CHAPTER VI

THE 'IREATY OF FRI£NDSHIP

'lbe return of the Afghan delegation from rJiussoorie

to Kabul t-ms followed by a temporary eclipse of f-1ahmud Tarzi • s

influence and the predominance of General Nadir Khan in the

Afghan CotmcU, Tarzi was accused of having been \'JOn over by

the British just as Sardar Ali Ahmad had been at the Rawalpindi

Conference, This, ho,.,rever, was not the case, It l'lill be

recalled that Mabmud Tarzi neither signed any agreement \'lith

nor gave any concession to the British, Nadir Khan wanted to

1treaken Tarzi' s position as the latter \'TaS his major opponent

among the nobility of Amir Amanullab' s court. Tarz1, being

Arnir Amanullah' s father-in-law and supported by a major faction

in the court, was saved from disgrace, 1

Tb.e Treaty of Sevres \'las signed on 10 August 1920,

together \'lith tne Tripartite agreement between Great Britain,

France and Italy, regarding Anatolia. The struggle between

the Greeks and Turks continued w1 th .fluctuating fortunes until

16 September 1921, \"/hen the Greek '\>Tithdrawal began and even­

tually resulted in the evacuation of Anatolia, 2

1 Dobbs Report on tb.e Kabul I~ission, Memorandum, A 194, L/P&S/18, IOLR,

2 R,R, Maconachie, A Precise on Afman A&!atrs ; 191~ 19~ (Simla, 1928), p. 45.

- 347 -

Relations bet\1een the Turkish and Soviet Governments

were cemented by the signature of the Treaty at rllosc0\'1 in

1921. The precise nature of the relations between the leaders

of the party of Union and Progress comprising Enver, Talat,

Jemal, Khalil, and Nuri Pashas, and the Soviet Government \'!ere

then not known clearly. In January 1921, Talat \..ras in

S\d tzerland and in touch w1 th Berlin; Knalil was at Tashkent;

Jemal Pasna at Kabul; and Enver .l?asha at Mosco,,. -- all

cooperating \d. tb the Bolsheviks in a campaign of anti-Britisn

propaganda. It appears from Enver Pasha' 5 subsequent

activities and death 1n Turk1stan that the Turkish leaders

were 1n effect pursuing some Pan-Turanian designs of Uleir

own, and only waiting for a favourable 'blrn of events to

discard Bolshevik friendship. Insofar as the Pan-I slaxnic

movement, promoted by the Committee of Union and Progress

leaders, threatened British interest in Asia, it suited tne

policy of the Soviet Government to support and finance it.

The Bolsheviks did not altogether trust either Enver or Jamal,

and suspected them of Pan-Turanian designs 'cbicb. threatened

Russian predominance in the Central Asian States and Trans­

Caucasia. Angoran nationalist leaders and tbe Soviet Government

.... ere thus co-operating 1n an un-easy association based on

their common nostility to Britain and the \dllingness of the

Bolshevil(s to finance and promote any intrigue which \>Jould

damage British interests. 3

3 Ibid.

lhe Soviet Government continuously engaged 1n intrigue

and propaganda against the British Empire. Lenin, Trotsky and

Chicherin openly denounced Great Britain as their chief enemy,

and the main obstacle to tne spread of their doctrine. 4

In Trans-Caucasia and Turkistan, the Bolsheviks con­

solidated their hold and the Muslim revolts in these regions

"'ere crushed. In Aul!'Jlst 1920, the Amir of Buknara was over­

thro\m and fled along \d.Ul his follottrers to Af[jlanistan \\here

the story of their sufferings had a profound impression. It

\vas at this juncture and apparently in a revulsion o.f feeling

caused by tb.e Bukhara debacle that the Am1r 1nV1 ted a British

mission to Kabul.s

The Anglo-Soviet 'lrade Agreement, concluded 1n March

1921, was published with a British note addressed to the

BolsheVik Government, setting forth the evidence available

regarding their anti-British activities. The British. note

referred to the all.eged activities of the Russian Government

and its representatives and agents in Eastern countries

directed against British interests. To substantiate tb.e

charges, the note referred to the Congress of the 'rhird

International \oJhere Soviet leaders spoke against Britain. 6

4 Ibid.

5 Lud,dg 'vi. Adamec, Aj:ghan~tan. 1~t.1923 1 A Dieloma!i!,e Historx (Los Angeles, 19 ), p. 1 •

6 British Foreign Office note to Soviet Foreign Office., 27 September 1921, L/P&S/10/956, pt. 2, IOLR.

350

Chicherin, 1n his reply, undertook to avoid all action or

propaganda hostile to Great Britain tn the sense provided

against by the agreement. 'lbe formal reply from the Soviet

Commissarate for Foreign Affairs rejected the charges. It

categorically stated; "It is quite obvious that all the reports,

speeches and utterances quoted in the British Note have been

invented, forged and falsified for some purpose.?

'lbe internal si tuat1on of the Indian Empire also had

an impact on external events. During the later half of 1920,

the alliance between the Ali brothers and Gandhiji maintained

its strength and the non-cooperation movement gathered momentum.

During the first half of 1921 sporadic disorders and rioting

occurred tbrou@:lout India, \mile the speeches of the Indian

nationalists became e~avagantly inflammatory in tone,

IJiaulana Mohammad Ali, for instance, 1n a speech at Madras

declared that if the Amir of Afgnanistan invaded India to free

her .trom the infidel, 1 t would be the duty of Muslims to

assist him.8

'li'ibal unrest too continued. In October 1920 raids

by Zakka Khel increased, and two British soldiers were carried

a,-ray; they \'rere returned at the end of November. In the same

month a serious outrage was committed by Illirzali, a well ltno~m.

raider. Lt. Col. Foulkes, A.D.M. s. of Kohat was killed, and

his "'tife fatally wounded.

7 I"laxim Li tvinQ~ to Lord Cur zon, 27 September 1921, L/P&S/ 10/956, pt. 2, IOLR.

8 r•1aconacllie, n. 2, p. 48.

351

In September tbe Afridees \'rere inVited to attend a

ji£ga at Jalalabad by the Afghan Governor, Hashim Kh.ant who

had succeeded his brother Nadir Khan in August 1920. Shah

.r.tanmud, during his governorsb.ip o:f Khost, succeeded 1n causing

many attacks on the British linea of communication. All these

activities \'lere carried out by Haji Abdul Razaq of Kabul. '!be

Idona v:azlrs had been responsible for most of the raiding

carried out in Zhob. In September 1920, the \'laziris

\d th the approval of Haji Ab.dul Razaq surrounded Drazinda po.st,

and in October attacked Kaur Bridge Camp causing ninety

casual ties. 9

Two events, vrbich occurred during the interval between

the close of the Mussoorie Conference and the departure of the

British f'i1ss1on to Kabul, largel.y determin~ the Amir' s policy

to enter into free and direct diplomatic relations \d th other

countries. General r4ohammad \t[ali Khan, during his visit to

Tashkent, conducted preliminary negotiations for a Russo­

Afghan Agreement. He was nominally appointed as envoy to

BUkhara and he had returned to Tashkent in June 1920. On 25

July 1920, he again left for MosCO\'/ where he eventually

concluded th.e treaties \'lith Moscow and Angora. The other

Afghan Mission, led by Abdul Karim Khan and accompanied by

Raja Mahendra Pratap, left for China. '!his mission conveyed

letters from the Amir, \me intended to negotiate a Treaty

9 Ibid.

352

of Friendship vti th the President of the Chinese Republic. 10

'rhe Government of India received information in

September that tbe excitement caused in Kabul by the revolution

in Bukl'lara might shortly lead tile Amir to press for the

conclusion of a formal a~eement w1 t.h tb.e British Government.

It l'ras anticipated that sucll overtures mi€Jlt be directed to

secure either a defensive alliance, or a free supply of arms

and amnnmi tion. The Government of India was inclined to

concede the latter as they considered the first alternative to

be impracticable. 11 The Viceroy in his letter of 24 September

1920 to I"lontague \tlrote that the Government of India would

insist 11of course~ onimmediate signature of :fr'ialdshlp 'treaty

on lines already laid do\·.n, on sincere co-operation on Indian

frontier between Afgllans and ourselves, and so long as

Bolshevik menace to Afghanistan may subsist, on continuous

friendly interchange of views on joint policy". 12

The secretary of State expressed a preference for a

gift of money to one of arms, and concluded: 11 \ie must take

care to prevent Afghans from manoeuvering into a position of

keeping in with both sides, and, ,.mile evading corresponding

10 Dobbs Report on the Kabul l11ssion, Memorandtml, A 194, L/P&S/18, IOLR.

11 Foreign Department, F. No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), Notes, P• 29, NAI.

12 Viceroy to secretary of State, 24 September 1920, Foreign Depar'bnent, F .No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.

