Chevron Refinery Fire 2012Jasmine Hinojosa, Heather Melendez, Jonathan Ramos

A little background info.Chevron Refinery in Richmond

Largest oil refinery in Northern California

Nearly 250,000 barrels of crude oil per day

Transportation fuels i.e. diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and lubrication oil

Refining process happens in the Crude unit

The crude oil is cleaned, heated, boiled & distilled into vapor

The vapor condenses in the distillation tower into liquid hydrocarbon gas oil & streams into separate pipes for further refining

Events leading up to the incident

▪ Chevron inspectors knew over the years, the wall to the #4-sidecut line had thinned due to sulfidation corrosion

▪ Sulfidation corrosion– Caused by high temperature-related

chemical reaction between sulfur compounds in crude oil and iron ore in steel

– This reaction deteriorates the steel pipes causing the pipe walls to gradually thin over time

Timeline…

▪ 2002-Oct: Sulfidation corrosion identified, analyzed and replacement upgrade recommended

▪ 2006-Oct: Recommended upgrade DENIED as did not meet “Framing Document” work request requirements

▪ 2007-Feb: Only minimal portions of piping replaced

▪ 2009-Sept: ETC (chevron Energy Technology Company) Sulfidation Failure Prevention initiative developed

Timeline… (continue)

▪ 2011-Jan: Recommended upgrade and 100% inspection DENIED as did not meet “Framing Document” work request requirements

▪ Previous inspection data for the 4-sidecut piping* indicated the piping could safely operate through 2016

– (*measurements historically taken on 4-sidecut piping with high-silicon fittings, not older pipes)

▪ 2011-Oct: Refinery lowered pipe “Alert Thickness” without multi-person review, allowing 4-sidecut line to continue operating

Preventive Action – August 6th, 2012

▪ 3:50 pm Operator performing routine check, noticed a small puddle near the distillation tower with a leak noted at the 4-sidecut line

▪ 4:07 pm The on-staff Chevron fire department arrived at the leak and established an incident command

▪ 4:15 pm Management and inspectors arrived to assist in decision making

▪ There was no shut off valve between the distillation tower and the pipe

▪ The group decided to locate the leak before shutting down the entire production

▪ 5:00 pm The feed rate of the liquid was reduced and a firefighter used a pike-pole to pry away some of the pipe insulation

▪ This was determined to be too dangerous as it was moving the pipe

Preventive Action

▪ 5:15 pm Additional personnel arrived for a shift-change. Workers built a scaffolding to get close and remove the pipe insulation to find the leak.

▪ 6:27 pm Flash fire occurs during insulation removal

▪ 6:29 pm Order was made to shut down the crude unit

▪ 6:31 pm The 4-sidecut pipe line ruptures releasing toxic vapors

▪ 6:33 pm Process fluid ignites

Affected by the incident

▪ 19 employees were affected by the pipe rupture and explosion

– 18 employees escaped through the vapors before it ignited

-1 employee, a Chevron fire fighter was inside the fire engine when the explosion occurred

* he was wearing his PPE and was able to escape the flames to safety– Out of the 19 employees, 6 employees

suffered minor injuries

Outer radius of explosion

Following Weeks…

▪ About 15,000 people in the surrounding communities sought medical attention for:

▪ breathing problems, shortness of breath, sore throat, and headaches

▪ Twenty people were admitted to hospitals for treatment

Total # of affected▪ Approximately ± 15,000

people were affected, 20 people were hospitalized, but no serious injuries or deaths

Richmond, CA

Aftermath• Vapor cloud quickly began to accumulate and light gas ignited

• EPA found dozens of failures to comply with federal environmental laws in an investigation of the 2012 fire in Richmond, CA

• 49 failures by Chevron to effectively operate a risk management plan for the refinery

• EPA’s first action was to send a letter and violations to Chevron

Aftermath…

▪ Chevron had 30 days to reply and explain its plan to correct the violations

▪ IF failure to respond and correct the failures, EPA would fine the company $37,500 per violation per day

▪ California’s Occupational Safety and Health division issued nearly $1million in fines to Chevron due to the blaze

▪ Chevron faced lawsuits by the city of Richmond and hundreds of area residents due to the fire

Company Responsibility?

▪ Chevron ETC, technical experts issued a corporate newsletter that focused on materials, corrosion, and warnings of potential consequences of sulfidation failures, and made it accessible to all employees in Chevron companies

▪ Chevron ETC hosted training sessions for refinery personnel, refinery inspection staff, refinery engineers, and some operators.

