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Transcript of CHAUCER'S CRISIS OF FAITH - Library and Archives · PDF fileChaucer's Crisis Of Faith In "The...
CHAUCER'S C R I S I S OF FAITH
IN
"THE MILLERr S TALE, " "THE CLERKr S TALE, "
AND "THE PARDONERr S TALE"
SHARON DAWN SELBY
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate S t u d i e s
i n Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of English U n i v e r s i t y of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba
National Library I*I ofCanada Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services serviczs bibliographiques
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YOW Ha Votre rderenc~
Our fi& Notre refdreme
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Chaucer's Crisis Of Faith In "The Miller's Tale," "The Clerk's Taie," And "The Pardoner's Talen
SHARON DAWN SELBY
A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Gradusze Studies of The University
of Manitoba in partial falfillment of the requirements of the degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS
Sharon Dawn Selby01999
Permission has been granted to the Library of The University of Manitoba to lend or seIi copies of this thesis/practicum, to the National Library of Canada to micro6lm this thesis and to lend or seii copies of the film, and to Dissertations Abstracts International to publish an abstract of this thesis/practicnm.
The author reserves other publication rights, and neither this thesidpracticum nor extensive extracts fmm it may be printed or otherwise reproduced withogt the author's written permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CKAPTER ONE Medieval and Modern Literary Theory
1. Introduction
2 . St. Augustine
3. St. Thomas Aquinas
4. William of Ockham
5. John Wyclif
6. Twentieth Century Theorists
CHAPTER TWO "The Miller's Tale" & "The Clerkfs Tale"
CHAPTER THREE "The Pardonerf s Tale"
CKAPTER FOUR Conclusion
WORKS CITED
In The Canterbury Tales, Chaucerr s satiric
reappropriation of Norninalist word-play reveals the
inability of any mortal authority to impart ultimate truth.
Through his satire, Chaucer also demonstrates the
instability of the meaning of the Word (as it is interpreted
by the Church) and thus the word; the resulting uncertainty
leads to a crisis which is analogous to that recognized by
twentieth-century existentialists. In Chapter One, I examine
how the works of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, William
of Ockham, and John Wyclif inform Chaucerf s poetry. 1 also
incorporate the works of twentieth century theorists whose
ideas seern to be similar to those with which Chaucer was
working. In Chapter Two, 1 discuss how "The Miller's Tale"
and "The Clerkts Tale" illustrate the ways in which language
can be employed to create an illusion of orthodoxy to attain
unorthodox ends. As Chapter Three demonstrates, the dangers
involved in reconfiguring reality, as do the Miller and the
Clerk with their misuse of science and philosophy, are also
irnplicit in the Pardoner's failed attempt to recreate
hirnself through h i s words and his relics. Chapter Four
proposes that Chaucer's satire in T h e Canterbury Tales
denonstrates that any authority can be undermined, and that
the struggle to maintain a relationship with God is
ultimately a natter that cannot be resolved by reason or
pious ignorance alone.
CHAPTER ONE
MEDIEVAL AND MODERN LITERARY THEORY
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
Chaucer ' s p i l g r i m a g e i n The Canterbury T a l e s r e p r e s e n t s
humanityf s q u e s t f o r knowledge and u l t i m a t e t r u t h . I n "The
M i l l e r ' s Tale," "The C l e r k ' s T a l e , " and "The P a r d o n e r r s
T a l e , " Chaucer s a t i r i z e s t h e i n a b i l i t y o f f i n i t e m o r t a l
reason--in s u c h a u t h o r i t a t i v e forms as o r g a n i z e d r e l i g i o n ,
s c i e n c e , phi losophy-- to p r o v i d e t h i s t r u t h and t o e x p l a i n t o
humankind t h e n a t u r e o f God a n d Godrs r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h H i s
c r e a t i o n . Chaucer a l s o u s e s sa t i re t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e n a t u r e
o f l anguage a n d t h e ways i n which l anguage u s e r s , i n order
t o p r e s e r v e one p a r t i c u l a r v e r s i o n of t r u t h , can
( re 1 i n t e r p r e t and man ipu la t e words t o p r i v i l e g e one
i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n w h i l e d e v a l u i n g o t h e r s . Through h i s
s a t r i ca l r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of Nomina l i s t ideas, Chaucer
d e m y s t i f i e s t h e l anguage and r i t u a l s o f t h e C a t h o l i c Church;
however, he a l s o shows t h a t t h e ability o f Nominalism i t s e l f
t o reveal t r u t h is c o n t i n g e n t on f a i t h r a t h e r t h a n on r e a s o n
and is , t h e r e f o r e , i nadequa te . Chaucer t a k e s t h e Nomina l i s t
c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e u n c e r t a i n t y of r e a l i t y t o a n extreme: t h e
r e s u l t is s k e p t i c i s m , which S h e i l a Delany d e f i n e s as " t h a t
s e n s e o f the u n r e l i a b i l i t y of t r a d i t i o n a l i n fo rma t ion" ( 2 ) . S k e p t i c s q u e s t i o n e v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e y are t o ld by supposed
a u t h o r i t i e s because t h e y believe t h a t truth c a n n o t b e proven
by l o g i c , experience, o r tradition and is, therefore,
unknowable. This skeptical tradition is "rooted in the
awareness of coexistent contradictory truths and result[s]
in the suspension of final rational judgment8' (1) In The
Tales, Chaucer presents many possible truths, none of which
can be proven absolutely by r e a s o n alone. The inability to
find a single, unquestionable truth results in a crisis
similar to t h a t faced by twentieth-century Existentialists,
in which the insignificance ar?d meaninglessness of
humankindfs existence in an uncaring world created by an
unknowable God :eads to despair.
Much of fourteenth-century society revolved around the
rituals and teachings of the Catholic Church. The prominence
of religious themes and allusions in medieval literature
suggests the importance of the Church in daily life. Through
the Church, Christ's "Mystical Body," people had access to
redernption and grace: "Christ had chosen to manifest Himself
under the ecclesiastical dispensations . . . for the express purpose of enabling man to know and love God and other men
through an integral union with Him in the life of the
Church" (Colish 2). However, the apparent materialism of the
Church left it open to charges of corruption and nepotism.
Delaney also notes that this notion of skepticism is not simply an imposition of modern ideas on Chaucer's work; "the skeptical tradition is amply stated in the poetrs own time: it is found in cosmology, metaphysics, encyclopedic compilations, poetry, and popular treatises. . [Tl hat tradition was the product of historical and cultural events that had impaired certain established modes of authority and trust" (1).
A s t h e c u l t u r a l c r i t i c Barbara Tuchman e x p l a i n s , " [ t l h e
c l a i m o f t h e Church t o s p i r i t u a l l e a d e r s h i p c o u l d n e v e r be
made w h o l l y credible t o al1 i t s communicants when it w a s
founded i n m a t e r i a l wea l th . The more r i c h e s t h e Church
amassed, t h e more v is ible and d i s t u r b i n g became t h e f l a w "
( 6 ) - The Church's p e r c e i v e d c o r r u p t i o n , coup led w i t h its
g r e a t i n f l u e n c e on d a i l y l i f e , i n s p i r e d a t r a d i t i o n of
r e l i g i o u s sat ire and c r i t i c i s m i n t h e w o r k s of medieval
a u t h o r s . Anne Hudson s u g g e s t s t h a t w r i t e r s such as Chaucer
a t tack t h e p r a c t i c e s o f t h e Church b u t n o t " [ t h e Church's]
ideals, however much t h e y a r g u e t h a t contemporary reality
b e t r a y s [ t h o s e i d e a l s ] " (Prema t u x e 22) . However, Hudson
f a i l s t o c o n s i d e r t h a t rnany of Chaucer ' s works r e v e a l n o t
o n l y t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between t h e ideals t h e Church p r o f e s s e d
t o r e p r e s e n t and i ts p e r c e i v e d c o r r u p t i o n , b u t a l s o t h e
d a n g e r s t o t h e l a i t y a n d t h e c l e r g y i n h e r e n t i n t h e r i t u a l s
and the h i e r a r c h y o f t h e Church. Chaucer u s e s s a t i r e t o
undermine t h e i d e a l s which were t h e r e l i g i o u s f o u n d a t i o n o f
medieval s o c i e t y , and by s o d o i n g r e v e a l s t h e i n s t a b i l i t y o f
t h a t f o u n d a t i o n , f o r c i n g h i s a u d i e n c e t o r e e v a l u a t e t h e role
of t h e C a t h o l i c Church i n t h e i r p o l i t y .
Robe r t P. M i l l e r n o t e s t h a t " [ t ] h e f u n c t i o n o f the
a u t h o r i t i e s w a s t o make possible t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of
' s e d u c t i v e cove r ings ' which would o t h e r w i s e d i s t r a c t t h e
una ided mind o f Adam's progeny. . . . Truth c o u l d n o t be
a l t e r e d " (Chaucer 7 ) ; but, af ter b e i n g misled by his
garrulous guide and discovering the subjective nature of
authority itself, the narrator of The Kouse of Fame declares
"1 wot myself best how y stonde" (1878) . "Geffrey" refuses to follow indiscriminately the advice of any person or
institution: ultimately, he chooses to remain independent.
f act , when Chaucer f inally introduces "man
auctorite" (21581, the poem ends before "Geffrey" can record
any of his words. The reader is left, paradoxically, with
only the authority of Geffrey's experience: in the houses of
Fame and Rumour, certainty and justice are reduced to
unreliable words and insubstantial illusions. Similarly, in
The Canterbury Tales, Chaucer often criticizes and questions
the hegemony of the Church and its clergy: the portraits in
the "The General Prologue" reveal various forms of sin and
corruption, such as the Monkf s worldliness, the Friarf s
wantonness, and the Pardonerrs despair. The questionable
morality of these characters raises doubts about the
clergy's fitness to represent Christ,
As "Christ's mystical body," the role of the Church was
to perform Godrs will. Colish explains that medieval
thinkers believed "the Being of God Himself was the
guarantee, the criterion, and the condi t io sine qua non of
John Burrow discusses how fragmentary endings are enticing to contemporary readers, who must be conscious of "the accident and the contingent" (36); the poem may not have an ending due to accident, loss, etc. He suggests that the concern with "undiscriminating over-interpretation" ( 3 7 ) is a consequence of a postmodern taste for "anti-closure" ( 3 5 ) .
whatever men might know a b o u t Him, o r a b o u t ü n y t h i n g else"
(1) . But, i n "The M i l l e r r s Tale" and "The C l e r k ' s Tale,"
Chaucer i n v e r t s and p a r o d i e s t h e ideal o f a Church created
i n t h e image o f God t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e p r o b l e m a t i c n a t u r e o f
e a r t h l y a u t h o r i t y . T h i s parody s u g g e s t s t h a t i f t h e Church,
i n a l l its c o r r u p t i o n , t r u l y r e p r e s e n t s God's w i l l , t h e n God
must be e q u a l l y corrupt. By e x p l o d i n g and i n v e r t i n g t h e
c o n v e n t i o n a l v i e w of God, Chaucer a l s o e x p l o e e s e v e r y t h i n g
g u a r a n t e e d b y t h a t v i e w and f o r c e s his readers t o q u e s t i o n
what t h e y know and c a n know a b o u t a n y t h i n g .
The s t a b i l i t y o f t h e Word (and hence the word) i tself
is a l s o t h r e a t e n e d by t h i s i n v e r t e d image o f God which
undermines h u m a n i t y p s a b i l i t y t o know and u n d e r s t a n d t h i n g s ,
and c r e a t e s t h e u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f
Nominalism: i t is n o t merely p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r p r e t a word o r
a p h r a s e i n more t h a n one way b u t , r a t h e r , i n e v i t a b l e .
Accord ing t o Nomina l i s t t h e o r y , t h e r e are as many p o s s i b l e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f a s i n g l e word as t h e r e are i n d i v i d u a l s .
A s a r e s u l t , it is e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o know a n y t h i n g w i t h
c e r t a i n t y , i n c l u d i n g God: u n i v e r s a l s and t r a n s c e n d e n t
knowledge d o n o t e x i s t o u t s i d e t h e mind. R u s s e l l A, Peck
says t h a t Nominalism
r e f u t e s real is t prernises t h a t u n i v e r s a l s are
t h i n g s o f c r e a t i o n , p r o v i n g t o t h e c o n t r a r y t h a t
o n l y i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s exist and are e x p e r i e n c e d ,
a n d t h a t c o n c e p t s beyond t h e i n d i v i d u a l are names
only (concepts which exist exclusively in our
heads) . (745)
One of the dangers of these intellectual
generalizations is that the remembrances cr retellings of an
experience may not accurately reflect the actual thing or
event. This danger parallels the difficulty of conveying
meaning through language; speakers can use words to
obfuscate and to deceive their listeners through the
recreation and reinterpretation of reality according to
their imrnediate needso3 As Peck observes, the "Nominalistic
idea that the mind and its knowledge are an ongoing
imagistic-linguistic process is appealing to Chaucer"
because the "boundaries of man's interior reality are open
to almost limitless variation" (747). Indeed, May's
deception of January in "The Merchant's Tale8' is an example
of the potential disjunction between interna1 and external
reality.
Peck also suggests that Chaucer is interested in the
moral implications of this philosophical stance; if these
concepts can exist only w i t h i n the mind of the individual,
even morality becomes a matter of will, human or divine,
rather than a universal quality inherent in a subject or an
act. William of Ockham, a fourteenth century philosopher and
theologian, recognizes the importance of the individual and
Miscomrnunications may also be inadvertent, on either the speaker8 s or the hearerr s side,
i n s i s t s t h a t t h e morali ty o f any act depends upon t h e
i n t e n t i o n w i t h which t he w i l l h a s committed itself (Peck
7 4 6 ) . A s a r e s u l t , the Pardoner s i n s even when he c a u s e s
peop le t o "twynne/ From a v a r i c e and s o o r e t o r epen te"
(430-31) b e c a u s e he p r e a c h e s "nothyng b u t f o r coveitise"
(433) . F u r t h e r , as E l i z a b e t h D. K i r k p o i n t s o u t , Norninalist
m o r a l i t y l a c k s the " o r g a n i c q u a l i t y " o f Aquinasf m o r a l i t y i n
t h a t , f o r Norn ina l i s t s , "God does n o t w i l L someth ing because
it is good; it is 'good' because he w i l l s it - h e might have
wi l led it o t h e r w i s e . . . elsewhere" (115). Thus, all t h i n g s
are p o s s i b l e f o r God a c c o r d i n g t o H i s p o t e n t i a a b s o l u t a
d e s p i t e t h e self-imposed boundar i e s of H i s p o t e n t i a
~ r d i n a t a ; ~ H e is o b l i g a t e d t o keep H i s covenan t o n l y as H e
w i l l s .
For Chaucer, Nomina l i s t ideas do n o t provide a n y
u l t i m a t e answers; r a t h e r , Nominalism c o m p l i c a t e s t h e problern
of knowledge a n d t r u t h even f u r t h e r . Chaucer a p p r o p r i a t e s
Norninalist p h i l o s o p h y t o u p s e t and i n v e r t t r a d i t i o n a l ways
of t h i n k i n g , b u t even Nominalism itself is n o t exempt from
h i s s c r u t i n y . H e dernons t ra tes t h a t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f
language makes t h e t a s k s o f a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y i n g and
According t o Oberman, "God can--and, i n fact, has chosen to--do c e r t a i n t h i n g s a c c o r d i n g t o the l a w s which h e f r e e l y e s t a b l i s h e d , t h a t is , de potentia ord ina ta . On t h e o t h e r hand, God can do e v e r y t h i n g tha t does n o t imply c o n t r a d i c t i o n , whe the r God h a s decided t o do t h e s e t h i n g s [de p o t e n t i a o rd ina ta ] or n o t , as t h e r e are many t h i n g s God c a n d o b u t which he does n o t want t o do. T h e latter is called God' s power de p o t e n t i a absoluta" (Narvest 37) .
unde r s t and i . ng r ea l i t y so h o p l e s s t h a t : the Manciple ends his
tale with the declaration, "be noon a u c t o u r newe/ of
t h e po ten t i a .1 to lead ta skepticism, to empty al1 t h i n g s of
meanino, and t o a l - i c rna te people f i i r ther from. God and each
other; f o r t h e Manciple, t h e only r e c o u r s e is s i l e n c e .
Ultirnately, C h a u c e r demonstrates t h a t r e a s o n alone cannot
provide adeqiiat:e a n s w e r s about God and t h e n a t u r e of reality
and, i n t h e a b s e n c e of c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e , humanity must make
a leap of f a i t h "to avoid agnosticism" (Delany 2 4 ) and
d e ~ p a i r . ~ In the end, Nominalism can prove n o t h i n g because
it, too, depends on fai t h t o explain s u c h problems as t h e
n a t u r e of Goci.
When no p h i l o s n p h y o r system of bel ief can crovide
absol rite proof of the existence and nature of God, hi~rnans
exnerience a crisis i n f a i t h , As Chaucer seems t o h a v e
recogn i .zed, many were di .s i 7 lusioned by t h e Churchf s obvious
~eoccupation wj th m a t e r i a 3 things, a n d t h a i r discontent was
compoimded by t h e C h i i r c h ' s inability t o provj.de a
satisfactory e x p l m a t i o n of o r meaninq for s u c h apparently
inexplicable events as the B l a c k Plagiin. Tiichrnan explains:
If a disaster of s u c h magnitr lde , . . w a s a mere
wanton ac t of God or perhaps not Godrs .work at
T h i s f a i t h may be r e l i g i o u s o r s e c u l a r in n a t u r e : i n the former case, indivuals place their trust i n God and the afterl i fe , whereas, in the latter, individuals p l a c e their t r u s t i n other humam o r human i n s t i t u t i o n s ar,d i n the present earthly life.
all, then the absolutes of a fixed order were
loosed from their moorings- Minds that opened to
admit these questions could never again be shut.
Once people envisioned the possibility of change
in a fixed order, the end of an age of submission
came in sight; the turn to individual conscience
lay ahead- (123)
When personal doubt and fear isolate the individual from
others and £rom God, that individual faces a void created by
the loss of fixity: the future becomes uncertain. Thus, in
the face of such a crisis, William Barrettrs description of
the plight of modern humanity becomes applicable to the
fourteenth century:
The loss of the Church was the loss of a whole
system of symbols, images, dogmas, and rites which
had the psychological validity of immediate
experience. . . . In losing religion, man lost the concrete connection with a transcendent realm of
being; he was set free to deal with this world in
al1 its brute objectivity. (21)
Barrett demonstrates that without the "psychological
validity of immediate experience," people must ultirnately
move toward a form of persona1 faith: even disbelief
requires a f o m of faith. Many of Chaucer's tales
systematically reveal the instability of philosophies that
attempt to establish themselves as "right" beyond doubt, and
that claim to provide a definitive solution to uncertainty,
b y s t r i p p i n g t h o s e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f their c e r t a i n t y a n d t h e i r
a b i l i t y t o provide meaning. Chauce r shows t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s
mus t move beyond t h i s s p i r i t u a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l v o i d a n d
e s t a b l i s h for t h e m s e l v e s a set of beliefs t o which t h e y c a n
a d h e r e , b a s e d o n l y on t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e i r p e r s o n a 1
e x p e r i e n c e ra ther t h a n o n a n u n a t t a i n a b l e , a b s o l u t e p r o o f .
As Chaucer ' s P a r d o n e r d e m o n s t r a t e s , anyone u n a b l e t o move
beyond t h i s v o i d becomes "cast ad r i f t , . . . a wande re r upon
t h e face o f t h e e a r t h " ( B a r r e t t 21-2).
I n t h e f irst c h a p t e r of t h i s t h e s i s , 1 w i l l examine t h e
works o f S t . Augus t i ne , S t . Thomas Aquinas , W i l l i a m o f
Ockham, and John Wyc l i f t o show how some of Chaucer ' s poems
are in fo rmed by t h e s e t h i n k e r s . 1 w i l l t h e n i n c o r p o r a t e t h e
ideas o f t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y c r i t i c s , i n c l u d i n g S a u s s u r e ,
Barrett , and S a r t r e , t o d e m o n s t r a t e how the ideas with which
Chaucer w a s work ing a r e , i n some r e s p e c t s , a n a l o g o u s t o the
ideas of modern t h e o r i s t s . I n C h a p t e r s Two a n d Three, 1 will
examine C h a u c e r c s u s e o f r e l i g i o u s sa t i re i n "The M i l l e r ' s
T a l e , " "The C l e r k f s T a l e , " a n d "The P a r d o n e r r s T a l e . ''
T o g e t h e r , "The M i l l e r ' s Ta l e " and "The C l e r k r s T a l e "
d e m o n s t r a t e t h e ways i n which l a n g u a g e c a n b e employed t o
create a n i l l u s i o n of o r t h o d o x y t o a t t a i n uno r thodox ends .
T h e d a n g e r s i n v o l v e d i n r e c o n f i g u r i n g r e a l i t y , as do t h e
M i l l e r a n d t h e C l e r k w i t h t h e i r N o m i n a l i s t wordp l ay a n d
t h e i r rnisuse o f s c i e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y , are a lso i m p l i c i t i n
t h e P a r d o n e r r s fa i led a t t e m p t t o recreate h i m s e l f t h r o u g h
his words and his relics: the Pardoner dernonstrates the
impossibility of controlling and limiting the potential
meanings of longuage. Like "The Millerf s Tale, " and "The
Clerk's Tale," "The Pardonerf s Prologue" and "Tale" are
examples of Nominalist wordplay because words, deeds, and
intentions are at odds. Thus, the Nominalist position is
undermined through the revelation that the Pardonerfs
arrogance and extravagance are subterfuges, intended to
disguise his absolute despair. In al1 three tales, Chaucer
uses satire to show the ease with which an authority can
manipulate language and create illusions that ironically
reveal its own failings; in "The Pardonerf s Tale,'' he shows
the crisis of faith that results when these illusions are
revealed and stripped away. Chapter Four demonstrates that
any authoritative position can be subverted and undermined,
and suggests that the struggle to understand the nature of
God and the universe is ultimately a matter which cannot be
resolved by science, philosophy, or pious ignorance.
2. St. Augustine (354-430)
As J. A- Robson says:
The genius of Plato and Paul, transmitted from
antiquity in the monumental work of Augustine of
Hippo, cast upon the medieval mind a spell which
none could avoid. . Indeed it is hard to think of any century . . more soaked in Augustine than the fourteenth. (25)
Because his writing played such a significant role in
fourteenth-century thought, any discussion of that period
requires an acknowledgment of Augustine's philosophy and
theology. Augustine believed it was necessary for people to
question their faith and to understand what Church doctrine
demanded of thern. He argued that only through rational
questioning and contemplation does the individual attain
knowledge which, when illurninated by faith, can lead to a
better, more persona1 comprehension of God by transcending
"pious ignorance," the blind acceptance of theological
doctrine without knowledge or understanding. Meyrick H.
Carré explains:
The searching and comprehensive inquiries of
Augustine led the meditations of subsequent
generations of churchmen to pass beyond this rule
of pious ignorance. His writings invited men to
examine the rational basis of their faith. He did
not deny that it is necessary to believe in order
to know; understanding is the reward of faith.
But he also declared that Christian doctrine
contains many things that we cannot believe unless
we understand them. A man who thinks it is
sufficient to hold fast to the Faith without
aspiring to an understanding of it ignores the
true end of Eaith. (5)
Thus, it is not enough for Christians simply to accept and
believe what they are told: they must contemplate and test
both their faith and their understanding.
