CHILD PROTECTION IN AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT …lishment of the Peace and Security Council of the...
16
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS Report Summary CHILD PROTECTION IN AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Transcript of CHILD PROTECTION IN AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT …lishment of the Peace and Security Council of the...
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
Report Summary
CHILD PROTECTION IN AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
2012-2013
2013-2014
SAUDIARABIA
S U D A N
SOUTHSUDAN
State where the mission operates
Name of the Mission
Years of operation
Organisation under which the mission is deployed
Legal reference Number of force
LEGEND
Côte d’Ivoire
Opération Licorne
Since 2002
France
4,000
Côte d’Ivoire
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)
Since 2004
United Nations
S/RES/1528 – S/RES/2000 (2011) 10,954
Central African Republic
Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX)
Since 2008
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
2,000
Mali
African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)
Since 2012
African Union
S/RES/2085 9,620
Mali
Opération Serval
Since 2013
France
4,000
Mali
European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali)
Since 2013
European Union
2013/34/PESC 450
Sudan
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
Since 2011
United Nations
S/RES/1990 4,250
Mali
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Since 2013
United Nations
S/RES/2100 12,600 (Authorised)
Sudan
African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
Since 2008
United Nations / African Union
S/RES/1769 21,600
Guinea-Bissau
ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB)
Since 2012
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
629
Central African Republic
Opération Boali
Since 2002
France
450
Liberia
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
Since 2003
United Nations
S/RES/1509 16,115
Democratic Republic of Congo
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
Since 2010
United Nations
S/RES/1925 22,016
Democratic Republic of Congo
European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC-CONGO)
Since 2005
European Union
2005/355/PESC 50
Somalia
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
Since 2007
African Union
S/RES/1744 17,781
Somalia-Uganda
European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Somali Security Forces (EU TM Somalia)
Since 2010
European Union
S/RES/1879 (2009) 125
Central African RepublicDemocratic Republic of CongoSouth Sudan-Uganda
Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA)
Since 2011
African Union
Statement 299th meeting PSC Council 4,500
South Sudan
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
Since 2011
United Nations
S/RES/1996 7,900
2 I CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS – Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations – REPORT SUMMARY
Countries where Peacekeeping Missions are Currently Deployed in East, West and Central Africa
Since the end of the Cold War, in the early 1990s, most contemporary conflicts and wars in Africa have been internal, resulting in the fact that civilians constitute the overwhelming majority of the victims. Such conflicts are not only theatres of massive kill-ings; they are also often enablers of abuse and viola-tions of human rights, particularly among vulnerable population groups, such as children and women. As a result, these vulnerable groups are denied optimal opportunities for development and the realisation of their full potential.1
The most shocking development in contemporary armed conflicts is the deliberate targeting of civil-ians, due in part to the strategic blurring of the lines between combatants and civilians. The former often live or find shelter in villages and refugee camps, sometimes using civilians as human shields. The tar-geting of civilians most often involves killing, maim-ing and sexual violence, with claims that these acts
are in reprisal for suspected support of the oppo-sition or for attacks by opposing forces. In other instances, combatants force civilians to help them. All of these phenomena result in the increased involvement of children as combatants, as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. It is therefore not surprising that conflicts in most African countries have remained cyclical.
The asymmetrical and continuous conflicts in Africa have wide ramifications for socio- economic oppor-tunities for children. Moreover, given the fact that combatants rarely have uniforms, rations or a stan-dard kit, it is extremely difficult to identify who is
TAblE OF CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Drivers of Conflict and the African Union Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Unfolding Conflict ‘Hot Spots’ in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Policy Gaps and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
What Should Be Done to Pursue an Effective Strategy for Protecting Children in Armed Conflicts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
About Save the Children Regional Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
About the International Bureau for Children’s Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Cover PhotosPhoto 1 n From (3rd right) Hussein Halane, Regional Director for the Save the Children in East Africa holding the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and looking on (2nd left) Mr . Benediste Hoareau, Head of Political Affairs East Africa Standby Force(EASF), backed by (2nd right) Farida Bascha, Regional Child Protection Manager, (right) Francis Onditi, Regional Child Protection Project Coordinator and (left) Mr . Getahun Seifu, the EASF Legal Advisor .
Photo 2 n From (right) Anne Musomba, Maj Modoi, Lt Col Bengue, Capt . Sakama, Mr . Emilio and Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) Signal Officer on arrival in Obo, North-Eastern part of Central Africa Republic for the Child Protection Course, August 2013 .
Photo 3 n The military officers taking notes during Child Protection Course in Obo, Central Africa Republic, August 2013 .
Photo 4 n Save the Children International – East and West Africa regional staff with ECOWAS Standby Force staff led by Brigadier General Hassan Lai (standing on the right side – back row) during coordination meeting in Abuja, September 2013 .
INTRODUCTION I 3
The most shocking development in contemporary conflict is the deliberate targeting of civilians, due in part to the strategic blurring of the lines between
combatants and civilians.
INTRODUCTION
fighting for whom. This confusion is strategic, as it allows individuals and combatants leeway to oper-ate more freely and with reduced risk of sanctions, since the command structures are harder to identify and ‘prove’. Nevertheless, while there may be fewer military casualties, the number of civilian and chil-dren casualties is high. Furthermore, the destruction of infrastructure and denied access to basic social services impinge on the basic rights of children.
“For many sub-Saharan African countries, inade-quate national defence capacity prompts them into developing an ‘armchair attitude’ towards securing their borders and citizens. As a result, they adopt covert defence and security policies that are inca-pable of averting any form of aggression. In Côte d’Ivoire and [the] Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the loosely formed and barely accountable paramilitary squads and private companies often prove to be particularly brutal in their treatment of civilians.”2
Moreover, the rise of ‘auto-defence’, or self- defence militias that emerge as a community- level response to actions of armed groups or State forces, is another dimension of today’s conflicts. Significantly, these self-defence militias are often responsible for enlisting children. The on-going sectorial conflict in the Central African Repub-lic and the recruitment of children by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in affected countries are typical examples where children are forcibly recruited and used as human shields in a con-flict zone. In natural resource- endowed countries, foreign business interests, misconduct of inter-
national peacekeepers and resource trafficking among ‘powerful’ individuals perpetuates conflict. Again, children pay the highest price for this ‘inter-ested’ violence. The cyclical case of the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the recent crisis in the new Republic of South Sudan attest to the fact that the original political objectives of such conflicts have been sidelined as warring par-ties fight to control the natural resources in territo-ries they have conquered.
