and arbitrarystate power associations. There has been a slow

emergence of independent groups and associa-tions. For example, organized labor by itself, orthrough an alliance with the middle class, cancheck the power of the state and promote democ-racy. Unfortunately, labor unions, a primary agentof civil society in the Middle East, remain eithernonexistent, repressed, and/or controlled by thestate.

Overall, opposition political parties in theMuslim Middle East have been ineffective in chal-lenging the domination of governments' politicalparties. In all national elections in the MiddleEast between 1980 and 1999, only in Iran (1989,1997), Turkey (1991, 1995), and Israel (1992,1996, 1999) did a change in the government actu-ally occur—and none of these are Arab states. Inall other cases where elections were held, the rul-ing government's political parties maintainedtheir control of the state (national elections wereheld since 1980 in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran,Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria,Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, as well as in the Palestin-ian territories). Such mechanisms as restrictingvoter and candidate eligibility, gerrymandering,legal constraints on political parties, and choice ofelectoral system are used by governments to main-tain a political monopoly. Furthermore, accord-ing to Jillian Schwedler, "many governments [inthe Middle East] adopt or change laws betweenelections in order to produce different results."

In some Arab countries economic and politi-cal crises have been responsible for some politicalopening and electoral participation, not at the endof a long process of gradual expansion in inclu-siveness. The challenge posed by economic slow-down and the popularity of Islamic movementshave been the primary reasons behind some politi-cal opening in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen,which all experienced a decline in the quality oflife over the course of the 1980s. "And in twocases—Algeria and Jordan—a sharp economic crisisappears to [have] galvanized the governments intomajor democratization reforms," as noted byMichael Hudson. Both Egypt and Jordan intro-duced political reforms to channel growing oppo-sition caused by deteriorating economic conditionsand high unemployment and to defuse the threatof fundamentalism.

The better educated and the healthier,wealthier, and more organized the people, thestronger the society in protecting itself from dom-ination by the state. These resources allow for theformation of institutions that act as foci for debateand discussion without resorting to violence. Forthe systematic and orderly channeling of thedemands of contesting elites for political leader-ship, institutionalization is thus essential for polit-ical stability. Political parties, whether religious ornot, must function within an independent organi-

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 14: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, F IRST SERIES 79

PEOPLE CHOOSE FREEDOMOn 12 December 2002, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Pow-

ell addressed an audience at the Heritage Foundation onUS, p/a*B for fo& spread of democracy in the Middle East-

Given a choice between tyranny and free-dom, people choose freedom. We need onlylook to the streets of Kabul, filled with peoplecelebrating the end of Taliban rule last year,There are rays of hope In the Middle East, aswell, Countries such as Bahrain, Qatar, andMorocco have embarked on bold politicalreforms, Civic organizations are increasinglyactive in many Arab countries, working onbread-and-butter issues such as securing badlyneeded identity cards for women. We are alsoseeing an explosion of media outlets, from sat-ellite television stations to weekly tabloids.Though some still do not live up to their respon-sibility to deliver responsible coverage and fac-tual information, altogether they are makinginfoimation available to more people than everbefore. Arid with information, ultimately comesknowledge, knowledge to raise young peopleup, knowledge about what is happening in otherparts of the world, Still, too many Middle East-erners are ruled by closed political systems. Toomany governments curb the institutions of civilsociety as a threat, rather than welcome themas the basis for a free, dynamic, and hopefulsociety. And the language of hate, exclusion,and incitement to violence is still ail too commonthroughout the region. As Morocco's KingMohammed told his country's parliament twoyears ago, *to achieve development, democ-racy, and modernization, it is necessary toimprove and strengthen political parties, tradeunions, associations, and the media, and toenlarge the scope of participation."

Any approach to the Middle East thatignores Its political, economic, and educationalunderdevelopment will be built upon sand. It istime to lay a firm foundation of hope. Hope iswhat my presentation today is about. Americawants to align itself with the people of the MiddleEast, moving forward on the basis of hope,hope for peace, hope for a better life for the chil-dren of the Middle East and the children of theworld To that end, I am announcing today aninitiative that places the United States firmly onthe side of change, on the side of reform, andon the side of a modem future for the MiddleEast, on tfie side of hope.... I am pleased toannounce the initial results of our work—aninnovative set of programs and a framework forfuture cooperation that we call the U.S.-MiddleEast Partnership Initiative. The U.S.-MiddleEast Partnership Initiative is a bridge betweenthe United States and the Middle East, betweenour governments and our peoples, an initiative