A clear understanding of Church doctrine depended on a
correct and rational perception of reality, and Augustine's
view of that perception was based on Platonic principles of
Ideas and their essences, Barrett explains that for Plato,
as well as for Augustine, "[tlhese Ideas . . . were . . . keally real,' more real than the particular things t h a t
derived their own individual being from participation in t h e
Ideas" (91) . Augustine believed in the existe~ce of objective, transcendent truths that were independent of the
changeable, transient world of things:
The region of reality is the world of Ideas,
necessary, imrnutable, intelligible. Augustine's
main concern is this realm of Ideas, and he
constantly seeks to show that they are integral to
thought, even at the lowest levels, (Carré 12)
These Ideas, perceived by the mind, exist beyond the
material world; they "constitute the stable reality of
things" (Carré 26) . To deal with the limitations of human speech to express
Ideas, such as the nature of God, Augustine developed a
linguistic sign system based on his conception of the Word
and t h e problem of its expression. Colish says that
Augustine's definition of a sign is a "thing which causes us
to think of something beyond the impression that the thing
i tsel f makes upon t h e senses" ( 5 9 ) . Beyond every p h y s i c a l
t h i n g l i e s t h e Idea o r e s s e n c e of the t h i n g : s i g n s r e p r e s e n t
u n i v e r s a l Ideas b u t t h e y can a l s o be a p p l i e d t o i n d i v i d u a l
t h i n g s , Also , it is p o s s i b l e f o r words t o r e p r e s e n t God and
t r u t h a c c u r a t e l y when t h e y are i n t e r p r e t e d wi th t h e gu idance
of d i v i n e i l l u m i n a t i o n : l anguage c a n be t r ans fo rmed and
recast as a P a u l i n e m i r r o r , f a i t h f u l l y rnedia t ing
God t o man i n t h e p r e s e n t l i fe; and t h e a g e n c i e s
a p p o i n t e d f o r t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f man's p a r t i a l
knowledge by f a i t h i n t o h i s complete knowledge o f
God by direct v i s i o n w e r e t o be r e d e f i n e d as modes
of verbal e x p r e s s i o n . ( C o l i s h 19-20)
Thus, when i n t e r p r e t e d p r o p e r l y , l anguage becornes a n
i n s t r u m e n t of t r u t h . T h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o c c u r s b e c a u s e
t r u t h is g u a r a n t e e d by t h e I n c a r n a t i o n which, Augus t ine
clairns, b r i d g e s t h e gap between t h e human and t h e divine:
God creates t h e wor ld and man th rough H i s Word,
and He takes on hurnanity i n t h e Word made f l e s h so
t h a t human words may t a k e on D i v i n i t y . . . and
man's f a c u l t y o f speech is empowered t o c a r r y on
the work of I n c a r n a t i o n i n e x p r e s s i n g t h e Word t o
the world. ( C o l i s h 35)
Augus t ine a l s o w r i t e s t h a t i t is p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r p r e t
a t e x t e i t h e r l i t e r a l l y o r f i g u r a t i v e l y , and t h a t more t han
one meaning c a n be t r u e . Signs are "called l i t e r a l when t h e y
a r e used t o d e s i g n a t e t h i n g s on a c c o u n t o f which t h e y were
i n s t i t u t e d . . . F i g u r a t i v e s i g n s occur when that t h i n g
which we designate by a literal sign is used to signify
something else . . ." (OCD 2.10.15). In other words, it is
possible for a text to have meaning on multiple levels.
ALso, the use of figurative language allows for the
possibility that not every sign will be understood
perfectly: figurative signs must be interpreted, which
allows for more than one way of reading and understanding
them but also increases the opportunities for human error.
As a result of the possibilities of signification,
authors can reveal profound truths both consciously and
unconsciously. Augustine States in On Christian Doctrine
that, when deciphering the Holy Scriptures, meanings not
intended by the author are still valid as long as they do
not contradict those set down in other sections of the
Scripturez because
the Spirit of God, who worked through that author,
undoubtedly foresaw that this meaning would occur
to the reader. . . . For what could God have more generously and abundantly provided in the divine
writings than that the same words might be
understood in various ways . . . ? (3.27.38)
Augustine also acknowledges that, if the Scriptures cannot
provide evidence to support a statementfs meaning, the
interpreter must use reason:
when a meaning is elicited whose uncertainty
cannot be resolved by the evidence of places in
the Scriptures whose meaning is certain, it
remains t o make it more clear by r e c o u r s e t o
r ea son , even i f h e whose words w e s e e k t o
u n d e r s t a n d did n o t pe rhaps i n t e n d t h a t meaning.
(3.28.39)
H e warns, however, t h a t such a d e p a r t u r e from t h e S c r i p t u r e s
is dangerous because i t may lead t o wrong t h i n k i n g a n d s i n ,
Users o f l anguage can p e m e r t the t r u t h by t e l l i n g l ies, and
i t is for t h i s r e a s o n t h a t Augus t ine condemns and rejects
the pagan a u t h o r s because of
t h e i r a b u s e o f l anguage and t h e d e l e t e r i o u s
m o r a l i t y which h e feels t h a t t h i s abuse
encourages . T h e p o e t s , h e s a y s , u s e words
e r r o n e o u s l y , s i n c e t h e y u s e them t o refer t o
t h i n g s and ideas which are n o n e x i s t e n t o r u n t r u e ,
F u r t h e m o r e , h e adds, t h e p o e t s d e p i c t i g n o r a n t
and i r r e s p o n s i b l e a c t i o n s i n t h e i r f i c t i t i o u s
c h a r a c t e r s , who o p e r a t e i n accordance w i t h t h e
u n r e a l u n i v e r s e o f t h e a u t h o r s f c r e a t i o n , . . and
. . . make t h e f a n t a s t i c m o r a l i t y o f t h a t world
a t t r a c t i v e a n d convinc ing . ( C o l i s h 25)
T h i s p e r v e r s i o n o f l anguage i s s i g n i f i c a n t because it
a d u l t e r a t e s t h e " t r u e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f words" ( C o l i s h 55),
b u t more i m p o r t a n t l y because it is a c o r r u p t i o n o f Godrs
w i l l t h a t b l u r s t h e l i n e s of m o r a l i t y and makes t h i s
c o r r u p t i o n attractive. Y e t , d e s p i t e h i s warning, Augus t ine
a l l o w s f o r a s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e Word g u i d e d by
b o t h r e a s o n a n d f a i t h i n S c r i p t u r a l knowledge.
When i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e Word and t h e word, August ine
emphasizes t h e importance of t h e i n d i v i d u a l and t h e
i n d i v i d u a l ' s consc ience as i t is gu ided by d i v i n e
i l l u m i n a t i o n . Augustine says t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l "Go n o t
o u t s i d e t h y s e l f , b u t r e t u r n w i t h i n t h y s e l f ; f o r t r u t h
resides i n t h e inrnost part o f man" ( C a r r é 11). Barrett
r e i n f o r c e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f August ine ' s focus on t h e
i n d i v i d u a l :
Where P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e had asked t h e ques t ion ,
What i s man?, S t . August ine ( i n t h e Confessions)
asks, Who am 12-and t h i s s h i f t is d e c i s i v e . . . . August ine 's q u e s t i o n . . . s t e m s from an
a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t , more obscure and v i t a l
c e n t e r w i t h i n t h e q u e s t i o n e r h imsel f : from a n
a c u t e l y p e r s o n a l s e n s e o f d e r e l i c t i o n and l o s s ,
r a t h e r t h a n from t h e detachment w i t h which reason
susveys t h e world o f o b j e c t s i n order t o l o c a t e
i t s bearer, man, z o o l o g i c a l l y w i t h i n it. ( 8 4 )
Thus reason a l o n e is n o t enough: w i t h o u t f a i t h , t h e
"pe r sona l s e n s e o f d e r e l i c t i o n and l o s s " leads t o d e s p a i r .
True unders t and ing of u n i v e r s a l Ideas and o f God, who is t h e
s o u r c e cf t h o s e Ideas , depends upon t h e i l l u m i n a t i o n of
reason by f a i t h ; i n t h i s way, t h e i n d i v i d u a l ach ieves
wisdom.
August ine saw " f a i t h and reason-the v i t a l and t h e
r a t i o n a l - a s coming t o g e t h e r i n e v e n t u a l hamony" ( B a r r e t t
85) as a mode1 f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as f o r t h e whole
of C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t . H e r a i s e d q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e human
mind and s o u l , a n d a b o u t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l
t r u t h s which would be t a k e n up almost n i n e hundred y e a r s
la ter by S t . Thomas Aquinas .
3 . St. Thomas Aqu inas (c.1225-1274)
Like St, A u g u s t i n e , St- Thomas A q u i n a s was p r i m a r i l y
conce rned w i t h "how t h e o u t s i d e world gets i n t o t h e mind"
(Colish 166). H e q u e s t i o n e d t h e way t h a t t h e mind
internalizes and u n d e r s t a n d s s e n s a t i o n , which he u n d e r s t o o d
as t h e p r o c e s s t h r o u g h which p e o p l e p e r c e i v e a n d know
r e a l i t y . The p e r c e p t i o n of r e a l i t y i n c l u d e s t h e p e r c e p t i o n
of t h e Word; C o l i s h e x p l a i n s t h a t Aquinas expanded upon t h e
t h e o r y of s i g n s d e v e l o p e d by Augus t i ne :
T r a n s l a t e d i n t o t he mode o f o logic o r i g i n a l l y
f o r m u l a t e d t o analyze and t o o r g a n i z e c o n c e p t u a l l y
t h e s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n o f t h e s e n s i b l e
u n i v e r s e , t h i s t h e o r y i s i n t e r p r e t e d b y Thomas so
as t o stress ideas, and t o some e x t e n t t h e created
u n i v e r s e , as t h e p r i n c i p l e signa Dei. Like
A u g u s t i n e . . . Thomas is p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e
t a s k of f i n d i n g the most s u i t a b l e t e r m s i n which
t o e x p r e s s man's knowledge of God, a n d h e is
i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e r e a s o n s why these terms make
d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t i v e impressions on d i f f e r e n t
a u d i e n c e s . (1 62 )
Aquinas is indebted to Augustine not only for his theories
of linguistic signs and subjective interpretations, but also
for his theory of the interaction between faith and
knowledge, and the dependence of understanding on
illumination by God's grace. However, Aquinas takes the
Realist premises of Ideas and their divine Source and
develops his own theories about knowledge and faith that
move towards the subjectivity of the individual mind which
the Nominalists would later take to extremes.
Aquinas' works dispute the premise that al1 minds are
one Mind. He declares that "the intellect is united to the
human body as its [the bodyr s ] form. But one form cannot
possibly exist in more than one matter" (SCG 2 : 7 3 : 2 ) . Carré
elaborates:
The active intellect [which causes particulas
impressions to be abstracted and generalized in
the mind as universals] is not a power outside the
mind, an Intelligence in which the mind can share.
For it is imperfect and attains truth, not by
direct intuition, but by . . . reasoning. The
Augustinian view t?at the active intellect is the
divine Mind must be rejected. (86)
Augustine's view of the one Mind is based on the assertion
that the body and the mind are wholly separate, and that the
mind works actively upon the body which is, in essence,
passive and thus unable to influence the mind. Aquinas
agrees with Augustine's description of the mindrs
i n c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e , b u t s u g g e s t s t h a t i t h a s a d i f f e r e n t
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e body:
The s e n s e s do n o t know e x i s t e n c e Save u n d e r
c o n d i t i o n s o f here a n d now, w h e r e a s the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g knows t h i n g s a b s o l u t e l y a n d
e t e r n a l l y . S o far, Thomas a d h e r e s c o r n p l e t e l y t o
S t . A u g u s t i n e ' s way o f t h o u g h t . B u t t h e g r e a t
d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h a t p h i l o s o p h y a n d h i s own i s
t h a t h e does n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e mind as such , pu re
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f u n c t i o n s i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e . The
mind o f man is n o t a p u r e i n t e l l i g e n c e ( s u c h as a n
a n g e l ) n o r is i t a s p i r i t i n a c o r p s e . I t i s a n
o r g a n i c c o m p o s i t e of mind a n d body. ( C a r r é 77)
Aquinas ' c o n c e p t of t h i s " o r g a n i c composite" p l a c e s
i m p o r t a n c e on the i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e p t i o n b e c a u s e
minds are i n d i v i d u a l i z e d ; f o r t h e b o d i e s of which
they are p a r t s are, as matter, n e c e s s a r i l y
particular. . . . S i n c e , t h e n , t h e human mind i s
i n t i m a t e l y a l l i ed w i t h rnatter i t s t h i n k i n g is
t h r o u g h o u t i n f e c t e d w i t h s e n s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e . . . . Human knowledge i s d e p e n d e n t upon p e r c e p t u a l
e x p e r i e n c e . Our minds c a n n o t free thernselves of
s e n s o r y r e f e r e n c e s e v e n i n r e f l e c t i o n upon " the
e t e r n a l t r u t h s " . . . . I n c o r p o r e a l p r i n c i p l e s are
known t o us o n l y t h r o u g h s e n s i b l e b o d i e s . ( C a r r e
79-81)
While Augus t ine declares t h a t t h e mind c o u l d know
e s s e n c e s and forms but n o t p h y s i c a l b o d i e s , Aquinas
d i s a g r e e s , i n s i s t i n g t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be no knowledge i f
s e n s e and though t w e r e s e p a r a t e front one a n o t h e r . C a r r é
e x p l a i n s t h a t i f
t h e r e is n o t h i n g i n e x p e r i e n c e b u t what i s
apprehended by t h e s e n s e s , e x p e r i e n c e becornes a
p e r p e t u a l f l u x . And what is i n t h i s s tate ceases
t o be and i s r e p l a c e d by a n o t h e r b e f o r e t h e mind
can Say what i t is. If o n t h e o t h e r hand . . . genu ine knowledge were c o n f i n e d t o immaterial
entities w e s h o u l d p o s s e s s no u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
b o d i e s i n motion. . . . [ W J e are asked t o refer t o
e n t i t i e s which have no connexion w i t h them. (85)
The r e s u l t of Aquinas ' r e a s o n i n g is t h a t t h e mind and s e n s e s
work t o g e t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d o b j e c t s ; each mind i n t e r p r e t s
t h e s e n s e s t h a t effect i ts p a r t i c u l a r body a c c o r d i n g t o i t s
own n a t u r e . Thus, t h e r e a r e as many i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of
r e a l i t y as t h e r e are mincis. Aquinas a l s o e x t e n d s his t h e o r y
t o a l l o w f o r m u l t i p l e meanings when i n t e r p r e t i n g S c r i p t u r e s ,
'not because one w o r d h a s many meanings b u t because the
a c t u a l t h i n g s s i g n i f i e d by t h e words can b e s i g n s of o t h e r
t h i n g s " (Minnis et . a l . 242) . Aquinas r e i n t e r p r e t s Augus t ine ' s t h e o r y o f t h e
a c q u i s i t i o n o f knowledge a c c o r d i n g t o his own belief that
knowledge depends upon t h e s e n s e s . Aquinas' t h e o r y o f
internalization maintains that a sensory sign is made
intelligible by the active intellect,
The active intellect in a sense distills the
significative content out of the phantasm6 by
abstracting it frorn its intelligible species, that
is, the aspect of the phantasm which is capable of
being conceptualized. The intelligible species is
then impressed on the possible intellect, or the
mind insofar as it can know all things, and the
possible intellect responds by forrning a verbum
mentis, or conceptual sign of the original object.
(Colish 172)
Once the verbum mentis has been formed, the mind must
evaluate the object as a conceptual sign before it can make
use of that object.
The validity of the sign must be judged and its
truly representative character accepted before the
mind can willingly employ the sign in composing
negative or affirmative propositions concerning
the object. . . . As in [Augustine0 s] theory of signification . . . the beings signified, for Thomas, are the criteria of the correspondence,
and hence the truth, of the ideas that men have
about them. (Colish 173-74)
A phantasm is " [ a l n accurate sensible sign . . . forrned out of sensory impressions" (Colish 172).
According to Aquinas, it is necessary for the mind to judge
the signs offered by the senses; otherwise, "every sensation
would be true, even contradictory ones. There would be no
means of distinguishing reality from ilfusion" (Carré 85).
It is only by evaluating each sign that the mind can form
the phantasm, or perfect sign.
Once the phantasm has been internalized and judged, it
is possible for the individual to acquire knowledge:
That wnich is the universal nature of things, and
is the final object of knowledge Thomas properly
calls the q u i d d i t a s of things. . . . The cognitive process appears as a specific movement from the
individual. (res) to the universal ( q u i d d i tas) . . . . The quiddity is comrnunicated to the possible intellect as the content of the intelligible
species by the agent intellect. (Pellerey 95)
In other words, the q u i d d i t a s represents the essence of the
object. However, there are limitations to a person's
knowledge of an objectfs quiddity: "Men, [Aquinas] States,
do not know natural objects perfectly, even those objects
accessible to the senses, since they . . . can make mistakes about them8* (Colish 175). When attempting to gain knowledge
about God, these limitations are compounded because His
nature is unknowable and inexpressible. However,
Thomas frequently quotes St. Paul's dictum: "The
invisible things of God are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made" [Romans
1:SOJ. It i s important . t h a t w e know t h e
world accura te ly ; otherwise w e rnight rnisconstrue
t h e na tu re of God. (Colish 182)
Thus, desp i t e t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r mistakes, it is s t i l l
possible f o r s i g n s t o represen t an ob jec t accura te ly ; it is
a l s o poss ib le f o r o b j e c t s o f God's c rea t ion t o represen t t h e
nature of God t r u l y , although incornpletely.
Because Aquinasf works a r e e s s e n t i a l l y theo logica l ,
f a i t h takes precedence over philosophy. Colish expla ins t h a t
"the publ ic and p r i v a t e goa ls of theology make it e s s e n t i a l
t h a t i t be a l i v i n g dialogue between t h e contemplator and
God, and not rnerely an a b s t r a c t d i sc ip l ine" ( 2 0 7 ) . Aquinas
emphasizes t h e importance o f f a i t h : 'so t h a t man rnight have
a f irmer knowledge of Him, God revealed c e r t a i n th ings about
Himself t h a t t ranscend the human i n t e l l e c t " (SCG 4.1.4).
Reason can be appl ied t o f a i t h i n an at tempt t o understand
b e l i e f s t h a t a r e a l r eady held; however, "the g r e a t e s t
demerits go t o persons who re fuse t o be l ieve what they
cannot understand s c i e n t i f i c a l l y by dernonstrative proof"
(Colish 2 0 0 ) . God can be known through knowledge based on
f a i t h , not through knowledge based on philosophy, because
humanityfs understanding o f t he exis tence and na ture of God
i s lirnited by t h e f i n i t e nature of t he human rnind: it can
corne t o no abso lu te r a t i o n a l bas i s f o r b e l i e f . People must
r e l y on t h e s igns found i n nature f o r evidence o f God.
Colish s u m a r i z e s : "The more adequately t h e s e s igns s i g n i f y
God, t h e less they r e l y on reason, and t h e more c l o s e l y
correlated to the mystery of the Godhead they become" (222).
Thus, despite the differences of their theologies, &quinas
and Augustine come to the same conclusions about the
necessity of faith: reason and philosophy cannot provide
ultimate answers, and the individual must rely on faith and
grace to enlighten imperfect knowledge.
According to Aquinas, because knowledge is imparted by
the senses and depends upon the individual's judgment of
sensations, it is possible to interpret reality in more than
one way; he observes,
there is no reason why there should not be several
different images of one thing; it is thus that one
man is seen by several. Hence, the existence of
several intelligible species in several persons is
not incompatible with the intellect's knowledge of
the universal, (SCG S : X : 9 )
This potential for multiple interpretations of sensory
experiences was taken to extremes by William of Ockham and
the Nominal-ists of the fourteenth century in their rejection
of universal forms; yet, despite their insistence that
universals were mere creations of mind, the Nominalists also
acknowledge that "the insights of faith, though they cannot
be proven by reason, are not therefore contrary to reason,
but sirnply go beyond it" (Peck 747).
4 , William of Ockham (c.1285-1347)
Unlike Augustine and Aquinas, William of Ockham
rejected al1 forms of Realism, clairning that universal Ideas
and Forms existed only in the mind. He believed that the
Realist arguments for the actual existence of universals
were paradoxical, and his response to the Realist premise
that universals were part of the existence of individuals
was that "there would be as many universals as there are
individuals. And this would mean a denial of universals;
there would be no comrnon nature" (Carré 109) . To Ockham, the perception of universals is an act of the intellect, which
"stands for things outside the mind or for other things in
the mind, just as the spoken words stand for them by
convention" ( 4 7 ) . William Ho Watts and Richard J. Utz note
the significance of Ockham's position on universals:
In asserting the ontological primacy of particular
things over universals, Ockham relegates
universals to the status of linguistic signs;
hence, universals have no substantial existence
outside of the human mind, (148)
His insistence on the individuality and subjectivity of al1
forms of being is the basis of Nominalism.
However, Ockham himself was not an extreme Nominalist;
he declared that, as creations of the rnind, universals have
logical, if not actual, being. Ockham believed that all
knowledge was grounded on the "direct apprehension of
i n d i v i d u a l o h j e c t s " ( C a r r é 1 1 2 ) . I n other words, u n i v e r s a h
s u c h as t h e c o n c e p t "humanity"
refer t o " i n t e n t i o n s " of t h e mind, t o concepts .
They canno t refer t o real i t ies . , . , V e n c e t h e
e r r o r of t h o s e who believed t h a t t h e r e w a s
someth ing i n r e a l i t y besides the s i n g u l a r e n t i t y
and who h e l d t h a t humani ty d i s t i n g u i s h e d from
s i n g u l a r i n s t a n c e s is someth ing t h a t exists i n
l n d i v i d u a l s and is related t o t h e i r e s s e n c e (Summa
T o t i u s L0gicae.i. 66) ." (Carré 115)
Ockham divided e x i s t e n c e i n t o e x t e r i o r and i n t e r i o r
rea l i t ies . E x t e r i o r r e a l i t y i s t h e p h y s i c a l world o u t s i d e
t h e mind, e x p e r i e n c e d th rough t h e s e n s e s . I n t e r i o r r e a l i t y
i s t h e wor ld of t h e mind, i n which s e n s a t i o n i s i n t e r n a l i z e d
and c o n s i d e r e d . F u r t h e r , " [ e l x t e r i o r r e a l i t y is knowable;
i n t e r i o r r e a l i t y i s what is e m p i r i c a l l y known and reknowable
th rough r e f l e c t i o n and a b s t r a c t i o n " (Peck 7 4 7 ) . According t o
Ockham, t h e r e are t w o stages i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge
abou t t h e e x t e r n a l world: f i r s t " t h e mind i n t u i t s ; it t h e n
reflects" (Peck 748 ) ; i n t u i t i o n i s b o t h sensory and
i n t e l l e c t u a l . C a r r é e x p l a i n s t h a t ' [t] he s e n s o r y f a c t o r
t e l l s u s t h a t t h e t h i n g e x i s t s , t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l f a c t o r
a l l o w s u s t o r e c o g n i z e it; and any p e r c e p t i o n r e q u i r e s bo th
e lements" (110) . However,
it i s n o t only objects p e r c e i v e d by means of t h e
e x t e r n a l s e n s e s which can be d i r e c t l y known.
A c t u a l l y it i s t h e region of i n n e r expe r i ence ,
comprising acts of will, pleasure, or sorrow, that
are most imrnediately and convincingly known.
Judgrnents based on these processes carry greater
certainty than any other class of contingent
propositions. (Carré 111)
As Carré suggests, Ockhamrs theory of intuitive
knowledge is not without qualification. Ockham explains that
the perceptions of the inner senses are more reliable than
those of the external senses because while it is possible to
doubt sensory experience, the existence of the individual in
the world is beyond doubt to that person. Carré says this
qualification of the external senses leads to the second
qualification of Ockhamfs empiricism:
For intuitions may sometimes be clear without
giving guarantee of their existence. . . . [W]e may continue to see a star after it has been
destroyed. And God can give an intuition of an
object that has no real existence. (111-12)
Despite these contingencies, intuitive knowledge is the most
precise for Ockham: in its immediacy, it can give true
knowledge of reality.
The second stage in the acquisition of knowledge is to
abstract the information provided by the senses, which Peck
de£ ines :
From intuited information, the intellect,
motivated by the will, abstracts words, images,
and concepts which it holds in the minci for
f u r t h e r a b s t r a c t i o n a n a c o n f i r m a t i o n . Through
r e p e t i t i o n t h e s e p r o c e s s e s leaa t o p r i n c i p i e s and
h a 8 i i s which c o n s t i t u i e e a c h i n a i v i d u a l f s s e n s e of
r e a i i t y . ( 7 4 8 )
Abstract Knowleage i s less reliaoie t h a n intuitive because
such Knowieage is iess c e r t a i n when it has p a s s e a i n t h e
i n t e l l e c t from i r n m e a i a t e t o past e x p e r i e n c e ,
[ f i o r even mernory images are classifiea as
abstract i n t h i s s t r i c t empi r i c i sm. When 1 see a
w a i i o r t o u c h a fiame, 1 know c e r t a i n l y t h a t t h e
w a i l o r f i a m e e x i s t s . Bu t i f i reca l l them or
imagine them I a m n o t s u r e t h a t t h e y e x i s t .
