Can the African Union Cope with the Logistics Challenges of the African Standby Force?

By Geofrey MugumyaFormer Director, Peace and Security Department, AUC

Presentation at the Peacekeeping ConferenceJohannesburg 26 – 27 August 2010

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• The adoption of the PSC Protocol and its subsequent entering into force in December 2003, was a culmination of the concerted efforts, since the early 1990s, to equip the continent with a more robust apparatus for preserving and enhancing peace and security in the continent.

• The central objectives of the PSC are:

i. anticipate and prevent conflicts;

ii. promote and implement peace-building;

iii. develop a common defence policy for the Union;

iv. coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism;

v. promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.

• The PSC, as provided in the Protocol, is to be supported by the African Standby Force which is subject of discussion of this paper.

Introduction

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• The first peacekeeping venture undertaken by the OAU was in Chad in 1979 to 1982.

• The operation in Chad furnished the first occasion ever for the OAU to mount a peace-keeping operation. It differed from all other instances of OAU military involvement in conflict management in that it was more complex than the ceasefire observation missions that the Organization had been deploying.

• Among the other countries, which were supposed to provide units to the neutral African force—Congo, Benin, and Guinea, only the Congolese contingent composed of 500 troops showed up in Chad on 18 January 1980.

• With the exception of the lead country—Nigeria, there was lack of cooperation from many African countries.

History of OAU/AU Engagement in Peacekeeping

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ii. The lack of a clear mandate, and concept, particularly with regard to logistics, operation and troop-generation, further demonstrated the inexperience of the OAU.

i. The effectiveness of peacekeeping was commensurate with the capacity and political will of the troop-contributing countries and the centrality of cooperation by the neighbouring countries.

iii. The fact that peacekeeping was not a picnic but a complex and expensive operation.

iv. Many African countries could not afford to participate in peacekeeping operations without being assisted from outside especially with logistics.

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the Chad’s operation were that :

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The Chadian experience was later to inform reflections in the continent on how best to deal with future peacekeeping.

• The Africa Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS). The first meeting of the ACDS, was held in Addis Ababa, from 3 to 6 June 1996, which reflecting on Chadian experience, emphasized that the primary responsibility of the OAU should lie with the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1993 Cairo Declaration.

• At the same time, recognized that certain exceptional circumstances can arise which may lead to the deployment of limited peacekeeping or observation missions by the OAU.

• It also recognized that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly in the area of peacekeeping, rests with the United Nations Security Council.

How lessons learned have been used to formulate future policies of the OAU/AU engagement in peacekeeping

operations including the ASF

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In order to equip the OAU to better undertake peace support missions, the Meeting saw the need to strengthen the military Unit of the General Secretariat. (by the time AMIS was planned and launched only one military officer existed at the Secretariat).

It is also recommended that the OAU should continue to co-ordinate closely with Sub-Regional Organizations in its peace support operations, taking advantage of existing arrangements within the sub-regions.

The Meeting accepted the principle of standby arrangements and earmarked contingents on a voluntary basis, which could serve either under the aegis of the United Nations or the OAU or under sub-regional arrangements.

The Meeting recognised the need for proper preparation and the standardisation of training.

How lessons learned have been used to formulate future policies of the OAU/AU engagement in peacekeeping operations including the

ASF

Strengthening the Military Unit:

Coordination with RECs:

Standby arrangements:

Proper preparation:

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Inspired by the role played by the Monitoring Mission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS-ECOMOG) in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, there grew a strong desire for the continent to take on matters of peacekeeping.

• The 2nd of the ACDS

This meeting which was held in Harare, from 24 to 25 October 1997 and which was convened to consider the recommendations, observations and proposals of the Group of Military Experts, discussed among others:

i. The concept of peace support operations (PSO);

ii. Applicable procedures and adequacy of structures for PSO;

iii. Need for standard and adopted training in the field of PSO;

iv. Command and control of OAU PSO at various levels.

v. Command and control of joint OAU/UN and OAU/Regional Organization operations;

vi. Planning and structure of PSO communications;

vii. Capacity building of Africa and the OAU General secretariat in the field of PSO;viii. Logistic support and financing of OAU PSO.

Inspiration by ECOMOG success

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The Meeting recommended, among others, that all Peace Support Operations in Africa should be conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration; and that the concept should be firmly linked to the operationalisation of its Early Warning System, including a network linking each of the Early Warning cells of the various sub-regional organizations in Africa.

i. OAU should use existing UN references and adapt them to unique continental and organizational factors;

ii. OAU must also develop its own Standard Operating Procedures, for use by Member States in training and preparation for peace operations;

iv. Training should be conducted in accordance with UN doctrine and standards,

To be continued

iii. OAU should identify about 500 trained military and civilian observers (100 from each sub-region) as an appropriate starting point for standby capacity;

Substantive recommendations made

On the Concept

On procedures for conducting of peace support operations

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v. Centres of expertise for peace support operations training should be established.

vi. OAU conduct simulation exercises at the organizational level and joint exercises at the sub-regional level under its auspices.

vii. A command, control and communications framework for OAU peace support operations, taking into consideration the OAU Charter and the Cairo Declaration.

