Simon  Schwartzman  

Final  examination,  Political  Science  220  International  Relations,  Berkeley,  1967  

Professor  Ernst  B.  Haas  

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1. Vietnam  and  the  oppression  of  minorities  2. Systems  3. Middle-­‐range  theories  

 

 

 

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Simon. S chwGt.rtzman

Take-home Final Nxa;l1ination ! . 'b lj

Pol Sci 220 ""'P.-T ..... o ..... f ...... _E ... ·· _0 B ...... .... ~,!l2..!.!

Berkeley, F~11~961·

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Simon Schwartzma~ - .' , ,

Take-Home Final Examination

1 i Vietnam and QPpress ioLl .2! minorities

Pol 8 01220 ,Prof Haa s;

A linkage between t~e Vletnamw~r and t;heoppreseion of minor! ties - the Negro problem ,- in the United sUa tes is not an unusual proposition among tho$~ t hat fQll o)N ,Waltz' s "second i magen of Interna tiona l , Rela tions " : tha,t rel~te international

conflicts with the interna l st~cti1-r~ 0 ;£ the sta te. According to this fA pproQch, the JD..'l in exp:t3 h~ t lion ,for t .be external conf l ict should be s ought not in the c har~cter,istics of tme interaction

, .. \

patterns between the nations in -c,<;>nflfci:t , . or t he international

system (.13 iii. wh.olet bu:t rather as a: Qons ~q\i~nce of the internal , . \

cham. cteristic~of the s tates. ,.'. . "\ \

Which. of the two images is 'Q($st f th.is or ''''t.h:e third one,

that; cons1sts axactly on consider~pg that intern tiorual conflics

Gl.re res ulta ntsi'rom a sta.te ' ~f int~rnation~l " ana; r~? We could sugges t 'that there is . not ,sing;9 Bfswer to 't~j;SC;~qlt'~tion, it depends. I,t is possible to th'ing , t~at a u.tight ff i~yernati,.onal

; " . I

system does not leave mu.ch. freedom of a-pt1on,\ fo,r the ":actors .. being . ! ~ t . " "

so that each has to consider 'car~fuily tne nt'ovents .\ of\ the other ,: . \ / ~ . " \\ .. \ ,

a nd r es;pond accordingly. In this . s,:ens e there \~S ,a syst'$,mic . . {- '" ' . \\ \\

logiC 'the i mposes 1. t e aLf upon tne ; ~:ct o:rs .. ,. How~;ver, in a~\loose ._0 ",," _>_ . o( ':1: \'; \

system. tae s t e tes have mucn ,mOr, / .-:freedom Qf c n,.oice, en~" a l:Q.gic of the sys tem can only establish <the genernl lS'9, ri~e of'· alterQ~ti:~eet, or degrees of freedom, of ea.en ac.:~or.. ";;:,,\, -_. '. ;~\\ .

. . '.' \'i . . \ \ If this is s o, we can eta r-t-l)ux d1scus~fon ' P1:' tbe proposed

linkage g~ asking whether t he in~erna.t1ona1. )system did no~imposed u piuJ. the Uu i -t ed sta'tes i -ts pres~'J1It policy ~n V1etn~m. ~hl.s 1s, of course, the offiCial l;"ational: i~Ae United St~ite s had no choice but

to resXlDnd aggression, avoiu+6g{ i. Munich. and the consequences of .. ~ "!f' 1 •

-the Domino process . And. tie' 1h~'( c1.aiis of the Vietnamese are correct, tl:lat they are simpl y r~'6'vonding to i mperia list ag&ress1on,

, /'

;

the problem falls iIttAx£!ly within the lo~ic of the "third image": reciprooal peroeptions, containment,. equilibrium. and so on; with no pla.oe for internal ,questions.

But we Can also say tha t this ki.nd of systemio oonflie

is much more likely to oceur among *quals than in Qssymetrio relationships. It is clear tha.t, for the Vietnamese, the only ohoice that ever existed was among differ ent levels' of tes).sta nce. wn1le,. f(l)T th.s Un! ted States, there was 51 choice of not starting the fight 1n the first place, and there;i.s a new choice at each level o.f the escalation ladder. Again, at the official levlitl, each decision is justified int terms of' its necess ity, ass a function of the i nternational sitwation, the cold war. But it is very clear that the official picture of the international system is rather a rationaliza tion than a determinant of the Amerioan involvement in Vietnam. There is no need to discuss this pOint here, since it is openly recognized today, even in offiCial circles, that the main reason why the 'United States is in Vietnam i s beoause they are already there" Wha t ha ppened was just Ii successive accumulation of small steps, each of them avoida.ble in itself., having little t o do with the global l.ogic of 'the cold war. and the offic'ial appeal to the problems of the cold war worked. and still work; only a s a protective i deological screen .. f.he conclusion, thus. is that the Vietna.m war is not something that was imposed upon the United States. but an action that hav..e to be explained by the4 analysis of the motivations ' of this country. Which could be this motiVation, 'in this Case?

The linkae between internal oppression and external war is Ii commonpl a ce among Marxists, in theirm interpretation of nat.ionalislJl. According to it, na tionalism i s a phasis of development of Ca pita1islJl that is still more decadent than Imperialism; while i mperialism means to make war for keeping up tb.e level of surplus-value ... nationalism, and nationalist wars. is an attempt to avoid internal conflagration by direot appeal to irrational symbols a nd the estimulation of external conflicts.

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This scheme wa s developed mainly to expla in the European,

fascist kind of ntationalism., and Was almost completely dropped with the emergence of nationalism in the underd.evelopecl worll:d.

In spite of t hese i deological contingences, this theory a.grees

wi th what i s said in sce! ological theory about the effects of externa.l conflict in the ct.)hosion of groups (as in Simmel­

Coser), or. on the o'thor wa y r ound . abut -the mechanisms of

genenalized fl nd transferred conflict behavior as a form of oollective reaction to sanctions; SEl sugges ted by Smelser

(in his ,t!1eorl 2! Oollective ]3ehaVior-t . The agreement does

not go very i'a r,- since the socfiologiCal statemente a re based

on observa tions ox' small groups, a nd do not Gppl y neces sarily

to .. the behavior of nations. Besides, there is an specifj.c

elem.ent, nationalism, that is basic fDr the theory.at the na tional level land does not enter a.t the-: small group level,

at least in a first aiPPJI§Ximation.