(Carre 1 1 0 )
Thus, the accuracy of a h t r a c t Knowieage r ema ins p r o b l e m a t i c
because "it a o e s n o t e n a 8 l e u s t o know the e x i s t e n c e of what
a o e s e x i s t o r t h e non-ex i s t ence o f what d o e s n o t e x i s Y p
(Gckham 2 7 j . Feck e l a b o r a t e s on the problem, s u g g e s t i n g t h a t
t h e d e g r e e t o which e x p e r i e n c e refiects i n d i v i d u a f t r u t h
depends upon t h e p e r c e p t i o n of t h e ind iv idua l : "The w i l l can
motivate, but it can a l s o i n t e r f e r e , and t h e i n t e l l e c t may
be weak, t h u s o b s c u r i n g judgment. E r r o r may l i e i n b o t h t h e
a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d t h e j udgment" ( 7 4 9 ) . W h i l e l i m i t i n g t h e r o l e of u n i v e r s a l s l i k e "good" and
"evil, " Ockham i n c r e a s e s Godr s active r o l e i n t h e worid,
a s c r i b i n g t o him u n l i r n i t e d power. Ockham inçists t h a t God's
poten t i a ordina ta d o e s n o t restrict His potentia absoluta.
In fact, His potentia ordinata is c o n t i n g e n t upon the
covenant God has made with humanity, and not at all the
result of necessity (Oberman, "Shape" 12). As a result,
[t] he combined effect of Ockharn's restriction of
the ontological status of universals and his
elevation of the power of God is to render al1
creatures and things utterly contingent upon their
creator not only for their existence, but also for
the circumstances that govern their existence. If
universals have not substantial existence, then
God is the final source and guarantor of truth
just as he is the final source and guarantor of
laws concerning physical bodies. (Watts and Utz
149)
The result of the limitations irnposed on universals and the
elevation of God's power is that all of his Creation depends
on Him alone for existence and truth. However, the
distinction between Godfs two powers becomes problematic:
OckhamCs declaration that God's absolute power is unlimiteci
by his ordained power removes al1 limitations £rom the
divine volition. In other words, the distinction between
morality and immorality is based not upon inherent universal
concepts of "good" and "bad" but upon the particular
intention of God's will. As Courtenay explains,
God coufd have established and still could
establish a different moral order in which rnurder
and adultery would be virtuous acts. God could
even cause a man to hate him and accept such
actions as meritous. The moral order which
presently pertains, therefore, is dependent solely
on the arbitrary will of God and can be altered.
(29)
The apparently arbitrary nature of the moral order
leads to the possibility of skepticism and religious
pessimisrn. Since abstract cognition is not reliable and God
has the power to make people perceive things that do not
rea l ly exist, even intuitive cognition can be unreliable
(which makes abstractive cognition doubly so). Humans rely
on God for Truth, but Truth is a universal without real
existence and so is dependent on particular situations
which, in turn, depend upon the arbitrary will of God.
Ultimately, people cannot know the world with any certainty
because "there is no assurance that universal ideas and
words bear any resemblance to the real world" (Watts and Utz
149). Even language itself becomes problematic: Holly
Wallace Boucher observes that, because of Ockhamrs
theorizing,
[t] he firm bonds between signifier and signified . . . had unraveled: so had the necessary tie between sign and reality. . . . Words could no longer be assumed to fit the shape of reality
because of their origin in a real world of ideas
beyond the rnind. Language . , . has become a skewed grid that may not fit the scheme of
reality- (215)
Because of the contingency of language and the problem of
abstract generalizations already existing in the minds of
both author and reader, interpretation becomes problematic,
A personrs interior reality can be altered and separated
from the initial perception of external reality, since the
two forms of existence are coterminous only in the mind.
When the two are disunited or, as Peck says, when " [t] he
f i c t a in the brain fail to correspond exactly with the
phenornena," there is a danger that, lost in the confusion
between the inner and outer worlds, people can become
imprisoned by their own ideas or become trapped by someone
else's words (757) ,
It is possible to interpret Ockhamrs discussions of the
inability to know anything with certainty as a proper
Christian awareness of the individual's dependence on God
(Watts and Utz 149). Sturges writes that "Ockhamfs
philosophical world is inhabited by radically individual
beings separate from a l 1 others. Since God is separate £rom
humanity, human knowledge is severely limitedO' (27) . Sturgesf statement is qualified, however, by the theory that
"the giver of foms rnay be seen in the forms, " suggesting
that God can be known, to some degree, through His creation,
and especially through the human mind (Peck 750). The result
is that Christians rejoice in their dependence on a God
whose nature can be known, though imperfectly. However, when
placed in the context of the Nominalist b e l i e f that this
universe is created according to the arbitrary decisions of
t h e d i v i n e w i l l , a n d t h a t i t is possible f o r God t o c a u s e
p e o p l e t o p e r c e i v e t h i n g s t h a t do n o t ex i s t , t h e faith of
t h e i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n may waver and t u r n t h e f o r m e r
believer i n t o a s k e p t i c . Fo r t h e N o m i n a l i s t , f a i t h i s
e s s e n t i a l : "The i n s i g h t s o f f a i t h , t hough t h e y c a n n o t b e
p r o v e d by r e a s o n , are n o t t h e r e f o r e c o n t r a r y t o r e a s o n , b u t
s i m p l y g o beyond it" (Peck, p r e v i o u s l y cited, 7 4 7 ) . God is
u n d e r s t o o d t o be a r a d i c a l l y free and omnipo t en t
c r e a t o r , s u b j e c t t o n o t h i n g e x c e p t non-
c o n t r a d i c t i o n , free o f a l 1 l a w ( even h i s own), t h e
a b s o l u t e n e c e s s a r y be ing who migh t command h i s
chosen one (Abraham) t o s l a y h i s o n l y s o n (Isaac)
w h i l e j u d g i n g hirn a c c o r d i n g t o h i s f i d e l i t y tU
t h a t s i n g u l a r d i v i n e command a n d d i s c o u n t i n g a n y
mere m o r a l law p r o s c r i b i n g s u c h a n act .
( D e l a s a n t a 212 )
Wi thou t f a i t h to s u s t a i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e
u l t i m a t e b e n e v o l e n c e of God a n d t o g u a r a n t e e t h e t r u t h of
t h e Word, t h e Norn ina l i s t is l e f t a l o n e i n a u n i v e r s e w i t h o u t
c e r t a i n t y o r rneaning.
5 , John W y c l i f (c. 1330-1384)
John W y c l i f f s " u l t r a - r e a l i s m " ( D e l a s a n t a 214 ) domina ted
the l a t t e r part of t h e f o u r t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Norninalism had
dismissed u n i v e r s a l s and d i s c o u r a g e d m e t a p h y s i c a l
c o n t e m p l a t i o n , and t h e c e r t a i n t y p r o v i d e d by u n i v e r s a l s w a s
r e p l a c e d by s k e p t i c i s m :
when the universal is understood to exist solely
as a sign in the human intellect, such an
epistemology does violence to the essentiality of
tbe real and impedes any intellectual
accessibility to a metaphysical or moral order,
(Delasanta 214)
Consequently, Wyclif's restoration of the universal and his
claim that philosophy could provide absolute proofs to
questions such as the existence of God were very appealing
to his contemporaries, especially as a counter to the
Nominalist suggestion that nothing could be known with
certainty. Robson summarizes the two most important aspects
of Wyclif's metaphysics: "that we can obtain absolute
certainty of knowledge, and that the basis of ultimate
truth, including divine truth, lies in 'pure philosophyf "
(142) . Wyclif, like Augustine, believed that al1 human
knowledge was grounded on immutable universal ideas that
exist in the divine Mind. As Delasanta observes,
this was standard Augustinian doctrine, and as
such was not particularly remarkable, except that
Wycliffe redefined these archetypes as ideas
participating in God's own being. . . . By making the individual's archetype share God's being,
Wyclif conferred upon it the same attributes of
eternity, necessity, and indestructibility as God
enjoyed. (214-5)
Wyclif takes Augustine's Realism to extremes. His belief in
the indestructible nature of individuals led to h i s
rejection of Transubstantiation which, in turn, contributed
to his attacks on the clergy. As Knapp says, his
"uncompromising realism drove him to attack the doctrine of
transubstantiation, which posited that the substance of the
bread disappears in the sacrament of the Eucharist" (Chaucer
66) . Unlike some of his followers, Wyclif affirmed the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. He argued that the
spiritual being of Christ is added to the physical elements
of bread and wine; there is no physical transformation.
Wyclif was concerned with the meaning of the sacrament, not
the "accidents and subjects" (Hudson Premature 282). In his
sermons, he reasons that, should a rnouse eat a consecrated
wafer, 'a mous etip not Cristis body, al ?if he ete pis
sacrament, for De mous fayliD gostly witt to chewe in hym
Dis beleue" (EWS 206/24-25). Like the mouse, an unrepentant
sinner is unable to receive spiritual benefits from "Cristis
body": the sacrament depends upon the spiritual condition of
the communicant rather than of the priest.
The Eucharist was not the only sacrament Wyclif
scrutinized; he also turned his attention to confession. He
declared that only God can forgive sin because only God can
know if the sinner is truly penitent, which suggests that
the priest who serves as intermediary betwsen humans and God
is again unnecessary. Hudson explains that "[alt the root of
the offender's state of mind 4s his state or' grace, a state
dependent upon h i s predestination to salvation or his
foreknowing to damnation; only God knows this state"
(Preinature 294) . As a result, ?if we han synned neuere so myche, and neuere so
longe han lyghged in synne, axe we God mercy in
oure powyt, and haue we sorwe for P i s synne, and
God is redy to for3yu it, howeuere pat preestus
fayfon. (ERS 82/106-09)
Wycliffite writers objected to the practice of oral
confession because contemporary practices of confession were
not in keeping with Biblical examples, and because of the
abuses to which the laity and the clergy were exposed. All
foms of simony in the sacraments were deplored; by making
the individual ultirnately responsible for his or her own
salvation, Wyclif effectively reduced the importance of the
clergy. As Tuchman observes,
Wyclif reached the point of denying the validity
of the priesthood itself as necessary to
salvation. . . . From there the rest followed--the non-necesshty of the Pope, rejection O£
excommunication, confession, pilgrimages, worship
of relics and saints, indulgences, treasury of
merit. (289)
Out of Wyclif's criticisms of the sacraments and the
clergy corne two of the most important aspects of his
theology: the concept of predestination and the preeminence
of the Bible. Both aspects are important to Wyclif's vision
o f " d i s p l a c i n g t h e c e n t u r i e s - o l d c l a b t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y i s
founded on b o t h t h e B i b l e and t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e Church
and s u b s t i t u t i n g the B i b l e a l o n e as t h e a u t h o r i t y which must
e s t a b l i s h C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e and p r a c t i c e " (Knapp, Chaucer
6 5 ) . P r e d e s t i n a t i o n played a n impor t an t r o l e i n what Wycl i f
s a w as t h e d i m i n i s h i n g a u t h o r i t y of the Church and t h e
c lergy. For Wycl i f , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l chu rch w a s divided
between t h e congrega tio predes t i n a torum, those " p r e d e s t i n e d
f o r s a l v a t i o n " and who belongeci t o t h e " t rue" church , and
t h e congregatio prescitorum, t h o s e " d e s t i n e d t o damnation"
and who were n o t rnembers of t h e " t rue" church . Congregatio
predestina t o r u m and congrega t i o presci t o r u m b o t h p o s s e s s e d a
combina t ion of virtue and vice; t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e
two depended on t h e i r f i n a l ends , which c o u l d n o t be known
by any human be ing . Robson p o i n t s o u t t ha t
no c r e a t u r e p r e d e s t i n e d t o s a l v a t i o n can m e r i t
e t e r n a l punishment, however g r a v e l y h e may s i n ,
n o r any foreknown t o r e p r o b a t i o n evade it, however
p l e a s i n g h e may be t o God i n t h i s l i fe . For i f w e
allow temporal m e r i t t o e l i c i t i ts reward, t h e
reward i t s e l f canno t be heaven ly but o n l y
t empora l . (212)
I n o t h e r words, s a l v a t i o n is n o t t h e r e s u l t of v i r t u o u s
behav io r ; r a t h e r , "God n a t u r a l l y j u s t i f i e s men t o e t e r n a l
life before t h e p r e d e s t i n e d show m e r i t i n t h i s world"
(Robson 208) .
The i n a b i l i t y o f humans t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h o s e
who are s a v e d and t h o s e who are damned had d i s t u r b i n g
consequences f o r t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e church . As Hudson
remarks ,
[t] he i n s t i t u t i o n a l church , t o a medieval. o u t l o o k ,
c o n t a i n e d t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n . . . . But it w a s
u n r e a s o n a b l e t o t h i n k that t h e whole p o p u l a t i o n
w a s predestinatus; it w a s equally u n l i k e l y even
t h a t a l l t h e E n g l i s h c l e r g y were, l e t a l o n e t h e
c l e r g y o f t h e whole Roman church . Where, amongst
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l chu rch , w a s t h e t r u e chu rch . . . t o b e found? . . . [ A ] u t h o r i t y , whe the r o v e r
i nan ima te goods o r o v e r a n i m a t e n a t u r e , depended
upon the s ta te o f grace of t h e man w i e l d i n g it.
(Premature 315)
A cleric who w a s n o t i n a s t a t e of grace had no a u t h o r i t y ;
any d i s p o s i t i o n s made by such a person were n e i t h e r legal
nor b i n d i n g . Wyclif i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e B i b l e w a s t h e s o l e a u t h o r i t y
of p r o p e r doctrine and p r a c t i c e i n the cnurch . H e found t h a t
[ t l h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l chu rch b e a r s t h e p e r f e c t l y
r e a d a b l e m a r k s o f d i v e r g e n c e from a p o s t o l i c t r u t h s
in t h e B i b l e : it errs i n d o c t r i n e , n o t a b l y
Eucharistie d o c t r i n e , and i n p r a c t i c e , by a b u s i n g
p r o p e r t y and power (ecclesiastical p r o p e r t y ,
n e g l e c t of t h e poor , p a p a l w a r s ) . (Knapp, Chaucer
68 1
The c l e r g y w a s u n r e l i a b l e b e c a u s e many mernbers were guilty
of v a r i o u s a b u s e s a n d c o r r u p t i o n s ; even p a p a l decrees c o u l d
n o t be t r u s t e d b e c a u s e of t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e m o r a l i t y of many
popes . Hudson o b s e r v e s t h a t t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y w a s f a r more
d e t r i m e n t a l t o the i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e chu rch t h a n w a s t h e
condemnation o f a b u s e s , which c o u l d be i d e n t i f i e d and
remedied, Accord ing t o Hudson, once t h e a u t h o r i t y and
i d e n t i t y o f t h e c h u r c h were q u e s t i o n e d , any a t t e m p t s at
reform were s u b j e c t t o t h e same d o u b t s . She conc ludes , "As
e f f e c t i v e l y as la ter P r o t e s t a n t t h e o l o g y , Wycl i f ' s v iews
forced t h e i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n i n t o making h i s own
-judgments" ( P r e m a t u r e 3 1 6 ) .
Wyc l i f ' s v iews p l a c e d new r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on t h e
i n d i v i d u a l and p r e s e n t e d a need f o r a n E n g l i s h v e r s i o n o f
the B i b l e . Nowhere, Knapp w r i t e s , i s Wycl i f more c l e a r l y
i n v o l v e d w i t h
t h e s o c i a l world of active l a y p i e t y , o f
i n c r e a s i n g l a y l i t e r a c y , o f i n c r e a s i n g l y b l u r r e d
b o u n d a r i e s between t h e estates, a n d o f changing
a s se s s rnen t s of womenrs r o l e s t h a n i n h i s
e g a l i t a r i a n opennes s a b o u t Bible r e a d i n g and
s c r i p t u r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . (Chaucer 7 3 )
Wycli f a r g u e d t h a t e v e r y C h r i s t i a n s h o u l d be free t o read
and s t u d y t h e B i b l e . H e b e l i e v e d t h a t the B i b l e s h o u l d b e
a c c e s s i b l e t o everyone , and t h a t t h e c l e r g y s h o u l d f o l l o w
C h r i s t ' s example a n d p r e a c h t o t h e p e o p l e i n t h e i r own
l a q u a g e . H e believed t h a t anyone i n a s tate of grace who
approached the scriptures with rneekness and humility would
be able to interpret and understand them correctly, while
anyone in a state of sin would be unable to discern true
meaning (Gellrich 9 5 ) . This belief in the importance of
grace in guiding the interpretation of the Scriptures is
similar to Augustine's theory of divine illumination; Wyclif
wrote:
[ w ] e schulde not trowe in p i s enke, ne in Pese
skynnys pat is clepud booc, but in pe sentence pa t
Dei seyen, whyche sentence is De booc of lyf; for
al ?if per ben manye trewpus and diuerse resonys
in De gospelus, nepeles eche of pes trewbus is pe
substaunce of God hymself. (ENS 94/19-24)
Also like Augustine, Wyclif favored literal
interpretations of the Bible but also recognized the need
for allegorical readings; he argued, however, that
when a figure is undeniably the intention of the
divine author, it may be counted as literal. . . . His Latin treatise De V e r i t a t e Sacrae Scripturae
defends the literal truth of the Bible by making a
distinction between what is literal (proper) in
human language and what is literal (proper) in
divine discourse,-which in some cases overrides
ordinary grammatical and sentantic usages.
(Knapp, Chaucer 72)
Wyclif argued that the Scriptures should be presented to
people without the standard readings of the patristic
g l o s s e s , t o which h e o b j e c t e d on t h e grounds t h a t they
obscured the t r u t h . However, ecclesiastical a u t h o r i t i e s a l s o
claimed t h a t t h e W y c l i f f i t e glosses were e q u a l l y
o b f u s c a t i n g . T h e r e s u l t of t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y was a
r e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e word glose; Knapp e x p l a i n s :
glose i s u s e d by b o t h sides t o rnean ' s p e c i o u s o r
s o p h i s t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' (Middle E n g l i s h
Dictionary) , a l o n g s i d e i t s p o s i t i v e meanings. . . . Once a l y inq g l o s s is able t o b e c o n c e i v e d of,
t h e p a t r i s t i c t r a d i t i o n takes i t s p l a c e , i m p o r t a n t
b u t n o t a l o n e , among other i n t e r p r e t i v e sys tems .
(Chaucer 7 5 )
Wyclif's emphas is on a l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e B i b l e
w a s based on h i s belief t h a t " t h e Word o f S c r i p t u r e w a s God
H i m s e l f , an emanat ion of t h e Supreme Being ' t r a n s p o s e d i n t o
w r i t i n g ' " (Robson 1 4 6 ) . I n o t h e r words, t h e B i b l e c o n t a i n s
Tru th ; it i s up t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l gu ided b y f a i t h t o
i n t e r p r e t i t .
Like t h e Nomina l i s t s , Wycl i f leaves t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r
s a l v a t i o n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l . Kowever, h i s " u l t r a - r e a l i s t "
belief i n u n i v e r s a l s p r o v i d e s a n o b j e c t i v e T r u t h which g i v e s
t h e Wycliff i tes a s o u r c e of s e c u r i t y t h a t t h e N o m i n a l i s t s
d id n o t have. Wycl i f ' s ideas seem t o i n d i c a t e a r e t u r n t o
Augus t ine and h i s t h e o r i e s of u n i v e r s a l s , which ra t i f ies
Augus t ine ' s impor t ance i n any d i s c u s s i o n of f o u r t e e n t h -
c e n t u r y ph i lo sophy .
6. Twentieth Century Theorists
Every time period is dominated by "large-scale
conceptual frameworks" which Richard Harland, a critic of
structuralist and post-structuralist theory, calls
"epistemes" (105) . An "episteme" is the a priori upon which
any new idea or discovery is based, whether that idea is
true or false. It is a cultural foundation that consists of
al1 pre-existing perceptions and understandings of the world
that inform the minds and ideas of the people living in a
given society. An episteme shapes the ways in which people
define and think about their world, causing them to share
common understandings and questions about the way the
universe works, These conceptual frameworks contain al1 the
discourses which exist during a given period of time; Peggy
Knapp appropriates Catherine Belseyrs definition of
discourse, using it
to indicate, "a domain of Ianguage use; a
particular way of talking (and writing and
thinking) " which "involves certain shared
assumptions which appear in the fomulation that
characterize it."' Ideology is always implied in
discourse; we must make assumptions about the
world in order to Say anything. (2)
Catherine Belsey, Cri t i c a l Prac t i ce (London : Methuen, 1980) 5.
Knapp is r e f e r r i n g t o p a r t i c u l a r ways o f l ook ing a t and
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e world . These i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s c a n be
c o n f l i c t i n g as w e l l as harmonious; ideas which oppose e a c h
o t h e r p r o v i d e a l t e r n a t e p e r s p e c t i v e s from which a s o c i e t y
c a n be unders tood . Any d i s c u s s i o n of l a t e - f o u r t e e n t h c e n t u r y
ideas must acknowiedge how l i t e r a ry works are i n e v i t a b l y
informed by t h e works and t h o u g h t s o f o t h e r a u t h o r s . Because
t h e ideas o f S t . Augus t ine , S t . Thomas Aquinas, Wi l l i am of
Ockhani, and John Wyclif i n f o r m t h e v a r i o u s f o u r t e e n t h -
c e n t u r y s c h o o l s o f r e l i g i o u s and p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n ,
Chaucer would have been a t least aware o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s
t h a t t h e y p r e s e n t .
Within any episteme, t h e r e are peop le who a r e i n
p o s i t i o n s o f power; one way of p r e s e r v i n g t h a t power i s t o
undermine oppos ing p o s i t i o n s . Language, whether w r i t t e n o r
spoken, can e i t h e r reveal o r c o n c e a l power. The re fo re , t o
c o n t r o l c o n f l i c t i n g v iew-poin ts , one need o n l y c o n t r o l t h e
language, t h e r e b y l i m i t i n g what c a n and cannot be said. A
society can p r o h i b i t and e x c l u d e c e r t a i n d i s c o u r s e s which
t h r e a t e n t o expose t h e weaknesses o f i t s own p r i v i l e g e d
p o s i t i o n s t h rough a p r o c e s s of d i v i s i o n and r e j e c t i o n : i t
divides t r u t h from f a l s i t y , r i g h t £rom wrong. A d i s c o u r s e
becomes a u t h o r i t a t i v e when enough p e o p l e b e l i e v e that it
r e v e a l s t r u t h . However, i f s o c i e t y rejects t h e " r e s t r a i n i n g
language" (Har land 1 0 0 ) t h r o u g h which a n a u t h o r i t y d e f i n e s
i t s v e r s i o n of r i g h t and wrong, that a u t h o r i t y i s r e n d e r e d
power less . Thus, when affimed by enough people , one
position is considered "true"; the rnarginalized position is,
necessarily, considered false because, in such an
exclusionary system, there can be only one truth. It is also
possible for a false premise to be accepted as true if
people believe it because of the power of language and the
individual's will to believe. Truth is a convention, not a
universal. As Paul Rabinow observes, "there is no external
position of certainty, no universal understanding that is
beyond history and society" (4) . Like tzuth, language is also subject to convention. As
Ferdinand de Saussure says in his Course in General
Linguistics, language is an already existing "collection of
necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social
body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty [of
speech]" ( 9 ) . Language does not exist in an individual but
in a group of individuals; as a result, it is beyond the
power of an individual to change language. Because of its
arbitrary, conventi~nal nature, the distinguishing
characteristic of a sign is that "in some way it always
eludes the individual or the social will" (Saussure 17).
