China s Growing Involvement in Chad · 2016-05-03 · AbStRACt Relations between Chad and China...

South African Instit

ute of Inte

rnat

iona

l Affa

irs

African perspectives. Global insights.

China in Africa Project

O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 1 6

China’s Growing Involvement in Chad: Escaping Enclosure?

M a y 2 0 1 2

R o m a i n D i t t g e n & D a n i e l L a r g e

A b o u t S A I I A

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record

as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,

non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into

public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs

with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research

excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers

present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in

Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good

governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;

and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the

environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about

SAIIA’s work.

A b o u t t h e C h I N A I N A F R I C A P R o J e C t

SAIIA’s ‘China in Africa’ research project investigates the emerging relationship between

China and Africa; analyses China’s trade and foreign policy towards the continent; and

studies the implications of this strategic co-operation in the political, military, economic and

diplomatic fields.

The project seeks to develop an understanding of the motives, rationale and institutional

structures guiding China’s Africa policy, and to study China’s growing power and influence

so that they will help rather than hinder development in Africa. It further aims to assist African

policymakers to recognise the opportunities presented by the Chinese commitment to the

continent, and presents a platform for broad discussion about how to facilitate closer

co-operation. The key objective is to produce policy-relevant research that will allow Africa

to reap the benefits of interaction with China, so that a collective and integrated African

response to future challenges can be devised that provides for constructive engagement

with Chinese partners.

A ‘China–Africa Toolkit’ has been developed to serve African policymakers as an

information database, a source of capacity building and a guide to policy formulation

SAIIA gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the main funders of the

project: The United Kingdom Department for International Development and the Swedish

International Development Cooperation Agency.

Project leader and series editor: Dr Chris Alden, [email protected]

© SAIIA May 2012

All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any

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storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Opinions expressed are

the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.

Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.

A b S t R A C t

Relations between Chad and China have expanded and deepened since diplomatic

ties were resumed in August 2006. Growing links have been underpinned by Chinese oil

development operations, epitomised by the Rônier refinery project. This symbolises China’s

ascendancy in Chad following N’Djamena’s rejection of its relations with the World Bank-

led Chad–Cameroon pipeline project. Despite recent turbulence, oil investment looks set

to play the key part in China’s continuing engagement in Chad and enhance the potential

for stimulating economic growth, despite severe constraints and ongoing challenges. By

investing in a refinery, and dealing with N’Djamena in a different way from the conditionality

heavy approach of recent Western engagement, China has embarked on an innovative

intervention of increasing importance in Chad. This is seen in the appropriation of China

by the Chadian leadership under President Idriss Déby as a means to promote a range of

social goals related to the domestic political objectives of his regime. However, tensions

remain within the terms of the newly forged partnership. Whether China can follow

through on and sustain its present engagement, and enable Chad to escape its historical

confinement amidst chronic underdevelopment and protracted insecurity, remains to be

seen.

A b o u t t h e A u t h o R S

Romain Dittgen is a PhD candidate and assistant lecturer in human geography at the

University of Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne).1

Daniel Large is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. His publications include Sudan Looks East:

China, India and the Politics of Asian Alternatives (Oxford: James Currey, 2011), co-edited

with Luke Patey.2

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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 116

C H I N A I N A F R I C A P R O J E C T

A b b R e v I A t I o N S A N d A C R o N y m S

CAMC ChinaCAMCEngineeringCoLtd

CAR CentralAfricanRepublic

ChinaEximBank Export–ImportBankofChina

CNPC ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation

CNPCIC ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationInternationalChad

DPP DemocraticProgressiveParty(Taiwan)

FOCAC ForumonChina–AfricaCooperation

GRAMP-TC GroupedeRecherchesalternativesetdeMonitoringduprojet

pétroleTchadCameroun

JEM JusticeandEqualityMovement(Darfur)

MINURCAT UNMissionintheCentralAfricanRepublicandChad

MW megawatt

MOFCOM MinistryofCommerce(China)

OHADA OrganizationfortheHarmonizationofBusinessLawinAfrica

OPIC OverseasPetroleumInvestmentCorporation

PRC People’sRepublicofChina

SHT SociétédesHydrocarburesduTchad(HydrocarbonCompany

ofChad)

SOE state-ownedenterprise

SRN SociétédeRaffinagedeN’Djamena(N’DjamenaRefineryCompany)

C H I N A ’ S G R O W I N G I N V O L V E M E N T I N C H A D : E S C A P I N G E N C L O S U R E ?

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I N t R o d u C t I o N

“Openingupinordertomovecloser”3

(ToumaïAirChad)

TheresumptionofofficialtiesbetweenN’DjamenaandBeijinginAugust2006setthe

stageforanexpansionoftheChineseengagementinChad.Comingasitdidinthe

midstofamilitaryinsurgencyaimedatoverthrowingthelongstandingleader,IdrissDéby,

andhisgovernment’sdecisiontoabandontheWorldBank’sconditionalitiesdesignedto

allocateoilrevenuesforsocialdevelopment,itseemedaninauspiciousfoundationfor

anewrelationship.However,despitethesecontroversialbeginningrelations,Chadand

Chinahavebeguntodevelopstrongeconomicties.TheimpactofChineseinvestment

intheoilsectorinparticularlookssettobecomeanevenmoreimportantpartofChad’s

domesticpoliticsandforeignrelationsinfuture.

AlthoughChina’sattentionisnotdirectedsolelytowardstheextractivesector,the

interestoftheChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation(CNPC)inoildevelopmentis

neverthelessattheheartofthecurrentChineseinvolvementinChad.Thelatteronly

joinedtheclubofoil-producingcountriesin2003.Aconsortium,ledbytheUSmajoroil

companyExxonMobil,hasbeenoperatingoilconcessionsnearDoba,southernChad.In

manyrespects,thisconsortium–inwhichtheMalaysiancompanyPETRONASoperatesa

30%stake,togetherwithExxonMobil(40%)andChevron(30%)–hasestablishedasetof

referencesintermsofmanagementandinstitutionalframeworkandhascreatedastrong

legacy.TheCNPCmayhavebeenanewcomertoChad’soilsectorbutenteredanindustry

withahistoryandprior-establishedsetofactorsperceivedashavinga‘Western’character.

Thefirstproject,supportedbytheWorldBankandimplementedbytheExxonMobil-led

consortium,hasincludedtheconstructionofa1 070-kilometrepipelineconnectingthe

oilfieldsaroundDobawiththeKribiharbourinCameroon.In2004,followingawrangle

withtheChadiangovernmentovertheuseofoilrevenues,theWorldBankpulledout

oftheDobaproject.Comparedwiththis‘Western’experience,theexistingandrelatively

newChineseoildevelopmentproject,knownasRônier,isquitedifferent,notonlyin

termsofscope(dailyproductionbeingsignificantlylower)butaboveallwithregardsto

theobjectivespursued.TheCNPC’sengagementispursuingtheintegrationofChad’s

upstreamanddownstreampetroleumindustry,addingacompletelynewdimensiontothe

industryandtheChadianeconomymoregenerally.

Incontrasttootherinternationalprotagonists,whichsofarhaveshunnedinvesting

inChad,4China is starting tomultiplyvariousprojectson thegroundaspartofan

expandinganddeepeningengagement.Althoughtheoilsectorremainsthefocalpointof

interest,thereareadditionaldynamicsworthmentioning.IncreasingnumbersofChinese

enterprises,aswellas independentmigrants,havestarted toestablish themselves in

Chad,creatingparalleldynamicsontheground.Hence,thisdemonstratesamorediverse

ChineseengagementinChadthatcannotbereducedmerelytoChina’sforeignpolicy.

Infact,Chadhasbeenasalientexperimentineffortstopromoteaprogressiveagenda

formanagingtheoilindustryviatheambitiousChad–Cameroonpipeline.Byincludinga

refinerycomponent,China’soilroleappearstodepartinitsambitionandinitiativesfrom

theDobaexperience.ItalsoseemstoempowerPresidentDéby’srulingregime,which,

since2006,seemstohaveincorporatedBeijingintoitsdomesticagenda,firstlythrough

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theshort-termimperativesrelatedtotheChad–Sudanproxyconflictandmorerecently

through new development ambitions into which China has become more centrally

co-optedoverashortperiodoftime.

OfferingananalysisofChad’sgrowinglinkswithChina,thepaperarguesthatrelations

havedevelopedimportantlyinarelativelyshortspaceoftime,aprocessthathasseen

Chinabecomemore involvedandsignificantwithinChadiandomesticpolitics.The

coreofChina’sengagementistheRônierproject,adomesticoil-productionunit.This

appearstoenableneweconomicopportunitiesforChad,eventothepointofwidening

thecountry’sindustrialpotential,andrepresentsanotabledeparturefromChad’sprevious

experienceofforeignoilinvestment.InspiteofChad’schallengingbusinessenvironment,

relationslooksettodeepenaseffortsaremadetopursueanambitioussetofinfrastructure

andotherventures.

ThepaperfirstoutlinestheChadiancontext,atnationalandregionallevels,inorder

tolocateChina’sengagementappropriately.BecauseChina’seconomicengagementin

Chadisstructuredmostlyaroundoilinterests,thesecondsectionexaminesthedifferent

dimensionsofthe‘Rônier’project,theapparentbasisoffurtherChineseinvolvementin

Chad,andregardedastheenablingfoundationforawidersetofeconomicrelationsbased

uponlong-termengagement.Recentdevelopments,however,haverevealedthefirstsigns

ofdiscordbetweentheChineseandtheChadiangovernments.Thelastsectionreviews

thedifficultyofreconcilingPresidentDéby’ssocialambitionswiththeCNPC’seconomic

constraints, indicating Chinese companies’ increasing concern about the economic

viabilityoftheirprojects.

t h e C o N t e X t

Chadremainsatthebottomofdatasetsofworlddevelopmentandbusinessindicators.5

Overall,andfollowingarecenthistoryofconflict,Chadis far frombeingabusiness

environmentattractivetoforeigninvestment.This is linkedpartlytohighelectricity

pricesandthelackofbasicinfrastructure.Withthisinmind,thegovernmentandthe

ChadianpopulationhavefairlyhighexpectationsthattheChinese-builtoilrefinerycan

beameanstoescapethecountry’sgeographicallylandlockedenclosurebydeveloping

domesticrefiningcapacityandenhancingself-sufficiency.6

AlthoughparallelswithotherexamplesofChinese involvement inAfricacanbe

drawn,notablyconcerningtheentanglementofpoliticalandeconomicconstituentsin

countriesasdiverseastheSudansandZambia,Chadstilloffersanumberofunique

attributes.ConsideringthatChadisnotastrategicpriorityforChineseattention,does

thisinfluencethewayitsengagementunfoldsinacountryof‘intermediate’importance?