Before continuing, we oan ant.ec1pate the conolusion, that is negative : the supposed linkage. between oppression of

mino!rities and the Vietnam \'VQ r does not stand uP. Of oourse,

being just one Case under analysis , oonnections oan b e found between the phenomena. But., if ftinternaloppres s iorl' refers to the historical situation of the ~egro, the argument is pointless : this situation is a constant in American histOry,

and in consequence cannot explain variations in behavior. So , we take it as referring to the reoent raual unrest ....... But, ohronologically, the Korean war i s pre'Vious to this u.nrest,

and is" nevertheless, vary similar to th-a present Vietn!ilm

war __ The ex pl a nation must be Common for both wars, and has

to exclude the l'av.ial unrest ., that is contempora r y to just

one of it.( We oould acce pt , on the other !'land; that the Vietna.m

War has some bearing in the prasent shaking of American society"

of' whioh the Negro problem is one aspect - but th.is is another question) •

It is i nteresting to cons:tder, a t this pOint, what

Sch.wnpeter has.t to say about ca pitalislJl and Imperialism~ He adresf;H3s himself to the ques tion of Why states engage in

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"obj ectless " agr ess ive behavior - hi s definition of I mpe r i a lism­and looks :Lor the int ernal characteri ntics of t he Sta t es t hat have t hi s k ind of behavior , in the bost tradition of the "s ec c;nd i mage". Contrar-..r to Leni n , for whom I mperial ism is at t he essence of Ca pita lism, S chUL~peter states , qvi te flately, the opposite : ca pitali sts a re "all i nevitab1u demo­cr<lti zed, individuali zed, and r a tionalize4", and , in consequence, woul i never be i nteres ted on uch an i rra'iiona 1 behavior as i mperi ali st warfare ~ l)Be ca us e L.l r:erialism i s just a r emi ni s cence of pre- capital i st probl ems and situations , that tend to vani sh in a mtiona1 ( e . g ., capitalist) world: "The fuls tinct t

t ha t i s only ' ins tinct t, th..qt has lo ;.; t its purpose , langui s hes

relatively quickl y in t he capi taU.s t world, jus t as (: OC8 an inefficient economic practice" (2) ; "a purely ca pitalist world t herefore can offe r no :fertile s oil to i mperia list L':l.pulses " (3).

And , a s an example of hi s thes i s: " Amon all capitalist economies , tha t of the United S ta te~ is least burdened with precapita l i s t

elements , survival', reminisce ces and power f actors" . ~ cc ordingly,

"we Can conj ecture that amo ng all c ountries the United Sta·tes i s like l y to 0xhi'b i d the weake~t i mperi a lis t trend" (4).

It i s no ·t t ha t Schumpet er i s not aware of the problems of eOQnomic competition among na tional ca pital i sms . He ta lee G them into a c count, and expl a ins them as conse quences of t a riff

barriers tha t coul d Ie d , intEedd , to war among capitali s t countries , ac~ ording to good an~ rat i onal reas ons . nut he takes pa in to demonstrate that the establi sIJ.:'11en- of ecohomic barriers i s irr~tional in the long rvn for a l l c ountries , and , since capitalists a r e democra tized , indi v i dualized and rational,

they will end u p in a situation of ppen international ma r ke t

where pea ce will prevail.

(1) I mper i al i sm and Capitali sm, p . 68. ( 2 ) ~. , p . 69

( 3) ibid . , p . 6 9

( 4 ) ibid , p . 72 .

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Here 3illlmpeter l eav 08 the "second i mage" and a ppe21 s

simul t a ne ous l y to the firs -t; ami t he t hird ones : man; i s

perfectible through Capital i sm , and , when t hi s perfection is obta ined , r a tiona l intereH3-t wi l l preva i l, ,otJ jectless

War will end , and. I.tere ','" i 11 be "Pe~l c e . We ca n see in t hi s

a very curiov.H lapsus: Sc h'UIl1peter i s well aware t hn t t here

a re ra tiuna 1 wa r s , bu.t he only admit t hem fo r t he pre -en pi t a l ist

coun-tr'ies . In a capi t a lis t f3ys t em , t he ass i mila tion i s prac tica l ly

compl ete between im k'eria lis t, or " ob j ectles GtI vva r t and VvTU'

tttout courtJi •

.. Perha ps t he m.os t i mportant i ns i ght of' SChUL'1peter ' s i s

the i dea tha t war oan t indeed , be carried on in a objectless

way , a nd tha t we should look into the hi s torjr of' the i mperi a list

cOll...l1try to understand the reasons for it . I n general, hi s

thes i s i s that some na tions , or the ruling Clas s of some na tions ,

have somc"tim.es to engage in wa r s , either :for self- defense ,

or for a 1'8:] l i ..:; tic objective . Howev er, after the first

ob jective i s obtainned , a war inachine i s created., a warrior

he"bit i s e s t ablished , a_od t hen pur posel ess , i mperialist

wa r - making sta rts . In this paint Sc humpeter hes ita t es aga in : some times i mperialism i s ex pl a ined by "the necessities of its soci a l s tructure , from t he i nherited di spos itions of

i -to ruling class", as i n the case of abs o lut i s t Frs nee ;

b ut , when it comes to t he c apita list r egim.es , thes e neces s i,ti"es

of the soc i a l structure a re nothing but i ns tinctive remi ni s ce nces of a " past era .

I:f we l eave as i de t he a ppea l to II .Lus 'tincti ve ll elements,

a soumd pro pos ition stands : war can be made not only for Itthe

im:mediate adva ntages to be derived b y c onques t*' (5), but for

the solution of interna l prob l ems of the s t a t e tha t tL:'lve little

~o d o with the t a r eet of a :gress i on .

Le t us leave Schumpeter a t thi s paint, for a moment, a nd leote to R . Tanier ' s attempt to f ind , as Rumme l d i d before ~ the empirica l d i mens i ons of int ernal a nd ex t e rna l c onf l ict behavior of na tions f a nd the ir correla tions (6).

( 5) i b i d t p . 59 .