▪ Chevron used a turnaround planning and implementation process initiative for managing pacesetter turnarounds (IMPACT process) to perform turnarounds efficiently and effectively only when necessary work is performed

▪ Online dashboard Operational Excellence and Reliability Intelligence (OERI) to track 26 different process safety indicators

▪ Stop work authority

Chemical of Richmond Refinery Fire

▪ Crude oil sweet a type of petroleum▪ SDS # 724160▪ Intended use crude oils, refinery feed ▪ Natural gas condensate can contain

minor amounts of sulfur, nitrogen, and oxygen containing organic compounds as well as heavy metals

▪ The term sweet originates from the low level of sulfur which provides the oil with a mild sweet taste and pleasant smell

▪ The hazard for crude oil is it is a flammable liquid. It is ranked as class 3 In the hazard classification

Component 1CASRN CASRN Concentration2

 

Crude Oil (Petroleum)

8002-05-9 100

Naphthalene 91-20-3 0-0.9 

Benzene 71-43-2 <1 

Hydrogen Sulfide 7783-06-4 <0.2Total Sulfur: < 0.5 wt%2 All concentrations are percent by weight unless ingredient is a gas. Gas concentrations are in percent by volume.

1CASRN (Chemical Abstract Services Registry Number)

Exposure Limits and Monitoring

▪ The same day of the explosion, 12 direct reading samples were used from the multi-gas monitor– The data detected low levels of hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, and

carbon monoxide

▪ Tedlar bags were also collected from surrounding cities to observe any effects– According to the data results, samples resulted well below PELs of Cal

OSHA

▪ Furthermore, A day after the explosion, samples were collected again, from a MX6 iBird gas monitor, which resulted in similar results, well below the PELs

▪ Fence-line monitoring gathered from Chevron’s Office Hill, to Castro Street and Gertrude Street– Data collected was from point of incident to all clear

Exposure Limits Report (8hr)

Cal/OSHAPEL

Castro Street Office Hall Gertrude Street

H2S(ppb) Background @ 3 PM

10,000 ppb 3.04 ppb 3.99 ppb 2.09 ppb

H2S(ppb) max 10,000 ppb 3.21 ppb 5.41 ppb 2.51 ppb

SO2(ppm) background @ 3 PM

2 ppm 0.006 ppm 0.003 ppm 0.002 ppm

SO2(ppm) max 2 ppm 0.007 ppm 0.006 ppm 0.002 ppm

Emergency Response Guide

▪ There were liquid flammables▪ Easily ignited (HIGHLY FLAMMABLE)

▪ Inhalation or contact may irritate▪ Vapors may cause suffocation▪ In case of fire, isolate a 800 meter perimeter around site▪ Eliminate all ignition source▪ Fresh air for victims

Influential Factors

▪ Thin pipe– Inspection of pipes in the refinery needed to be maintained to

ensure substance can be contained. Failure of maintenance and design.

▪ Poor Inspection– Pipes were not properly inspected and measured. Did not

account for pipe thinning. Human factor was also key.▪ Equipment failure– Once the pipe leaked, vapors immersed in the air and caught fire.

Tesoro’s Anacortes Refinery, WA

▪ Similar to Chevron, however, much deadlier.– 7 workers dead from the incident

▪ Due to rupture of heat exchanger, fire ignited immediately upon interaction with air

▪ Chevron, had no deaths▪ Anacortes refinery produced similar material as

Richmond refinery▪ 3 people dead at scene, 4 people hospitalized with

severe burns

Tesoro’s Refinery Factors

▪ Heat exchanger failed due to long term attack of high temperature hydrogen– Making cracks and creating fissures

▪ Every 6 months, the heat exchangers were taken offline to be cleaned because of accumulation of deposits in the tube.

▪ In order for the tube to work properly, i.e. the flow of heat exchange, it needed to be cleaned to flow better, like a blood artery.

▪ Middle pipe of heat exchange was so stressed, it created a leak (hiss) and finally an explosion.

▪ Material inside tube, mixed with air and immediately ignited.

Prevention

▪ Proper inspection of equipment and not merely the “it will do”

▪ Proper conveying of information to correct source▪ Repairing/replacing of equipment▪ Train employers/ employees to know the material used

in production▪ Notify first responders of the possible chemicals leaked

References

Crude Oil, Sweet; SDS No. 724160. (2014, August 13). Retrieved October 24, 2015, from http://www.conocophillips.com/sustainable-development/Documents/2014.08.13_724160%20Crude%20Oil,%20Sweet.pdf

Kemsley, Jyllian. (2014, February 4). Tesoro refinery fire caused by weakened steel. Retrieved November 2, 2015, from http://cenblog.org/the-safety-zone/2014/02/tesoro-refinery-fire-caused-by-weakened-steel-tubing/

Mason, Mark. Alert: Chevron Oil Refinery at Richmond Is on Fire! Digital image. : Alert: Chevron Oil Refinery at Richmond Is on Fire! Http://sanpablobayepa.blogspot.com/, 12 Aug. 2012. Web. 02 Nov. 2015. <http://sanpablobayepa.blogspot.com/2012/08/alert-chevron-oil-refinery-at-richmond.html>.

U.S. Chemical Safety And Hazard Investigation Board. (2015). Final investigation report: chevron richmond refinery pipe rupture and fire (Report No. 2012-03-I-CA). Retrieved from http://www.csb.gov/chevron-refinery-fire/