Chilling Civil Society in Russia

Chilling Civil Society in Russia:

2012 Foreign Agents Law and NGOs in Chechnya

Introduction

In reflecting on the North Caucuses of the Russian Federation, most people remember the

bloody conflict in the 1990’s and the dominant presence of Islamic fundamentalism. However,

very few understand or know of the abominable conditions that the Chechen-Ingush people have

endured since the 1700’s to the present year. Under the power of local Islamic warlord Razman

Kadroyv and the power vertical system of within President Putin’s autocratic regime, hope seems

sparse.

Since the 1990’s, Chechnya has endured two brutal conflicts with the Russian forces,

which have left long lasting wounds upon the people of Chechnya. In 2000, the small self-

proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, was once again plunged into another conflict with

Russian forces after rouge separatist Islamist leaders invaded the neighboring Russian republic of

Dagestan; threatening the security of the region. Unlike the previous conflict the Russians had

the upper hand in the image of a strong man, President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. It was

under Putin’s leadership that Russia re-asserted itself over Chechnya, but by absolute brute force.

The Second Chechen War ended being the bloodiest conflict for the Chechens, in which

thousands civilians and refugees from the previous war were targeted by Russian forces on both

land and air(Smith 2005, Wood 2007, CBC Correspondant 2008). The official count total of

civilian causalities and deaths from the war are still unknown to the public, due to the political

police state imposed upon Chechnya by Putin and his local puppet, Ramzan Kadyrov. News and

facts about the Second Chechen War have been repressed and kept hidden by both President

Putin and Kadroyv’s regime by suppressing and targeting local and foreign NGO’s who focuses

on human rights abuses in the region (Human Rights Report 2007, Amnesty International 2011,

Human Rights Report 2011, Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Report 2012, Amnesty

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International 2013, Human Rights Report 2013, Amnesty International 2014, Human Rights

Report 2014).

So far, these methods have been successful in retaining political stability in Chechnya,

for the once bombed out city of Grozny has been rebuilt, and numerous civil building has been

restored with a newly built Grand Mosque (Hughes 2007, DeWaal 2010). Numerous former

IDPs and refugees are once again flocking back to the cities and the region, but live in fear of the

new regime. To many it is clear that this new stability is an ‘illusion’ and that Kadyrov will

ensure that “what happens in Chechnya stays in Chechnya”. This is at any cost. Through acts of

ruthlessness by his personal guards (Kadyrovsky) and supporters against watch dog groups. In

2005 & 2009, the Kadyrovsky’s brutality became apparent in the murders of two major

internationally known human rights workers: Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova

(Human Rights Report 2007, Amnesty International 2011, Human Rights Report 2011,

Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Report 2012, Amnesty International 2013, Human

Rights Report 2013, Amnesty International 2014, Human Rights Report 2014). Both women

worked with local human rights group Memorial and the local newspaper Nova Gazeta on

human rights ‘forced abduction’ of refugee cases that occurred during the Second Chechen War.

Politkovskaya had been the most outspoken critic of President Putin’s regime and the army’s

actions in Chechnya. She had criticized Putin’s policies in supporting ex-Islamic rebel leader

Kadyrov for being chosen as ‘President’. Ramzan, like his father, were known to be responsible

for numerous human rights violations during the First Chechen war (Donlop 2002, Politkovskaya

2003, De Waal 2010 ).

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In 2001, shortly after acquiring power, Kadyrov was given the ‘green light’ from

Moscow to initiate the process of ‘Chechenization’ by using local oil field revenues to rebuild

Grozny’s infrastructure and society (Sakwa 2005, Akhmadov 2010, De Waal 2010, Cosgrove

2013, Sakwa 2013). But, in truth this process is at its heart ‘Russification of the Chechens’ by

force. While President Putin has permitted Ramzan to allow the Chechens to express and retain

their Islamic identity, this only goes so far. During the period of 2004-2006, any trace of ‘ethnic

Chechen identity’ was been wiped out or ‘white washed’ by the removal of historical

monuments, enforcing the use of the Russian language, revising text books, and mostly

importantly, hunting down “Islamic terrorists” or Chechen nationalists(Tishkov 2004, Sakwa

2005, Hughes 2007, Akhmadov 2010, Sakwa 2013). Most of the “raids” or “sweeps” that have

occurred during the period of 2004-2007 in Chechnya and neighboring refugee camps in

Ingushetia have resulting in forced abductions or murders of young men from the ages of 13-30

years (Human Rights Report 2007, Amnesty International 2011, Human Rights Report 2011,

Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Report 2012, Amnesty International 2013, Human

Rights Report 2013, Amnesty International 2014, Human Rights Report 2014). Numerous people

have been reported missing or illegally detained by Russian police or local officials. These are

the cases that Natalya investigated and published before her murder. She discovered that 90

percent of the forced abduction of young men has been tied to local Chechen policemen within

the Kadyrovsky (Dunlop 2002, Cornell 2002, Tishkov 2004, Sakwa 2005,Hughes 2007,

Akhmadov 2010, De Wall 2010, Cosgrove 2013). Such information has shaken the credibility of

Kadyrov’s regime as well as his benefactor, Vladimir Putin.

While it is necessary to hunt down terrorism in one’s country to obtain security, such

operations in Chechnya have become a method of terror and control over political opponents and

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human rights activists (both local and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

(Henderson 2005, Blank 2010, Forsythe 2011, Lapitskaya 2011, Russell 2011, Sakwa 2013). In

early 2012 the Russian Duma, under the leadership of recently re-elected President Putin, began

drafting a law that would enhance Russian internal security by placing extreme restriction upon

civil society in Russia; particularly NGOs. This piece of legislation was the 2012 Foreign Agent

law (Law No. 121-FZ) which called for:

1. “Organizations that receive foreign funding and engage in “political activities” to

register as “foreign agents.”

2. Introduces additional reporting requirements for representative offices or

branches of foreign organizations

3. required to have “registration documents” when protesting in public”

4. Maintain separate records for expenditure of funds received from foreign

sources(in addition to the regular reporting on funding sources and expenditures

that NGOs must submit to the Tax Service and the Ministry of Justice)

5. Submit reports on their management team and their activities twice a year

6. Submit quarterly expense reports to a “designated body”

7. Conduct a compulsory annual audit

8. law also authorizes government agencies to inspect (announced or unannounced)

the registered representative or branch offices of foreign organizations

9. Failure to register can result in warnings and after two the NGO will be fined up

to 300,000 rubles

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10. Any erroneous information or ‘foreign propaganda’ against individuals or incite

civilians not to fulfill their duties will be met with penalties such as fines up to

120,000 rubles or a two year prison term (Amnesty International 2011, Human

Rights Report 2011, Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Report 2012,

Amnesty International 2013, Human Rights Report 2013, Amnesty International

2014, Human Rights Report 2014)

Each of these ten requirements within the Foreign Agent Law has caused a great stir in

Russian civil society, but the law and its political implications have caused more controversy in

the international community. Both USA President Obama and German Chancellor Angela

Merkel have expressed concerns about the law and what it means Russian civil society in the

future, particularly in regions like Chechnya (Sakwa 2013). This is also important because there

is a long history of HR NGOs in that region. With this information, my main research question is

the following:

To what extent has the current Foreign Agent law enacted in 2012 impacted political stability

within the North Caucus region of Chechnya and the human rights groups present?

History of the Conflict:

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The Russian controlled Republic of Chechnya has remained a volatile region for the

various Russian incarnations since Chechnya was absorbed into the old Russian Empire in the

mid-1700s Chechens have maintained a sense of patriotism towards their homeland and people

(Donlop 2002, De Waal 2010). In turn, this created a sense of “difference” that stoked great

tension over the centuries. It has led to periods of violence, guerilla warfare, terrorism, civilian

exodus and regional destabilization. In short, a sense of difference between Chechens and

Russians is ever-present through Russo-Chechen history, especially through political and ethnic

differences.

Russian Conquest of the Caucuses

In 1707, Tsar Peter II (the Great) set his ambitions on expanding the former Russian

Empire’s border in the desire to create a modern European State, at the expense of weakened

Persian Empire (Donlop 2002, Billingsley 2003, De Waal 2010). However, Peter died in 1725,

leaving Russian ambitions to his daughter/successors, particular Empress Elizaveta Petrovna,

whose army was able to push into the Northern Caucus regions. Her reign control of the area of

what is now Dagestan was built in forts to secure borders to protect Russia from the former

Ottoman Empire (Donlop 2002, Billingsley 2003, Vachagaev 2007,De Waal 2010). Russian

security was assured in 1783 when Russian troops under Ekaterina II (the Great) secured the

Crimea from the Ottomans, as well as swallowing the small Kingdom of Georgia with the Treaty

of Georgievsk (Hugh 2001,Smith 2005, Wood 2007, Sakwa 2013). This treaty helped to solidify

Chechnya within Russian borders as a permanent fixture. Since the Treaty of Georgievsk, the

Russian Empire ruled the Caucus region with an iron fist, due to the mistrust between Muslims

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and Russian Orthodox Christians that continues to this day(Gorensburg 2001, Cornell 2002,

Murphy 2004, Sakwa 2005, Smith 2005, Wood 2007).

The first large military clash was the 1877 rebellion that was launched by the radical

Muslim leaders of the Naqshbandi and Qadiri brotherhoods. Their creed was to free the Chechen

people from the “infidel” Tsarist government. Though, the struggles between St. Petersburg and

Grozny continued well into the twentieth century, but became more and more violent just as the

religious fervor of Chechen leaders(Cornell 2002, Murphy 2004, Sakwa 2005, Smith 2005,

Wood 2007).

Soviet Period & Dissolution

The first apex of violence in the twentieth century was that of the early phases of WWII

in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the successor of the Russian Empire)

(Dunlop2002, Billingsley 2003, De Waal 2010, Vatchagaev 2013, Sakwa 2013). From the period

of February 23-27, 1944, the most heinous crime was imposed upon the Chechen people. Known

as Operation Lentil, it the forced the deportation of Chechens to Siberia on the personal orders of

Josef Stalin(Dunlop2002, Billingsley 2003, Murphy 2004, Sakwa 2005, Smith 2005, Wood

2007, De Waal 2010, Vatchagaev 2013, Sakwa 2013). In the winter of 1940-1942, the German

army was mounting its offensive and was nearing Soviet borders through the Balkans and this

threatened Soviet security. Stalin was very aware of the potential situation in the North

Caucuses, given the previous history of consistent rebellion by Chechens in 1877 and the present

and ongoing rebellion (1940-1944). It is still disputed whether or not the Chechens collaborated

with the Germans during this period. However, evidence from primary sources state that it is true

the Chechens did have contact with German officials, but made no agreement to supply military

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aide against the USSR. However, Stalin used this uncertainty to his advantage by gaining mass

support for the forced deportation of the “Ingush” peoples of the North Caucuses in a period of

four days (Dunlop2002, Billingsley 2003, Murphy 2004, Sakwa 2005, Smith 2005, Wood 2007,

De Waal 2010, Vatchagaev 2013, Sakwa 2013). The forced march took place in the middle of

winter and across rough terrains of the western USSR. The majority of Chechens died on this

forced march. The estimated death toll is also still disputed between Russian and European

academics, in which the Russian death tolls ranges around 400,000 persons (23.5 percent),

versus European scholars who contend that the death toll was 724,297 persons (66 percent)

( Dunlop2002, Billingsley 2003,Murphy 2004, Sakwa 2005, Smith 2005, Wood 2007, De Waal

2010). Of these numbers, 25 percent to 35 percent of the dead were women and children. Those

who were not keeping pace died or were shot dead in mass (700 persons), in a similar fashion

from the Kahibah Massacre that occurred in modern-day Ukraine. During this exile to Soviet

Siberia, a further third of the Chechen population died over a thirteen year period until their

return in 1956.

In their immediate return, riots broke out in Grozny in 1958 due the disputes over

property between ethnic Russian settlers and the returned exiles, resulting in 10,000 civilian

deaths (Dunlop2002, De Waal 2010, Billingsley 2003, and Billingsley 2003). Operation Lentil

and following events marked a dark period in Russo-Chechen history and is remembered by

every Chechen, especially during the 1990’s when the second apex of violence erupted during

the dissolution of the USSR (Dunlop2002, Billingsley 2003, Murphy 2004, Sakwa 2005, Smith

2005, Wood 2007, De Waal 2010, Vatchagaev 2013, Sakwa 2013). Under Gorbachev’s

Perestroika reforms, Chechen nationalism re-emerged in a great deal of fervor by establishing

their own self-government under Dzhokkar Dudayev. In 1991, he refused to partake in the New

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http://www.google.com/search?biw=1366&bih=667&q=Kahibah&spell=1&sa=X&ei=7g2HUePvMoTH0gGTxYHYCA&ved=0CCoQBSgA



Union treaty that granted an ambiguous form of self-autonomy and sovereignty (Dunlop2002,

Wood 2007, De Waal 2010, Vatchagaev 2013, Sakwa 2013). Dudayev immediately declared

Chechen independence from the newly declared Russian Federation, and the establishment of the

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, thus setting Chechnya on a crash course with Moscow that would

have long lasting consequences.

First Chechen War:

By late 1991 early 1992, Chechnya/Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) had its first taste of

independence from Russia since the 18th century, but had no internal or external capabilities to

retain their sovereignty. Externally, tensions with the Russian Federation was high due their

declaration, and no other nation with exception of Georgia (which was embroiled in their own a

civil war) recognized their boarders. Russia threatened military actions and the international

community labeled Chechnya’s government as “secessionist” thus making Chechnya a pariah in

the international community (Dunlop2002, Cornell 2002, Billingsley 2003, Politkovskaya 2003,

Murphy 2004, Sakwa 2005, Smith 2005, Wood 2007, De Waal 2010, Cosgrove 2013,

Vatchagaev 2013, Sakwa 2013). On top of this President Dudayev was facing numerous internal

problems from combating terrorism, establishing rule of law in terms of human security, drafting

and ratifying a constitution to establish a stable government. Within a year of assuming power

there was a coup launched against Dudayev’s regime and in response Dudayev assert direct rule

over Chechnya. But, this did very little to address the political situation, for as the regime began

its security crackdown enemies continued to grow and some even sought aide from Russia. In

1994, another coup against Dudayev’s regime failed(Dunlop2002, Cornell 2002, Billingsley

2003, Politkovskaya 2003, Murphy 2004, Sakwa 2005, Smith 2005, Wood 2007, De Waal 2010,

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Cosgrove 2013, Vatchagaev 2013, Sakwa 2013). However, there was no lack of opportunity to

unseat the Chechen President. In late 1994 threats from the neighboring republics that either

sided with Russia or were in civil conflict themselves had begun to spill over onto Chechen soil

causing President Dudayev to call for a state of emergency. This was taken by his enemies as an

attempt to solidify power and led to Dudayev’s demise in 1994 and plunged Chechnya into

chaos; which the Russians took full advantage of.

Historians debate about who was on the offensive or defensive during the initial phases of

the war and who attacked whom. What is known and engrained in both party’s minds is that of

the devastation that the war had left on all parties involved: especially the civilians. Most of the

horror stories the West knows about Chechnya is that massive amount of human rights abuses

conducted by both forces during the First Chechen War, where ‘Western’ NGOs and

humanitarians were massacred, humiliated, tortured or simply “disappeared (Dunlop2002,

Billingsley 2003, Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2004, Murphy 2004, CBC 2006).”

Numerous NGOs and IGO’s responded to the call for aide in Chechnya, but all were at

high risk not only due to the war but because of the numerous separatist guerillas that had a

reputation of being “entrepreneurs of violence” from arms deals to hostage taking for money

(Dunlop2002, Poulin 2002, Billingsley, 2003, Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2004, Murphy 2004,

CBC 2006). Contemporary scholars believe that those responsible for the numerous abductions

were either mercenaries hired by the Russians or that of foreign mujahedeen fighters for the

Chechens. Now in relation to the exact percentage of foreign mujahedeen fighters within the

Chechen forces in the 1990’s is a guarded secret by the Chechen populace or those who fought in

the war (Lyall 2009, Sakwa 2013).

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By the end of 1994 and early 1995, Russian forces had been able to seize the country

side, but had been able to target and capture leading Chechen rebels Aslan Mashadov, Ibn Al-

Khattab, and the radical Islamist leader Shamil Basayev(Billingsley, 2003, Politkovskaya 2003,

SBS 2004, Murphy 2004, CBC 2006, Francis 2008, Lyall 2009, Forsythe 2011, Russell 2011,

Vert 2012, Cosgrove 2013, Kramer 2013, Elder 2013). This made a planning an assault upon

Chechen forces difficult for the rebels hiding in Grozny or in the mountains. This forced the

Russian troops few strategic options other than continual carpet bombing. Unfortunately, such

operations were not carried out according due to the inexperience of Russian troops resulting in

indiscriminate barrages of rocket artillery causing enormous casualties among the Chechen and

Russian civilian population. Russian airborne forces took the military airstrip outside Grozny

and repelled the Chechen counterattack; the next objective was the city itself; which was even a

bigger problem due the number of civilians in Grozny(Billingsley, 2003, Politkovskaya 2003,


Vert 2012, Cosgrove 2013, Kramer 2013, Elder 2013)

The battle itself did not begin until 5am on New Years of 1995 when the Russian artillery

began to pour out of the skies into Grozny. These bombardments were intended to create

confusion and to intimidate the Chechens into surrendering, when in fact most of the shelling hit

Oil Institute creating massive clouds of black smoke. Russian troops were broken into three

groups: Northern, Western and Eastern. The Northern group’s target was the Presidential Palace

in the center of the city, Western group’s objective was the Central Railway system on the

western part of the city near the airfield and Eastern group’s objective was the main highway into

Grozny and the Central hospital (Russell 2011, Vert 2012, Cosgrove 2013, Kramer 2013, Elder

2013). However, once this three-pronged mission began the Russians learned that due their

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carpet_bombing



limited numbers of trained men, the Eastern group had to break up into two factions that went

after the highway and the other for the hospital. This weakness played right into the hands of

Chechen forces that had numerous fighter cells within these crucial areas in order to focus their

attention on the Russian air strike.

When the battle began it became clear that while the Russians had air power the

Chechens had ground power, for only the northern group reached their objective (Russell 2011,

Vert 2012,Cosgrove 2013, Kramer 2013, Elder 2013). But, after a long fight against Chechen

sniper militants stationed outside the presidential palace. Both the sections of the Eastern group

and Western group failed to reach their objectives due to understaffed and unexperienced

soldiers in each group. The Eastern group’s failure started once they were hit by Russian artillery

leaving few men left and the second section was ambushed then picked off by Chechen fighters.