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A short summary both of Rummel's and Tanter's research is: they took dozens of indicators, factor-analyseJ them" and different factors of interna l and external behavior Came up. Since the hortbgonal rotations were made separately for the interne'l and external factors, they wer e by definition inde pendent :from eaoh other within each group .. - When he looks for oorrala.tiona between the in~..e'xJll.at, and the external group of fa ctors, he finds none. The oonclusion is that the thes is that internal conflict has to

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do with external ones, either as determinant or consequence (he makes the regression ana lys is in both ways) does not stand. Actually, Tantelll' finds some correlation when he introduces a time span among the indica-tors of the internal and extlrrnal di mens ions. But it. i s not a very high correlation, that does not mean very mu.ch in a context of general d1sconfirmati.on.

The outcome is meager, but not completely useless: the factor analys is gives the main dimensions that structure the plurality of di s crete phenomena under observation, a nd opens the way: to more specific analys i s . After studies of this kind, the speculative question of the relations between internal Bnd external conflict becomes a matter of the relations between IIturmoil'*, "internal war" of a "subversive n

or revolutionar~' types, in one hand (these are the internal oonflict dimensions found by Tanter and Ru:mmel) and a.

"diplomatio" t Ii tlbelligerancy" and a "warY factor, in the other.

The persistence of this outcome of la,ck ef correlation (Sorokin came to the same many years before) rests strengh to the general theory of linkag§ between internal and external conflicts. But we have another outcome from Ta.nter's factors, tha t is Ii basis for a furth.er specification of the problem. Even if we accepted that the linkage exist, it does not have to lead, neaess2Tily, tG war. If the Negro unrest is a manifestation of fJtu:rm.oil" .we could imagmne, for instance, that it would lead rather to "belligerance" t han to war: -and these are , b~' definition, independent dimensions.

7 -We ca.n tie up the argument now. First t we acee pt that .

the sheer logic of the cold war does not explain .the war in Vietna.m, we ha ve to look for internal factor.s in the United States . Is it an im.perialist war, in Lenin's sense? VVe would say no .. s ince it i s obvious thlZlt there is no material gain in the wa r" or a.t le as t the costs a re much higher <a point could be made for the pos itive eff'ects on the lev-el of empl oymerrb ,-

but an intensive space program could have the Same effect t

with hi gher political gains) . Is it then imperialist in Sohumpeterts sense? We would say that it is not, insofar as we take Schumpetertsconcept of imperial ism as an Hatavistic lt

phenome na. This a tavism is, or wouldmbe,expressed in nationalist feel ings and manifestations, and would lead -to a stage of internal mobilizat ion i.n th,e country . Onl'y in this way Can foreign conflict be used as a solution for internal tensions, since there is not much use in Iii scapegoat if it is not sufficiently explored. But even if this were the oas e, we CQuld expect, in terms of Tanter; rather a stage of genera 1 belligerancy than effective a cts of war that are .• actua lly , aimed to be limited and speOific.

What we Ca n t a.ke from Schumpeter i s the sugges tion that we must look for the specific institutions that, in the past, were developed f or othert meaningful wars .. The paradox, for the United Sta tes, is tha t this structure that remains fighting, as Schumpeter says, by the tlobjectless momentum. of the machines in motionU (7), are not a legatby from the past, but from the futUre. This structure i ,s at the same time military, industrial !ind bureauoratic " in one hand, a nd psychO­logical on the other, It wasJi: developed for a kind of Wa r tha t did not eXist, that-will perhaps neVer eXist, but imposes a very rigi d s cheme o:f';perception and patterns of reaction to the foreign policy-making .

It would be redundant to descrive the a utomatisms of

(6) Tanter,R. "Dimensions of ConfUct Behavior1, Journal of S;0nflic.1 R~solutionf J.1arch, 1966 . -

(7) Sehumpeter; i~o id .. , p •. 63 { I • J

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this machinery, from the CIA maneauvering to keep Diem in power, a mi.-nor operation, to half a million troops in defense of Ky. Instea.d; let us finish wi-bh S~humpeter's description of

Rotn.e.n i mperialism:

"Ther e waC no corner of the KI.1.0Wn world whl::lre 8 c.m.e interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack.if the interests were not Roman, they

were thos e of Roman's allies; and if Rome had not

s.llies, then allies would be in.vented. When it Wa.S

utterly impossible to oontrive suchan interest -

why, then it was the national honoA' tl)'at nail been insulted. The fight Was always invested with an aura of legality. tae waole world WQS pervaded by na host of enemies. and it WaS lllanifestly Rom.€! fa duty

to guard aga.inst their indubitably aggressive designs'·

(8).

(8)Sohumpeter,.· ibid. , p.61 • ......

2 ~ Systems -~ ". -

Landau ' s c oncept i s very b road , a nd corres pond to wh~t is

rather known as Ittheory" (" a logic, an ordered se t of rela tionshi ps")

than sys·temfi I f we t a ke the conce pt of sys t em as a kind of heuri s tic

device for heory forrn.~ltion , it d oes not fulfi l l the requisi t s of

a theorJ - in -his s ensa there a r ellsys ' ems H tha t are not i nc luded

i on JJandau' sconce pt. If , on the othe r hand ,"- we t~ ke sye tem as

meam.timg a t ype of theoretics 1 cons truct, then La ndau I S defi ni tiOl1

is not incorr ect, bu.t too ,re nera l and ines pacif ic. system" f or

him, i s e s sencia l ly a sys t ema tic set of rel a tionships, while,

i n t he colitrse , the concept was used t o s i gnifj a set of rela tionshi ps

orbani zed in a system.io \,\~. wa y- a nd not necessarily 'very systematic; -.-'-~-'-

~'--r-"

'J: he conce ptual " precis ion a round the word " system't i s ouch

'~h.a t nobody i s qui to ha ppy with the conce pte of t he othero , and I

ea ch one offers his own conce pt or conc e ptual s c heme . Ad din~ to

this , we Carl sugges t t ha t perha po the best procedure i s to cpel1

out t he <.l i z'farent i deas , or dime nsions , th,gt are i mplicit, vrcry

offen i n an incldffe I'encia od ma nner , behinu -the concept of system ..

~hese d i mens i ons corr es poad to a lterna tives which , when c ombined

logica lly , ca n g ive a define d rna p from which one could pick the

concept t ha t st).its one bes t, or a t leas t Can help us to order the

1i t era ture . We ca n i dentify the following i deas , or diJ10mons :

a ) s ystemati~ation: i s t he i dea be hind Landau ' S definition. Syotema-t i zat i on i s oa t a ine · when it i s i mposs ible to c ome to d i ffe rent

cdmc lus:bns ei t he " by".:, deduct io n from the Same set 01n presumptions

or b y deducti on fro:u1 di fferent presumptiontl that entor / t he theo retica l

system. Ees i des this rule of compa tibility of assumption:::: and

log ica l c onsis'be nc y t a rule of compl eimess i s a l s o des i rable ,

by which any ota teLUen t rega r ding t he phe nomena cover ed by t ho

theory Can be sa i d to be in agreement or in di sagreement with it.