Saussure explains that every language system is made of
"distinct signs corresponding to distinct ideas" ( 9 ) . A
"signf' is the combination of two parts: the signifier which
is a word, and the signified which is the concept to which
the word refers. Saussure says of the arbitrary connection
between signifier and signified:
the whole system of language is based on the
irrational principle of the arbitrariness of the
sign, which would lead to the worst sort of
complication if applied without restriction. But
the mind contrives to introduce a principle of
order and regularity into certain parts of the
mass of signs. . . . (Saussure 133)
In contrast to Saussure, post-structuralists do not
believe that the mind is able to impose order on language or
on anything else: for post-structural theorists, as for
Augustine, irrational complications and disorder are
inevitable because the conventions linking the signifier to
the signified
can be changed, disregarded, broken, . . . [Words] are able to point to the truth but do not possess
it. And consequently, al1 kinds of slips are
possible between the speaker, his language, and
his audience. (Dinshaw 171)
Thus, it is possible to free signifiers from the things they
signify. It is through the freeing of signifiers from
definite meaning that authoritative positions can be
destabilized; for example, in the late fourteenth century,
the Wycliffites atternpted to redefine the doctrine of
"transubstantiation" by demonstrating how logically
impossible the transformation was, then redefining the terms
that originally meant a physical alteration to suggest a
symbolic presence.
T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l n a t u r e of l a n g u a g e means t h a t
i n d i v i d u a l s are lirnited by t h e e p i s t e m e i n which t h e y l ive:
t h e i r means o f e x p r e s s i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g are i n s e p a r a b l e
from t h e c o n c e p t u a l framework which i n f o r m s t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n
o f t h e world. I n o t h e r words, "C13anguage is no l o n g e r a
p u r e t r a n s p a r e n c y , b u t f i l l e d w i t h 'hidden' f o r c e s t h a t t h e
l anguage u s e r n e v e r d i r e c t l y e x p e r i e n c e s " (Har land 112).
T h e r e f o r e , t h e u s e r of l anguage c a n n e v e r e x h a u s t a l 1 t h e
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f meaning c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t l anguage ,
Language c a n n o t c o n t a i n a l 1 t h e p o s s i b l e meanings o f a
s t a t e m e n t ; as a r e s u l t , s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d i n
i s o l a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , w i t h i n e v e r y e p i s t e m e t h e r e are
" [ r l e l a t i o n s between s t a t e m e n t s ( even i f t h e a u t h o r is
unaware of them; even i f t h e s t a t e m e n t s do no t have t h e same
a u t h o r ; e v e n i f t h e a u t h o r s were unaware of each o t h e r r s
e x i s t e n c e ) " ( F o u c a u l t 2 9 ) - Each s t a t e m e n t reflects on and
changes t h e meaning of t h e o t h e r s t a t e m e n t s i n e v e r y
episteme. A u t h o r s r i n t e n t i o n s may i n f l u e n c e t h e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r wosds; t h e i n t e n t i o n , however, does
n o t domina te t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
L i k e any a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i s c o u r s e c o n t r o l l e d by
language , t h a t of t h e Medieval Church c o n t a i n s c o n f l i c t i n g
ideas, i n c l u d i n g t h o s e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s and t h e o l o g i a n s
d i s c u s s e d earlier. And, like o t h e r authorities, t h e Church
c l a i m s t o be objective b u t , b e c a u s e it creates t h e c r i t e r i o n
by which it i s t o be judged, it c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d
a n y t h i n g b u t s u b j e c t i v e . Thus, o r t h o d o x dogma is p r i v i l e g e d ,
whereas positions such as Nominalism are marginalized. To
control and subjugate such positions, the Church uses words
such as heresy, sacrilege, and sin. The subversive elements
resist the Churchrs language by creating their own language,
countering accusations with "logic" and "rationalism."
As Augustine observes, Godf s presence in nature is
sub jected to multiple interpretations; therefore, many
interpretations can exist simultaneously that either oppose
or support the privileged position, Harland's comments are
applicable to the Medieval period:
What we now see as the natural world appears . , . as a great artifice, a great book, in which God,
as the Word itself, inscribes signs and ches and
an endless play of overlapping resemblances for
men to interpret. (109)
For example, Chaucer uses religious satire and wordplay to
raise questions about religious orthodoxy from various
alternative positions. Each of these marginalized positions
translates the authorityfs words into its own language,
thereby revealing the weaknesses of the orthodox position.
The result of this revelation Y s to discredit the clergy
[who follow these orthodoxies] . . . by showing its learning as a cynical exploitation of the word with which it is
entrusted" (Knapp, "Deconstructing" 75). By discrediting the
clergy, Chaucerrs satire attempts to raise doubts about
Catholic truths. His undermining of Church ritual and
language leads to questions about the Churchfs authority. A
loss of faith in Church doctrine leads to a loss of
confidence in the Church itself which, in turn, can create
the state of confusion, fear, and despair, exhibited by
Chaucer' s skeptical and nihilistic Pardoner. The result is
the alienation of humanity: people are estranged from God,
nature, and society, as well as from their sense of self,
resulting in the absolute psychological isolation (hence
alienation) of each individual.
This theme of the alienation of humanity becomes the
central theme of twentieth-century existential philosophy.
Barrett itemizes the historical conditions that produced
existentialism:
Alienation and estrangement; a sense of the basic
fragility and contingency of human life; the
impotence of reason confrmted with the depths of
existence; the threat of Nothingness, and the
solitary and unsheltered condition of the
individual before this threat. (31)
The conditions created by the crises of the fourteenth
century appear analogous to those described by Barrett:
disillusioned by the failure of the systems on which they
had relied, people began to question the authenticity of
these systems. Although Chaucer cannot be called an
existentialist, many of the questions and ideas raised in
his works are similar to those of the existentialists.
Chaucer was doubtless aware of the alienation of humans
because " [ s ] uch matters as anxiety, death, the conf lict
between the bogus and the genuine self, the faceless man of
the masses, the experience of the death [Le., the removal]
of God are . . . themes of life" [Barrett 9). Nothingness is the void created by humanityrs sense of its alienation and
homelessness in the world. Religion provided a "framework, "
a structure that encompassed manr s life, providing
him with a system of images and syrnbols by which
he could express his own aspirations toward
psychic wholeness. With the loss of this
containing framework man becarne not only a
dispossessed but a fragmentary being. (Barrett
3 5 )
The danger of nothingness is that the individual may remain
incomplete and desperate. Humanity is left seeking
wholeness; for some existentialists like Sartre, the
solution was to find a project, a cause for action that
could fil1 the void with meaning and lend significance to
existence. As Sartre says, "Man is nothing else but that
which he makes of himself" (28).
Existential philosophers question the meaning of
religion and religious faith "in relation to the individual.
Each has put religion itself radically in question" (Barrett
15). The decision to either affim or deny faith rests on
individual judgment, and existentialism is a philosophy of
individual responsibility and freedom. Sartre explains that
human existence is grounded on the individual's actions and
experiences: "Man is al1 the time outside of himself: it is
i n p r o j e c t i n g and l o s i n g h i r n s e l f beyond h i m s e l f t h a t he
makes man t o e x i s t ; and, on the o t h e r hand, it is by
p u r s u i n g t r a n s c e n d e n t a i m s t h a t h e h i m s e l f i s able t o e x i s t "
(55) . L i k e Thomas Aquinas a n d t h e Nomina l i s t s , S a r t r e
believes t h a t e x i s t e n c e precedes e s s e n c e . I n o t h e r words,
i n d i v i d u a h E i s s t exis t , t h e n c r e a t e t hemse lves t h r o u g h
e x p e r i e n c e , a n idea n o t u n l i k e t h a t e x p r e s s e d i n Chauce r ' s
"Wife of Bath's Prologue," i n which the e x p e r i e n c e s which
have shaped t h e Wife become h e r a u t h o r i t y . And, s i n c e humans
must ground t h e i r e x i s t e n c e o n t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e a n d i n t h e i r
own a c t i o n s , t h e y are r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e i r own lives. Thus,
f o r S a r t r e and, pe rhaps , for Chaucer , t h e o n l y r e s p o n s e t o
t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of n o t h i n g n e s s is n o t n i h i l i s m b u t a c t i o n :
i n a n u n c e r t a i n u n i v e r s e , t h e o n l y way t o l ive a mean ing fu l
existence is t o choose t o act. I will argue t h a t , f o r
Chaucer, w r i t i n g The Canterbury Tales is t h e n e c e s s a r y
a c t i o n ; h i s r e sponse t o the r e c o g n i t i o n o f u n c e r t a i n t y a n d
n o t h i n g n e s s i s t h e q u e s t i o n i n g of h i s own f a i t h i n "The
M i l l e r r s T a l e , " "The C l e r k r s T a l e , " and "The Pa rdone r ' s
T a l e . "
CEIAPTER TWO
"THE MILLER'S TALE" AND "THE CLERKr S TALE"
A u t h o r i t i e s l i m i t and govern speech by r e c o g n i z i n g a n d
u s i n g t h e power o f language. These a u t h o r i t i e s a t t e m p t t o
c o n t r o l what can be said; however, as Chaucer's sa t i r ic u s e
of l anguage demons t r a t e s , t h i s c o n t r o l is a n i l l u s i o n . I n
"The M i l l e r ' s Tale" and "The C l e r k f s T a l e , " Chaucer e x p o s e s
t h e s e false appea rances o f c o n t r o l , r e v e a l i n g t h e power of
l anguage t o undermine t h e d i s c u r s i v e f o r m a t i o n s which
comprise t h e f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y ep i s t eme , and showing t h e
e a s e w i t h which a p p a r e n t l y r e a s o n a b l e p remises can b e
i n v e r t e d and m i s i n t e r p r e t e d . S o - c a l l e d " u n i v e r s a l t r u t h s "
a r e shown t o be d e c e p t i o n s created by a u t h o r i t i e s t o
m a i n t a i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s ; t h e r e f o r e , d e f i n i t i v e answers t o
q u e s t i o n s o f n a t u r e and e x i s t e n c e a r e u n a t t a i n a b l e u s i n g
r a t i o n a l means a l o n e . A s a r e s u l t , Chaucer ' s sa t i r ica l
t r e a t m e n t o f r e l i g i o u s themes dernons t ra tes t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r
skep t i c i s rn and d e s p a i r t h a t can result from t o o heavy a
dependence on r e a s o n . H e shows t h a t , u l t i m a t e l y , i n d i v i d u a l s
can f i n d t r u t h and s u b s t a n t i a t e the i r beliefs, b u t o n l y
th rough a n act o f p e r s o n a l fa i th .
I n "The M i l l e r ' s Tale" a n d "The CLerkrs Ta le , " words
becorne t h e means through which t h e c h a r a c t e r s test b o t h
t h e i r knowledge o f t h e wor ld a n d t h e a b i l i t y o f t h a t
knowledge t o reveal t r u t h . The M i l l e r t e l l s t h e ta le of a
s t u d e n t o f a s t r o l o g y ( m i s ) u s i n g h i s knowledge t o dupe h i s
l o v e r ' s husband who, i n h i s "p ious ignorance" of t h a t
science, is willing to believe what he cannot understand. By
warning that people should not inquire too deeply into
"Goddes pryvetee" (31641, "The Miller's Tale" becomes an
exploration of the ability of human authorities, such as
those of "The Knightrs Tale's" assertions of certainty in
Theseusr Prime Mover speech1 or of Church doctrine, to
provide fundamental assurances about the nature of God and
the Divine Mysteries. The tale seems to conclude that such
an exploration leads to disillusionment because nothing can
be known definitively. "The Clerkrs Tale," too, explores the
possibility of answering such unanswerable questions. The
Clerk examines God's relationship with His creation through
the description of Walter's \experimentr using Griselda as
the subject. But the Clerk only calls into question the
extent to which such a philosophical exercise can provide a
reliable understanding of the human relationship with God:
in the end, the ways of God still remain a mystery. Both
Walter and Nicholas use language to create illusions of
reality contrary to what they know to be true to achieve
their own ends: Walter attempts to rneasure his wife's
constancy by subjecting her to three cruel tests, and
Nicholas falsely predicts a flood so that Alisoun "sholde
slepen in his a m al nyghtw (3406). The lies and
Theseus ascribes the events that lead to Arciters death, for which (as the audience knows) Saturn was responsible, to Jupiter; Theseusf misapprehension undermines the idea of order that he presents.
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t are e s s e n t i a l t o t h e u n f o l d i n g of t h e
c h a r a c t e r s ' schemes are a l s o m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of t h e
u n r e l i a b l e n a t u r e of l a n g u a g e .
The Canterbury T a l e s b e g i n s w i t h t h e Knigh t b e c a u s e his
s o c i a l s t a t u s i s t h e h i g h e s t among t h o s e on t h e f ic t ive
p i l g r i m a g e a n d h i s t a l e reflects his p o s i t i o n . "The M i l l e r ' s
Ta l e " is a r e a c t i o n against t h e a r t i f i c i a l c o u r t l y love and
s o c i a l o r d e r t h a t t h e Knigh t u p h o l d s a n d recreates i n h i s
ta le . Here, t h e M i l l e r ' s l o w social s t a t u s a n d imp ious
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s t h e K n i g h t ' s t a l e p r e s e n t s a n a l t e r n a t i v e
t h a t s u b v e r t s the K n i g h t ' s c o u r t l y a n d c o n s e r v a t i v e p o s i t i o n
e v e n as i t acknowledges t h e power o f t h a t p o s i t i o n . A s
Hanning says, t h e M i l l e r p i e r c e s " t h r o u g h facades t o l a y
bare p r y v e t e e , e x p o s i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c f i c t i o n s t h a t are
t h e r e b y shown to be a c e n t r a l p a r t of l i fe" ( 1 1 2 ) . The p l o t
of "The M i l l e r ' s Ta le" i s complicated by t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f
Abso lon , whom P r i o r describes as "at first j u s t s i m p l y
David's Absalom, b e a u t i f u l b u t doomed" (61 -2 ) . H e is a
p a r o d y o f t h e c o u r t l y c h a r a c t e r s i n "The Kn igh t r s Ta le" b u t ,
i n "The M i l l e r ' s Ta l e " where e v e r y t h i n g is i n v e r t e d , t h e
" p r i z e i n t h i s c o r n p e t i t i o n d o e s not g o t o t h e p a t i e n t ,
s e l f - r e s t r a i n e d s u i t o r , . . b u t t o t h e one who s e i z e s t h e
main chance" (Knapp, Chaucer 38 ) ; i r o n i c a l l y , however,
Absolon is more s e l f - r e p r e s s e d t h a n "self- r e s t r a i n e d " :
' soo th t o seyn, h e w a s somdeel squaymous/ O f f a r t y n g , and of
s p e c h e daunge rousw (3337-8) .
A s a r e s u l t o f A b s o l o n f s o v e r c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s c o u r t l y
r o l e , h i s " f a n t a s y b e g i n s t o o u t r u n p e r c e p t i o n , t h e
imag ina ry t o u s u r p t h e real" ( G a l l a c h e r 4 4 ) . Consequent ly ,
h e i s u n a b l e t o conce ive o f t he p o s s i b i l i t y o f A l i soun as a n
independen t , p h y s i c a l b e i n g w i t h a very u n l a d y l i k e s e n s e o f
humor; h e is misled by the p romise o f a k i s s and f a i l s t o
r e c o g n i z e h i s m i s t a k e u n t i l " w i t h h i s rnouth he k i s t e h e r
naked ers/ F u 1 savour ly" (3734-35) . The s c e n e i s a parody o f
a p a r i s h clerk worsh ipp ing , n o t t h e V i r g i n Mary
whom he s h o u l d have been worsh ipp ing , but a n
e a r t h l y woman. . . And it is no a c c i d e n t t h a t ,
as he p r e p a r e s h i m s e l f o u t s i d e h e r wlndow t o
receive A l i s o u n f s k i s s , Absolon "doun sette hym on
h i s knees" (A 3723) and asks for A l i s o u n r s "grace"
(A 3726) . (Be id le r 9 4 )
I n s w e a r i n g revenge, t h i s pa rody of the c o u r t l y l o v e r whose
language c o n f i g u r e s him as a weak, c o r r u p t f i g u r e o f Solomon
a n d o f C h r i s t i n a parody o f t h e Song of Songsr2 becomes a
f i g u r e of Judas when he r e t u r n s f rom t h e f o r g e w i t h a " k i s s
o f b e t r a y a l " ( P r i o r 6 3 ) . Absolon r e t u r n s t o A l i s o u n r s window
w i t h a h o t c o u l t e r ; h i s words, "Spek, sweete bryd, 1 noot
n a t where t h o u art" (38O5), c u e N i c h o l a s r thunderous f a r t
I n t h a t moment, a l l speech is r e n d e r e d mean ing le s s as words
R. E. K a s k e d i s c u s s e s Chaucerf s p a r o d i c t r e a t m e n t o f t h e "Canticum Canticorum, " p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Absolonr s r e f e r e n c e s t o "hony-comb" (3698) , "bryd" and 'my sweete cynamome" (36991, and "lemman myn" (3700) ( K a s k e 481-2 ) .
and p e r c e p t i o n s a r e shown t o be mis t aken ; when the
c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between s i g n i f i e r s a n d their
s i g n i f i e d s i s broken, speech is r e d u c e d t o t h e "ey r ybroken"
o f The House o f Fame (765) . The M i l l e r rejects t h e u n i v e r s a l
ideals and c o u r t l y manners r e p r e s e n t e d by the Knight, and
reaffirms h i s own p o s i t i o n , s t r i p p i n g
t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i s c o u r s e of i ts e x a l t e d s t a t u s
by p o i n t i n g o u t what h e takes t o be t h e comrrton
needs o f a l l people--John's ungovernable c u r i o s i t y
a b o u t Nicholas , b o t h s u i t o r s ' s e x u a l a p p e t i t e s ,
A l i sounf s desire f o r a young l o v e r , N icho la s r s
g e t t i n g u p "for t o pisse," a n d t h e l i k e . (Knapp,
Chaucer 4 2 )
Thus, Absolon embodies t h e f a i l i n g s r a t h e r t h a n t h e v i r t u e s
o f t h e c o u r t l y lover who is more conce rned w i t h h i s r o l e a n d
t h e i d e a l i z a t i o n o f h i s l o v e r t h a n w i t h t h e l o v e r h e r s e l f .
When Absolon makes A l i s o u n "the o b j e c t of h i s ' l o v e
longyngs, ' h e r e i n f o r c e s h i s own l anguage and se l f - image by
r e d u c i n g A l i s o u n t o a r e f l e c t i o n dependent on his flattery
and d i s c o u r s e f o r h e r own i d e n t i t y " (Donaldson 1 4 5 ) . B y
expos ing t h e s e f i c t i o n s , t h e M i l l e r shows t h e i n s t a b i l i t y of
t h e c o u r t l y ideal and i t s language .
T h i s exposu re r e a c h e s i t s climax w i t h Absolon 's
unexpected reappearance , when N i c h o l a s l o s e s his a b i l i t y t o
c o n t i n u e t h e d e c e p t i o n , cu l rn ina t ing i n t h e "fart/ As g r e e t
as it had been a thonder-dent" (3806-713 which s i g n a l s the
m e t i n g o u t of v a r i o u s p e n a l t i e s t o c h a r a c t e r s t o o c o n f i d e n t
i n t h e i r own a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l l anguage a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
R e f e r r i n g t o t h i s i n s t a b i l i t y , Peggy Knapp declares:
The s t o r y p r o c e e d s b e c a u s e Nicho la s , i n h i s con o f
t h e c a r p e n t e r , p l a y s fast and l o o s e w i t h the f a i t h
t h e dominant d i s c o u r s e had p l a c e d i n t h e
r e v e l a t o r y power of words. (Chaucer 4 8 )
Through t h e sa t i re i m p l i c i t i n t h e tale, Chaucer ' s n a r r a t o r
is able t o " r e a p p r o p r i a t e l anguage f o r [ h i s ] own cunning and
i r r e v e r e n t u s e s . . . . [Tl h e s i g n i f i e r s Robyn e x p l o i t s
a l r e a d y have t h e d o u b l e edge t h a t a l l o w s h i s o u t r a g e o u s
l i n g u i s t i c alchemy" (Knapp, Chaucer 4 1 ) . T h a t is, words can
create and reveal i l l u s i o n s b y combining b o t h t h e sacred and
t h e s a c r i l e g i o u s i n a s i n g l e s i g n i f i e r .
T h e M i l l e r a l so i n t e n t i o n a l l y misxses s i g n i f i c a n t
e l e m e n t s of r e l i g i o u s l e g e n d t o undermine i t s a u t h o r i t y . H e
p r o p o s e s t o t e l l a double-edged " legende a n d a l y f / Bothe of
a c a r p e n t e r and o f h i s w i f e " (3141-2)- As B e r y l Rowland h a s
p o i n t e d o u t , " Cl] egend is t h e r e g u l a r t i t l e f o r t h e l i f e o f
a s a i n t . . . [ and] t h e a u d i e n c e would probab ly i d e n t i f y t h e
s a i n t w i t h t h e famous c a r p e n t e r . . . S t . Joseph, t h e
husband o f t h e V i r g i n Mary" ( 4 4 ) . T h e double-edge of t h e
N i c h o l a s r fury i n t e r n a l , which so o f f e n d s Absolon, works as a parody of P l u t o r s " f u r y i n f e r n a l " (KnT 2684) which c a u s e s Arcite t o be thrown f rom h i s horse ; i n b o t h cases, a rurnbling in t h e bowels (of e i t h e r N icho la s or o f the earth) is c r i t i ca l t o t h e denouement of t h e p lo t .
religious satire "pushes to the blasphemous extreme the
similarities between the Creator, the Saviour, and the
Saved, on the one hand, and their antitypes the Avenger, the
Tempter, and the Fallen, on the other" (Prior 60) . In the tale, Nicholas sings the Angelus ad virginem, which places
him in the role of Gabriel speaking to the Virgin, but the
allusion to the sacred event is undermined by association
with Nicholas' lascivious intentions: e-g., as when "prively
he caughte hire by the queynte" (3276). Through Nicholas'
appropriation of the Annunciation, "[the Miller] depicts
clerical learning as a cynical exploitation of the Word with
which the religious state is entrusted" (Knapp, Chaucer 40).
a depiction, incidentally, consistent with Wycliff s distrust
of the clergy.
Prior claims that Alisounrs role as 'a type of the
Virgin Mary . . . is primarily suggested through her relationship to . . . Nicholas" (61). However, the allusions to refigious symbols in Alisounfs description also associate
her with the Virgin Mary:
Fair was this yonge wyf, and therwithal
As any wezele hir body gent and smal . . . White was hir smok, and broyden al bifoore
And eek bihynde, on hir coler aboute,
Of col-blak silk, withinne and eek withoute.
The tapes of hir white voluper
Were of the same suyte of hir coler; . . . (3233-42)
Rowland e x p l a i n s t h a t A l i soun is compared t o t h e weasel
which "conceived b y t h e ear a n d gave b i r t h t h r o u g h t h e
mouth" as t h e V i r g i n conce ived Godrs Son, the Word made
f l e s h . A l i s o u n is dressed i n b l a c k a n d whi te , which are t h e
" c o l o u r s of ho l iness" ; s h e is "softer t h a n t h e wolle i s of a
wether" (MIT 32491 and wool i s " t h e most famous of a l 1
symbols of t h e V i r g i n Mary" (Rowland 4 7 ) . However, when
t h e s e images are c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e l e c h e r o u s
"swalwe" (3258) , Al i sounf s c o l t i s h s p i r i t , h e r p lucked
eyebrows, and h e r " l i k e r o u s ye" ( 3 2 4 4 ) , t h e r e l i g i o u s
symbols o f wool and weasel are rningled w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l ,
sexual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and are t h e r e b y undermined. Also, t he
n a r r a t o r f s a s s e r t i o n t h a t s h e w a s "a prymerole , a
p iggensnye , / Fo r any l o r d t o l eggen i n his bedde,/ O r y e t
f o r a n y good yernan t o wedde" (3267-70) s u b v e r t s t h e
r e l i g i o u s i l l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e V i r g i n Mary
create. A l i s o u n cornes t o resemble " t he e t e r n a l Eve" (Rowland
4 7 ) , e a s i l y seduced by Nicho la s p l a y i n g t h e r o l e o f t h e
Ternpter.
