CHAPTER 38 · · 2017-02-13ates the support of Wade Sewell and the research assistance of Justin...

The renaissance of interest in civil society has added recent emphasis to the role ofnon-governmental organizations (NGOs).2 NGOs and other voluntary associations,which make up the fabric of civil society, play a key role in ensuring a stable anddemocratic social order. The practical effect and relevance of NGOs has also beenincreasingly recognized in the international political and diplomatic community. Forexample, the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights noted in its ViennaDeclaration and Programme of Action “the important role of non-governmental or-ganizations in the promotion of all human rights. . . . The World Conference onHuman Rights appreciates their contribution to increasing public awareness of humanrights issues, to the conduct of education, training and research in this field, and to thepromotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”3

The United Nations General Assembly has also recognized the role of NGOs andcivil society in promoting human rights through the Declaration on the Right andResponsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and ProtectUniversally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.4 The Declara-tion recognizes the rights of individuals and groups to promote human rights through

Elizabeth A. Sewell1

CHAPTER 38

FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

THROUGH NGOS

Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr., Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie (eds.), Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook,819–842. © 2004 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.

1 The author is grateful to Tore Lindholm and W. Cole Durham Jr. for their helpful comments and appreci-ates the support of Wade Sewell and the research assistance of Justin Elswick, Michael Monson, DevaughnFraser, and Aaron Brogdon.2 See., e.g., Don E. Eberly, ed., The Essential Civil Society Reader (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000);Adam Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992); Charles Taylor, “Modes of CivilSociety,” Public Culture, vol. 3, no.1 (fall 1990): 95–118; Edward Shils, “The Virtues of Civil Society,”Government and Opposition, vol. 26, no.2 (winter 1991): 3–20; Michael Waltzer, “The Idea of Civil Soci-ety,” Dissent (spring 1991): 293–304; Daniel Bell, “American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Role of CivilSociety,” The Public Interest, no. 95 (1989): 38–56.3 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993), para. 38,reprinted in 32 ILM 1661 (see also paras. 13, 18); see generally Manfred Nowak, ed., World Conference onHuman Rights: The Contributions of NGOs: Reports and Documents (Wien: Manz, 1994).4 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote andProtect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, General Assembly Resolution53/144, UN Doc. A/RES/53/144, adopted 8 March 1999, arts. 5, 6, 8, 9.

820 � Part VI � Elizabeth A. Sewell

associating, disseminating information, advocacy, submitting criticism and proposalsto state bodies, having complaints reviewed under law, having access to internationalbodies, and other means. It also specifically recognizes that non-governmental organi-zations “have an important role to play in contributing to making the public moreaware of questions relating to all human rights and fundamental freedoms throughactivities such as education, training and research” and that they, along with govern-ments and other civil society actors, “have an important role to play and a responsibilityin safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms andcontributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutionsand processes.”5

This chapter attempts to trace the workings of NGOs in promoting and establish-ing the fundamental right of freedom of religion and belief. In addition to offering ataxonomy of NGOs working in this field, the chapter also offers explanations of waysin which they can be most effective. Building on political theories of the roles ofNGOs, the chapter examines some of the internal debates among human rights NGOson how best to promote political and practical change and attempts to put these debatesin perspective. This chapter uses current political theories of transnational relations andnorm socialization to suggest that while multiple avenues can be productive, theireffectiveness in a particular situation depends primarily on the extent that the targetcountry has socialized norms of freedom of religion and belief.

I. MODELS OF NGOS’ INFLUENCE

A. NGOS IN POLITICAL THEORY

In the late twentieth century international NGOs have grown rapidly. According to theUnion of International Organizations, international NGOs grew from 973 in 1956 to5,471 in 1996. 6 Theories of the role and influence of international human rights NGOshave struggled to keep up with the tremendous growth in the field. State-centeredapproaches to the theory of international relations have gradually given way to sophisti-cated theories of transnational relations that offer useful explanations of the uniqueposition of international NGOs7 and their powerful effects in promoting human rights.8

5 Ibid., arts. 16, 18.6 Claude E. Welch Jr., ed., NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance (Philadelphia: University ofPennsylvania Press, 2001), 1. See also Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations BackIn: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures, International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1995), 10–11 (citing figures).7 The term “transnational relations” was coined by Karl Kaiser in “Transnationale Politik,” Die anachronistischeSouveränität, ed. Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cologne-Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969), 80–109. See gener-ally Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, 3–33.Risse-Kappen defines “transnational relations” as “regular interactions across national boundaries when atleast one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergov-ernmental organization” (Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, 3).8 See, e.g., Rein Müllerson, Human Rights Diplomacy (New York: Routledge, 1997), 144: “It is difficult tooverestimate the role of the non-governmental (both national and international) organizations (NGOs) inthe promotion of human rights.” See also Welch, NGOs and Human Rights, 261–80 (evaluating NGOs’roles in promoting human rights).

Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief through NGOs � 821

Theoretical attention to the role of international NGOs has been gatheringmomentum comparatively recently. For many years scholars looking at internationalpolitical interactions relied heavily on regime theory. Regime theory focused scholarlyemphasis on the role of identifiable legal and practical regimes—”principles, norms,rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in agiven issue-area.”9 International regime theory identified areas of international inter-actions where international cooperation, whether formal or informal, had establisheda basic set of principles or rules. These “regimes” could deal with anything from thewidth of railway tracks to international banking procedures, but generally dealt witheconomic and political cooperation among nations and international norm-settingbodies.10 Regime theorists did not typically look at human rights NGOs, although thetheory did open room for discussion of the role of human rights NGOs in interna-tional norm creation and maintenance.11 Theories of transnational relations, whichflourished in the 1970s, also initially provided limited theoretical understanding ofthe role of international NGOs in influencing states. Transnational relations theoristsset up a dichotomy between “state-centered” and “society-centered” views of inter-national politics, but paid less attention to the interactions between national andinternational actors.12

A major thinker in the emerging discussion of the relationship between interna-tional systems and domestic politics was Robert Putnam. In a landmark 1988 article,Putnam expressed the relationship between national and international politics throughthe idea of “two-level games.”13 Putnam’s metaphor places political leaders as partici-pants in one or many games. Each nation has its own game board, attended by thenational leaders. In addition, one game board is surrounded by international lead-ers. Moves rational at one board may be less sensible at the others. Although theinternational board and national boards are largely independent of each other, attimes movements on one board will trigger realignments on the others.14 Putnam’s