Followingtheambivalentresultsof theDobaexperience,aprojectpredictedtohelp

alleviatepoverty,7towhatextentcanthecurrentChineseventurechangetheoddsin

Chad?BeyondtheirinitialdecisiontoinvestinChad,thequestionthatemergesishow

andinwhatwaysChinesebusinessesmanagetheirinvestmentinahigh-riskenvironment.

Consequently,theobjectiveistoanalysethevariousdynamics,aswellasthedevelopment

opportunities,underlyingtherecentandemergingrelationsbetweenChinaandChad.8


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C h A d R e t u R N S t o C h I N A : t A I W A N A N d A F t e R

Untilitre-establishedrelationswiththePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC)inAugust2006,

Chad’srelationshadbeenrelativelyminorandnon-strategic,owingtoacombinationof

Chad’spost-colonialhistoryandChina’sownlimitedengagementintheregionbeforeits

morerecentexpansionofrelationswithAfricaoverthepastdecadeinparticular.Although

Chad’scolonialhistoryunderFranceformallyendedwithitsindependenceon11August

1960,theimpoverishedcountryenteredaphaseofprotractedcivilwarswithimportant

regional andgeopoliticaldimensions. Itwas in this context thatChadand thePRC

formallyestablisheddiplomaticrelationsin1972.Chinaundertookanumberofassistance

projectsindifferentpartsofthecountry,suchasricecultivationinsouth-westernChad

andtheconstructionofahospital,palaceandstadiuminN’Djamena.

In1997thegovernmentofChadrecognisedTaipei followingaperiodofmoving

betweenChinaandTaiwan.Chadthusbecamecaughtupincross-straitsChina–Taiwan

tensionsasplayedoutinAfrica.Priortoitsswitch,therewerecertainlinksbetween

N’DjamenaandBeijing, includingavisit toChinaby IdrissDéby in1994.The then

Chineseforeignminister,QianQichen,signedaneconomicco-operationagreementin

ChadinJanuary1996,andChad’spresidentvisitedBeijinginJuly1997.Nonetheless,

inAugust1997,ChadrecognisedTaipeiandreceivedaloanof$125 million.Asaresult,

ChinabrokeoffallformalpoliticalandeconomicrelationswithChad.

Chad’sswitchbacktoBeijingon6August2006wasabrupt.Itcame,however,asa

resultofvariousinternalpressuresfacingPresidentDébyinthecontextofaseriesof

interlockingconflictsinthegreaterChad–Darfurregion,includingaproxywarbetween

ChadandSudan.Thoughinitiallyclose(KhartoumhavinghelpedColonelDébycometo

powerinthefirstplaceinDecember1990),relationsbetweenKhartoumandN’Djamena

haddegeneratedandcametobecharacterisedbyapatternofmutualinterventionand

destabilisation,withbothregimessponsoringproxyrebelmovementstoopposeeach

other.The conflict that escalated inDarfur afterApril 2003had important regional

dimensions.PresidentDéby,himselfsupportingsuchgroupsastheJusticeandEquality

Movement(JEM)fightingagainstKhartoum,feltparticularlythreatenedbyrebelsbacked

bythegovernmentofSudan.UnderPresidentOmaral-Bashir,Sudanhadbeensupported

byChinainmultifacetedways,especiallyfollowingtheCNPC’sentryintoSudanin1995.

TheseincludedaprogrammeofmilitaryassistancetoKhartoum,whichinevitablybecame

involvedinthefightinginDarfurand,bynaturalextension,Chad.

InjustifyinghisreturntoChina,PresidentDébyreportedlyexplainedtotheTaiwanese

president, Chen Shui-bian, leader of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),

thatbecauseoftheseriousnessofthecivilunrestcausedbytherebels,hehadtomake

compromiseswiththeChinesegovernment‘forthesurvival’ofChad.Thecontinuation

ofhisregime,inotherwords,necessitatedatacticalshift:recognisingBeijingwouldbring

myriadshort-andlonger-termadvantages.9PresidentDébystoodtobeempoweredbythe

certaintyofaid,thelikelihoodofinvestment,andmilitaryassistancefromapermanent

memberoftheUNSecurityCouncilthatcouldserveasaninternationalally.Chinaalso

happenedtobeKhartoum’skey internationaleconomicpartnerandpoliticalpatron,

aswellasimportantmilitaryally.Inthisrespect,Déby’sgambitwasinspired:among

otherthings,itunblockedChina’soppositionattheUNandallowedChadtodiscussits

problemswithSudanwithChina.10

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LosingChadinAugust2006wasamajorsetbackforTaiwaninAfrica.Incontrast

toTaiwan’sother fewremainingAfricanallies,Chadrepresentedstrongpotential in

termsofresources.WinningbackChadwasanimportantachievementfortheChinese

government,especiallyasthiscamenotlongbeforeitsthirdForumonChina–Africa

Cooperation(FOCAC 3)inBeijinginNovember2006andwasanimportantvictory

against DPP-governed Taiwan. However, despite the diplomatic gains, Beijing was

suddenlyfacedwithachangedregionalpoliticalandsecuritycalculus.Ithadtoconfront

theawkwardnewcomplexitiesandpotentiallydamagingcontradictionsofsupporting

twoneighboursseekingtopromoteregimechangevis-à-viseachotherand,byextension,

threateningChina’sestablishedinterestsinSudanandanyeffortstobuildnewonesin

Chad.

Chad’s relations with Beijing subsequently strengthened, and saw N’Djamena

participate in FOCAC 3. The then Chinese foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, visited

N’DjamenainJanuary2007toopentheChineseembassyandannounceanassistance

package. President Déby undertook a state visit to Beijing in September 2007,

accompaniedbyafullministerialdelegation.11HemetPresidentHuJintaoandPremier

WenJiabao,dutifullyexpressinghisoppositiontosecessionistactivitiesbyTaiwanand

support for theone-Chinapolicyaspartof solemnvows tomaintaina longer-term

relationshipwiththemainland.TheChadianpresidentalsometCaoGangchuan,China’s

defenceministerandvicechairmanoftheCentralMilitaryCommission,andthetwo

countriesagreedtoincreasemilitaryco-operationbetweentheirarmedforces.12Escorted

byWangYingwu,China’sambassadortoChad,DébyalsovisitedtheCNPCheadquarters.

Relationshavealsofeaturedhigh-levelexchangesbetweenotherimportantfiguresinthe

Chineseleadership,includingthosecentraltoitsenergysecurityconcerns,notablyZhou

Yongkang,theCentralCommitteeleaderofChina’spowerfulCommunistPartyofChina

andformerCNPCgeneralmanagerwithlongstandingandinfluentialinvolvementin

Sudan.13InFebruary2011theChineseforeignminister,YangJiechi,visitedN’Djamena.

TogetherwithPresidentDéby,heattendedthefoundation-layingceremonyofChad’s

newparliament,whichisbeingbuiltwithChineseassistance(Chad’sNationalAssembly

buildinghavingbeendestroyedin2008bySudan-backedrebels).

China’s elevated importance to Déby from 2006–11 demonstrates an important,

ongoingshiftinthedomesticroleoftheChineseengagementinChad:fromashort-term

tacticalimperative,China’sroleinDéby’sagendahasalreadybecomemorecentralinand

importanttothelonger-termpoliticsofhisregime.Effectivelyresortingtoaresource-

backedstrategyofChineseassistance,DébythuscampaignedintheApril2011elections

asChad’ssocialarchitect-in-chief,inanapparentcaseofChinabeingincorporatedinto

Déby’sdomesticpolitical strategies through thedeliveryof a rangeofdevelopment

projectstoconfirmandenhancethelegitimacyofhisrule.14

G R o W I N G e C o N o m I C t I e S

Sincediplomatictiesresumed,andaccompanyingenhancedpoliticalrelations,economic

linksbetweenChinaandChadhaveincreased,atrendwhichismademanifestinthe

growingnumberofChinesecompaniesandindependentmigrantssettlinginthecountry.

ThemainareasofChineseeconomicactivityinChadcanbedividedintothreecategories:


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assistanceandaid,extractiveprojects,andsecondaryactivitiesdirectlyor indirectly

connectedtooneorseveralcoreinterests.

China’sgrowingeconomic linkswithChadhavecomeduringaperiodof recent

reformsgearedtowards improvingthecountry’sbusinessenvironment.15Asaresult,

economicrelationswithChinahavebecomemoreorganisedandstructured,notablyafter

theChina–ChadJointCommissiononCommerceandTrademetforthefirsttimeon

26April2010inN’Djamena.PresidedoverbyChina’svice-ministerofcommerce,Fu

Ziying,andChad’sforeignminister,MoussaFakiMahamat,thiswaslaudedasa‘milestone’

takingrelations‘intoanewera’.Fourpriorityareaswereidentified:implementingtheeight

newmeasuresoftheNovember2009FOCAC4andenhancingdevelopmentassistance

co-operation;strengtheningupstream–downstreamintegrationinthepetroleumindustry;

promotingcorporateexchangeandcommunicationtoincreasetrade;andensuringthe

safetyofChinesenationalsinChad.16

TheChinesemedicalandagriculturalprojectsare,forthemostpart,directlyconnected

toChina’sofficialprogrammeofbilateral assistance.Although tailored toChad, this

also falls within the general terms of China’s Africa relations, including its FOCAC

commitments.17China,forexample,carriedoutaprogrammeofdebtcancellationworth

some$34 million.In2010theFreedomHospitalrenovationprojectwasalsolaunchedin

N’Djamena,andisduetoreverttoitsformernameastheChad–ChinaFriendshipHospital.