Systematiza.tion i s obta ine(l when t he pres umptions a re spelled out

and tho r~~es of deduction are defided .

b) rea 1i~m : i s the i dea - ha t the system exi sts i n i tself , ao a be ing

~j .

to ' b-e- a"budied ("realismu he~ is not the opposi-t'e mfom" ideal.iam", but rather of Ifnominali.sm") II A syat.em oan "existfJ either in an

abstract, platonic manner, .s;S~12.r very substantively "out there " II In any-ease (and we would not enter in the complioations of this . distinction here) the central conce.pts here are:

1 .. the difference between U .. ving and non-living systems. A non ......---...... -living system is a section of the reality, defided by its boundaries f In "this sense non-living s.y-stems are not"reallytt

~,:.-: .. ~c--s=ystemst since they do not .e:xisJ;~Dtherw1g1F"-"'than as conceptuallYj .' Living systems; however. tTaafriae their own boundaries, are

equiped for self .... ma inte~;. ... ee tilnd auto-regulation. these are the other elements that enter in the characteriza tion of' living systems:

2. -nlife tt · and "death"" A living system is · ... t-dead ll when it is not J" . able to keep' its boundaries from blurri.ng by elltropic decay.. The definition of what is life is becoming problematio even in biology, and i n social sciences it is, of course, muoh more oonfusing •. Two solutions are possible, The first is an intensional definition, a solution a t the conceptual level -in socul scienoes, it becomes the question of Sitributes of the

sys tem" The other is extensional, less clear-cut and based on the observation of persistence of patter ns of in-teraction among the elements of the system and between: the system and the

environment.

3. structures and funotions: In biology, it is the distinction between .. anatomy and physiology. In social sciences it is not 50 clear, when, for instance·, we say that ffdiplomacy is a structure for the stabilization function, which is in itself a strucyure for the maitenance of the a.ttribute of equilibriwn. ... We can see by

this mad3-up statement that :1 any pattern that al1unpartibaiJastto the maintenance of othel" is a "structure" for this "function" -and the ultimate functions are the flattributes U of the s ystem.

· 4" a wh.ola that ie distinct from the parts. The basic idea. here, _ :::

is that the parts oannot be fully unders tood by themselvelh TwO emphasis are poss ible nere: the Olle oz' the bibbogist, for

whom the in.terest is tue whole organism, ;and pt:'lrts matter only as parts of the orga,ni.sm (which is alsotb.e orientation of the

an1ropologist when attem.pt1ng to understtJd a oultural system) the one of muoh of the International Rel~t1ons theorists, for whom what matters a.re the part.s (ooun.t .;rte.s ) and tnesystem only as much as it has to be iludirrstood to explain what happens with the parts.

c) JB!.compu: eraS ]!!! analQCQr: the uae of this analogy, or, in genera. 1 , tius use of oonoe'pt11a.l tools that were developed by the

computt3 r soienoes (servo .... mecnanisms t feed-baok, and general infor­mat1ontheory) cnaraoterize the more spec1f'ically Usystem1e ft types of system. analysis. It 1s this oonceptual schema that gave birth to general ayatems theor1aing; and 1s widely used to oharacterize nreal'~ sysrteI1l$* But the study of th.ese real systems do net require, in general, the use of tnese conoepts. as much as the use ·of coo.­cepts such as interdependence, feed-back, etc, Can be used outside system a .n.alyeis in the sense E,.

~) ana,l:l;t1cal va_. em;e1ricaJ.. (oroonoret,~)~ystems: concretaaor empirical systeu we consider those that. are meant as Q,dequate

to reality, aceording to a given seto! rules that control for

non-aooounted Vari!b2-!j: They are developed by . empirical induotion, and leat?,.J in the IlU bVI11 scienoes t to probabilistio ot-imprecise statements.. Analytical systems are deductive, derived; by more or leas arbitrary rules. from. more or less arbitrary assu.lD.pt.ions, or rather-presumptions it The aim is to b e able to make analytical infer ences that could lead toempiric6111y valid statements, and this could be done if it was :possib1.e to develop empirioa 1 s;ys tams th.at could beisomQrfi(t to analyti,cal ones.,

rela:tions be"t.we ~en these 4 di~en~~ns Oan be th.ought as

,.

follows. Fir-st, things being as they are in social sOienoes, empirioal systems a,I'e never :th.lly systematic, nor are systematic systems CQnal'ate. The discussion that A .J.j. Burns makeslJ of his own work in simulation is a good indication of it. Thus. we ean i dentify ana.~ytioal with sys tero.a tic .. SefQond, the oomputet-2nalogy, as well as the biological and mechanios analogies from previous perio{~. can be used either in anal.ytioal or in empirical contexts , in realists orin non-realists theo:ries. When used for !.1'ti\1:;;,..rea list th/~HJl"ies) they simply help to mlde;rs-tand patterns of

relationshmp that d<O not add up to °real n systems. This :1.$ done very often when one uses a systemic O~ , fu.nctionalist applmacn

(rather than a systemic or functionalist theQry) and, first, define a rbitra.rly a ae't/ of attributEH?l. or high-level functions t and aftex'wards look for the attributes tha t are positively or negatively (functional or dpfunctionally) related to itiO

We are now equiped v{i th a typology that could be as follows-:

Analyt1oal/ sl.stematic

rea1.1st.i , ' i ,

s ystemls (simulation models)

(Ca.plan)

non .... realist F _ Q - -' . •

(learning m.odels)

(axiomatio syst$ms )

rea11sjt

K.Deutseb (U$e of io­fOI'tllation theory in linguistice

(VilaSSioal . ..( func.t1on .... fu..nctionalJ.sD}tlist

ttapproach" )

will fit, in our table, between the classical functlonalisrp. and th& "func';;'lonalist a pproQch". His analysis is --empirical. in the sensa that it aims to reproduce real-ity; and he does not use -the o1bmpwter analogy. He is not conoerned with, the interna. tional systems in, gem ral, bu.t only with one aspect of ...., ,- .