9 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,”International Organizations 36 (spring 1982): 185.10 See, e.g., Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Arton the Art of the State,” International Organization 40, no. 4 (autumn 1986): 759 (“Regimes are broadlydefined as governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organizeaspects of international behavior in various issue-areas. They thus comprise a normative element, state prac-tice, and organizational roles.”).11 A few authors did deal with issues of human rights and international organizations. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly,“International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis,” International Organization 40 (summer 1986): 599–642; John Gerard Ruggie, “Human Rights and the Future International Community,” Daedalus 112 (fall1983): 93–110; Nicholas G. Onuf and V. Spike Peterson, “Human Rights from an International RegimesPerspective,” Journal of International Affairs 38 (winter 1984): 329–42.12 The theories, of course, had more nuances than can be explored in this chapter. Some major contributionsto the debate in the 1970s include: Walter Bühl, Transnationale Politik (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978);Czempiel, Die anachronistische Souveränität; Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics;Harold Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System(New York: A. A. Knopf, 1979); Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Or-ganizations,” World Politics 27 (October 1974).13 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” InternationalOrganization 42 (summer 1988): 433–35.14 Ibid.


exploration of the role of international actors in domestic politics laid the ground-work for the serious study of international NGOs and their influence in preventingabuses of human rights at the national level.

Discussions of NGOs have not only arisen in works building on Putnam’s articu-lation of the relationship of international actors and domestic politics. Transnationalrelations theory has regained some popularity as recent writers have attempted tobroaden international relations theory to accommodate the increased role of NGOsand other multinational actors. For example, Jessica Matthews and others have arguedthat the growth of NGOs and “people power” reflects the end of a system of territorialstates.15 While recognizing the clout of international NGOs, these discussions oftenignore NGOs’ interaction with state governments—a theoretical link that cannot beignored since, at least in the field of religious freedom, many if not most NGOs focuson effecting change in individual countries’ governmental practices and laws.16

B. MODELS OF NGOS’ INFLUENCE ON STATES

A few authors have recently focused on the effect NGOs can have on states, rejectingthe common separation in the discipline between international relations and compara-tive politics. Building on Putnam’s work, they analyze the complex interactions betweenstates and transnational relations.17 One extremely valuable result of scholarly atten-tion to the interactions of states and transnational actors such as NGOs is an emergingmodel of how NGOs have been able to promote change most effectively.18 At itssimplest version, this has been referred to as the “boomerang” pattern:19 individualstates violate their citizens’ human rights and limit recourse through internal politicalor judicial channels. Facing limited recourse at the national level, domestic NGOsbypass the state and seek out international NGOs that can provide leverage andpressure from outside. Based on the information gained from domestic NGOs, these

15 Jessica T. Matthews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (1997), reprinted in Is Global CapitalismWorking? A Foreign Affairs Reader (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 55–71.16 This is less true in discussions of NGOs dealing with environmental or economic justice issues, whereNGOs often focus more on multinational corporations and other international economic actors. Humanrights NGOs have been criticized for paying excessive attention to state atrocities and failing to address thesources of atrocities in the structure of the state and civil society. See, e.g., Rajni Kothari, “Human Rights—A Movement in Search of a Theory,” in Smitu Kothari and H. Sethni, eds., Rethinking Human Rights:Challenges for Theory and Action (New York: New Horizons Press, 1989), 19.17 See, e.g., Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in Interna-tional Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing TransnationalRelations Back In; Susan Burgerman, Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2001).18 The most complete of these models are explored in the text, but a number of other thinkers have proposedsimilar individual elements of successful NGO activities. For example, Burgerman identifies some key pre-conditions for state change: the development of international human rights norms and their use in foreignpolicy; an activist transnational human rights network; a state government that becomes concerned about itsreputation; and domestic NGOs to provide information and keep the state’s violations on the internationalagenda (Burgerman, Moral Victories, 4–5).19 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 12; Morton E. Winston, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Inter-national Human Rights NGOs: Amnesty International,” in Welch, NGOs and Human Rights, 39–40 (adoptingKeck and Sikkink’s boomerang model).


international NGOs mobilize their own states and international organizations to pres-sure the rights-violating government to change.20 In this way pressure “boomerangs”back against the violating state, encouraging change.

Risse and Sikkink (one of the developers of the “boomerang pattern”) provide asophisticated description of the interaction of domestic and international NGOs, in-ternational norms, and states that violate human rights.21 Their “spiral model” furtherelaborates on the “boomerang pattern,” describing five phases in the process of states’human rights socialization. Risse and Sikkink recognize that governments may regressor remain static for a lengthy period of time,22 but persuasively argue that the “spiralpattern” accurately models the stages through which governments progress from normviolation to rule-consistent behavior.

An in-depth examination of this model is valuable because it highlights the differ-ing roles NGOs, both domestic and international, play at various stages in the processof promoting governmental change. Reflecting on this model provides a response tothe debate that often rages among human rights NGOs over how they can be mosteffective. Heated disputes among NGOs often center on whether they, and the gov-ernments or international organizations that they can influence, should focus on“finger-pointing,” or identifying, publicizing, and/or sanctioning violations, or “light-ing a candle” through quiet diplomacy, dialogue, providing expert advice, and/ornegotiating with violating states. The spiral model suggests that there is a place forboth types of activities and that each will be most successful at different stages in aviolator state’s norm socialization.

The spiral model is also particularly significant because the model provides sup-port for and development of the idea of norm socialization—the belief that actors caninfluence government through articulating principled norms and identifying viola-tions of those norms, as well as through instrumental power politics.23 The spiral modelhighlights the important role of argument and persuasion in promoting norm insti-tutionalization and change, incorporating social constructivism theories with someelements of rational choice theory.24

At the first stage in the spiral model, “repression,”25 individual states engage inhuman rights violations. Extremely repressive states may remain at this stage for alengthy period of time by eliminating internal opposition and preventing the spread ofinformation of their violations to the international community. When a transnational

20 Winston has elaborated on this model by adding lines of information from sources other than local humanrights NGOs to international human rights NGOs and adding lines of influence from international NGOsand transnational corporations directly to the target state (Winston, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Interna-tional Human Rights NGOs,” 39).21 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Do-mestic Practices: Introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change,ed. Thomas Risse et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–38.22 Thomas Risse and Stephen Ropp argue, however, that the power of global human rights norms andtransnational advocacy networks has increased from the 1960s to the 1990s; the rate of movement throughthe spiral model has itself increased during this time—which they call the “world time” phenomenon (Risseand Stephen C. Ropp, “International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change: Conclusions,” in Risse,The Power of Human Rights, 264–65).23 Risse and Ropp, “International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change: Conclusions,” 270.24 Ibid., 272–3.25 Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms,” 20.


advocacy network—a loose connection of international and domestic NGOs, founda-tions, and some governmental and intergovernmental officials with a common supportof human rights norms26—gains information on the violations and places them on theinternational agenda, the situation moves to phase two.