Furthermore,sinceChinaismostlywillingtoengageinlargeinvestmentdeals,financial

backinghasbecomeincreasinglyimportant.InChad,theExport–ImportBankofChina

(ChinaEximBank)hasbeeninvolvedinmajorinvestmentprojects,togetherwithother

Chinesebanks.18ThemajorChinesetelecommunicationcorporationshavealsobecome

activeinChad,withHuaweiandZhongxinTelecom(ZTE)operatinginthecountry.19

ArelativelysmallbutgrowingnumberofChinesemigrantshavealsomadeatimid

appearance in N’Djamena and have started to become part of the capital’s evolving

landscape, althoughnot in anespeciallyprominentwayasyet. Suchentrepreneurial

businessactivitymostlyinvolvestheservicesectorandhasseentheopeningofrestaurants,

hotelsandmassageparlours.20Eventhoughthesepremisesremainlimitedinnumber,they

havenonethelessgainedincreasingvisibilityinacityofmorethanone millioninhabitants.21

DespitesuchindicationsofmorediverseChinesepresenceandengagementinChad,the

majorityofChineseinterestsremainmoreorlessdirectlylinkedtoextractiveactivities.

C h I N e S e o I L I N v e S t m e N t I N C h A d : t h e F I R S t P I e C e o F A G R o W I N G J I G S A W P u Z Z L e

AlmostimmediatelyaftertherestorationofSino–ChadiandiplomatictiesinAugust2006,

theChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationInternationalChad(CNPCIC)purchasedall

thesharesrelatedtoEncana’soilpermitinChad.22Havinginitiatedtheexpansionofits

operationsinChad,thisChineseoilinvestmentoffersarangeofsingularitiesforthehost

country.

The originality of the Rônier project primarily comes from its composition and

structure.Thismulti-facetedinvestmentisstructuredarounda311-kilometrepipeline

connectingtheoilfields,locatedintheBongorBasinineastern-centralChad,toarefinery

inDjarmaya,some50 kilometresnorthofthecapital.23Inordertoallowandpromote

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Chad’sparticipationinthisventure,ChinaEximBankgrantedaloan.Asaresult,through

itsnationaloilcompany,SociétédesHydrocarburesduTchad(SHT),theChadianstate

becamea40%shareholderoftheSociétédeRaffinagedeN’Djamena(N’DjamenaRefinery

Company),createdspecificallytomanagetherefinery,withtheremaining60%goingto

theCNPCIC.24Thecostoftheentireprojectwassetat$1 billionandhasbeenadvanced

entirelybytheChineseoilcompanyandChinaEximBank;one-halfforconstructing

therefinery,theotherfordevelopingtheoilfieldsandassociatedtransportinfrastructure.

Undertheguidanceandco-ordinationoftheChadProjectCompany,theparticipating

oilsub-contractingcompanies25andCNPCSoluxeInternationalcompletedtheoilfield

surfacefacilitiesandpipelineconstructioninjustfourandahalfyearsandlaunchedthe

projectintoproductionontime.ThevalveswereopenedinMarch2011,followednot

longafterwardsbytheinaugurationoftheconnectedrefineryinlateJune.

At the same time, thisChineseventurehasbeen influencedbyChad’sparticular

circumstances.Chadhasbeenproducingoilsince2003.FollowingtheDobaproject,

implementedbytheExxonMobil-ledconsortiumandinitiallysupervisedbytheWorld

Bank,Chadhasgainedafairamountofexperienceintheoilindustry.26Thisfirstproject,

whichrequiredamajorinvestment,27includedtheconstructionoftheChad–Cameroon

pipeline(Doba–Kribi)toanoffshoreterminal intheGulfofGuineaandiscurrently

producingabout130 000 barrelsperday.28

TheRônierproject,however,isconsideredtobetheoutstandingmarkerofChina’s

differentapproachinChadcomparedwiththeFrenchorUSengagements,whichhad

regardedthisinvestmentasunprofitable.29WhereasWesterninvolvementintheAfrican

oilsectorisusuallylimitedtoexportingrawcrude,ChineseoperatorsinChadofferthe

possibilityofdevelopingthehydrocarbonpotential,aswellasallowingforvalue-added

investment,inlinewithChad’snationalneeds.30TheChineserefineryinChadfollows

thatwhichwasbuiltnearKhartoumandcompletedin1999.Withinonlyafewyears,

ChinahasthusdevelopedintoamajorplayerinChad,undertakingadistinctivedeparture

fromChad’spreviousexperienceofinternationaloilinvestment.31TheCNPChasbecome

central to theChadiangovernment’soildevelopment strategy in away thatdeparts

significantlyfromN’Djamena’sprevioustroubledpartnershipswiththeWorldBankover

theChad–Cameroonpipeline.

TheenergyburdenhasplayedaveryimportantpartinlimitingChad’sdevelopment.

Theideaofacquiringarefinerydatesbacktothelate1970s,32nearlytwodecadesbefore

theoilvalvesinDobawerefirstopened.OwingtoChad’slandlockedposition,recurrent

supplydifficultiesfromNigeriaandproblemswithinthemanagementoftheenergysector,

thepriceofelectricityinChadisamongthehighestintheworld.Furthermore,beyond

N’Djamena,onlyahandfuloftownshavemoreorlessregularaccesstoelectricity.33This

structuralshortagehasbeenpartofthereasonwhy,sofar,thepossibilitiesofdeveloping

anyindustrialbaseinChadhavebeenseverelylimited.

ChinesepublicextractiveinvestmentinAfricahastendedtobestructuredas‘package

deals’.Infact,Chinesefirmshaveoftenusedthisapproach(andstilldo)towincontracts

andbecompetitive.IfthismethodappliesalsotoChad,thescenariohas,however,been

slightlydifferent.Atfirst,theCNPCdidnotnecessarilyseetheusein‘offering’toomuch,

aspotentialcandidatesinterestedinthispermitremainedmostlyabsent.Atthesametime,

sincethecurrentpartnershipwithBeijingisstillfairlyrecent,theChadiangovernment

hadtimetoobserve(fromadistance)howsuchprojectsunfoldinotherAfricancountries.


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ChadappealedtoChina’sgeneralwillingnesstocoverwideraspectsofextractiveprojects.

Asaresult,whentheCNPCboughtEncana’sshares,theChadianauthoritiesexhortedthe

Chinesecompanytoincludetherefinery.

Inorder to address theenergy shortage,ChinaEximBank, inco-operationwith

the Dutch firm Wärtsilä, is financing an electrification scheme to link N’Djamena

withDjarmaya, the siteof the refinery.TheChadiangovernmenthas topay30%of

XAF34 95 billion($185 million),therestwillbecomingfromChinaEximBank.TheChina

NationalMachineryandEquipmentImportandExportCorporationwillconstructthe

distributionnetworkandtransmissionlines,whichwillbelinkedtoanew60-megawatt

(MW)powerplantatFarcha.

Figure 1: Location of main Chinese and related activities in Chad and beyond

Source:DittgenR,2012.

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TheCNPCisengaginginaninnovativeinterventioninChad,butthescopeofthe

Rônierprojectremainsnonethelessquitesmall.AtthebeginningofproductioninMarch

2011,oilfieldcapacityamountedto20 000 barrelsaday,withapossibleincreaseofupto

60 000 barrels.Therefineryhasamaximumformalproductioncapacityof40 000 barrels

aday,althoughitwasonlyprocessinghalfthisamountatthisfirststage.35Onpaper,the

facilityisabletoannuallyproduceapproximately700 000 tonnesofpetrolandkerosene,

20 000 tonnesofdiesel,25 000 tonnesofpolypropylene,60 000 tonnesof liquefied

petroleumgasand40 000 tonnesofgasolinefuel.36Thecrudeissupplyingacentralpower

plant,expectedtoproduce40 MW.37Therefineryuseshalfthisamountofenergy;the

otherhalfgoestotheSociéténationaled’électricité,Chad’snationalelectricitycompany.

PresidentDébypubliclyforecastChad’s– oratleastN’Djamena’s –energyindependence,38

butthe20-MWcapacityofthispowerplantisclearlyfarfrombeingsufficienttosolve

thecountry’sstructuralproblems.Infact,thecapitalalreadyconsumes100 MWalone.

Nevertheless,thisinvestmentwillhelptoalleviateasaturatednetwork,atleastuntil

longer-termsolutionsarefound.39

Inmanyways,therefineryinDjarmayaalsoconstitutesaneuralgiccentreoffering

thepossibilityoffurtherinvestment.FollowingtheCNPC’soilengagement,Chadand

Chinahaveagreedtodevelopanindustrialpark.40Thecostforthisprojectamountsto

$150 milliontobeadvancedbySoluxeInternational,theChinesecompanyinchargeof

theimplementation.Theareawillcover25squarekilometresinalocationadjacenttothe

refinery.Intermsofbusinessandproducts,somefacilitieswillbeconnecteddirectlyto

therefiningprocess,whereasothers,merelybenefitfrompreferentialterms;notablythe

‘freezone’statusthattheparkwillenjoy,aswellastheavailabilityofenergy.Thisfuture

industrialcomplexwill,inotherwords,beinchargeoftransformingseveralby-products

fromtherefinery:includingvariousplasticgoods,polypropylenefibreandnaturalgas

bottlingfactories.Itisalsoprojectedthattherewillbecompaniesprovidingawiderange

ofactivitiessuchassolarenergy,drinkingwaterandelectricbicycles.41Althoughnot

restrictedtoChineseinvestment,todateonlyChinesecompanieshavecommittedto

developingoperationsinthepark.

OtherChineseprojectsarealsobeingdeveloped,someofwhicharemoreadvanced

thanothers.TheBaoréturnkeycementfactory,locatedinMayoKebbiWest,issecondto

theRônierprojectintermsofscaleandimportance.ChinaEximBankhasadvancedthe

fundingforthisprojectintheformofapreferentialloan.Theprojectisbeingimplemented

byChinaCAMCEngineeringCoLtd(CAMC),asubsidiaryofChinaNationalMachinery

IndustryCorporation.Owingtotheexpansionofroadandinfrastructuredevelopmentin

Chadinrecentyears,therehasbeenincreasingdemandforcementandinterestinoptions

tomanufacturethisdomestically.TheBaoréprojectisChad’sfirstcementfactoryandis

expectedtocutcostsforinfrastructureprojectsinthecountrybyreducingrelianceon

importsfromCameroon.42CAMCbrokegroundontheplantatBaoréinNovember2007

andproduction,whichhadaimedtodeliver200 000tonnesperyear,shouldhavestarted

inJuly2011butwasdelayed.43Accordingtosomesources,thereasonforthedelaywas

political.44However,othersclaimittohavebeenofatechnicalnature,45withanumberof

unresolvedproblemsremainingfortheplant.Oneseemstobelinkedtotheseparationof

theproject’smaincomponents;withcementproductionlocatedinthesouth-westofChad

butthestoragecomponentinAbéché(north-easternChad).Successoftheprojectisthus

dependentondevelopingthenecessarytransportinfrastructure.