This ended being the same for the Western group once they reached the Central station. By 1pm

on New Year’s Day, the operation was over and resulted in a Russian defeat; military casualties

were very high on the Russian side 1,376 died and about 408 missing and 1,500 Chechen

militants died in one day (Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2004, Murphy 2004, CBC 2006, Francis

2008, Lyall 2009, Forsythe 2011, Russell 2011, Vert 2012). It was not until late January of 1995

that the Russians reinforcements arrived and were able to take Grozny within a week. However,

by this time over 2,000 Russian troops were missing or dead, causalities were about 35,000

civilians (mostly ethnic Russians), and 5,000 of these were children. Most Chechen militants fled

and some resorted to hit-and–run tactics in the urban parts of Grozny until mid-March of 1995,

when Chechen forces regrouped their forces in the countryside (Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2004,

Murphy 2004, CBC 2006, Francis 2008, Lyall 2009, Forsythe 2011, Russell 2011, Vert 2012).

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This forced the Russians to re-focus their strategy to the countryside warfare. In mid-June

the Russians had the Chechen rebels on the run. However, the war was not over and the

Chechens were determined to make the Russians pay for the bloodbath in Grozny; particularly

Shamil Basayev. Basayev’s vengeance was cruel and bloody. On June 14th after the Chechen

forces’ failure to secure strategic position in the city of Budyonnovsk, Basyev and a group of 80-

200 Chechen militants retreated into the central hospital(Dunlop 1998, Poulin 2002, Billingsley,

Politkovskaya 2003). The Chechens held 1,500-1,800 civilians (including about 150 children

and a number of women with newborn infants) hostage; forcing President Yeltsin to open

negotiations for a ceasefire and an end to the war (Dunlop 1998, Poulin 2002, Billingsley,

Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2004, Murphy 2004, CBC 2006, Francis 2008, Lyall 2009, Forsythe

2011, Russell 2011, Vert 2012, Cosgrove 2013, Kramer 2013, Elder 2013).

President Yeltsin immediately vowed “to do everything possible to ensure the safety and

freedom the hostages “but publicly denounced the attack as "unprecedented in cynicism and

cruelty(Dunlop 1998, Hughes 2001,Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2004, Murphy 2004, CBC 2006)”"

Yeltsin’s comment and slow action in opening negations with Chechen rebels angered Basayev

and the next day shot five people and the chief doctor of the hospital. After three days President

Yeltsin ordered ‘security forces’ in conjunction with the elite Alpha Group to take the hospital

and free the hostages. It was not so easy for the rescue forces met heavy resistance; it took hours

for Russian forces to get inside the walls of the hospital. Many of the hostages were killed by

crossfire, but rescue forces were able to broker a local ceasefire and 227 hostages were released;,

61 others were freed by the Russian troops(Dunlop 1998, Hughes 2001,Politkovskaya 2003, SBS

2004, Murphy 2004, CBC 2006). However there were still more hostages in the other wings. A

second and third attack on the hospital also failed. The exact or official death toll from the

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Yeltsin






Budyonnovsk hostage crisis is still debated. Russian sources state that only 129 hostages were

killed and 415 were injured. European reports state that 166 civilian hostages were killed (18

died later due or wounds), 541 were injured during the siege upon the hospital( De Waal 1998,


Vert 2012). Russian authorities claimed that higher death toll was due to the Chechens using

hostages as human shields; which could be accurate. Yeltsin's human rights advisor Sergey

Kovalyov described the scene:

"In half an hour the hospital was burning, and it was not until the next morning that we found out

what happened there as a result of this shooting. I saw with my own eyes pieces of human flesh

stuck to the walls and the ceiling and burned corpses (De Waal 1998).”

It was this event that turned the international community against the Chechen’s cause and had

begun to sympathize with the Russian president, particularly US President Bill Clinton, who

would continue to aid Yeltsin until his downfall (De Waal 1998, Hughes 2001).

In the aftermath of the hostage crisis in Budynnvosk Basayev and his remaining forces

fled into the mountains to fight another day. The war dragged on for another year, devouring all

in its path from homes, refugee camps, cities, and troops. By mid-1996, the Chechens were once

again on the offensive and re-took the city of Grozny in three days, due to the numerous amounts

of weaponry and foreign reinforcements enlisted by Chief mufti, Akhmad Kadyrov. He called

for a ‘jihad’ in Chechnya (Smith 2005,CBC 2006, Wood 2007, Al Jeezera 2010). About 5,000

foreign volunteers enlisted and helped re-take and secured the city of Grozny for the Chechens.

In August of 1995, the Russian Army once again besieged the city of Grozny resulting in heavy

Russian causalities; about 200 soldiers were killed in the first day and over 800 wounded to

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Kovalev

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Kovalev




1,000 dead within five days(Smith 2005,CBC 2006, Wood 2007, Al Jeezera 2010). The Russians

were at a stalemate and threatened to use ballistic missiles (not used in Chechnya up to this

point) if the Chechens did not surrender the city. However, before Russian troops were able to

fulfill that threat a peace deal was proposed and signed on August 31, 1996 (Smith 2005,CBC

2006, Wood 2007, Al Jeezera 2010).

The Khasav-Yurt Accords peace deal included: technical aspects of de-militarization, the

withdrawal of both sides' forces from Grozny, the creation of joint headquarters to preclude

looting in the city, the withdrawal of all federal forces from Chechnya by 31 December 1996,

and a stipulation that any agreement on the relations between the ChRI and the Russian federal

government need not be signed until late 2001(Dunlop 1998, Hughes 2001,Wood 2007, De Wall

2010). It was the signing of the Khasav-Yurt Accords that turned the Russian people against

Yeltsin, but Yeltsin had already chosen his successor, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin who would

never forget the lessons of the first Chechen War.

Second Chechen War

The First Chechen War may have resulted in a Russian defeat and a de facto

independence for ChRI but by no means was the Republic able to retain its sovereignty or

stability. The first blow to the Chechen cause was that of the 1997 assassination of President

Dudauyv by Russian air forces, bringing in Aslan Maskhadov(Aron 2003). While Maskhadov

may have belonged to the more conservative wing of the anti- Dudauyv faction, in the short time

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demilitarization

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khasav-Yurt_Accord



power he had proved to be an effective leader. In the months after the signing of the Accords

Maskhadov was able-politician, he was able to: broker a deal between Moscow and Grozny to

send funds to rebuild Grozny’s infrastructure, able to reduce the amount of Russian troops within

Grozny to only two brigades, traded Chechen oil with the United Kingdom, and had secured

Russian paid pensions to rebuild schools and hospitals for the half a million (40% pre-war

population) refugees(Hughes 2000, Rubin 2000, BBC 2001,Gorensburg 2001, Cornell 2002,

Tishkov 2004, Smith 2005, CBC 2006, Akhmadov 2010, Nichol 2010). Unfortunately , these

measures were not enough, and like his predecessor Maskhadov was unable to control the

rampant crime rate in Chechnya that prevented his state building process.

Most refugees lived in overcrowded villagers or camps run by local Chechen officials or

ex-fighter/former guerillas who ran the camps in a “mafia style” manner giving rise to the power

of the Islamic fundamentalists like Basayev along with their comrades who ran the black market.

This lead the many kidnappings, robberies, murders of humanitarian workers or reporters; most

notably the killing of four news reporters for British Granger Telecommunications in 1998.

Over a three year period these thugs had been able to procure 200 million dollars in ransom

demands not to mention he money they stole from humanitarian workers or officials from

Moscow and abroad(Hughes 2000, Rubin 2000, BBC 2001,Gorensburg 2001, Cornell 2002,

Tishkov 2004, Smith 2005, CBC 2006, Akhmadov 2010, Nichol 2010). The Chechen Republic

was in chaos and by 1998 isolated herself even further with the continual political divisions

between the Islamic fundamentalists and the moderate government in Grozny; which by mid

1998 were in open conflict in the parliament. Islamists pushed Maskhadov to assert Sharia law in

Chechnya which he grudgingly allowed and launched a major campaign against hostage-takers,

but was unsuccessful due to the escalating political situation(Hughes 2000, Rubin 2000, BBC

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2001,Gorensburg 2001, Cornell 2002, Tishkov 2004, Smith 2005, CBC 2006, Akhmadov 2010,

Nichol 2010). The first phase of internal violence was in July of 1998 when Maskhadov’s

national guard clashed with the ‘militants’ in a small town killing fifty people and Maskhadov

called for state of emergency in Chechnya while battling numerous assassination attempts by

pro-Russian forces(Hughes 2000, Rubin 2000,BBC 2001,Gorensburg 2001, Cornell 2002, Poulin

2002, Aaron 2003, Tishkov 2004,Smith 2005, CBC 2006, Akhmadov 2010, Nichol 2010,

Caspian 2013). Secondly, Maskhadov’s diplomacy with Russia by 1999 was breaking down due

to his government’s inability to secure the pipelines across Chechnya from the Caspian Sea,

militants were illegally tapping their oil lines or sabotaging certain areas of the pipeline.

Chechnya’s only political economic means for survival was at risk (Hughes 2000, Rubin

2000,BBC 2001,Gorensburg 2001, Cornell 2002, Poulin 2002, Aaron 2003, Tishkov

2004,Akhmadov 2010, Nichol 2010).

The breaking point came in April 1999, Magomedov, the "Emir of the Islamic leader of

Dagestan," appealed to the "Islamic patriots of the Caucasus" to "take part in the jihad" and to

help neighboring "liberate Dagestan from the Russian colonial yoke (Hughes 2000, Rubin

2000,BBC 2001,Gorensburg 2001, Cornell 2002, Smith 2005).” Numerous young Islamic zelots

took this call seriously and on August 4 1999 the Second Chechen war had begun.

The Second Chechen war was very different from the first in numerous ways. By this time

radical Wahhabi Islam had taken roots in Chechnya amongst the younger population who had

nothing to lose and everything to gain by joining ‘armed militants and their crime rings(CNN

1999, De Waal 1999, BBC 2001 Politkovskaya 2003, Smith 2005, Corwin 2005, Bremer 2005).

Not only did these crime rings have many youthful supporters but had external links both

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jihad

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Jamaat_of_Dagestan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Jamaat_of_Dagestan



financial and political ties with Taliban, who were the only group to recognize Chechnya((CNN

1999, De Waal 1999, BBC 2001 Politkovskaya 2003, Smith 2005, Corwin 2005, Bremer

2005).). This shift caused many ex-fighters from the first war to change sides one of the most

notable was Akhmad Kadyrov. He would become one of Russia’s key sources of pro-Russian

influence and information in the coming war. However, most young Chechens sided with the

Islamists and Chechens were on the prowl again(De Waal 1999, BBC 2001 Politkovskaya 2003,

Smith 2005, Corwin 2005, Bremer 2005).). In early September there were numerous bombings

that killed 300 people in an apartment complex in downtown Moscow. Most Russians blamed

the Chechens and called for Moscow to intervene. At the same time, some researchers claim that

the FSB staged the incident(De Waal 1999, Politkovskaya 2003, Smith 2005, Corwin 2005,

Bremer 2005)..

The newly appointed Prime Minster, Vladimir Putin, was swift to act and ordered an air

strike upon Grozny in September of 1999, thus breaking the 1996 ceasefire. This time Russia

was ready for battle and had hatred for any non-Christian minority. Over 250,000 (25% of the

population arriving with 5,000-6,000 people per day) of Chechens were lining up across the

border ready to flee into the neighboring republic of Ingushetia, from the Russian forces (CNN

1999,Hoffman 2000, Marcus 2000, Lipatov 2000, Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999, Dunlop 2002,

Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003). The Russian air forces launched numerous air attacks along

the borders and in Grozny. In the first air strike in Grozny, 42 people were killed and over 300

wounded, most of them were civilians(CNN 1999,Hoffman 2000, Marcus 2000, Lipatov 2000,

Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003).

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Another key aspect that makes the Second Chechen War different from the first was that

of extreme detailed effort that President Putin (elected in 2000 during the war) made to ensure

that the media was excluded from the war. In 2000, he ordered his commanders not to allow any

journalists past the borders of Chechnya in order for his troops to keep efficient combat against

“Islamic terrorists(Hoffman 2000, Marcus 2000, Lipatov 2000, Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999,

Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003).” Putin’s counter-terrorism rhetoric bolstered his

credibility also with the USA after September 11, 2001. This was to be Putin’s “copt-out”

strategy in response to the massive human rights abuses conducted during the war. Most of the

atrocities were either from the excessive force used by the Russian air force via missiles,

complete air strikes and heavy artillery killing over 150,000-2,000 civilians during the course of

the war (Hoffman 2000, Marcus 2000, Lipatov 2000, Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999, Dunlop

2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003, Finn 2005). The land war was even more brutal as Putin

installed a pro-Russian government in Chechnya that helped him assert more power in the region

with placing Akmad Kadyrov in power. Land causalities were mostly planned and conducted by

his “puppet” regime along with the pro-Russian supporters within Chechnya. Unlike the last war,

Russia finally had a reliable ally to take out the guerillas in the mountains(Hoffman 2000,

Marcus 2000, Lipatov 2000, Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003,

Politkovskaya 2003 , Human Rights Watch 2007, Wood 2007, CBC Correspondant 2008).

Despite having this new set of power, Russian troops continued to fight in the mountains and in

the camps until 2002 respectively.

Majority of the land war was conducted from 1999-2001 where numerous civilians were

either attacked or killed by Russian armaments, or worse disappeared into the newly established

‘filtration camps’ established by the puppet regime to hunt down and question ‘terrorists.’ Over

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5,000 souls since the second war began have been reported missing by local families, mostly

refugees. Initially, the sweep campaigns were successful in finding and killing guerilla fighters

but they also targeted refugee camps, as well ( Hoffman 2000, Marcus 2000, Lipatov 2000,

Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003 , European Court

of Human Rights 2005, European Court of Human Rights 2006, Human Rights Watch 2007,

Wood 2007, CBC Correspondant 2008). These operations have had mixed results over the

years, for in 2002 Chechen fighters including war widowed women stormed the Moscow theatre

and held over 800 people hostage. Russian police immediately stormed the theatre and released a

gas that killed a majority of the hostages. In an act of malice Russian police shot every Chechen

that was in the left building to cover up their mistake. By this time, the Chechens cause had little

sympathy internationally due its tainted affiliation with radical Islam;, even if most Chechens did

not adhere to specifics of Islam (Hoffman 2000, Marcus 2000, Lipatov 2000, Dunlop 1998, De

Waal 1999, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003 , European Court of Human Rights

2005, European Court of Human Rights 2006, Human Rights Watch 2007, Wood 2007, CBC

Correspondant 2008).

Insurgency & Chechenization (2003-2009)

After the 2002 theatre attack, it was clear that Putin had to go further in order to restore

stability to the rebellious region. The only way of doing this was by providing political and

financial support to his pro-Kremlin ally, Kadyrov. In 2003, Akhmad Kadyrov won the local

elections (80% of the vote), which most human rights groups that remained in Chechnya viewed

as a “rigged election(Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999, Hoffman 2000, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003,

Politkovskaya 2003 BBC 2005, Walsh 2006, Human Rights Watch 2007, Wood 2007, SBS

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2008,Poulin 2011)”. In the past ten years human rights activists, such as the OSCE, Danish

Council Group, U.S. Department of State, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

have confirmed this skepticism by stating that “Kadyrov only gained the votes due to the fact

that the rebels were banned from participating along with the numerous accounts of Kadyrov’s

pro-Moscow henchmen at the voting polls(Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999, Hoffman 2000, Dunlop

2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003 BBC 2005, Holocaust Museam 2005,Walsh 2006,

Human Rights Watch 2007, Wood 2007, SBS 2008,Poulin 2011)”.

Since 2003, “voter intimidation” by pro-Moscow forces have been a common

phenomenon in Chechnya as well as her sister republics. This was for the first indicator of how

President Putin planned to rule Chechnya. However, in May 2004, Akhmad Kadyrov was

assassinated by a local Chechen Islamists at a WWII day parade in Grozny (Dunlop 1998, De

Waal 1999, Hoffman 2000, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2008, Al

Jeezera 2010, Caspian Report 2013). Despite the setback Putin continued his plans by placing

Akhmad Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan in power once he turned 30 in 2006. In the meantime, Putin

and Kadyrov brokered an agreement that when Ramzan became “president” he would be granted

money, Russian military support, and power over the oil fields in order to rebuild/ re-make

Chechnya (but in only in fashion pleasing to Putin). Until then, Putin was on the search for a Pro-

Moscow leader that would do his bidding until Ramzan would become of age (Dunlop 1998, De

Waal 1999, Hoffman 2000, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2008, Al

Jeezera 2010, Caspian Report 2013). In 2004 Chechnya held elections for the temporary roll as

president and 84% of Chechens voted in the election for a local, Abdul-Kerim Arsakhanov who

won 85% of the vote (Economist 2007, Walsh 2006). But, the Kremlin ignored the votes and

placed military general Alu Alkhanov as leader of the Chechen Republic claiming that

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alu_Alkhanov

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Department_of_State



Arsakhanov was ‘ineligible” since he used “intimidation tactics” to have Chechens vote for him.

This rebuke of the Chechen people was to have immediate and disastrous consequences(Dunlop

1998, De Waal 1999, Hoffman 2000, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003, SBS 2008,

Al Jeezera 2010, Caspian Report 2013). While the local Chechens were “silenced” a group of

Islamic radicals1lead by Basayev attacked a North Ossetian (Russian) school in Beslan in 2004.

The hostage crisis was reminiscent of that in the first Chechen and the 2002 theatre attack. The

militants held over 1,100 people (777 were children) hostage demanding that “Russia recognize

the independence of Chechnya at the UN (mostly humanitarian workers at this point) and

Russian forces withdrawal from Chechnya(Dunlop 1998, De Waal 1999, Hoffman 2000,

Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003, Satter 2006, Walker 2008, SBS 2008, Al Jeezera

2010, Caspian Report 2013)

The Kremlin2ordered a siege to the school to disband and capture the rebels by force.

Once again, storming into a hostage situation caused more to die and allowing the rebels to

escape. Approximately 334-380 people died in the siege and 184 of them were children; while

the remaining others were reported missing(Satter 2006, Walker 2008). It was clear at this point

that the Russian government had to do more in their counter-terrorism efforts. In response in

2005, Putin made the decision to prematurely establish Ramzan Kadyrov as the President of

Chechnya. As faithful client to Putin Ramzan Kadyrov initiated during the period of 2004-2009

the first phase of the Chechenization process: wiping out terrorists that threated the republics

stability, not to mention his credibility. The first order of business was to hunt down the

“terrorists” in the mountains lead by Basayev and Dokka Umarov. Since the beginning of the

1 mostly Chechens and Ingush

2 not sure if it was Putin directly

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Second Chechen war Islamist leaders may have lost ground but not their influence(Murphy 2004,

CBC 2006, Dateline 2008).Numerous local young and foreign recruits flocked to the North

Caucuses to join the rebels and to push out the Russians.