In phase two of the spiral model, or the “denial stage,” the transnational advo-cacy network publicizes the human rights violations and engages in pressure and moralpersuasion of the violator state and international organizations and states that havetraditionally supported human rights. The target state, in turn, generally responds withdenials, typically not only rejecting the specific charges, but also denying the validity ofthe norms and the right of international bodies and other states to concern themselvesin the internal affairs of the target country. At times the norm-violating state can evenuse the external criticism to feed national sentiment opposing foreign involvement andcriticism. As Risse and Sikkink note, “the initial ‘boomerang throw’ often appears to becounterproductive because it allows the state to solidify domestic support.”27 The denialstage can nevertheless be considered part of the socialization process, because denialmeans at least implicit awareness that the country’s international reputation may be atstake. Yet, as Risse and Sikkink recognize, some governments care little for their reputa-tions and prefer to squelch protest by killing or buying off internal opposition.

The primary challenge for transnational human rights networks under the spiralmodel is the transition to phase three, the “tactical concessions” stage. The effective-ness of the transition depends on a combination of the strength and mobility of thenetwork and the vulnerability of the target government to international pressure.28 Inphase three, continuous combined pressure from above and below forces the norm-violating government to appease international critics through cosmetic changes. Bymaking tactical concessions, the government accepts the legitimacy of external criti-cism on human rights grounds and becomes vulnerable to a normative process of“shaming.” Government leaders, becoming entrapped in their own rhetoric, are in-creasingly forced by the weight of opposing arguments to respond with specificity tocriticism. “In other words,” argue Risse and Sikkink, “a process which began for instru-mental reasons, with arguments being used merely rhetorically, increasingly becomes atrue dialogue over specific human rights allegations in the ‘target state.’”29

The international attention and connections strengthen domestic NGOs, posi-tioning them to be able to promote further changes. Of course, as Risse and Sikkinknote, the process is not inevitable; norm-violating governments can head off domesticopposition through arresting or killing key leaders. If target governments allow do-mestic NGO networks to develop, they become confronted with the choice between“controlled liberalization”30 and increased repression. Increased repression at this latestage strengthens domestic opposition and eliminates any international support forthe target state, often leading to an overthrow of the regime.

26 Ibid., 21. NGOs play a “core role” in any transnational advocacy network. See Keck and Sikkink, ActivistsBeyond Borders, 8–9.27 Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms,” 23.28 Ibid., 25; see also Burgerman, Moral Victories, 5: “A violator state will comply with human rights normsonly if a key element of its domestic political elite, one capable of exercising its authority over armed ele-ments, perceives itself to be vulnerable to human rights condemnation or has concern for its country’sinternational reputation as a violator state.”29 Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms,” 28.


Through either controlled liberalization in the government or a more dramaticchange in government, previously norm-violating states enter the fourth stage, inwhich human rights norms are elevated to “prescriptive status.”31 In this phase gov-ernment acceptance of the validity of international norms can be seen not only in theiruse of the norms in dialogue over accusations of violations, but also in their institu-tionalization of practices consistent with the norms. Acceptance of norms at this stagedoes not guarantee implementation of norms; it is important that domestic andtransnational networks maintain international scrutiny and pressure in order to ensureimproved compliance with international human rights norms.

The fifth and final phase, “rule-consistent behavior,” comes as governments bringtheir actions into full compliance with the previously accepted norms. At this pointPutnam’s two-level game may come into play as domestic pro-human rights leaderstake power and use international influence and leverage to implement changes. Social-ization of norms takes place as continued external and internal pressure makes normcompliance habitual and institutionalized.

As is readily apparent from a brief examination of Risse and Sikkink’s spiral pat-tern, NGOs play a key role in promoting government compliance with human rightsnorms, including freedom of religion or belief. The model highlights some of thevaried roles of NGOs, such as providing information of norm violations or influencinggovernments or international organizations to put pressure on violating states. As themodel presupposes the existence of international norms, it would be helpful to add anadditional preliminary stage in the model—the formation of international norms, inwhich NGOs also play a part.32

The spiral model is significant because it illuminates the need for both domesticand international NGOs, as well as for strong transnational networks that tie themtogether. Domestic NGOs are especially needed in the “repression” phase to provideinformation33 and in the final two stages (“prescriptive status” and “rule-consistentbehavior”) to oversee continued compliance with norms and to influence the creationand operation of domestic institutions designed to protect human rights. Interna-tional NGOs play a particularly significant role in the first three stages (“repression,”“denial,” and “tactical concessions”), as they report on violations of rights and mobi-lize other international actors to condemn and pressure rights-violating governments.The effectiveness of both domestic and international NGOs, however, depends on thenetworks they develop with other NGOs and governments, intergovernmental orga-nizations, and media leaders.

The stages also shed light on conflicts among international NGOs on their properrole—whether they should attack violations or foster facilitating institutions. The simpleanswer is that both are needed, but their effectiveness depends greatly on the normsocialization stage of the violator state. At the “repression” stage and the beginning ofthe “denial” stage, states respond most to sanctions, “shaming,” threats, and otherforms of instrumental sticks and carrots. To be most effective at these stages, NGOs

30 Ibid.31 Ibid., 20.32 See section II.B.1.33 See also Bergerman, Moral Victories, 5: “Organized local members of the human rights network arenecessary to keep their issues on the international agenda and to provide information to international allies.”


can provide information on violations and pressure violator states, either directly orthrough other states or international organizations. When violator states begin toenter into a meaningful dialogue at the end of the “denial” phase, and then as theytransition into the “prescriptive status” stage, NGOs will find that promoting dialogue,technical assistance, and quiet diplomacy are increasingly effective. The instrumentaltechniques that were most effective at the earliest two stages will become increasinglyless effective in the norm-socialization efforts of the final “prescriptive status” and“rule-consistent behavior” stages.

In summary, NGOs can play vastly different roles that may all serve to fosternorm socialization. A wide variety of seemingly contradictory approaches are neededover the lifespan of the norm-socialization process. Undermining the mutual criticismthat NGOs with differing approaches often engage in, the spiral model instead sug-gests that their efforts, if used judiciously and appropriately, complement one anotherand are all necessary to move a violator state through the norm-socialization process.