The complexity of conflict in Africa calls for con-certed efforts not only by the national armies, but more crucially, by regional forces. The African Union (AU) has risen to this challenge by expanding its capacity and partnering with other organisations working to alleviate conflicts in Africa. In May 2013, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, in its regular reporting to the African Union’s Assem-bly, stated that persistent conflict, insecurity and instability, and their humanitarian and socio-eco-nomic consequences, affect several regions of Africa. Meanwhile, the African Union is consolidat-ing efforts through regional standby forces to build a multidimensional capacity to respond to conflicts across the continent by 2015.
Whilst the AU has been making efforts towards stabilising the continent through military and polit-ical interventions from various regional standby forces, the organisation still grapples with numer-ous challenges. Apart from the cyclical nature of conflict in Africa, funding gaps and lack of political support are identified as key hindrances. As well, the lack of coordination between peace support operations (PSO) actors remains a problem. This is particularly the case in the Eastern and Western African sub-regions, where the operationalisation of the standby forces has not yet led to a corre-sponding reduction in children exposed to abuse and rights violations. The question therefore is how should the PSO actors contribute towards the protection of children in armed conflicts across Sub-Saharan Africa?
The next section highlights key issues identified during this research as being critical in reshaping the architecture of PSO in the Eastern and Western African sub-regions.
The complexity of conflict in Africa calls for concerted efforts not only by the national armies, but more crucially, regional forces. The African Union has risen to this challenge by expanding its capacity and partnering with other organisations working to alleviate conflicts in Africa.
4 I CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS – Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations – REPORT SUMMARY
Numerous drivers were identified during this research as influencing the African Peace and Security Archi-tecture (APSA) in its efforts to respond to various con-flicts across the continent. These include: the AU’s structural capacity in response to armed conflict; chil-dren and armed conflict; and peacekeeping training.
African Union Structural Capacity in Response to Armed ConflictAlthough progress has been made in the implemen-tation of various road maps set up to establish and operationalise the African Standby Force (ASF)3, this body has yet to achieve full operational capability throughout Africa. However, the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the AU is seen as a landmark event in the institutionalisation of intergovernmental political and collective security structures on the African continent. The adoptions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in July 2000, and of the Protocol Relating to the Estab-lishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in July 2002, marked critical steps in building Africa’s capacity to address the challenges of peace, security and stability on the continent.
In particular, the Protocol Relating to the Establish-ment of the Peace and Security Council provided for the creation of the APSA, designed as a set of institu-tions and standards to facilitate conflict prevention, management and resolution. The APSA is under-pinned by the principle of “non-indifference”, which means that all situations that may threaten peace and security on the continent can be brought before the AU, including intervening in a member state in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; or at the request of a member state, in order to restore peace and security. As the AU con-tinues to intensify its inward-looking intervention policy, the risk is that this approach may minimise continuous engagement with international organisa-tions. And, a challenge not to be underestimated, the capacity of the AU to deliver effective interven-tion remains hindered by inadequate resources.
Under the above-mentioned Protocol, the Peace and Security Council is the main decision-making body within the architecture, modelled on the UN Security Council. It is composed of 10 represen-tatives of the AU member states and of five repre-sentatives from five Regional Economic Communi-ties (RECs)4. Advised by a Military Staff Committee (MSC) if necessary, its principal task is to provide effective responses to crisis situations in Africa.
The Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD), responsible for overseeing peace operations across the continent, presents opportunities for humani-tarian organisations such as Save the Children for planning and delivering projects tackling the prob-lem of children in armed conflicts. The various units5 within the Division present another platform for Save the Children to contribute to policy development on matters relating to children and armed conflict.
As one of the key components of the APSA, the ASF is meant to consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their respective countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment as soon as required. However, this research demonstrated that the ASF faces several technical, funding, and logistical challenges. For example, though the EASF and the ECOWAS-Standby Force have a permanent Logistical Base, they do not have strategic airlift capabilities and lack many other essential transpor-tation and intervention resources such as airplanes, armoured vehicles, helicopters, radios, and some-times even weapons and ammunition.
DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND THE AFRICAN UNION RESPONSE I 5
DRIvERS OF CONFlICT AND THE AFRICAN UNION RESPONSE
The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African
Union is seen as a landmark event in the institutionalisation of intergovernmental
political and collective security structures on the African continent.
Sour
ce: A
frica
n Un
ion
Stud
ies i
n Af
rica
n Se
curi
ty
AU
Fa
ct
s
Cont
inen
tal
Earl
yW
arni
ng
Syst
em
The
Afr
ican
Uni
on c
onsi
sts
of 5
4 ou
t of 5
5 st
ates
on th
e A
fric
an c
ontin
ent.
Mor
occo
is n
ot a
m
embe
r sta
te.
The
Regi
onal
Eco
nom
ic C
omm
uniti
es (R
ECs)
and
Reg
iona
l m
echa
nism
s fo
r Con
�ict
Pre
vent
ion,
Man
agem
ent a
nd
Reso
lutio
n (R
Ms)
are
a k
ey c
ompo
nent
of t
he o
pera
tiona
l-iz
atio
n an
d e�
ectiv
e fu
nctio
ning
of A
PSA
. The
PSC
and
the
Chai
rper
son
of th
e AU
Com
mis
sion
are
resp
onsi
ble
for h
ar-
mon
izin
g an
d co
ordi
natin
g th
e ac
tiviti
es o
f Reg
iona
l M
echa
nism
s in
the
�eld
of p
eace
, sec
urity
and
sta
bilit
y,
and
to e
nsur
e th
at th
ese
activ
ities
are
con
sist
ent w
ith th
e ob
ject
ives
and
prin
cipl
es o
f the
Uni
on.
Seve
n RE
Cs a
nd tw
o RM
s ha
ve s
igne
d an
MoU
with
the
AU
on C
oope
ratio
n in
the
area
of P
eace
and
Sec
urity
. Th
ese
are:
The
Ara
b M
aghr
eb U
nion
(UM
A),
whi
ch is
one
of t
he R
ECs
reco
gniz
ed b
y th
e AU
, has
not
yet
sig
ned
the
MoU
.
The
deci
sion
to e
stab
lish
an A
fric
an U
nion
was
ta
ken
by th
e O
rgan
izat
ion
of A
fric
an U
nity
(OAU
) A
ssem
bly
of H
eads
of S
tate
and
Gov
ernm
ent i
n 19
99. T
he in
augu
ratio
n of
the
AU to
ok p
lace
in
July
200
2.