Unfortunately, unlike the last war, arms and money were harder to come by since Putin

had ‘loaned’ Russian forces to patrol and conduct “sweep operations” in Chechnya. However,

this operation was to turn sour very quickly. In the summer of 2005, Russian troops and Pro-

Moscow policemen (the Caucasian Front) launched into the mountains south of Grozny and

Dagestan in attempt to wipe out any “terrorist” strongholds. The fight for the mountains would

continue until 2009 when a mere tactical victory turned into a strategic one due the “external

operations (Al Jeezera 2009).” These external operations consisted of numerous raids upon

refugee camps in both Dagestan and Ingushetia. Initially they were hunting for rebels hiding

among civilians but were unable to find the leaders or gain any information as to their

whereabouts. This mission went from a simple counter-terrorism operation into a dirty war

against Chechen civilian that has yet to end (ECCHR 2005, ECCHR 2006, Wood 2007,

Dannruther 2007, Vachagaev, Smirnov 2008, Lyall 2009,Slovan 2009, Kramer 2013).

In 2006, the second phase of Chechenization had begun by Ramzan formally being

invested as Chechnya’s president along with a massive wave of building projects, one being the

Grand Mosque in Grozny which is boasted to be the largest mosque in all of Europe. However,

while the city may have risen from the ashes of war the people of Chechnya were being

terrorized by Russian forces that were still in Chechnya and their own local policemen(ECCHR

2005, ECCHR 2006, Wood 2007, Dannruther 2007, Vachagaev, Smirnov 2008, Lyall

2009,Slovang 2009, Kramer 2013).

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The first sign of trouble for most Chechens were that of the ‘moral edicts’ declared by

Kadyrov on January 20, 2006, declaring the establishment of Sharia Law in Chechnya. He

banned alcohol and gambling and enforced women's use of headscarves (Wood 2007,

Dannruther 2007). He also spoke in favor of polygamy and asserted that the

Quran and Sharia should be obligatory at Chechen schools. On February 11, Ramzan criticized

the republican media for broadcasting immoral programs and officially introduced censorship in

Chechnya (Economist 2007). Some of the conservative Islamist factions were in support of most

of these measures to retain Chechnya’s Islamic identity. However, most Chechens and human

rights (HR) watchdogs saw this as an omen of the troubles to come. Only a week later Ramzan

also called for all refugee camps to be closed for housing “international spies(Dunlop 1998, De

Waal 1999, Hoffman 2000, Dunlop 2002, Smith 2003, Politkovskaya 2003, Satter 2006, Walker

2008, SBS 2008, Al Jeezera 2010, Caspian Report 2013).

Now as to what Kadyrov’s definition of international spies in unknown, but what is clear

is the massive amount of illegal detentions and abductions of male refugees ages of 10-30 being

kidnaped may be an indication(ECCHR 2011, Human Rights Watch 2011, Amnesty

international 2011, Amnesty International 2012, FDIH 2012, Human Rights Watch 2012, US

State Department 2012, Amnesty International 2013). Very few, if any, have returned home

after these raids for most have either been tortured immensely, died from the torture or are still

missing. Numerous IGO’s and NGO’s still within the region have provided most of the civil

services for society from education, medical assistance, and legal assistance. According to

UNHCR reports there have been over 5,000 disappearances since 1999 (majority during the

second war) and over 200,000 are living in refugee camps in fear of arbitrary arrest, extortion,

torture, murder, rape, looting(Finn 2005, Amnesty International 2006, Ferras 2007, Amnesty

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polygamy

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gambling

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alcohol



International 2007, Presse 2008, Amnesty International 2009, Fiefer 2010, Amnesty

International 2010, ECCHR 2011, Human Rights Watch 2011, Amnesty international 2011,

Amnesty International 2012, Doctors Without Borders 2012, FDIH 2012, Human Rights Watch

2012, US State Department 2012, Amnesty International 2013, Dyomki 2013, Elder 2013,

Human Rights Watch 2013, Frontline Defenders 2014). No one really knows the exact number

of how may have perished for either of these abused by Russian or guerilla forces, but the

numbers keep increasing (estimated 200,00-500,000) There is simply not enough aid or

protection given to Chechen civilians even six years after the war; the civilian population lives in

absolute terror (Finn 2005, Amnesty International 2006, Ferras 2007, Amnesty International

2007, Presse 2008, Amnesty International 2009, Fiefer 2010, Amnesty International 2010,

ECCHR 2011, Human Rights Watch 2011, Amnesty international 2011, Amnesty International

2012, Doctors Without Borders 2012, FDIH 2012, Human Rights Watch 2012, US State

Department 2012, Amnesty International 2013, Dyomki 2013, Elder 2013, Human Rights

Watch 2013, Frontline Defenders 2014). Such reports have been confirmed by numerous IGOs

and NGOs such as: Amnesty International, Helsinki group, Human Rights Watch, Prague

Watchdog, Memorial, Doctors without borders, UN Children’s Fund, Physicians for Human

Rights, Russian-Chechen Friendship Society/ Imitative etc. These are only a few of those who

have ventured into Chechnya to aid the suffering civilians; they also have faced threats from

local and Russian forces(Amnesty International 2006, Ferras 2007, Amnesty International 2007,

Amnesty International 2009, Amnesty International 2010, ECCHR 2011, Human Rights Watch

2011, Amnesty international 2011, Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Watch 2012,

Amnesty International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2013).The most notable would be the local

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civilians that work for Memorial in Moscow in particular, former HR worker and journalists:

Anna Politkovskaya and Natalia Estemirova.

Both journalists worked for the Russian newspaper Nova Gazeta in Chechnya and were

investigating cases on abductions and torture cases. Politkovskaya had worked for Nova Gazeta

during the wars and published numerous books about the abuses and corruption of Russian and

local officials as far up as President Putin(Fox News 2006, Johnston 2006, Kommersant. 2006,

Washington Post 2006, Feifer 2010, FDIH 2011, FDIH 2012, Memorial 2007, Jenkins 2007,

Parafit 2011, Memorial 2012). She was murdered in her home in October of 2006 while working

on a case of abducted youth. After her sudden death her supporters rallied and demanded the

court to find and prosecute the guilty parties; however the local government did nothing and

ignored the matter. It would not be until 2008 when a re-trial would begin for a suspect who had

fit the profile. However, he was let off “due to lack of evidence (Fox News 2006, Johnston 2006,

Kommersant. 2006, Washington Post 2006, Feifer 2010, FDIH 2011, FDIH 2012, Memorial

2007, Jenkins 2007, Parafit 2011, Memorial 2012)”. Such complicity and neglect is common in

such cases, for the same happened to Natalia Estemirova in 2009(Fox News 2006, Johnston

2006, Kommersant. 2006, Washington Post 2006, Feifer 2010, FDIH 2011, FDIH 2012,

Memorial 2007, Jenkins 2007, Parafit 2011, Memorial 2012). She too was not only followed for

three years by “local” thugs, but was shot in the head and her dead body dragged to the site

where she was investigating a murder days before her death(Finn 2005, Amnesty International

2006, Ferras 2007, Amnesty International 2007, Presse 2008, Amnesty International 2009, Fiefer

2010, Amnesty International 2010). Others were to soon follow during the years of 2006-2010

and the Chechen population would be forced to be silent. During these four years numerous

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NGOs and IGOs were forced out of Chechnya leaving vulnerable civilians to be treated by the

few local remaining NGOs like Memorial to care and advocate for them.

Since their departure Chechnya has continued to slide into further chaos. While the most

of the insurgents are either dead or are imprisoned, the dirty war has continued. Mass graves

continue to be found by accident. Commemoration services are banned, national memorials

destroyed, unemployment ranges around 45% percent(Finn 2005, Amnesty International 2006,

Ferras 2007, Amnesty International 2007, Presse 2008, Amnesty International 2009, Fiefer 2010,

Amnesty International 2010, ECCHR 2011, Human Rights Watch 2011, Amnesty international

2011, Amnesty International 2012, Doctors Without Borders 2012, FDIH 2012, Human Rights

Watch 2012, US State Department 2012, Amnesty International 2013, Dyomki 2013, Elder

2013, Human Rights Watch 2013, Frontline Defenders 2014). Moreover, homelessness is

rampant, there are 250,000 children are orphans, the majority of civilians have PTSD (77%), and

high infant mortality (17 per 1,000 babies) marks the highest in Russia (Doctors Without Borders

2012). The only hope comes from those who have been able to flee into EU countries and appeal

to the European Human Rights Courts about the ongoing abuses in Chechnya during the second

war. Almost 65% of all 141,450 cases from Chechnya have found the state at fault. Despite this,

no policy has been put in place to hold the guilty parties accountable or end the ongoing

impunity(Lapitska 2011, Vert 2012, Toft 2012, Sundstrom 2012).

All of these conditions have lingered on, but what is worse is that no one can speak out

without getting killed. It is no wonder why the North Caucuses have continued to be a hotbed for

terrorism despite the strict authoritarian measures in place.

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Recent Developments 2010-2014

With the tumultuous events of 2006-2009 one would think the Kremlin would re-think

their strategy in the North Caucuses and start appropriate state-building polices. However, 2010

was an election year in Russia and as always there were controversies. According to voter

watchdog groups, the Moscow Helsinki Group declared that the election results favoring Putin

were “illegitimate” due to voter intimidation and voter fraud(Finn 2005, Sakwa 2005, Amnesty

International 2006, Ferras 2007, Amnesty International 2007, Presse 2008, Sakwa

2008,Amnesty International 2009, Russell 2011, Sakwa 2013). Nowhere else would this be

more of the truth than in Chechnya. Kadyrov in 2010 came out and boasted that 97% of

Chechens voted in the election and Putin’s party received 99.3% of the votes casted; and Putin

himself won 91.2% of those votes. Now these numbers are certainly the outliers in comparison to

the rest of Russia where only 63.3% of Russians voted and Putin barely received a majority of

those votes(Finn 2005, Sakwa 2005, Amnesty International 2006, Ferras 2007, Amnesty

International 2007, Presse 2008, Sakwa 2008,Amnesty International 2009, Russell 2011, Sakwa

2013). It was clear that Chechens were the “most pressured and intimated voters in Russia” due

to Kadyrov’s absolute dependency of his boss, Vladimir Putin(Finn 2005, Sakwa 2005, Amnesty


2008,Amnesty International 2009, Russell 2011, Sakwa 2013). It was clear Putin was the

president for good and the Chechens’ condition would not improve. However, the close ties

between Kadyrov and Putin began to become less congeal in March of 2010 when Kadyrov

refused to relinquish Chechnya’s only blessing, oil (Finn 2005, Sakwa 2005, Amnesty


2008,Amnesty International 2009, Russell 2011, Sakwa 2013).

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Unlike the neighboring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan, Chechnya (and Grozny

itself) has over 800,000 tons of oil that is being pumped by the Rosneft Company(Finn 2005,

Sakwa 2005, Amnesty International 2006, Ferras 2007, Amnesty International 2007, Presse

2008, Sakwa 2008,Amnesty International 2009, Russell 2011, Sakwa 2013). Since the global

recession of 2008 the Kremlin had cut 30% of the allotted finical support to Chechnya or

Kadyrov’s regime (Finn 2005, Sakwa 2005, Amnesty International 2006, Ferras 2007, Amnesty

International 2007, Presse 2008, Sakwa 2008,Amnesty International 2009, Russell 2011, Sakwa

2013). The two leaders were at odds until President Putin secured the prestige of Russia by

hosting the 2014 Winter Olympics, and where better to show off his power but to have this

honored tradition in the most unstable region in Russia, Sochi a small town in the North

Caucuses. To most Russians this was an honor and secured Putin’s political popularity, however,

for thousands of Ingush and Chechens it meant further repression and suppression.

Very few questioned Putin’s Olympics gambit, for he was already in the process of

ensuring strict silence and obedience for all of Russia within the Duma. This strict obedience

took form in amending the Russian Criminal/Penal code, re-legalizing libel and deformation a

criminal offense(Human Rights Watch 2011, Foreign Agents Law, Human Rights Watch 2012,

Human Rights Watch 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014). Naturally, this would have been a

welcome reformed if the aim were to be less vague and focused on silencing Putin’s political

critics. The law itself has no “concrete” definition of what libel was, but its punishment was

labeled as an “administrative offense,” meaning violation in the form of stiff fines(Human Rights

Watch 2011, Foreign Agents Law, Human Rights Watch 2012, Human Rights Watch 2013,

Human Rights Watch 2014). According to a Russian legal team for Human Rights Watch Tonya

Lokshina, “These high fines can effectively suffocate smaller Russian media outlets and seem

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designed to increase self-censorship in mass media and online(Human Rights Watch 2011,

Foreign Agents Law, Human Rights Watch 2012, Human Rights Watch 2013, Human Rights

Watch 2014).” In addition to the law that is most crucial in understating Lokshina’s statement is

that of the proviso that states “on libel against judges, jurors, prosecutors, and law enforcement

officials” which is punishable by a fine of up to 2 million rubles. Most HR legal scholars claim

that “such a provision is incompatible with Russia’s human rights obligations, especially the

need to protect freedom of expression (Human Rights Watch Report 2010, Parafit

2011,Memorial 2012, Human Rights Watch Report 2010, Elder 2013).” The last attempt for

productive dialogue was now gone, and certain Russians resorted to more drastic measures,

terrorism; particularly those in the Caucuses.

In March 2010, in a local station in Moscow was bombed, leaving 40 people dead and

102 injured with 88 of those being critical condition. It was soon blamed on Chechen terrorists-

separatist; two Dagestani women with supposed links to al-Qaeda via the Chechen separatist

leader, Doko Umarov demanding Russian leave the “Caucasus Emirate(Tutov 2011).”3 This was

to worst attacks in six years, but was not to be the last of the terrorist attacks committed by

Islamic fundamentalists. In 2011 and 2012, further bombings occurred in Makhachkala in

Dagestan4 and the Domodedovo International Airport bombing( Tutov 2011).5 Russian security

kept expanded year by year as the Sochi Games came closer. It was essential to continue

counter-terrorism measures at any cost. A sense of paranoia and xenophobia had set in after the

numerous bombings, Russia’s main watchdog group, Memorial in 2011 stated that “Russians

have become more suspicious and fearful of foreigners in the past 5 years.” This paranoia was to

3 The Emirate was declared in 2005 by the insurgency lead by Shamil Basayev and Doko Umarov who was just recently killed in March of 20144 Killed 37 people wounding 1735 Killed 13 people and injuries unknown

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become institutionalized in 2012 when the Russian Duma passed Public Law No.272-FZ the

“Foreign Agent Law”. This placed numerous restrictions upon NGOs both local and foreign.

Literature Review

While the recent Russo-Chechen conflict may be a ‘forgotten conflict’ in the eyes of the

world, there is a strong body of literature on the conflict from historical accounts. Said accounts

regard human rights documents from the international community, data analysis or predictions

from academics on the region, and the personal narratives of the victims themselves from

documentaries to blogs. This literature review will take into account each of these sources in

order to present the body of literature that exists on the Russo-Chechen conflict.

Historical & Political Literature: Articles

In recent years there have been many political articles written on the topics of state

building, governance, indiscriminate violence and the repression of Chechens by President Putin

and his political puppet Ramzan Kadyrov. One of the most prominent and well known authors is

Professor John Russell. Two of Russell’s articles, Chechen Elites: Control, Cooption or

Substitution and Kadyrov’s Chechnya: Template, Test or Trouble for Russia’s Policy highlight

the main political questions and tensions that are facing the region today, particularly the

relationship between Kadyrov and President Putin. In Russell’s first piece, he discusses the

strategies of Russia’s current government in Chechnya (Russell 2011). He begins by stating “the

emergence of an autocratic leader post-conflict Chechnya, traditionally structured on polycentric

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elites from clans and regions, has been just one of the outcome of Vladimir Putin’s

‘Chechenization’ policy” and that what is at the heart of this government is a shrewd and

assertive leader, Ramzan Kadyrov(Russell 2011). It is under Kadyrov that Chechnya has been re-

built as well as re-integrated within the Russian Federation (Russell 2011). In 2010, Kadyrov had

openly welcomed back “any elites or forces that sought separation from Russia”, which is

curious being that Chechnya has a long history of rebellion against Russia. But what has

changed? In Russell’s view this self-assertion hides the fact that while Chechnya is de jure part

of the Russian Federation, though it is ruled de facto by Kadyrov who has made many deals with

Putin. By delivering to Putin stability (the illusion of it), oil revenues, and political power in the

forms of votes, Kadyrov has also been able to broker local elites or former guerilla leaders,

which is a normal practice in a ‘power vertical’ structured government (Russell 2011).

The local Chechen government resembles that USA’s nineteenth-century Tammany Hall

where there is a boss-client relationship; in this case the top boss is President Putin and below is

Kadyrov and his cronies, who are responsible for enforcing his rule and promoting Putin’s

agenda (and promote local norms) (Russell 2011). In terms of why these local leaders switched

sides during the war is more complex (Russell 2011). Some of the leaders switched over because

of the division in religion, in which moderate Sufis distrusted the Wahhabi splinter groups that

embraced jihad and others did not trust the Dudayev’s or Maskhadov’s government due to their

inability to assert rule of law in Chechnya (Russell 2011). There was too much division and

radicalism for the small republic to remain “independent” and those who sided with Russians

would at least garnish some personal benefit, even if it meant betraying Chechen independence

(Russell 2011). Those who have placed their bets with the Russians in the end seemed to have

made a safe choice for there has been a compromise between Russian government’s interests and

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the Chechen elite: Chechnya is Russia, but culturally its own (Russell 2011). This devolution of

power is in a sense unique, for Chechnya is one of the few Caucasian regions to enjoy such

autonomy from Moscow(Russell 2011). However, Dr. Richard Sakwa argues that this

compromise is not complete devolution on the part of the Kremlin due to the way they have

responded to current issues in Chechnya.

Professor Richard Sakwa, professor at the University of Kent in the United Kingdom, is

one of the leading experts on Eurasian affairs, particularly Russian politics in Chechnya.

According to Sakwa the dual governmental model in Chechnya is unique in a sense that “There

is a contrast between the constitutional state and the administrative regime defines contemporary

Russia”. This means that the Russian Constitution has certain provisions that the Chechen

“Republic” does not adhere to until it comes to administrative issue, being that of legal codes and

civil codes (Sakwa 2013). However, in terms of sustainability, Chechnya has been a “blow back”

to Russian policy due to the financial and political burdens it has placed upon Russia, ranging

from financial burdens (rebuilding projects, sustainability of local business, and extensive

poverty among the population) and socio-political burdens in terms of corruption, lack of

political transparency, and the continued human rights violations(Sakwa 2013). Each of these

factors have contributed to Chechnya’s current condition causing many political discussions

inside the Kremlin on solving these issues, which will be discussed by the next group of

authors(Sakwa 2013).

Roland Dannreuther and Luke March along with Stephen Blank and Ole Solvang,

analyze the effectiveness of Putin’s polices on Chechnya. However, each author differs on how

they categorize and asses Putin’s policies. Dannruether and March claim that Putin’s

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propaganda machine has been the main source of calling Chechnya a ‘success’ in ending the

Islamic insurgency in Russia as part of the war on terror; Blank and Solvang’s assert that Putin

has launched a campaign of state terrorism upon the Chechen people(Dannruether and March

2007, Solvang 2009).