II. NATURES OF NGOS PROMOTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

The analytical models of change presented in part I of this chapter suggest that effec-tive human rights NGOs exist in a multiplicity of forms and play a wide variety ofroles. NGOs promoting freedom of religion or belief are similarly varied. In this sec-tion I will attempt to give a more concrete feel for the various forms these NGOs take,their sponsors, and their missions. During the discussion of various missions of NGOs,I will flesh out aspects of the theoretical model established in part I by providing morespecifics on how NGOs promoting freedom of religion and belief work to pressure orotherwise influence states that violate freedom of religion or belief.

A. WHAT KIND OF NGOS ARE PROMOTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION

OR BELIEF?

Early international human rights NGOs, though not focused on promoting freedomof religion or belief, were often motivated by religious ideals and sometimes coalescedaround churches or missionary programs.34 Some goals of these early NGOs includedthe abolition of slavery, the promotion of women’s suffrage, and the elimination offemale circumcision and footbinding.35

34 Keck and Sikkink, “Historical Precursors to Modern Transnational Advocacy Networks,” Activists BeyondBorders, 39–78 (arguing at 75 that “[a]ll of these campaigns emerged from religious organizations”); J. D.Armstrong, “Non-Governmental Organizations,” Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Issues and Responses,ed. R. J. Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 247–48. Klaus Hüfner provides thefollowing list of early NGOs: “the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (1823), and the World’s Evan-gelical Alliance (1846), the World Alliance of YMCA’s (1855), the International Workers’ Associations(1864), the International Law Association (1873), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1888), the SecondInternational (1889), the Young Women’s Christian Association (1894) and the Union of InternationalAssociations (1907)” (Klaus Hüfner, “The Role of NGOs vis-à-vis International Organizations and Na-tional Governments,” in The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the New European Order, ed.Jürgen Schramm [Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, 1995], 15).35 Keck and Sikkink, “Historical Precursors to Modern Transnational Advocacy Networks,” Activists BeyondBorders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 39–78.


A survey of contemporary NGOs that seek to facilitate freedom of religion orbelief reveals more variety than continuity, which would be expected under the spiralmodel. Some NGOs are purely domestic, others have an international scope, and stillothers are regionally focused. Some NGOs, such as the International Helsinki Foun-dation for Human Rights,36 promote freedom of religion or belief as one among manyhuman rights. Others focus exclusively on religious freedom issues, such as the Inter-national Association for Religious Freedom.37 Still others are human rights groupswith well-established subdivisions focusing on religious liberty issues, such as Free-dom House’s Center for Religious Freedom.38

NGOs promoting freedom of religion or belief are typically established as non-profit organizations and receive funding from membership dues, grants from founda-tions, and private donations from individuals, corporations, churches, governments,or intergovernmental or interchurch organizations.39 A broad membership base canspread awareness of and commitment to an NGO, but often involves high fundraisingcosts. While Amnesty International is a classic example of a member-supported humanrights NGO, it is also one of the few that have made a success of this method.40

Government funding may be seen as reducing the impartiality of an NGO, but somegovernmental programs attempt to mitigate this by establishing intermediate bodieswithout political accountability to administer the funds.

It is also important to recognize the important roles played by nontypical NGOs.For example, religious organizations are themselves non-governmental organizationsand often promote religious freedom directly, through loose coalitions, through orga-nizations of religious associations, or through organizations sponsored by faith groups.For example, many churches work through the World Council of Churches, the Councilof European Churches, or through councils of religious organizations at national orlocal levels that focus on religious freedom issues. In addition, some religious organi-zations have established their own or affiliated organizations to promote religiousfreedom. One example of this sort would be the International Religious Liberty Asso-ciation, founded and energized by Seventh-Day Adventists, which promotes freedomof religion for all religious organizations and involves members of many faiths.41

Religious freedom is an issue that can bring together numerous, extremely di-verse religious organizations and civil libertarian groups. For example, in the UnitedStates representatives of a broad range of religious organizations and civil libertygroups participate in a joint Religious Liberty Committee, which tracks issues relat-ing to religious freedom. Similarly broad interreligious coalitions have also beencreated to work together on specific legislation or court cases that raise religiousliberty concerns.42 Broad ranges of groups can also be brought together through

36 See their website at <www.ihf-hr.org>.37 See their website at <www.iarf-religiousfreedom.net>.38 See their website at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/>.39 See discussion in section III.40 Winston, “Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights NGOs,” 36–43.41 See their website at <http://www.irla.org/welcome.html>. In a similar vein, the International Coalitionfor Religious Freedom is af filiated with the Unification Church; see their website at<www.religiousfreedom.com>.42 For example, several hundred religious and civil libertarian groups cooperated in promoting broadergovernmental protection of religious freedom in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (see


NGOs created to reflect interfaith religious liberty concerns, such as the Oslo Coali-tion on Freedom of Religion or Belief,43 the International Academy for Freedom ofReligion and Belief, and the Dutch Platform for Freedom of Religion or Belief.

Other nonstereotypical, non-government actors include academic centers or con-sortia involved in religion and law issues. These types of institutions and groups, oftenreferred to as “knowledge-based” or “epistemic” communities,44 can draw on theexpertise and institutional resources of universities and make unique contributions toa transnational advocacy network.45

While governments and intergovernmental organizations by definition are notnon-governmental organizations, they play an important role in transnational advocacynetworks and should not be overlooked in a discussion of NGOs.46 Many governmentsor intergovernmental organizations have established official human rights founda-tions or have offices in departments of foreign affairs that deal with religious freedomor human rights. As described further in the following section, NGOs can have ex-tremely fruitful interactions with these governmental and intergovernmental players.

B. WHAT ROLES DO NGOS PLAY IN PROMOTING FREEDOM OF

RELIGION OR BELIEF?