The
Afr
ican
Pea
ce a
nd S
ecur
ity A
rchi
tect
ure
is
unde
rpin
ned
by tw
o pi
llars
: the
PSC
Pro
toco
l (2
002)
est
ablis
hing
the
Peac
e an
d Se
curit
y Co
unci
l, an
d th
e Co
mm
on A
fric
an D
efen
ce a
nd
Secu
rity
Polic
y (C
AD
SP) (
2004
), w
hich
pro
vide
s a
fram
ewor
k fo
r all
inst
rum
ents
rele
vant
to p
ro-
mot
e pe
ace
and
secu
rity.
The
Ass
embl
y of
Hea
ds o
f Sta
te a
nd G
over
nmen
t is
the
Supr
eme
Org
an o
f the
AU
.
AS
F S
ce
na
rio
sTh
e AU
see
ks to
dev
elop
an
Afr
ican
Sta
ndby
For
ce (A
SF) c
on-
stitu
ted
of b
rigad
e-si
zed
cont
inge
nts
from
Afr
ica´
s �v
e su
b-re
gion
s. Th
e A
SF is
com
pose
d of
bot
h m
ilita
ry a
nd c
ivili
an
capa
bilit
ies
read
y to
dep
loy
rapi
dly
in c
ase
of g
rave
circ
um-
stan
ces.
The
oper
atio
nalis
atio
n of
the
stan
dby
forc
e is
now
sc
hedu
led
for 2
015.
The
sce
nario
s fo
r whi
ch th
e A
SF is
to b
e de
ploy
ed a
re o
utlin
ed b
elow
.
Scen
-ar
ioD
escr
ipti
onD
eplo
ymen
tre
quir
emen
t
1AU
/Reg
iona
l mili
tary
adv
ice
to a
po
litic
al m
issi
on.
30 d
ays
2AU
/Reg
iona
l obs
erve
r mis
sion
co-
depl
oyed
with
a U
N m
issi
on30
day
s
3St
and-
alon
e AU
/Reg
iona
l obs
erve
r m
issi
on.
30 d
ays
4AU
/Reg
iona
l pea
ceke
epin
g fo
rce
for
Chap
ter V
I and
pre
vent
ive
depl
oy-
men
t mis
sion
s (a
nd p
eace
bui
ldin
g).
30 d
ays
5AU
Pea
ceke
epin
g fo
rce
for c
ompl
ex
mul
tidim
ensi
onal
pea
ceke
epin
g m
issi
ons,
incl
udin
g th
ose
invo
lvin
g lo
w-le
vel s
polie
rs.
90 d
ays
with
the
mili
tary
com
po-
nent
bei
ng a
ble
to d
eplo
y in
30
day
s.
6AU
inte
rven
tion,
e.g
. in
geno
cide
si
tuat
ions
whe
re th
e in
tern
atio
nal
com
mun
ity d
oes
not a
ct p
rom
ptly
.
14 d
ays
with
ro
bust
mili
tary
forc
e.
Afr
ican
Stan
dby
Forc
e
Pe
ac
e a
nd
Se
cu
rit
y A
rc
hit
ec
tu
re
Thes
e ar
e th
e m
ain
elem
ents
of t
he A
fric
an P
eace
and
Sec
urity
Arc
hite
ctur
e (A
PSA
).The
foca
l poi
nt is
the
AU P
eace
and
Sec
urity
Coun
cil l
ocat
ed in
Add
is A
baba
. The
Cou
ncil
is m
odel
ed o
n th
e U
N S
ecur
ity C
ounc
il an
d co
nsis
ts o
f 15
mem
ber s
tate
s, ro
tatin
gon
a re
gion
al b
asis
. The
re a
re n
o pe
rman
ent m
embe
rs a
nd n
o ve
to. T
he C
ounc
il ha
s ap
poin
ted
a Co
mm
issi
oner
of P
eace
and
Se
curit
y w
ho le
ads
the
Dep
artm
ent o
f Pea
ce a
nd S
ecur
ity, w
hich
runs
the
ever
yday
bus
ines
s of
APS
A.
Dep
artm
ent o
f Pea
ce a
nd S
ecur
ityPS
CSe
cret
aria
tPe
ace
Supp
ort
Ope
ratio
ns
Div
isio
n
Con�
ict M
anag
emen
t an
d Po
st C
on�i
ct
Reco
nstr
uctio
n D
ivis
on
Con�
ict P
reve
ntio
n an
d Ea
rly W
arni
ng
Div
isio
n
Def
ence
and
Se
curit
y D
ivis
ion
Ope
ra-
tiona
l and
ad
min
i-st
rativ
e su
ppor
t to
the
PSC
•• • •
••
• •Polic
ySu
ppor
t and
m
anag
emen
t of
AU
PSO
s
ASF
Con�
ict R
esol
utio
n &
Man
agem
ent
• Con
tinen
tal E
arly
W
arni
ng S
yste
m• P
anel
of t
he W
ise• A
U Bo
rder
Pro
gram
• Pea
ce-b
uild
ing
Reco
n-st
ruct
ion
and
Dev
elop
.• A
U Li
aiso
n O
�ce
s
Coun
ter t
erro
rism
Disa
rmam
ent &
N
on-p
rolif
erat
ion
Secu
rity
Sect
or
Refo
rm
The
Peac
e Fu
nd is
one
of t
he
oper
atio
nal t
ools
to �
nanc
e pe
ace
and
secu
rity
activ
ities
of t
he A
U. I
t is
mad
e up
of
�nan
cial
app
ropr
iatio
ns fr
om th
e re
gula
r AU
bu
dget
as
wel
l as
from
vol
unta
ry c
ontr
ibu-
tions
from
oth
er s
ourc
es w
ithin
Afr
ica.
Peac
e Fu
nd
NA
RC ECO
WA
SEA
PSM
SAD
C ECCA
S
FOM
AC
Regi
onal
Coo
pera
tion
Pane
l of t
he W
ise
AU
Peac
e &
Secu
rity
Coun
cil
Regi
onal
Eco
nom
ic
Com
mun
itie
s an
d Re
gion
al
Mec
hani
sms
The
CEW
S co
llect
s, an
alys
es
and
repo
rts
on c
on�i
ct-r
elat
ed
indi
cato
rs in
sup
port
of e
arly
re
spon
se c
apab
ilitie
s. Th
e ce
ntra
l situ
atio
n ro
om in
Add
is
Aba
ba c
onne
cts
with
ear
ly
war
ning
sys
tem
s in
the
regi
ons.