that spans the hope gap with energy, ideas, andfunding. Our Partnership Initiative is a continua-tion, and a deepening, of our longstanding com-mitment to working with all the peoples of theMiddle East to improve their daily lives and tohelp them face the future with hope. Just as ourdecision to rejoin UNESCO is a symbol of ourcommitment to advancing human rights and tol-erance and learning, so this Initiative is a con-crete demonstration of our commitment tohuman dignity in the Middle East We are ini-tially dedicating $29 million to get this Initiativeoff to a strong start. Working with Congress, wewill seek significant additional funding for nextyear. These funds will be over and above themore than $1 billion we provide in economicassistance to the Arab world every year. Our ini-tiative rests on three pillars. We will engage withpublic and private sector groups to bridge thejobs gap with economic reform, business invest-ment, and private sector development We willpartner with community leaders to close thefreedom gap with projects to strengthen civilsociety, expand political participation, and lift thevoices of women. And, we will work with parentsand educators to bridge the knowledge gap withbetter schools and more opportunities for highereducation..,. The second pillar of our Partner-ship Initiative will support citizens across theregion who are claiming their political voices.We began the first pilot project in this area lastmonth, when we brought a delegation of 55Arab women, women political leaders, broughtthem to the United States to observe ourmid-term elections. I had an excellent meetingwith this remarkable group, and I was inspiredby their energy and their commitment. They puttough questions to me, and we debated theissues as people do in a free society. Thesewomen were proud of their heritage. Theyspoke eloquently of their dreams of a worldwhere their children could grow up and live inpeace. They told of their hopes to see an end tothe conflicts that cripple their region. They alsospoke of their expectations of America. Theytalked about how they want control over theirown lives and their own destinies. And, theyasked to know more about American democ-racy, and how to make their own voices moreeffective. Increased political participation alsorequires strengthening the civic institutions thatprotect individual rights and provide opportuni-ties for participation. Through our PartnershipInitiative we will support these efforts.

Source: "Powell Launches Middle East PartnershipInitiative,* 12 December 2002, United StatesEmbassy, Israel, website <htiptfusemba$$y-ismeI.orgJI/pubIish/peace/archives/2Q02/december/I2l30l,htmt>.

80 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 14: THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, FIRST SERIES

ed

zational network in which final decisions aremade and executed without constant interferencefrom state bureaucracies.

Islam has historically remained on theperiphery of state politics, overshadowed by secu-lar authoritarian states. Furthermore, the overallstructure of the post-World War II political econ-omy in the region helped consolidate state power.States dependent on oil rent and external supportin the form of military, economic, and financialaid led to the monopolization of domestic powerduring the Cold War era. The Arab-Israeli conflictalso increased regime hegemony by providing anexcuse for inadequacies in socio-economic perfor-mance and legitimizing authoritarianism.

Islam is no more innately antidemocraticthan Judaism or Christianity. The popularity ofIslam in the 1980s was largely a reflection ofthe bankruptcy of other alternatives posed toresolve social ills than some inevitable preferencefor authoritarianism or an antidemocratic society.It is economic crisis, coupled with a crisis of legiti-macy, in most Muslim states that has encouragedand strengthened religious opposition. Religiousgroups and movements and their leaders can bepragmatic contenders for state power as much astheir secular counterparts. Islamic candidates andorganizations have participated in elections inAlgeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Turkey, Egypt, Jor-dan, and Kuwait, as well as in Pakistan andMalaysia.

John Esposito argues that in countries suchas "Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan,Islamic organizations have been among thebest-organized opposition forces, and are oftenwilling to form alliances or cooperate with politi-cal parties, professional syndicates, and voluntaryassociations to achieve shared political and socio-economic reforms." The cases of post-RevolutionIran, in particular, and other self-declared Islamicstates such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia providevivid examples of the triumph of realism over ide-ology and rhetoric. In short, Muslim groups andassociations have the capacity to contribute posi-tively to the development of civil society anddemocracy in the Middle East and elsewhere inthe Muslim world.