As is suggested in the preceding sections, NGOs facilitate freedom of religion or beliefthrough multiple overlapping methods. Some NGOs choose to focus on one approach,while others use various combinations. Some key roles of NGOs include standardsetting, violation reporting, providing technical advice, and lobbying and agenda set-ting. I will address these roles in turn. Conflict resolution, networking, facilitatinginterfaith cooperation, and education are also important functions performed by someNGOs, but I will not discuss them here, as they have been addressed in depth in otherchapters of this volume.47

<http://hydra.gsa.gov/pbs/pt/call-in/pl103141.htm>) and in supporting its constitutionality in the caseCity of Boerne v. Flores (see <http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/95-2074.ZS.html>).43 See their website, <www.hri.ca/partners/forob>.44 Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” Interna-tional Organization 46, no.1 (winter 1992): 1–36.45 See, e.g., the European Consortium for Church and State Research (bringing together scholars andacademic centers from EU countries) (online at <http://www.uni-trier.de/uni/fb5/robbers/eng/Welcome.HTML>); the J. M. Dawson Institute for Church–State Studies at Baylor University (online at<http://www.baylor.edu/Church_State/>); Emory University’s Law and Religion Program (online at<http://www.law.emory.edu/LAW/REL/law-rel1.html>); Columbia’s Center for the Study of HumanRights (online at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/humanrights/); DePaul’s Center for Church–State Stud-ies (online at http://www.depaul.edu/about_DP/centers.asp#Church/State>); the University of Essex’sHuman Rights Centre (online at http://www2.essex.ac.uk/human_rights_centre/); and the BrighamYoung University International Center for Law and Religion Studies (online at <http://www.law2.byu.edu/Law&Religion/>). Many others could be named as well.46 See, e.g., chapters on the Human Rights Committee, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation inEurope, and the Council of Europe in this volume. Some individual countries are also heavily involved inpromoting freedom of religion or belief. See, e.g., Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001 Memorandumon Human Rights Policy (May 2001) (describing Dutch support for initiatives promoting freedom of reli-gion or belief).47 See chapters by Noll, Plessner, Swidler, Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, the chapter by Eidsvåg, Lindholm, andSveen, and the Conclusion and Agenda for the Future.


1. STANDARD SETTING AND COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS

Implicit in the spiral pattern is the existence of international norms accepted by aninternational community of states and non-governmental actors. The creation of normscould be seen as a preliminary step before the spiral pattern of change can happen, andthe adoption of these norms by violator states plays significant part in the “prescriptivestatus” step. NGOs can play an important role in both establishing the internationalnorms and promoting common understanding and acceptance of them. The technicalexpertise in drafting and articulating proposals for norms may come from epistemiccommunities, while other NGOs may play a greater role in influencing internationalorganizations to accept these proposals.

NGOs have been instrumental in setting international standards on freedom ofreligion and belief.48 NGOs have also been instrumental in the equally difficult processof encouraging countries to ratify international agreements. Jeremy Gunn’s chapter inthis volume, which focuses on how individuals and groups influenced key religiousfreedom legislation in the United States, provides an important example of the pre-eminent role NGOs can play in promoting religious freedom in domestic legislationand in states’ foreign policies.

Involvement in standard setting can be approached through different avenues,and varying types of NGOs may be best suited for various aspects of standard setting.International NGOs that have consultative status or lobbying access at internationalorganizations may effectively participate in the drafting discussions directly, but evenso, they may rely on epistemic communities or NGOs with technical expertise forinformation or advice. Other NGOs can also exert influence over drafting processesthrough state representatives in a drafting body.49

NGOs seeking to be involved in the standard-setting process should evaluatetheir strengths to see where they can play a significant role in the drafting process. Onecommentator described the fluid character of a multilateral negotiation: the negotiation“usually changes drastically from its initiation to the conclusion of a final agreement thatterminates the process. For example, the need for new knowledge and information ismuch more limited at the end of the negotiation, when concessions are exchangedand deals are made, than when the agenda is set and issues are clarified in the earlierstages of the process.”50 Clearly different types of NGOs are needed at different stagesof the process of formulating norms.

48 See Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, Freedom of Religion and Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) (describing NGO influence on, inter alia, the UN’s 1981 Declara-tion). William Korey also details NGO involvement in the formation of numerous international humanrights norms, such as the human rights provisions in the UN Charter to the Universal Declaration of Hu-man Rights and OSCE Commitments. See generally William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights: “A Curious Grapevine” (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).49 See Nigel Rodley, “The Work of Non-Governmental Organizations in the World-Wide Promotion andProtection of Human Rights,” UN Bulletin of Human Rights 90, no. 1 (1991): 85.50 Gunnar Sjöstedt et al. as quoted in Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights inContext: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 498.


NGO interactions with international organizations are not limited to norm set-ting. NGOs can also influence international organizations to condemn violator statesor impose sanctions, which are particularly effective at the “repression” and “denial”stages, and can use international organizations as a means to facilitate dialogue andexpert consultations, emphasize international norms, and support domestic rights-pro-tection institutions, which are valuable as the target state moves through the “tacticalconcessions” to the “prescriptive status” and “rule-consistent behavior” stages.

International organizations each have varying policies on cooperation with NGOs.Some international organizations, such as the United Nations, have established formaland informal observer or consultative relationships with NGOs.51 While achieving ob-server or consultative status grants certain formal privileges to NGOs, it is not generallya precondition for cooperation with or informal lobbying of most international organi-zations.52 Often NGOs are also granted opportunities to present written and oral state-ments at committee meetings and conferences of international organizations. Of these,institutions associated with UN bodies, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe havebeen most active on freedom of religion issues. All of the organizations here described,however, have a scope that includes protection of freedom of religion and belief.

The United Nations has established a procedure under Resolution 1296 (XLIV),updated in Resolution 1996/31 of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),whereby international NGOs can obtain one of three levels of consultative status.53

The levels correspond with the number of fields of ECOSOC in which NGOs areinvolved, and grant correspondingly varied privileges. General consultative status isgranted to NGOs dealings with most of ECOSOC’s activities. These are the onlyNGOs permitted to propose items for ECOSOC’s agenda. Obtaining special consul-tative status, granted to NGOs with special interest in a few of the fields covered byECOSOC (such as human rights NGOs), allows NGO representatives to attend meet-ings, speak, and submit written statements for circulation. NGOs in the third category,or the Roster, are those with the most specialized interests. In practice, the distinc-tions between the categories blur.54

To obtain ECOSOC consultative status, NGOs must apply to the UN Commit-tee on NGOs and submit reports on their activities every four years.55 The grant ofsome level of consultative status or placement on the Roster also allows NGOs to

51 See generally Martin A. Olz, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems,”Columbia Human Rights Law Review 28 (winter 1997): 307; Arie Bloed et al., Monitoring Human Rightsin Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms, vol. 30, International Studies in HumanRights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).52 See, e.g., Council of Europe Resolution (93) 38, appendix A, para. 12: “The procedures [relating toconsultative status] described above shall not restrict the right of the Committee of Ministers, or of theParliamentary Assembly, or of the Standing Conference of Regional and Local Authorities to initiate anyaction concerning other non-governmental organisations in pursuance of their respective rules of proce-dures. It should also not prevent the Secretariat of the Council of Europe from considering practical coop-eration on an ad hoc basis with other international and national non-governmental organisations in any fieldof mutual interest.”53 UN Resolution 1996/31, adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council, 25 July 1996 (availableonline at <gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/esc/recs/1996/E-RES96.31>); see also UN Resolution 1296(XLIV), 23 May 1968; for a broad range of information on NGOs and ECOSOC, see generally <http://www.un.org/partners/civil_society/ngo/n-ecosoc.htm#top>.54 See Bloed, Monitoring Human Rights in Europe, 126–27.


participate in UN conferences on request; other NGOs may only participate throughindividual application. Even without formal consultative status, NGOs can still beapprised of and involved in UN activities. NGOs may join mailing lists of the UNOffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,56 the UN Department of PublicInformation,57 and the United Nations Children’s Fund.