According to Dannreuther and March’s account Chechnya: From Russian enemy to its

proxy assert that Putin’s main way of controlling the situation in Chechnya is that of media

control and being complicit in Kadyrov’s action to establish censorship upon local media stations

in Chechnya(Dannruether and March 2007). This has helped him in the election polls in Russia

during the 2012 election, let alone that is how Putin came to power by being the “strong man”

unlike his predecessor, Yeltsin during the first Chechen conflict(Dannruether and March 2007).

Due to Putin’s decisive actions in launching a “total war” upon Chechnya and establishing an

ability to negotiate and establish a ‘Russian proxy’ government that was charged with the main

duty of combating domestic terrorism in the Caucuses(Dannruether and March 2007). However,

in the authors’ view this success is an example “Putin’s spin on luck” because in 2005 Alsan

Maskhadov, head of the Chechen resistance died by “accident” when a Russian convoy’s

misplaced grenade blew in 2005, otherwise Maskhadov would have been still in

hiding(Dannruether and March 2007). The same can also be said for the death of the second in

command of the Chechen resistance, Shamil Basayev whom died in 2006 from an explosion

(Dannruether and March 2007).

No one is really sure what the circumstances are that caused his death though most

believe that it was an FSB assassination that killed the rebel leader (Dannruether and March

2007). To many Chechens, the death of Maskhadov was a big blow to the Chechen nationalist

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cause and a sign that the Russians were closing in the Chechen resistance (Dannruether and

March 2007). Other academics like Blank and Solvang claim this was only the beginning of

Russian suppression of the Chechen resistance. Blank’s account Putin's Twelve Step Program

lists and analyzes the numerous steps Putin has taken to suppress the Chechen resistance and

ensure that his policy agenda will be implemented in the rebellious region(Blank 2010). He

claims that this has been done by the use of “excessive force” during the Second Chechen war,

mostly during the Battle for Grozny. Mass human rights violation committed by Russian troops

and re-structuring of the KGB to the FSB as a part of the Global War on Terror. Other methods

include instituting or drafting anti-European laws (i.e. anti-gay legislation and censorship laws)

and “recriminalizing libel” in the Russian criminal code (Blank 2010). The author even takes the

step further to claim that like Stalin, Putin has a personal vendetta against the Chechen based on

history(Blank 2010). President Putin is well known to be an admirer of the Russian Tsars and

that he seeks to emulate them, and has done this by destroying the ‘traditional enemies’ of the

Russian state, the Chechens by fighting and “winning” the Second Chechen War along with

wiping out the resistance movement and establishing a “puppet government” that follows his

rules(Blank 2010).

All of these polices have led to the current situation in Chechnya causing a society to live

in fear. Ole Solvang’s piece Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Price of Non-

Cooperation is much more forward in a sense that he openly states that the wars against

Chechnya were acts of state terrorism and reiterates the Blank’s list of reasons, particularly that

of the Second Chechen War, but adds the First Chechen War to the list as well.According to

Solvang the First Chechen War merits its place in the list due to the chaotic situation before and

during the short period of Chechen independence that Russia played a “behind the scenes role”

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in terms of fueling the internal tensions that lead to the second war(Solvang 2009). In the 1990’s,

Chechnya was a hot bed for violence and crime, for after the collapse of the Soviet Union rule of

law was nonexistent and many people resorted to crime as means of economic survival(Solvang

2009). This was especially the case in Chechnya who had immediately declared independence,

and had not yet elected a government (Solvang 2009). However, as time went on the heads of the

republic had closer ties with weapons dealers; Solvang specifically cites President Dudayev’s

weapons dealer connections (Solvang 2009). He describes Chechnya during this period as an

“open arms bazaar” where anyone could access or buy an A-47 or other arms. This was one of

the reasons why the first Chechen War was so bloody, for both parties were almost equally

armed, causing mass devastation during the war and armed crime after it(Solvang 2009).

Here is where Solvang attacks the Russian government’s policies in Chechnya because

most of the crimes have been committed by either Russian forces or Chechen guerillas during

both wars. Many crimes remain unsolved and unaddressed by the Russian government who is

legally responsible to address these issues but has not made an effort at all (Solvang 2009). Most

Chechens have some a legal grievance and have resorted to appealing to the ECtHR who until

2006 had actively addressed these grievances in Court (Solvang 2009). It is the lack of action to

end or even address the continued violence and human rights violations in Chechnya that truly

illustrates the level of the Kremlin’s complicity in the crimes that create such terror in the

region(Solvang 2009).

Historical & Political Literature: Books

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The first body of literature to be presented is that of the historical texts from the

following authors: John Dunlop, Thomas de Waal, Sebastian Smith, James Hughes and Paul

Murphy, Richard Sakwa, Anna Politkovskaya, and Rick Fawn. Each of these authors have

donated their time and efforts into writing about the past and present of Chechnya, even if

history is not their main profession.

The first author to be discussed is John Dunlop’s book, Russia Confronts Chechnya:

Roots of a Separatist Conflict. Dunlop, an expert in Russian-Soviet history/nationalism, has been

one of the key research academics and has played a crucial role in forming USA foreign policy

towards Russia since 1991. His study in nationalism is mostly focused on the Caucus region and

their interactions with both Imperial Russia and Soviet Russia. Dunlop’s text mostly focuses on

the earlier periods of Chechen history and their first encounters with the Russians in the 1700’s

from the treaty of Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783, and the Caucasian wars (Dunlop 1998).

According to Dunlop, the origins of Chechen nationalism and identity began during this period

when Orthodox Russia came in contact with their Islamic neighbors (Dunlop 1998). Unlike their

neighbors Georgia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia, the Chechens are unique because of

their religious affiliations and ties to old Persia/Ottoman Empire (Dunlop 1998). In some cases,

Chechens intermarried with Russian Cossacks but refused to convert to Christianity, thus

debunking Russian integration policy (Dunlop 1998). It is was this tension that spawned the

conflict once Russia had tried to not only “formally” annex Chechnya to its empire, but also to

establish a centralized Russian authority in the region(Dunlop 1998).

For centuries the Islamic peoples of the North Caucuses (Chechen, Ingush and Dagestan)

enjoyed a unique sense of local autonomy under a de-centralized government but when Russia

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began to assert its power and influence (i.e. Christian settlers and military presence) conflict

became inevitable - war erupted in 1817 with the Caucasian War(Dunlop 1998). One of the key

figures in this war that has left an imprint on the Chechen psyche and identity is that of Imam

Shamil(Dunlop 1998). Shamil was the head of the Caucuses people’s mountain forces and during

the war lead his 30,000 men into battle with the Russians for 47 years against the Russians

(Dunlop 1998). The Caucasian War was devastating to the local population despite their strategic

knowledge of geography, for while the Chechen fighters used the mountains for refuge, ethnic

cleansing was occurring in the villages below by Russian Cossacks (Dunlop 1998). This was to

be an everlasting wound to the Chechen people, 90% of the local population where either killed

or deported to the neighboring Ottoman Empire(Dunlop 1998). Shamil himself was captured in

1868, by Russian forces and exiled to small village outside Saint Petersburg. No one knows

exactly why Tsar Alexander II granted this amnesty, but what is clear is the impact his résistance

movement remains with Chechens to this day (Dunlop 1998).

While most researchers recognize the importance of the Caucasian War, some like

Thomas de Waal argue that the spark of conflict between Russians and Chechens is not about

religion(De Waal 2010). In Thomas de Waal’s texts The Caucuses an Introduction and

Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus disagrees with Dunlop on two accounts: the reasons for the

conflict and the importance of Caucasian War(De Waal 2010). De Waal agrees with Dunlop that

there is a religious undertone to the conflict and has played a major role, but is not the spark of

the conflict (De Waal 2010). It was more so of the issue of power or sovereignty which has been

the backbone of the conflict (De Waal 2010). The Chechens have always been very independent

of the Russians prior to Caucasian War, and were very strict within their own community (De

Waal 2010). Most did not intermarry with Russians or other Christian groups and isolated

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themselves from them in order to retain their power (De Waal 2010). De Wall claims this tactic

is very applicable to the present and argues that this is Kadyrov’s rational in implementing and

enforcing Sharia law in Chechnya today (De Waal 2010). De Wall takes this notion even further

stating that implementing Sharia in Chechnya is an act of defiance against Putin to remind him of

the power of Chechen nationalism(De Waal 2010). It is nationalism that fuels the Russo-

Chechen conflict not religion, for De Waal was one of the few British journalists that have

visited Chechnya during both wars; his second text discusses this further(De Waal 2010).

According to De Waal, Chechen nationalism stems from the traditions and history of

Imam Shamil clan’s resistance against imperial Russia (De Waal 2010). After his exile outside

Saint Petersburg, Shamil continued to preserve the Chechen ethos through his children and

grandchildren. It was his descendants that aroused the people to rise up against the Tsar in the

1877 Rebellion (De Waal 2010). It was this rebellion not that cemented Shamil’s popularity in

Chechen culture (De Waal 2010). The 1877 rebellion was the Chechen’s second major attempt to

push out the Russian Empire from the Caucuses region for good (De Waal 2010). Russia was

engaged in a war with the Ottoman Empire as a part of the Crimean War in the mid 1800’s (De

Waal 2010). Accounts of the rebellion are well known and romanticized by authors like Tolstoy

who were stationed in the region during the war (De Waal 2010). Being of the same faith and

ethnic identity the Chechens took full advantage of the war by siding with the Ottomans and

conducting guerilla war upon the local imperial officials (De Waal 2010). Unfortunately, the

movement was short lived and the rebellion was put down with brute force by Russian forces

(De Waal 2010). Humiliated and defeated the Chechens faced further repression by imperial

officials; the Ingush language was banned and certain Islamic practices (reading Quran) was

banned (De Waal 2010). However, despite this Chechens continued to desire independence and

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practiced their religious rites in secret (De Waal 2010). Worse was to come for the Chechens

even after regime change in Moscow.

With the Russian Revolution in 1917 there came many changes for the Chechen people in

Russia, they enjoyed a short period of political autonomy under Lenin (De Waal 2010). This was

to change radically after his death in 1924 Stalin took power (De Waal 2010). Stalin was very

familiar with the Chechens and their history, in part due to Stalin’s Georgian descent where he

learned to despise the Chechens (De Waal 2010). In De Waal’s writing he asserts the recent wars

were spawned by an unaddressed grievance that occurred under Stalin in the 1940’s that

traumatized the Chechen people ever since (De Waal 2010). This grievance was the mass

deportation and subsequent genocide of the Ingush peoples to Soviet Siberia/Central Asia (De

Waal 2010). All of the “Ingush” peoples6 of the North Caucuses were forced to march in a period

of four days in the middle of winter and across rough terrains to Siberia (De Waal 2010).

Majority of Chechens died on this forced march, and the estimated death toll was estimated

around 400,000-to-724,297 persons (66 percent) (De Waal 2010).

These figures are still debated today and there has been little effort by Moscow to fact

find and educate Russians about the genocidal march as well as the massacres that occurred

along the way in Kahibah(De Waal 2010). It is these grievances that have driven most Chechens

to hate or distrust anything Russian (De Waal 2010). One very insightful quote by an elderly

man from De Waal’s interview in his second text sums up the trauma amongst the Chechen

population. “Hatred for the Russian we received by our mother’s milk” (De Waal 2010). With

such animosity brewing it is no wonder why the Chechen conflict continues (De Waal 2010). De

6 Mainly Chechens but other minorities were deported as well, Kalymuks (Mongolian Russians) Balkars and Karachays( Turkish speaking Russians)

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http://www.google.com/search?biw=1366&bih=667&q=Kahibah&spell=1&sa=X&ei=7g2HUePvMoTH0gGTxYHYCA&ved=0CCoQBSgA



Wall also goes into a short history about the first Chechen war and how independence proved

difficult for to maintain in the early 1990’s (De Waal 2010). After the collapse of the Soviet

Union, Chechens once again made a gambit for independence but failed miserably due to their

lack of experiences in operating under a centralized government(De Waal 2010). From 1991-

1994 there was no sign of regional stability regardless of how hard President Dudayev tried (De

Waal 2010).

A major problem was the role the international community played by not recognizing

Chechnya, which in De Waal’s opinion, may have de-escalated the immense tension in the

region (De Waal 2010). The immediate gain was that of Russia’s original recognition of

Chechnya as independent with the singing of the Kursvurt Accords (De Waal 2010). Otherwise,

there were no other benefits and many grew frustrated with Dudayev’s government and sided

with the radical factions (De Waal 2010). Chechnya’s failure was due to internal factors that

caused the fall of the independent Republic, as well as another war with Russia (De Waal 2010).

Over half-a-million refugees were forced into crowded camps on the borders of Russian

Dagestan/Ingushetia with ‘no formal’ economy and where weapons were readily available on the

black market. Warlords sought power or control of oil revenue and no foreign investors worked

with the Chechen government (De Waal 2010). It is no surprise that insurgents and unemployed

persons resorted to kidnappings, robbery and murder (De Waal 2010). It was clear that central

authority broke down and ‘other means’ to obtain power and support became the norm (De Waal

2010). In 1999, a renegade Islamist group bombing of an apartment in Moscow led Moscow to

immediately blame the Chechens (De Waal 2010). Again, the Russian military intervened in

Chechnya, sparking the second Chechen War, which was bloodier than the first. This time,

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Moscow prepared to use counter-terrorism tactics with the latest technology against land and air

strikes (De Waal 2010).

Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, attacks upon civilians became accepted practice

(De Waal 2010). It was during this war that the most human rights violations were committed by

the Russian military where a “disproportional use of force” was committed against civilians(De

Waal 2010). Such crimes included ballistic missiles that targeted civilians; cluster bombs,

sweeps of refugee camps; establishing military law and occupation in Grozny; civilian

abductions; illegal detainments of civilians; and establishing military camps where prisoners

were tortured (the death toll for this war is still unknown)( De Waal 2010). Unfortunately, these

human right violations would continue after Russian forces would withdrew in 2006. Under

Kadyrov, such practices became the norm for civilians and human rights workers that speak out

(De Waal 2010).

Like Dunlop and De Waal there is another earlier account of the Caucuses and the origins

of conflict, that is Smith’s account Allah's Mountains: Battle for Chechnya. His book has been

critiqued as too “pro-Chechen” whilst others see his work in a more positive light revealing the

suffering of the Chechens during the First Chechen War (Smith 2005). Majority of the text

describes the entirety of the Russian Caucus region from Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia,

Chechnya and Dagestan (Smith 2005). He too reiterates the early history of the Caucasian War

and how religion plays the main role in Caucasian identity, particularly during the transition

period from the tsars to communist times.

Smith’s text describes the religious diversity of the Caucuses, how there were once a

numerous amounts of Jews and Tartars living amongst the Muslims in the Caucuses and how

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each of them respected each other and worked the land (Smith 2005). This was why the

Caucuses were such a de-centralized region, for this was the best way to grant or allow mixed

groups of peoples to live together (Smith 2005). However, this was to be shattered when Stalin

took control and ordered the deportation of all “Ingush” peoples (Smith 2005). This text provides

a “general” perspective and establishes that the Chechens were not the only minority group

repressed by Stalin; Jews, Pontics (mix of Ingush-Greek), and Tartars were targeted too (Smith

2005).

However, Smith highlights the fact that Chechens were unique in a sense, due to their

determination to survive (Smith 2005). The Chechens were a part of the group that survived the

deportations and came back to their homeland, whereas other groups like the Tartars moved to

modern day Ukraine, Greeks went back their homeland or settled in Armenia and majority of

Jews moved to Israel(Smith 2005). Smith’s account is a part of this body of literature because it

is a reminder that other groups suffered as well.

The fourth and fifth author that is a main part of the literature is that of John Hughes and

Paul Murphy; both discuss the point of view of the Islamic insurgents. Hugh’s Chechnya: From

Nationalism to Jihad and The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror

describe how a secular nationalist cause morphed into an Islamic call to jihad. Most academics

discussed the level of influence religion has had on the Chechen struggle for independence. Like

Dunlop, Hughes asserts that religion is key to understand the independence movement and after

the first Chechen War (Hughes 2007). It was during the brief period when Dudayev failed in the

state build process that Islamic fundamentalism became popular for both Chechens and foreign

mujahedeen fighters (Hughes 2007). According to Hughes and Murphy most fighters joined the

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http://books.google.com/books?id=_LXfR7wNWTUC&printsec=frontcover



Islamic radicals like Shamil Basayev and Doko Umarov either for two reasons: money or jihad

(Hughes 2007). Those who joined for money were initially secular but sided with the

fundamentalists for they gave them opportunities to make money through crime that existed

since the 1991(Hughes 2007). Others joined because it was their nationalistic “duty” to fight for

Chechnya (Hughes 2007). More religious fighters state that it for jihad against the ‘West’ that

was destroying Chechnya’s ties with the past and their Islamic culture (Hughes 2007). Such a

conclusion is not difficult to understand given the fact that the international community, besides

Poland, Estonia, Latvia, was very slow to recognize Chechnya (Hughes 2007). This just added to

the pre-existing trauma of most Chechens; their only allies were the Islamic extremists (Hughes

2007). Under these circumstances it was not difficult for the Islamic factions to find volunteers

both in Chechnya and abroad. Hughes notes that many came from Syria, Yemen, Iraq, but

mostly Afghanistan (Hughes 2007). Hughes and Murphy attribute this to the fact that Kabul was

the only government at the time to recognize Chechnya as an independent state in the 1990’s

(Murphy 2004, Hughes 2007). Radical Islam became more popular during the second Chechen

conflict and with the events of 2001 it also escalated tensions within Chechnya among the

civilians population (Murphy 2004, Hughes 2007).

The second Chechen war in Hughes’ and Murphy’s view is unique for this is where

Islamic fundamentalism blends in with the secular cause of self-determination (Murphy 2004,

Hughes 2007). One becomes a method of achieving the other, for it seems to be the best option

for many due to the diplomatic history of the conflict. However, this comes with many

disadvantages, especially after the 9/11 attacks for the world forgets the aspect of self-

determination and just sees an Islamic terrorism (Murphy 2004, Hughes 2007). Hughes and

Murphy also discuss how this has impacted Russian policy and how President Putin has used the

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9/11 attacks to justify his ‘counter terrorism policy in Chechnya with the numerous “sweep

operations” conducted by both by Russian troops and pro-Moscow police forces (Murphy 2004,

Hughes 2007). The next author, Richard Sakwa, discusses this topic in more detail.

The first text by Sakwa is that of Chechnya from Past to Future, where he highlights the

personal stories and reports of fighters and civilians during the first Chechen War and after

(Sakwa 2005). Unlike the previous authors, Sakwa presents a different perspective of the

conflict rather than just a historical or political narrative. He writes through a human security

lenses and argues the current conflict in Chechnya is about unaddressed grievances from

previous events (i.e. genocides and ethnic cleansing that occurred), and has been accepted by

most western scholars today (Sakwa 2005).