353

obligations, deriving material assistance from both." 13

The British expectation that the Am1r would immediately

appeal for help on account of the collapse of Bukhara was

belied. It may have been that the Bolsheviks had promised

enormous amo1.mts of money and munition or that the Af~an

pride forbade an absolute confession of political miscalculation

and also a reversal of policy. It might be that even distrust

of the Bolsheviks, engendered by their successful conspiracy

against Bukhara, had been counter-balanced by the terror of

their success and by thougtl ts that the same fate might be in

store for Afghanistan. The situation in Bukhara drove the

Af ghana to take immediate steps tm'lards the renewal of nego-

ti at ions for .friendship td th the British.

The Amir did not agree with some of th.e items contained

in the aide memoire given to the Af{#lan delegates after the

lllussoorie Conference. He explained his objectives in the

follo,.ring \'JOrds:

Notwithstanding that some of the 1 tems contained in the written statement and memoranda have been found in our Supreme Council not to be free b'om poss1b111 ty of complaint and objection, I can assure your Excellency that Ulis objection and complaint does not conflict with the basis of the question on 1tibich we \dsh to fo1.md the

13 secretary of State to Viceroy, 4 October 1920, Foreign Department, F .No. s-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.

14 Amir to Viceroy, 6 October 1920, Chelmsford Papers, M3S, EUR, E 264/55(0), IOLR.

354

conclusion of a treaty of friendship, but refers to certain things \·Jb.ich. are considered to be trivial. 14

The Amir requested tne Viceroy to send to Kabul a

delegation invested \'lith. full powers to negotiate and conclude

a Treaty of Friendship. He added: "Af€tJ,anistan considers itself

ready and prepared for the conclusion of a 'lreaty of Friendship

a."ld in the same 1:my as your Excellency has said that there \'1111

be no objection on th.e part of your Excellency' s Goverrunent to

negotiate a treaty, my Royal Government also have no objection

\d Ul regard to 1 t. "15 He expressed his desire that the Br1 t1sh

delegation should not exceed more than twenty persons. At the

same time, Mahmud Tarzi wrote a letter to Foreign Secretary to

the Government of India to the effect that the Amir would

prefer that an Englistunan, rather than an India, be vested

\'lith full po\rer s to si~ the proposed 'lreaty. 16 The Amir' s

decision to invite a British. delegation to Kabul had been

helped by a combination of events favourable to tb.e British.

both. inside and outside India and by internal troubles in

Afghanistan. In India the bi;)rat movement, \ffl.ich at the end

of July 1920 had swollen to enormous proportions, nad

collapsed about the middle of August. 'lhe non-cooperation

movement nad reached 1 ts peak of popular support but the British

14 Am1r to Viceroy, 6 October 1920, Chelmsford Papers, MSS, EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOLR.

15 Ibid.

16 Mabmud 'rarzi to Dobbs, 7 October 1920, C!lgl.m§ford Papers, MSS, EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOLR.

355

authorities were able to suppress it. In the Masud cotmtry,

the tribesmen seemed on tb.e point of accepting British

occupation, and had even submitted a petition setting forth

conditions on which the.y ~ggested that the administration of

their cotmtry should be carried out. In Af@lanistan there was

serious disaffection among the Af~an troops in distant

stations. In Afghan Turkistan, at Mazar-1-Sharif, there had

been a mutiny in August 1920, caused partly by an attempt to

pay the troops 1n kind instead of in cash. In September, the

troops in Farah and Chakhansur on the Western Afghan border

had also been mutinuous on account of the reduction of their

pay. On tb.e eastern side of Afgb.anistan, the Khostwals and

rllangals had been giving trouble throu€Jlout September, owing to

attempts to raise their revenue and to construct a telephone

line throu€)1 their country. 'lhese events undoubtedly influenced

the Afgtlan Government towards the decision to ask for the

despatch of a British fJiiss1on to Kabul. 17

'lbe Viceroy in a private letter to tbe secretary of

State informed tile latter of the Amir' s invitation and stated:

11You will be glad to hear that the Am1r has \\1ri tten me a letter

in \\bich he expresses the hope that a Treaty of Friendship will

soon be made. 1118 He, however, expressed the vievr that until

Afghanistan proved her .friendliness, it \'ras impossible to

conclude a Treaty of Friendship. 19 In his telegraphic message

17 Chelmsford to Montague, 7 October 192::>, Montague Paeers, Roll No. 1833, NAI.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

356

of 15 October 1920 to the Secretary of state he weighed the

pros and cons of the acceptance of the Amir' s proposal. He

favoured a bilateral discussion of the problems as also the

conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship \'Jitb the Amir. He gave

the additional consideration 1n favour of sending a British

delegation to Kabul:

Owing to ineradicable tendency of delegates to intrigue td.th Indian Extremist party, presence of Afghan delegation at Mussoorie was found very troublesome. It \'TaS possible, O\lling to geograpnical position of Mussoorie, to isolate delegates to some extent, but 1 t \Y()uld be difficult to do so if renewed discussions took place in cold \lTeather in plains. In present circumstances, therefore, t>te should strongly deprecate arrival of another Afgban delegation 1n India and despatch of Britisn Mission to Kabul is only alternative. 20

The Government of India proposed tb.e follo,rJ.ng con­

ditions as precedent to tne despatch of the British Mission

to Kabul:

(1) That the British Mission be authorised from the outset

to use the title of 'His Majesty• in addressing the Amir.

( 2) 'lbat as the i'tission would be sent only on the understanding

that the atipulations made in the Mussoorie aide memgil;e

v-rere accepted by the Amir, tne latter should be informed

accordingly.

(3) That no suspension of operations agatnst the Wana vLaztrs

20 Viceroy to secretary of state, 15 October 1920, Chelmgford Paeers• MSS. EUR. E/264/55 (0), IOLR.

357

could be entertained, and that the fact should be made

clear to the Amir.

(4) The British wireless installations and operators should

be taken to Kabul, and employed by the mission during the

negotiation. 21

There were some si@li:ficant shifts in tbe position

of the Government of India. It \'ras suggested that the contest

for 1nnuence in Afghanistan bet,.reen the Bolsheviks and the

British was inconvenient and migb.t eventually prove to be

embarrassing. Tbe British were in a position either to keep

absolutely aloof from Afgb.anistan, or to participate with tb.e

Bolsheviks in financing tile Af @tan Government. Even if the

Bolshevik agreement provided for the payment of an annual

subsidy to the Amir, this should not be held to preclude the

simultaneous grant of financial assistance to him by the

British Government. Tb.e Viceroy declared: "Tb.e exclusive

domination of Afghanistan, \'1bich vre should doubtless muon

prefer, has been rendered impossible by development of events,

unless 111e go to war. a22

The Government of India .felt that 1 t was necessary

to obtain accurate information as to tile contents of the

Russo-Afghan Agreement, before proceeding to negotiate a

Treaty of Friendship with Amir. Tb.e Viceroy stressed that

21 Ibid.

22 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 21 October 1920, Che1msford Papers, I'1SS. EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOLR.

358

1 t should be ascertained \'lhether the Amir had signed an

agreement with the Bolsheviks and that if so, did it include

provisions inconsistent w1 th Bri tisb interests. It \·ras

accordingly proposed to the home government to add another

condition to those mentioned above, requiring the Amir to

disclose the terms of the Russo-Af~an Agreement. 23 The

secretary of State concurred with the Viceroy tbat a clear

statement must be obtained from the Am1r as to his position

regarding his agreement with. the Bolsheviks. No subsidy should

be gi. ven in case it was revealed that the Amir was getting 1 t

from the Bolsheviks. It was not necessary to prevent

Afghanistan from haVing relations of a friendly cbaracter with

Soviet Russia. The Secretary of State added:

But tb.e pretence of accepting plea of Bolshevik assistance in developing Af@lanistan "rill not serve any purpose, when the fact that Bolshevik policy is inspired solely by tne desire to damage us is a matter of conunon knowledge. Therefore, if 1 t should turn out to be true tbat an a~eement on Ule lines indicated by evidence now at our disposal, bas actually been concluded betv1een Afgb.ans and Bolsheviks, and that the former are not prepared to repudiate it, it vzould be impossible for us to contemplate Treaty of Friendship w1 tn the Amir. 24

lhe Government of India, therefore, decided ttlat a

Treaty of Friendsbip was impossible if tbe Russo-Afgb.an

23 Viceroy to 3ecretary of state, 12 October 192.9.! Chel!nsford fapftts, MSS. EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOut.

24 secretary of state to Viceroy, 29 October 19:!>, Foreign Department, F. No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.

359

Agreement contained a provision for the establishment of SoViet

Consulates at Kandahar and Ghazni. 'I'l1e Viceroy accordingly

\-rote to the Amlrs

We have reason to believe that amongst other clauses the Bolshevists have stipulated for instance for tne location of their consulates at Gnazni and Kandahar in return for a subsidy. My friend, I find it difficult to believe tnat these Bolshevist claims can be found on faot, 1 t would render the conclusion of a friendship treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan impossible. 25

·rne Viceroy fUrther pointed out that 1 t was decided at the

r•lussoorie Conference that if aJ13 agreement designed by the

Bolsheviks directly or indirectly against Great Britain \'lere

made between Afghanistan and the Bolsheviks, tbis would be

considered by the British Government as an unfriendly act.