It. 11 the Politics and Organiza,tion of Seourity" ii ~he international system, :f'or him, is fa multiple equilibrium of It :lnsti tutional.

military-politioa l and socia-economic faotors 'ft , and international

~rganizations enter as a. part of thiS , ft.dynamio interpta," Y" .h,' ' , lIe is realist. but i.n Ii very weak sense. Internation~

;organ.izations exist. endowed with a reality that is not oompletely :r:eduotibla to the sum. of its components - bu.t qu.ite. This realit.y is extremely thi.n and unstable, since it depends, always, On the

, ,

will of its parts - the nation-states - to' keep on existing.. So.

he wou.ld say that, in general. equilibrium ot an organization is an "'ll·qu.;i.11brium of' willett. that remains ,only as far as .. the actual

:.. readiness of members' to perform Qor~s pond to their ~:f'ormal

obliS"1ations" t (11). fo obtain this. a carefu.l equilibrium bette to be worked out in each as pect of the organization, regardltng what

is expected ;from an acto}. and W@it he wana 'bo do. The structure

has to be such that "the rations between the nationalp power and the institutional influence of individual member-states are not too d;lsperate"; and its functional scope oannot eX'Q,eeti "the willingness 0.£ membeFs states to yeld the requisite meaSllre ot domestie juris­diction" (12)~,

Xn t erms of our four as pects of P real" s ys tams, Liska's organizations are l.iving systems that havett equi11br1um.'· as the

sole atribute. tctually, an organization could not work, being ,tllen teohuioally t'deaiPJ" if the willingness of the members to

cooperate did not rsi <eXiSt,. Wh.'it he calls ttstruotl,U'en and f':functic

are not the same as a more rigorous functionalism. would do.

(9) ,International Equilibrium. Harvard Univ .. Press, 1957. (10) ~.cit.J p. 15 (11) iW,d .. t p. 14 (12) ibid t pp. 57r .... 8 and 124

:>.,..., .

""

,. -- --- .~ .• ~ .. ~ ... -.:-::<

More teohnioa.lly speaking, ·'structures" here are the agreements bQtween right and might~ dependence and carelessness, etc; and ·the functions of them, than is, the funotions to whioh these structures serve, 1s equilibrium. Then there a re some by .... products , such as in'ternational cooperation in communice tions,

trade-agreements , etc •• 'that Liska calls fffunotions", bu.t a re :ra.ther goals, or purposes, of the insti tutionitT The weakenees of his theoretica approaoh does not lie, however. on these

questions 01' terminology. that are, atter all, a matter of

conventiOlh· ~he main problem is that he remains a t a for.rnal level tha t deals witn o:rgenizstion as a purely 'fotuu.tary system, It :113 imposs ible. wi'oh this framework, 'bo look for

'z'1,,\f> ,the possible c.ons tl:'aints -tha.t the ' s ystem oould hcfve upon the

" , actors, . or. more genera.lly, to the systemic determi nants .... , .....

of actorts behavior.

It . Boulding~ inCont11ot and Defense. also works with the idea of parts playing - or fighting - aga.inst each other - but he analysis systema.tically the oonsequences of the interplay, and. arriV'eto a systemic an.a l.ysis that places lltlm close to Oa plan in om"' t t1ble ~ 1ie'-· 'CtOes not attempt to oonst,ru.ct an empirioally based theory, ' He

starts wi tn a few presUfllptione - that ea.oh actor would eliminate the other if be oould - define a few concepts in t .he simplest way ' he oan, and then see Which are the logicalconsequerices of' these assumptions. He is able ..

for instance, ' to p:t'esent a reoipe for stability, that is .ito l'lav'e a high oostof transport of violence,. countries

a 11llng way apart, and rapidly d.iminishing e:ffic1eno~c ,1

increase of sca1 w (13). m. !r.. ' . ' t . b '.1'''' f .· 0 .... <'lI ., tl · ",. ~"l.S l.S a Sa. . 1. . 1. fJy ... ...

s pacific kind of inte.rnationalsystem, the "national defense'. system ....

Because 13 oulding, d.ifferent from Liska, thinks in terms of vQl'l.Gtbles , he does not remain at the level of genenl stmtements, but is equiped to s @y, af'tar the above reciee, that tlitta beca,use of the failure of all three of (11) PP. 241/2

these condit ions that we fa.oe an acute breakdown ·of the system of

national defense in the world of toda.y" (14) .. Now we have not

only a definition of a system, b.sed on concepts such as "home strengn", tlloEls-of-strength gnadientn and usphere of i nfluence u ,

all precisely conceptual}Zed j but also we know the limits of

the system - when tilere l no home-strength that i s b i gger than

tne strength of the oppos i.te at home - that is, when the other . Ii

is s ·tronger and 'the LSG ( "10ss-oI'-strength gradient) . i s minimal. He goes further on, and is able !bo discuss abou.t the number of uni ts that f in a st:able system, can 'occupy a g iven closed area, such as a sphere . This number is a function of troll , that is

LSG per mile, and Us", dis t a nce, blletween each pair of actors

(1.5). AU.hough h~ could not pos.t..;:bly make this calculus empirically; he is conceptually much better ~n Liska, who csn talk on little more than the necessity of agr eement between right and might.

In his chapter on the moddifications a.nd applications

of the basic theory of interna ·tio na l conflict, Boulding gives

some i nsights into his conoeption of what "systemfl and "system

t heorylt is. vWl~he diqcusses the a lternance between war and

peace (which he compares with the economi.c cycles), he states

tha t wha-t we have are, really, two systems J.n.J'a.lternance. a

diplmma tic and a War system.. These systems are de:f'ined not

e;gtensionaly. iJyth~ir units (WhiCh are the same in both), but

conce ptually by their a ttributes, war and peace. And a final.

look on his conce ption of sys t em a nalysis is given when he o);'itic.ises Caplan. j'or him, what Capla n cb es is Ii taxonomy

of types of national actiors and patt.erns of choi.ce - bu·t

Bouldingis models "eventually abstract from the processes by

which deCisions are made , concerning on the grea t forces that eff'ectivelly limit the field of decision'l (16). These "grea t

forces" Q,re not somet hing mystical, but the systemic result

of the interaction of a set of units.