Like Hughes, he discusses the convergence of Islamic fundamentalism and Chechen self-

determination but disagrees with Hughes on the reasons why people joined the Islamic

fundamentalists or “mountain fighters” (Sakwa 2005). In his point of view most joined these

forces due to the repressive political climate in Chechnya and how both Russian and local

governments have not acknowledged or made attempts to reconcile the past with the present

(Sakwa 2005). Since 2005, President Putin has conducted a “dirty war” in conjunction with the

Chechen President Ramzan Kadryov to wipe out the “Islamic terrorists” in the Caucuses that has

had horrendous consequences for both fighters and civilians (Sakwa 2005). Since the beginning

of the Second Chechen War there have been over 500,000 refugees living in camps (Sakwa

2005). Those who have come back to Grozny and other cities find the place changed and order to

survive must follow and support President Putin’s regime in order to rebuild (Sakwa 2005).

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However, many Chechens do not trust Kadyrov or his promises of rebuilding projects due

to fears of indiscriminate violence that goes unpunished and human dignity is nonexistent (). In

Sakwa’s view this is due to Putin’s exploitation of “Islamophobia” since 9/11, in which he has

used the “ticking time bomb” premise to silence opposition to “sweep” operations that hunt

down “terrorists” rather than “Chechen nationalists” (Sakwa 2005). Those terms have been

replaced in order to justify the excessive force used by Russian forces and pro-Moscow service

men (i.e. Caucasian front); these are the perpetrators violating human rights of civilians and

refugees from kidnappings, forced abductions of young males suspected of being terrorists,

torture, murder, harassment, and rape (Sakwa 2005). All of these have been present in Chechnya

since 2001, pushing Chechens to choose sides, either to fight back by joining the “terrorists” in

the mountains or be silent and suffer(Sakwa 2005). Several young Chechens have chosen to

fight with the terrorists for in their eyes the only way to achieve independence and preserve their

culture is by fighting (Sakwa 2005).

Those who do not fight either ignore the participation of the community members and are

silent, others side with the Russians and try to gain favor, but most play both sides (Sakwa 2005).

Majority of the accounts from civilians in Dr. Sakwa’s account resemble those who have helped

hiding Jews in Nazi Germany or those who helped supply the French Resistance with

information and food; Chechen women in particularly fall into this category and being such they

are the most harassed by policemen or Russian forces (Sakwa 2005). Fortunately for the victims

of these human right abuses by both local and national regimes human rights workers have

reported these atrocities to the world and they have gained some attention(Sakwa 2005).

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Professor Sakwa’s second book Fire from Below elaborates on the current political

situation “on the ground” in Chechnya, much further than other pieces in relation to the tensions

that now exist between Kadyrov and Putin(Sakwa 2013). Sakwa’s piece provides more updated

details on how Kadyrov is keeping his power through his personal guard or Kadyrovsky in

eliminating his political enemies that are mostly human rights workers and NGOs who criticize

his regime internationally(Sakwa 2013). According to Sakwa, these reports have caused more

tension between Kadyrov and Putin since 2009 when President Putin ended Russian military

“sweep operations” in Chechnya declaring “Mission accomplished”(Sakwa 2013). By this time

the unsolved murder of several international human rights activists who were abducted and killed

in 2006 became international news, particularly those of Anna Politkovskaya and Natalia

Estrominova (Sakwa 2013). Putin since the murders has made statements undermining the

importance of Politkovskaya and Estrominova, though it has weakened Kadyrov’s position in the

Kremlin (Sakwa 2013). It is well known that most of Putin’s advisors do not trust Kadyrov and

see him as political liability to Putin’s regime (Sakwa 2013). Sakwa speculates that Putin had a

“brief” discussion with Kadryov about the murders (Sakwa 2013). When questioned Kadyrov

placed blame upon the remaining Islamic insurgents in the mountains, which Putin had accepted

and has taken further measures to repress civil society in Russia(Sakwa 2013).

Luckily for the Chechens, this premise of “Islamic insurgency” is no longer accepted by

the international community due the numerous brave IGO’s and NGOs that have worked in

Chechnya during and after the wars(Sakwa 2013). Most of the NGO’s on a humanitarian aid

missions during and after the wars had now turned into political rights activists (Sakwa 2013).

Sakwa further explains that the connection between their previous duties and current actions

were because of how Putin’s government did not address the grievances (Sakwa 2013). No effort

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had been made by either government to help veterans or refugees whom the next key author

illustrates.

Anna Politkovskaya’s work A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya

elaborates on the cruelties of the Russian government in Chechnya both during and after the wars

in Chechnya (Politkovskaya 2003). Politkovskaya was a correspondent for the liberal Moscow

newspaper Novaya Gazeta, and is the only journalist who had access the region despite Putin’s

restrictions of journalists during the Second Chechen War(Politkovskaya 2003).

Naturally as reporter Politkovskaya was at risk when reporting about certain

“occurrences” during war, but what she wrote the most about was the amount of human suffering

amongst civilians during the Russian air bombardment of Grozny with missiles (Politkovskaya

2003). Her accounts describe the mass destruction of the city and the numerous dead civilians

from the air attack (Politkovskaya 2003). Unlike the first war the Russians were supported by a

powerful air force and force that out-gunned the Chechen fighters (Politkovskaya 2003). There

were about 3,000-to-6,000 Chechen fighters versus the estimated 50,000 Russian soldiers and

2,000 Chechens who decided to side with the Russians (Politkovskaya 2003). In her account

Politkovskaya describes how this wore down the Chechen fighters physically and

psychologically along with the civilians who had PSTD from the last war (Politkovskaya 2003).

No one knew where to hide from the bombings and matters worsened when the Russians

launched a chemical attack attached to a TOS-1 thermo baric missile (Politkovskaya 2003). The

air siege lasted for several weeks and 4,000 Russian civilians also died during the strikes

(Politkovskaya 2003). There was no deciphering between Russian and Chechen in the bombings,

people of all ages were either trapped or killed in their basements (Politkovskaya 2003). Only

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Air_Force

http://books.google.com/books?id=M0NgDHDnpqgC&printsec=frontcover



30-to-40 civilians were able to escape the city during the bombing along with the remaining

Chechen fighters (Politkovskaya 2003). No one really knows how many civilians were injured or

died during the siege of Grozny (Politkovskaya 2003).

In December 1999 to January 2000 Grozny was hell just as the region had become the

center for war once more. Politkovskaya writes in her prelude of the book:

Naturally, I have traveled far and wide through all of Chechnya. I have seen a lot of

suffering. The worst of it is that many of the people I’ve been writing about for the past

two and a half years are now dead. It has been such a terrible war. Simply medieval,

even though it’s taking place as the twentieth century passes into the twenty-first, and in

Europe, too… So I want you to know the truth. Then you will be free of cynicism. And of

the sticky swamp of racism our society has been sliding into. And of having to make

difficult decisions about who’s right and who’s wrong in the Caucuses, and if there are

any real heroes there now (Politkovskaya 2003).

Politkovskaya was lucky to survive the siege of Grozny as well as the aftermath for she

too faced harassment on reporting about the conflict. In her books she describes her encounter

with Russian forces and was arrested on February 18, 2001. She writes about her detention and

her captors who tortured her during the process:

I demanded that they tell me my charges, write their report, and send me to prison so that my

family could at least bring me a toothbrush. “No!” they said. “You’re a militant! You came here

to look at the pits! Slut! Bitch! Basayev paid Yastrzhembsky for you, Yastrzhembsky paid your

editor, and your editor sent you here (Politkovskaya 2003).

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Unfortunately this was not to be the last time Anna was to be harassed or detained before

her luck would run out in 2006 when she uncovered more than she was supposed to know about

Russia's leaders in Chechnya and their involvement in the ongoing human rights

abuses(Politkovskaya 2003). Even after her death, Anna’s work inspires many of her peers at

Novaya Gazeta to continue to speak up about the abuses that went on during and after the war

(Politkovskaya 2003).

The last source to be discussed is that of Rick Fawn and his piece International

Organizations and Internal Conditionality: Making Norms Matter. This text is an overview of

EU Enlargement policy and how their influence has been unable to pressure Moscow in

following the Universal Deceleration of Human Rights along with other international legally

binding treaties(Fawn 2013). As previous literature has suggested there have been numerous

human rights violations during both wars observed and reported by Anna Politkovskaya and

other NGO’s in the region(Fawn 2013). Most of the IGO’s in the region are either a part of the

UN or the EU in particular agencies that provide legal aid to victims; most notably the European

Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

(OSCE)( Fawn 2013).

The ECtHR is one of the main organs of the EU and has reviewed and ruled on numerous

cases involving indiscriminate acts of violence committed against civilians or refugees; Russia

has been found culpable and fined various sums for damages (Fawn 2013). However, as the

author discusses there is no institutional mechanism to enforce the judicial ruling even if Russia

had signed an agreement with the ECtHR granting them legal jurisdiction in Chechnya (until

2006 when the treaty ended) (Fawn 2013). Another key area of legal casework is the issue of

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political asylum for refugees (Fawn 2013). Under the EU charter an EU nation has the right to

deny an individual political asylum if the client cannot prove the certainty of refoulment by their

home country (Fawn 2013). Since 2004, there has been a mass Chechen diaspora to EU nations

and many have sought legal protection from the EU to escape the political repression in Russia,

though some EU nations are not as flexible in terms of granting asylum as seen in the next source

section (Fawn 2013).

Human Rights Literature: Academic Articles

One of the most abundant pools of literature on the Chechen conflict is about Human

Rights (HR). Through annual reports from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) such as: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,

ECTHR case law, Moscow Helsinki Group and Memorial.

The first piece of HR literature is that of Julia Lapiskya and Freek der Vert on how the ECTHR

is dealing with the large amount of casework from Chechen victims. According to Julia

Lapitskya and Freek Van der Vert, the ECHR courts are overwhelmed with human rights abuses

case files because of the lack of respect for rule of law and habeas corpus rights in Russian

courts (Lapitskya 2011, Van der Vet 2012). Over 40,000 applications for ligations are being filed

from Chechnya and about 29 percent of them are unable to get to court either because of lack of

witnesses or evidence (Lapitskya 2011, Van der Vet 2012). Of these 29 percent of cases, 96

percent (as of 2010) of the cases have found the Russian government liable (Lapitskya 2011, Van

der Vet 2012). However, only 45 percent of the cases the Russian government has respected the

Court’s decision (Lapitskya 2011, Van der Vet 2012). Vert believes that these cases have come

to the EUCHR courts, not just because of the “stacked courts in Russia”, but because of the

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intimidation that occurs when a case is being filed (Lapitskya 2011, Van der Vet 2012). Both

client and legal advisor are either intimated or killed (Lapitskya 2011, Van der Vet 2012).

This was such the case with Natalya; she was helping a litigant by gathering testimonials

and evidence for a case, before she was murdered (Lapitskya 2011, Van der Vet 2012). Vert also

claims that NGO’s are the most targeted groups by thugs, such as SRJI (Dutch based) & EHRAC

(British) are targeted in Chechnya because of their ties with Natalya and the case (Van der Vet

2012). As to whom the thugs are and their connections to local or national governments is non-

existent, which is what spawned my curiosity and desire to study the subject (Van der Vet 2012).

However, the challenge is to find sources that focus specifically on how many NGO’s have been

targeted, why are they targeted, and what type of cases are being brought to court (Van der Vet

2012).

The exact break-down of the type of cases are dubious but the cases that have come to

court from Lapitska’s work are mostly forced abductions/disappearances and murder

(specifically in 2010) (Lapitskya 2011). About 40,050 out of 141,450 cases have come from

Russia and about 28.3 percent of those cases include more than just one HR violation on the part

of the Russian government (Lapitskya 2011). Around 59 percent have found that not only is the

Russian government liable but fails to provide evidence or cooperate with court decisions

(Lapitskya 2011). Lapitskya’s article continues to state that there is a new pattern in Russian

behavior and how the nation ignores court rulings; adherence of court decisions dropped from 29

percent to 10 percent in the span of two years (Lapitskya 2011). Another area of literature that is

abundant is that of EU case law for deportations of Chechens in other countries who fled Russia

for their lives (Lapitskya 2011).

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Some European countries have granted these refugees refuge, such as Sweden and

Norway. One of the most recently decided cases was that of I v. Sweden where a couple fled to

Sweden illegally in 2007 and was granted refuge in Sweden because it was proven within the

courts that if they were deported they would die (Lapitskya 2011, I vs. Sweden 2013). Such cases

have been on the rise since 2010, especially when it is a Chechen NGO worker or a witness in

the midst of a court case. And, in accordance to Article 13 (issue of political asylum), of the

Human Rights Convention, Sweden could not deport individuals that would face death if

deported (Lapitskya 2011). Unfortunately, this was one of the few cases that saved people’s lives

all because they spoke up, which is always hazardous (Lapitskya 2011). However, there has been

an effort from local Russian NGOs to enforce the ECtHR rulings though they too face numerous

institutional barriers as the next HR author will prove (Lapitskya 2011).

Lisa Sundstrom’s work is crucial to understand why civil society has been weak in Russia

not only due to the government structure but as to the lack of professional resources or staff for

local NGOs in Russia (Sundstrom 2012). Sundstrom’s work was an empirical study on advocacy

and litigation within the ECtHR on Russian NGO’s where she examines the various Russian

NGOs involved in litigation at the ECtHR in relation to level of advocacy for improved domestic

implementation (advocacy improving Russia’s adherence to Court decisions)(Sundstrom 2012).

Her paper traces four specific advocacy activities: adherence to ECtHR decisions, NGO access to

professional support, what legal precedents are being used in Russian courts and the level of

advocacy from NGOs (Sundstrom 2012). According to Sundstrom the “four key problem areas

for Russia’s implementation of the European Convention has resulted in : (1) domestic judges’

knowledge and citation of the European Convention or ECtHR case law; (2) the execution of

domestic court judgments by Russian state bureaucratic bodies; (3) extrajudicial disappearances

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and killings in anti-terrorist military operations in the North Caucasus; and (4) torture or

inhumane treatment in police detention(Sundstrom 2012).” She concludes that these are the

focus areas that need to be changed in order for the Russian government to properly adhere to

ECtHR rulings (Sundstrom 2012). In the end, it is up the Russian duma to create legislation that

will legally ensure that reforms are followed, or to create their own laws that make adhering to

ECtHR rulings impossible for numerous reasons (Sundstrom 2012).These reasons in the Russian

Federation’s case stem from both the state and Russian civil society itself, due the fact that

participating in civil society outside the political party is a new concept for Russian citizens since

the end of communism, therefore causing civil society to be disadvantaged in dealing with the

numerous political issues facing Russia today.

Henderson’s article Selling Civil Society: Western Aide and Nongovernmental

Organization Sector in Russia discuss the relationship between external aide and its effect on civil

society in Russia and if they have helped. In her research from interviewing numerous Russian

NGOs her results have yielded that sending aide had “inadvertently had the opposite affect”

creating a “principled clientelism” in Russia mostly due to the issues of the “grant game” rather

building facilitating civic development (Henderson 2005). This is mostly due to the Russian

NGO’s inability to re-create the NGO sector structure (being centralized, bureaucratized and

cooperate) (Henderson 2005). Another key problem that has inhibited the development the NGO

sector is that of Russian NGO not being able to decide on a cohesive mission statement causing it

to become difficult to obtain a constituency as well (Henderson 2005). Henderson’s report also

illustrates another phenomena that has caused some problems Russian-based NGOs; the external

“indirect pressure” for NGO’s to reflect US foreign policy (Henderson 2005). This is mostly due

to the clientelism argument that in order to retain and maintain an NGO the organization must

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please their donors in order to continue (Henderson 2005). The last issue Henderson analyzes is

the lack of professionalism within Russian NGOs (Henderson 2005). She claims that a lack of

funds or support of donors to export paid professionals to train workers in Russia (Henderson

2005). At the same time, despite the internal challenges of organizing and running and NGO,

there has also been a huge effort to build-up civil society in Russia in order to reinforce the

democratic process despite recent legislation that penalizes those who speak out (Henderson

2005). The next source describes the efforts being made by NGOs to preserve what little civil

society Russia contains(Henderson 2005).

Bowring’s work focuses on the aspect of Russian law and if the human rights ideology is

compatible with these laws (Bowring 2009). He also looks at particular case studies on how

Russia applies its laws in conflict regions like the North Caucuses (Bowring 2009). According to

Bowring it is hard to make a general assessment about Russia and their ability to follow human

rights because the country is so large and diverse thus creating many different political situations

for Moscow to address (Bowring 2009). On the positive side, Russia has a “rich history of

reform” from those under Catherine the Great, perestroika in the 1980’s, and most recently under

Yeltsin’s administration in the early 1990’s. European government bodies during this time began

to participate in the reforms from the signing of Human Rights conventions to reforms in the

Russian criminal code (Bowring 2009). However, reform stopped at the borders of the North

Caucuses, very few of the reforms under both former Yeltsin and Putin have ever been

implemented in this region(Bowring 2009).

Some speculate that it is due to the conflict; however, Bowring rejects this argument and

probes further by looking into the private correspondence between the Russian Foreign Minister

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and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe(Bowring 2009). The correspondence reveals

the true reason as to why human rights in certain regions of Russia are not being applied “were

not adequate and that the Russian Federation is unable to implement the duties specified in

Article 25 of the Convention” (Bowring 2009). It is from this statement that author concludes

that the lack of implementation stems from the Russian government blatantly ignoring the

protocols, but then pleads ignorance in Russia is how to apply them in certain situations.

Therefore, Bowring concludes that HR ideology is compatible with Russian law but it is

Moscow that does not wish to implement it for whatever reasons they wish(Bowring 2009). It

should come as no surprise that human rights and civil society in Russia have continually

worsened since the 1990’s, particularly in the North Caucuses.

Human Rights Literature: NGO Reports

A majority of the data compiled for this thesis derives from human rights (HR) reports

from the numerous NGOs involved in Chechnya from 1999-2014. The following selection of

literature is a small and updated snap shot of the current conditions in Russian Chechnya from

2007 and 2011-2014 from two major NGO’s: Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

The first report is from Human Rights Watch dated back to 2007 during one of the most

agitated years in Chechnya in terms of the number of HR violations that had occurred. The report

describes the following:

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ECtHR ruled against Russia in Chitayev v. Russia7 (first torture case against Russia there

are other cases pending) which was about illegal detentions of refugees(Human Rights

2007)

137 Journalists killed in Russia as a total(Human Rights 2007)

NGO Russian-Chechen Friendship charged with “inciting ethnic hatred” and shut was

shut down by Russian authorities(Human Rights 2007)

Russian Duma amended terrorism legislation in ways that would punish speech

characterized, respectively, as “propaganda” for terrorism or support of

“extremism” (Human Rights 2007)

54 forced disappearances or abductions have occurred and there has been no

investigation by local police(Human Rights 2007)

Murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya in late October 2006 by an “unidentified

gunman(Human Rights 2007)

New restrictive legislation imposed on NGOs which range from: reporting requirements

on all grant registration officials, law, officials may without a court order, demand any

document at any time from an NGO, can further order an intrusive inspection of an

NGO’s office(Human Rights 2007)

Another law requires foreign NGOs to submit annual and quarterly work plans and

permits government

officials have to banned certain projects or activities that conflict with Russia’s “national

interests(Human Rights 2007)”

7 There were majority of others including: Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia (2005), Isayeva, Yusupova, and Bazayeva v. Russia( 2005), Isayeva v. Russia (2005), Estamirov v. Russia (2006), Imakayeva v. Russia (2006), Luluyev and others v. Russia (2006) each of these cases dealt with either illegal detentions, abductions or reparations from the Second Chechen War

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All foreign NGOs had to re-register by mid-October; hundreds had to suspend their

operations for weeks while their applications were pending(Human Rights 2007)

These are only a few of the main events of 2006-2007 that have occurred in Chechnya.