The letter concluded t11th an intimation Utat if the Wana

\'lazirs did not accept tne terms offered them, punitive measures

would be taken against then. 26

The Amir in his reply pointed out that as the head

of an independent State he had the ri~t to enter into relations

wi tn other countries. Soviet Kussia was Af ~anistan' s nei~bour,

and he wanted to have neitllbourly and friendly relations 1.1itn

her. Moreover, h.e \-ranted to settlle the old boundary dispute

m th her. The Amir accused the British of conspiring and

25 Viceroy to Amir1 7 November 1920, Foreign Department, F .No. 2-F/1923 \Secret), NAI.

26 Viceroy to Amir, 7 November 19al, 9\§l.m§ford. Papers, MSS. EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOta.

360

designing to keep his country isolated from others and added:

Today the said Government bas reached such a stage that 1 t has entered into commercial and even political relations and discussions \dtn Your Excellency's Government, and Afghanistan considers it vitally important to settle and rectify the violations of terri tory \'1hich had taken place on its borders during tbe time of the Tsarist Government. ZT

He assured the Viceroy that the agreement bet,reen Russia and

Af8lanistan ,.,ould not in any 'VBY harm British interests.

Regarding the establistunent of Soviet consulates at Ghami

and Kandahar, he assured the Viceroy that the issue had not

been decided and \'JOuld never be used for political purposes.

The Amir further proposed that action against the Wazirs

should be deferred and requested that no punisbment should

be meted out to them. 28

Having received the Amir' s reply, the Viceroy

expressed his vim>ts to the Secretary of State. The Amir bad

"faUed to comply with our stipulation that the terms of b.is

agreement \'Tith. the Bolsheviks should be furnished to us"•

But on the -

contemplated establishment at Gbami and Kandahar of Bolsb.evik consulates, his assurance that final. decision has not yet been reacbed, seems to us to be genuine, and to indicate that he is open to enter into discussion and negotiations on that

27 Amir to Viceroy:, 16 November 1920P Chelmsford Paper;s, l.\1SS. EUR. E26li/55 (0) , IOLR.

28 lunir to Viceroy, 16 November 1920, FO. 371/6745, Public Record Office, London.

361

point •••• As to \1/azirs expedition, it would of course have been impossible to accept sugges­tion of Amir, but difficulty seems n0\1 to have been removed by Wazir' s submission. 29

Persistence in the demand .for disclosure of the Russo-Afghan

Treaty t'lOUld have dangerous consequences. 1 t was feared that

the Amir mirjlt refuse the disclosure of the treaty. The

Viceroy recommended Ulat His r-tajesty' s Government agree 'tx>

send a mission to Kabul. 30

The Secretary of State in b1s private and personal

tele~am to Lord Chelmsford stated that the matter pertaining

to Afgbanistan vzas of vital importance and be could not take

an independent decision to send a mission to Kabul. 'lhe matter

would be decided by the Cabinet. He further remarked: ny our

mission will arrive in Kabul to find 1\lrkisn and Bolshevik.

missions and tnat Ute Amir tdll have an opportunity for

typical. Af@tlan tactics 1n playing one against the other. n31

'lbe secretary of State invited tlle Cabinet to

express their considered opinion as to the expediency of

sending a mission to Afghanistan. He reViewed and furnished

brief information regarding Anglo-Afghan relations since the

Ra\'ralpindi Peace Conference. The Cabinet did not take any

29 Foreign Department, F.No. 2-F/19Zj (Secret)p Pro. 679, NAI.

30 Ibide

31 Secretary o.f State to Viceroy, 2 December 1920, L/P&S/10/1061, IOLR.

362

decision as its members felt that they could not overrule the

considered opinion of the man on the spot. 32 After 'this

Cabinet decision, tne matter had to be settled betlmen the

India Office 1n London and tb.e Government of India. AA. India

Office minute, dated 28 November 1920, concurred with the

Viceroy• s suggestion that the presence of Bolshevik Consulates

1n Ghazni and Kandahar "rould render tba conclusion of treaty

of friendship w1 th Afghanistan impossible. The British had

suggested at tne Mussoorie Conference that the British and the

Bolsheviks should establish their consulates on their oto.tn

sides - J alalabad and Kandabar for the British and Her at and

Mazer Sharif .for the BolsheViks. It was also decided that the

Amir should communicate tbe terms of the Russo-Aftjlan

'l'reaty. 3'

The Secretary of state accordingly informed the

Viceroy that no treaty of fr1endsb1p cOUld be signed w1 th

Afghanistan in case there were anti-British provisions, such

as the establishment of consulates 1n Eastern Af~anistan, 1n

the Russo-Af{jlan 1reaty. ije feared that the dispatch of a

mission to Kabul would be a matter of humiliation for the

Bri tisb. He feared that the 'lUrks and the Bolsheviks \'rould

create trouble for tb.e British t<lission. He "rent on to say:

32 Cabinet meeting, 6 December 1920, L/P&S/10/1061, IOIR.

33 f'linutes by Roos-Keppel. 2B November 1920, L/P&S/10/1061, IOlR.

His Majesty's Government still entertain serious misgivings regarding the proposal wtlich you make •••• In any case Amir is guilty of deliberate evasion in not replying to our definite requests and, once our ~i1ss1on is at Kabul, the risk remains that our hands will be forced again and again by consideration that almost any concession on our part is to be preferred to not securing any agreement at all. 34

The Viceroy referred certain points to the Secretary

of State for urgent consideration. These were:

(1) v~ether the Mission could be authorised to use the title

of 'His r-tajesty' w1 th reference to the Amir.

( 2) \'Jhether the Am1r should be informed that any treaty

concluded would have to be published under Article 18

of tb.e Covenant of tbe League of Nations.

(3) vlh.ether the Amir could be allot-red diplomatic represen­

tation 1n London.

(4) 'tJhetner a minor rectification of the frontier at Torkham

could be granted. 35

The Secretary of State agreed that the last three

points may, if absolutely necessary, be conceded and then only

in return for an adequate ®1d .P.£.9. .9l!2 in eacb case. Regarding

the ftrst point tne Secretary of State deferred the concession

tm.til the conclusion of a satisfactory 'treaty. 36

34 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 8 December 19~, L/P&S/10/1061, IOLR.

35 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 December 1920, L/P&S/10/1061, IOLR.

36 secretary of state to Viceroy, 19 December 1920, Foreign Department, F.No. 2-F/1923 (secret), NAI.

364

'lhe Viceroy, however, thought that the title of the

Amir was of vi tal importance. He pointed out: "Our r·ii ssion

\'1111 be helplessly handicapped if they are not authorised to

address Amir by the title which he has asswned, and it is

more than likely that the \r1h.ole negotiations may break down

upon this petty matter. n31 'l'he Secretary submitted the

question to tl:le King ~Jbo did not .favour the grant of the

title of 'His Majesty• to the Amir tmtil he had signed a

treaty of .friendsb.ip with Britain. Further, he \·ras against tb.e

employment of the title as something to bargain with in 'b:'eaty

negotiations, for in his opinion: "It ouEjlt to be reserved as

re,.,ard· for practical proof of bona &1qes and friendsnip of

Am1r as evinced 1n a treaty acceptable to British Govern-

ment. n38

After some correspondence the British Mission arrived

in Kabul on 7 January 1921. 39 Th.e reception at Kabul, thougtl

extremely friendly from the official point of vie\'lt was far

from that accorded to the Dane l41ssion in 1904. No higll

officials came out of Kabul 1x> greet the lllission; there was

no Salute (Dane had been accorded a twenty-one gun salute;

37 Viceroy to secretary of State, 12 December 193>, Foreign Department, F. No. 2-F I 1923 (Secret) , NA.I.

38 secretary of State to Viceroy, 29 December 1920, Foreign Department, F.No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.

39 lhe British Mission ~1as led by Sir H. Dobbs and had among its members P.J. P1pon, Lt. Col s.F. Muspratt, Nawab Sir Shams Shah and J. G. Ai tcheson.

365

and no regiments \'lSre drawn up on the parade grolmd 1x> give a

general salute as the British Mission passed). There was,

however, a magnificent guard of honour to receive the Mission

at the gate of their residence. 'lhe meharnandg, the officer­

in-charge of guests, explained that the officials could not

travel 1n uniform all the way tbrougb. the cold \'leather out of

Kabul for reception. \llhile this may be one explanation it may

have been that the Amir did not wish to receive tb.e Mission

\d th a public demonstration any greater than \'ras accorded to

the Bolshevik Mission. Furttler 0 the Amir may have had the

intention of according to the British Mission a reception at

par with the reception accorded by the British to the Afghan

Mission. It \'JOuld be recalled that the Afghan Mission led by

'l'arzi had not been given a salute. 40

The first ph.ase of negotiations began on 13 January

1921, with a private meeting bet\'leen the Amir and f~Jahmud Tarzl

on one side and S1r H. Dobbs and Sir Shams Shan on the other.

Dobbs communicated the information at his disposal regarding

the Russo-Afghan negotiations, and tbe objects of J emal.