Knapp e x p l a i n s t h a t , i n t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f Noah's
Flood, N icho la s f scheme h i n g e s upon "us ing i n a d i s t o r t e d
way t h e dominant d i s c o u r s e o f o b e d i e n c e t o b ib l ica l
i n j u n c t i o n s " (Chaucer 36 ) , r e i n f o r c i n g t h e v a l i d i t y of
Augus t ine ' s conce rn fo r t h o s e who believe w i t h o u t
q u e s t i o n i n g . N i c h o l a s t a k e s advan tage o f J o h n f s faith i n
what h e believes to be S c r i p t u r a l truth and h i s belief i n
t h e power o f words t o p o r t r a y t r u t h and r e a l i t y , r e l y i n g on
h i s "pious ignorance":
[ i ] n Nicholas ' t r i c k , t h e p r e d i c t i v e power of
s c i e n c e , i n t h i s case a s t r o l o g y , and the sacred
power of s c r i p t u r e ( t h e Noah s t o r y ) are used
c y n i c a l l y t o a u t h o r i z e a scarn c o m p l e t e l y of
Nicholas ' s own manufac ture . (Knapp, Chaucer 39)
Again, N icho la s seems t o play t h e r o l e o f Godfs messenger
[ i f no t o f God h i m s e l f ) as h e p r e d i c t s a n o t h e r f l o o d t o
John. However, N icho ia s p r o v i d e s what Wyclif would cal1 a
" l y i n g glose'' t o h i s own text; John is deceived by hav ing
t o o g r e a t a f a i t h i n words, and i n t h e dominant r e l i g i o u s
and s c i e n t i f i c a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t Nicholas e x p l o i t s .
Nicholas i s able t o conv ince John t h a t h i s p r e d i c t i o n
o f t h e approach o f a n o t h e r f l o o d i s t r u e b e c a u s e John
b e l i e v e s i n t h e B i b l e stories: he does n o t q u e s t i o n
Nicholas ' s t o r y , b u t cries, " A l l a s , m y wyf!/ And shall s h e
drenche?" (3522-31, i l l u s t r a t i n g h i s immediate and a b s o l u t e
faith i n Nicholas ' words. A s Knapp e l a b o r a t e s , ' [t] h e whole
scam relies on John 's belief i n t h e t r u t h of t h e B i b l e ,
which i n t u r n rests on i t s p e r v a s i v e n e s s and a u t h o r i t y i n
h i s c u l t u r e ( f o r John is a simple and u n o r i g i n a l man)"
(Chaucer 4 0 ) . And, it i s John 's s i m p l i c i t y and lack of
o r i g i n a l i t y t h a t a l l o w Nicholas t o manipulate and s u b v e r t
t h e p r i v i l e g e d r e l i g i o u s p o s i t i o n , w h i l e p r o v i d i n g a n
a l t e r n a t i v e which must re ly on John 's f a i t h and h i s
incomple te knowledge o f t h e B i b l e f o r i t s v a l i d a t i o n .
Nicholas recognizes that the discourses he manipulates are
very powerful, but he also has to be aware of their
weaknesses: if he believed that Bible stories about the
punishment of sin were true, "the chance he takes with his
blasphemy would be too great. . . . Nicholas is not afraid of the consequences of diverting authorized discourses--
biblical and astrological--to his own ends" (Knapp, Chaucer
40).
The religious satire in the Tale appears to be inforrned
by the Nominalist idea that the power of words can create
illusions of goodness that can disguise underlying
corruption. As Knapp observes, " [t] he Tale should be called
Nominalist because words--signifiers--are irreverently pried
loose from what they signify. No guaranteeing order is
assumed to prevail to keep everything in place" (Chaucer
48). "Hende" Nicholasf references to divinely-inspired
events create illusions without substance: his test of his
own cleverness and the manipulation of his clerical
knowledge fail when he is unable to see through Absolon's
words and is "scalded in the towte" (3853). Nicholas
orchestrates the events and initially seems to control the
illusions he creates with his words, but the language on
which he relies f a i l s him; as Knapp says, he "should have
trusted the stability of language less, not more. . . . He is vulnerable to unpredictable accidents and the
machinations of his rivals in this chaotic world" (Chaucer
4 0 ) . In the end, Absolonrs cour t ly persona, John's faith in
the p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n of r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y , and
N i c h o l a s r d e c e p t i o n s are w o r t h no more than a fart. A l i s o u n
a l o n e g o e s unpunished f o r her d i s l o y a l t y t o h e r husband,
p a r t l y b e c a u s e she i s t h e o n l y o n e who is unconcerned w i t h
words. She is i n v o l v e d only w i t h t h e t a n g i b l e reali t ies of
sex, and n o t w i t h t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s o f s c i e n c e o r ph i lo sophy .
L i k e A l i s o u n , the M i l l e r seems t o embody a p r i n c i p l e of
a c t i o n a n d a conce rn f o r what is real. H e l a u g h s a t t h o s e
who fa11 i n t o t h e rnarle p i t o f " p i o u s ignorance ."
I n "The C l e r k ' s T a l e , " as i n "The M i l l e r f s Ta le , " one
c h a r a c t e r s u b v e r t s a n a u t h o r i t y C s u s e o f l anguage t o
o r c h e s t r a t e e v e n t s as though he w e r e a god. I n t h e C l e r k ' s
n a r r a t i v e , Walter u s e s words t o deceive, t o man ipu la t e , and,
i n t h e end, t o j u s t i f y his d e c e p t i o n s and m a n i p u l a t i o n s .
Knapp o b s e r v e s t h a t Walter desires "Griselda's ' sadnesse f o r
t o knowef i n o r d e r t o p u r g e h i m s e l f o f something t h a t looks
v e r y much l i k e i n t e l l e c t u a l doubt" (Chaucer 138). However,
Ockhamfs Nomina l i s t view o f knowledge s a w
a s e v e r e r e s t r i c t i o n on what c o u l d be p r e d i c a t e d
a b o u t God and d i v i n e t h i n g s by t h e una ided
r a t i o n a l hurnan rnind. The emphas i s came t o be
placed on a n ever w i d e r s c o p e f o r f a i t h i n
d e f i n i n g t h e n a t u r e of God. (Stepsis 132)
I n t h e t a l e , Walter's i n e f f e c t u a l e x p e r i m e n t d e m o n s t r a t e s
t h a t r e a s o n a l o n e is n o t enough t o d i s p e l i n t e l l e c t u a l
doubt ; he i s no more c e r t a i n o f Griselda's cons t ancy i n t h e
e n d t h a n he w a s a t the s tar t .
L i k e "The M i l l e r f s Taf e, " "The C l e r k f s T a l e " seems to
rnove towards t h e moral t h a t "[rnlen s h o l d e n a t knowe of
Goddes pryve tee" ( M i l T 3 4 5 4 ) . With i t s r e f e r e n c e s to Job
(871-2, 932) and s i t u a t i o n a l parody o f Abraham's
a c q u i e s c e n c e t o Godfs demand that h e sacrifice h i s son
(501-4) , "The C l e r k r s Tale" seems t o a d v i s e i n d i v i d u a l s t o
a c c e p t i n j u r y w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n , and t h a t t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l
w i l l s should be i n comple te con fo rmi ty w i t h God's. The
r e l a t i o n s h i p between Walter and Griselda reflects t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p between God a n d hurnankind: " s i t h a womman was
s o patient/ Unto a m o r t a l man, w e l moore u s o g h t e / Receyven
a l i n g r e e t h a t God us s e n t " (149-51). This r e l a t i o n s h i p
i rnp l ies t h a t i t is best t o a c c e p t t h e Lord's w i l l w i t h o u t
q u e s t i o n . However, by showing t h e p o s s i b l e consequences of
b l i n d a c c e p t a n c e a n d p i o u s i gno rance , the tale s u b v e r t s i ts
own moral .
T h e C l e r k r s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n i n g o f Walter as God
i s p rob lema t i c : as S t e p s i s s a y s , Walter is " c r u e l , v a i n ,
c a p r i c i o u s , and u n f e e l i n g " ( 129) . Wal te r reflects t h e
Norninal is t v i s i o n of t h e a b s o l u t e freedom o f God; as S t e p s i s
obse rves , " [ t l h e o n l y a b s o l u t e l y t r u e s t a t e m e n t s t h a t man
can make abou t God i s t h a t H e can do whatever H e w i l l s and
H e can w i l l a n y t h i n g because h e knows eve ry th ing" (135). AS
a r e s u l t , God cari a l s o de t e rmine what is good:
that which is good is not good per se, but is good
because God willed it to be good; and since his
will is free and all-powerful, it is entirely
conceivable that He could will something to be
good, rather than that which is now the good.
(Stepsis 134)
Chaucer's portrayal of Walter as constrained only by His own
will forces his readers to question the orthodox doctrine of
the appropriateness of subrnissive responses to Godfs
seemingly arbitrary decisions to test his people. For
example, Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son seems
unnatural and is reflected in Griselda's equally unnatural
subrnission to her husbandrs whims. Griselda rernains constant
to her lord despite his cruelty and, by consenting to the
murciers, actually becomes an accomplice in the crimes.
Walter considers Griselda's consent to what she believes is
the murder of her children a virtuous act, creating a
paradoxical situation in which murder can be at once
virtuous and unvirtuous. Thus, the tale challenges the
morality of such conformity and also of the tests that
Walter attempts to justify as he manipulates language.
Through the testing, Griselda supposedly becomes
an emblem of the patient human sou1 in its ideal
response to the adversities visited on it by God
or as a figure of the Virgin, Job, or Abraham in
their obedience to the apparently arbitrary
demands of the Lord. (Stepsis 1291
She vows t o conform h e r w i l l e n t i r e l y t o Walter's; S t e p s i s
writes t h a t , "[hluman f reedom resides i n the a b i l i t y of t h e
c r e a t u r e t o conform h i s w i l l t o t h e i n f i n i t e l y free w i l l of
t h e Creator" ( 1 3 4 ) . A s a r e s u l t , a p e r s o n ' s a c t i o n is
v i r t u o u s n o t i n i t se l f b u t b e c a u s e of t h e c o n s c i o u s d e c i s i o n
t o d o God's w i l l , w h a t e v e r God's w i l l happens t o be. Thus,
Griselda's u n v i r t u o u s b e h a v i o u r becomes v i r t u o u s a c c o r d i n g
t o W à l t e r ' s r e w r i t i n g o f e v e n t s .
Once Griselda h a s made h e r vow o f con fo rmi ty , a l l s i g n s
o f h e r f o r m e r l i f e are erased and s h e " t r a n s l a t e d was i n
s w i c h r i c h e s s e " (385) . T h e Middle Englisk? Dictionary d e f i n e s
" t r a n s l a t e d " as " [ t ] o change t h e n a t u r e , c o n d i t i o n , o r
a p p e a r a n c e . . . , t r a n s f o r m , a l t e r . . ; a l s o , a d v a n c e
( o n e ' s p o s i t i o n ) " (983) . David Wallace w r i t e s t h a t
" [ t l r a n s l a t i o n i n Chaucer is a term t h a t is c u s t o m a r i l y
hedged w i t h n e r v o u s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , . . . Every t r a n s l a t i o n
c o n t a i n s a trace o f i m p u r i t y b e c a u s e n o t r a n s l a t o r can
g u a r a n t e e a p e r f e c t t r a n s f e r be tween languages" ( 1 9 7 ) .
T r a n s l a t i n g i n e v i t a b l y changes t h e e s s e n c e of the o r i g i n a l
" t e x t " b e c a u s e the t r a n s l a t o r c o n t r o l s t h a t t e x t a n d imposes
h i s o r her own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o n t 0 it. Thus, Griselda is
t r a n s f o r m e d by h e r vow, p h y s i c a l l y and s p i r i t u a l l y : as
F innegan s a y s , "Griselda d e l i b e r a t e l y creates h e r s e l f i n
Walter's image, a d c p t i n g h i s ends, and a c c e p t i n g p e r f o r c e
t h e r e b y his means t owards thern" ("She" 307). She verges on
" t h e edge of vowing t h e e x t i n c t i o n of h e r s e l f as a p e r s o n -
Such e x t i n c t i o n implies t h e a b r o g a t i o n of c o n s c i e n c e , of t h e
a u t h o r i t y t o make moral d e c i s i o n s " (Finnegan, "She" 3 0 6 ) .
H e r o b e d i e n c e is a f o m o f "p ious i gno rance , " a n
u n q u e s t i o n i n g a c c e p t a n c e o f wha t Walter demands o f h e r which
d e m o n s t r a t e s h e r b l i n d f a i t h i n someth ing beyond her
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Because s h e has become a r e f l o c t i o n o f
Wal t e r ' s own beliefs and i n t e n t i o n s , h i s test r e v e a l s more
a b o u t h i m s e l f t h a n i t does a b o u t Griselda: th rough t h e
tes t s , Griselda becomes a l i e n a t e d f rom b o t h h e r s e n s e of h e r
self and f r o m Wal t e r (and, t h e r e f o r e , from God) . I n fact ,
Walter's t r a n s f o m a t i v e test is doomed t o fail because h e
"has made G r i s e l d a unknowable t o h i m s e l f by t h e very comrnand
on which t h e m a r r i a g e i s based" (Kirk 1 1 6 ) :
1 s e y e t h i s : be ye r e d y w i t h good h e r t e
To a l my l u s t , a n d t h a t 1 f r e l y may,
As m e b e s t t hynke th , d o yow l aughe o r smerte,
And n e v e r e ye t o g rucche i t nyght ne day?
And e e k whan I s e y 'ye, ' n e sey n a t 'nay,'
N e i t h e r by word ne frownyng contenance? (351-356)
"The C l e r k ' s T a l e " f u r t h e r c h a l l e n g e s t h e d o c t r i n e o f
p a t i e n c e and a c c e p t a n c e t o which Griselda s u b s c r i b e s by
t a k i n g h e r submis s ion t o ex t remes . She te l l s Walter,
If 1 hadde p r e s c i e n c e
Youre w y l t o knowe, er ye youre l u s t m e tolde,
1 wolde it doon w i t h o u t e n n e c l i g e n c e ;
But now I woot youre l u s t , a n d what ye wolde,
Al youre p l e s a n c e ferme and s t a b l e 1 holde;
For w i s t e I t h a t m y d e e t h wolde do yow ese,
Right gladly wolde 1 dyen, yow to please.
(659-665)
Griselda acknowleCges a willingness to f u l f i l l Walter's
desires even before he tells thern to her; she insinuates
that if she had known he wanted to kiLl their son, she would
have committed the murder herself. She is even willing to
commit suicide. Griselda is willing to sacrifice not only
her own life and her children's lives but I t appears that
she is also willing to sacrifice her soul, The Clerk
demonstrates the double edge of this doctrine of
unquestioning acceptance and "pious ignorance": religious
philosophy fails to provide an adequate solution to Walter's
tests, and the individuals within the artistic frame--and,
by extension, the audience outside--are left to consider the
nature of the relationship between God and humans for
themselves.
Van says that Walter's "relentless testing of Griselda
is an examination, by surrogate, of his own spiritual
interior" ( 215 ) . Like Nicholas, Walter seeks to test his own
knowledge of philosophy and human nature. He claims that his
people are dissatisfied, that he intends to remarry, and
even that he has the power to obtain Papal bulles with which
he convinces Griselda that the Pope approves of his planO4
The ambiguity of the bullesr authenticity is irrelevant because, as Wyclif observed, the binding power of any bulle depended upon the moral state of the Pope who issued it; even if the bulles came from the Pope, he was clearly in Walter's service and probably guilty of the simony that
I r o n i c a l l y , h e te l l s G r i s e l d a t o ' [ t l a a k heede o f eve ry word
t h a t y yow seye8' ( 4 7 5 ) even though he l ies t o h e r throughout
t h e tests. H e man ipu la tes Griselda and imposes a r e c r e a t i o n
o f r e a i i t y on h e r . I n e v i t a b l y , t h e tests fa i l , even though
G r i s e l d a does e x a c t l y what Walter r e q u i r e s . As Van observes ,
" [b] ecause [Walter] is look ing f o r o c u l a r p roof o f what
cannot b e seen . . . he will never know f o r c e r t a i n " ( 2 2 1 ) .
Walter wants p roof of Griçeldars v i r t u e , b u t t h e evidence
causes him t o q u e s t i o n h e r v i r t u e even f u r t h e r ; as Finnegan
states,
Walter i s now t r o u b l e d by Griselda's conduct,
wondering whether h e r ' pac ience r i n r e sponse t o
h i s ' ternptingr does n o t e x h i b i t '. . . some
s u b t i l i t e e , . . . o f ma l i ce , o r o f c r u e e l corage.
. . (691-92) . Thus t h e t e m p t e r h i m s e l f fears he
has been t o o s u c c e s s f u l and he, t h e n a r r a t o r a n d
w e are f o r c e d t o c o n s i d e r whether G r i s e l d a , i n
keeping h e r promise, has n o t l o s t a b s o l u t e l y h e r
fo rmer ly v i r t u o u s c h a r a c t e r . ("She" 316)
A t t h e v e r y least, G r i s e l d a is permanent ly changed by t h e
t e s t i n g : Finnegan compares h e r t o a c o i n t h a t h a s been ben t
t o test i t s worth, remarking t h a t "once having been tested
t h u s , the bent c o i n can never be r e c o n s t i t u t e d t o i t s
p r i s t i n e , i t s innocent , cond i t ion" ("She" 3 1 9 ) . Walter's
Wyclif desp i sed . I n t h a t case, even a u t h e n t i c b u l l e s would have had no t r u e power.
philosophy fails to remove his intellectual doubt. In fact,
he is l e f t in more doubt about his wife; he may even have
destroyed that which he valued most in her. The tests f a i l
to prove anything.
"The Clerkfs Tale's" subversion of orthodox religious
ideology demonstrates the failure of language to express the
nature of God. Steinmetz states that "God is guided by H i s
own inner sense of justice, which, even if it cannot be
predicted, comrnends itself to human reason as
self-consistent and reasonable, once it is revealed" (41).
In the end, Walter reveals his intention, and his behavior
seems to be justified because Griselda appears to have
passed the tests. By manipulating language, he creates the
illusion that the tests were part of a plan and attempts to
demonstrate his omnipotence.
In the tale, the Narrator observes that "[tlhis markys
i n his herte longe th so/ To tempte his w y f " (451-2); "tempt"
carries with it the dernonic implications of enticing a
person t o sin.5 However, Walter is a l s o connected with God
and the Clerk observes that God does not tempt men, he
"preeve that he wroghte" (1152), thereby proving that their
intentions and faith are genuine (MED 1277 ) . Because
Griselda passes the tests by avoiding the sin of
The M i d d l e E n q l i s h Dictionary defines "tempt" as " [t] he act of testing t h e faith or character of a person. . . . The act or condition of being ternpted by the devil, fleshly desires, etc." (197). The act of "tempting" is generally associated with the Devil.
disobedience, Walter is able to translate "tempt" into
"assai" through a process of linguistic alchemy that
transforms Griselda and alters the people's interpretations
and thus their mernories of the events. By the end of the
Tale, "assai/"' with its ceremonial and religious
connotations, has replaced "tempt": Walter insists,
1 warne hem wel that 1 have doon this deede
For no malice, ne for no c rue l t ee ,
But for tr assaye in thee thy wommanheede,
. . . Ti1 1 thy purpos knewe and al thy will. (1073-8)
Walter redefines the concepts of "tempting" and "testing" to
reconfigure the events that occur during his testing of
Griselda, much as Nicholas does at the end of "The Miller's
Tale" when he and Alisoun "tolden every man that [John] was
wood" ( M i l T 3833). Walter also transforms the ideal of
virtue to create the illusion of a happy ending- Despite the
fact that Griselda's virtue lies in her blind submission to
external forces, rather than in an intrinsically motivated
devotion to what is good, she has proven to Walter that she
is virtuous in the ways he required, so she is reinstated as
his wife and her children are returned to her. Ironically,
"Assai" is defined as 'a testing of character or persona1 traits (such as faithfulness, f r iendsh ip , fortitude); trial, ordeal ; . . . A test of arms, combat; an attack or s a l l y ; . . . a sa l ly (as of the Devil or an enemy)" (MED 4 3 6 ) - This form of "testing" carries with it connotations of ceremony and formality.
Griselda' s reward seems to prove that " [a] dversity, no
matter how severe, never invalidates the principle . . [that] God is faithful to the sou1 who is faithful to Himtf
(Steinmetz 51). But Walter's behavior only seems to be
justified, and therefore the covenant he made with Griselda
and his people seems to be preserved; the manipulation of
language creates the illusion that Walter's tests have
proven her virtue and are thereby justified. Through
Walter's recreation of the events, the authority of orthodox
doctrine appears to remain intact: G o d f s actions, "while
mysterious and unpredictable, are finally just" (Steinmetz
51). However, Chaucer reveals the instability of the
orthodox position and undermines its authority through the
exposure of the illusions Walter has created through his
manipulation and creative "translation" of words.
Just as he uses satire to reveal the inconsistencies in
Walter's logic, Chaucer uses the double-edge of satire in
these tales to expose gaps in the logic of the privileged
position of the late-fourteenth-century Church. The
radically Nominalist conception of God, seen in the
characters of Nicholas and Walter, demonstrates the
inability of finite human reason to explain the infinite.
This Norninalist perspective challenges and empties
traditional readings; in the end, Norninalism is also emptied
of meaning when it becornes radically skeptical and unstable.
Thus, John warns Nicholas:
Ye, blessed be alwey a lewed man
Tha t nogh t b u t o o n l y h i s b i l e v e kan!
So ferde a n o t h e r c l e r k w i t h as t romye;
H e w a l k e d i n t h e feeldes f o r t o p r y e
Upon t h e sterres, what t h e r s h o l d e befalle,
T i 1 he w a s i n a m a r l e - p i t y f a l l e ;
H e saugh n a t t h a t . (3455-3461)
John s u g g e s t s t h a t becoming t o o i n v o l v e d i n abstract s t u d i e s
c a u s e s peop le t o lose s i g h t of real e v e n t s i n t h e t a n g i b l e
world. B u t John fa i l s t o heed h i s own warning; l i k e N icho la s
and Absolon, h e s u f f e r s f o r h i s c u r i o s i t y and h i s
ove r -conf idence i n t h e s t a b i l i t y of l anguage . Walter, too ,
f a l l s i n t o t h e "marle-pit" (3460) when h i s desire t o control
a n d unde r s t and h i s w i f e a l i e n a t e s Griselda f rom him and
m a k e s h e r u n r e a d a b l e . Both "The M i l l e r ' s T a l e " a n d "The
C l e r k ' s T a l e " d e m o n s t r a t e t h e d a n g e r s of depending t o o
h e a v i l y on t h e s t a b i l i t y o f a n y a u t h o r i t y when t h e y show how
a l t e r n a t i v e rea l i t ies can be created w i t h l anguage i n order
to s u b v e r t t h e s e a u t h o r i t a t i v e p o s i t i o n s w h i l e , a t t h e same
t i m e , seeming t o p r e s e r v e them.
T h e i l l u s i o n s t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r s create t o p r e s e r v e o r
recreate t h e i r v i s i o n of t h e world are hol low. The "moral
o r d e r n e i t h e r p u n i s h e s [Nicho la s ] n o r rewards John 's
gene rous concern f o r A l i s o n o r r e g a r d f o r t h e l a w " (Knapp,
Chaucer 41); t h e i r reward o r punishment is c o n t i n g e n t on
Absolon 's unexpec ted a c t i o n s , j u s t as his relies on t h e i r s .
Walter, t oo , i s p u n i s h e d b y t h e f a i l u r e o f h i s tests, n o t
because he w a s wrong b u t b e c a u s e of his o v e r c o n f i d e n c e i n
h i s a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l l anguage ; t h e t a le m e r e l y a p p e a r s t o
have a happy end ing . Al though t h e c h a r a c t e r s who s e e k t o
t e s t t h e i r knowledge are able t o m a n i p u l a t e o t h e r s ' "p ious
i gno rance" of c e r t a i n a u t h o r i t i e s w e l l enough t o r e w r i t e
t h e i r own e n d i n g s , their tests are u l t i m a t e l y u n s u c c e s s f u l .
