China's emergence as a defence technological power

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China's Emergence as aDefense Technological Power:

IntroductionTai Ming Cheung

Available online: 17 Jun 2011

To cite this article: Tai Ming Cheung (2011): China's Emergence as a Defense

Technological Power: Introduction, Journal of Strategic Studies, 34:3, 295-297

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.583155

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China’s Emergence as a DefenseTechnological Power: Introduction

TAI MING CHEUNG

China is beginning to flex its expanding military and strategic clout in

the pursuit of its broadening national security interests. At the sametime, the country’s economic and technology policies have also becomemore nationalistic, state-centered, and ambitious. The reasons behindthis adjustment from a previously accommodating posture, why it hasoccurred across different policy areas, and whether it is a temporaryphenomenon or the beginning of a more deep-seated strategic shift arenot yet well understood.

Important drivers appear to be at play. Powerful political and policydynamics include surging nationalistic sentiment, leadership competi-tion ahead of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2012,and a more confident policy elite seeking to accelerate China’s relativerise in the international order in the wake of the 2008 global economiccrisis. More structural explanations point to weak authority at the top

that allows powerful bureaucracies such as the military and science andtechnology (S&T) apparatus to pursue their own interests, which maynot always align with national priorities. It will take some time beforethe overall nature and direction of change in China’s grand strategy canbe determined.

In the defense technological realm, the development path is morevisible. China’s defense economy has set its sights on catching up withthe West by the beginning of the 2020s and is making steady progressin building up its innovation capabilities, although this is presently inthe form of incremental and sustaining types of activities. More high-end, disruptive forms of innovation that would lead to majorbreakthroughs are likely to be beyond China’s reach for another fiveto ten years, although there may be exceptions in high-priority areas,

such as space or aviation, that enjoy access to ample funding, foreignknowledge and technologies, and leadership support.

The Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 34, No. 3, 295–297, June 2011

ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/11/030295-03 Ó 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2011.583155

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This special issue provides a wide-ranging and detailed assessment of the present state of the Chinese defense economy at a time of rapidchange and accelerating advancement in its innovation capabilities andperformance. This collection of articles has three main goals: (1) tolocate China’s defense innovation dynamics within broader historical,technological and methodological frameworks of analysis; (2 to assessthe performance of the Chinese defense economy’s six principal sub-sectors; and (3) to compare China’s approach to defense industrializa-tion with major counterparts in the Asia-Pacific region.

These articles were originally written for a conference on ‘China’sDefense and Dual-Use Science, Technology, and Industrial Base’organized by the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflictand Cooperation (IGCC) in July 2010. The conference is part of aresearch project led by IGCC and funded by the US Defense

Department’s Minerva Initiative on ‘The Evolving RelationshipBetween Technology and National Security in China’. This projectexamines China’s drive to become a world-class defense and dual-usetechnological and industrial power and the security, geo-political,economic and technological implications of this transformation.

Some Key Findings

These papers offer at least three insights into the state of developmentof the Chinese defense economy at the end of the 2000s and longer-term trends.

First, the technological development of the Chinese defense economysince the onset of major sector reforms in the late 1990s has been

impressive. This progress can be measured through a diverse array of hard performance indicators such as corporate profitability, patents,product and research and development output, and educationalstandards. If this momentum can be maintained, the Chinese defenseeconomy will be able to narrow considerably the still wide technolo-gical gap it faces with the world’s advanced defense S&T powers overthe next decade.

Second, the aviation and space industries are leading the way in theChinese defense economy’s transformation, especially in civil-militaryintegration, access and linkages with global production and innovationnetworks, the building of innovation capabilities, and the ability toadapt to market competition.

Third, over the past decade, China has climbed to the apex of the

military technological and industrial order in the Asia-Pacific regionand its technological capabilities today match or exceed those of Japan,South Korea, and India. However, the Asia-Pacific region lags farbehind the US and Europe, and this defense technological gap appears

296 Tai Ming Cheung


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to be widening with the gradual decline of the Japanese defenseindustry and the chronic inability of India to overcome deep-seatedstructural obstacles. China will become the dominant regional militarytechnological power over the next decade, which will be a key pillar inits growing economic and military shadow over this region.

Introduction 297


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China's emergence as a defence technological power

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