13


HavingaccesstocheaperfuelthankstotheRônierproject,inApril2011theChadian

government andCAMCsigned an agreementworth$919 million todevelop anew

internationalairportinDjarmaya.Thissite,whichissupposedtoinitiallyaccommodate

aboutone millionpassengersayear,willbeconnectedtoN’Djamenabya40-kilometre

highway,whichisalsoincludedintheproject.AccordingtoDjikoloum,thedeputy-

managingdirectorattheMinistryofPublicWorksandTransport,thereisstrongpotential

forthisinitiativetoestablisharegionaltransithubnexttothoseinAddisAbaba(Ethiopia)

andDouala(Cameroon).46Theairportshouldbeoperativeinfouryears’time,although

theexactlocationhasyettobeidentified.47

AnothertransportprojectaimstoconnectCameroon,ChadandSudanviaarailway

network.On14March2011,Chad’stransportminister,AdoumYounousmi,signeda

$7.3-billiondealwiththeChinaCivilEngineeringConstructionCorporationtobuild

a1 344-kilometrerailwaynetwork.ProjectedtobeChad’ssingle-largestinfrastructure

project, thefirststage is intendedto linkAbéchétoAdréontheborderwithSudan,

andMoundoutoNgaounderéon theborderwithCameroon;with thesecondphase

connectingMoundouwithN’DjamenaaswellasconnectingtheChadiancapitalwiththe

borderregions,notablywithAbéché(thirdphase).Aftercompletion,thefourthphase

aimstolinkAbéchéwithNyalainSudan.ItwillbefinancedbyChina’spolicybanksand

repaidbytheChadiangovernment,withoilofferingthepossibilitytodoso.48

TheseprojectsreflecttherapidandincreasingChineseinvolvementinChad.However,

theyalsobringaboutnumerouschallenges.Comparedwiththerecentnatureofthisform

ofengagement,therearestillanumberofquestionsthatremainunanswered.

S u C C e e d I N G A G A I N S t A L L o d d S ? o N G o I N G C h A L L e N G e S

FollowingthenearremovalbyrebelsofPresidentDébyfrompowerinFebruary2008,the

armedopponentsofhisregimeseemtohavelosttheirimpetusandrelationswithSudan

havebeenrestored.49Inrecenttimes,andincontrasttothemoreusualperceptionofthe

countryasafailedstate,boththelocalandtosomeextenttheinternationalpresshave

startedtoportrayChadasacountryonitswaytomorepeacefulpoliticalstability.Chad

maynotbecharacterisedasademocracy,butthenotionthattheregimeisstrongenough

toremainincontrolandprovidetherequiredconditionsforaviablebusinessenvironment

ismorewidespread.ThisisunderlinedpartlybyDéby’snewfoundambitiontodisplay

himselfasthearchitectofChad’sdevelopment,whiletryingtodistancehimselffromhis

‘warlord’image.ThischangecanbeseeninthewayDébyportrayshimselfonbillboards

andposters,manyofwhicharescatteredthroughoutN’Djamena.Inthepastheworea

uniformandwasoftensurroundedbyarmedsoldiers.Morerecentlyhehasswitchedto

civilianclothingandispicturedalone,withhiswifeoryoungChadians.Thecombined

messagealsoreflectsDéby’sself-proclaimedsocialturnandmessageofunity:‘Ensemble

pourleTchaddedemain’or‘togetherfortheChadoftomorrow’.

Thankstooilrevenues,theChadianregimeseemstohaverediscovereditstastefor

large-scaleprojects.Initiallythegovernmentdirectedthebulkoftheroyaltiestowards

maintainingstatesecurity(through,forexample,purchasingweapons,somethingthat

eventually contributed towards theWorldBank’s exit).Today,however, part of this

14



income(theexactamountremainsunknown)isinvestedininfrastructureconstruction,

includingroads.

Fromashort-termstandpoint,thesituationinChadappearstobeimprovinggradually.

Thesocio-politicalcontext,however, ismuchmorecomplicatedandrendersaclear

distinctionbetweenastateofpeaceandwardifficult.Owingtocyclesofapparentchronic

instability,thecircumstancesresemblemoreofan‘interwar’periodand,foralongtime,

armedviolencehasinfactbeenpartoftherealityofthecountry.50

Theviolenceislinkedtobothinternalandexternaltensions.51AccordingtoMarielle

Debos,armedviolenceisoftenawayofexpressingcontestation,makingaliving,achieving

socialmobilityoradefiningmodeofpoliticalsociability.52Onaregionalcross-border

scale,theformationandthepresenceofconsecutivewavesofrebellionshavelargelybeen

possibleowingtoexternalfinancialsupport.Inthepast,theLibyangovernmentunder

ColonelMuammaral-Gaddafi,andtheSudanesegovernmentunderPresidentBashir,

regularlybackedChadianrebelgroupswhoaimedtoremovePresidentDéby(Bashir

havingalsohelpedDébycometopowerinthefirstplace).53Currently,however,both

sourcesoffundinghaveceased:Gaddafi’sregimehasbeenoverthrown,andtheSudan

governmentunderwentaprocessofrapprochementwithChadthateventuallysawa

workingpeacearrangementbetweenthetwo,featuringjointmilitaryborderpatrols.54

JEM,aleadingDarfurrebelgroupformerlyveryclosetoDéby,wasweakenedinDecember

2011bythedeathof its leader,Khalil Ibrahim,aZaghawacousinofPresidentDéby.

CurrentcircumstancesseemtoplayinDéby’sfavour,butdomesticandregionalrealities

canevolveveryquickly.ClaimingthatthepeakofinstabilityinChadbelongstothepast

isthereforeahastyandriskystatement.

C h I N A ’ S R e G I o N A L S e C u R I t y e N t A N G L e m e N t

ThevulnerabilityofChineseinterestsinChadwasfirsthighlightedbytheevacuationof

over200ChinesenationalsfromN’DjamenainearlyFebruary2008,whenarebelattack

cameextremelyclosetotopplingPresidentDéby.55InSeptember2010,andfollowing

otherattacksinSudan,securityriskswerepersonalisedbytheabductionofaChinese

engineerworkingonawaterprojectfortheCGCOCGroupChadneartheborderwith

Sudan,whowassubsequentlyrescuedbyjointSudanese–Chadianforces.Suchincidents

weresurfacemanifestationsofdeeper,morecomplexregionalsecuritydynamicsand

conflictsinvolvingmassiveforcedpopulationmovementsofSudanesefromDarfurinto

easternChad,aswellasChadiansineasternChad,andrefugeesfromtheCentralAfrican

Republic(CAR).

AlthoughBeijinghadwelcomedChad’srejectionofTaiwan,dealingwithN’Djamena

and Khartoum in the context of conflict linking Chad with Darfur (and CAR) was

clearlyadiplomaticchallenge.China’sspecialenvoy,LiuGuijin,hadbeenappointed

withresponsibilityforDarfur,andsoonfoundhimselftravellingbetweenKhartoumand

N’Djamena.China’smilitary-securitycalculusintheregionwaschangedinAugust2006.

OneoftheunintendedconsequencesofChina’smilitarysupportforKhartoum,andthe

linksbetweenChinesearmscompaniesandtheSudangovernment,wasaprevalenceof

Chinese-manufacturedsmallarmsandammunitionintheregion.56Indeed,inApril2006,

ChaddisplayedChinesemunitionscapturedfromrebelssupportedbyKhartoum.Sudan


15


backedtheFebruary2008attackthatnearlyoustedDéby.Chad,inturn,supportedDarfur

rebelgroups,includingJEM,whichmountedaspectacularattackonOmdurmaninMay

2008thatcameuncomfortablyclosetoKhartoumitself.

Beijingengagedindiplomatic–politicalinterventionspropelledbyitsownbilateral

interests,byseekingtoeaseChad–Sudantiesandconductingshuttlediplomacybetween

KhartoumandN’Djamena.Thiswascouchedinwidertermsaspromotingpeaceinthe

region,buttheneedforsuchdiplomacywasundoubtedlycatalysedbythreatstoChinese

interests.IntheaftermathoftheFebruary2008attackonN’Djamena,LiuGuijinwas

careful to insist thatChinawouldnotbecome involved inmediatingproxyconflict

betweenKhartoumandN’Djamena,althoughhedidurgebothpartiestopractise‘good

neighbourliness’.HevisitedN’DjamenatomeetDéby,followedbymeetingswithBashir

andNafieAliNafieinKhartoum,‘withthepurposeofpersuadingbothcountries[Chad

andSudan]tofurtherimproverelations.’57LiuGuijincontinuedtoengagewithboth

N’DjamenaandKhartoumaspartofhisDarfurdiplomacy,byextensionfulfillingChina’s

diplomatic–politicalandeconomicinterestsinregionalstability.Forexample,hevisited

N’DjamenainlateMay2009inatripstyledasseekingtoendtheconflictbetweenChad

andSudan.58

SuchdynamicsofChina’sbilateralsecurityinterestsintheregionoccurredwithin

widerinternationaleffortstorespondtoconflictinChadandtheregion.Chadwasthe

siteofamajor internationalpeacekeepingeffortuntil thegovernment inN’Djamena

requestedtheUNSecurityCounciltodisbandtheoperation.Chinadidnotcontributeto

themission.