The
ASF
is c
ompo
sed
of �
vere
gion
al, m
ultin
atio
nal s
tand
-by
brig
ades
, civ
ilian
and
pol
ice
capa
bilit
ies.
The
Pane
l is
com
pose
d of
�ve
high
ly re
spec
ted
Afr
ican
per
-so
ns w
ho h
ave
cont
ribut
ed to
pe
ace,
sec
urity
and
dev
elop
-m
ent.
Its ro
le is
to a
dvis
e th
e PS
C on
suc
h m
atte
rs, a
nd to
ser
ve
as a
med
iatio
n in
stru
men
t.
AM
IB (B
urun
di)
Apr
il 20
03-
May
200
4A
MIS
(Dar
fur)
Apr
il 20
04 –
Dec
200
7
RCI-L
RA M
arch
201
2
AM
ISO
M (S
omal
ia) J
an 2
007
– pr
esen
t
Ope
ratio
n ‘D
emoc
racy
in C
omor
os’ (
Com
oros
Isla
nds)
Mar
ch- M
ay 2
008
MA
ES (A
U E
lect
oral
and
Sec
urity
Ass
ista
nce
Mis
sion
) (Co
mor
os Is
land
s) M
ay 2
007-
Nov
200
8
AU
Mis
sio
ns
20
03
– 2
01
2Th
e gr
aph
dem
onst
rate
s th
e au
thor
ised
str
engt
h, a
s w
ell a
s ac
tual
num
ber o
f tro
ops
depl
oyed
, of a
ll AU
mis
sion
s be
twee
n 20
03 a
nd 2
012.
Num
ber o
f tro
ops
Aut
hori
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©
Afr
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ustr
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bas
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n cu
rren
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abou
t the
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ut it
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ly u
pdat
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ne w
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eria
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lian
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mun
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ican
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tes
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tic R
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men
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anni
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ent:
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a
1 br
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e at
hig
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ness
NA
RC is
a s
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echa
nism
that
has
bee
n de
velo
ped
for
the
purp
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of th
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uild
-up
only
.
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th A
fric
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bers
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eria
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pt, L
ibya
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ritan
ia, T
unis
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bers
: Bur
undi
, Com
oros
, Djib
outi,
Eth
iopi
a,
Keny
a, R
wan
da, S
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elle
s, So
mal
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udan
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nda
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Plan
ning
ele
men
t:Ka
ren/
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(Ken
ya)
EASF
COM
is a
spe
cial
mec
hani
sm th
at h
as b
een
deve
lope
d fo
r the
pur
pose
of t
he
ASF
bui
ld-u
p on
ly.
East
Afr
ican
Sta
ndby
Bri
gade
Co
ordi
nato
n M
echa
nism
1 br
igad
e at
hig
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vel r
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ness
•
1 br
igad
e at
hig
h le
vel r
eadi
ness
•
Mem
bers
: Ang
ola,
Bot
swan
a, D
emoc
ratic
Rep
ublic
of
Con
go, L
esot
ho, M
adag
asca
r, M
alaw
i, M
aurit
ius,
Moz
ambi
que,
Nam
ibia
, Sey
chel
les,
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h A
fric
a,
Swaz
iland
, Tan
zani
a, Z
ambi
a, Z
imba
bwe
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ning
ele
men
t:G
abor
one
(Bot
swan
a)
Sout
hern
Afr
ica
Dev
elop
men
t Com
mun
ity
Co
mo
ro
s
Isl
an
ds
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yc
he
ll
es
Sã
o T
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inc
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pe
Ve
rd
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ur
itiu
s
Policy analysts have identified a number of other technical and political challenges. On the techni-cal side, these include the failure of a multinational endeavour to develop common doctrine, system, tactics, techniques and procedures, and the lack of an intermediary command and control structure between the AU’s Peace and Security Department and ASF brigades. Politically, a crucial missing ingredient has been an adequate level of interstate and inter-REC cooperation. Lastly, African financial support has been largely insufficient.6
At the RECs level, a 2010 assessment of the insti-tutions’ strengths and weaknesses concluded that, in relation to the EASF, there were internal tensions and conflicts within members’ states, shortfalls in committed troops from member states, and a gen-eral lack of political, diplomatic and military cohe-sion in the region. This implies that the concept of optimal integrated planning and collective regional security systems remains elusive.
The varied geopolitical and socio-cultural histories of the EASF members and dual membership of some countries in the region discourages progress. The previously mentioned study pointed to greater “soli-darity” among members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and high levels of commitment to funding the regional security effort. Another study suggested that certain ECOWAS mem-ber states are less enthusiastic and are suspicious of Nigerian ambitions to be the regional hegemon.
These political challenges and capacity gaps facing PSO actors in both Eastern and Western Africa result in disturbing implications for the rights of children, which shall be explored in the following section.
The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children7
The major drivers of conflict, particularly in resource-rich countries such as the DRC and the Republic of South Sudan, are the control and exploitation of nat-ural resources including diamonds, coltan, gold and oil. Politically instigated conflicts are also the scourge of the African continent. For example, the recent crisis in the Republic of South Sudan has been attributed to the mobilisation of political support based on identity
politics and state weaknesses. Causes and drivers of conflicts are as diverse as their consequences. How-ever, in Sub-Saharan Africa where the majority of the population is constituted of young people, domestic unemployment and declining economic opportunities create the perfect conditions for mobilising groups of individuals to violence.8
The conflict dynamic across Africa produces devas-tating impacts on children’s development and sur-vival. “In recent years, United Nations child protec-tion actors have noted with concern that the evolving character and tactics of armed conflicts are creating unprecedented threats to children. The absence of clear front lines and identifiable opponents, the increasing use of terror tactics by some armed groups and certain methods used by security forces have made children more vulnerable. Children are being used as suicide bombers and human shields, while schools continue to be attacked, affecting girls’ education in particular, and to be exploited for military purposes. In addition, children are being held in security detention for alleged association with armed groups. Furthermore, drone strikes have resulted in child casualties and have had a detrimen-tal impact on the psychosocial health of children”9
n In some cases, warfare rages on and off throughout childhood, girls and boys reaching adulthood never having known long-lasting peace in their homeland. Some of the countries in the Eastern and Western African sub-regions have experienced conflict for more than a decade, and suffer the consequences of protracted conflict, e.g. the DRC, Liberia, North-ern Nigeria, Northern Uganda, the Republic of South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Somalia.
DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND THE AFRICAN UNION RESPONSE I 7
The conflict dynamic across Africa wields a devastating impact on children’s development
and survival. In recent years, United Nations child protection actors have noted
with concern that the evolving character and tactics of armed conflict are creating
unprecedented threats to children.
n The denial of humanitarian access to children in conflict areas is often a great concern, as demon-strated in recent years in Sri Lanka and Sudan. When denied humanitarian assistance, children are deprived of their right to survival, develop-ment, food, water and medication.
n Whether sudden or chronic, warfare leads to violations of children’s rights. Physical survival becomes a daily challenge, often with difficulty accessing clean water, an adequate food supply and appropriate shelter, among other deprivations.
n Access to adequate healthcare and securing appropriate drugs (both preventative and cura-tive) and vaccines are major concerns for both children and mothers, including pregnant and breastfeeding women. In many conflicts, the majority of child mortalities occur away from the battles, bombings and terrorist attacks.10
n Conflict-related targeting of educational facil-ities (of both their staff and infrastructures) has increased significantly since 2004, resulting in school closures and even the collapse of educa-tion systems.11 Over 50% of all primary school-aged children who are not in school reside in a ‘fragile state’.12
n Armed conflict affects children at all levels, as individuals and as members of both a family and a community. Conflict fragments a society, gen-erating questions of identity and allegiance while dividing communities through suspicion.
n Emergencies disrupt daily routines, weakening the social ties they provide, as people are separated from their social support networks and displaced from their homes. In addition to losing loved ones, homes and possessions, children lose geographi-cal references (such as a favourite tree or route to school) and symbolic personal items (such as pho-tographs or an inherited stamp collection), which serve as important reminders of their life, identity and culture.13
n Warfare has an impact on personal safety and security, as children often rely on adults for their protection. As conflict unfolds, protective struc-tures often break down and the social norms that regulate behaviour are affected, making children even more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.
n Armed conflict can have long-term effects on a family’s financial well-being and ability to support all of its dependents, especially when it causes displacement. There is often increased poverty resulting from loss of land and assets, which causes depletion of savings, as people barter what they have for safety or basic needs. This often results in reduced access to education, including secondary and professional schooling, as well as disruption of earnings, as family mem-bers are imprisoned or killed.
n Children who are separated from their traditional caregivers or who are orphaned during times of conflict are frequently left to be taken in by other families or institutions, or to fend for themselves and/or their siblings. Children with a pre-existing vulnerability factors, such as orphans and children with disabilities are particularly at risk of emotional instability, physical injury, sexual violence, torture, recruitment into armed conflict, and death.14
Peacekeeping TrainingIt is generally observed that the AU, the RECs and Regional Mechanisms and various peacekeeping training institutions collaborate regularly on numer-ous projects, including conducting Training Needs Assessments (TNA), joint delivery of trainings and funding coordination.
The denial of humanitarian access to children in conflict areas is often a great concern, as demonstrated in recent years in Sri Lanka and Sudan. When denied humanitarian assistance, children are deprived of their right to survival, development, food, water and medication.
8 I CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS – Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations – REPORT SUMMARY
In spite of this collaboration in the field of training, the research undertaken has shown some of the areas that remain a challenge within the training of stakeholders. The points of weaknesses identi-fied include insufficient interoperability and lack of standardised training resources. Although the Afri-can Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) is keen on harmonising the various training pro-grams, at the time of research for this study, train-ing remained a loosely coordinated activity, mainly donor-driven, and weakened by the lack of stable internal funding.
Training opportunities do exist among stakeholders in both sub-regions of Eastern and Western Africa. For instance, demands from the AU, RECs and AU member states for capacity building in regard to pro-tection of civilians/child protection, as well as training on Gender-Based Sexual Violence, were expressed by most of the key informants of the implementing institutions. On a similar note, it was established that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had expressed the need for specialised courses as well as basic POC and child protection training.
There seems to be a gap in reliable information on which centres were or were not providing POC or child protection training at the time of writing. The exceptions are the Kofi Annan International Peace-keeping Centre in Ghana and the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya, who offer train-ing as both stand-alone modules and in the format and when their main collaborating partners require it. There is also no reliable data on training mate-rials, nor regarding how comprehensive and up-to-date trainee databases may be. Many of the training centres are carrying out monitoring and evaluation of their training activities. An informant met when collecting data for this report asserted that “nearly all of them face challenges with monitoring and eval-uation and are dedicating resources to improve on these two aspects including the use of mobile eval-uation teams.
On cooperation and collaboration, an informant said: “It [is] clearly obvious that even though the Training Centres of Excellence (TCEs) purport to and/or aspire to collaborate, the extent to which this
is done and/or will ever be done is a matter of con-jecture. The main reason being that […] the TCEs are in competition with each other (whether they admit it or not), and each of them is guarded as to what they can share and how the other party will use what they share.”
There are also countless perception issues that may be influencing training programs in the two sub-re-gions. The unclear line between the roles of military and civilian components in peace missions was evident in the contributions of some of the senior military officers. On military perceptions of need, another interviewee said: “My gut feeling is that the demand for training in child protection is not high. First of all this is perceived as a civilian component […] Militaries are not preoccupied with this to start with. They are fighters. They at least [sic] think they have more pressing things to look after. Police yes, but as they work in very unsafe environments, child protection would not be their first priority but maybe the second or third.”15
In light of these challenges, several recommenda-tions emerged, with some of the interviewees feel-ing that, in order to enhance understanding of chil-dren’s rights by military personnel, there is a need to integrate socio-cultural aspects in child protection training for peacekeepers. This was supported by the view that knowledge and skills are not sufficient to overcome certain beliefs and representations of children and childhood.
DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND THE AFRICAN UNION RESPONSE I 9
In light of these challenges, several recommendations emerged, with some of the interviewees feeling that, in order to enhance understanding of children’s
rights by military personnel, there was a need to integrate sociocultural
aspects in child protection training for peacekeepers.
In 2011, ECOWAS also adopted a Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services in West Africa. Its Article 7 specifies that “In the exercise of their duties, armed and security personnel shall provide adequate protection, refuge and assistance to all persons in need. They shall ensure that internally displaced persons, refugees, non-nationals, stateless persons, minorities, women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities are not discriminated against. No one shall discriminate on the basis of race, identity, religion, political beliefs, status or condition.”