Gaining consultative status with ECOSOC or joining a mailing list, however, arenot the only ways for NGOs to become involved in UN activities. NGOs dealing withhuman rights and freedom of religion or belief issues at the UN can work with andtestify before the Commission on Human Rights and submit information to its Spe-cial Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (formerly called the UN SpecialRapporteur on Religious Intolerance), both discussed in depth elsewhere in this vol-ume.58 UNESCO also has its own types of consultative status for NGOs, and allowsorganizations with consultative status to send representatives to sessions of UNESCO’sGeneral Conference and take part in UNESCO-sponsored Conferences of Interna-tional Non-Governmental Organizations.59 UNESCO also cooperates withunaccredited NGOs for information distribution and contracting purposes. In addi-tion to UN charter bodies, the Human Rights Committee, which was created underthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and is also discussed else-where in this volume, is an important forum for international NGO involvement, andhas its own rules for NGO involvement.60

International NGOs can also obtain consultative status with the Council of Eu-rope.61 To obtain consultative status, NGOs must file an application with the Councilof Europe’s Secretary General. The application must contain the NGO’s statute, areport of recent activities, and a formal declaration that the organization accepts theprinciples of the Council of Europe as set forth in the preamble and article 1 of theCouncil’s statute.62 The Secretary General determines whether consultative statuswill be granted; in the absence of objections by the Committee of Ministers and the

55 See ECOSOC Rule 80; UN-NGLS Factsheet for Applying for Consultative Status with the UN Economicand Social Council (ECOSOC), available online at <http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/english/factsheets/ecosoc.htm>.56 See their website at <www.unhchr.ch>.57 The Department of Public Information has an NGO section that organizes briefings, conferences, andworkshops for NGOs, and maintains and distributes information on the UN and a directory of NGOsregistered with its office. See <http://www.un.org/MoreInfo/ngolink/dpingo.htm>. For information onapplication for associated status with the DPI, see <http://www.un.org/MoreInfo/ngolink/brochure.htm>.58 General information and links for human rights NGO interactions, directories, and committees associatedwith these and other UN bodies are available at <http://www.un.org/partners/civil_society/ngo/n-hr.htm>.For additional information on the UN Commission on Human Rights, see the chapter in this volume byTheo van Boven and the Commission’s website, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chr.htm>.59 For more information on UNESCO’s activities promoting freedom of religion or belief, see the chapter inthis volume by Doudou Diene. UNESCO has an NGO-UNESCO Liaison Committee (online at <http://www.unesco.org/ext/ngo/comite/>). For a useful evaluation of UNESCO’s cooperation with NGOs doneby the Union of International Organizations, see <http://www.uia.org/organiz/unesa.htm>.60 For additional information on the Human Rights Committee’s role in promoting freedom of religion orbelief and NGO interactions with the Committee, see the chapter in this volume by Martin Scheinen. Seealso their website, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/hrc.htm>.61 For general information on the Council of Europe, see their webpage at <http://www.coe.int> and thechapter in this volume by Javier Martínez-Torrón and Rafael Navarro-Valls.62 Council of Europe Resolution (93) 38, appendix A (outlining “Rules for Consultative Status”).


Parliamentary Assembly, he or she will grant consultative status after three months.63

The Council of Europe also grants observer status for individual committees createdby the Committee of Ministers.64

The European Court of Human Rights (European Court)65 also allows for NGOinvolvement. NGOs can apply to the European Court on their own behalf or in behalfof a victim of human rights abuse if they serve as legal counsel for the victim.66 TheEuropean Court has also accepted amicus curiae briefs from NGOs.67

The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe encourages NGOparticipation, but has no formal consultative status for NGOs. NGO involvement isusually coordinated through individual field offices or through the Office for Demo-cratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), particularly its NGO Unit.68 NGOsregularly participate at OSCE meetings and seminars and at the ODIHR HumanDimension Implementation Meetings. Among other capacity-building projects, theNGO Unit currently has a fund to facilitate Central and East European NGO partici-pation in OSCE Human Dimension events.69 NGOs may also communicate withODIHR’s Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief through itsresponsible advisors and officers.70

The Organization of American States has no formal procedure for NGOs to ob-tain observer status, but has formal agreements of cooperation with some NGOs andinformally cooperates with many more. The OAS General Assembly has also accred-ited NGOs as observers on an ad hoc basis, and NGOs have been allowed to addressthe Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers as well as the Permanent Council,which proposes actions to the General Assembly.71

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commis-sion) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both established under theAmerican Convention on Human Rights, have created additional opportunities for

63 Ibid.64 Council of Europe Resolution (76) 3; see also Resolution (93) 38 (referring to “Rules of Procedures” ofCouncil of Europe committees).65 The European Commission for Human Rights was disbanded in 1998 under Protocol 11. For a discus-sion of the Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Court’s case law on freedom ofreligion or belief, see the chapter in this volume by Javier Martínez-Torrón and Rafael Navarro-Valls. Seealso the website of the European Court at <http://www.echr.coe.int/>.66 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 34 (recog-nizing the right of the European Court to receive applications “from any person, non-governmentalorganisation or group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation” of rights protected under theEuropean Convention) (available online at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm>).67 See Arie Bloed, Monitoring Human Rights in Europe, 136–67. See generally Rules of Court (availableonline at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/RulesOfCourt.html>). The European Court also main-tains a database of human rights cases at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Hudoc.htm>.68 See Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, OSCE Handbook, 160–61(available online in English and Russian at <http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/handbook.pdf>).The website for the NGO Unit is <http://www.osce.org/odihr/democratization/ngo/>.69 See <http://www.osce.org/odihr/projects/prj2001_ngo.pdf>. Contact information for the NGO Unitis available at its website, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/democratization/ngo/ >.70 See their website at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/democratization/religion/ >.71 Olz, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems,” 355.