China’smountingrole inChad,connectedas it is toDarfurandSudan,hasbeen

predominantlybusinessorientedfollowingBeijing’scross-straitscoupagainstTaiwan

in August 2006. Beijing has enhanced bilateral military relations with N’Djamena,

and security concerns aboutChadhavecontinued tobepresent, albeit in changing

circumstances,asLibyademonstratedmostrecently.LikeChad,Chinahasbenefited

indirectlyfromthesecurityroleledbytheFrenchmilitarywhileseeminglynothaving

madeanysubstantialcontributionofitsowntotheinternationalsecurityresponse.59China

didnot,forexample,contributetotheUNMissioninCARandChad(MINURCAT).60

Simplyput,suchadivisionofsecurityresponsibilitiesallowsChinatoconcentrateon

thebusinessofinvestment,withFranceleadingeffortstorespondtothesecurityofsuch

business(andthemainlypoliticalinterestsofParis).Recently,however,therehavebeen

recurringrumoursaboutapossibleFrenchwithdrawalinthenearfuture.61Inevitably

thisraisesthequestionofhowthesituationcouldalterifthe‘Épervier’operation62comes

toanend;andhowChinamayneedtoreviseitsdevelopment-securitycalculusinthe

regionifitistosustainitsinvestments.ThepossibilityofaswiftchangeofeventsinChad

thatcaninfluenceandhaveanimpactonthelong-termviabilityofChineseinvestments

remains.

o I L P R I C e d I S P u t e : S o C I A L A m b I t I o N S v e R S u S e C o N o m I C v I A b I L I t y

AtpresentChineseandChadianprotagonists,embodiedbytheCNPCICononeside

andChad’sMinistryofOilandEnergyontheother,seemmoreconcernedaboutthe

16



waytheRônierprojectshouldbemanagedandoperated.Themainimpedimentliesin

thedifficultyoffindingacompromisebetweensettingupamarketpriceallowingthe

CNPCtopayoffitsinvestment,anda‘social’priceenablingtheChadianauthoritiesto

carryouttheirobjectives.Unexpectedissuesappearedontheverydaythattherefinery

wasinauguratedinJune2011.Débyhastriedtoaccomplishasetofsocialpromises

madeduringhislastpresidentialcampaigninApril2011–oneofwhichwastoprovide

moreaffordablepetroleumpricesforthepopulation.Consequently,theChinesehavebeen

worriedaboutthenegativeeconomicrepercussions.Duringtheopeningceremony,and

withoutanypriorconsultations,63DébyannouncedauniquepriceofXAF200perlitreof

refinedproductsduringatransitionalperiodofthreemonths.Asaresult,thepumpprice

wasfixedatXAF365perlitreforpetrolandXAF330forpremiumliquefiedpetroleum

gas,whereasotherrefinedpetroleumproductsweresoldataboutXAF500perlitreon

averageatpumpsintheregion.64

OrdinaryChadians respondedpositively to thedecline inoilprices;nonetheless

thismeasurewasalsoaccompaniedbyaseriesofdifficulties.Taxidrivers,forexample,

welcomed this measure, although some hoped for further price reductions. Being

compelledtolowerthepriceoftheirservicesandroutes,somearguedthattheirmargin

ofprofithaddeclinedcomparedwiththepre-refinerycontext.65Asaresult,themajority

continuedtofilltheirtanksinKousseri,justacrosstheChadianborderinCameroon,

wheretheycouldgetalitreofgasoilforXAF250.66Furthermore,applyingauniqueprice

forthewholecountrywasnotsustainable.Ensuringnationwidesupplyrequireshaving

recoursetoawideinfrastructurenetwork,whichisnotyetinplaceinChad.Besides

this,transportationcostsneedtobetakenintoconsideration,especiallyforthosewho

purchasefuelinDjarmayaandsellthiselsewhereotherthaninoraroundthecapital.

Clearlythesecalculationswerenottakenintoaccountandshowalackofpreliminary

workpriortothedecision-making.

Oncethetransitionalpricehadbeenset,theChadianauthoritiesneededtonegotiate

withbothurbanandlong-distancetransportassociations.WithinnumerouspartsofChad,

however,ittookawhileforpricestodrop.Furthermore,sincethereleaseofthenewprice

wasalreadyexpectedbytheendofSeptember2011,thepossibilityoftensionscould

notbeexcluded.Overall,theChadianauthoritiesseemnottohavethoughtthroughthe

immediateconsequencesandimplicationsofsuchaproject.Establishingapricerange,

takingintoaccountcostsandobjectives,wouldhavebeenawaytoavoidoratleastreduce

theseproblems.

The transitional price was considered unreasonable, as the refinery had already

undergone heavy losses and had been unable to continue normal operations. The

processingcost–takingintoaccountemployeesalaries,maintenanceandtheredemption

factoroftheequipment,generalexpensesandfinancialcosts–amountstoXAF205per

litreofcrude(foracapacityof500 000 tonnesofcrude).67Consideringthesellingprice

atthetime,therefinerywasnotonlyunabletocoveritsprocessingcostsbutalsoits

employeesalaries.BytheendofAugust2011,theNationalRefiningCompanyhadalready

accumulatedalossofsome$4.7 million.68EventhoughtheChadianstateis(officially)

a40%shareholder,therefineryhasnotyetreceivedanyformofsubsidy.Duetothis

breechoftrust,therehavebeenrumoursthattheinitial60/40partitionofthedownstream

sectionbetweentheChineseandtheChadiansideisnolongervalidandhasalreadybeen

redividedintoa70/30ifnot80/20split.69


17


Chadhasalsoexperiencedsignificantchangesintermsofoilsupplyanddistribution

methods. Before June 2011, distributors were more or less restricted to Total and

Oilibya.However,thelaunchingoftherefineryhasattractedincreasinginterest.Asthe

requirementstomountdistributionoperationsonly involveobtainingadministrative

authorisationfromtheMinistryofCommercetoestablishapetrolstation,andproviding

proofofbeingabletoimport10 millionlitresperyear,thenumberofoperatorshasbeen

expandingcontinually.Most–like3SH,Tourra,TchadHydrocarb,SosadepandDounama

–haveonlybeensetuprecentlyandlackexperienceinthisfield,withtheresultthat

theircapacitytoimporttherequiredyearlyminimumcannotbeproven.Nonetheless,an

increasingnumberoftanktruckshavebegunpurchasingfueldirectlyfromtherefinery.

AgrowingshareoftheserefinedproductsaresoldinCameroon,totheextentthatit

iscausinganapparentshortageinChad.Thecombinationofimposedsellingprices,

disorderedproliferationofnewdistributorsaswellasasomewhatunregulatedpurchase

environmenthavepromptedlong-timeoperatorssuchasTotaltoreviewtheirregional

strategy.Asthecurrentpatternappearsdisorganised,withquestionableeconomicreturns,

leavingChadcouldbeapossibilityforTotal.70

Atfirst,theCNPCkeptalowprofileoverDéby’sostentatiousdeclarationofholding

oneofthecheapestpetrolpricesintheregion.Astheduedateapproachedwithoutany

significantprogresstowardstheestablishmentofanewprice,theChinesesidedecided

totakeactionandputtherefiningprocessonhold.BytheendofSeptember2011,both

sides(theCNPCandtheMinistryofOilandEnergy)claimed,however,thatnegotiations

wereprogressing.Thecontentofthesediscussionsremainsconfidential,butsomeof

thebasicissuesareknown.Apartfromcertaindiscrepancieslinkedtotheproject,the

lackanddifficultyofcommunicationareoftenportrayedasthemainstumblingblocks.

Havingadvancedtheentireinvestmentasaloan,mostlythroughChina’sEximBank,the

CNPCobviouslyaimstorecoveritsinvestmentthroughthesaleofpetroleumproducts.

Accordingtovarioussources,theChinesecalculationshaveeithernotbeenveryprecise

orreasonable,especiallysincethelatterplannedtoamortise$1 billionwithinfiveyears.71

Following theseestimates,Chad’sMinistryofOilandEnergyclaimed that theprice

suggestionsmadebytheChinesewouldexceedthecostofimportedrefinedproducts.72

TheChinesestakeholdersdeploredboththelackofpreparatoryworkandtheoutlookof

theirChadianpartners.Intheend,bothpartiesseemedtoblameeachotherforthelack

ofnegotiatingprogress.

Theuncertaintyanddoubtsovertheimplementationofthenewfuelpriceseemedto

havebeenresolvedbymid-October2011.73TheMinistryofCommerceandIndustryissued

adecreefixingthenewratesforpremiumgasolineatXAF490andatXAF495forgasoil.74

PumppricesthroughoutChadwereboundtotheonesinN’Djamena,andthistimethe

transportationcostsinabsolutetermsweretakenintoaccount.75Thepetroleumproducts

experiencedasubstantialpriceincrease;forsomeitalmostdoubled,muchtothesurprise

oftheChadianpopulation.Thereactionbythelatterisallthemorecomprehensible,asthe

Chineseprojecthadbeenpresentedindevelopmenttermsandwassupposedtoalleviate

energyshortages.Inasubsequentpressrelease,GroupedeRecherchesalternativesetde

MonitoringduprojetpétroleTchadCameroun(GRAMP-TC),aChadianNGOandthink

tank,whichgainednotorietythroughtheDobaproject,expresseditsregretthattheCNPC

intendedtoobtainanimmediatereturnonitsinvestmentandrapidlymaximiseitsprofits,

onthegroundsthatChadremainedapoliticallyunstablecountryandrecoveringfunds

18



couldbeadifficulttask.76Sinceopacityandalackofinformationcontinuetocharacterise

variousprojectsinChad(notablythemanagementofoilrevenues),itremainsdifficultto

produceadetailedportraitofthetermsofthecontract.AccordingtoseveralChadiancivil

societyorganisations,thisresolutiondiscreditsthevalidityofthebilateralco-operation.

ThedecisionseemstoconfirmtheirallegationsthatChinaismerelyinterestedinitsown

benefits.ItalsoraisesquestionsabouttheChadiangovernmenthavingturneditsbackon

itspledgetoprovideanaffordablesourceofenergy.AsChinaisoneofthefewexternal

partnerswillingtoinvestwidelyinChad,theriskofundulyantagonisingamajorbusiness

associateoverapricedisagreementappearstohavebeentoohigh.

ThebalanceofpowerisplayedoutmainlybetweenChinesepartnersontheoneside

andtheChadiangovernmentontheother,frequentlyreducingthepopulationtotherole

ofmerespectators.Duringtheceremoniallayingofthefirststonefortheconstructionof

theDjarmayaInternationalairportinNovember2011,however,Débyrevealedthatthe

rateswouldberevised.77Thischangeofmindcanberelateddirectlytopriorcivilsociety

reactions.Forinstance,GRAMP-TCheldapresentationquestioningthebenefitsofthe

DjarmayarefineryforChadianconsumers;themeetingwasattendedbymorethan500

participantsandcoveredbythemedia.Asaresult,afewdayslater,theSHTorganised

talkswithChadiancivilsocietygroups,anddiscussionsonanewpricingpolicyare

currentlyunderwaybetweentheCNPCandthegovernment.78

Nonetheless,theDjarmayarefinerywasshutdownonthe19January2012.Laterthat

month,DébyfiredMahamatAliHassa,theministerofplanning,andTabeEugene,the

oilminister.On6February2012,Chadannouncedthattherefinerywouldbereopened.