Amnesty International has also documented these events in their reports; in particular the

concern for journalists in Russia. Despite the reports and the recommendations given by both

organizations and others, Moscow has refused to follow them and has resulted in a repetitive

pattern four years later in 2011. Amnesty International’s 2011 yearly report is similar to that in

2007 in terms of the legal issues concerning NGOs and the freedom in speech in Russia.

Numerous violations have occurred as listed below:

Arrest and illegal detention of several protesters (apx. 100) in Grozny on International

Support Day of Victims of Torture; these supporters were also charged of participating in

“subversive activities against the state (Amnesty International 2011)”

Head of the Members of the Interregional Committee against Torture harassed by thugs

with death threats in graffiti form on her house and work building(Amnesty International

2011)

Other Members of the Interregional Committee against Torture charged with being

affiliated with illegal terrorist groups(Amnesty International 2011)

Major change in the Russian Criminal Penal Code with the re-criminalization of

libel/deformation against public officials(Amnesty International 2011)

Reports reiterate the need for a thorough fact-finding Mission to find the culprit in the

murders of: Anna Politkovskaya; the 2009 murders of Memorial HR workers Natalia

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Estemirova, Zaremea Sadlayeva, and Alik (Umar) Dzhabrailov(Amnesty International

2011)

Illegal arrest and detention of members from Join Mobile Group (an media advocacy

group) (Amnesty International 2011)

Harassment and death threats against Joint Mobile Group member’s families

“Zarema” (renamed) reported to Amnesty International that she has been systematically

subjected to sexual violence by a close male relative for several years (Amnesty

International 2011). In 2010 she married but he too abuses her with domestic violence

and she has tried to resolve it religious leaders, who told her just to obey her husband and

if she left her brothers would kill her(Amnesty International 2011).

Once again there is a pattern emerging from the Russian Federation in terms of the types of

Human Rights abuses occurring in the Chechnya, except for the last violation listed. Amnesty

International states this one of the many incidents of this kind that has been ‘formally’ reported

to their NGO. However, there is a high probability that such acts against women are

underreported since the reemergence of Islamic traditions in 2006 (Amnesty International 2011).

The next group of reports in 2012 comes from three HR NGOs: Human Rights Watch,

Amnesty International and Front Line Defenders. In each of the 2012 reports the authors focus

on the further legal developments in terms of freedom of speech and press:

2012 Foreign Agent Law (Law No. 121-FZ) further restricting NGOs: to register as

foreign agents and if they engage in “political activity” they will subjected to heavy fines

or shut down(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Front Line

Defenders 2012)

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Article/Amendment added to the 2012 law three weeks after its passage: the harsh fines

receiving foreign funding and suspension of any NGOs that have U.S. citizen members

or receive U.S. support and are engaged in “political activity” or “pose a threat to Russian

interests(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Front Line Defenders

2012)

New legislation allowing Russian authorities to block Web sites without a court order,

and significantly expand the definition of treason (Law No. 18-FZ, & Law No. 139-FZ)

(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Front Line Defenders 2012)

Politically motivated disappearances have reached its peak since 2006, over 100 in the

last year in in the Northern Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan) (Human Rights Watch

2012, Amnesty International 2012, Front Line Defenders 2012)

Multiple cases of alleged police torture and illegal detention in Chechnya against

returning refugees from Ingushetia(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International

2012, Front Line Defenders 2012)

Phillip Kostenko, an activist with Human Rights Center Memorial was beat up by ‘local’

thugs resulting in a major concussion and broken leg and was taken to the hospital where

he was forced by police to ignore the incident (Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty

International 2012, Front Line Defenders 2012).

The last grouping of reports covers the 2013-2014 period including both the normative

reports and the new set of data/events from Russia’s preparation for the Sochi Olympics.

Normative Reports:

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In October, a senior Federal Security Service (FSB) official reportedly stated that the

FSB had secured the closure of 20 NGOs in Ingushetia for their links with foreign

agents; however the human rights NGO, Mashr, as a “foreign agent” still in operation

(shut down in 2014) (Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Human

Rights Watch 2013, Amnesty International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014, Amnesty

International 2014)

Murder of HR lawyer Omar Saidmagomedov in Chechnya and his cousin were shot dead

in Makhachkala Dagestan(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012,

Human Rights Watch 2013, Amnesty International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014,

Amnesty International 2014)

Igor Kalyapin, head of the NGO Committee Against Torture, was threatened with

criminal proceedings in connection with his work on the case of Islam Umarpashaev,

torture victim from Chechnya(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012,

Human Rights Watch 2013, Amnesty International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014,

Amnesty International 2014)

Armed groups continued to launched a double bomb attack on 3 May in Makhachkala,

Dagestan, left 13 people dead (including eight police officers), and over 80 emergency

and rescue workers were injured(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International

2012, Human Rights Watch 2013, Amnesty International 2013, Human Rights Watch

2014, Amnesty International 2014)

Kadyrov, continues his collective punishment against relatives and ‘suspected’ (Human


International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014, Amnesty International 2014) supporters’

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of alleged insurgents. Victims are prohibited to speak about violations due to fear of

official retribution. Abuses remain unpunished and largely under-reported(Human Rights

Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Watch 2013, Amnesty

International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014, Amnesty International 2014)

Prosecutor’s Office rejected the petition against the ban International Tribunal for

Chechnya as “extremist”. The book calls for the creation of an international tribunal to

investigate alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity omitted during two wars in

Chechnya(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights


International 2014)

“Honor killings” are on the rise in Chechnya and remain under-reported(Human Rights


International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014, Amnesty International 2014)

Abuses on the road to Sochi

Government refusals to pay the Caucasian ‘migrant’ workers are in the process of

building the Sochi Olympic Stadium. According to Memorial over 700 workers have

complained about their late payments and poor working conditions(Human Rights Watch

2012, Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Watch 2013, Amnesty International

2013, Human Rights Watch 2014, Amnesty International 2014, Memorial 2014)

Employers’ failure to provide written employment contracts or copies of

contracts(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Watch

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http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/11/russia-ioc-acts-sochi-abuses




2014, Memorial 2014)

Excessive working hours, such as 12-hour shifts without overtime payment(Human


International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2014, Amnesty International 2014, Memorial

2014)

Overcrowded employer-provided housing and inadequate employer-provided

meals(Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2012, Human Rights Watch


2014, Memorial 2014)

Illegal withholding of migrant workers’ passports and other identity documents (Human



2014).

Cutting off the water supply to the nearby village of village of Akhshtyr (Human Rights



2014)

Each of these reports either dated 2007 or 2013-2014, it is clear that the North Caucuses is a

“supermassive black hole” for violence. The same sort or type of human rights violations either

by thugs or the Russia state itself (via legislation) re-appear over and over again each year until

one finds these occurrences as “normal”. This is the tragedy, for reports can become mundane

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http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/29/russia-olympic-construction-devastates-sochi-village



and easy to ignore but the visual content of these stories are not easy to ignore. This will become

more visible from the stories in the next section.

Grassroots Documentaries

The one gift that modernization and technology has given is the ability to express

emotion and trauma through film, as well as presevering the memories of both the dead and the

living. Just as in most conflicts, the Russo-Chechen Wars are complex and there are numerous

narratives to tell. But the ones listed here are from three perspectives: narratives from the

civilian, the human rights worker in Chechnya today and the Chechen fighter.

The first piece of media is by SBS/Dateline is a general documentary of the conflict and

displays footage of Dirty War or “counter terrorism” operation carried out in Chechnya by

Russian forces from 2005-2009(SBS/Dateline 2008). This film focuses on the stories of the few

victims willing to speak out about the human rights abuses that have become “normal” since the

end of the Second Chechen War(SBS/Dateline 2008). The majority of Chechens both in and

outside of refugee camps are afraid to speak out in fear of reprisal. However, the film makers

were able to find a few Chechens to talk with their reporters, as well as a Russian soldier who

served during the last war. One of the first victims to openly speak was an elderly man, Musa,

who lives in a refugee camp in Ingushetia he states that “People keep disappearing and murders

happen daily, funerals go to any village you are bound to see one…. Why do I say in the camp?

Because, there is no guarantee of security. My son is 17 and they will take him, I am here

because of him, my pension is small and only 1300 rubles and if they take him they will kill him.

I will have to buy his body back (SBS/Dateline 2008)”

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According to locals it is common to see Russian troops in the camps they raid them often

and take young men away as “suspected terrorists” and they never return(SBS/Dateline 2008).

The malice is very clearly, displayed in the film, for a survivor of one raid mentioned the recent

metro bombing and told reporters that Russian soldiers came in and took five men and left telling

them “It’s payback time, for the metro” (SBS/Dateline 2008). Musa states the reason for arrest is

that “There is no reason; the only reason is they were Chechens. It’s not our fault we are born

Chechens and of course I’m not sorry, I am proud to be Chechen. Russians want to destroy us

and our nation” (SBS/Dateline 2008).

When Musa was asked about using the term genocide, he stated “Why I think this? If our

young men disappear we will lose out next generation(SBS/Dateline 2008).” Such a sentiment is

common amongst Chechen survivors of the war, the camerawomen who filmed the interview

herself said she fears speaking out “I had to pass 17 checkpoints on the way back to Grozny and

payoff the officers there, and fear to film in the bombed out buildings in Grozny, because of

snipers it happens all the time. I had no idea the risk in working with camera, being a Chechen I

never thought I need protection on the ground…I regret it now(SBS/Dateline 2008)”.

This fear is widespread, but some others are willing to share their stories like Razit who

is an elderly woman who spoke up for she felt that she “had nothing else to lose”. Her story is

most compelling for today she looks after 8 grandchildren for their parents (her two sons) were

abducted recently by Russian forces. Her recollection is horrifying “They came at 3AM dark at

night into my home and took away my children. I care for them now (SBS/Dateline 2008)”. To

most Russians the events in Chechnya are just a mopping up operation and Russian officials

deny any military action against civilians (SBS/Dateline 2008). However, there has been a tight

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clampdown on media in the region since the beginning of the war but the some Chechens have

been able to smuggle out videos showing the massacres occurring in Chechnya by Russian

forces; such events have been supported by human rights groups. Even former Soviet boxer

champion Ruslan Medalov, head of Chechen Committee for National Salvation, unlike other

victims openly describe what is going on. “In every sense, it’s genocide and is committed

openly. What else could you call it? It fits the definition” (SBS/Dateline 2008).

While many call Russia’s actions in Chechnya genocide others may not. But, what is

clear is that there have been continual human rights violations in Chechnya, more so than war

veterans like Ivan would like to admit, just as Ivan had divulged in his interview:

“I remember a little girl or maybe it was a boy perhaps four or five years old who had come out

of their house. I had my armour, gun, knife and ammo, I was scowling. This was no joke and a

woman came out asking me what happened. But what I remember is the eyes of the child were

full with terror. I thought when that kid grew up he would remember me and be angry with

Russia because I’d mess his life up when he was little” (SBS/Dateline 2008).

He further described that most men in the army were ill prepared. “They gave them no

money or food, so of course they would turn to loot from the locals, they had to feed themselves

other than fighting” (SBS/Dateline 2008). Ivan had also mentioned another issue that has gone

underreported by Russian officials, “there is a severe problem with drunkenness and drug use in

the army, sometimes men would go at each other at night with their knives. This was quite

normal. That’s the Russian army” (SBS/Dateline 2008). Now while some individuals like Ivan

may be brave enough to speak out about some ‘mishaps’ in the army either by choice or

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inebriation, the fact remains the death toll and number of “disappeared persons” are climbing

along with the tension in Moscow.

The second documentary comes from the perspectives of human rights workers from

Memorial and Human Rights Watch, who discuss the threats that 2010 and 2012 laws have

placed on civil society in Russia. According to Elena Panfilova she states that

“Historically in Russia it was government that decided what society does, but now out of the

blue there is society there willing to speak loudly and not afraid to spend nights in pre-trial

detention. Authorities do not know what to do with except the good old recipes to stop it’ which

is what the 2010 and 2012 laws are meant to do” (Human Rights Watch 2010).

Elena’s co-worker Tanya Lokshina reiterates her comments by stating

“That it was the rigged elections brining Putin back to power that started this “society” once in

the Presidential chair Putin decided to tighten the screws by the parliament passing very

restrictive laws that certain to freedom of information, expression, association and assembly in

order to create legal mechanisms to put pressure on civil society…..the law is there to demonize

nongovernmental organization in the eyes of the public” (Human Rights Watch 2010).

Another one of their peers, Oleg Orlov from Memorial in Moscow, shares the same

sentiments especially after his NGO was raided by the police in 2012 (Memorial 2012).

However, what most of these workers did not expect were the extremities of the laws and how

people would react to them (Memorial 2012). It is a well-known fact that Memorial in Moscow

was a target for the night before the vote on the 2012 Foreign Agents Law a group of thugs

sprayed the phrases “foreign agents and (heart) USA on the walls of the building” (Memorial

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2012). It was clear that NGO’s were the new enemies of the Kremlin and Putin had done his

Tsarist/Soviet history homework well. However, since the outbreak of the Second Chechen War,

numerous Chechens have either fled to neighboring Russian republics or to EU countries. The

last documentary to be discussed is that of ex-guerilla fighter who fled from Russia to the United

Kingdom. His story highlights the reasons why many young men have joined the resistance and

Wahhabi Islam and their experiences as guerillas against the Russians.

The ex-fighter, “Omar” begins his story telling how he was a fighter and has fled, but

does not reveal his true name in fear of what the Russians would do to his relatives. He states

that

“We have fought the Russian occupiers for centuries we have even had our own Holocaust under

Stalin a third of our people died. But it is happening all over again now since we began to live

with the Russians and no one seems to notice over 500,000 have died in the two wars that is 1/5

of our population” (Caspian Report 2013).

“Omar” also explains his background about how his family was special because they

were one of the few families that survived the deportation in the 1940’s. He continued his story

about the second war in 2004 and how Russia invaded. Luckily for him, he was wounded early

on and fled to the UK where he met other resistance fighters, like his friend “Chengis”. Both

men are very close and are careful of how many times they contact the resistance leaders in the

mountains or send supplies” (Caspian Report 2013). However, they state the home videos of the

rebels are weeks old and that majority of those in the film are now dead, mostly being the ex-

fighters neighbors and brothers

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“After I was wounded my brothers, I had 5 of them started to join the resistance, one was killed

without participating in anything, the others died. The youngest he managed to get him married

to stay away from the war, he was in love with a beautiful lady. He collected money for the

wedding and lives in Chechnya (Caspian Report 2013).”

His peer Chengis then began his story about how he lost most of his brothers to the war

as well, and how he was captured by the Russians

“One of my friends were captured then killed by the Russians, they cut off his nose, ears, gouged

his eyes and broke all the bones in his body. Villagers said that it was the most mutilated body

they saw from both wars. That is why I joined (Caspian Report 2013).”

In the documentary another ex-fighter spoke after him, named Mansu. Unlike “Omar” he

fled to the UK after being captured and tortured by the Russians for weeks:

“Before the first war I was a merchant and the Russian shot missiles from the sky killing people.

I was captured and put in a pit in a bent position. They would only take me out when they wanted

to torture me, wires are placed on parts of your body like the genitals and tongue. While

electricity runs throughout the wires they stand there laughing at you in pain. You just want to

die, beatings never stop and they put plastic bags over your head. When you lose consciousness

they wake you so you can feel the pain. It has affected me, I wake up four or five times a night

from nightmares even if it was three years ago. Like many fighters I have turned to Islam for

solace” (Caspian Report 2013).

Such accounts like Musa’s are common amongst those who are captured by the Russians

and survive. Numerous human rights groups have heard similar accounts from other victims in

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Chechnya. The problem is that few people speak up about such abuses undertaken by both

Kadyrov’s regime and the remaining Russian troops in Chechnya today. All three of these

documentaries add a “face” to the conflict from the civilians who survived hell, to those who

have imposed the carnage, and to those who continue fight. My concern is more about those who

fight and how they are perceived and treated in the Russian Federation today, especially the non-

governmental organizations and how the new laws impact their work.

Methods:

As displayed in the literature there have been numerous abuses conducted by the Russian

Federation against civilians and NGOs, particularly those who work in the human rights field.

With such a large body of literature that range from academics to formal reports designed by

different agencies, it has prompted me to probe the topic further by asking: To what extent has

the current Foreign Agent Law enacted in 2012 impacted political stability within the north

Caucus region of Chechnya and the human rights groups present? The purpose of this

dissertation is to measure the effectiveness of the 2012 Foreign Agent Law in a qualitative study

by using descriptive statistics to illustrate a before and after comparison of the number of NGOs

currently within Chechnya. This has been done by gathering informational data from numerous

resources, as found in the existing literature on the topic that has been compiled it into a master

data chart. Each of the 56 NGOs (N) found from the literature were then broken down into two

main categories: local and foreign NGOs. This categorization was determined by their location

and their main donors.

Definitions

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NGO: A non-governmental organization that are neither part of a government nor conventional

for-profit businesses. However, in this study IGO’s are also included due to the blurred lines

within the literature the data was compiled from.

Foreign NGO: Any NGO that has not been established or originates within the Russian

Federation or that is a part of a larger international organization.

Local NGO: A non-governmental organization founded in Russia by Russians that are neither

part of a government nor conventional for-profit businesses. Local branches of larger NGO’s are

excluded unless the NGO specifies that they are independent or share the name of the larger

organization.

Primary Function: Defines the main “type” of the organization in relation to their mission

statement and/or purpose of work.

Secondary Function: Defined by the secondary/additional work of an organization in relation to

“on the side” activities undertaken as part of their primary goal or mission statement.

Shut down: Defined as an organization that was (i) closed down by Russian officials (ii) if the

organization was bound by a deadline under an international agreement to leave by a certain

date, and (iii) were finished with their projects and willingly left.

Foreign NGOs

The foreign NGO’s data has been traced back to their state of origin and then further

categorized by their primary and secondary purposes (Appendix 1 & Appedix 3.3). Each NGO

was thoroughly and individually researched to try and find (i) when the NGO was present in

Russian Chechnya (ii) how long was the NGO there (iii) what type of activities the organization

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did there and (iv) if they are still operating in Russian Chechnya today. Each of these guiding

questions helped to categorize each NGO into sub-categories within the primary and secondary

purposes, thus illustrating the diverse grouping of foreign NGOs in Chechnya (Appendix 1).