Civil society is often associated with the pres-ence of viable and effective associations and inter-est groups that help check the power of the stateand promote active citizenry participation in themanagement of society. There seems to hold anassociation between civil society and democracy,but what really constitutes civil society is oftenunclear: the characteristics are left for speculation.What distinguishes society from civil society isimportant in that it reflects the viability and effec-tiveness of agents of civil society in checking andcontrolling the authoritarian urges of the state. Inthe Arab world, the Middle East, and the develop-

ing countries in general, the state has historicallydominated almost all aspects of state-society rela-tions. The extensive involvement of the state inthe economy; its control of natural resources; itsbureaucratic, regulatory, and military power; andits hold over institutional and organizationalfoundations of society all have left societies in thedeveloping world at the mercy of state power. Inthe Arab world, the state continues to resist powersharing and is loathe to relinquish its control overvast economic and social resources. The move-ment toward relatively more-open societies in afew Arab countries such as Jordan, Tunisia, andBahrain reflects not drastic shifts in power awayfrom the state and in favor of the society but eco-nomic crises, political upheavals, and overalluncertainties of the post-Cold War era. Arabstates remain in dire need of reform, where orga-nized and institutionalized opposition to the stateremains either nonexistent or weak. The tensionfrom globalization and the American war on ter-rorism is supposedly putting some pressure onsome Arab states for political reform, but pros-pects for real change are ultimately dependent onevents taking place inside these countries, shapingthe nature of the state-society relations.

-ALI R. ABOOTALEBI,UNIVERSITY

OF WISCONSIN, EAU CLAIRE

Viewpoint:No. Civil society in Arabstates is much more prominentthan popularly perceived and inthe near future could be a dynamicfoundation for the growthof political liberalization.

Italian Marxist social thinker Antonio Gram-sci argued that "a crisis cannot give the attackingforces the ability to organize with lightning speedin time and in space; still less can it endow themwith fighting spirit. Similarly, the defenders arenot demoralized, nor do they abandon their posi-tions, even among the ruins, nor do they lose faithin their own strength or their own future." Eversince the demise of the Soviet bloc, partly becauseof the strength of a vibrant civil society that devel-oped within the womb of the Communist order,the concept of civil society has taken on majorimportance in the study of democratization.Indeed, many scholars and politicians view thematerialization of civil society as one of the prereq-uisites of democratization and its consolidation.

The literature on democratization, which blos-somed in the mid 1980s, conspicuously neglects

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the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Forexample, the major, four-volume study on democra-tization in the Third World—Larry Diamond, JuanJ. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset's Democracy inDeveloping Countries (1988-1989)-deliberatelyexcludes MENA because, as the editors stated,"Islamic countries of the Middle East and NorthAfrica generally lack much previous democraticexperience, and most appear to have little prospectof transition to even semi-democracy." The reasonfor this neglect stems from the so-called exception-alism of that region. Those who hold this viewargue that for a variety of reasons—Islamic tradi-tions, patriarchal political cultures, and the absenceof strong civil societies—MENA countries areunlikely ever to make the transition to democracy.What these studies omitted, though, is that whileworld attention in the 1980s focused on changes inEastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, fewseemed to notice the change, though incrementaland hesitant, that had started even earlier in theArab world, particularly in North Africa. Newgroups surfaced to challenge the autocratic state,albeit through different means and at dissimilar lev-els of intensity. For instance, even if spontaneousand lacking effective organization, the riots ofOctober 1988 in Algeria shook the foundations ofthe authoritarian regime and compelled it to openup an era of liberalization that saw the establish-ment of hundreds of independent organizationsand a relatively free press. Clearly, emerging civilsocieties in the Arab world have rejected authoritar-ian, "developmentalist" governments, and they arecalling, though with little degree of success so far,for governments that will institute more social jus-tice and allow for greater individual freedoms.Undoubtedly, civil societies in MENA have thepotential of playing a consequential role in the pro-cess of liberalization and, eventually, democratiza-tion in the region. Although those who arepessimistic about the prospects for democratiza-tion in MENA have some valid reasons, there arealso signs for optimism.