Pasha's Mission to Kabul and pressed for a statement of

Afgtan policy. He explained 12lat the start of negotiations

would be difficult tmt11 the Afghans disclosed the terms of

their treaty w1 th Russia. 1be Amir prevaricated, but offered

an assurance that th.e Bolsheviks '-rould not be· aJ..lowed to

40 Dobbs to Chelmsford, 9 January 1921, f4ontague Papers, Roll No. 1831, NAI.

366

Wldertake any action deemed to be hostile to the British

Government. In conolus1on the Amir said lle would discuss the

matter over w1 th his adVisers and then take a decision as to

whether he could render a definite reply to Dobb' s enquiries. 41

On 18 January at a five-hour long conference where

the Af(jlans were represented by Mahmud Tarzi and Nadir Khan

and the Br1 tish by Dobbs and Colonel ttluspratt, the Afgtlan

representatives gave deftnite assurances to the Britisn

delegates that:

( 1) ratification of the Russo-Af gtlan 'lreaty had not yet

taken place~ and that even if i.t \'lere ratified by

Moscot'l, the Amir could decline to rats.fy it;

(2) if the Amir were satisfied of British fX-iendship, he

would decline to ratifY clauses hostUe to the British

Government, and

(3) Jamal Pastla' s mission was to re@gan1se the Afghan army,

and b.e would not be perm! tted to intrigue w1 th the

frontier tribes. Nadir Khan pressed for some concession

to Af3lan pretensions in connection wi tb the Bri tisb

frontier tribes.42

Regarding Dobbs' request that 1he terms of the Russo­

Afgban agreement may be commWlicated to him, Tarzi pointed out

41 Dobbs to Denys Bray~ 15 January 1921, L/P&s/10/955, IOIR.

42 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20 January 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

367

that at the preliminary stage of negotiations those terms could

not be disclosed. 43 Nadir Khan insisted that the tribes should

be granted the ri~t to self-determination. He said: "'\tle have

made promises to the tribes. They are our co-religionists, and

our own flesh and blood. We cannot abandon them. I don't want

you to give them to us entirely. Let them be free and let us

agree to punish them jointly if they raid eith.er British or

Afghan territory. n44

In the first and second official meetings held on

21 and 24 January, an Afghan Draft 1%-eaty \'ras discussed.

The principles of the 11ussoor1e ~ memoire were generally

agreed to by the Afghan representative, Malunud Tarzi, but \'lith

various amendments. The provisions of the draft included,

inter ~~ Afghan independence, tbe establishment of an

Afghan legation 1n London and consulates in India; the ri~t

to import arms and ammunition via India to Afghanistan; the

payment of rupees four crores 'thirty-six lakhs to the Am1r as

compensation for expenses incurred by Amir Habibullab during

the First '"'orld vlar; a plebiscite among Bri tisll frontier tribes

\'11th a vie\<r to • seJ.f-determination• as to the form of their

future government; and, a British undertaking that the 'l'urkisb.

Treaty 1rrould be amended. 45

43 Foreign Department, F.No. s-F/1923 (Secret), Pro. 746, NAI.

44 Maconachie, n. 20 p. 56.

45 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24 January 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

368

Dobbs pointed out that the Af@lan draft differed

.fundamentally from the stipulations of the t-Iussoorie aide

memoire. So great \'tas the difference that Dobbs feared an

immediate breakdown of the negotiations. 46 He made it clear

that in such an event relations be~reen the two Government

\•rould not be tb.ose which bad supervened on the Treaty of

Ra\1lalpind1 and \'l!arned: "From the day tb.e Rawalpindi Treaty

ttfas si@Jled \lfe have exercised tbe greatest forbearance regar­

ding numerous incidents. In futllre any measure vb.ich '"e may

consider to be necessary for our securit¥ or our honour will

be taken without hesitation. n47 Secretary of State Montague,

on learning of the Afghan Draft Treaty, exclaimed: "Y e Gods~

But TJrhat is tile use of Dobbs listening to all this. As I

said yesterday or tile day before, he surely ougbt not to

discuss treaty at all unless we are satisfied as to BolsheVik

relationsh1p.n48

ihe Chief Cormnissioner of the North-West Frontier

Province, however, was of the opinion tbat only t\tfo courses

'-rare open, either to insist on absolute non-interference w1 th

the tribes by the Afghan Government or to offer a concrete

concession. He himself favoured the second alternative and

46 For-eign Department, F .No. 2.F I 1923 (Secret), Pro. 767, HAl.

47 Maconacnie, n. 2, p. 56.

48 Note, 31 January 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.

even sUggested an undertaking to be gi. ven for British with­

dra"Jal from Wana. 49

On 7 February 1921 Dobbs \'Jrote to the Viceroy and

informed him about the subst1tut1on of the clause drafted as

a face-saving device, proViding for reciprocal information by

the t'tlO Governments regarding any measures \'tlieh mif#lt appear

necessary for maintenance of order among the tri 'bes on their

common border and for periodical exchange of visits between

the British and the Af~an frontier officers.so The Viceroy

\'ras \d.se enougtl to agree to a face-saVing clause for the

Afghans rather than break off tne negotiations altogether.5 1

'!be Secretary of State however, took exception to the

provision; "'lbe tribes of Afghan origin \\!hose \'relfare has

always been of close interest to the sentiment of the Af@lan

natlon" incorporated in the draft. He \'!rote to the Viceroy

that to recognise formally the ri~t of tlle AfS1ans to interest

themselves in frontier Pathans, on grounds of common nationality,

\'fas of vi tal importance. It \'ras in effect a vi tal departure

.from British attitude on tribal questions. He, however, set

aside his reservations and accepted the Government of Indiat s

advice. 52

49 .l"orei~ Department, F.No. 2-F/1923 (secret), Pro. 818, NAI.

50 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 9 February 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.

51 Chelmsford to t'lontague, 14 Febru3l"y 1921, Montcamas Papet.s, Roll No. 1831, NAI.

52 Ibid.

370

I'rlahmud Tarzi, in a private meeting, assured Dobbs

that a settlement on the lines of his draft 'face-saver' \'10ul.d

be accepted by Afghanistan, if she \'Tere satisfied as to other

clauses of the Ai. gh.an draft Treaty. 53

On 18 February Dobbs communicated his first draft

of ',W eller' Treaty aimed to control anti-British elements

in Af~anistan, rather than at their exclusion from 'the

country on the lines of the Mussoorie ~memoirs; to th.e

Government of India vJhen 1 t was communicated to tne secretary

of State. This draft reco~ized Afghanistan's independence.

Diplomatic relations WOUld be established between London and

Kabul; but the Afghan minister in London could deal w1 th the

British Government only tb.roufP, Secretary of State for India.

The Consulates of third Po~.rers v!OUl.d be excluded from the

Indian border. Afghanistan could import arms via India witbout

paying transit duties. ibe Afgb.ans \tlOuld not be allowed to

intrigue td. th the Frontier Tribes. Recirpoeal declarations

were to be made that ne1ttler party had concluded with a 1h1rd

Povrer any agreement ·.·.hich affected the mutual interests of

the parties. The British. would grant an annual. subsidy of

25 lakhs of rupees and tel.egraph material from Landi Kotal to

Kandahar via Kabul. 54

53 Dobbs to Denys Bray, 15 February 1921, Foreign Department, F.No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.

54 Maconachie, n. 2, p. 54.

371

The Secretary of State expressed bis alarm at the

course of the Kabul negotiations. 1he Afghan tactics of aiming

at piecemeal concessions \-rould, he feared, resul. t 1n spirming

out negotiations until receipt of ratification of the Russo­

Afghan 'treaty. He went on to say that the abandonment of the

Afghan request for technical facilities "apparently synchro­

nises with Bolshevik decision, for \·.rhich it may perhaps be

inferred that Afghans on their side intend to ratify. I,

therefore, think they sb.ould be reminded that His I-iajesty' s

Government have no intention of concl.uding treaty \d th them

tmless completely satisfied as to terms of treaty l<.rith the

BolsheViks.n55

Dobbs disagtteed with the Secretary of State's vie\'r

that the negotiations be stopped if the Af~an did not disclose

the terms of the Russo-Af ljlan treaty. He thought it unnecessary

to denand for a disclosure of the Russo-Afghan Treaty to the

point of rupture, 1£ the Afghans accepted his proposals with

minor changes and gave guarantees which adequately proVided

against BolsheVik designs. He added: "If Af~ans deliberately

intended to deceive, they could al\'laYs produce bogus or in­

complete Russian Treaty, and we should, therefore, be better

off from their having pretended to disclose 1 t. n56

55 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 19 February 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

56 Vicerqy to Secretary of State, 2B February 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

372

The Secretary of State 1fJaS • however, dissatisfied w1 th

the 'gis a1ler' Treaty as a \\bole. He held tb.at the British

had already given more concessions to the Af{#lans and that

notb.ing had been secured 1n return. He suggested incorporation

of a provision for British • advice in a friendly way in regard

to foreign relations of Afghanistan•. He reiterated that no

treaty could be signed unless and until there was an assurance

that the Treaty wi tb the Bolsheviks contained nothing against

British interest. He went on to say:

In particular it should be understood that any treaty which provides for payment of a subsidy to tbe Af(jLans by tile BolsheViks must ipso facto, be held objectionabl.e. It is a question for consideration ~ether a strong stand mignt not also be made against supply of aeroplanes and arms to Afghans by BolsheViks outside their treaty. 57

Dobbs assured his Government from Kabul 'that h.e would

not make concessions about Torkham or other points unless pre­

vention of Russian propaganda, Afghan neutrality and cessation

of intrigues \"11th tribes were assured. After discussing the

situation in Kabul~ ne remarked: "'tis not possible to

entertain the hope of making Afghans, at any rate by res­

pectable means, discard Russian subsidy or admit any measure

of control of their foreign relations by the British. n58

57 Secretary of State to Viceroy • 23 February 193), L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

58 Viceroy to Foreign and Political Department, 28 February 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

313

'lhe Government of India requested the Secretary of

State to modify his att1 tude and to empower Dobbs to proceed

\dth tne negotiations. They proposed that the Bolshevik

consulates should be excluded from the frontiers of India,

the terms of the Bolshevik agreement should be secured if

possible, and that tbe grant of Russian subsidy to Afghanistan

should not be held necessarily to preclude the grant of a

British subs1dy. 59

1he Secretary of State replied to the effect that,

( 1) if the Afghan Government rejected the proposals prohibiting

Bolshevik consulates on tbe Indian frontier and intri@.le,

negotiations should be broken off. (2) If they accepted these

proposals, they \t~ere further required to disclose the terms of

the Russo-Afghan Treaty; (3) If the terms were disclosed and

considered by Dobbs to be such. as to justify continuance of

negotiations, the instructions of His rllajesty Government should

be taken. (4) 1he idea of a subsidy being paid both by the

British Government and Russia were not liked by the British

Government. 60

It is apparent tb.at the Secretary of State was

forced by circumstances to modify his Viel>rs. He \tras no longer

quite as def1ni te as b.e b. ad been in his telegram of 29 October

59 Viceroy to Sec~tary of State, 1 March 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.

60 secretary of State to Viceroy, 5 March 1921, L/P&s/ 10/955, IOLR.

374

1920, 1n \'Thien he had said that simultaneous subsidies from

the British. and the Russian Governments ttrere an impossib111 ty

l'ihile in a telegram of 29 July he had characterised such an

idea as absurd and indefensible. 61

On 28 February 1921, the Russo-Af~an Treaty \'Tas

signed by the Afghan Envoy at Mosco"r and the Russian Foreign

Minister. Dobbs anticipated rupture as a result of the ins­

tructions given by tne Secretary of State. He, therefore,

decided to give first place 1n renewed discussions to

official request for disclosure of the terms of Bolshevik

1reaty.62

The Secretary of State in his telegram of 11 March

changed his tone; he insisted on the disclosure of tbe terms

of the Russo-Afgtlan Treaty. 63 'lbe Government of India now

formally requested the Home Government to reconsider their

demands; and that disclosure of the Russo-Afgban a~eement and

Bolshevik subsidy or gift of arms to Afghanistan be eliminated.

The Viceroy requested tile Secretary of State for a free hand

in concluding a treaty of friendship w1 th Afghanistan. 64

The Secretary of State instructed the Government

61 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 29 JUly 1920, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

62 Minute, India Office, 2 March. 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

63 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 11 {'!larch 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.

64 Viceroy to secretary of State, 15 March 1921, L/P&S/ 10/1955, IOLR.

375

of India not to sign th.e treaty until the Afl#\ans disclosed the

Russo-AfB)lan 'lreaty and they were convinced that this treaty

contained nothing harmful. The Viceroy as well as Dobbs, on

the other hand, held that there \'laS no need for disclosure of

Russo-Af{#lan 'lreaty. 1bey thou~ t that their draft treaty

provided ample safeguards. 65

'Lhe Secretary of State, therefore, deci~ed to refer

the controversy to the Cabinet. 'lhe Cabinet decided that

there should be no dual subsidy and th.at certain passages

should be redrafted to bring out this point. On the oUler

b.and, 1t t'las urged that in v1e"1 of British mUitary obliga­

tions el.Se\..tlere, 1 t mignt be pre.ferable to tolerate a Russian

subsidy for the time being rattler than incur the risk of the

heavy expense of a fresh .frontier "tlar. The Cabinet finally

decided that Dobbs sb.ould not sign the treaty, until the

Cabinet had had an opportunity of considering the terms of

the Soviet Treaty, particularly tb.e question of subsidies. 66

The Viceroy telegraphically requested the Home

Government to set aside their objection to Bolshevik subsiey

and arms. It was more important from the British point of

Vie\'1 to resist the establishment of Bolshevik consulates 1n

65 Proceedings of the Cabinet Meeting, 3 March 1921, D,fP&S/10/955, IOlR.

66 Ibid.

376

Gham1, Kandahar and Jalalabad. He argued that money and arms,

even if they were excluded from the Treaty oould be given 1n

trade transactions between Afghanistan and soviet Russia. 67

\'lhile these exchanges t~ere taking place the Home

Government sprang a surprise at the Government of India. The

Secretary of State informed the Viceroy on 16 March that a

Trade Agreement had been s1~ed bet\>reen SoViet Russia and

Great Bri ta1n. The Government of India had not been kept

informed of the progress of the negotiations preliminary to tilis

agreement. They were surprised to find that use had been made,

in Sir Robert Horne's note accompanying the agreement, of

information regarding l'.bich Dobbs had given the Am1r an implied

undertaking against publication. 68

, 'lhe Kabul negotiations were seriously affected by AV\.t.to- R \A.SSlcU'\

the ~ lrade Agz'eement and Sir Robert Horn's note to

Krass1n, as Br1 tain was now 1n direct contact w1 th SoViet Russia.

Dobbs thou~t that th.e British Mission 1n Kabul could not

reasonably ask the Afghans to disclose the terms of the

Russo-AffJ:lan ':treaty. The matter could n0\'1 be discussed bet\1een

th.e British and SoViet Governments directly. Dobbs t1ent on

to saya

67 Vicer~ to Secretary of State, 15 March 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

68 Sir Robert Horne \'laS Chief British Representative who signed the Anglo-Russian trade agt"eement tori th Krasin who led the Soviet delegation.

377

Crux of the problem is \"lhether Moscow, in res­ponse to Bri tisll pressure, \dll decline to ratifY draft Afgpan Treaty and eliminate clauses 1n 'l.bicb. provision is made for subsidy, arms, and Eastern consulates. If trade agreement continues in operation in spite of tb.eir refusal to adopt this course. 1 t will gl'eatly weaken our position vis-a-vis Afghanistan, since it \'Jill be argued by Af@l.ans that question has n0\'1 become one of direct negotiation between British Government and Russia. 69

After the conclusion of the Russo-Afg,.an agreement,

Dobbs folmd himself in a difficult situation and Visited Delhi

for consultations. His suggestion \'laS ttlat the Home Government

should demand from the Russian Government disclosure of the

Russo-Afghan Treaty. In the meantime, on 31 March the

MancBester Guardi!Jl publisb.ed the text of the Russo-Afghan

Treaty.70

The Af(jlans, 1n the mean\\b.Ue, prepared an amended

draft treaty and submitted it to Dobbs on 5 April. It was

accompanied by an official letter indicated that 1 t was an

absolutely final draft. Tb.e terms included stipulations tilat

the tribes which took part in the Afgb.an war should be excused

from the payment of fines and surrender of rifles; and 'that the

Af gb.ans claim to Arnawai should be recognised. 'lbere was no

provision excluding foreign consulates in Eastern Afghanistan.

This draft treaty \oJaS not acceptable to Dobbs \'bo, therefore,

69 Dobbs to Government of India, 22 March 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOIR.

70 Maconacnie, n. 2p p. 59.

378

prepared for rupture tn the negotiat1ons.71

Aware of the impending rupture, Tarzi had fixed

9 April for the final official meeting, and 11 April for a

fare\'Tell audience \din tb.e Amir. In the meantime, the Amir' s

uncle died, and official business tms suspended for three

days. Tb.e Amir intervened to resolve the deadlock and discussed

the problems directly with Dobbs. It appeared from 1he

discussion that the main difficul. ties were the proposed Russian

consulates in Eastern Af t1lanistan, and the condi tiona about the

imports of arms. Regarding consulates, the Amir conceded tbat

the British objections were just, but pointed out that Dobb' s

insistence upon the exclusion of Russian consulates from

Eastern Affjlanistan forced him to choose between Soviet

Russia and Britain. 72 Tarz1 admitted Ulat tne main considera­

tion g1 ven to the Russians in the treaty was Eastern consulates,

the sole object of wb.ich, he conceded, was to stir up trouble

in India. 'lhe Am1r and Tarzi, however, dwelt on tb.e risk of

rupture w1 th Russia, ''lhic:h they \'JOuld rtm by exclusion of the

consulates from Easter.n Afghanistan.73

Dobbs realised the Amir' s difficulties and suggested

th.at the Home Government "be no\'r moved to press Russians very

71 Viceroy to Seaetary of state, 6 AprU 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.

72 Dobbs Report on the Kabul Mission, Memorandum, A 1/94, L/P&S/18, IOLR.

73 Vicer~ to the Secretary of State, 12 April 1920, L/P&S/10 /955, IOIR.

379

strongly regarding consulates and to demand an early reply.