Despite all the military and political efforts towards building peace in Africa, the continent still experi-ences devastating conflicts. The list of new and long-standing peace and security threats includes the recent crises in the Central African Republic and Mali, as well as conflicts that “have thwarted all efforts at peacemaking” in Western Sahara. The list also includes the proliferation of armed groups in the DRC, the defiant Eritrea against her neighbours, and others that have seen some progress but remain areas of risk, in danger of reigniting, for example the Great Lakes region, Somalia, Darfur and the recently politically instigated crisis in the new Republic of South Sudan.
Despite attempts to delegitimise unconstitutional changes of government, coups d’état and other seizures of power have affected the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Mali.
Recourse to armed rebellion in Mali, the DRC and the Central African Republic were seen as gover-nance-related and characterised in the report to the Security Council as the greatest threat on the conti-nent to peace, security and stability because of their impact on civilians.
The cyclical conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa seem unlikely to come to an end in the near future. Responses to these conflicts can vary widely in terms of preparation and of actual implementation.
In Mali, for instance, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) had a Protec-tion of Civilians mandate, and was the first African Union mission to have an approved Protection of Civilians policy.16 It also had ground-breaking provi-sions for human rights training of troops pre-deploy-ment. Nonetheless, most actors were unprepared to undertake child protection or Protection of Civilians (PoC) measures in general, when events began to unfold in January 2013. With the quickened pace of events, much human rights training was “side-stepped”.17
As late as June 2013, no Standard Operating Pro-cedure (SOP) on how to deal with children affected by armed conflict were in place for any of the armed forces operating in Mali, nor had the Malian Armed Forces or AFISMA troops received substan-tial child protection training, despite the fact that human rights observers from ECOWAS and from the AU were arriving in Bamako. The draft agreement on SOPs for the Malian Armed Forces remained unsigned. While transfers of children caught up in the conflict from AFISMA or Malian forces to civilian actors generally took place, this was as a result of the “good will” of involved parties, and was not insti-tutionalised. The external support by the European Union Training Mission in Mali in April 2013 offered a one-hour course on child protection, and was put in place with the support of UNICEF and the Interna-tional Bureau for Children’s Rights.
10 I CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS – Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations – REPORT SUMMARY
THE UNFOlDINg CONFlICT ‘HOT SPOTS’ IN SUb-SAHARAN AFRICA
The policy options presented in this section pro-vide a range of opportunities for consideration by individuals and organisations actively engaged in supporting initiatives for averting violence against children in armed conflict across Sub-Saharan Africa. The opportunities identified are useful for decision-makers in addressing some of the chal-lenges faced by defence institutions. They include international and African child protection frame-works, the AU response to conflict, regional coop-eration for conflict aversion and training issues.
International and African Political and Legal Child Protection Frameworks
Protection of Civilian norms and those specific to, or generally applicable to children affected by armed conflict, are derived from a wide range of sources: international humanitarian law, norms set by the United Nations (UN) such as within the UN Secu-rity Council or international humanitarian organisa-tions, those found in peacekeeping mandates, those established by regional intergovernmental organisa-tions, and within the Responsibility to protect UN initiative (R2P).
The R2P, adopted by UN members as part of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, obli-gates individual governments to prevent violence against their own populations, to react to protect those populations against “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, as well as to assume the responsibility of rebuilding afterwards if such acts have taken place. The R2P includes a second responsibility on the behalf of the international community: “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it,”18 it becomes the responsibility of the international community to intervene for protec-tion purposes.
The APSA follows a similar pattern in developing institutions for the protection of civilians, in par-ticular of children. In July 2002, the AU adopted a Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa that urges member states to ratify the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Many African states have also commit-ted themselves to the 2007 Principles and Guide-lines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles), which provide that all children associated with armed actors should be considered primarily as victims of viola-tions of international law, not perpetrators.
The Proposed Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians in African Peace Support Operations, currently under review, make no specific men-tion of African or other legal frameworks explicitly focused on child protection or child’s rights. The guidelines do include references to children in the provisions concerning civilian groups with spe-cials needs, which are listed as women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, internally displaced individuals and refugees. It is obvious that both the international community and the AU are committed to institutionalising the protection of civilians in the AU peace operations. However, challenges related to the lack of a clear framework for implementation in the field, and the general scarcity of information on child protection issues seems to be hindering the efforts.
POLICY GAPS AND OPTIONS I 11
“Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it,” it becomes the responsibility of the international community to intervene
for protection purposes.
POlICY gAPS AND OPTIONS
Regional Cooperation for Conflict AversionThe AU Regional Task Force (RTF) pursuing the LRA operates within four nations affected by the armed group’s actions: the Central African Republic, the DRC, the Republic of South Sudan and Uganda.
Even though the Task Force has been able to lower the number of LRA attacks against civilians, it struggles with many challenges. While the LRA has ceased to be a threat in Northern Uganda with the overall number of attacks reduced since 2012, it continues to maintain a presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central Afri-can Republic and possibly in Southern Sudan19. Most of the LRA’s attacks have generally taken place in areas where security, government pres-ence, accessibility and communication infrastruc-tures are poor. It is widely felt that LRA activities are currently limited largely to logistical raids aimed at ensuring its survival. In November 2011, the African Union Peace and Security Council declared the LRA a terrorist organisation.
In 2013, Save the Children, in collaboration with UNICEF, spearheaded a training schedule for the RTF in East and Central Africa with the intention to train at least 3,500 troops by the end of 2014.
This initiative is, however, faced with many logistical challenges, as well as the cyclical nature of conflicts in the region. For example, the efforts to develop the capacity of the designated peacekeepers are ham-pered by the current intercommunal conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan and the on-going armed conflict in the Central African Republic.
Training Issues In both the Eastern and Western African sub- regions, peacekeeping training centres collaborate with the AU, RECs and Regional mechanisms on various activities, including training needs assessment and harmonisation of common courses. The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) coordi-nates most of these training standardisation activities.
Due to the capacity challenges facing peacekeep-ing training centres, there is a general feeling among actors that these centres require capacity building mainly in child protection and Gender Based Violence.
Other pertinent issues identified during pilot training for the EASF child protection curriculum include the lack of solid participant selection criteria and weak mon-itoring and evaluation systems within peacekeeping training. Although efforts are underway to establish a roster, there seems to exist certain distrust among key stakeholders, concerning the transparency of the troop-generating countries throughout the process, even though they are the ultimate safeguards.