Ph i losophy , r e l i g i o n , a n d s c i e n c e f a i l t o provide the
c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e t h a t would f i l 1 t h e void created b y
i n t e l l e c t u a l u n c e r t a i n t y ; i n s t e a d , t h e c h a r a c t e r s who employ
t h e s e i d e o l o g i e s face t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of becoming f u r t h e r
a l i e n a t e d f rom t h e t r u t h t h a t t h e y s e e k b e c a u s e of t h e i r
r e l i a n c e o n a w o r l d created w i t h words- The words t h e y u s e
are i n s u b s t a n t i d , c h a n g e a b l e , and , f i n a l l y , n o t w o r t h a
f a r t . A s t h e C l e r k s a y s , d e r n o n s t r a t i n g his r e c o g n i t i o n o f
t h e weaknes se s o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y w h i l e s t i l l a p p r e c i a t i n g
t h e ac t o f t a l e - t e l l i n g ,
L a t noon h u m y l i t e e y o u r e t o n g e n a i l l e ,
N e l a t no c l e r k have c a u s e o r d i l i g e n c e
T o w r i t e o f yow a s t o r i e of swich mervaille
A s o f Gr i s i l d i s pacient and kynde,
L e s t Chichevache yow s w e l w e i n h i r e e n t r a i l l e !
(1184-88)
CHAPTER THREE
"THE PARDONERr S TALE"
The Miller and the Clerk demonstrate how authorities
use words to create the certainty and control t h a t maintain
their dominant positions; however, these seeming rational
certainties are only an illusion. For an authority, as well
as for individuals, these illusions are necessary: they
provide reassuring and meaningful answers to questions which
would otherwise be unanswerable. "The Miller's Tale" and
"The Clerkrs Tale" warn their readers not to inquire too
deeply into "Goddes pryvetee" because such questioning can
undermine and destroy the illusions to which people cling in
pious ignorance. However, both the Miller and the Clerk
intentionally subvert authoritative illusions and leave the
reader with the idea that not everything requires the
support of an authority for validation; some things, such as
the nature of God, can be examined rationally but,
ultimately, must be accepted on f a i t h alone. "The Pardoner's
Tale" demonstrates that the shattering of illusions c a n lead
people to skepticism and despair if they are unable to
discover their own fom of individual faith. The Pardoner
abuses and misrepresents the Churchrs ideah and sacraments
through his Nominalist manipulation of the mutable nature of
language. Chaucer creates in the Pardoner a character who
has been stripped of his illusions and h i s faith, and who is
left with only the tonnent of religious despair in the face
of fundamental uncertainty. In this chapter, 1 will first
examine the history of indulgences and penance in the
Catholic Church; then, I will discuss the ways in which the
Pardoner, in his despair, abuses and misrepresents these
doctrines through a manipulation of language similar to that
which I have discussed in my analysis of "The Miller's Tale"
and "The Clerkrs Tale."
The Pardoner abuses the power he gains through his
association with the Church. People relied on the clergy for
the sacraments that would put their souls in the proper
state of grace and that would ensure their entrance into
heaven. In other words, if a person committed mortal sins,
he or she could potentially be reconciled with God through
the sacrament of penance. The administration of this
sacrament generally required a member of the clergy with the
proper faculties to hear the confession, grant absolution,
and instruct the penitent in ways of avoiding future sin.
Divine forgiveness of a l 1 past sins was essential for
salvation; however, before they could receive divine
forgiveness, sinners had generally to fulfill the conditions
of contrition, confession, and satisfaction (Lea 2: 169) . Contrition, the result of intense self-examination and
Contrition is the sinners* sincere repentance for their sins: "Catholic teaching distinguishes a twofold hatred of sin; one, perfect contrition, springs from the love of God Who has been grievously offended; the other, imperfect contrition, arises principally £rom some other motives, such as loss of heaven, fear of hell, the heinousness of sin, etc." (Catholic Enclyclopedia 338) . Perfect contrition does not necessarily require the sacrament of Penance to reconcile people to God.
self- j udgment, i s s i n c e r e r emorse for o f f e n d i n g G o d .
C o n f e s s i o n is a n act of h u m i l i t y i n which s i n n e r s are
r e q u i r e d t o c o n f e s s t h e i r s i n s a n d any r n i t i g a t i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o a priest who would g r a n t a b s o l u t i o n o n t h e
c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e p e n i t e n t makes s a t i s f a c t i o n . S a t i s f a c t i o n
is t h e act o f a tonemen t i n which t h e p r i e s t prescribes a
series of p r a y e r s o r a c t i o n s whereby the s i n n e r c a n make
arnends f o r o f f e n d i n g God. The d o c t r i n e of p e n a n c e r e q u i r e s
that a l 1 three c o n d i t i o n s be m e t ; a b s o l u t i o n is d e n i e d t o
any p e r s o n who makes a s a c r i l e g i o u s c o n f e s s i o n b y
c o n s c i o u s l y c o n c e a l i n g e v e n a s i n g l e mortal s i n , f a i l i n g t o
feel c o n t r i t i o n , o r be ing u n w i l l i n g o r u n a b l e t o rnake
s a t i s f a c t i o n . L e a states:
T h e r e c a n be no p a r t i a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h God,
and t h e w i l l f u l o m i s s i o n o f a s i n g l e rnortal s i n . - . r e n d e r s t h e whole c o n f e s s i o n i n v a l i d and
u n s a c r a m e n t a l ; i n fact, r e c e i v i n g t h e s a c r a m e n t
t h u s i r r e v e r e n t l y is a new s i n , N o m o u n t of
c o n t r i t i o n a n d of l i f e - l o n g penance can wash away
a s i n t h u s c o n c e a l e d ; every c o n f e s s i o n a n d
communion is a f r e s h s i n , and it w e r e better fo r
t h e p e n i t e n t t o l ive and die w h o l l y w i t h o u t t h e
sac ra rnen ts . (1: 348)
To e n c o u r a g e p e o p l e t o meet a l 1 t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f
a b s o l u t i o n , i n d u l g e n c e s w e r e p r e s e n t e d t o those who h a d
received a b s o l u t i o n a n d who had g i v e n d o n a t i o n s t o s u p p o r t
t h e church. T h e i n d u l g e n c e s worked i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e
s a c r a m e n t of penance : o n c e t h e g u i l t of a s i n was f o r g i v e n ,
a n i n d u l g e n c e c o u l d r e m i t e i t h e r p a r t o r a l1 of t h e t i m e
s p e n t i n p u r g a t o r y wnich had been e a r n e d by h a v i n g s i n n e d
i n i t i a l l y ( L e a 3: 3 9 ) . There were t w o t y p e s of i n d u l g e n c e s :
p l e n a r y ( a b s o l u t e ) a n d p a r t i a l . P l e n a r y i n d u l g e n c e s
c o m p l e t e l y e x c u s e d t h e h o l d e r s f r o m punishrnent ; p a r t i a l
i n d u l g e n c e s e x o n e r a t e d them from o n l y part of t h e i r
pun i shmen t . I n d u l g e n c e s drew on t h e " T r e a s u r y of M e r i t " i n
which "the rnerits of f io ly men on earth [ b e g i n n i n g w i t h
C h r i s t a n d i n c l u d i n g a l1 t h e s a i n t s ] formed a £und f o r t h e
b e n e f i t o f t h e s i n n e r " (Lea 3: 1 9 ) .
T e c h n i c a l l y , people were n o t a l l o w e d t o buy o r sel1
i n d u l g e n c e s o r relics; however, t h e y c o u l d ( a n d t h e t r u l y
p e n i t e n t would) o f f e r goods o r money a f te r receiving a n
i n d u l g e n c e t o d e m o n s t r a t e g r a t i t u d e a n d c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t o f
t h e C h u r c h r s good deeds. The c i i f f e r e n c e be tween buy ing a n
i n d u l g e n c e a n d g i v i n g money i n a p p r e c i a t i o n of a n i n d u l g e n c e
is c r u c i a l : i n t h e l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n , t h e p e n i t e n t who
receives t h e i n d u l g e n c e h a s a c h i e v e d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d s p i r i t u a l s ta te ; i n t h e former, t h e p e r s o n
has p a i d t o make up f o r t h e i n a d e q u a c y of h i s o r her
c o n t r i t i o n , t h e r e b y cornrnitting t h e s i n of simony.
To e n s u r e t h a t n o one w a s d e p r i v e d of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y
t o do penance ( a n d t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c h u r c h ) , p a r d o n e r s
were h i r e d by t h e Church t o offer i n d u l g e n c e s a n d t o f u l l y
exp la in t h e i r b e n e f i t s t o "the f a i t h f u l " who w e r e " exho r t ed
t o p e r f o r m t h e service or g i v e the ' a l m s ' which would
p r o c u r e them" (Lea 3 2 8 4 ) ; however, t h i s p r a c t i c e w a s
g r o s s l y a b u s e d and w a s e v e n t u a l l y a b o l i s h e d i n 1567 by P i u s
V ( L e a 3 : 4 2 4 ) . Pardone r s were n o t o r i o u s l y c o r r u p t ; ' c o u n c i l s
everywhere t h r o u g h o u t Europe w e r e c o n s t a n t l y occup ied w i t h
the s u b j ect [o f p a r d o n e r s r c o r r u p t i o n ] , g i v i n g ample
e v i d e n c e of t h e e v i l r e p u t a t i o n of t h e clerics who f o l l o w e d
the trade of pardoner" (Lea 3:286). L e a q u o t e s from t h e
c o u n c i l of Mainz i n 1261 which condemns pardoners as:
in famous l iars . . , who a b u s e t h e word o f God f o r
f i l t h y g a i n . They o f t e n e x h i b i t as re l ics t h e
profane bones o f men a n d beasts, t h e y i n v e n t
miracles . . . and p r o m i s e r e m i s s i o n o f s i n s i n
s u c h f a s h i o n that scarce any one can r e s t r a i n
h i m s e l f f rom pu rchas ing , t o t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f
d i s c i p l i n e , f o r t h e r e are few who w i l l a c c e p t
penance f rom their p r i e s t s , b e l i e v i n g . . . t h e m s e l v e s t o be a b s o l v e d £rom t h e i r s i n s by such
i n d u l g e n c e s . And t h e gains t h u s s t o l e n f rom t h e
Church are s p e n t i n d runkennes s , f e a s t i n g ,
gambl ing, and l e c h e r y . ( 3 : 287)
B y p e d d l i n g false pardons and g r a n t i n g fa lse a b s o l u t i o n , a
p a r d o n e r n o t o n l y r o b s t h e p e o p l e of t h e i r material
p o s s e s s i o n s b u t p o s s i b l y c a u s e s t h e m t o lose t h e i r s o u l s as
w e l l . Peop le who bought f r a u d u l e n t i n d u l g e n c e s would
d i s c o v e r their error i n t h e a i t e r l i f e when t h e y received a
punishment t h a t t h e y t h o u g h t had been r e m i t t e d . Because o f
t h e terrible r e p e r c u s s i o n s of such abuse, p a r d o n e r s who t o o k
advan tage o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n f o r t h e i r own p e r s o n a 1 g a i n t o
t h e d e t r i m e n t of o t h e r s w e r e t h r e a t e n e d w i t h
excommunication. However, t h e threats w e r e se ldom carried
o u t because , as L e a n o t e s , t h e r e "were a lways g r e e d y
p r e l a t e s and needy chu rches t o d i s r e g a r d [ r u l e s and
t h r e a t s ] " (3: 288) . Between t h e r i g o r o u s s p i r i t u a l demands o f c o n f e s s i o n
a n d t h e p e o p l e ' s u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e exact n a t u r e o f t h e
i n d u l g e n c e s t h e y w e r e r e c e i v i n g , t h e r e w a s g r e a t p o t e n t i a l
f o r c o r r u p t i o n i n t h e sacrament of penance. Because some
i n d u l g e n c e s w e r e wrongly b e l i e v e d t o pardon g u i l t a s well as
r e p e a l punishment , some p e o p l e rel ied on t h e power o f a n
i n d u l g e n c e r a t h e r t h a n a t t e m p t i n g t o a c h i e v e t h e p r o p e r
s t a te o f c o n t r i t i o n and g o i n g t o c o n f e s s i o n ; t h u s , t h e i r
s i n s would remain un fo rg iven . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , however,
c o n t r i t i o n i t se l f c o u l d lead t h e p e n i t e n t i n t o t h e s i n o f
d e s p a i r , the se l f - imposed alienation o f t h e s i n n e r from God.
Because s i n c a u s e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o be divided from God and
makes t h e i n d i v i d u a l incornplete , t h e p e n i t e n t must be truly
r e m o r s e f u l t o be r e u n i t e d w i t h God. However, a s P a t t e r s o n
e x p l a i n s , t h e remorse which l e a d s t o c o n t r i t i o n and
f o r g i v e n e s s may be overwhelming t o the s i n n e r . If the o n l y
way t o a t t a i n s a l v a t i o n is t h r o u g h
t h e i n t e n s i t y of [ the s i n n e r ' s ] remorse, he w i l l
e n t e r i n t o a p r o c e s s o f se l f - judgment i n which he
a l l o w s h i m s e l f no qua r t e r - -w i th t h e . . . r e s u l t
t h a t he w i l l become so overwhelmed w i t h
s e l f - l o a t h i n g t h a t h e no l o n g e r believes h imse l f
wor thy o f t h e s a l v a t i o n h e s o d e s p e r a t e l y desires.
(Pattersm, Chaucer 378 )
I r o n i c a l l y , t h e n , t he a t t e m p t t o reach t h e f rame o f mind
r e q u i r e d by t h e Church had t h e p o t e n t i a l t o drive t he
p e n i t e n t t o mortal s i n . Unable t o ask f o r f o r g i v e n e s s , t h e
s i n n e r remained a l i e n a t e d and l a c k i n g i n s p i r i t u a l
wholeness .
The dange r t o t h e c o n f e s s o r w a s a l s o g r e a t . H e c o u l d be
led t o s i n t h r o u g h t h e c o n f e s s i o n s o f h i s p a r i s h i o n e r s ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y , it w a s t h o u g h t , t h o s e of women c o n f e s s i n g
c a r n a l s i n s * L e a comments on t h e numerous warn ings g i v e n t o
p r i e s t s , i n s t r u c t i n g them n o t t o q u e s t i o n t h e i r p e n i t e n t s
t o o c l o s e l y a b o u t " s e x u a l a b e r r a t i o n s . . . l e s t b o t h
p a r t i e s be l ed i n t o t e m p t a t i o n " (1: 3 8 0 ) . The c o n f e s s o r had
also t o a v o i d t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o u s e h i s powers of a b s o l u t i o n
f o r m a t e r i a l g a i n e i t h e r f o r h i rnse l f o r i n a l l i a n c e w i t h
c o r r u p t pa rdone r s o r o t h e r c lergymen. Once tempted and
f a l l e n , t h e c o n f e s s o r , who would becorne t h e p e n i t e n t , was
e q u a l l y susceptible t o d e s p a i r .
Because t h e r i s k s were s o great and the penalty f o r
f a i l i n g t o s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s w a s so h igh , c o n t r o v e r s y
a n d debate s u r r o u n d e d t h e sac ramen t o f penance. S c h o L a s t i c
t h e o l o g y a r g u e d t h a t c o n t r i t i o n b e f o r e c o n f e s s i o n w a s n o t
n e c e s s a r y , as t h e sac ramen t itself o f t e n b r o u g h t a b o u t the
a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e p e n t a n t s ta te o f mind ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer
3 7 4 ) . Normally, t h i s meant t h a t t h e peni tent depended on a
member of t h e c l e r g y t o a d m i n i s t e r t he sac ramen t , t o g u i d e
h i m o r h e r t h r o u g h t h e stages of c o n t r i t i o n , and , f i n a l l y ,
t o g r a n t a b s o l u t i o n . T h e r i t u a l t o o k r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f rom the
p e n i t e n t a n d p l a c e d it on t h e s a c r a m e n t and t h e c o n f e s s o r
which c o u l d be p r o b l e m a t i c b e c a u s e t h e p e n i t e n t becomes
d e p e n d e n t on t h e p r i e s t for g u i d a n c e . Wyc l i f , f o r example,
i n s i s t e d t h a t "a p r i e s t r s s o l e w a s p u r e l y declarative a t
b e s t ; a t w o r s t , when t h e p r i e s t r s d e c i s i o n w a s a t odds w i t h
t h e knowledge of God, it w a s of no force a n d w a s a
r n i s l e a d i n g and blasphemous a r r o g a t i o n of d i v i n e power"
(Hudson Premature 294) ; i n o t h e r words, it w a s p o s s i b l e f o r
a p r i e s t t o declare t h a t a s i n had b e e n f o r g i v e n when God
d e n i e d f o r g i v e n e s s , o r vice versa. Wyc l i f a r g u e d t h a t t h e
p r i e s t mus t be i n a s ta te o f g r a c e t o i n t e r p r e t c o r r e c t l y
Godr s w i l l ; and, s i n c e p r i e s t s w e r e n o t e x e q t f rom s i n ,
t h e r e w a s no way t o be c e r t a i n t h a t the c o n f e s s o r be longed
t o t h e congrega tio predestinatorum a n d w a s i n a s tate of
grace ( a n d t h e r e f o r e able t o g i v e t r u e a b s o l u t i o n ) . However,
t h e Church ' s off ic ia1 s t a n c e w a s t h a t as l o n g as t h e p r i e s t
declared t h a t t h e p e n i t e n t r s s i n s were a b s o l v e d , t h e y w e r e
f o r g i v e n : t h e p r ies t f s moral s tate w a s i r r e l e v a n t . T o
e x p l a i n t h i s s t a n c e , which was p r o b l e m a t i c b e c a u s e it d e n i e d
t h e n e c e s s i t y of a p r i e s t p r o v i d i n g a m o r a l example, Aquinas
' [ c a s t ] t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n God t o evoke good o u t of . . . evil , f o r g e t f u l t h a t h e [ w a s ] t h u s p r a c t i c a l l y d e n y i n g t h e
p r i e s t l y power" ( L e a 1:249). P a t t e r s o n summarizes t h e
debate :
d e s p i t e t h e e f f o r t s o f s c h o l a s t i c t h e o l o g i a n s t o
r e n d e r q u e s t i o n s o f t h e psychology of r e p e n t a n c e
moot b y d e f i n i n g penance as a l a r g e l y objective
a c t i o n , t h e p e r v a s i v e c o n t r i t i o n i s m of
late-medieval r e l i g i o u s t hough t r e i n s t a t e d t h i s
p sycho logy a t t h e c e n t e r o f s p i r i t u a l concern .
(Chauce r 384)
T h i s debate raised t h e q u e s t i o n of whether p r i e s t s had
any s p e c i a l power t o g r a n t a b s o l u t i o n ; Wyclif i n s i s t e d
" C r i s t e . . . o o n l y cLens iP man o f synne, and p r e s t e s ben
h e l p e r s w i P hyme. . . And s o bynde and vnbynde w i P hyme
whenne Dei haue pat power and De keye o f kunnyng
[knowledge], a n d el les pe i neper byynden n e lowsyn b u t
s c a t e r y n abrood8' (Hudson, Premature 2 9 5 ) . If t h e p e n i t e n t
d i d n o t need t o r e l y on t h e c o n d i t i o n o r t h e example of t h e
p r i e s t f o r a b s o l u t i o n , and t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l a y w i t h t h e
i n d i v i d u a l (as N o m i n a l i s t t h e o l o g i a n s claimed), it f o l l o w s
t h a t " t h e sac ramen t i s n o t t h e causa efficiens of grace" b u t
rnerely a s i g n ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 377) ; t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r p r o p e r c o n t r i t i o n l a y w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l . On t h e o t h e r
hand, if t h e p e n i t e n t d id depend on t h e p r i e s t b u t c o u l d n o t
receive t r u e a b s o l u t i o n f rom a p r i e s t who w a s i n a state o f
s i n and t h e r e f o r e u n a b l e t o i n t e r p r e t God's w i l l , t h e r e w a s
no way of knowing i f t h e p e n i t e n t ' s sins were f o r g i v e n . The
c o r r u p t i o n o f t h e p a r d o n e r s created t h e sarne problems;
peop le c o u l d n o t depend on t h e indulgences they o b t a i n e d ,
e s p e c i a l l y from a person who may n o t be licensed t o hear
c o n f e s s i o n s and whose indu lgences w e r e no t n e c e s s a r i l y
genuine. Rather t h a n a f i g u r e o f d i v i n e g r a c e and mercy, t h e
p r i e s t r i s k e d becoming a f i g u r e o f a r b i t r a r y d i v i n e j u s t i c e :
i f a b s o l u t i o n w a s e f f e c t i v e , t h e p e n i t e n t w a s among t h e
f o r t u n a t e ; i f a b s o l u t i o n w a s i n e f f e c t i v e , t h e s i n n e r
dese rved no b e t t e r f o r having s inned i n t h e f irst place.
Chaucer creates h i s Pardoner i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e s e
debates. The Pardoner perpetrates every cr ime
s t e r e o t y p i c a l l y a t t r i b u t e d t o pardoners: he " t e l l e [ s ] a n
hundred false japes" (394) ; h e preaches , c a j o l e s , and
blackmails t o sel1 h i s indu lgences and f r a u d u l e n t relics,
d e c l a r i n g t h a t anyone who h a s an unforgiven "synne h o r r i b l e "
(379) on h i s o r h e r consc ience " sha l have no power n e no
g r a c e / T o o f f r e n t o my r e l i k e s i n t h i s place" (383-4) ; he
open ly admi t s t h a t he does n o t c a r e i f " h i r s o u l e s goon
a-blakeberyed" ( 4 0 5 ) . H i s c o r r u p t i o n both symbolizes and
c a u s e s h i s skept ic i s rn and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t wi th t h e Church,
l e a v i n g him i n a p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e which reflects t h e
d a n g e r s o f t h e r a d i c a l l y Nominal is t p o s i t i o n . For t h e
Pardoner, t h e Church's d i s h o n e s t y has emptied its sacrarnents
of meaning and i n v e r t e d i ts sacred s i g n i f i e r s by s e v e r i n g
t h e m from t h e t h i n g s that they were thought t o s i g n i f y . The
Pardoner a t t e m p t s t o use t h e i n s t a b i l i t y of language t o
r e c r e a t e and c o n t r o l t h e i l l u s i o n s of c e r t a i n t y and power
su r round ing t h e Church and himself; h e promises m i r a c l e s i n
r e t u r n f o r "pens, o r elles g r o t e s " (3761, a d e s p e r a t e act o f
sirnony that depends upon the uncertain nature of language
which allows the Pardones's patrons to be deceived.
Readers as early as Kittredge have despised hirn and
labeled him a lost soul; however, the Pardoner is better
described as a figure of despair, a character who is
unredeemed because he has lost faith in redemption. As a
soul in despair, the Pardoner is the product of the
institution that he both represents and perverts. According
to Arieh Sachs,
He who despaired of his salvation was regarded as
being in the psychological and theological state
of discordia, disturbed, disordered, isolated, cut
off from the source of his being, and consequently
desiring universal discord and alienation. (232)
The Pardoner exhibits both his despair and his desire for
"universal discord" through the sale of false relics and the
indifference he shows towards the spiritual state of his
customers. His religious despair is compounded by bis
extreme cupidi tas, which Leicester def i n e s : "in the deep
Christian and Augustinian sense . . . [ c u p i d i t a s ] refers to
a consuming desire for that which one is lacking--it means
wanting in both senses" (45) .2 The Pardoner is inadequate as
a spiritual leader and he is lacking the spiritual
* The OED defines "want" as: '1.b. to fa11 short;. . . d. to fail . , . ; to give out; to be insufficient for (a purpose, etc. ) . 2. a. Not to have; to be without; to lack; . . . e. to be deprived of, to lose" (879).
connection with God that he tries to replace with material
wealth. Thus, the Pardoner appears to face a despair very
similar to that confronted by existentialisrn, which declares
that humans are removed from God and that the despair of
being alienated and insignificant in the universe is the
natural state of humanity.