The th.il'd author we lOOked through , for this discus s ion on

system, '<vas H. S prout, from the Geaopoli tics and Capability

theorists. His work is big .. nea.vy, detailed, erudite - and,

intellectually pOOr, to sayffrom the , piece tha.t was read more

ca refully (17), His theory, if' the word oa n b e used here"

is that an aotor has to behave according to the things hIB

perceives, m,nd the outcome of his ac-ts a rE~ not ~ s imple function of what he -th1nlcs it will be t but depends also on how things

rea lly are. Hence, the hybrid concept, of' lIoognitive behavior"$

to mean that a person reacts to the mil1ieu as he perceives

-- it .....

All this is very triV'ial.of cours e, and all depends on

how on,as \l.se 't. The Sprou"Gls use it mainly for exhaustive

descrip"t ions 0 levels of os pa.bili ty, by geogr~ phic, milita r y ,

and economic da ta .. In terms of our typology, the work is

obviously empirical, non-realist (the re i s no s ystemic concept) and uses no computer a nalogy .. And since it does, not include

even heuristic concepts t ake n from systemic the9ry, berhaps

it would be better place\'.i, outside our matrix f (GC:MiPpli tic

theory. however, insofa r as it ~s ~ based on concetrp$ of regional "

interde pendence and geographic determi nism, would fall in the

"rea list" category, together with classical functionalism in

our ta lie .. ) "

(14) ibid. t p.242

(15) ibid.

(16 ) ibid .,m p. 275

(17) "Environmental Factors in the St,udy of Internat ional p oliticS",

in Roseuau.

::

3. Middle-range theories.

The expression "middle-range theorytl was, it seems, I.ntroduced by Merton, in tne introduction of his SOCial Theon

and Social Struoture. As it is there, there is no olear-cut -definition of what fit middle-range theory might. 'be; in terms of ",

specific attributes. What there iStthough~ is a given conoept1on of sooial sciences and the sta,tement of a strategy for their development.

The conception of social sciences ,-'-or of sociology,. more speoifically, Can be summarized as follows. Sociologi@ib$ spends' muoh of their time arguing about personalized tJtheories lJ , or

"schools" .. Thi.s is not good, first, because these a re not theories, actually. A theory is a set of interrelated propositions that can be empirioally veri.t~.df and the disous s ions about funotionalism, marxism, the necessity of ideal types mnd"verstenenu •

etc. ', a re about m.ethodology, general tneoretical orientations,

cono~,pt formation, etc .. - but se~dom th.eory. Second. the situation is bad because. if we keep discussing about ~ I'sonalized s chools, we snaIl never come down to business to make' proper theory: "a science which hesitates -tO:f ofo.rge~l..ts founders is lost". But how'tQ 'Come down to busines-s2 Aocepting th~r 'idea'- that: our theories

will be part1al, and very often .wjr4rbtniibGeed:H~ct10ns with others, and lea,ving lnany sectors of reality unex plainned. These theories will be of ftmiddle-rangeu.1n two senses: they "-/ill be limited

in scope, because many aspeots of reality will have to be left

outside; and they will be limited in generality., since it would be i mposs ible to tes t it for all relevant Oases, In short. the strategy for coming one day to big theory is to start now doing littlB theories, and acoumulating data.

There are many flaws in this conception, that oannot be fully disouss ed here. We can indica te some of them, however. For one thing, there is not much evidenoe - a nd Merton offers none - that the acoumul ation of small theoretical pWlces will lead eventually to the orea tion of big theory. Besides, the idea l

"theory", as an interconneoted set of verifia ble propositions, iB

c.,< /~ om found in s ocia. l sciences , and, when it is, the s ubstantive

~+'ent is in genera l trivial. Finally, it is not so clea r ~

-\L, t the a im of socia l sciences is to come to a sta ge of a mature a nd

~ca-embrg,Cing theory i Farha ps Weber wa s right when s ugges t ed -cha t )cia l s ciences a r e among thoselt'to which eterna l youth is granted tl

..... (J~)

So much. aga inst Merton. In his f avor, let us s a y tha t his messa ge. a s a warning aga ins t excess ive especula tion a nd

pers onaliza tion of s ociology, a t a time when new techniques of social res ea rch were being delleloped a nd needed i mplementa tion, was a nd

is s till a valuable a nd r eleva nt onG. Let us define our:~J conce pts in s· precis e way, make our propositions in an w'IeJ that can be tes ted empirica lly, a nd verified by others ; let us be modest and s elf -oons ciou.s::_.

So, there a~e two conce p,tions of middle-ra nge theory, a

s trong a nd a weak one. ,A ccording to the s trong version, there is no theory ., i n s ocia l sciences , tha t is not mi ddle-range: "grand theories t' ,

are not theories " as a matter of f a cti If we loosen the concept of

theory , then mi ddle range theories are thos e th2t a re s elf-conscious of their limitations , a nd that tend towa rds empirically tested

pro pos i tiona. • Xhe more the level of ana.lysis is defined. the more

the level of mea ning is precise, the less sweeping a r e t he

generaliza.tions; the more umi ddle-re nge n the theory is" I n other words, in a field like international relations. where speculative theorizing i s s till strong, mi ddle-range theorizing ~oints to the s cientific s t 'l ndards of the predictive mode.

There isn 't much more to say about it a t this level of

genera li ty. ' Let us examine a fe w a uthors.

Karl W. J)euts ch (Nationalism and Socia l Communica tion,

An inquiry in-to the Founda tions of Nationa lity) could hardly be pl a ced among the middle-range theof!~~s , if by Il

mi ddle-ra ngeU

we mea n either well tied-up theory or mod es ty of i ntent .. Iilinsp1te

of tha t, ther e is no d oubt th t he ~us t be placed a t the 11 predictive lt

mode, f a r away f Tom the emptines s of ver bal es pecula tion,

It i s very difficult, if not i mpossible, to s l).mrna rise the

wealth of insights, hypothasj.s and li.nee of research that appear

in. this bril1.ant peaoe of work • . What we can do is simply tJ1y tl) assess Which kind of endevour is he u.p to, and point out some of his c-otitrtbntions ..