Substantive recommendations made

On procedures for conducting of peace support operations

The proposed framework excluded peace enforcement operations.

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• At the inception of AMIS there was only one Military Officer;

To be continued

• None the of the regular AU senior staff especially in peace and security Department had experience in peacekeeping;

• The PSO Division which was to take the lead in the formulation of process leading to establishment of ASF had no single staff ( At present it has only two regular staff).

• The planning of AMIS was made in hurry as the political leaders wanted to demonstrate political commitment and as result there was no time to look at the best practices based on the lessons learned from the past;

• The mandate of the Mission was never clear (For example the GoS continued to refer to the earlier SOMA which was concerned with Ceasefire Commission (CFC);

Did the AU incorporate the lessons learned from its past engagement in peacekeeping operations in the planning of AMIS and AMISON, and

hence the envisioned

AMIS

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• Critical areas that are necessary for launching a successful large and multidimensional operations peacekeeping operations were lacking such as the INTEGRATED STRUCTURES.

No JLOC - A Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) to support coordinate the provision of logistical support in accordance with Senior Leader Team (the SLM itself was not in place) priorities.

No JOC – A Joint Operation Centre (JOC) that collates situation reports and operational information to provide current situational awareness of the mission and acts as crisis coordination hub

No JMAC - A Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) that provides integrated analysis of all-sources of information to assess medium and long term threats to the mandate and to support SLT decision-making.

Did the AU incorporate the lessons learned from its past engagement in peacekeeping operations in the planning of

AMIS and AMISON, and hence the envisioned ASF?

No ISS - A Integrated Service Support (ISS) that harnesses all logistical

Resources of the mission and the JLOC to support coordinate the provision of

logistical support in accordance with SLT priorities.

AMIS

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• AMIS was launched on the assumption that donors will come forth to support the mission operations.

• The boots were on ground before predictable funding was secured.• AMIS had no control over those who supported in kind strategic areas of the

mission such as in, aviation, fuel, ground transport, camp construction, catering, medical and insurance.

• Coupled with the inadequate administrative, procurement as well as financial rules and regulations of the AU, which were not designed to respond to the needs of such huge operations, the whole programme became a mess.

• In some instances, the first contractors to arrive in the mission, took advantage of the AU weaknesses to make deals.

• SOMA with the host country was not clearly negotiated as the result most its provisions were not implemented.

• SOFA were badly drafted and sometimes even never signed and as result some countries turned up with non-functional equipment.

An AUC Task Force sent in early 2005 to assess the management and logistical procurement wound out that the whole Administrative and Management structure was not in place. In particular the logistics were messy.

AMIS countered serious challenges

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• By the time AMISO was planned and launched, criticism of the AU performance in Darfur were high.

• In an effort not to repeat what happened in Darfur, the AU simply decided that TCCs to AMISOM should operate on self sustainment basis with the AU to reimburse them-once it mobilized resources. This was another miscalculation, because most of the countries that had originally pledged troops could not afford to cater for themselves in all logistics.

• Another negative factor was that by the time AMISOM was launched, it was at the same time that AMIS was being transformed to UNAMID, and bearing in mind the challenges TCCs/PCCs encountered with AMIS, most of them shifted their pledges to UNAMID as they understood that under the UN, there is always predictable funding.

In spite of the logistical improvement following the UN intervention, with the creation of UNSOA, still there is still problems of Force Generation for AMISON.

Did the AU incorporate the lessons learned from its past engagement in peacekeeping operations in the planning of AMIS and AMISON, and hence the envisioned ASF?

AMISOM

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Most of the lessons have been incorporated to drafting the relevant ASF documents.

However, success of how the future ASF shall much depend on the availability of funding, which should not only from the AU Members States but the United Nations as whole.

ASF Deployment Missions’ Scenarios. Six main scenarios have been envisaged for the deployment of the ASF:Scenario 1: AU and Regional Organization Military advice to a political missionScenario 2: AU and Regional Organization Military Observer mission co-deployed with the UN mission;Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU and Regional Organization observer mission; Scenario 4: AU and Regional Organization peacekeeping force for Chapter VI of the UN Charter and preventive deployment missions;Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission—low level spoilers (as in many of the ongoing conflicts);Scenario 6: AU intervention, e.g. in the case of genocide, or where the international community does not act promptly. Each scenario shall be determined by the situation on the ground. The decision on which brigade to deploy shall also be guided by analysis of the crisis and the best scenario.

Conclusion and future ASF

Thank you for your attention