If they cannot do this, it is necessary for us to realise

that AfW1ans are precluded from complying with our demands,

except at the utmost risk of rupture wi1h Russia, and, unless

the support and compensation indicated forthcoming, they \'rill

not run the risk. a74

The Secretary of State thereupon consul ted Lord

Curzon, the Foreign secretary t-lho considered 1 t un\d.se to put

pressure on the Russians regarding consulates 1n Eastern

Af€tlan1stan; tbe Russians migbt retort by asking the British

\#that right had they to object to Russian consulates in an

independent AfS1an1stan. 'lbe Viceroy \'laS told that "Dobbs has

at the moment established position \\bicll is advantageous from

detaching A.fgbans from BolsheViks by our making a comprehensive

offer of assistance, and I shall be glad to have your further

views.n7S

For some time the correspondence between the Secretary

of State and the Viceroy \mB mainly concerned with th.e possibi-

11 ty of securing an 'Exolusi ve• 'Ireaty to eliminate Bolshevik

influence &an Afghanistan. 'lhe Aftjlans were to be compensated

adequately for. the loss of the benefits accruing fran the

Russo-Afgtlan Treaty, and supplied w1 th the means of repelling

Russian aggression, \'bich might be expectea to result from

74 Dobbs to Government of India, 10 AprU 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.

75 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 15 AprU 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.

380

their acceptance of an 'Exclusive' Treaty w1 tb. the Bri t1sh

Government. Dobbs also expressed his opinion th.at if suffi­

cient inducement \'lere offered to the Afi?Jlans, the British

could tdn them over. Regarding Afghanistan• s financial crisis

he ~ote:

Her need of money now is so B'eat, and the dis­content of army is so serious, that it was possible that far immediate adequate sum and promise of arms in the event of Russian aggression, she would sacrifice to some extent her power of independent action, \iOuld forego her tribal pretensions, and break with the Turkish Nationalists and Russia sufficiently for our purposes. 76

In a subsequent letter to the Government of India,

Dobbs was less hopeful of the prospect of success in dealing

1.·ti th tbe Afghans. Rosenburg, \\ho had a treaty w1 til him for

ratification, ~ras announced by Kabul press to arrive in Kabul

on 26 AprU. Afghanistan• s relations w1 th Soviet Russia had

reduced Brittan freedom of action. As Dobbs put it:

It is impossible for us nottr to suggest even informal control of foreign. affairs, but a mutual promise not to make wi Ulout consul­tation agt"eement affecting mutual interests 1111 tb. a tnird power ••• could be made acceptable to Afghanistan. Dismissal of Bolshevik Minister from Kabul could not be demanded by us but we could ask tb.at official or unofficial representatives be strictly limited, and \'te eoul.d possibly secure informally tnat Jamal's uervices be politely terminated. 77

76 Dobbs to Government of India, 21 AprU 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, rom..

77 Ibid.

381

'.t.be complexity of the problem was summarized as

follows:

( 1) Russia tfanted a treaty w1 th. Afghanistan to secure her

position w1 th Muslims in her Central Asian republic

on the Af ~an border and to threaten the British 1n

India.

(2) Afghanistan \!ranted a treaty with both Russia and Britain

and wanted to escape domination by either power,

{3) Britain t'lanted a treaty tdth Afghanistan to prevent

Russia' s domination and bring Aftjl.anistan under her

own sphere of influence.

{ 4) 'lhe North-vi est Frontier of India \'las unsettled, partly

because of lack of settlement bet\reen Afghanistan and

Britain and partly because Afgnanistan was exercising

her influence against the Bri tisn 1n order to force

concessions from them,7B

The Secretary of State preferred an exclusive policy.

He feared that the course of action favoured by Ule Government

of India would leave the Amir free to receive money and arms

from the Bolsneviks and military assistance from the Turks,

He assured the Viceroy that Britain abandonment of consulates

in Eastern Af ghan1 stan, 79

78 Viceroy to Secretary of State, Zl April 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR,

79 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 29 April 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955t IOLR.

382

Dobbs could not see any advantages in concluding an

exclusive tt'eaty 1!tiUl Af~anistan. He thought that if the

Russians were excluded on paper, the Amir would receive Russian

money and arms under the guise of commercial transactions. 'lbe

Viceroy agreed w1 th. Dobbs and suggested that a settlement

should be made wi tll At. gtlanistan. He cautioned that rupture

would create problems both on the frontier and in India and

added&

But I want a settlement at present td th Af8lanistan, even though we cannot get 1 t on terms we should like. It is 1n rrt'J opinion undesirable that we should come away wi 1hout a treaty, w.L th probabUi ty of serious external and internal consequences and prospect of Af~anistan securing treaty relations of sorts t-ritb all important powers but our-selves. 80

Dobbs in his private letter to Lord Reading cautioned him by

saying: "VIe could afford to be dilatory in the old days \ben

we had no Vigilant opponents at Kabul. '\'le can no longer afford

1 t now at critical stages of negotiation such as present. n81

The Government of India reviewed the situation and

presented three possible courses of action viz. { 1) pursuance

of the exclusive policy; ( 2) presentation of tb.e • ,W al.ler'

treaty as a final offer plus a public and formal assurance

against aggression by a third po\'Ter and a demand for the

disclosure of all treaties made by the Afgban Government; and

80 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 5 May 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

81 Dobbs to Lord Reading, 26 May 1921, vol. 23, Reading Paoet-it MSS. E.'UR. E 238, IOLR.

383

(3) Modification of 'J?J& a1U£' is unessentia1 9 but insistence

on the disclosure of Ule Russian Treaty, exclusion of the

Eastern Consulates, and an assurance against Russian

aggression. 62

Tb.e Viceroy, after reviewing the three alternative

courses. of action, preferred modification of 'pis aller'

treaty. He explained his preference clue to th.e changed

circumstances as follows:

\Ve should be prepared to go to considerable length, in money and arms to secure a clear S\'leep of the SoViet 'l'reaty and SoViet influence from Af~anistan \-Jere this possible. But \'Ie believe that 1 t is not. Our offer, in \\hatever form 1 t \'las couched, t'fould be in effect a reversion towards our old control of Afghanistan• s foreign relations and \-<TOuld be regarded as such •••• But the Am1r came to the throne as the champion of Afgjlanistan' s independence and has proclaimed it in all his public utterances, and \'Te believe it would be impossible for bim to accept this or ant similar clause. 83

It was feared that an Exclusive Treaty and \Atithdrat.,al

of Russian legation \ITould be an act of provocation and would

lead to a 'lrlal' bet\-reen Afghanistan and Russia. It \'Tas British

policy not to encourage Afghanistan to provoke Russia. rJiore­

over, a formal promise that the Russian legation should be

excluded from Af€Jlanistan l'Tas irreconcUable w1 tb. Afghan

independence. 'lhe British wanted to exclude Russia from

82 For exclusive, • pis aller' and gentlemanly treaties, see Appendix XI.

83 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27M~ 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

384

Afghanistan and keep it under their sphere of influence. without

bearing expenditure and any risk.

The Secretary of State, emphasising his preference

for th.e Exclusive Treaty, agreed, if this t'lere fotmd to be

impraetible, in the last resort to sanction the '.W, a11E' • 84

Dobbs decided to inform the Afghans tb.at if they '\'TOuld ter­

minate tbeir 'lreaty \d th Russia and undertake not to receive

any subsidy or munition directly or ind1rectly from Russia,

the British vrould g1 ve 40 lakhs of rupees. The Afghans could

have a Russian legation in Kabul and could make a purely

commercial agreement ~Ti ttl Russia. 85 'Ihus the benefits to

be anticipated from the • Exclusive• 'lreaty t>Tere very unsubs­

tantial. It seemed that the Af{jlan Government could only be

asked to g1 ve undertakings against acceptance of Russian money

and arms. The Bolshevik intrigue in Af~anistan \>JOuld remain

~li tn the unavoidable retention of the Russian legation and

consulates outside the prohibited zone. It ".ras evident that

an exclusive treaty with tbese reservations t'IOUld not be

exclusive at all.