The history of the concept of civil society ismore than two hundred years old. Yet, it reap-peared in the late 1980s, and the concept has dom-inated current debates on democratization. Civilsociety embraces many "private," yet potentiallyautonomous, public sectors distinct from the state.Such sectors are regulated by various associationsexisting within them, preventing society fromdegenerating into a shapeless mass. At least twoingredients characterize civil society: distinctionand autonomy from the state. Civil society consistsof a network of economic, intellectual, political,and religious associations, which are independentof the state and of the family but not totally sepa-rate from them. In other words, as Diamondexplains, "civil society is the realm of organizedsocial life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely)self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and

bound by a legal order or set of shared rules . . . . Itinvolves citizens acting collectively in a publicsphere to express their interests, passions, andideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals,make demands on the state, and hold state officialsaccountable." Civil society is also what Gramscidescribed as the space for ideological struggle andfor ideological hegemony, a characteristic that con-temporary authors have often overlooked in theirdiscussion of the concept. The concept of civilsociety, as opposed to the more general concept ofsociety, helps analysts to distance themselves fromthe statist approaches that dominated the analysisof MENA polities until the late 1980s. Indeed,Arab intellectuals on the whole were state centeredand criticized the state, only to demand a moreimportant and more effective intervention of thatvery same state while completely ignoring the roleof civil society. Only mass organizations, linked tothe single ruling parties, had any consideration.

Civil society figures even more prominentlyin the theories on the transition from authoritar-ian to democratic regimes because it plays a criticalrole once liberalization of the authoritarian regimehas begun. One of the consequences of authoritar-ian regimes is, evidently, the depoliticizing andatomizing of society through repressive measures,ideological domination, and the restriction of thespace of political action to the mere pursuit of pri-vate goals. In other words, the state is in total com-mand of the public sphere and preventsorganizational or group autonomy where politicalidentities could be expressed.

In most Middle Eastern countries, whatevertheir ideological orientation, civil society has beenthe victim of autocratic rulers who have succeededin controlling it to a degree. The rentier states, inparticular, have succeeded in eliciting and main-taining a considerable level of consensus fromboth the masses and the elite. Intellectuals pro-vided justification for a strong state and over-looked its repressive measures in the name ofmodernization and nation building. The intelli-gentsia in MENA, in fact, never became the cata-lyst of new critical associations within civil society;if anything, they viewed the burgeoning pluralismto be a factor offitna (disunity) for the revolution.For decades, central power held almost total con-trol over society. The "opposition"—muted as itwas—consisted only of supporting the power inplace so as not to create divisions within thenation. It was forbidden from seeking power orfrom attempting to weaken the establishedregimes, let alone presenting itself as a distinct orautonomous component, and those regimes sup-ported by the so-called progressive Left—such asAlgeria under Houari Boumedienne, Egypt underGamal Abdal-Nasser, and the Baathists in Iraq andSyria—proved that they could mobilize quicklyagainst any genuine opposition.

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Although frequently the target of revolution-ary rhetoric, the "business class" (bourgeoisie)agreed to a tacit pact with the regimes. Theyrenounced any prominent political role and fol-lowed the state's main economic guidelines inexchange for the state's acquiescence in allowingthem to make sizable profits. The state thereforecontrolled the working masses through a combina-tion of social benefits and repression. The intellec-tuals, the new capitalist class (usually concentratedin the public sector), and the trade unions (con-trolled by the state through the single party)formed a common front favoring authoritariancontrol instead of forming the basis for civil society.

Those who view the prospects of democrati-zation in MEN A as chimerical base their argu-ments precisely on the durability of theauthoritarian state and for the outside military,economic, and political support that some Arabautocratic regimes—such as the Persian Gulf states,Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia—receive from West-ern democracies for "strategic" reasons. One ofthe major arguments of the pessimists is capturedin the Arab Human Development Reports(2002), which found that the barrier to betterArab performance is not the lack of resources butthree "deficits": freedom, knowledge, and womanpower. They rightly hold the view that absoluteautocracies have survived and that confusionbetween the executive and the judiciary branchesin most of the MENA countries has continued.They also observe that there are major constraintson the media and civil society and that the socialenvironment is patriarchal and intolerant. In sum,despite elections—often phony—and the signing ofhuman-rights conventions, democratization isalmost nonexistent. Democracy is sporadicallyoffered as a concession, not as a right. Otherobservers discount the rise of Arab civil society,arguing that political parties, in places where theyhave emerged, are not only weak and their opposi-tion to ruling regimes mediocre, but also that theyhave actually been the creation of the rulingregimes. Because practices within the structures ofthese parties are said to be undemocratic, suchanalysts question the ability of these parties torule democratically should they ever come topower. Thus, even the more hopeful among thesepessimists shed serious doubts about democraticprospects of MENA, the rise of a civil society not-withstanding.