However, one of the main limitations of this categorization process is that of differentiating

between NGOs and IGOs in Chechnya. Both sectors depends on one another for functionality

and protection in the region and in part the lines become blurred; not to mention the 2012 law

itself makes no distinction between the two so this study framed itself under that pretext

(Appendix 3.4).

In regards to the results and calculations, the number of foreign NGOs were divided by

the overall sample size (x/N) of the NGOs found in Chechnya from the literature. This gives the

percentage of foreign NGOs in Chechnya from the period of 1999-2014 (Appendix 2). This was

the general timeline used due to the indications in the literature that most NGO or global

attention started with the First Chechen War in 1999 and continues today. Another set of data is

also presented by the breakdown of what ‘type’ of NGO’s was in Chechnya. These “types were

counted” according to their primary functions then divided by the overall sample size of foreign

NGOs (y/x of N) from the following categories: Political, humanitarian, health, education, and

financial (Appendix 3.1 & 3.2). As for secondary functions the list consisted of: political, legal,

humanitarian, health, education, information and media. Lastly, there was a calculation of how

many “Foreign NGOs” were shut down or “pressured to leave” by Russian officials and the date

of their closure that gives a percentage of the NGOs that have been closed down (Appendix 3.5).

Local NGOs:

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In the case of the local NGO’s this study data placed local NGO’s in a separate category

but replicated the calculation steps by: (i) categorizing local NGO’s into primary categories that

consisted of political or humanitarian and secondary purposes with the following categories.

Political, humanitarian, media or information, health, educational and legal aide (ii) how long

has the NGO been in operation (iii) what type of activities their organizations do and (iv) if they

are a part/a branch of any larger or “sister organizations” in Russia, which help clarify the

precise amount of NGOs working “independently” within Chechnya (Appendix 4).

Now in terms of the results and calculations to the number of local NGO’s the same calculation

process is replicated in relation to the foreign NGO’s: (i) Defining the types of primary and

secondary groups “that were shut down by Russian officials (see also Appendix 5.3.1 & 5.3.2)

(ii) the date of their closure thus giving a percentage of how many local Russian NGOs have

been shut down by their own government (Appendix 5.3).

Results:

Overall:

In light of the methods the data has presented that 94.6% of all NGO’s in Russian

Chechnya have been shut down either by Moscow or on their own accord. The overall

demographics of NGO’s are broken down into two main groups being that of humanitarian

(54.1%) and politically-based (45.3%). Secondary demographics consist mostly or legal/political

aide (42%) and education (36.4%) among the general sample size.

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Foreign NGOs

According to the data the nation-states that have given the most aide in terms of NGO

creation would be that of the United States of America (37.5%), Belgium (12.5%)8, and the

United Kingdom (7.5%). The leading primary NGO purpose was that of humanitarian (52.50%)

and political (30%) followed by health (12.50%). In relation to those NGO’s with secondary

purposes the leading category was that of politics (22.50%), education (22.50%) and

humanitarian (20%)9. In this sample size there is an outlier in the sense that IGO’s are included

as NGO’s in the literature. The data that is statistically insignificant comprises of only an eighth

of the overall foreign NGO data. However, 99% of these foreign NGOs have left Chechnya in

the period 2005-2011, except for Amnesty International.

Local NGO’s

The data, ranging between 2007-and-2011, regarding local NGO’s also mirror that of

foreign NGO’s in a sense that 73.6% of all local NGO’s have been shut down. A majority of

local organizations were organizations that had primarily been political or humanitarian.

Moreover, many had a secondary function as legal aides and media outlets. 80% of the 67% of

the local political NGO’s were shut down and 60% of the 33% humanitarian NGO’s were closed

as well by Russian officials. Other groups were targeted as well: 50% of NGO’s that were

political and carried a secondary purpose of being health-based closed had all closed (100%

(all)). Overall, health NGO’s with a secondary purpose have been closed and 80% that were

8 with exception of IGOs listed being 1/8 of total, even so Belgium would have (N)=59 If political or humanitarian was not their primary goal it was their second

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media-base as a secondary purpose have been shut down. Only two local organizations remain in

2014, one that is humanitarian-based and the other media and information-based.

Conclusion

According to the data presented it can be concluded that both foreign and local NGO’s

are being targeted by some mechanism that has caused almost if not all NGO’s to move out of

Chechnya. As to the exact mechanism there can only be two possibilities given the data, the 2012

Foreign Agent Law or the Chechenization process. The data seems to point to the latter due to

the fact that the majority of the NGO’s (especially the foreign NGO’s) have all but left Chechnya

between 2005 and 2010; the peak years being 2005, 2007, and 2011. All three of these years are

statistically significant being that in 2005 was the beginning of the Putin’s “counter-terrorism”

operation in Chechnya and soon after when Ramzan Kadyrov was sworn in as “president”.

There is also another phenomenon highlighted in this past vs. present model, the other

being that the largest wave of departures by foreign NGO’s was in 2011, a year after legislation

was passed to re-criminalized libel against public officials. If foreign NGO’s would criticize

Kadyrov’s regime they would be heavily fined or shut down. Under such circumstances we can

logically correlate this to be a part of the Chechenization or Russification process as stated in the

academic literature. In relation to the existing outliers except which consist of the IGO’s who left

Chechnya only due to the enforcement by either Kadyrov or Putin. IGO’s must adhere to

international agreements that were signed by former Russian President Yeltsin that allowed

IGO’s into Russia until 2006.

If the results relating to foreign NGOs are unable to illustrate a positive correlation

between the Chechenization process and the decreasing presence of NGO’s from this study the

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data from local NGO’s will reassert this claim. The data contends that majority of politically-

oriented NGO’s have been shut down by Moscow, especially if the NGO in question has

provided legal aid to clients. Local NGO closures mirror that of foreign NGO’s for the highest

amount of closures occurred in 2007, 2009, and 2011. Luckily there are still a few in operations,

but they are primarily humanitarian-media/information-based, though they have also been

subject to harassment by Russian officials. These NGO’s include Memorial and Union of the

Committees of Soldiers´ Mothers of Russia that have refused to register themselves as foreign

agents as Amnesty International has done.

Limitations of the study:

There have been some limitations within this study and further research is much needed. The

limitations are as follows:

1. Accessing to unbiased and unedited information on the non-governmental organization

sector in Russia

2. Language barrier and translation (researcher does not speak Russian)

3. Reporter bias on certain stories/credibility of the human right reports

4. Vagueness of the 2012 law in terms of not separating or defining the difference between

IGOs and NGOs

5. Including an IGOs as a part of the NGO’s overall sample size

6. Inability to have uniform primary and secondary indicators (due to the researchable pool

available)

7. Limited amount of time to gather and report all necessary data, personal interviews with

NGO workers about their work in Chechnya would have been undertake given more time

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8. The study only focuses on a specific region in Russia and does not illustrate the complete

effect of the new 2012 law on civil society in Russia overall

9. Focused on an extensive time frame from 1999-2014

Overall, there is a need to expand the study and refine the methods in terms of the data

pool. However, this study has given a hint to what institutional pressures have been placed upon

civil society in Chechnya and eventually Russia as a whole.

Policy Recommendations:

My policy recommendations reiterate those of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty

International, Article 16 Front Line Defenders and Memorial in Moscow:

To the Russian Government

Bring Legislation into Line with Russia’s International Legal Obligations:

Repeal provisions of Law No. 121-FZ (the “foreign agents” law) requiring

organizations that accept foreign funding and engage in “political activities” to

register as “foreign agents”

Repeal the amendment to article 151 of the Criminal Code broadening the definition

of treason;

Repeal provisions of Law No. 272-FZ (the “Dima Yakovlev Law”) that allow for the

suspension of nongovernmental organizations and the freezing of their assets;

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Repeal article 128.1 of the Criminal Code, reinstating criminal responsibility for libel

Amend any other laws regulating NGOs, including Law No. 18-FZ, that create

excessive administrative and legislative barriers to NGO work; for example, repeal

articles that allow officials to order an unlimited number of inspections;

In the meantime, desist from implementing laws that contradict Russia’s

international human rights obligations and immediately stop using inspections to harass,

intimidate, and discredit civil society groups;

Repeal the Law No. 139-FZ on internet governance. In the interim publish the list of

websites that contain banned content, publish regulations on how government agencies

will evaluate content, and invite and take under due consideration public input into such

regulations (Amnesty International 2010, ECCHR 2011, Human Rights Watch 2011,

Amnesty International 2011, Amnesty International 2012, Doctors Without Borders

2012, FDIH 2012, Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty International 2013, Human

Rights Watch 2013, Frontline Defenders 2014).

Demonstrate Commitment to International Human Rights Obligations:

End the rhetoric aimed at stigmatizing NGOs and creating a hostile atmosphere for civil

society;

Stop using force to break up peaceful assemblies, regardless of whether they are

sanctioned, if they are not disrupting public order; stop arresting protesters in such

situations;

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Cooperate fully with the special procedures of the United Nations Human Rights

Council, including by issuing a standing invitation for country visits and responding

positively to pending requests for access by the UN special rapporteurs on the protection

of human rights defenders, on freedom of association and assembly, and on freedom of

expression in Russia

Accept recommendations, made in the context of the Universal Periodic Review of

Russia at the Human Rights Council, to repeal or revise legislation affecting the work of

NGOs and to stop obstructing human rights work (Amnesty International 2010, ECCHR

2011, Human Rights Watch 2011, Amnesty International 2011, Amnesty International

2012, Doctors Without Borders 2012, FDIH 2012, Human Rights Watch 2012, Amnesty

International 2013, Human Rights Watch 2013, Frontline Defenders 2014).

Epilogue:

In the past year President Vladmir Putin has pushed his power beyond modern Russia’s

borders south back into historical Russian Crimea, but to the expense of his nation’s credibility

and standing international community; not just with the illegal invasion of Eastern Ukraine and

the annexation of Crimea but with the absolute silencing of it’s own population. In a two month

period the remaining NGOs that spoke out against Putin’s regime on the issue of human rights

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have been targeted, dragged into court and shut down(Amnsty International 2014, Nikitin 2014,

Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). Majority of the remaining NGOs

in Chechnya are gone, even the long standing Memorial Human Rights Center and the

underground groups of Masher and Mobile Chechnya(Amnsty International 2014, Nikitin 2014,

Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). The exact same pattern and smear

strategy is now the not only occurring on a macro level, but is now the norm, using the law

against their own people; according to recent news over 1,000 of the remaining NGOs have been

dragged into the courts and coerced into registering as “foreign agents” in accordance with the

2012 Foreign Agent Law(Amnsty International 2014, Nikitin 2014, Rahman 2014, Gregory, C.

2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014).

If any resistance was present Putin’s regimes utilize the 2010 criminal code law of libel

to usurp popular sentiments to be turned against human rights groups; even the most well known

and credible groups like Memorial, Soldier’s Mothers and Amnesty International(Amnsty

International 2014, Nikitin 2014, Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014).

Each of these NGOs are under Putin’s blacklist to destroy, because human rights groups bring to

light his regimes’s repression and covert actions in Ukraine(Amnsty International 2014, Nikitin

2014, Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). In particular Soilder’s

Mothers who have mass support across Russia, ever since tensions in Ukraine have risen and

numerous Russian troops have gone missing; or are dead but the Kremlin refuses to notify or

communicate with the grieving mothers(Amnsty International 2014, Nikitin 2014, Rahman 2014,

Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014).

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Many have raised their voices in protests in early June only to be arrested and demonized

by Putin’s regime including his thugs that have played a large role in the current police state

apparatus; it is not unuasal to see tit for tat reprisals between Putin supporters and the

opposition(Amnsty International 2014, Nikitin 2014, Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP

2014, Antonova 2014). This tension has only became heightened with the invasion of Crimea,

where grieving mothers flood the streets asking for the whereabouts of their children and join

forces with the remaining local human rights groups or Sociological universities such as: Golos

Association/Regional Golos, JURIX: Lawyers for Constitutional Rights and Freedoms, Center

for Social Policy and Gender Studies etc.10 who provide legal aide in the court system(Rahman

2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). Intially in the lower courts these groups

have won their civil suits, but once they have gotten to the “higher courts” in Russia the

connection between the Kremlin’s policies and the justice system become more

apparent(Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). this can best be seen in

the Supreme Court’s ruling in early April of 2013 that not only upheld the Foreign Agent Law

but stated that “"foreign agents" law does not contradict the Russian constitution and that

labelling NGOs as foreign agents is aimed at "important public interests(Rahman 2014, Gregory,

C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014)."

The Court’s ruling was welcomed by the Duma and the new provisions that were

“suggested” by the Court’s ruling and was added to the law “formally” in November stating

that “court also ruled that an organization that researches social issues must register as a "foreign

agent" organization” but was enforced way before the pen ink dried on the books(Rahman 2014,

Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). Not only is it now mandatory to self-label an

10 See Appendices for the entire list

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NGO as a foreign agent but now all cyber forms of human rights advocacy for NGOs have been

shut down(Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). Naturally in this day

and age an aggrieved person resorts to internet blogging to spread a message, Putin’s lawmakers

were well aware of this and not only preempted bloggers but silenced them with yet another

additional provision in early May of 2014 known as the Bloggers Law(Rahman 2014, Gregory,

C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). This law states the following

“that any website with more than 3,000 visitors daily will be responsible for the accuracy of all

information published. Besides registering, bloggers can no longer remain anonymous online,

and organizations that provide platforms for their work, such as search engines and social

networks, must maintain computer records on Russian soil of everything posted for the previous

six months. The law, which will go into effect in August 2014, also includes fines for violators

that can reach up to $142,000(Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014).”

These recent amendments passed by the Russian Duma and endorsed by the higher courts

of Russia have displayed a clear and present danger not only to civil society in Russia, but

Russian citizen’s rights to free speech and freedom of association; which Putin’s regime has

risked all to protect by the illegal invasion of Ukraine; but Russian freedom on Putin’s terms. As

of November 20th the only glimmer of hope has presented itself, the only remaining human

rights NGO in Moscow has been saved for the time, the Russian Court ruled that they will

suspend proceeding against Memorial for refusing to register as a foreign agent(Rahman 2014,

Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014). However Memorial’s executive director Yelena

Zhemkova stated that

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“This is the move to close it down is a symbolic final push by the Kremlin against Russia’s civil

society — an attempt to impose top-down control of public life and drown out critical voices.

They want everything to be controllable and predictable. It is a fear that criticism and change

can come from civil society,” she said. Ms. Zhemkova also blamed “progressive spy mania”,

with NGOs perceived as acting “on the orders of the West(Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014,

AFP 2014, Antonova 2014).”

The lawsuit against Memorial was the final straw after two years of harassment by

“unidentified” thugs and growing pressure by the state on Memorial via smear publications and

and vandalism of the group’s headquarters in Moscow. Human Rights activists have also been

personally targeted and harassed. Ms. Zhemkova added “that the ministry’s demands are illegal,

and not germain to Memorial’s charter and was not a problem for 23 years before and all of a

sudden is now. According to the law an organization can determine its own structure(Rahman

2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014).” There was an international uproar over

the current lawsuit against Memorial and for the time pressured the Kremlin to suspend the

prosecution of Memorial in the Russian Courts, or at least hold off shutting Memorial down until

the organization changes it’s charter(Rahman 2014, Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova

2014). Unfortunatly other NGO’s have not had the same luck in ralying support to pressure the

Kremlin to halt their forced closures, in particular political groups including Golos, Juriex,

LGBT advocacy groups and thousands of other less known grassroot groups(Rahman 2014,

Gregory, C. 2014, AFP 2014, Antonova 2014).

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Appendices:

Appendex 1: Complete NGO Data Chart

NGO name Local or Foreign

Country of Origin

Primary Services

Secondary Started Ended

Amnesty International

Foreign United States Political Humanitarian 1996 In operation

European Human Rights Advocacy Center

Foreign London UK Political Humanitarian 1999 2007

Human Rights International

Foreign United States Political Humanitarian 1995 2011

Human Rights Watch

Foreign United States Political Legal Aide 1997 2011

World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)

Local Moscow Political Legal Aide 1999 2011

International Federation for Human Rights Leagues (FIDH)

Foreign Belgium Political Humanitarian 2001 2009

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International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights



Foreign United Kingdom

Political Humanitarian 1989 2006

Physicians for Human Rights

Foreign Boston Health Humanitarian 2001 2005

Society for Threatened Peoples

Foreign Germany Humanitarian Education 1999 2009


Foreign Switzerland Humanitarian Education 1999 2009

Russian-Chechen Friendship Society


Russian Justice Initiative

Foreign United States Political Information 1999 2009

Prague Watchdog Foreign Czech Republic

Humanitarian Information 2000 2010

European Commission on Human Rights (EUCHR)

Foreign Belgium Humanitarian Information 1999 2006

European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)

Foreign Belgium Humanitarian Political 1989 2005

European Council on Refugees and Exiles (UNICEF team)


Centre for Peacebuilding and Community Development (CPCD)

Foreign France Humanitarian Political 2001 2008

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (part of UNICEF)

Foreign Switzerland Political Humanitarian 1999 2005

World Food Programme (WFP)

Foreign United States Humanitarian Education 2001 2006

Danish Refugee Council

Foreign Denmark Humanitarian Political 1999 2005

Doctors Without Foreign France Health Education 2000 2011

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BordersDoctors Without Borders

Foreign Belgium Humanitarian Education 2004 2011

Doctors Without Borders

Foreign Switzerland Health Education 2000 2011


Foreign Holland Humanitarian Education 1999 2011

Fund for Humanitarian Assistance to the Chechen Republic

Foreign Poland Financial Political 1999 2011

Grazhdanskoye sodeystviye (Civic Assistance Committee)

Local Moscow Humanitarian Legal Aide 1999 1993

Hilfswerk Austria Foreign Austria Health Education 2000 2006

International Committee for the Children of Chechnya

Foreign Belgium Education Health 1995 2004

International Committee of the Red Cross

Foreign United States Health Humanitarian 1995 1996

International Rescue Committee



Foreign United States Humanitarian Political 2000 2007

Islamic Relief Foreign United Kingdom

Humanitarian Health 1995 2009

Mercy Corps International

Foreign United States Humanitarian Health 1995 2009

People in Need (Člověk v tísni)

Foreign Czech Republic

Humanitarian Education 1999 2005

Polish Humanitarian Organisation (PAH, Polska Akcja Humanitarna)

Foreign Poland Humanitarian Political 1999 2007

U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants


Action Against Hunger


World Vision Foreign United States Political Information 2000 2003

The American Committee for Peace in the


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Caucasus (Freedom House Organization)United Nations Human Rights Group (UNCHR)