As a false preacher, the Pardoner perverts the premises
of teaching, delighting, and persuading--Augustinef s three
criteria for a good speaker (OCD 4,143)--and gives rise to
what Augustine warns against in his discussion of the
potential dangers of locating multiple meanings in
Scripture. When he preaches that money is the root of al1
evil and causes people "soore to repente" (431), the
Pardoner reappropriates Church doctrine and uses it to
further his own purposes. His manipulations and deceptions
reveal the mutable nature of language and the "kinds of
slips [that] are possible between the speaker, his language,
and his audience" (Dinshaw 171) , These "slips" demonstrate
the Pardonerrs nominalist wordplay, "in which words and
deeds are at odds with one another" (Watts and U t z 153). For
example, the Pardoner admonishes "Rad ix mal orum est
Cupidi tas" (334 ) , hypocritically preaching against the sin
However, the existentialists, rather like Chaucer himself, respond to the recognition of nothingness and meaninglessness by developing their own personal systems of belief based on questioning, evaluation, faith, and action, whereas the Pardoner embraces his despair and becomes nihilistic and (self-) destructive.
t h a t he c o n s c i o u s l y and e a g e r l y commits: he w i l l Save them
from t h e dangers of m a t e r i a l i s m , " f o r t o make them free/ To
yeven h i r pens, and namely un to me" (401-402). H i s c l a im t o
be doing ' C r i s t e s hooly werk" (340) is i r o n i c and
blasphemous; he makes a mockery o f t h e Church's language and
r i t u a l s when " i n Latyn 1 speke a wordes f e w e , / T o s a f f r o n
w i t h m y p red icac ioun , / And f o r t o s t i r e hem t o devocionrr
( 3 4 3 - 4 5 ) . Even his relics, which are supposed t o he lp people
feel a connec t ion t o God, a p p e a l t o g reed and l e a d t o s i n :
he c l a ims t h a t h i s holy s h e e p f s bone w i l l c u r e any animal
t h a t h a s been poisoned by a snake, rnu l t ip ly a man's "bees tes
and his stoor" (3651, and c u r e j e a l o u s y i n husbands--even i f
t h e y know t h a t t h e i r wives have been u n f a i t h f u l and "taken
prestes t w o o r thre8' (371) . F i n a l l y , anyone who wears h i s
h o l y m i t t e n " s h a l have r n u l t i p l i y i n g of his grayn" ( 3 7 4 ) .
When he boasts t h a t " [bjy t h l s gaude have I wonne, y e e r by
y e e r , / An hundred m a r k s i t h 1 was pardoner" ( 389 -go ) , t h e
Pardoner puns on t h e words God and gaude, once again
jux tapos ing t h e audience ' s s p i r i t u a l i t y and c r e d u l i t y w i t h
h i s own verbal t r i c k e r y . H e i s t h e s e r p e n t who w i l l "stynge"
( 4 1 3 ) h i s enemies wi th h i s false preaching .
I n h i s tale, t h e Pardoner dernonstrates i r o n i c a l l y t h e
consequences o f having t o o much f a i t h i n words (though it is
u n l i k e l y t h a t h i s l i s t e n e r s r ecogn ize t h e danger they a r e i n
because o f t h e i r f a i t h i n t h e P a r d o n e r f s words): t h e r i o t e r s
t a k e t h e boy's d e s c r i p t i o n o f the anthropomorphic
p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e "p r ivee t h e f Deeth" l i t e r a l l y , and
f i n d o n l y an un t ime ly demise. Like t h e Pardoner h imsel f , t h e
o l d man s a y s what t h e r i o t e r s e x p e c t t o h e a r , b u t h i s words
mis lead and sa direct t h e r i o t e r s t o their d e a t h s ; a l s o , t h e
r i o t e r s f o a t h t h a t t h e y a r e "sworen b r o t h e r [ s ] " (809) is
rendered meaningless by t h e i r t r e a c h e r y . Thus, throughout
"The Pardonerf s Prologue8' and " T a l e , " t h e Pardonerf s
aud ience is p l a c e d 'in t h e s t r a n g e p o s i t i o n o f knowing and
n o t knowing s irnul taneously" ( P e c k 7 5 6 ) . I n such a p o s i t i o n ,
t h e meanings o f words t h a t t h e aud ience b e l i e v e s it h a s
hea rd a r e c o n t i n u a l l y a t odds w i t h t h o s e i n t e n d e d by t h e
Pardoner who, l i k e Walter, r e p e a t e d l y t e l l s h i s audience t o
"Taak o f my wordes keep, " ( 3 5 2 ) , even though e v e r y word is
false. By expos ing t h e P a r d o n e r f s c o r r u p t i o n a n d d e s p a i r
through s u c h wordplay, Chaucer q u e s t i o n s t h e a b i l i t y of t h e
Churchfs powerful h i e r a r c h y (as w e l l a s t h e r i t u a l s which
n e c e s s i t a t e and s u s t a i n i t ) t o p r o v i d e t h e i n d i v i d u a l wi th
answers t o q u e s t i o n s o f b e l i e f .
"The Pardoner' s Prologue" f o c u s e s on t h e Pardonerr s
r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of Penance and indu lgences , r e v e a l i n g t h e
p o t e n t i a l t o c o r r u p t b o t h c o n f e s s o r and p e n i t e n t t h a t is
i n h e r e n t i n t h e d o c t r i n e s and p r a c t i c e s themselves. A s t h e
Pardoner p l a y s t h e r o l e of confessor , h i s attempt t o f i l 1
h i s s p i r i t u a l Yack" with i l l - g o t t e n material wealth has led
him f u r t h e r i n t o s i n ; as a p e n i t e n t , t h e P a r d o n e r f s d e s p a i r
h a s led him t o s p i r i t u a l s t e r i l i t y th rough h i s s e l f - c r e a t e d
a l i e n a t i o n from God. H i s d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t he preaches "nat
but f o r t o wynne,/ And nothyng fo r c o r r e c c i o u n of synne"
(403-04) displays the Pardonerfs ability to manipulate
Church doctrine with such brilliance that he manages to
"maken oother folk to twynne/ From avarice and soore to
repente" (430-1) despite his self-serving inentions.
However, the Pardoner's
works are not the product of the faith--they are
the product rather of h i s "yvel entencioun" to
"wynne gold and silver." Hence the Pardonerrs
faith is without works, and "even as the body
without the spirit is dead, so also faith without
works is dead" (James 2.26). The Pardonerf s faith
is like his body, his body like his faith--there
but sterile, alive but dead. . . . (Shoaf 218)
In other words, his works are fruitless. Even the Pardoner's
confession to the sins of greed and hypocrisy is rnasochistic
and, therefore, an inverted and ineffective sacrament of
Penance. Further, the works he performs are inef fective
because he seems motivated to serve only himself rather than
the penitents, the Church, or God.
The Pardonerrs perversion of the doctrine of Penance is
the result of his inability to believe in any f o m of
spiritual redemption. The repetition of the word
"~ill"~--which he uses forty tirnes--shows his attempts to
The OED defines "will" as: "the power or capacity of willing; that faculty or function which is dircted to conscious and intentional action; power of choice in regard to action" (340-1).
c o n t r o l h i s ta le , h i m s e l f , a n d h i s a u d i e n c e . It also
e x e m p l i f i e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t Nominalism p l a c e s on
i n d i v i d u a l v o l i t i o n : t h e m o r a l i t y of any act depends upon
t h e i n t e n t i o n b e h i n d it. Aquinas also emphas izes t h e
impor t ance o f t h e r o l e o f w i l l i n acts of f a i t h : h e declares
t h a t , t o t h e mind, E a i t h
r e p r e s e n t s par t ia l knowledge . . . which c a n n o t be
verif ied i n a manner l e a d i n g t o s c i e n t i f i c
c e r t a i n t y . It i s t o overcome these i n t e l l e c t u a l
s c r u p l e s t h a t t h e w i l l now i n t e r v e n e s , s i l e n c i n g
t h e d o u b t s o f t h e i n t e l l e c t . I n t h e comple ted ac t
of f a i t h , t h e w i f l s u p p l i e s what is l a c k i n g i n t h e
i n t e l l e c t . . . . ( C o l i s h 1 8 7 )
The Pardoner is u n a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e t h e leap o f f a i t h t h a t
would overcome h i s d e s p a i r and s i l e n c e h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l
d o u b t s . H i s h y p o c r i s y i s b o t h t h e c a u s e and t h e r e s u l t o f
t h i s despair. S t r i p p e d o f t h e belief i n redempt ion t h a t
p r o t e c t s o t h e r C h r i s t i a n s f rom d e s p a i r , the Pardone r f i ts
Barrett 's d e s c r i p t i o n o f 'a b e i n g who h a s become t h o r o u g h l y
q u e s t i o n a b l e t o h imse l f " ( 4 1) because , as Shoaf e x p l a i n s ,
t h e P a r d o n e r "is n o t whole, and h e knows it; moreover, t h e
comrnunity i n which h e must l i v e c a n i n c l u d e him o n l y by
o s t r a c i z i n g hirn" ( 2 1 4 ) . A l i e n a t e d from God, h i s s o c i e t y , and
h i m s e l f , t h e P a r d o n e r f s " p s y c h i c ba l ance" is u p s e t and h e
becomes "no t o n l y a d i s p o s s e s s e d b u t a f r a g m e n t a r y being"
(Barrett 35), exposed t o t h e n o t h i n g n e s s t h a t is h i s
e x i s t e n c e . Unable t o e s c a p e f rom his empty state, t h e
Pardoner becomes like the Old Man in bis tale: homeless,
alone, existing in a living death.
The Pardonerfs "honest thyng" (328) begins with the
confession that he preaches his sermon against greed by rote
and that his intent is "nat but for to wynne,/ And nothyng
for correccioun of synne" (4 04 ) . But the Pardonerf s confession to the pilgrims is defiant and invalid because he
demonstrates no contrition nor is he willing to change his
ways: in his pride and despair, he inverts the sacrament of
penance by turning his confession into a boast; for example,
he declares,
I wol have moneie, wolle, chese, and whete,
Al were it yeven of the povereste page,
Or of the povereste wydwe in a village,
Al sholde hir chifdren sterve for famyne.
(448-51)
Instead of attempting to Save himself, he condemns himself
further. Patterson describes the characteristics of a
typical person in despair: "Accused by his conscience, he
fears to be assailed; yet nonetheless he is always
increasing that by which he is assailed. He scorns his
return [to God] , despairs of grace, glories in sin" (Chaucer 382). He cannot humble hirnself to ask sincerely for
forgiveness because he does not believe it is possible: the
Pardoner despairs further and w i l l f u l l y re j ects the
possibility of redernption. Thus, as Sachs points out,
despair is also a sin of pride because the sinners believe,
i n t h e i r r e b e l l i o n , t h a t " t h e r e is more s t r e n g t h i n sin t h a n
v i r t u e i n God t o a n n u l it by f o r g i v e n e s s " (232) . The P a r d o n e r r s a l i e n a t i o n from God is m i r r o r e d i n h i s
a l i e n a t i o n from t h e p i l g r i m s . H e is, says Dinshaw, " t h e
defective man who m a k e s t h e g e n t i l s c ry o u t and object e v e n
b e f o r e h e b e g i n s t o speak0 ' (156) . As P e a r s a l l p o i n t s o u t , t h e
P a r d o n e r i s a f r a u d b e c a u s e he i s i n c o m p l e t e ; h i s s p i r i t u a l
l a c k i s a m p l i f i e d by t h e fact t h a t he i s a f r a u d . By
d e s c r i b i n g t h e P a r d o n e r as "a g e l d y n g o r a mare" ( 6 9 1 ) , t h e
N a r r a t o r i d e n t i f i e s t h e Pa rdone r " i n terms of a n absence of
sornething: e i t h e r m a l e s e x u a l o r g a n s . . . o r m a s c u l i n e
g e n d e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " (Dinshaw 157) . T h i s l a c k o f d e f i n i n g
s e x u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s is a r e f l e c t i o n of h i s s p i r i t u a l
c a s t r a t i o n ; h i s s i n s " r e s u l t i n i n s u f f i c i e n c y . . . d r a w i n g
him back t o t h e n o t h i n g n e s s f rom wh ich h e w a s o r i g i n a l l y
f a s h i o n e d . And i ts effect w a s t o a l i e n a t e him from God, f r o m
n a t u r e , a n d f r o m h i rnse l f " (Shoaf 370) . The Pa rdone r r s
s p i r i t u a l s t e r i l i t y and despair are e v i d e n t despite b i s
a t t e m p t s t o p o r t r a y h i m s e l f as a f i g u r e of excess i n h i s
'Prologue" and "Tale."5 S i n c e p e n a n c e i s t h e o n l y means b y
which s i n n e r s c a n receive g r a c e a n d restore t h e m s e l v e s t o
wholeness , t h e Pa rdone r , b e c a u s e he is u n a b l e t o a s k f o r
g r a c e , is i m p o t e n t and i ~ s f f ec t i ve as a s p i r i t u a l g u i d e . I n
The Pardonerrs l i c e n t i o u s n e s s and d e b a u c h e r y are a l so symptoms of his despair: Sachs says t h a t " t h e d e s p a i r e r m u s t w i s h a t least t o e n j o y h i s t e m p o r a l e x i s t e n c e , a n d t h i s desire w i l l drive h i m t o vo1up tuousnes s " (233).
fact , h e is n o t m e r e l y i n e f f e c t i v e , he is d e s t r u c t i v e
b e c a u s e h e sells what may be false pa rdons : h e c o n s c i o u s l y
and i n d i f f e r e n t l y dams t h e p e o p l e who b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y
have been pa rdoned when t h e y a c c e p t h i s i n d u l g e n c e s .
The P a r d o n e r r s p h y s i c a l a n d s p i r i t u a l l a c k s a r e f u r t h e r
c o n n e c t e d t h r o u g h h i s e x c l u s i o n from c o n v e n t i o n a l s e x u a i
i d e n t i t y . If t h e p a r d o n e r i s emascu la t ed , t he t y p i c a l gende r
c a t e g o r i e s o f m a l e a n d female do n o t a p p l y t o hirn. T h e
Pa rdone r b e l o n g s t o n e i t h e r category. Because h e is o u t s i d e
b o t h c a t e g o r i e s , h e is v u l n e r a b l e t o d e s p a i r i n y e t a n o t h e r
way: Sachs n o t e s t h a t D e s p a i r a r g u e s ,
God c a n n o t l o v e a n ug ly , odd c r e a t u r e l i k e
y o u r s e l f . You are d e f o m e d , i l l e g i t i m a t e l y
conce ived , a s t r a n g e r i n God' s o r d e r e d c r e a t i o n .
The o n l y l o g i c a l t h i n g t o d o i s d e s p a i r o f e v e r
becoming part o f it. ( 2 4 9 )
A s "a s t r a n g e r i n God's o r d e r e d c r e a t i o n , " t h e P a r d o n e r r s
d e s p a i r a n d t h e s e n s e o f h i s own e m p t i n e s s i s m a s k e d b y h i s
e x h i b i t i o n i s m . L e f t w i t h o u t a d i s c e r n i b l e i d e n t i t y , t h e
Pa rdone r u s e s h i s words as w e l l as h i s relics t o recreate
h i s s p i r i t u a l and p h y s i c a l i d e n t i t y . P a t t e r s o n a r g u e s ,
[ l l a n g u a g e is t h e means by which t h e Pardoner
creates h i m s e l f f o r o t h e r s a n d f o r h i m s e l f ,
w h e t h e r it b e t h e c o c k s u r e p r a t t l e w i t h which he
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y disguises and reveals h i s eunuchry,
o r t h e w i t t y a n d l e a r n e d sermon, e m b e l l i s h e d w i t h
t e l l i n g exernpla, w i t h which h e e s t a b l i s h e s h i s
a u t h o r i t y before the " l e w e d people . " (Chaucer
398)
As P e a r s a l l comments, t h e Pa rdone r " e x i s t s o n l y i n t h e a c t
of performance" ( 9 9 ) ; h i s i d e n t i t y is as i l l u s o r y as h i s
relics and h i s words.
By engaging i n Nomina l i s t wordplay, t h e Pardoner
a t t e m p t s t o create verbal d i v e r s i o n s t o h i d e what Dinshaw
would cal1 h i s "mascul ine lack" a n d t h e s p i r i t u a l impotence
it reflects. H e a lso masks t h e d e s p a i r created by h i s
s p i r i t u a l and p h y s i c a l d e f i c i e n c i e s by emphas i z ing h i s
concern w i t h f a s h i o n a n d wea l th ; as t h e N a r r a t o r o b s e r v e s i n
"The Gene ra l Prologue":
But hood, f o r j o l i t e e , wered he noon,
For it w a s t r u s s e d up i n h i s w a l e t .
Hym t h o u g h t e he rood a l o f t h e newe jet;
Discheve lee , Save h i s cappe, h e rood a l ba re .
(680-4)
Shoaf e x p l a i n s t h a t i f t h e Pardoner
takes C h r i s t ' s redernption " l i t e r a l l y , " r e d u c i n g i t
t o "real" c o i n s , h e c o v e t s "real" c o i n s i n p a r t
because of t h e i r m e t a p h o r i c i t y i n t h e t h e o l o g y o f
Redemption. . . . Because C h r i s t ' s s a v i n g work is
u n d e r s t o o d i n t e rms o f pu rchase , rnerit, t r e a s u r y ,
wea l th , a n d so on, t h e s e and related c o n c e p t s and
o b j e c t s hold a s p e c i a l a p p e a l f o r t h e Pardoner ,
who desires even as h e r e s e n t s and resists
C h r i s t ' s s a v i n g work. (218)
The excessive nature of the Pardoner's claims that '1 preche
nothyng but for coveitise" is part of the masochistic
attempt to draw attention from his nihilism and despair by
suggesting he is wholly evil and corrupt (Dinshaw 157). The
pilgrims do not realize that the "profit" he seeks and can
never find is wholeness; his emphasiç on greed and avarice
reveals his rapacious appetite for completeness that can
never be satisfied.
The Pardoner also attempts to use his relics and
indulgences as substitutes for his lost physical and
spiritual virility. As Dinshaw states, "he is filled with
the radical desire ( c u p i d i t a s ) for wholeness; he holds on to
these objects, even though they are false, in hopes that
they will complete him and make him part of the larger
group" (159). His preoccupation with his own incompleteness
is unintentionally revealed through the dismembered body
parts that appear in the Pardoner's speeches (Hoerner 75):
"nekke" (395) , "handes" and "tonge" (3981, "Our blissed
Lordes body they totere" { 4 7 4 ) , "wombe . . . bely . . . stynkyng cod" (534), "bones" (541), etc. Although he is
eloquent as a preacher, he reveals his obsession with
incompleteness and despair despite his attempts to conceal
them. The Pardoner plays roles, assuming personas which are
artificially active and virile: he interrupts the Wife of
Bath in her Prologue to "teche us yonge men of youre
praktike" (187) and daims to have "a joly wenche in every
toun" (453) . As Pearsall observes, even "the Surnmoner' s
'stif burdounr ("General Prologue, " 673) becomes a n obscene
doub le e n t e n d r e , i n d i c a t i v e o f t h e n a t u r e of t h e a s s o c i a t i o n
between t h e Summoner and t h e Pardoner" ( 9 4 ) . As Pearsall
s u g g e s t s , the Pa rdone r h a s not " los t t h e s e n s e of t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e words h e u s e s and t h e r e a l i t y t o
which t h e y refer" (100) ; i n fact, he u n d e r s t a n d s t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p so w e l l t h a t h e a t t e m p t s a N o m i n a l i s t
r e c r e a t i o n o f r e a l i t y and hi rnse l f t h rough h i s language .
However, h i s words c a n n o t do what he r e q u i r e s of them a n d so
r e v e a l more o f h i m s e l f and h i s d e p a i r t h a n he i n t e n d s . The
Pa rdone r " p r e s e n t s a t h e a t r i c a l i z e d s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of
ev i l s o e x t r a v a g a n t t h a t it n e c e s s a r i l y ca l l s i tself i n t o
q u e s t i o n " ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 3 9 8 ) .
As he is i n h i s p ro logue , t h e Pardoner seems t o be
p r e s e n t i n h i s tale as a f i g u r e of l a c k r a t h e r t h a n as t h e
f i g u r e of e x c e s s t h a t he claims t o be ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer
402). The s e l f - d e s t r u c t i v e b e h a v i o r o f t h e t h r e e r i o t e r s who
"doon the d e v e l sacr if ise/ With inne t h a t develes t emple i n
curçed w i s e , / By s u p e r f l u y t e e abhominabf e" (469-71) ref lects
t h e Pa rdone r r s own p e r i l o u s s p i r i t u a l existence; they, t o o ,
take p r i d e i n t h e i r s i n s and are b r a z e n l y u n r e p e n t a n t , a n d
t h e y r e p r e s e n t t h e P a r d o n e r r s b e l i e f t h a t redempt ion a n d
atonement are impossible fo r t h o s e who have w i l l f u l l y
rejected God. The t h r e e r i o t e r s v o w that they "wol s l e e n
t h i s false t r a y t o u r Deeth" (699), " c a l l [ i n g ] up s u g g e s t i o n s
o f C h r i s t ' s sacrifice, which i s t h e unspoken a l t e r n a t i v e t o
t h e i r m i s l e d and u n r e g e n e r a t e q u e s t " (Knapp, Chaucer 83).
They a lso enact an i n v e r t e d E u c h a r i s t when t h e "yonges te o f
h e m a l l" ( 8 0 4 ) g i v e s t h e m t h e bread a n d p o i ç o n e d wine t h a t
b r i n g s d e a t h r a t h e r t h a n e t e r n a l l i f e t o those who eat and
d r i n k it [ P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 402) ; t h e p o i s o n e d wine is
a n a l o g o u s t o t he P a r d o n e r f s p o i s o n o u s words (Leicester 5 3 ) :
"Thus s p i t t e I o u t my venym u n d e r hewe/ O f h o o l y n e s s e , t o
semen h o o l y a n d trewe" (421-2). T h e i n v e r s i o n o f Christfs
sacrifice a n d t h e E u c h a r i s t i s s i m i l a r t o t he P a r d o n e r f s
p e r v e r s i o n of t h e i n d u l g e n c e s a n d relics which s h o u l d lead
t o s a l v a t i o n b u t lead i n s t e a d t o damna t ion .
I n t h e P a r d o n e r f s c o r r u p t i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e t h r e e
r i o t e r s are a n i n v e r t e d t r i n i t y : "we three been a l ones"
( 6 9 6 ) . T h i s p a r o d y of t h e T r i n i t y is pushed far ther when t h e
two older r i o t e r s s e n d t h e y o u n g e r " to t h e tounf' ( 8 3 7 ) ;
w h i l e h e i s away, t h e y p l o t h i s murder . When t h e r i o t e r
r e t u r n s , t h e other t w o k i l l him; t h i s s c e n a r i o is a
p e r v e r s i o n o f Godrs p l a n t o sacrifice His Son. I n t h i s
v e r s i o n of the T r i n i t y , no o n e i s saved by t h e s h e d d i n g of
blood: t h e r e is no r e s u r r e c t i o n . The o t h e r t w o r io te rs d i e
when t h e y ea t the bread a n d wine , a p o i s o n e d l a s t s u p p e r
s h a r e d w i t h i n s i g h t of t h e i r murde red f r i e n d f s c o r p s e . Like
t h e Pardoner , t h i s T r i n i t y i s s p i r i t u a l l y dead. Even the
a p o t h e c a r y , whose d u t y is t o h e a l p e o p l e p h y s i c a l l y j u s t as
a cler icr s d u t y is t o h e a l thern s p i r i t u a l l y , is w i l l i n g l y
deceived a n d sells t h e p o i s o n t o make a p r o f i t : he t e l l s t h e
young man t h a t h e will give him
A t h y n g t h a t , a l s o God m y s o u l e Save,
I n a l t h i s wor ld ther i s no c r e a t u r e
T h a t e t e n o r d ronken h a t h o f t h i s c o n f i t u r e . . . That he n e s h a l h i s l i f e anon f o r l e t e ;
Y e , sterve h e s h a l , a n d t h a t i n lasse w h i l e
Than t hou w o l t goon a p a a s n a t b u t a m i l e ,
T h i s poyson is s o s t r o n g and v i o l e n t . (860-6)
Not o n l y does t h e a p o t h e c a r y t e l l t h e r i o t e r t h a t t h e p o i s o n
i s s t r o n g enough t o k i l l a n y t h i n g , he even s u g g e s t s how f a r
away the r i o t e r c o u l d g e t b e f o r e his victim d i e so6
Every th ing wi th t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r good is made q u e s t i o n a b l e
t h r o u g h Nominal is t i n v e r s i o n s i n t h e ta le b e c a u s e t h e s to ry
i s to ld by a d e s p a i r i n g , s p i r i t u a l l y dead c h a r a c t e r who h a s
a t t e rnp ted t o r e p l a c e redempt ion w i t h t h e material
p o s s e s s i o n s o f t h i s world . S i n c e t h e sac ramen t s depend upon
grace, t h e Pardoner can o n l y i n v e r t them.