Some analysts of MENA, including Arabscholars such as Fouad Ajami, argue that prevail-ing Islamic traditions will make it difficult forthese countries to make genuine and lasting transi-tions to democratic government. In the 1980s,Samuel Huntington, in contrast to what he latercame to believe, argued that prospects for demo-cratic development in the Middle East were slim.That pessimism derives from an old established

neo-Orientalist tradition that views Islamic socie-ties as resistant to change. Orientalists and neo-Orientalists believe that Islamic societies are inca-pable of producing a middle class; they argue thatthe absence of a middle class is tied to the lack ofentrepreneurial spirit and achievement motiva-tion. Despotism and economic backwardness, intheir assessment, are therefore the hallmarks ofIslamic societies. The suspicion and lack of coop-eration that have allegedly characterized Islamicsocieties account for the failure of the evolution ofcapitalism and democracy. Academics and journal-ists who subscribe to analyses based on politicalculture argue forcefully that Islam and democracyare simply incompatible. The fact that Islam alleg-edly does not allow for secular rule and thus thatsovereignty rests solely with God excludes Islamicsociety from achieving a democratic order. ElieKedourie argues that "the idea of democracy isquite alien to the mindset of Islam." In his view"there is nothing in the political traditions of theArab world—which are the political traditions ofIslam—which might make familiar, or indeed intel-ligible, the organizing ideas of constitutional andrepresentative government." Lacking are any refer-ences to the many thought-provoking works dem-onstrating that secular traditions do in fact exist inIslam.

These views on the authoritarian influence ofIslam fail to take into account the diversifiedbeliefs within Islam or ways in which it is, in fact,opposed to authoritarianism. The works ofIslamic thinkers who have demonstrated the com-patibility of Islam and democracy have beentotally overlooked.

The more optimistic view also has merit.Without denying the problems that plague theregion, it is perhaps important to highlight someof the changes that have inevitably had an impacton the future of MENA. Perhaps the most impor-tant factor was the failure of state-led developmen-talist programs, despite their initial successes. Inmost MENA countries, the widespread corrup-tion, absence of democratic freedoms, the margin-alization or sheer exclusion of large segments ofsociety (especially young people), arbitrary rule,clientelism, nepotism, and human-rights viola-tions caused the ruling elites to lose their legiti-macy, which explains the appeal of the Islamistwave. Severe socio-economic crises caused by infla-tion, soaring international debt, high unemploy-ment, and mismanagement of resources, coupledwith no means of redress through democraticinstitutions, resulted in the repudiation of thetacit social contract that rulers had establishedwith the ruled following independence from colo-nial domination. The crises allowed new socialgroups to challenge the authority and legitimacyof the state with an intensity and on a scale neverpreviously witnessed. Although Islamists were the

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leading force opposing the state, others-includ-ing cultural groups, human-rights organizations,students' organizations, moderate Islamists, busi-ness associations, and women's associations—arenow political forces. Literally tens of thousands ofindependent organizations sprang up through-out the region. According to Jillian Schwedler,"although the existence of civil society in the Mid-dle East (or anywhere) does not mean that coun-tries are on the verge of democratization, it doesillustrate that citizens are both willing and able toplay a role in shaping the state policies that governtheir lives. And, as the experiences in Central andEastern Europe illustrate, reform depends asmuch on the will of the citizens as on the willing-ness of the government." Clearly, failing econo-mies induced regimes to liberalize in order tobring about the necessary reforms and to imple-ment the austerity programs imposed by interna-tional financial institutions. To survive, manyMENA regimes allowed a degree of economicand political liberalization (holding of elections,legalization of human rights organizations, and soon). They initiated liberalization in the hope thatcivil society would support them and would stopcontesting their authority. The governments alsohoped that such limited liberalization would cur-tail the potential for violence and destabilization.

Feeling threatened, many regimes tried toconfine or stifle their opponents. The inability of

regimes to respond to the increasing demands oftheir citizens, and of their previous social allies,compelled them to disengage from sectors ofwhich they had traditionally been in charge. How-ever, despite the weakening of the state and therelative strength of civil society in a few countries,the state still has more financial, institutional, andideological capacities than civil society. This con-centration of power obviously means that civilsociety, as well as political society-which in Hegeland Gramsci's sense refers to political parties-need to continue their struggle. In particular, sec-ular and moderate Islamist political parties, wherethey exist, must oppose strong challenges to auto-cratic regimes. No doubt, a degree of civility anddedication to democracy must exist within societyat large, for without tolerance and acceptance ofthe other, the political and social struggle wouldturn violent, as the Algerian case illustrates.Indeed, as noted by Edward Shils, "as a feature ofcivil society [civility] considers others as fellow-citizens of equal dignity in their rights and obliga-tions as members of civil society; it means regard-ing other persons, including one's adversaries, asmembers of the same inclusive collectivity, i.e.,members of the same society, even though theybelong to different parties or to different religiouscommunities or to different ethnic groups." InAlgeria and Jordan, for instance, parliamentarydebates have gradually become the forum where

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opposition forces learn to tolerate one another. Inother states, no matter how imperfect the systemis, its existence has allowed some degree of expres-sion and democratic education.