In May 2013, the Secretary-General’s report to the UN Security Council on children and armed conflict, expressed “concern that the evolving character and tactics of armed conflict are creating unprecedented threats to children. The absence of clear front lines and identifiable opponents, the increasing use of terror tactics by some armed groups and certain meth-ods used by security forces have made children more vulnerable. Children are being used as suicide bombers and human shields, while schools continue to be attacked, affecting girls’ education in particular, and to be used for military purposes. In addition, children are being held in security detention for alleged association with armed groups. Furthermore, drone strikes have resulted in child casualties and have had a serious impact on the psychosocial health of children.”
Source: United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Children and armed conflict, A/67/845–S/2013/245, May 2013
12 I CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS – Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations – REPORT SUMMARY
In 2013, Save the Children, in collaboration with UNICEF, spearheaded a training schedule for the RTF in East and Central Africa with the intention to train at least 3,500 troops by the end of 2014. This initiative is, however, faced with myriad logistical challenges, as well as the cyclical nature of conflicts in the region.
It is common knowledge that more than half of the AU’s budget is now provided by Western donors and that this is unlikely to change in the foresee-able future. Virtually all future AU sanctioned inter-ventions will be dependent on considerable finan-cial, logistic and other military support from the international community, particularly the United States and the former colonial powers, France and the United Kingdom.
At the same time, the AU continues to cumulate yearly deficits. The performance rate per year is about 40 per cent. Sometimes funds arrive late, sometimes they are earmarked, but there is also a lack of capacity to absorb funding in a timely fash-ion. When funding is not steady and predictable, it is difficult to utilise 100 per cent. Part of the fault lies in donor funding restrictions, such as release times. Both the AU and donors are constrained by their own rules and capacities, which results in a very unpredictable environment.
The AU capacities have been developing for about 10 years, but that is still a very short timeframe for an international institution. There is likely to be a very uncertain environment for the next 10 to 20 years until its structures have proven their value. Ultimately, donor coordination and cooperation is limited, inconsistent and susceptible to changing resource levels, national political and security inter-ests and domestic public attention.
What hope there was that the originally envisaged African Union Standby Force could be the answer to Africa’s multiple security crises has been seriously eroded by the AU’s inability to take the lead in stem-ming the Islamist-led insurgency in Mali. While some take solace in AMISOM’s successes in pushing back insurgents in Somalia, that mission has been marked by individual AU states (Kenya and Ethiopia) intervening unilaterally and by reports of widespread human rights abuses.
With South Africa, Ethiopia and Uganda as leading participants, the “temporary” African Immediate Cri-sis Response Initiative is now being discussed. This initiative could possibly replace the stunted ASF as the intervention tool of choice for some African mili-tary powers with interests and reach from Southern Africa into Central Africa and the Horn. It is difficult to see Nigeria and other West African states collab-orating in such an arrangement, rather than continu-ing to rely on ECOWAS. Another possibility is ad hoc arrangements dependent on several individual states cooperating in a joint intervention sanctioned by the AU, as in the case of the LRA Task Force.
Whatever military or political configurations they participate in, about half a dozen African militaries are likely to continue to lead in troop contributions: those from Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
CONCLUSIONS I 13
The execution rate year on year is about 40 per cent. Sometimes funds arrive late,
sometimes they are earmarked, but there is also a lack of capacity to absorb funding in a timely fashion. When it is not steady and predictable, it is difficult to utilise 100 per cent. Part of the fault lies in donor funding
restrictions such as release times. Both the AU and donors are constrained by their own rules and capacities and the result is a very
unpredictable environment.
CONClUSIONS
14 I CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS – Child Protection in African Union Peace Support Operations – REPORT SUMMARY
WHAT SHOUlD bE DONE TO PURSUE AN EFFECTIvE STRATEgY FOR PROTECTINg CHIlDREN IN ARMED CONFlICTS
The issues discussed and options considered in this report could increase efficiency of PSO actors in regard to the protection of children in armed conflicts. Increasing interactions and sharing of information through ‘lessons learnt’ mechanisms can be greatly beneficial to all stakeholders.
No single solution can be prescriptive to the multitude of challenges faced by PSO actors. Nevertheless, decision makers and other stakeholders will have to prioritise attention to creating and sustaining synergy in training, knowledge generation, and advocacy initiatives.
Further action is needed in a number of key areas, including:
n Leading humanitarian organisations such as Save the Children to strengthen working relationships with regional standby forces and troop contributing countries to entrench and institutionalise the protection of civilians and child protection concepts and training. The regional standby forces could assume leadership on this, while benefiting from the necessary support on behalf of the international community;
n Greater synergy rather than competition among PSO actors will minimise tensions and duplication of efforts;
n Strengthening the capacities of regional standby forces and task forces in monitoring and reporting through system development and information sharing;
n Support training material harmonisation and promote the concept of Centres of Excellence so as to minimise the negative competition and maximise synergy and joint programming.
No single solution can be prescriptive
to the myriad challenges faced
by PSO actors. Nevertheless,
decision makers and other
programmatic staff within this
context will have to prioritise
attention to creating and sustaining
synergy in training, knowledge
generation, and advocacy initiatives.
Save the Children is the world’s leading independent organization for children. We work in around 120 countries. We save children’s lives, we fight for their rights; we help them fulfil their potential. Our vision is a world in which every child attain the right to survival, protection, development and participation Our mission is to inspire breakthroughs in the way the world treats children, and to achieve immediate and lasting change in their lives.
1 . For more information, please refer to the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and 1889 (2009) on women, peace and security, Security Council Resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009) on children and armed conflict, and for information specifically on sexual and Gender-Based Violence, to Resolutions 1820 and 1888 (2008) .
2 . Ekaterina Stepanova, “Trends in Armed Conflicts: One-sided Violence Against Civilians”, SIPRI Yearbook 2009, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2009, available online at http://www .sipri .org/yearbook .
3 . African Standby Forces form part of the five bodies of the APSA . They are: Peace and Security Council; Continental Early Warning System; Panel of the Wise; African Standby Force and Special Fund .
4 . The five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) .
5 . The division is composed of four units: Policy Development; Plans and Operations Unit; Capability Development; and Mission Support Unit .
6 . For more information, refer to the various publications by Williams, Paul D ., “Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa”, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Research Paper No . 1, National Defense University Press, Washington, D .C . September 2010; Williams, Paul D ., Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned Since 2000, Africa Security Brief, No . 25, July 2013, Africa Center for Strategic Studies http://africacenter .org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/AfricaBriefFinal_25 .pdf; Williams, Paul . D ., 2013 . “The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges”, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2(2):39, DOI: http://dx .doi .org/10 .5334/sta .bz .