At a meeting of the tt-To delegations held on 30 J1.me,

Dobbs ~ormed Tarzi of tne secretary of State• s sanction of

• pis aller' 1reaty. 'lhe Afghan delegates pointed out that

84 Dobbs Report on the Kabul f>iission, Memorandum, A 194P L/P&s/18, IOLR •

85 Dobbs to Government of India, 3 Jtme 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOill.

385

Afgtanistan would, by rupture with Russia, lose not only

Panjdeh and Russian subsidy, but also other benefits, such as

telegraphic lines, a smokeless po\'lder factory, 5,500 rifles,

field guns, anti-aircraft ~s, and twelve aeroplanes. The

British should supply all these immediately and not only in

the event of an attack by a third power. Tarzi and the other

Af~an representatives professed to be prepared to consider a

complete break 't'ri ttl Russia involving the exclusion of the

Russian legation.86

proposals:

Dobbs at a meeting held on 4 June made the foUO\dng

If treaty with. Russia is entirely scrapped and Russian Minister withdra"m, British Government will give assurances alreac:\V' mentioned, subsid;y of 40 lakhs of rupees, in1 tial grant of 10 lakhs • telegraph. material b-om Kabul Via Kandahar to Herat only 160 miles being provided immediately and six aeroplanes after six months, ''lith the contingent gift of muni tiona already mentioned in the event tmprovoked Russian attack. 87

Dobbs went on to say that 1f the Afghans received only a Russian

legation and Russian Commercial agents outside the probib1 ted

zone, tile British Government would give the Afghans 35 lakhs

of rupees and telegraph material. In the event of war

bet\>reen Russia and Af@Jlanistan, the Bri tisn would not give

86 Dobbs to Government of India, 3 June 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

87 Dobbs to Government of India, 4 J\Dle 1921, L/P&s/10/955, IOI.R.

386

any assurance of military or any other type of b.elp to

Af ~ani stan. 88

Though the Aftjlans at first seemed. somewb.at inclined.

to consider these proposals, they eventually pressed for an

offensive and defensive alliance with the Br1tish.8 9

On 11 June, Dobbs reported to the Government of India

that the Aff#\an Government bad decided on a complete break

\'11th Russia.· At this point th.e Secretary of State telegt-a­

phically reminded the Government of India of their earlier

contention that the Bolsheviks" after being expelled fran

Afghanistan, would stUl be able, under the Turko-Af3lan

Treaty, to return in a Turkish guise. 90 In anotner telegram

he insisted for a simllar reason on the exclusion of Bukbaran

consulates from the prohibited zane.91

At a meeting on 14 July, Mahmud Tarzi intimated that

a definite decision had been reached by the Aftjlan Council

that no understanding could be given, as prov1ded for by clause

15 of the proposed Exclusive Treaty~ for exchange of viet-rs

regarding future agreement. 92

The Secretary of State \'laS not ready to accept a

88 Dobbs to Government of India, 4 June 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.

89 Ibid.

90 secretary of State to Viceroy o 11 June 1921, L/P&S/ 10/ 955, IOLR. .j

91 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 16 Jme 1921, L/P&s/ 10/ 955, IOLR.

92 Dobbs to Government of India, 18 July 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.

387

' pis aller' treaty and w1 thdre\'1 any authority g1 ven to Dobbs

to negotiate it. He proposed a treaty as between two c1V111-

zed nations, by \tJhich provision t>rould be made for the reci­

procal riS1t to send Envoys and Consuls arid for offer of

ordinary ne1ghbourly relations. The subs~dy could not be

paid to Afghanistan. Ttle Treaty thus described came to be

known 1n the correspondence as the 'gentlemanly' treaty. 93

Durtng these negotiations tne British continued

these efforts to retain as much Exclusive control over

Af~anistan as was possible. On 17 July, the British Foreign

0 ffice objected to a commercial agreement signed between

Af ~anistan and Italy; 1 t informed the I tal ian Government

that the Amir, by an agreement \'lhich b.e was on the verge of

concluding \d.th the British, was about to admit the superior

and predominant pol1 tical influence of Great Britain in his

country. Tb.e British stUl considered Af(jlanistan to lie

~ tb.1n tbe spllere of Bri t1 sh political influence. 94 News o.f

this British representation regarding Italo-Af@tl.an ireaty

reache\'! tne Afghan Government on 25 July. Dobbs immediately

felt a ef4, Be in the Aftjl.an attitude. He reported that the

British obje, t1on-

woUl.Cl ~P~Y ... ~ccotmt for the Afghans extra­ordinary~ face and their sudden bitter

·,

93 secretary of state to Viceroy, 5 August 1921, L/P&S/ 10/ 955, IOlR.

94 Dobbs Report on the Kabul f1ission, Memorandum, A 194, L/P&S/ 18, IOIR.

anti-Bri t1sh attitude. We may be sure that Frenob and Italians have made most of the statement that tb.e intention of our contemp.. lated treaty was to reaffirm our predominant political interest in Af~anistan, and that thou~ ostensibly Afgnanistan now enjoys independence, she is still regarded by us as within the sphere of our political influence. 95

In a private meeting held on 6 August, Mahmud i'arz1

put forl1ard an absolutely final draft treaty.96 It \'ras

accompanied by a note setting forth the disadvantages and

dangers wnich complete rupture \\11th Russia \vould entail for

Aftjlanistan. 97 The proposed treaty abandoned the exclusive

proposals, did not proVide for the exclusion of the Eastern

Consulates, and demanded an amnesty, not only for the Masuds

and Wazirs, but for all the frontier tribes '.from Cll1 tral to

Soutb. Baluchistan• •

Dobbs 1n his telegram of 6 August remarked that

' argue further would be useless and humiliating". \'lhile

th~~ relatS.ons between Dobbs and the Afghan Government '\'Iere

str \:ned, the meil bag of the British. l4iss1on was lost on its

Kabul to India. Dobbs suspected the Af~an Govern­

ment' s n. . 1nth1s and, tilere.fore, suspended the negotiations.

95 Dobbs to aov~ nment of India, Z1 July 1921, L/P&S/ 10/ 955, IOLR. ,_

'-,

96 This draft treaty ~~ pX"epared by the Amir' s CotmoU. 'lb.ey had decided that- 1 t either nad to be accepted or the Bri tisb. Mission sil~ul.d leave.

97 Dobbs to Government of India, 8 August 1921, L/P&S/ 10/ 955, IOIB.

389

He planned to wait for a fortnigb.t for the recovery of the

mail bag and appropriate explanations from the AffP.an

Government. He wanted to use the incident to exert pressure

on the AfS1ans: "In view of this robbery of diplomatic post,

we shall now be 1n a position to take up strong position

w1 th the Af ghana and threaten them. n9B On 20 August two

members of the Afghan Foreign Office brought tb.e maU bag

along \'lith a letter of apology from 1·7ahmud Tarzi. 1be

interval between the rupture of negotiations and the return

of the bag 'l.'las occupied by discussions regarding the future

talks, bet\'reen the Government of India and the Home Government.

Dobbs proposed to place the 'exclusive' and 'gentlemanly'

draft treatm simultaneously before the Afl'Jlans and allO\'T

them to choose. He thought that the Af ghana would prefer

an ordinary treaty to rupture. They t-rere not ready for war,

d ~~uld like to avoid confrontation with Russia. To

m.., tnta1n balance between the two powers, the Afghans could not

w predominance of Russian ~linister in Kabul. 99

·On 23 August Mahmud Tarzi informed Dobbs that the

Russo-Af an ~eaty had been ratified. On 1 September, fal'zl

officially ;, tlmated a copy of the Treaty to the Bri t1sb

r-tission in Kabu, ·.; 100 'lbe Government of India considered that

98 Dobbs to Reading, 9 August 1921, vol. 23, Reatiing Pagmos, MSS. EUR. E 238, IOLR.

99 Dobbs to Government of India, 21 August 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.

100 Dobbs to Reading, 24 August 1921, vol. 23 • Reading Paoers, r-tss. EUR. E. 238, IOUl.

390

no further insistence on disclosure of secret clauses \ms

needed, and that the ''13'3 \'las no,., clear for negotiations of

the ' pis aller' treaty, proVided a note was given by Dobbs to

the effect that the establishment of consulates in the prohi­

bited zone by a third power \>Tould constitute a breach. of the

treaty • 101

Dobbs was directed by the Government of India to

request the disclosure of the Russian Treaty as ratified in

Kabul. The SoViet Government bad already furnished the

British Government officially w1 th a copy of the treaty

ratified by them, \'1hich contained a provision for the estab­

lishment of Russian Consulates at Kandahar and Gb.azni and

had granted a large subsidy and other help to Af@lanistan.

In reply to Dobbs' request, the A.f Sian Government furnished a

copy of a portion of the treaty and agreements, omitting the

~ost vi tal portions relating to the grant of help to

A'(gnanistan by the Soviet Government. 102

·,·,hUe the negotiations bet\'reen Af@lanistan and

Brita~ \'lere at a critical juncture, an Afghan mission to

the United States led by Mohammad Wali Khan had

arrived 1n ondon and had an intervie\'1 on 17 August with Lord

Curzon. Wh.e}M~hammad Wall Kban re£erred to the Kabul '-,

101 Vicerey to Secretary of State, 9 August 1921, L/P&S/10, 1956, IO~.

102 The Treaty as disclosed by the Af{#lan Government "'as an ordinary treaty guaranteeing neigb.bourly relations bet\-reen Af g-,.anistan and Soviet Russia. See Appendix XII.