Undoubtedly, the old rulers have put up stiffresistance and have severely constrained civil soci-ety—as in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt—but civil soci-ety has waged an incessant war of attrition, whichwill eventually force the regimes to negotiate tran-sition pacts toward a more democratic order.Sooner or later the old rulers, who are leaving theMEN A scene anyway, will need to compensate fortheir lack of legitimacy and the fragility of theirrule by negotiating honorable pacts with civil soci-ety. Controlled or tutelary democracy might bethe first step toward liberalization and democrati-zation in MEN A. No doubt, the process will beslow because democracy itself is a process, not anend.

The real brake to democratization in MEN Ais not cultural—even if the ideology of radicalIslamists gives credence to such perception—butrather the resistance of the old rulers to allowsweeping change to take place. Thus, as AlbertSchnabel puts it: "What is required is not theimmediate (or even eventual) adoption offull-fledged Western-style liberal democracy, but agradual process toward more participation in thepolitical and economic life and governance of thecountry, in harmony with religious norms andteachings respected throughout society."

Although conditions in MENA look bleak,there is also reason for hope. Societies are notstatic but are prone to change, which is preciselywhy the culturalist thesis is refuted. In fact, pros-pects for democratization in MENA countries arenot so different from those for other Third Worldsocieties. For instance, similar to the Orientalistsand neo-Orientalists with respect to MENA'sprospects for democratization, specialists in thepast argued that Latin American countries,because of their inherent authoritarian politicalculture and the Catholic religion, would be for-ever doomed to remain authoritarian. The wide-spread and enduring trend toward democracy inLatin America suggests strongly that this view isinvalid. Comparable arguments made aboutMENA are also incorrect even if the current con-ditions give more credibility to the pessimists,who, incidentally, tend to overlook the informa-tion revolution in MENA and its potential impactin accelerating sociopolitical change. No doubtthe development of a "network society" will haveimplications in breaking the power of the authori-tarian state and the institution of pluralistic socie-ties in MENA. This arena is not to forget the

remarkable struggle that the independent press,especially in Algeria, has waged in not onlyinforming and educating public opinion but alsoin challenging rulers. The tremendous courage ofsome journalists in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere, who havefaced imprisonment and unbearable harassment,illustrates this willingness of civil society to bringabout change in the region. This journalistic activ-ism, indeed, is a hopeful development.

One can only concur with Schnabel that"there is hope for progress [in MENA] if thecountries in the region become more prosperous,more cooperative, less influenced by the prefer-ences of external powers, and supported andassisted by a restructured, reformed, and neutralUnited Nations." Whether these conditions mate-rialize and whether the United States, the globalhegemonic power, and Europe are willing to gen-uinely assist in the establishment of a democraticorder will be paramount in determining thedemocratization of MENA.

-YAHIA H. ZOUBIR, THUNDERBIRD,THE AMERICAN GRADUATE SCHOOL OF

INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT, ARIZONA

References

Ali R. Abootalebi, "Civil Society, Democracy,and the Middle East," Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs, 2 (September 1988):47-59.

Abootalebi, Islam and Democracy: State-SocietyRelations in Developing Countries., 1980-1994(New York: Garland, 2000).

James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics inthe Middle East (New York: HarperCollins,1994).

Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble,eds., Political Liberalization and Democratiza-tion in the Arab World, 2 volumes (Boulder,Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995, 1998).

Michael Hudson, "After the Gulf War: Prospectsfor Democratization in the Arab World,"Middle East Journal, 45 (Summer 1991):407-426.

Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in theMiddle East, 2 volumes (New York: Brill,1995,1996).

Emmanuel Sivan, "The Islamic Resurgence:Civil Society Strikes Back," Journal of Con-temporary History, 25 (Fall 1990): 353-364.

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