OtherdevelopmentssuggestedthatdespitesuchturbulencetheCNPCwasintentona

longer-termengagement.InFebruary2012,andfollowingnegotiationsongoingsince

mid-2010, theCNPCsignedadealwith thegovernmentofCameroontoallowit to

starttransportingcrudeoilfromChadthroughtheChad–Cameroonpipelinebytheend

of2012,thusaddingChinese-producedcrudetothatfromExxonMobil,Chevronand

PETRONASalreadybeingcarriedbythepipeline.

Thisextendedperiodofbargainingbetweenthetwosidesraisesinterestingquestions

abouthowlinkscouldevolveovertime.It isdifficulttoassessexactlywhatrolethe

Chineseauthoritieshavebeenplayinginthisinteraction.79However,theCNCP–Chad

corporate–politicalinterfaceappearstohavepredominantlyentailedtheCNPC’srole,

indicativeoftherelativeautonomyitseemstohavewithinChina’sbroaderengagement

andofhowitpursuesitsowncorporateinterests.Inaddition,theChadiansideseemsto

havedrawnanumberoflessonsfromtheireconomicengagementwiththeRônierproject.

Concedingthatcertainissuescouldhavebeenavoidedhadtheybeenmanagedinadvance,

thegovernmentdecidedtocreateaspecificboard80tosupervisefuturesensitiveprojects.

Theobjectivebehindthisisnotonlytobroadenanddecentralisethemanagementof

Chineseinvestments,butalsotobeabletoforeseeproblems.

Altogether,theRônierprojecthighlightsthedifficultiesoffindingaviablearrangement

for all parties involved, and signals the variation and inconsistency of the Chadian

businessenvironment.Thenagain,italsoreflectsthepossibilityofagrowingdialogue

betweenoilcompany,stateandcivilsociety,andshowsacertainresponsivenessofthe

SHTandtheCNPCtowardsevolvingcircumstances.


19


C o N C L u S I o N

ComparedwithotherAfricancountries,China’sinvolvementinChadisfairlyrecentinthe

newcontextofthegrowingChineseengagementacrossthecontinent.Thisis,toagreat

extent,relatedtoanearlyten-yeardiplomaticbreakwiththePRC,whichonlyendedin

late2006,andresultedinverylimitedengagementfromthemainlandduringthatperiod.

Atthesametime,China’spresenceinChadisoftendisplayedasamarginofChina–Africa

dynamicsandhas,sofar,beenovershadowedbyother,moresalientexamples–notably

thoseinneighbouringSudan.Sincediplomaticrelationswereresumed,andledbythe

CNPC’soilinvestment,anewphaseofrelationshasbeenunderway.

Chad’sswitchbacktoBeijingcanbeexplainedbypressingpoliticalconstraintsand

aseriesofinterlockingconflictswithinthegreaterChad–Darfurregion.AsSudanhas

benefitedfromcrucialChinesesupport(andstilldoes),includingmilitaryassistance,

DébyjustifiedtheofficialrecognitionofthePeople’sRepublicaspartofthenecessary

conditionstobringthemoreorlessdirectconflictwithKhartoumtoanend.Chad’s

connectionwith thePRCat first thus restedupon apressing regional andpolitical

dimension,dominatedbythearmedconflictsthreateningDéby’sregimeandfeaturing

China-supportedKhartoum’ssupportforrebelgroupsseekingtomilitarilyoustDéby.In

2006PresidentDébywasinaverytightmilitaryandpoliticalspot.Arenownedmaster

ofsurvival,histurntoChinapaidoffinhisterms.Beyondthis,Chadmightbesaidto

illustratetheroleofN’Djamena’sabilitytomaximiseitsotherwiselimitedleverage,firstly

byplayingthe‘OneChina’gambittoDéby’sadvantageandthenbyfollowingthrough

onandrefiningthisbyseekingandsecuringamoresubstantialCNPCengagementin

Chad.However,economicinterestshaverapidlymatchedorevensurpassedthisaspect

ofrelationsaspartofathickeningpartnershipbetweenN’DjamenaandBeijing.Thecore

ofSino–Chadianco-operationtodayistheRônieroilinvestment.Eventhoughthescale

oftheprojectremainssmall,itincludesarefineryandthereforeoffersthepossibility

ofdomesticproduction.Inthisregard,theChineseoperationdiffersfromChad’sfirst

experienceinDoba,whichislimitedtoexportingthecrude.

Astherecentoilpricedisputeshows,however,whetherthereisnecessarilyabetter

unionofinterestsbetweenChinaandChadthanChad’spreviousfractiousrelationship

withtheWorldBankandtheinternationalcommunityoverthepipelineremainstobe

seen.Divergencesinthispartnershipareboundtobeexpectedfollowingaperiodthathas

hithertohadmuchtodowithestablishingrelations.Nowthatmoreattentionappearstobe

paidtohowtodeepenties,closelylinkedtothesustainabilityofinvestmentsbeyondthe

shortterm,howthesearereconciledislikelytoexertmuchcontinuinginfluenceonties.

ChinahasprogressivelybeenincorporatedintoChad’sdomesticpoliticalstrategies

througharangeofdevelopmentprojects.ThisispartlyareflectionofDéby’spresidential

campaigninApril2011,structuredaroundasetofsocialpromises,andportrayinghimself

asChad’ssocialarchitect-in-chief.Thereappeartobelatentandalreadyexistingtensions

betweenwhatDébywantsforhisowndomesticpurposesandwhattheCNPC,andthe

Chineserolemoregenerally,candeliver.PresidentDébymadearangeof‘social’promises,

likelowerpetroleumprices,duringhislastpresidentialcampaign.However,because

theCNPC’sbasicobjectiveispredicateduponthecommerciallogicofareturnonits

investment,thequestionoftheeconomicprofitabilityandviabilityoftheiroperations

remains,andcontinuestobesubjecttothevagariesofChadianpolitics.

20



FurtherchallengesontheradarconcernageneralfeatureevidentofChina’srelations

inAfricatodatewithregardstosecurity,thatis,howChina’sforeigneconomicpolicy,

encompassingstateobjectivesaswellaskeyactorsliketheCNPC,hasbeendependingon

prevailingWesternandtoanextentAfricansecuritystructures.Chinahasbenefitedfrom

theleading(andself-interested)roleofFranceinChad’ssecurity,readasthecontinuation

ofDéby’sgovernment,whileconcentratingonenhancingitseconomicactivities.The

questionofwhetherthisisfinanciallyandpoliticallytenablefortheWestloomsasa

subjectunlikelytogoaway,amidstquietinterestincertainChinesequartersaboutthe

securityimplicationsofengaginginplaceslikeChad.Theimplicationsofthishistorically

inheriteddefactodivisionoflabourandassociateddistributionofbenefitshaveyettobe

seen,whilethequestionofsecurityburdensharinginChad,andmoregenerally,islikely

tobecomemorecentral.

e N d N o t e S

1 Theauthor’[email protected].

2 Theauthor’[email protected].

3 Thisslogan– ‘Désenclaverpourmieuxrapprocher’(intheFrenchoriginal)–andChad’s

nationalairlinepublicityindirectlyreflectstheacuityofthisnotionandthechallengesforthe

country.

4 ExxonMobilChad’sgeneralmanagerunderlinedthispoint.WhereasExxonMobil,currently

thesecondmostvaluablecompanyintheworldaccordingtotheForbes list(DeCarloS,

‘Theworld’s25mostvaluablecompanies:Appleisnowontop’,Forbes,8November2011,

http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottdecarlo/2011/08/11/the-worlds-25-most-valuable-companies-

apple-is-now-on-top),wouldhavebeeneasilycapableofprovidingthenecessaryinvestment

for theDobaprojecton itsown, thecompanyrespondedfavourably to theWorldBank’s

involvementinordertolimittherisksofinvestinginChad(personalinterview,ScottMiller,

generalmanagerofExxon-Chad,N’Djamena,June2010).

5 AccordingtotheUNDP(UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme),Chadranks183outof

191countries(UNDPInternationalHumanDevelopmentIndicators,‘Tchad:Profildepays:

Indicateursdedéveloppementhumain’,http://hdrstats.undp.org/fr/pays/profils/TCD.html,

accessed6November2011).In2011Chadrankedsecondlast(outof183economies)inthe

WorldBank’s‘DoingBusinessReport’(WorldBank–InternationalFinanceCorporation,‘Easeof

doingbusinessinChad’,http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/chad,accessed

6November2011)andfifthfromlastinmattersoftransparency(TransparencyInternational,

‘Perception of corruption index 2011’, http://www.transparence-france.org/e_upload/pdf/

classement_ipc_2011.pdf,accessed7May2012).

6 AsearlyasDecember2008,Chad’snationaloilcompany,theSociétédesHydrocarburesdu

Tchad,entitledtheeditorialofitsmagazine:‘Arefineryofmajorambitions’.

7 TheWorldBank’sengagementintheDobaproject,alongsidetheoilconsortium,wasdriven

bytheobjectiveofpromotingthisinvestmentasadevelopmentmodelwithinChad.