7 . This section is an extract of Chapter 2 “War-Affected Children – An Overview” in “Children and Armed Conflict: A New Guide to International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law” published in March 2010 by the International Bureau for Children’s Rights . See http://www .ibcr .org/editor/assets/thematic_report/5/Conflict_Eng .pdf
8 . For more information on the subject, refer to Haider, Huma, Topic Guide on Conflict, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham, 2012, available online at http://www .gsdrc .org/docs/open/CON69 .pdf .
9 . Children and Armed Conflict - Report of the Secretary-General, p .2, May 2013, available online at www .poa-iss .org/poa/S-2013-503-E .pdf
10 . The International Rescue Committee (IRC), “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey”, 2003,
available online at http://www .reliefweb .int/library/documents/2003/irc-drc-8apr .pdf . The IRC estimated that 86% of deaths in the DRC’s war-affected provinces were the indirect consequences of the conflict and affected children disproportionately . For a discussion on the indirect consequences on children of terrorist attacks, see Human Security Centre, “Human Security Report 2005”, p .44, available online at http://www .humansecurityreport .info/index .php?option=content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63 .
11 . Brendan O’Malley, “Education Under Attack”, UNESCO, 2007, available at http://www .unesco .org/education/attack/educationunderattack .pdf .
12 . Save the Children Alliance, “Rewrite the Future – Three Years On”, 2009, p .1, available at http://www .savethechildren .org/publications/reports/Rewrite_the_Future_Three_Years_On_lowres-pdf-1 .pdf . The OECD defines a ‘fragile State’ as a country that is “unable to provide physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population” . See http://www .crisisgroup .org/home/index .cfm?id=4672&l=1 .
13 . Terre des Hommes, “Child Protection: Manual for intervention in humanitarian crisis”, 2006, p .14, available online at http://www .tdh .ch/website/doc_dnld .nsf/bf25ab0f47ba5dd785256499006b15a4/aa38138679a23d33c12571760041dd5d/$FILE/manuel_protection_en_2006 .pdf .
14 . For a more detailed analysis, please refer to the Children and armed conflict - Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/845–S/2013/245, May 2013 .
15 . Key informant 3, interview .
16 . “According to an AU official that was interviewed on 17 May 2013, a Protection of Civilians (PoC) strategy for AFISMA was approved in May 2013 . The official also pointed out that PoC was part of the AFISMA mandate as per UNSC Resolution 2085, and it was thus also strongly embedded in the CONOPS endorsed by ECOWAS and the AU .” Freear, M . and de Coning, C . “Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali”, (2013) 2(2): Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 23, note 13 .
17 . Watchlist, “Where Are They…? The Situation of Children and Armed Conflict in Mali” June 2013, http://watchlist .org/where-are-they-mali/, p . 41 .
18 . The Responsibility to Protection: Core Principles . See http://www .responsibilitytoprotect .org/index .php/publications
19 . LRA Regional Update: Central African Republic, the DR Congo and South Sudan, OCHA, April-June 2013, http://reliefweb .int/sites/reliefweb .int/files/resources/LRA%20Regional%20Update%20%28April%20-%20June%202013%29 .pdf .
EndnoTES
AcknowledgementsThis report is a summary of the larger contextual analysis carried out by the IBCR on behalf of Save the Children and was compiled by Francis Onditi, Regional Project Coordinator, Save the Children EARO .
Save the Children and the International Bureau for Children’s Rights wish to express sincere appreciation to several partners and colleagues, in particular the the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) for their contribution to the research and drafting of this study . We further wish to recognise the efforts and input of the project management team, including Thematic Advisors and project staff . Finally, Save the Children and the IBCR are grateful for the generous support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) in funding this project .
© 2014 Save the Children and the International Bureau for Children’s Rights . All rights reserved .
With the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency .
ABOUT SAVE THE CHILDREN REGIONAL PROGRAMMESave the Children in East Africa realises that the need to eliminate all forms of violence against children involves a multi faceted approach involving a number of stakeholders. This had led to the focus of protection interventions in the region geared towards establishing and strengthening national child protection systems to respond and prevent all forms of violence against children including abuse, neglect and exploitation in a holistic and coordinated manner. Since 2009, Save the Children has supported governments, civil society and children with technical support and financial resources to map child protection concerns and develop sustainable interventions in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan.
Recently, Save the Children has supported and collaborated with the Committee of Experts and the African Union on research and general comments on protection provisions under the Charter and relevant AU Instruments including the need for national child protection systems, corporal punishment under the Charter and the right of a child to a family and parental care. Regional integration and regional cooperation are essential for sustainable development and peaceful coexistence. The AU and the RECs play a key role in strengthening regional integration and cooperation in Africa. The operationalisation as well as the institutional capacity of these Bodies vary and need to be strengthened in order for them to fulfill their respective mandates and strategic roles in promoting child rights and in particular child protection in the Member States across the Region.
The Regional Programme promotes and implements through a right based approach based on partnerships, building a strong evidence base through research and advocacy and building the capacity of organizations in the Region to hold governments accountable.
Group photo at the opening ceremony at the Abidjan Workshop organised by the International Bureau for Children’s Rights in November 2013 with the training institutions of security forces from 22 African countries.
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU FOR CHILDREN’S RIGHTSEstablished in 1994, the International Bureau for Children’s Rights (IBCR) is an international non-governmental organisation based in Montreal, Canada. Internationally renowned and bilingual, it is the only Canadian organisation working on children’s rights that possesses Special Consultative Status granted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
The mission of the IBCR is to contribute to the respect and promotion of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its Optional Protocols. The IBCR is convinced that the implementation of children’s rights can be facilitated through the sharing of knowledge and good practices, as well as through the development of tools and models that help to monitor and inspire the implementation of the CRC. The IBCR seeks partnerships with those committed to ensuring the implementation of the CRC, including intergovernmental bodies, international, regional and local non-governmental organisations, and others that are also concerned by the rights and the dignity of all the children in the world.
In association with the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations, the IBCR recently under-took a review of military staff training tools used by peacekeeping schools. It is currently implementing pro-grammes in 12 countries in the Middle East and Africa to build capacities of security forces and justice person-nel on children’s rights. This work involves integrating permanent mandatory courses at the initial, continuous and specialised levels in training schools that adopt a competency framework and a participatory approach.
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