The main prupose of Deutsch·6 is not to make theory, but to suggest how theory can be :made. 'Xhis is done, by and large, showing how general and di:f:fuse concepts can he thOUght in a

precis e; operational and testable way.., So, we would define pow~:t:',

for instance, as t. the probabi11j1y of preserving the inner

structu.re of one of the systems in a clash, with little or no

relevant modification. at the price of bringing about a relatively large modifications in the structu.re of the systems which c1.ash with it" (1.9). Strength, he defines asUthe capao.ity to flunderS1l

the widest r a nge of changez: without losing its cohesion in e.. few essencials, so as to be Qole to include other patterns and structures within its elf without losing its identity or its continued os pa.ci ty :for growthU (20) ..

!Chis aIruizing capaCity of operationali~ation (which is much more impressive in The Nerveso.f G.overnment) . is used to develop allconceptual mOdelu "of the processes o~ nat:i.onalisijl. and nationality. He does not come to a model, but to a setai' opera tional, fru.itful and "c)::,itica l" concepts t ha t are able to lead t'O it ( 21). Tile basic concept,'1corn:nl,tuica tionU , is t~ken

from -general communications theory, as measurable in terms 01 bitso£ lnf'ormation. As far as people communicate, they are a.

communit.l .. (aas, ,: ien 't?), and when this commu.ni ty is tied up by com1>l~mentary habits and facilities (culture), _embrancing

.-'--_.-_.- -- .--~

r

III l arge group of person~, v,e have a eeople. And nationalit~ . is defined aB HalpeOPll press ing to 94qu1re a measure of effective control over the behavior of its m.embers".

"' ~he usefulness ot these dafini tions is that, wi. t h them, it is p()$ sible to talk. about levels of commu.nity and C'fltrlPlementarik1 and me~sure them. Deutsch suggest diff'erat methods for testing

(18) ~n.ax Weber.· "Objecti'vi ty in Social Sciences a nd Social PolioJ , in ?ieber, The MethodoloSl .2.! Social ~ciences?~;

(19) Deutsch, op • ..2ll.!. p. 73 (20) ibid •• p. 75~

h:ts concept of nationality, in terms of the range of the oommunications network .. The chapter 6 of th.e bOOk, "national assimila tion or d1f;t'erentiation 'f • is perhaps the most interes ting from the point

' of view of research, since it su.ggGstss s peoifio quant:l.tat1ve mee.s u,res or vliiriaoles sucb. 6lS mcibilizati on, as simil:ation and differentiation of l a r ge number of people"

r,J:he relevanoe of Deutsohts oontribution Can hardly be eXagerated , mainly in the field oi' the politics Qnd sociology of na tional. development . But what does all this have to do with I nternational Relations?

It does :tna!ll lea s t two senses. ]'irst, ·the u t1alysi.s Qf

the fortn.ation o:fttbloeks of na tionality". or na tions, gives an empirica.l basis for the knowledge and prediction of the stru.oture of th0 internQtional system in terms of its units. I n other wor ds, it let U,S now how nations are create'a, which. are the conditions for it, a nd how they enter in the international system. The same rratiion.9.l that l.se.ds to the study of integrated blocks of nationa Ii ty, by fie t i ona1. dif'f'e'ren'biat:i.on, qan also be used for the study of

na."tional integration. This is done, for insta noe, when Deutsch

dis()uss whether the differentelemtJn:t1s!#thst ente r in the forma tion

of clusters of' cQrn.munication ""- language, values and b@lief, and oommunication Channels - tend to correlate or not (the hypothesis oeing that a low level of correlation means blurred boundaries, cros s .... pressures and loyalties. and. non-die,eruptive conflicts).

Xha second sense that it If'alates to the international .1 ·t·- n , T6 a loO S '--

is thatIF with tltis approach, the interna tional system Can be seen as a strat1fi~d set of Bators, with cha nnels of m,obility and.

s ome patterns of behavior (ne., tioualism as one ), and so on.

Ii ' •

- 21 -

Is Schelling (The Str~~tegy of Conflict) a middle-range

tneorist? Only in the sense th@t b.:e does not belong to the

It grand the ory" tradi tion, to the s peclJ.lative m.ode.. He does

not talk ab out ttconf'lictn as &ill _alhl~·mm.'b:tacing concept - he

defines precine1.:,' wh~~t he means by it. in its d.iverse

"'";~ C111Ganings t and proceedf..~ to examin&~--1.11--:"l#etail how strategic

conflict13 are developed, which va riables are take~ into account

by the parts, what means Uto wintl an confltct, etc. Of course, .his wox'k does not aim to expla.in n everythingfl, not

even e\rory ltind "of con:f\ ict (he expres sely exclu.des 1100-

rational, or',lt irrationel conflicts - whatever that mSRns) .

But he wOI'ks s.t ' fa very high. level of §Janenlity. tha·t

intends ·tooover, wi to. the same conceptual s cheme, both his confliot with his son and a system of nuclear deterrence.

So.helling \'v or.k oocu.py fA v·ery interesting intermediate

posi'oion between the formalized, deductive ~ame theory and

the more empiricel (in general psychologic) approach to pro­blems of' confliot. Wba t he doo S t fat the beginning t is to

expand the definition of a game, basically b y introducing

mixed-motive 9i tuations. where the pa rts ;shra re some 1'..,.

interes ts. Out of the two-actors - zero- sum"~game, soon finds that the fOI"l'.OS.lization of the game, and the search of

its Usolutiol1 t! t or sad.dla.point, is a1 tber imposs ible err· not very relevant.

The firsrt difficulty is with the concept of rationality .. A "ra tions l tI beh:ilvior, for Schelling , (the quo"tation marks are

his') c ons ists of a "ca lculating, value .... maximizirlg s tra tegy

of deoision" (p.17). In a simple game with a saddle-point, it is always poss ible to c'O mpare the 'Ou·toome 'Of a rea l game

with the logical s olu:tion, a.nd this is a test 'Of rationality.

What Can be done , however, when there is no such solution? ,-~n.d the solution does not exist, among ether things , bewam e of the (i)rra;y~ of trrc!rs that IDa.y or may not be used by the

actors, in the bargatnning process. Threats, promises, tmcit

negotiations. all tho techniQ.ues of assuring reliablity 'Of'

- 22 -

threat (including Hir:t'ational" behavior of va rious kinds),

can enter in the game with different timing, with ou.tcomes

that depend of the communications and eon:fo:r;'cement s tructures,

a nd on the C01U.Ul.on cultural grounds ·tha·c allow for t a cit

negotiations. Even in cas es where a"s Olution"exist (and

a cond.i tion for this is tha t the parameters of the game

remain constant_), the details of the procis, are lost .. With

Schellingts own words. "while it is instructive to s ee how such tactics as threa ts, commitments, a nd promises can be absorbed into an enlarged, abstract "supergame fl (game

in the 'normal form'); it should be emphasized ·that we ca nnot

lea rn et nything abou"t; those tactics by s·t;uCiying games that

are li3, lrea.dy in normal form'l (22)"' ....