NGO cooperation. The Inter-American Commission, which performs fact-finding andadvisory functions,72 allows NGOs to help arrange in-country Commission visits,73 tobe involved in standard setting, to file petitions denouncing or complaining of stateaction on behalf of themselves or others, and to participate in hearings or settlementnegotiations to resolve petitions. 74 Most human rights petitions filed before the Inter-American Commission are filed by NGOs.75 The Inter-American Court of HumanRights76 also provides many opportunities for NGO involvement. NGO officials canserve as legal advisors to the court, represent victims before the court, and file briefs asamicus curiae in both advisory and contended cases.77

NGOs also have opportunities to work with the Organization of African Unity(the OAU) and the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights.78 The OAUhas granted observer status to a few Africa-oriented international NGOs,79 but mosthuman rights issues involve the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights(the African Commission), where NGOs have more influence.80 NGOs can not onlysubmit communications to the African Commission,81 but can also work informallywith the African Commission82 and obtain formal observer status. To obtain formal

72 For more information on the Inter-American Commission, see their website, <http://www.cidh.oas.org>.73 See David Padilla, “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of AmericanStates: A Case Study,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy 9 (1993): 104; AmericanConvention on Human Rights (ACHR), art. 48 (available online at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/B%C3%A1sicos/basic3.htm>); Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 18(g) (al-lowing on-site observations with the consent or at the invitation of a Party State) (available online at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic15.htm>).74 American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 43, 44, 48 (available online at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/B%C3%A1sicos/basic3.htm>); see also Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights(8 April 1980), art. 26 (as modified on 27 June 1987) (providing that “any nongovernmental entity legallyrecognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commissioncontaining denunciations or complaints of violations of this Convention by a State Party”). Information onpetitioning and an online petition form are available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/esemail9.asp> (Spanish)and <http://www.cidh.oas.org/email9.asp> (English).75 Olz, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems,” 357.76 For more information on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see their website at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr>.77 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, arts. 22, 23, 26 (available online at<http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic18.htm>); see also Dinah Shelton, “The Jurisprudence of the In-ter-American Court of Human Rights,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy 10(fall 1994): 348–51; Olz, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems,” 358–59.78 As this volume was going to press, the Organization of African Unity was replaced by the African Union.79 Olz, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems,” 360–70; see generally<http://www.oau-oua.org/> (OAU website).80 Olz, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems,” 361. See generally RachelMurray and Malcolm Evans, eds., Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights(Oxford: Oxford, 2001).81 See African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 45 (available online at <http://www.oau-oua.org/oau_info/rights.htm>).82 For example, the African Commission’s mandate requires that it “co-operate with other African andinternational institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights”(African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 45.1[c], available online at <http://www.oau-oua.org/oau_info/rights.htm>).


observer status, NGOs must submit written applications with the Commission’s sec-retariat, listing the organization’s statute and rules of procedure, a list of the names ofits officials, a report on its activities, and a financial disclosure.83

Obtaining observer status or being involved with international organizations notonly allows NGOs to influence norm creation, but also provides an excellent opportu-nity for NGOs to build networks with other NGOs. These ties may be unofficial ormay be officially promoted through the international organizations. For example, theCouncil of Europe has established a partially funded Liaison Committee and PlenaryConference, established under the responsibility of NGOs with consultative status.84

These allow NGO representatives to meet together regularly and to coordinate withthe Committee of Ministers’ working group on NGO relations. Similarly, the UNNon-Governmental Organizations Committee on Freedom of Religion or Belief, partof the UN’s Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations, organizes activitiesfor NGOs and UN representatives on issues relating to freedom of religion or belief.85

2. COMPLIANCE MONITORING

NGOs also play a critical role in monitoring and spreading information on violationsof international norms. It has been argued that “NGOs have significantly supple-mented states, and to a large extent supplanted them, in human rights monitoring.”86

As the spiral pattern would suggest, compliance monitoring is a key element in allstages of norm socialization. Reporting of violations to the international community,for example, is key to moving a state from the initial “repression” stage to the “denial”stage. Accurate reporting also provides a base of information with which governmentsand NGOs can bring violator states into a true dialogue about specific abuses duringthe “tactical concessions” and “prescriptive status” phases. At the “rule-consistentbehavior” stage, continued stable and effective compliance monitoring at the domes-tic level becomes critical.

Violation monitoring is done particularly effectively by networks of NGOs, asthey have more flexibility and less institutional reserve than governments. Claude E.Welch suggests that the convention-based human rights system “would be almosttotally ineffective if it were based on reports submitted by governments. NGOs’ goalof providing information about abuses remains central to the reporting systems.”87

The effectiveness of NGOs at compliance monitoring, however, depends heavilyupon their reliability and ability to spread information quickly. NGOs need to be ableto provide both technical information and dramatic testimony to policy makers, otherNGOs, and the media in order to effectively place local problems on the international

83 See Olz, “Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights Systems,” 367; see generallyRules of Procedures of the African Commission, ch. 13 (available online at <http://www.oau-oua.org/oau_info/rules.htm>); Gino J. Naldi, Documents of the Organizations of African Unity (New York: Mansell,1992).84 See Liaison Committee of NGOs enjoying consultative status with the Council of Europe, Representativebodies of the NGOs having consultative status with the Council of Europe and the conduct of their busi-ness, ONG.CL (93) 2 (1993).85 See their website at <http://www.conferenceofngos.org/ngosubs/freedrel.htm>.86 Welch, NGOs and Human Rights, 275.87 Ibid., 265.


agenda.88 NGOs that focus on reporting should be aware of potential problems in theircoverage, such as biased or limited sources and the tendency to report on particulargovernmental practices and ignore overall conditions.89 To be effective, NGOs needcredibility, accurate and dramatic information, and strong links with the media.90

NGOs monitor religious freedom at national, regional, and international levels,and spread information by internet postings, emails, newsletters, or periodic reports.Important academically based reports with broad international scope are Kevin Boyleand Juliet Sheen’s Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report91 and Freedom House’sReligious Freedom in the World: A Global Report on Freedom and Persecution.92 Othergroups involved in significant religious freedom violation reporting at the internationallevel include the Center for Studies on New Religions/Centro Studi sulle Nuove Religioni(through its website, www.cesnur.org), Human Rights Without Frontiers (through itswebsite, www.hrwf.net, and an email service), and Aiuto alla Chiesa che Soffre (Aid tothe Church in Need).93 Annual or periodic reports by many human rights organizationsinclude some reporting on religious freedom issues.94 At a regional level, Keston NewsService has long been recognized as a reliable and important source for information onviolations of religious freedom in the former Eastern Bloc nations.95 Keston publishes aperiodic journal, distributes a newsletter, and provides an email news service.