8 Thisstudyisbasedontwofield-researchtrips,conductedfromJune–September2010andin

September2011.ResearchandliteratureaboutChina’srecentinvolvementinChadremains

verylimited(see,forexample,TaboSN,BeassoumCN&TMAsngar,‘Relationséconomiques

entrelaChineetl’Afrique:CasDuTchad’,AERC(AfricaEconomicResearchConsortium


21


Paper), 22. Nairobi: AERC, January 2008). The only detailed analysis of the CNPC’s

involvement(eventhoughmostlycentredonenvironmentalregulationandcorporatesocial

responsibility)isVanVlietG&GMagrin(eds),‘Unecompagniepétrolièrechinoisefaceaudéfi

environnementalauTchad’,AFD(FrenchDevelopmentAgency),CollectionFocales,9,Quae,

February 2012, http://www.afd.fr/webdav/site/afd/shared/PUBLICATIONS/RECHERCHE/

Scientifiques/Focales/09-Focales.pdf;VanVlietGetal.,‘ChineseandAmericanoilcompanies

andtheirenvironmentalpracticesinChad:Aquietconfluenceofstreamsorsilencebefore

the battle?’, Rising Powers and Global Standards Working Paper, 2, December 2011,

http://www.risingpowers.net/sites/default/files/RisingPowers_WP2_Van%20Vliet%20et%20al.

pdf.AChadianNGO/researchinstitute(GRAMP-TC,GroupedeRecherchesalternativeset

deMonitoringduprojetpétroleTchadCameroun)producedamonitoringreportaboutthe

CNPC’sactivities.Chad’snationalpressinChadhasmerelyhighlightedthevariousopening

momentsoftheworksites,whiletheinternationalmediahasalmostcompletelyoverlooked

theRônierproject,andotheraspectsoftheChinesepresenceinChad.However,sincethe

productionphasewaslaunched,andthechallengesbecameincreasinglyvisible,theChadian

presshasstartedtofocustoagreaterextentonrelateddevelopmentpossibilitiesandenergy

questions.

9 TaipeiTimes,‘TaiwanforeignministerregretsdiplomaticbreakwithChad’,7August2006.

10 PresidentDébyhasstatedthat:‘Itusedtobethatwhenwehadproblemswithourneighbour

sendingmercenariesto invadeusthatnoneofourcomplaintsbeforetheUnitedNations

wouldpass,becauseChinablockedthem’but,sinceopeningthedoortoChineseinvestment,

‘wehavebeenabletoraiseourconcernswithouttaboo’.FrenchHW&LPolgreen,‘China,

fillingavoid,drillsforrichesinChad’,NewYorkTimes,13August2007;andReuters,‘China

oilcobreaksgroundonChad,Nigerrefineries’,29October2008.

11 Respectively,theministersofForeignAffairs,MinesandEnergy,Petroleum,Economy,Finance,

andInfrastructure.

12 ChineseGovernment,‘China,Chadvowtoboostmilitarycooperation’,Officialwebportal,

21September2007,http://www.gov.cn/misc/2007-09/21/content_758313.htm.

13 Forinstance,ZhouYongkangmetwithadelegationfromChad’srulingparty,thePatriotic

MovementofSalvation,callingformoreco-operationbetweenthetwocountries,headedby

NagoumYamassoum,inBeijing,inJune2010.

14 AfricaAsiaConfidential,‘CampaignsmadeinChina’,4,5,March2011,p.3.

15 In2008,forexample,ChadadoptedanewInvestmentCharterofferingincentivesforforeign

companies(includinga threeyear tax-exemptionstatus).ANational InvestmentAgency

wasestablishedin2010toactasaone-stopgovernmentshopforbusiness.Anumberof

regionalbusiness-orientedinitiativeswerealsopromoted.PresidentDébyhostedthefirst

OHADA(OrganizationfortheHarmonizationofBusinessLawinAfrica)SummitinDecember

2009.ThisaimedtoencouragememberstatestoadoptanenhancedOHADAInvestment

Arrangement that offers benefits beyond those in Chad’s national Investment Charter.

ThesubsequentOHADAarrangementcameintoeffectinChadinJanuary2010.

16 ‘FirstsessionofChina–ChadJointCommissiononCommerceandTradeheldinN’Djamena’,

5May2010,MinistryofCommerceofthePRC(fromhttp://fuziying2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/

photonews/201005/20100506898623.html,MOFCOMwebsite,Beijing).

17 In addition to the main Chinese medical presence, a team from the Jiangxi Provincial

Department of Health has been operating in N’Djamena. For agriculture and technical

co-operation,theprojectsareeitherrunbytheChineseAgriculturalTechnologyCooperation

22



Group,theYichangInternationalEconomicorbytheShandongInternationalEconomicand

TechnicalCooperation(personal interview,ZhengWei,Chineseeconomicadviserof the

PRCinChad,27September2011;datacollectedfromtheofficialwebsiteoftheChinese

EmbassyinChad,http://tchad.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/catalog/zgqy/201105/20110507567258.

html,accessed22October2011).DuringtwoconsecutiveresearchtripstoChad,onlyavery

limitednumberofindependentmedicalfacilitiesprovidingtraditionalChinesemedicinewere

encountered.

18 Namely,theNationalDevelopmentBankWorkingGrouponChad,andShaanxiBranchof

ChinaDevelopmentBank(datacollectedfromtheofficialwebsiteoftheChineseEmbassyin

Chad,op.cit.).

19 Forarelatedbutdifferentcontext,seeMthembu-SalterG,TheEvolvingNatureofChinese

TelecommunicationsInvestmentintheDRC,SAIIA(SouthAfricanInstituteofInternational

Affairs)PolicyBriefing,39.Johannesburg:SAIIA,2011.

20 ComparedwithotherWestAfricancapitals(suchasDakarorBamako),Chineseretailand

wholesaleactivitiesinChadarefairlyrare.Thefewexistingshopsareestablishedineconomic

nicheareas,generallyprovidingbasicelectronicandhouseholdequipmentaswellasvarious

typesofChineseprovisions.

21 ThiscouldberelatedtothefactthatthevarietyofforeignrestaurantsinN’Djamenaisquite

small.MostoftheChineserestaurantsandhotelsinN’Djamenahavebeenestablishedfora

while.Asaresult,theycannotberelateddirectlytothecurrentexpansionofeconomiclinks

betweenChinaandChad,althoughthegrowingnumbersofChinesetechniciansandengineers

inChadhaveclearlybeenimportantinraisingtheirrevenues.Chinesemassageparloursarea

muchmorerecentadditiontothearrayofChinesebusinessventures,oftenactingasacover

forbrothels.

22 EncanaisaCanadianoilcompanyandmostlyactiveintheexplorationphase.TheCNPC

hadbeenassociatedwiththemsince2003andacquired50%oftheconsortium’ssharesin

2006(MaoundonodjiG,Lesenjeuxgéopolitiquesdel’exploitationdupétroleauTchad.Doctoral

thesisinPoliticalandSocialSciences,CatholicUniversityofLeuven,2009,p.417).Although

theofficialChinesepositiongenerallyclaimsthatnoeconomiclinksareofficiallysanctioned

withoutdiplomaticties,therealityonthegroundismorecomplex.TheexampleoftheCNPC

inChad reveals that initial contactcanbemadeperfectlywellbeforeofficialdiplomatic

recognition.ThesameappliestoinvestmentcomingfromthePRC.Since2006theTaiwanese

oil company, theOverseasPetroleumInvestmentCorporation,hasbeen interested inan

oilconcessionnearDoba(despitethebreaking-offofdiplomatictiesthatsameyear)andis

currentlycarryingouttheexplorationphase(personalinterview,IsmaëlMoctar,independent

Chadianoilconsultant,N’Djamena,September2011).

23 Atthisstage,therearejustover100 hundredoilwells.Theplannersexpectthepipelineto

transport1 milliontonnesofcrudeperyear,risingto3 millioninthesecondphase.The

refineryhasanannualcapacityof100 tonnes.

24 MagrinG,‘LesenjeuxduprojetRônier’,inLagestionenvironnementaledelaCNPCauTchad:

enjeuxetmiseenperspectiveendébutdecyclepétrolier.Paris:FrenchDevelopmentAgency,2010,

p.250.

25 SuchastheBureauofGeophysics,GreatWallDrillingCompanyandtheChinaPetroleum

TechnologyDevelopmentCorporation.

26 Foramoredetailedanalysis,seeMagrinG,LeSudduTchadenmutation:deschampsdecoton

auxsirènesdel’ornoir.Paris:Sepia,2001,p.427.


23


27 Theprojecthadinitiallybeenestimatedat$3.7billion,butgraduallythecostneededtobe

revisedtoover$8billion.

28 In2010thedailyproductionreachedanaverageof122 500 barrelsperday(EssoExploration

andProductionChadInc.,‘ProjetdeDéveloppementTchad/Cameroun’,MiseajourduProjet

29,RapportAnnuel,2011,http://www.esso.com/Chad-English/PA/Files/29_all_french.pdf).

29 NadingarND&SYang,‘RelationshipbetweenChadandChina’NewYorkScienceJournal,

3,9,2010,pp. 50–54.

30 MagrinG,2010,op.cit.,p.250.

31 Chinaisupheldasamodelof‘InternationalStandard,ChineseSpeed’sinceittookovertheH

blockinJanuary2007.

32 MaoundonodjiG,2009,op.cit.,p.246.


34 XAFisthethree-lettercurrencycodefortheCentralAfricanFranc.

35 SeriesofpersonalinterviewswithIsmaëlMoctar,op.cit.,July2010,September2011.Michel

Boukar,SecretaryGeneraloftheMinistryofPetroleuminChad,claimedatthetimeofthe

interview(29September2011)that,unlikethepubliclyannouncedfigureof20 000barrelsa

day,therefinerywouldonlyproduceabout10 000barrelsaday.

36 SHTMagazine,‘Carted’identitédelaRaffineriedeN’Djamena’,Chad,001,December2008,p.

7.

37 AlthoughtheproductionstagebeganinlateJune2011,itisstillnotclearhowmuchoilis

beingproducedorbeingrefined.

38 SHTMagazine,‘ExtraitdudiscoursduMinistreduPétrole’,Chad,001,December2008,p.6.

Attheceremony,PresidentDébyassertedthat‘wearewinningavictoryofthebattleforenergy

independence’.


40 AlthoughthelayingofthecornerstonetookplaceattheendofDecember2010,itisnotclear

whentheconstructionphasewillbefinished.SoluxeInternationalisasubsidiarycompanyof

ChinaHuayouGroupCorporationandisoperatinginvariousservicefields,includinglogistics,

construction,commerceandtradeaswellastechnicalservicesonoilfieldengineeringand

oilfieldchemicalsadditives.InChad,thecompanyisnotonlyactiveintheareaofconstruction

anddecoration,butisalsowidelyinvolvedinlogisticsservicesstructuredaroundtheCNPC’s

oilinvestment(SoluxeInternational,‘SoluxeInternationalChadBranch’,http://soluxeint.com/

en/2010/0623/28.html,accessed21November2011).