Memorial Local Moscow Political Legal Aide 1999 2014

Channel 4 Chechnya


Human Rights Institute


Mobile Group Local Moscow Political Media 2009 2014

Frontline Defenders

Local Moscow Political Media 2001 2014

Jamestown Foundation


Care International Foreign United States Humanitarian Health 2004 2007

Anti-Racism Local Moscow Political Media 2000 2012

Committee of national Salvation

Local Moscow Political Health 1999 2009

Committee for the Protection of Displaced Persons

Foreign Belgium Humanitarian Health 1999 2009

Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation

Local Moscow Humanitarian Political 1996 2007

Mashr Local Moscow Political Media 2000 2007

Politzeki local Moscow Political Media 2000 2009

Union of the Committees of Soldiers´ Mothers of Russia

Local Moscow Humanitarian Information 1990 2010

Za prava cheloveka (For Human Rights)


Total:56

Appendex 2: Foreign NGO break down


Country Primary Services


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Amnesty International

Foreign United States

Political Humanitarian 1996 Open






Human Rights Watch

Foreign United States Political Legal Aide 1997 2011










Russian Justice Initiative














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Danish Refugee Council

Foreign Denmark Humanitarian Political 1999 2005


Foreign France Health Education 2000 2011


Foreign Belgium Humanitarian Education 2004 2011


Foreign Switzerland Health Education 2000 2011


Foreign Holland Humanitarian Education 1999 2011



Hilfswerk Austria

Foreign Austria Health Education 2000 2006











Mercy Corps International









Action Against Foreign United States Humanitarian Health 2002 2007

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HungerWorld Vision Foreign United States Political Information 2000 2003

The American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus (Freedom House Organization)


United Nations Human Rights Group (UNCHR)


Human Rights Institute


Jamestown Foundation


Care International




Appendix 3: Foreign NGO calculation

Table 3.1: Primary Purpose of NGO

Sample Primary Purposes of NGOs

%

(N)= 12 Political 30%(N)= 21 Humanitarian 52.50%(N)= 5 Health 12.50%(N)=1 Education 2.50%(N)=1 Financial 2.50%

Table 3.2: Secondary Purpose of NGO

Sample Secondary %(N)=9 Political 22.50%(N)=1 Legal 2.50%(N)=8 Humanitarian 20%(N)=6 Health 15%(N)= 9 Education 22.50%(N)=7 Information 17.50%(N)=0 Media 0%

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Table 3.3: State NGO Aide

Sample Aide from Nations (N=40) %(N)=15 United States 37.50%(N)=3 United Kingdom 7.50%(N)=2 France 0.50%(N)=1 Germany 0.03%(N)=3 Switzerland 7.50%(N)=2 Czech Republic 0.50%(N)=8 (-3 IGOs)

Belgium 20% (12.5%)

(N)=1 Poland 0.03%(N)=1 Austria 0.03%(N)=1 Holland 0.03%(N)=1 Denmark 0.03%

Table 3.4: Number of IGO in the NGO chart


Country of origin

Primary Secondary started ended










Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (part


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of UNICEF)

Table 3.5: Peak Years of Foreign NGO shut downs by Russian government

Year N=Shut down NGO

1996 12003 12004 22005 62006 52007 62008 12009 62010 12011 72012 12013 02014 1

Appendix 4: Local NGO breakdown


Primary Services

Secondary Started Ended Shut down


Local Political Legal Aide 1999 2011 Yes






Local Humanitarian Legal Aide 1999 1993 Yes

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Memorial Local Political Legal Aide 1999 2014Channel 4 Chechnya

Local Humanitarian Legal Aide 2001 2003 Yes

Mobile Group Local Political Media 2009 2014 Yes but are underground

Frontline Defenders Local Political Media 2001 2014Anti-Racism Local Political Media 2000 2012 YesCommittee of national Salvation

Local Political Health 1999 2009 Yes


Local Humanitarian Political 1996 2007

Mashr Local Political Media 2000 2007 YesPolitzeki local Political Media 2000 2009 YesUnion of the Committees of Soldiers´ Mothers of Russia

Local Humanitarian Information 1990 2010


Local Humanitarian Political 2000 2009 Yes

Appendix 5: Local NGO calculation

Table 5.1. Primary Purpose of local NGO

Sample Primary % x/15

(N)=10 Political 66.60%

(N)=5 Humanitarian 33.30%

Total: 15

Table 5.2 Secondary Purpose of local NGO

Sample Secondary % x/15


(N)=6 Legal 40%

(N)=0 Humanitarian 0%

(N)=1 Health 6.60%

(N)=0 Education 0%

(N)=1 Information 6.60%

(N)=5 Media 33.30%

Total: 15

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Table 5.3 Peak Years of Shut down

Year Number1993 1

2003 1

2004 0

2005 0

2006 1

2007 2

2008 0

2009 3

2010 1

2011 2

2012 0

2013 0

2014 1

Total: 13N=15 2 are still in

operation:Humanitarian-Information/MediaHumanitarian -political

Table 5.3.1 Primary Purpose for local NGO shut down

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Sample Primary %



Total: 15



Table 5.3.2 Secondary Purpose for local NGO shutdown

Sample Secondary % x/15(N)=2 Political 50%

(N)=6 Legal 83.30%


(N)=1 Health 100% (all)

(N)=0 Education 0%

(N)=1 Information 0%

(N)=5 Media 80%

Total:13N=15 2 are still in operation

Appendix 6: Map of the Caucuses

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Appendice 6: NGO’s in Chechnya May 2014-current


Country of Origin

Primary Services











Channel 4 Chechnya Local Moscow Humanitarian Legal Aide 2001 2003


Frontline Defenders Local Moscow Political Media 2001 2014












Appendice 6.1: Primary Purpose for local NGO shut down

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Sample Primary %

(N)=10 Political 66%


Total: 15



Appendice 6.2 : Secondary Purpose for local NGO shutdown

Sample Secondary % N/15(N)=2 Political 13%

(N)=6 Legal 40%


(N)=1 Health 6.6%

(N)=0 Education 0%


(N)=5 Media 33%

Total:15

Appendice 6.3: Peak Years of Shut down

Year Number1999 1

2003 1

2004 0

2005 0

2006 1

2007 1

2008 0

2009 3

2010 1

2011 2

2012 1

2013 1

2014 3

Total: 15

Appendice 6.4: Foreign NGOs in Chechnya

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Country of Origin

Primary Services


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Amnesty International Foreign United States






Human Rights Watch Foreign United States Political Legal Aide 1997 2011












Russian Justice Initiative Foreign United States Political Information 1999 2009















Danish Refugee Council Foreign Denmark Humanitarian Political 1999 2005

Doctors Without Borders Foreign France Health Education 2000 2011

Doctors Without Borders Foreign Belgium Humanitarian Education 2004 2011

Doctors Without Borders Foreign Switzerland Health Education 2000 2011

Doctors Without Borders Foreign Holland Humanitarian Education 1999 2011



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Mercy Corps International Foreign United States Humanitarian Health 1995 2009








Action Against Hunger Foreign United States Humanitarian Health 2002 2007



Foreign United States`

Political Information 1999 2012



Human Rights Institute Foreign United States Political Information 2001 2005

Jamestown Foundation Foreign United States Political Information 1999 2004




Appendice 6.4.1: Primary Purpose for local NGO shut down

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Sample Primary %

(N)=13 Political 31.7 % (N)=21 Humanitarian 51.21%

(N)=5 Health 12.19 %

(N)=2 Other 4.87%

Total: 41



Appendice 6.4.2: Secondary Purpose for local NGO shutdown

Sample Secondary % x/41(N)=9 Political 21.95%

(N)=1 Legal 2.4%


(N)=6 Health 14.63%

(N)=9 Education 21.95%


(N)=0 Media 0%

Total:41

Appendice 6.4.3 Peak Years of Shut down

Year Number1996 1

2003 1

2004 3

2005 7

2006 5

2007 6

2008 1

2009 7

2010 1

2011 7

2012 1

2013 0

2014 1

Appendice 7: Overall Russian(combined Chechen& others in Russia) NGOs data


Country of Origin

Primary Services






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Channel 4 Chechnya Local Moscow Humanitarian Legal Aide 2001 2003


Frontline Defenders Local Moscow Political Media 2001 2014












Association of NGOs in Defense of Voters’ Rights “Golos”

Local Moscow Political information 2000 2014

Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies

Local Saratov Political information 2010 2014

Women of Don (Rostov region)

Local Rostov Political information 1965 2014

“Ecozaschita! –Womens’

Council

Local Kalingrad Political information 2000 2014

Soldiers’ Mothers Local St. Petersburg Political Humanitarian

1989 2014

Freedom of Information

Foundation

Local Moscow Political Information 2012 2014

Regional Press Institute Local St. Petersburg Information Media 2010 2014

“News Agency

MEMO.RU”

Local Moscow Information Media 2000 2014

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Association “Partnership

for Development”

Local Saratov Information Political 2001 2014

PIR Center Local Moscow Information Political 2002 2014

Human Rights Center

“Memorial”

Local Moscow &Chechnya

Political Humanitarian

1989 Currently in court

2014

Freedom of Information

Foundation

Local Moscow Political Information 2001 2014

Association “Partnership

for Development”

Local Saratov Political Information 2001 2014

Side by Side LGBT Film Festival

Local St.Petersburg Political Information 2002 2014

Center for Civic Analysis and Independent Research / GRANI

Local Perm Political Information 1984 2014

Regional Press Institute Local St.Petersburg Political media 2001 2014

“Panorama” Center Local Moscow Political media 2003 2014

Independent Council of

Legal Expertise / NEPS

Local Moscow Political Legal aide 1990 2014

Perm Civic Chamber Local Perm Political Legal aide 2001 2014

Moscow School of

Political Studies


Legal Basis Local Yekaterinburg Political Legal aide 2012 2014

Democratic Center Local Voronezh Political Legal aide 2002 2014

Kostroma Soldiers’

Mothers Committee

Local Kostroma Political information 2001 2014

Kabardino-Balkaria

Human Rights Center –

regional branch of the

“For Human Rights” All-

Russian movement

Local Nalchik Political Humanitarian

2011 2014

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Volgograd Center for

NGO Support

Local Volgograd Political information 2009 2014

Interregional Committee against Torture

Local Nizhniy Novgorod

Humanitarian Political 1990 2014

“Man and Law” Local Yoshkar-Ola Political Legal aide 2002 2014

Institute of Press

Development

Local Siberia-

Novosibirsk

Political Media 2009 2014

“Phoenix” Foundation Local Vladivostok Political Legal aide 2009 2014

Ryazan “Memorial”

Society

Local Ryazan Political Humanitarian

2001 2014

Movement “For Fair

Elections

Local Kurgan Political information 2001 2014

Citizens’ Watch Local St.

Petersburg

information Political 2010 2014

Center for NGO Development

Local St. Petersburg information Political 2001 2014

Urals Democratic

Foundation

Local Chelyabinsk information Political 2002 2014

Urals Human Rights Group

Local Chelyabinsk humanitarian Political 2010 2014

Center Transparency

International

Local

Moscow

Political Political 2001 2014

Center for Independent Sociological Research

Local St. Petersburg information Political 1998 2014

Center for Independent Social

Research and Education

Local

Irkutsk


Komi Human Rights

Commission “Memorial”

Local Syktyvkar Political Legal aide 2001 2014

Center for the

Development of


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Democracy and Human

Rights

Journalism Advancement

and Support Center

Local Moscow Political media 2002 2014

Levada Center Local Moscow Political Media 2003 2014

Foundation for

Assistance to Public

Opinion Research


Regional Public Foundation “INDEM”


“International Standard”

Foundation

Ufa

media information 2005 2014

Center for Social and

Educational Initiatives

Local

Izhevsk

information Media 2007 2014

Foundation for Freedom

of Information

Local St. Petersburg Political information 2003 2014

Center for Interethnic

Cooperation

Local

Moscow


Appendices 7.1 Primary Purpose of local NGO

Sample Primary % x/63



(N)= 11 Information 17.4%

(N)=1 Media 1.5%

Total: 63

Appendices 7.2 Secondary Purpose of local NGO

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Sample Secondary % x/63


(N)= 15 Legal aide 23.8%


(N)=1 Health 1.5%

(N)=0 Education 0%


(N)=13 Media 20.63%

Total: 63

Appendice 7.3 Peak Years of Shut down

Year Number1999 1

2003 1

2004 0

2005 0

2006 1

2007 2

2008 0

2009 3

2010 1

2011 2

2012 1

2013 0

2014 53

Appendice 8: Foreign NGO overall in Russia


Country of Origin

Primary Services


Amnesty International Foreign United States






Human Rights Watch Foreign United States Political Legal Aide 1997 2011



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Russian Justice Initiative Foreign United States Political Information 1999 2009















Danish Refugee Council Foreign Denmark Humanitarian Political 1999 2005

Doctors Without Borders Foreign France Health Education 2000 2011

Doctors Without Borders Foreign Belgium Humanitarian Education 2004 2011

Doctors Without Borders Foreign Switzerland Health Education 2000 2011

Doctors Without Borders Foreign Holland Humanitarian Education 1999 2011












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Mercy Corps International Foreign United States Humanitarian Health 1995 2009








Action Against Hunger Foreign United States Humanitarian Health 2002 2007



Foreign United States`

Political Information 1999 2012



Human Rights Institute Foreign United States Political Information 2001 2005

Jamestown Foundation Foreign United States Political Information 1999 2004




Appendice 8.1: Primary Purpose for local NGO shut down

Appendice 8.2: Secondary Purpose for local NGO shutdown

Sample Secondary % x/41(N)=9 Political 21.95%

(N)=1 Legal 2.4%


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Sample Primary %

(N)=13 Political 31.7 % (N)=21 Humanitarian 51.21%

(N)=5 Health 12.19 %

(N)=2 Other 4.87%

Total: 41



(N)=6 Health 14.63%

(N)=9 Education 21.95%


(N)=0 Media 0%

Total:41

Appendice 8.3: Peak Years of Shut down

Year Number1996 12003 12004 32005 72006 52007 62008 12009 72010 12011 72012 12013 02014 1

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http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/24/russian-terror-attacks-timeline



http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/907jbmkm.asp?pg

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2009/04/200941692430245395.html

http://www.economist.com/node/9254176



http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html

Rahman, J. (2014, November 13). Russian rights ngo on brink of shutdown as kremlin tightens

grip. Retrieved from http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-1-284034-Russian-rights-NGO-on-brink-of-shutdown-as-Kremlin-tightens-grip

Gregory, C. (2014, November 19). Russia's 'foreign agents law' is shutting down prominent ngos

human rights and other groups fight heavy fines and persecution. Retrieved from http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/russia-s-foreign-agents-law-is-shutting-down-prominent-ngos

AFP. (2014, November 13). Russia postpones final hearing on shutdown of top rights ngo.

Retrieved from http://news.yahoo.com/russia-postpones-final-hearing-shutdown-top-rights-ngo-140004774.html

Antonova, M. (2014, November 11). Russian rights ngo on brink of shutdown as kremlin

tightens . Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/russian-court-forces-closure-prominent-human-rights-ngo-2014-04-08

Documentaries

Al Jeezera. (Producer) (2010). Wittiness: Inside the Chechen resistance I-II [Web]. Retrieved

from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MzHlQz2r5Dk

Caspian Report. (Producer) (2013). Origins of Chechen resistance [Web]. Available from

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vGIxJl-G9Rg

CBC Correspondent. (Producer) (2006). Chechen conflict part i-iii [Web]. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PWlpdflGzM

Channel 4 Dispatches. (Brittish Public Television) (2006). Chechnya: The Dirty War [Web].

Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkaVIIOE9ys

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkaVIIOE9ys

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PWlpdflGzM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vGIxJl-G9Rg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MzHlQz2r5Dk

http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/russian-court-forces-closure-prominent-human-rights-ngo-2014-04-08

http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/russian-court-forces-closure-prominent-human-rights-ngo-2014-04-08

http://news.yahoo.com/russia-postpones-final-hearing-shutdown-top-rights-ngo-140004774.html

http://news.yahoo.com/russia-postpones-final-hearing-shutdown-top-rights-ngo-140004774.html

http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/russia-s-foreign-agents-law-is-shutting-down-prominent-ngos

http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/russia-s-foreign-agents-law-is-shutting-down-prominent-ngos

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-1-284034-Russian-rights-NGO-on-brink-of-shutdown-as-Kremlin-tightens-grip

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-1-284034-Russian-rights-NGO-on-brink-of-shutdown-as-Kremlin-tightens-grip

http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html



Human Rights Watch. (Producer) (2010). tightening the screws: Clampdown on Russian civil

society [Web]. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3d21b9xzTQ

Jenkins, P. (Director) (2007). Murdering the truth in Russia [Web]. Retrieved from

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=No3QoPoEyPA

Memorial. (Producer) (2012). Politkovskaya killed by Putin part 1-8 [Web]. Retrieved from

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7pbc0317Go

Memorial. (Producer), & Amnesty International, (Editor) (2009). The disappeared

[Web]. Available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b2qVpmzW4gs

Parafit, T. (Writer) (2011). Russia's underground fire: Conflict and human rights in the north

Caucasus[Web]. Available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4IisVhlhxlY

SBS/Dateline. (Producer) (2004). Putin’s Hidden War [Web.]. Journeyman Pictures Released

2008. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHVKSW6NKPk

Websites:

Caucasian knot. (2013, June 17). Retrieved from http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/category/7

Chechnya Advocacy Network. (2010, May 17). Human rights groups. Retrieved from

http://www.chechnyaadvocacy.org/humanrights.html

Chechnya today. (2012, May 11). Retrieved from http://todayinchechnya.wordpress.com/

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http://todayinchechnya.wordpress.com/

http://www.chechnyaadvocacy.org/humanrights.html

http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/category/7

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHVKSW6NKPk

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4IisVhlhxlY

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b2qVpmzW4gs

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7pbc0317Go

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=No3QoPoEyPA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t3d21b9xzTQ



Foreign Agents Law, May 12, 2012. The implementation of the model program of legislative

work of the state duma in the summer session 2012. (2012, July 30). Retrieved from

http://www.duma.gov.ru/legislative/program-implementation/

International Rescue Committee. (2012, May 13). The crisis in Chechnya and the northern

Caucasus at a glance. Retrieved from http://www.rescue.org/news/crisis-chechnya-and-northern-caucasus-glance-3607

Memorial. (2014, March 17). Human rights work of “memorial”. Retrieved from

http://www.memo.ru/eng/memhrc/index.shtml

Novaya gazeta. (2014, March 17). Retrieved from http://en.novayagazeta.ru/

United States Holocaust Museum. (2003, April 23).Chechnya: The forgotten war. Retrieved

from http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/chechnya-the-forgotten-war

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http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/chechnya-the-forgotten-war

http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/chechnya-the-forgotten-war

http://en.novayagazeta.ru/

http://www.memo.ru/eng/memhrc/index.shtml

http://www.rescue.org/news/crisis-chechnya-and-northern-caucasus-glance-3607

http://www.rescue.org/news/crisis-chechnya-and-northern-caucasus-glance-3607

http://www.duma.gov.ru/legislative/program-implementation/

Chilling Civil Society in Russia

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Transcript of Chilling Civil Society in Russia