Schelling cannot predict the outcome of conflicts. nor

ca n he su..~·::est the best way of carrying them. Whe t he can

d o is t o defi.ne t he vari ables that enter, the t a ctics that

rare llivanabre to the players (and it 'M) uld be desirable if

these t a ctics wa~e presented i~ a more syatema-tic way) ,. the

necessity and types of underlying assumptions tha t enter

in limited conflicts, etc. These ooncepts str ucture the

field for the conduc t of empirical res ea rch, to determine

both the elemer.rts tha t enter a t play in a conflict ai tuation

8_nd ·t he mot ives a nd psychological mechan.isms tha t underlie

the different tactics a nd strategies by t he different t ypes of

studies of federalism a nd :lntsgration fall m.ore c onfortably

in the ca tegory of mi .ldle-ra nge theori~ s . lWorE~ down-to-ea rth,

they ·tend, in general, to find thes pecific mechanisms th..qt

lead to til specific kind of phenomena, integra tion. Since there

is no room here for "~he exam of a mat,or work in this field .

let us see What .4 .H .. Birch has to say in his a rticle on

I'A pp:roaches to the S tudy of Fausra lismtt ( 23) "

He listB four' "types Qf approa Ch, tlinstitutionaF' ~ "sociolo­

gical", Itfe&erali~1m as a process" and "federB.l i mn F,f.S a; gargain

(22) SChelling, ll;.~1iei;>: of Conflict, p . 156.

.----- - - --- ---

... 23 -

Then he t&l k:~s thre,~ of these a pproaches and submit th.em to wha t he , considers to be an empirical test,. He t a kes Deutsch (of

Poll t.i~? 1. .c1::.~!!C:p:.a!.~.x 2:£ !tt2. !!.9l:.i!h. ,A,tlaptic .Area) as the ,1 process'"

theorict ~ thez t h@,s, accor<ltng to B:treh, 9 oriteria for integra tion

( d i l:1 tinctive way of life, different expecta tions , increas e in

ca ,pgbilityp previous system. ofmcommunic~ tionst ete.). Then

K.C" Whea re, comes a.s representative of the I institutional

a pproschu f wi th six cri.teria of Wl:i~~Hh three are IthopssJl a nd

the other three" ha ve to do with pro.x.iri!.ity and ~,wm.e s imile ri ty t

aa,¢. previous contact. Riker'. with t wo criteria lhf :Lnterest,s -, is

the repre sentative of' tbe 'fBbarg!ain" approach.

:r'he conolusion he comes to is that the institutional

approaoh is tne best; and Deutschts is clearly the wors. ~ J1e does

it by compa ring acvual Oases of fed~nation with the criteria of the three onthors , and find th~t "Deutsch'if criteria does not

fit any of them; in their totality. Unfortunately; hist.:ory seemed to' be against B:1r(lh : Singapor~ left jVlala~na. even before the

article WliiIS finished .. and Nigeria. t we all know todQiY. is not a Very good exam ple od! a suocessful federat i on. The East Africen :e~jfjil?a'~±QnR never Game to eXist

7 a-nce-" • .l.'-~1.' l- - ,

Birch's mistake, is easy to see now, ii"88 to think on a

purely fOrIMa.11stio way - of CO'l..trse tha t formal eri t er'iS\ are useful

for defining ., formal t!ederation - .. ~l.1t he d 00S not haye anything

e l se to say , wher eas a more empirical analymt with knowledge of

the situation could predict. perhaps, the pro:ppects of Nigeria or

.Malaya .. But this demands both m.ore mod.est and more deep

a na lysis than the definition of ~ l i s t of cri tena «

What about Peace Research.? How doss it fit raga;rding the concept of' t'middle range"? There is no clea r answm'r to that, as muon ~s l;here a .re a l l kind.s of U peace researehers u • Ami·tai

Etzioni (~ Hard, Way l.2 Peace ) is concerned with Peace all right,

but not very much witb Res earch. in this work. Wha t h.e intends to '. '

( 23) foli 'tical Studies , Feb. 1966.

- 24 _.

i s to us e all the elements developed by the so ciology of conflict,

and ; ener3l theorie s of s tra tegy, to b uid u p a n argument against

t he American foreign policy. He sta rts with a his tory of

Western stra tegy, a nd and up by pro posing the s t rategy of

gradualism , by which ea ch step in a deescalation l adder would

be hopefully ma tche d by the o pponent. The part t wo of the book

is mea nt to ind icat e how , .

t h ll' ls t he only poss i b l e way out, a nd,

in the l ast pa rt, he s ugges t s t he po litica l strategy t hat should

be paralel to the who l e military stra tegy of arms r eduction.

Cl'his i s und oubtful l y a be:3. utiful pe a ce of work , but

with at l eas t t wo serious flaws . F i rst, the re i s no a nalysis

of the inte rna l s ituat i on i n the United S t a te s , of how l S it

poss i ble to expect that t he pre sen t establishment will c ome to

ac c ept this s t ra t egy . The b ook i s a politica l book , aimed to

convince t he official s tra t egi s t s ( wi t h whom Et zioni, vvi th

doub tful sincerity , se ems to i dentify), a nd it had to assume

that they a r e free t o c hose the be s t s tra tegy the y want.

But the most se rio),ts flaw i s t hat the wor l d i s not a nymore a s

Etz io ni saw it, a nd hi s evaluations of China, as tie d to

Russia for the years to come, proved to b e wrong . Things would

be easy if t he Russians a nd Americans could meet and dec ide

the faith of the rest of the world - but, fortunately or

unfortuna tel y , this is not the case any more.

In any ca s e, Etzioni's k ind of work is a go od example of

how the e:n p~rical s tudy of the mechanis ms of the int erna tional

system , in a ll its de tails, ca n be applied , if not to a success ful

arguInent, st l eaa; to a ve ry convincing one . S tra tegic think ing

i s lead ing u s to a worl d of !lbetter" fi g hts but a l s o, hopefull y ,

with l ess of them.

Berkeley, Dec embe r 1967.

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