41 Personalinterview,ZhengWei,op.cit.

42 Ontheotherhand,thenewcementfactorymayhaveanegativeimpactontheviabilityoflocal

brickmanufacturers.

43 PresidentDébyfinally inaugurated thecement factoryon16February2012(AfricaAsia

Confidential,‘Cementingambitions’,5, 5,March2012.

44 Thediscussionsrevolvearoundthemanagementandthefunctioningmodes,morespecifically

thedebateofretainingthestoragesectionintheproductionareawithtransferringtheend

producttoN’Djamena.

45 Personalinterviews,MaximeNelgarNadjirambaye,sociologistatGRAMP-TC,andZhengWei,

Chineseeconomicadviser,N’Djamena,23and27September2011.

46 Personalinterview,MiaoudouDjikonoum,deputy-managingdirectorattheMinistryofPublic

WorksandTransport,N’Djamena,28September2011.Chad’sinfrastructureminister,Adoum

Younousmitoldjournalists:‘Theprojectwhichwouldbefundedbyaloantothegovernment

24



ofChadfrom[the]ChinesegovernmentwillhelpChad,becauseofitsgeographicposition,

tobecomeanAfricanhubforflightstotheMiddleEastandAsia’(Reuters,‘Chadinksairport

accordwithChinesefirm’,22April2011).

47 Among other reasons, the current airport, ‘Hassan Djamous’, located near the centre of

N’Djamena,hastodealwiththecontinualextensionofthecityandrisinglandpressure.

48 InearlyAugust2011,ChadianandSudaneseofficialssigneda$2billiondealwithChinaExim

BanktofinancearailconnectionbetweenDoreandNyala,thecapitalofSouthDarfur.During

theOrganisationoftheIslamicConference’s(OIC)SummitinSenegalon14March2008,

acommitteewasestablishedtoimplementthePortSudan–DakarRailwayLine,toconnect

Sudan,Chad,Niger,Nigeria,Mali,BurkinaFaso,SenegalandpossiblyDjibouti.

49 TubianaJ,RenouncingtheRebels:LocalandRegionalDimensionsofChad–SudanRapprochement.

Geneva:SmallArmsSurvey,March2011,p.23.

50 Althoughovertconflictisrarelywitnessed,violencematerialisesinsteadintheexperiences

ofwar(DebosM, ‘LivingbytheguninChad:Armedviolenceasapracticaloccupation’,

JournalofModernAfricanStudies,49,3,2011,p. 412).

51 Magrin G, ‘Tchad 2008: Géographie d’une guerre ordinaire’, EchoGéo, Sur le vif 2008,

http://echogeo.revues.org/2249.

52 DebosM,op.cit.,pp.409–428.

53 MarchalR,‘TherootsoftheDarfurconflictandtheChadiancivilwar’,PublicCulture,20,3.

Durham:DukeUniversityPress,2008,pp.429–436.

54 TheRiyadhagreementof3May2007signedbyDébyandBashir,forexample,observed‘the

principalsofgoodneighbourliness;andnoninterferenceininternalaffairsofotherstates’and

agreed‘topreventtheuseoftheirterritorytoharbour,train,fundorbeusedaspassageby

armedmovementsopposedtotheother,andwillnotofferanyfinancialormoralsupportto

thesemovementsandwillejectthemfromthesoilofthetwocountries’(at3,b).Thiswasone

ofanumberofattemptedaccords,anothercominginJanuary2010whenSudanandChad

signedadealtonormaliserelationsinN’Djamena,featuringyetanothercommitmenttoend

supportforrebelgroupsonbothsides.

55 Itwasreportedthat‘alargeamountofequipmentandmaterials’ownedbyChinesecompanies

waslootedinthisattackbutcompensationwasprovidedbythegovernmentofChad.Yuanhui

S,‘Turmoilwon’tstopChineseenterprises’,AfricaMagazine,13May2011.

56 SeeReportofthePanelofExpertsestablishedpursuanttoparagraph3ofresolution1591

(2005)concerningtheSudan’(30January2006);ReportofthePanelofExpertsontheSudan

establishedpursuanttoresolution1591(2005)(S/2011/111,8March2011);andGramizzi

C,LewisM&JTubiana,‘LetterfromformerMembersofthePanelofExpertsontheSudan

establishedpursuanttoresolution1591(2005)andrenewedpursuanttoresolution1945

(2010)addressedtotheChairmanoftheSecurityCouncilCommitteeestablishedpursuantto

resolution1591(2005)concerningtheSudan’,24January2012.

57 PermanentmissionofthePeople’sRepublicofChinatotheUN,‘China’sSRonDarfurholds

a briefing in Beijing’, Beijing, 7 March 2008, http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/

securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/darfur/t468259.htm,accessed10March2012.

58 SudanTribune,‘ChinapledgestoendSudan–Chadconflict’,1June2009.

59 TheformerFrenchambassador,BrunoFoucher,statedthatParishadaskedtheChad-stationed

FrenchtroopstoevacuatethepersonneloftheChinese,AlgerianandRussianembassies,as

wellasallforeigncitizenswhohadsoughtassistanceatthecrisiscentre(TCHADONLINE,

‘Audition de MM. Bruno Foucher, ambassadeur de France au Tchad’, 23 March 2010,


25


http://tchadonline.com/audition-de-mm-bruno-foucher-ambassadeur-de-france-au-tchad/,

accessed11March2012).

60 MINURCAT (the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad), and a European

Unionmilitaryforce(EUFOR),wasestablishedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution1778

(25December2007)mandatedtoprotectcivilians,humanrightsandtheruleoflaw,and

regionalpeace.UNSecurityCouncil resolution1861 (14 January2009) reiterateddeep

concernaboutarmedactivitiesandbanditryineasternChad,north-easternCAR(Central

AfricanRepublic)andwesternSudan,deemedtobethreateningthesecurityofthecivilian

population,humanitarianoperationsandthestabilityofthosecountries,aswellasproducing

seriousviolationsofhumanrightsand internationalhumanitarian law. Itauthorised the

deploymentofamilitarycomponentofMINURCATtofollowupEUFORinbothChadand

CARattheendofEUFOR’smandateinMarch2009.ThetransferofauthoritybetweenEUFOR

andthemilitarycomponentofMINURCATtookplaceon15March2009.MINURCATfeatured

militarypersonnelfrom48countries,andpolicepersonnelfrom21countries,buttherewasno

Chinesecontribution.FollowingarequestbythegovernmentofChad,themissionfinishedon

31December2010inlinewithUNSCresolution1923(2010).

61 TherecentFrenchinterventioninLibyaseemedtohavetemporarilysupportedarguments

infavourofthecontinuityofthemilitarypresenceinChad.However,itisdifficulttojustify

operatingcostsofabout$118 millionperyear,especiallyinthecontextofdrasticbudget

cutsinFrance(personalinterview,JulienCats,secondadviser(politicalaffairs)attheFrench

EmbassyinChad,N’Djamena,26September2011).

62 ‘OpérationÉpervier’referstotheongoingFrenchmilitarypresenceinChad.Launchedin1986

toforcebacktheLibyaninvasion,ithasremainedoperationaltorestrainrecurrentepisodesof

regionalinstabilityandhelpovercomeseveralconflictsintheregion.

63 AccordingtocommentsmadebytheChineseeconomicadviser,aswellasbyIsmaëlMoctar,

theindependentconsultantwhoconductedtheEnvironmentalImpactAssessmentforthe

CNPC,theChineseweretakenbysurprisewithregardstothisdecision.

64 Priortothatdate,thepumppriceforgasoilwasXAF750perlitrewhereasdieselwassoldfor

XAF650perlitre(withXAF499,85equalling$1).

65 SeriesofinterviewsconductedwithcabdriversinN’Djamena,September2011.

66 LowerpricesinCamerooncanbeexplainedbythefactthatafairamountofinferiorquality

gasoilcomesfromNigeriaviafraudulentwaysandiscommonlysoldinJerricans(personal

interview,MichelBoukar,SecretaryGeneralattheMinistryofOilandEnergy,N’Djamena,

29September2011).

67 N’DjamenaBi-Hebdo, ‘Actualitéd’exploitationde laSociétédeRaffinagedeN’Djaména’,

N’Djamena,26September–2October2011,pp.4–5.

68 NakoJ, ‘ChadrefineryventurewithChinasuspendsoutput’,Reuters,30September2011,

http://af.reuters.com/article/chadNews/idAFL5E7KU2V620110930.

69 Initiallytheideawasthatthe40%participationoftheChadianstate,advancedbytheChinese

side,wouldbereimbursedthroughsalesandtaxes.

70 Personalinterview,MahamatAssouyouti,projectmanagerattheFrenchDevelopmentAgency

inChad,N’Djamena,24September2011.

71 Personalinterview,PhilippeLecluze,economicandfinancialadviserattheFrenchEmbassyin

Chad,N’Djamena,23September2011.

72 Personalinterview,MichelBoukar,op.cit.

26



73 However,asisdiscussedlaterinthepaper,thecircumstancesaroundthisprojectareevolving

rapidlyandmakeitdifficulttoassessforhowlongthecurrentpriceswillbeeffective.

74 On16October2011JetA1wassetatXAF529.36a litreandatXAF375pera litre for

kerosene.Duringthetemporaryperiod,thepricewassetatXAF350andXAF230respectively.

75 Chad,MinistryofCommerce and Industry, ‘Arrêtéfixant lesprixde ventedesproduits

pétroliers en République du Tchad’, Decree number 046/PR/PM/MCI/SG/DCCP/2011,

16October2011.

76 GRAMP-TC,‘CommuniquédePresse’,N’Djamena,19October2011.

77 DespitePresidentDéby’sannouncementabouttheratesrevision,asofDecember2011,Decree

number46wasstillfunctional.

78 OnlinediscussionsandemailexchangeonNetworkforAppliedResearchonOil,Gasand

MiningActivities(NARMA),December2011.

79 China’s economic adviser claimed that theChinese embassywouldnot takepart in the

negotiations.

80 The‘GeneralManagementoflargePresidentialprojects’(Directiongénéraledesgrandsprojets

présidentiels)isconnecteddirectlytothepresidency.

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China s Growing Involvement in Chad · 2016-05-03 · AbStRACt Relations between Chad and China...

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