Chemical Weapons Convention The Third Review of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the CWC, has just finished wrapping up. These reviews take place once every five years, and the next will occur in 2018. The CWC acts as an arms control agreement, and was signed into international law on April 29, 1997.1 Essentially the CWC is a supplement to the 1925 Geneva Convention. Running from April 8-19, 2013, the Review could not have had better timing. At a point in our global history where much has been accomplished in the way of eradicating chemical weapons, there nonetheless remain a few significant obstacles. Namely, the possibility of chemical weapons in Syria, and the failure of the Syrian Arab Republic and seven other countries to join the CWC remain of the utmost importance.2 Through working with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or the OPCW, the CWC has been successful in accounting for, and then eradicating, 78% of the world’s chemical weapons.3 All members of the CWC also belong to the OPCW by default.4 The OPCW acts as the backbone of the CWC through oversight and implementation tactics. These tactics largely consist of site visits and inspections to ensure the compliance of member states. The mission of the CWC is to establish a worldwide network of participants. At this time eight countries have opted against participation. Angola, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Syrian Arab Republic remain unaffiliated with the CWC’s efforts. In particular, Syria’s membership is of the utmost importance. Syrian historical decisions lend hope for cooperation. The country has a history of taking a stand against chemical weapons. Syria was a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and as such endorsed similar goals to that of the CWC. Essentially, Syria formally renounced both first and retaliatory use of chemical or biological weapons against any State.5 However, this renunciation neglected to make any promises towards halting their production or maintaining existing stockpiles. It is therefore crucial for the OPCW to have the power to verify the existence and ensure the destruction of any stockpiles of

                                                                                                               1 http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/about-the-convention/genesis-and-historical-development/ 2 http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/about-the-convention/genesis-and-historical-development/ 3 http://www.opcw.org/our-work/demilitarisation/ 4 http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/about-the-convention/genesis-and-historical-development/ 5 http://www.opcw.org/special-sections/the-opcw-and-syria/statements-and-press-releases/syria-and-the-opcw/  

chemical weapons. This power is not granted on the basis of membership to the Geneva Protocol, but requires admission to the CWC.6 Syria has gained the spotlight out of the remaining eight countries due to recent alarming media reports. It has been reported that Syria currently possesses significant stockpiles of chemical weapons, including highly lethal nerve agents.7 These reports cannot be verified without the intervention of the OPCW through membership with the CWC, a completely voluntary choice. These reports of chemical weapons are especially worrisome given that this is the third year that Syria has been in crisis. A promising political solution has yet to appear.8  

                                                                                                               6 http://www.opcw.org/special-sections/the-opcw-and-syria/statements-and-press-releases/statement-by-the-opcw-director-general-on-syria/ 7 http://www.opcw.org/special-sections/the-opcw-and-syria/statements-and-press-releases/syria-and-the-opcw/ 8 http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1818#.UXSbfqU1YlI