391

negotiations, Lord Curzon broke off the conversation, saying

that the negotiations 1n Kabul \~re tile affair of Afghanistan

and India and not his concern. The AfSlan mission wanted to

be introduced to the King by Lord Cura:>n but he declined to

do so and re£erred Ute matter to Ute India Office. Mohammed

vlali Khan informed the Affjlan Forei@ll.finister of Lord

Curzon• s attitude. Mahmud Tarzi in his letter of 28 August

to Dobbs complained about the treatment of the Afgtlan Mission

in London. 103

Lord Curzon addressed a note to the Soviet Govern­

ment on 7 September 1921, calling attention to breaches of

undertakings entered into under the preamble of the Anglo­

Soviet i'rade Agreement. The Russian Treaty with Af€P,anistan

t'las referred to as the most serious charge against the SoViet

Government. Reference was made to Stalin's mention of the

· Russo-Af(#lan Treaty as an instrument to guarantee friendl.y

}, ... elations with a state \'bose territory was an important

el by 't'JIU.ch tttne Communist International maintained

dire\! t contact with India". '!he note further referred to

4 and 5 of the Russo-Afgtlan Treaty which prOVided

for the ek'!tablishment of Russian consulates in Gbazni and

Kandahar. 10~ 1h1s ttlas also interpreted as an un&iendly

act.

103 Adamec, n. 5, P• 164.

104 British. Foreign Office to Cheoher1n, Soviet Fore13'). Commissary, 7 Septanber,1921, L/P&s/10/956, pt. 2, IOLR.

392

1be Russians People' s Commissariate on '0 September

handed over a note to the British re[lresentative in Moscow to

be submitted to the British ForeiPJl Office. Tb.e note denied

the charges against the Soviet Government and went on to say:

It is quite obvious that all the reports, speeches and utterances quoted in tbe Br1 tish note bave been invented, forged and falsified for some purpose. They have appeared some time ago 1n papers, t-:hieb. have also reproduced a number of o1:her documents, circulars and letters, purporting to come from tbe 'lbird International, various Soviet institutions or from Mr Lenin, Trotsky, Tchi tcherin, Litvinoff •••• 105

It t-ras added in the note that strict instructions had been

issued after the conclusion of tile Anglo-Russian Agreement

by the Russian Government to 1 ts representatives in the East

ordering them to abstain from any anti-Bri tisb. propaganda. 106

Th.e Secretary of State adVised the Viceroy that fUll

1solosure of any secret clause in the Russo-Af@lan ~eaty

tore.: s a condition precedent to the conclusion of a 'l'reaty on

aller' lines.

On 13 September Mahmud Tarzi, wiUlout replying to

the requ~t for full disclosure made by Dobbs 0 wrote 'that

the ·Afghan ~vernment could negQ_tiate only wi 1h His Majesty' s

105 r.iaxim Li tvinof, Deputy People's Commissary for Foreif¥1 Affairs t.o Lord Curzon, Z1 September 1921, L/P&S/10/956, pt. 2, IOLR.

106 Ibid.

Government and not \•11th the Government of India. 107 This was

an obvious counter-action to the attitude adopted by Lord

Curzon towards the Af[#lan Mission 1n London.

Dobbs repeatedly demanded full disclosure of tbe

Russo-Aff#lan Treaty, failing \'bich he would soon leave KabUl.

On 18 September, I'lahmud Tar z1 intimated that he could only

give a private verbal assurance in regard to tne supplementary

undertakings "11 1h Russia. Dobbs privately asked Mahmud Tarzi

whether he would be prepared to accept a 'gentlemanly treaty'.

The draft treaty was presented by Dobbs at an official

meeting held on 19 September. 100

On 25 September, the Amir intervened and 1nvi ted

Dobbs to see b.im privately. He insisted on an Exclusive

Treaty and indicated that he was prepared to cancel the treaty

w1 th Russia \IJb.ich had been recently ratified. Dobbs suspected

he Afgbans and thou~t that the Amir wanted to get the maximum

be; efi ts from botn the British and the Russians. In a

tb.e deeper implications of the Amir' s

r~y own feeling 1s that 1 t is 1m possible for "Great Britain to involve herself in a trans­a~:tlon of such a discreditable nature. If,

107 Vicerqy to Secretary of State, 15 September 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

108 Dobbs to Government of India, 19 September 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.

394

\'Ji thin six weeks after ratification, and after receiVing subsidy 0 Amir tears 1n pieces Treaty wiUl Russia he could equally well tear up ours. We should never be safe wi 1h him. 109

The Government of India ags:-eed w1 th tilis view and considered

the Amir' s proposal obviously dangerous.

'lbe Government of India feared that a breach with

Afghanistan \"'Iuld have a most serious upsetting effect on tb.e

tribes on the frontier, especially if 'the cry of jeh,aci l'ras

raised. Af~anistan had become stronger and had probably

received arms from SoViet Russia. It could rely on further

Soviet help in a conflict witb the British. It was, therefore,

proposed by the Government of India that the Friendship

1reaty was tbe best alternative.

After a lengthy correspondence between the Govern­

ment of India and the home government, tne Secretary of State )

~ave his decision as follows: \

Dobbs should accordingly reply to Amir that exclusive treat,y has been made impossible by Am1r' s own action in ratifying the treaty witb. Bolsheviks, even if his proposals t!J'ere acceptable in themselves; and that since be has not only rejected condition upon ~bida Hts Majesty' s Government were thernsel ves

· Fepared to offer b.1m a treaty of friendship b'Ut h.as no"r committed nimself formally to an alliance witn Bolsheviks, it has become necessary to adjourn negotiations until he is in different frame of mind. 110

109 Dobbs to Denys Bray~ 25 September 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOlR.

110 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 2B October 1921, L/P&S/ 10/9(:/J, IOLR.

395

After a lengthy bargaining by the Amir on tribal

question and financial assistance, on 11 November, the news

reached Kabul 'that the Bri tisn motor transport for the return

of the Mission to India b.ad erot\§led the frontier. On the

same evening Ule Amir granted Dobbs a farewell audience, 1n

\llhich he accepted the ' gentlemanly t..'reaty' • Stressing his

O\IJn role in finally agreeing to a treaty, the Amir assured

Dobbs tb.at Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarz1 was not aware of this

decision. 'lbe Treaty \'laS signed on 22 November 1921, 1n the

Delkusha Palace between Amir Amanullab. and Sir H. Dobbs. 111

After Ute signing of tne 'l'rea-ey Dobbs announced that as a

mark of its satisfaction at the establishment of good

neighbourly relations, the British Government would make an

immediate large gift of telegaph material to 1tle Amir. 112

On 1 December, after a most cordial fare't'rell to

t~e British Mission, tne Amir delivered a speech asserting

th.a.t tlle Treaty 'lri til the Br1 tish was one of neiS!.bourly

rela:t1ons only and not of friendship. He declared that he -,_

•.-~ould 'only be prepared to enter into close friendly relations

with tbe British if they showed generosity towards Turkey

and the fr<m.tier tribes and treated the inhabitants of India

td th kindness. 113 Most probably the aim of this speech was

111 For the text of tb.e Treaty see Appendix XIII.

112 Dobbs Report on the Kabul Mission, A 194, L/P&s/18, IOLR.

113 Ibid.

396

to tell the Indian IVIuslims that he \ltas the champion of tb.e1r

cause and ttle KhUafat movement and to as sure the frontier

tribes that he had not deserted tb.em and would struggle for

procuring their rif#lta.

The terms of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty were favoura­

ble to the Afghans. 1b.e Afl91ans could manage to extract

benefit from botb. of her pot~Ter.tul neigb.bours. They could

manage to stay out of th.eir spheres of infiuence. 1he

Af@tlans were congt-atulated by the Indian paper Zamindar in

these words:

'lbe terms of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty, indicate the cleverness of Ule Afghans in securing Vf!t"/ favourable cond1 t1ons for their country. 'lhe English appear to fear the Bolsheviks and llave managed to obtain a modification of the AfS1an 'lreaty td th Russ1at the Amir haVing agr-eed not to all0\'1 any SoViet agent near 'the frontier of India. 114

, lhe Dande Mataram of the 2B November 1921 congra-

tu.\ated the Am1r on his success in securing his terms from \

th.e'-~1tisb. 'lhe paper maintained that AffP.anistan succeeded .

in se~ing many advantageous terms from Great Britain, t.Jb.ile '

the latt~~ country gained nothing solid except tne Friendship

Treaty with the ruler of Afghanistan. 115

The Xftki~ in its 27 December issue \llrote that

signing the treaty was a great success for British diplomaoy.1

114

115

Tl}e 6amindar (Lahore), 19 December 1921; PUQjab Press Abs;tract, vol. 34, no. 51, p. 582.

B§,Pde !ateramp 28 November 1921, Pmjab .PJ:ess Abstract, vol. 3 , no. 49, p. 525.

It \'II'Ote:

\

'

No subsidy \dll be paid to it (Afghanistan) 1n future from tb.e Indian exchequer, tJbich should satisfy those tmo used to regard 1 t as an in­justifiable burden upon this country. 'lbe provision regarding the establishment of Bri tlsh Consulates at Kandahar and J alalabad constitutes the great victory for British diplomacy, inasmuch. as the arrangement would practically annul tbe Afghan treaty with SoViet Government. 116

116 ±he Va!sl• (Amritsar), 2.1 November 1921, Punjab P£ea§ Abstract, vol. 34, no. 49, PP• 525-26, N M L.