The o t h e r p rominent figure i n t h e ta le is t h e Old Man
whose words rnirror t h e Pa rdone r ' s s p i r i t u a l dismemberment:
"Lo how 1 van i she , f l e s s h , b lood , and skyn! / A l l a s , when
shall my bones ben a t r e s t e ? " (732-3) ; h i s a g e a n d i n a b i l i t y
t o die r e p r e s e n t t h e P a r d o n e r r s l i v i n g d e a t h . Accord ing t o
Purdon, t h e Old Man is t h e most " t h e o l o g i c a l l y a c c u r a t e
d e s c r i p t i o n [of] t h e punishment meted o u t t o t h o s e l i v i n g i n
d e s p a i r by s i n n i n g a g a i n s t t h e Holy S p i r i t " ( 3 3 5 ) . T h e Old
Man r e p r e s e n t s the "Ca in - l i ke wandering," P a t t e r s o n says ,
O f cou r se , t h e r io te r is killed b e f o r e he is able t o take advan tage o f t h e a p o t h e c a r y ' s sound advice.
t h e " l i v i n g d e a t h , wandering, and s t e r i l i t y " which 'are a l1
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f despair, and they are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
s h a r e d by t h e O l d Man and h i s c r e a t o r and a l ter ego, the
Pardoner" (Chaucer 4 0 4 ) . The O l d Man a l s o r e p r e s e n t s t h e
P a r d o n e r f s n i h i l i s m : h e walks t h e e a r t h ,
. . . l y k a restelees k a i t y f ,
And on t h e ground, which is m y rnoodres gate,
1 knokke w i t h m y staf, bothe erly and late,
And seye , "Leeve mooder, leet m e i n ! " (728-31)
A s Leicester w r i t e s , t h e O l d Man r e p r e s e n t s t h e P a r d o n e r r s
desire
t o be r i d o f n o t p h y s i c a l d e c a y b u t consc iousness .
Al though h e sounds s u i c i d a 1 (727-331, t h e Old Man
i s n o t s o i n t h e o r d i n a r y sense. . . . What he
wants i s t o be swallowed up--"leeve mooder, leet
m e i n " (731) - - to becorne n o t h i n g , t o e s c a p e from
t h e restless c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f h i s p r i v a t i o n , h i s
c u p i d i tas. ( 4 9 )
Most E e a r f u l o f a l l , t h e O l d Man c a n be r ecogn ized as a
symbol o f t h e Nomina l i s t v i s i o n of d i v i n e j u s t i c e . The
r i o t e r s d i e w i t h a l 1 t h e i r s i n s on t h e i r heads and are,
t h e r e f o r e , damned. The O l d Man s e n d s t h e t h r e e t o t h e i r doorn
when h e directs them "up t b i s c r o k e d wey" (7611, b u t he
cannot b e viewed a s a demonic f i g u r e even though h i s a c t i o n s
may n o t f i t t h e m o r t a l concep t ion of d i v i n e mercy and
j u s t i c e ; t h e r i o t e r s were neve r d e p r i v e d o f t h e i r free w i l l
and rno r t a l s canno t know Godrs i n t e n t i o n for humanity. Thus,
Godfs w i l l i s served and t h e i r punishments are j u s t b e c a u s e
it is God's w i l l .
I n t e l l i n g h i s t a le , t h e Pa rdone r seems t o corne c l o s e
t o a moment o f s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n . H e p o s e s a q u e s t i o n i n h i s
sermon :
A l l a s , mankynde, how may it b i t f d e
That t o t h y c r e a t o u r , which t h a t t h e wroughte
And w i t h h i s p r e c i o u s h e r t e - b l o o d thee boghte ,
Thou a r t s o fals a n d s o unkynde, a l l a s ? (900-3)
H e c o n t i n u e s on w i t h h i s i n v o c a t i o n o f God t o f o r g i v e t h e
"goode men" ( 9 0 4 ) and warns t h e m t o be wary of avarice, b u t
he d o e s n o t i n c l u d e h i m s e l f w i t h t h e men whom God s h o u l d
pardon which, Sachs observes, is y e t a n o t h e r symptom of
d e s p a i r : " [ t l h e d e s p a i r e r p l a c e d h i m s e l f o u t s i d e t h e d i v i n e
o r d e r i n p r e c i s e l y t h e way L u c i f e r had rejected h i s honoured
p o s t i n
example
Godfs o r d e r e d kingdom" ( 2 3 2 ) . Another , more t e l l i n g
is his s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p i l g r i m s :
And Jhesu C r i s t , t h a t i s o u r s o u l e s l e c h e ,
So g r a u n t e yow h i s pardoun t o receyve ,
For t h a t is best; 1 w o l you n a t deceyve."
(916-18)
The t o n e of t h e l i n e s is self -mocking; h e h a s a l r e a d y
exc luded hirnself from t h e "goode men" who need t o be ( o r
even c a n be) saved-he s a y s "yow" n o t "us," even though he
h a s admitted t h a t he h a s many u n f o r g i v e n sins. H e r e c o g n i z e s
C h r i s t as t h e redeemer yet he p a r o d i e s t h e h e a l i n g t h a t he
d e s p e r a t e l y needs and wants ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 223) . S i n c e
he c a n n o t c o n f e s s , he r e t u r n s t o h i s o u t r a g e o u s of fer of
p a r d o n s and relics th rough which, as Finnegan observes
("Eschatology" 308), he u s u r p s t he power and p o s i t i o n o f God
w i t h t h e d e c l a r a t i o n , "1 yow assoil le, by myn h e i g h power."
L i k e Walter and Nicho las , t h e Pardoner becomes a pa rody o f
the unknowable and u n p r e d i c t a b l e God that Chaucer s u g g e s t s
i s r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e c o r r u p t and c o n t r o l l i n g c l e r g y .
P e e r i n g f o r a moment i n t o h i s own " s p i r i t u a l abyss"
( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 388) , t h e Pa rdone r sees t h e d e p t h of h i s
despair a n d a l i e n a t i o n . H e faces a crisis o f f a i t h : t h e
Pa rdone r ' s d e s p e r a t e c r a v i n g f o r s a l v a t i o n r e s u l t s i n
the fear o r the b l a n k awareness that cornes when
you r e a l i z e t h a t you are o n l y one . . t h a t
t h e r e was only y o u r s e l f t o deal w i t h a l 1 t h e tirne.
With t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n , w i t h t h e l a c k o f a g e n u i n e
"o ther , " you c o l l a p s e i n t o n o t h i n g n e s s , (Shoaf
216)
Even a f te r h i s c o n f e s s i o n and r e v e a l i n g tale, t h e
Pa rdone r rejects h i s own advice t o t h e p i l g r i m s t o l o o k t o
God for pardon and f a l l s back on t h e r i t u a l h e knows. His
"sickness . . h a s becorne a l m o s t comfor tab le" (Shoaf 223 ) .
H i s moment of s i n c e r i t y becomes a s a d o m a s o c h i s t i c attack: if
t h e y are awed by h i s r h e t o r i c and buy h i s false relics s o h e
c a n "assoille" them, he t r i umphs over them, If t h e y c o u n t e r
his attack, h e r e l i s h e s t h e m a s o c h i s t i c p l e a s u r e o f h i s
false a tonement , L i k e h i s c o n f e s s i o n , t h e Pa rdone r ' s act of
a tonement has been i n v e r t e d . H e h a s n o t humbled h imse l f ;
rather, he has revealed his pride and his contempt.
Leicester paraphrases the Pardones's sales pitch (919-45):
1 am what the pope licenses, what the church
supplies for your spiritual needs; 1 am the
instrument of Christr s mercy, the representative
of the Holy Ghost among you; I am what you kneel
to, whose relics you kiss. . . (57)
The Pardonerfs expression of this attitude both undermines
the authority of the Church and his own role in it, and
draws Harry Baileyfs attack. His masochism creates a mask
behind whish he can hide and control what his audience sees.
Masochism is a perversion of humility, just as his
sacrilegious confession is a perversion of penance in which
he is punished but never forgiven. Divided from God, the
Pardoner suffers
insatiable longings for the inversions of God, for
the created rather than the Creator, for
peripheral accidents . . . that serve to consolidate the Pardonerfs illusion of the proud
self as center. (Hoerner 81)
The Pardoner inverts the images of God and the sacraments
because, in his despair, he both longs for them and, because
he cannot have them, hates them. He wallows in his spiritual
pain which serves as both a perverse act of atonement and a
confirmation of his existence (in a nominalist and an
existential sense), and which lends significance to his
otherwise meaningless life.
The Pardonerrs despair makes him dangerous because he
has no hope and no desire to Save himself or anyone else. He
also has the potential to stop the pilgrimage permanently
which, as a spiritual journey, seeks the way to heaven. If
St. Thomasr relics are replaced by the Pardoner's false
ones, the pilgrims would have no reason to continue, and
would be in the same spiritual condition as the Pardoner.
Fortunately, the Host's aggressive declaration that "1 wolde
1 hadde thy coillons in myn hand. . . . 1 wol thee helpe hem carie; They shul be shryned in an hogges toord!" (952-55)
"disarms" the Pardoner (Patterson, Chaucer 409) by rendering
hirn speechless and breaking the spell that the Pardoner has
attempted to cast with his words; the danger is averted and
the pilgrimage continues.
By revealing the danger implicit in depending too
heavily upon supposedly sacred ceremonies that are
administered by another imperfect being, "The Pardoner's
Tale" allows Chaucer to challenge the legitimacy of
confession and, by extension, the rest of the Church' s
sacraments by demonstrating the ease with which they corrupt
and can be corrupted. He makes blind obedience to Church
doctrine impossible by forcing his readers to question an
institution that would place such a destructive man in a
position of power over God's flock and, through the
Pardoner, to question the necessity of a r i t u a l that has the
potential to drive people to despair. Through the Pardoner's
corruption, Chaucer reveals the illusions that the Church
attempts to maintain:
In every case what ought to be a manifestation of
divine power, mercy, care, and love is shown to be
cheapened and undone by human stupidity or malice,
unthinking literalism or calculating
self-interest, What the Pardoner is making fun of
is the way the putative transcendence of the
institutions of the church is continually reduced
to a set of merely human practices. (Leicester
4 3 )
"The Pardonerrs Tale" demonstrates the spiritual abyss
created by the l o s s of faith in iliusions of certainty:
because the Pardoner has no faith, he cannot operate within
the ideology of the Church, nor can he create his own
alternative set of beliefs, as do the Miller and the Clerk,
each in his own way.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUS I O N
I n T h e Canterbury Tales, Chaucer reveals the f a i l u r e of
any a u t h o r i t y t o p r o v i d e a d e f i n i t i v e s o l u t i o n , based s o l e l y
on r a t i o n a l a n d e m p i r i c a l ev idence , t o q u e s t i o n s of
e x i s t e n c e and belief. Only a n act o f f a i t h , whe the r s e c u l a r
o r r e l i g i o u s , c a n p r o v i d e t h e fundamenta l a s s u r a n c e s o f
s i g n i f i c a n c e a n d meaning which are a b s e n t f r o m t h e M i l l e r ' s ,
C l e r k ' s , and P a r d o n e r ' s tales; u n l i k e t h e i n s u b s t a n t i a l
i l l u s i o n s r e q u i r e d t o s u s t a i n m o r t a l a u t h o r i t i e s , o n l y f a i t h
can p r o v i d e t h e i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a u t h e n t i c answers t o
q u e s t i o n s o f belief o r disbelief . Chaucer ' s a p p l i c a t i o n of
Nominal i s t p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e s e ta les d e m o n s t r a t e s the
weaknesses o f t h e o r t h o d o x medieval Church d o c t r i n e by
showing t h a t u n i v e r s a l s - - i n c l u d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between
s i g n i f i e r s and s i g n i f i e d s , and t h e c o n c e p t s o f good and
evi l - -might n o t ex i s t and, t h e r e f ore, can p r o v i d e no
c e r t a i n t y . However, Chaucer a l s o shows t h a t Nominalism is as
u n s t a b l e as o r thodoxy : i n i t s radical form, Nominalism is s o
c o n t i n g e n t on i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and e x p e r i e n c e t h a t
it, too, can lead t o s k e p t i c i s m , d e s p a i r , and even , as t h e
Pardoner i l l u s t r a t e s , n i h i l i s m . Without t h e p r o t e c t i v e
i l l u s i o n s that t h e Church o r o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s a t t e m p t t o
m a i n t a i n , p e o p l e must f i n d t h e i r own c e r t a i n t y t h r o u g h t h e i r
own f a i t h . The e x p o s u r e o f t h e i l l u s i o n s of c e r t a i n t y
i n h e r e n t i n a n y i d e o l o g y t o which i n d i v i d u a l s c l ing- -whether
r e l i g i o u s , p h i l o s o p h i c a l , o r s c i e n t i f i c - l e a v e s t h o s e
individuals in fundamental doubt. As Leicester explains, the
individual who becomes engulfed in a desire "to become
nothing" (49) faces a crisis of despair and alienation which
is essentially analogous to that of the existentialists
(49). So, while the Miller and the Clerk manage to avoid
falling into the "marle-pit" ( lY i1T 3460) created by
insecurity and disillusionment, the Pardoner cannot; he,
like the O l d Man in his tale, despairs. Chaucer himself may
have responded to this recognition of despair by embarking
on his own spiritual pilgrimage in writing The Canterbury
Tales.
Chaucer's depiction of the depair that results from the
loss of confidence in fundamental beliefs and authorities is
not limited to the Miller's, Clerkrs, and Pardonerrs tales.
Chaucer demonstrates throughout The Canterbury Tales how the
power of any authority resides partly in its ability to use
words: he tests the ability of religion, science,
philosophy, language, and individualsr perceptions to reveal
truth. Even literary tradition is questioned in The Tales.
Chaucer the pilgrim tells two tales: "Sir Thopas" undermines
the conventions of Romance poetry by creating two hundred
and six frivolous lines of outrageous rhymes and limping
rneter. When the Host cornplains that Chaucer's "drasty rymyng
is nat worth a toord!" (930) , Chaucer responds with "The
Tale of Melibee," which is a "practical demonstration of the
ways in which the author can manipulate his discourse and
how that resultant text can be variously apprehended by the
audience" (Waterhouse and Grif fiths 34 0) . The pilgrimç' ecstatic response to the moral quality of the tale calls
further attention to this parody of literature and language
because, as Waterhouse and Griffiths point out, "as a moral
lesson, the talef s 'sentense' /signification is finally
indeterminable" (339)
Sirnilarly, the Wife of Bath manipulates the words of
anti-ferninist authors to serve her own purposes, one of
which is to justify her actions. She begins her tale by
invoking experience as her authority; but, in her
"Prologue, " the Wife turns the words of authorities to her
advantage, thereby revealing not only the flaws in the logic
of the patriarchy but also the weaknesses in her own
argument. She attempts to recreate herself in her "Prologue"
and "Tale," but the inconsistencies and contradictions in
her language work against her by revealing the discrepancies
in her story and, ultirnately, by causing the illusions she
wishes to create about herself to fail- This failure calls
to mind the Norninalist contention that only in irnmediate
experience are things known; once an experience has been
transferred to memory, the individual's knowledge of events
becomes unreliable.
Waterhouse and Griffiths explain that "Melibee is reconciled with the world, the flesh, and the devil. . . . Thus there is an irreconcilable gap between the narrative discourse and its story on the one hand and the potential allegory to which we are alerted by Dame Prudence herself on the other, since coherent parallels that fit into the syntagmatic line of each level do not exis t" ( 3 4 6 ) .
The Wife of Bath is not the only character who
reinterprets events to suit her own purposes. In "The
Merchant's Tale," young May is able to reconfigure the
events that old January witnesses in the garden so that he
distrusts his own eyes and doubts what he actually has seen.
When he declares with absolute conviction that, "He swyved
thee; I saugh it with myne yen,/ And elles be 1 hanged by
the hals!" (2378-79) ' she convinces him that he had "som
glymsyng, and no parfit sighte" (2383); his statement, "me
thoughte he dide thee so" (2386) shows his growing
uncertainty, May finally convinces hirn that "[flul many a
man weneth to seen a thyng,/ And it is al another than it
semeth./ He that mysconceyveth, he mysdemeth" (2408-10).
May's revision of events dernonstrates the potential for
deliberate misinterpretation and the power of a speaker to
intentionally lead people astray. Similarly, the alchemist's
ruse leads the priest astray in "The Canon's Yeoman's Tale,"
in which the alchemist's transmutation of base metal into
silver is nothing but a trick, accomplished through sleight
of hand and convincing language. The narrator larnents, "O
sely preest! O sely innocent! With coveitise anon thou shalt
be blent!" (1076-77) . The priest is blinded by his greed and
so is easily deceived by the alchemist, who takes advantage
of the priestrs desire to believe in the illusion that he
creates. This scientific practice is exposed as fraudulent;
l i k e Nicholas' astronomy and Walter's philosophy, its
success depends on blind faith and "pious ignorance." Thus,
t h e a l c h e m i s t ' s t r i c k w i t h si lver is a n a l o g o u s t o Walter's
t r i c k w i t h l anguage : h i s base t e r n p t a t i o n s o f Griselda seem
t o becorne v i r t u o u s t e s t s a n d Griselda seems t o be
" t r a n s l a t e d " p o s i t i v e l y , e v e n t hough s h e c o n s e n t s t o what
she believes are t h e murde r s of h e r c h i l d r e n .
Language i s a l s o shown as u n r e l i a b l e i n "The M a n c i p l e r s
T a l e " when Phebus, the God of p o e t r y , u s e s it t o r e c o n f i g u r e
t h e e v e n t s which led hirn t o m u r d e r h i s w i f e : h e c o n v i n c e s
h i m s e l f t h a t t h e crow s p e a k s f a l s e l y when it cries,
"Cokkow!" (243 ) and t h a t h i s own v i s i o n o f h i s w i f e r s
c o n s t a n c y is a t r u e r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y . Language i n t h e
t a l e i s u n a b l e t o r e p r e s e n t r e a l i t y a c c u r a t e l y b e c a u s e i ts
a b i l i t y t o create i l l u s i o n seems greater t h a n i ts a b i l i t y t o
r e p r e s e n t t r u t h ; l i k e o l d January, Phebus c l i n g s t o h i s
i l l u s i o n s r a t h e r t h a n f a c i n g wha t h e h a s done , Phebus is
able t o recreate f a l s e l y b o t h h i s w i f e and r e a l i t y b e c a u s e
anyone who c o u l d r e f u t e o r d i s p r o v e his r e t e l l i n g of t h e
e v e n t s h a s been s i l e n c e d : a n y a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n s have
b e e n overpowered b y t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e , The t a l e c o n c l u d e s
w i t h t h e n a r r a t o r f s d e s p a i r i n g cry f o r s i l e n c e :
Thyng t h a t i s s e y d is s e y d , and f o r t h it goo th ,
Though hym r e p e n t e , o r be hym n e v e r e s o
100th .
h'e i s h i s t h r a l t o whom t h a t h e h a t h s â y d
A t a le of which h e is now y v e l e apayd.
M y s o n e , b e w a r , and be noon a u c t o u r newe
Of t i dynges , w h e i t h e r t h e y been false o r t r e w e .
(355-60)
Thus, decep t ion and t h e fa lse r e c r e a t i o n o f r e a l i t y a r e no t
t h e on ly dangers i m p l i c i t i n t h e s l i p p e r y n a t u r e of
language. Users o f language r i s k f a c i n g a l i e n a t i o n from
o t h e r s because o f the i n a b i l i t y o f language t o f u l l y express
t h e i r i d e a s , and frorn thernselves through se l f -decep t ion . As
a r e s u l t , t h e i n d i v i d u a l rnust e i t h e r f i n d a way t o move
beyond t h i s ernotional and s p i r i t u a l v o i d o r fa11 i n t o
d e s p a i r .
The f i n a l t a l e is t o l d by t h e Parson. Chaucer 's
presence i s fe l t , a s i t is i n "S i r Thopas" a n d "The Ta le o f
Melibee," when t h e a u t h o r o u t s i d e t h e a r t i s t i c frame i s
recognized as t h e shadow o f Chaucer t h e p i l g r i m : "My shadwe
was a t t h i l k e tyme, as t h e r e / O f swiche feet as my l eng the
p a r t e d w e r e / I n s ixe feet e q u a l of proporcioun" ( 7 - 9 ) . The
journey cornes t o an end a s n i g h t E a l l s : t h e pilgrimage h a s
revealed t h e i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f v a r i o u s i l l u s i o n s t o which
many of i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s have clung, and shown t h e d e s p a i r
t h a t r e s u l t s frorn t h a t reve la t io-n . Because t h e cry , "be noon
a u c t o u r newe/ O f t idynges" ("Manciplers" 359-60) i s followed
by a sermon which seems t o r e p e a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t each ings
o f t h e C a t h o l i c Church and because The Canterbury Tales ends
wi th Chaucer's r e t r a c t i o n s , there is a s e n s e of pe r sona l
conv ic t ion i n this f i n a l s e m o n / t r e a t i s e .
Scho la r s such as S h e i l a Delaney a rgue f o r Chaucer's
d e s p e r a t e r e v e r s i o n t o t h e old dogmas and b l i n d f a i t h i n t h e
Church because he "can f i n d no r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e " (118). It
c a n a l s o be a rgued t h a t the ta le e x p r e s s e s the a b s o l u t e
d e s p a i r of one who no l o n g e r believes i n h i s power t o create
o r f i n d meaning i n e x i s t e n c e and s o f a l l s i n t o a creative
v o i d by r e p e a t i n g t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e and t r a d i t i o n a l words o f
t h e Church (even though t h e i l l u s i o n s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s
i n h e r e n t i n t h o s e words have a l r e a d y been revealed i n t h e
o t h e r t a l e s ) . However, whe the r "The Parson 's T a l e " is read
as a s i n c e r e s ta te rnent o f f a i t h o r a h o p e l e s s d e m o n s t r a t i o n
of d e s p a i r , i t m a n i f e s t s Chaucer ' s r e a c t i o n t o the
u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e , and t o t h e
fundamental inadequacy o f f i n i t e m o r t a l r ea son ,
Because "The Parson 's T a l e " p r e s e n t s a p e r s o n a l s t a n c e
t h a t arises from q u e s t i o n i n g and con templa t ing t h e Church 's
d o c t r i n e , Chaucer does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have t o be pious,
solemn, o r or thodox. Thus, even i n his r e t r a c t i o n s , h e c a n
be i r o n i c and humorous b e c a u s e h e h a s freed h i m s e l f from
e a r t h l y a u t h o r i t y . * l When h e o b s e r v e s that ''Al that is
w r i t e n is w r i t e n f o r o u r e d o c t r i n e , ? and t h a t is myn
e n t e n t e " (1083), r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is once a g a i n p l a c e d on t h e
reader: because o f t h e m u t a b l e nature of language a n d t h e
i n e v i t a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t i s t h e
21 I n Nausea and The Outsider, S a r t r e and Camus r e s p e c t i v e l y are able t o f i n d humour i n the i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s O£ t h e absurdities o f human e x i s t e n c e ; l i k e w i s e , it would be p o s s i b l e f o r Chaucer t o a p p r e c i a t e , frorn even a p o s i t i o n of d e s p a i r , t h e i r o n y of humani ty 's a t t e m p t s t o find r a t i o n a l c e r t a i n t y i n a n u t t e r l y u n c e r t a i n u n i v e r s e .
readerfs own fault if he or she learns a bad lesson.
Ironically, Chaucer lists "many a Song and many a lecherous
lay" [1087]) instead of focusing his readerfs attention on
his didactic works: he refers directly only to "the
translation of Boece de Consolacione, and othere bookes of
legendes of seintes, and ornelies, and moralitee, and
devocioun" (1087). Again, because of the uncertain nature of
language and our inability to be completely sure of anyone
else's rneaning, it is up to the reader to determine whether
Chaucer's retraction is sincere. No rnatter how the reader
chooses to interpret "The Parsonrs Tale" and the retraction
(i .e,, as texts intended to be taken literally, ironically,
or both), Chaucer makes it clear that his philosophical
stance is his own: as "Geffrey" said, '1 wot myself best how
y stonde" (HF 1878).
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