NGOs can also contribute to monitoring efforts through contributing informa-tion to official state or interstate bodies that issue reports. Particularly significant inthis context are reports of the Human Rights Committee and the UN Special Rappor-teur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, as well as the annual international religiousfreedom reports of the United States State Department96 and the US Commission onInternational Religious Freedom.97 These rely heavily on reporting from domestic

88 See Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 16.89 See Henry Steiner, Diverse Partners: Non-Governmental Organizations in the Human Rights Movement(report from a retreat for human rights NGO activists in Crete, 1991), 19, quoted in Steiner and Alston,International Human Rights in Context, 462–63; David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, “Measuringthe Impact of Human Rights Violations,” in Welch, NGOs and Human Rights, 230–32.90 See discussion in Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 18–22.91 Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen, eds., Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report (London: Routledge,1997).92 Paul Marshall, ed., Religious Freedom in the World: A Global Report on Freedom and Persecution (Nash-ville: Broadman & Holman, 2000).93 See, e.g., Report on Religious Freedom in the World 2000, available in Italian online at <http://www.alleanzacattolica.org/acs/index.htm>, and available in English by sending an email [email protected] with the subject line: “Please send me the 2000 Report.”94 Reports of this sort include the annual Human Rights Watch Report (2002 report available online at<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/index.html>) and reports by the International Helsinki Foundation for HumanRights (see especially their Report on Religious Intolerance in Selected OSCE Countries in 2000 <http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/osce01/Religious%20Intolerance/ReligiousFreedom%20ReportJune01.pdf>; formore general information and other reports see <http://www.ihf-hr.org/index.htm>).95 See their website at <www.keston.org>.96 Available online at the US State Department’s website, <www.state.gov>. The 2001 report is located at<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/>. Annual reports are generally published in October.97 Available online at the Commission’s website, <http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php3>. The 2001 report islocated at <http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/01May01Report_Index.php3>, with an addendum at <http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/14May01report_Addendum.php3>. The Commission’s reports are publishedannually at the beginning of May.


and international NGOs. The US State Department, for example, designates one per-son in each US embassy to collect information on religious freedom violations in thatcountry for the annual report. This official often relies on information submitted bydomestic and international NGOs and religious organizations, in addition to in-coun-try government sources, to put together a complete report.98

As explained in greater depth in Theo van Boven’s chapter in this volume, NGOshave many opportunities to contribute to reports and country reviews of the UNSpecial Rapporteur and the Human Rights Committee. NGOs, as one member of theHuman Rights Committee explained, are “absolutely indispensable” to the Commit-tee, as without them there would be “virtually no sources of information” to questionofficial government reports.99

3. RESEARCH AND TECHNICAL ADVICE

An additional role of NGOs in promoting religious freedom is to provide scholarlyand technical advice to governments and governmental critics. Largely provided byepistemic communities, scholarly research and technical advice can benefit all otherfunctions of NGOs—standard setting, reporting of violations, and lobbying of policy-makers.100 In terms of the spiral model of change, technical advice is valuable in differentways at various stages. Initially, research and technical advice can help policy-makersunderstand the depth of the problems in target states and develop effective means ofboth instrumental leverage and moral persuasion. At later stages, particularly the crucial“tactical concessions” stage, technical experts can serve as neutral brokers in dialoguewith the target country over specific violations. Finally, academic experts can offersupport, guidance, and training for emerging domestic rights-protecting institutions.This becomes particularly crucial in ensuring a successful transition to the final, “rule-consistent behavior” stage.

Academic communities’ strengths in research and technical advice most obviouslylend themselves to roles in the research and technical sides of drafting and analyzinglegislation and international norms. Numerous academic centers have gathered andanalyzed national laws affecting religious organizations, which in turn allows them toprovide concrete analyses of draft laws or proposed international norms.101 An inter-national consortium of universities and academic centers, in connection with the OSCE’sAdvisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief,102 has developed an online

98 See, e.g., Preface to 2001 International Religious Freedom Report, available online at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/index.cfm?docid=5529>.99 Thomas Buergenthal, as quoted in Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 269.100 See generally Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordina-tion,” Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, special issue, International Organization46 (winter 1992): 1–36; Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 30.101 A representative sample of such books and commentaries on norms affecting religious freedom couldinclude Inge Gampl et al., Österreichisches Staatskirchenrecht, 2 vols. (Vienna: Orac, 1990); Joseph Listl andDietrich Pirson, Handbuch des Staatskirchenrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Berlin:Duncker &Humblot, 1994). Similar volumes have also been published by government offices or NGOs.See, e.g., Alberto de la Hera and Rosa María Martínez de Codes, Spanish Legislation on Religious Affairs(Madrid: Ministerio de Justicia Centro de publicaciones, 1998); Institut religii i prava, Religioznye ob’edineniiasvoboda sovesti i veroispovedaniia: Normativnye akti sudebnaia prakitka (Moscow: Yurisprudentsiia, 2001).


database of constitutional provisions, laws affecting religious organizations and rights,and key international reports on religious freedom in OSCE member states, located atwww.religlaw.org.

Scholarly research and conferences can also help to provide depth and backgroundinto situations in norm-violating states, which can serve as a healthy corrective tosome of the otherwise possible weaknesses in NGO violation monitoring.103 NGOviolation reporting, in the nature of things, is uneven, depending on the NGO in-volved. As a result, there are criticisms that NGO monitoring sometimes manifestsexcessive bias, a lack of depth, limited sources, and a tendency to focus on individualgovernment practices instead of an overall situation. While traditional NGOs are oftenmore effective at quickly obtaining and publicizing information, scholarly researchfrom epistemic communities can help provide the correctives and balance that comewith distance and in-depth research.

Many international journals focus on questions of freedom of religion or belief. Asampling of some significant ones includes The European Journal for Church-StateResearch, published by the European Consortium for Church-State Research; theAnuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, published by Complutense University ofMadrid; The Journal of Church and State, published by the J. M. Dawson Institute forChurch-State Studies at Baylor University; Religion, State, and Society, published bythe Keston Institute; Fides et Libertas, published by the International Religious Lib-erty Association; and Conscience et Liberté, published by the International Associationfor the Defense of Religious Liberty. Some significant scholarly journals also focus onnational or topical issues, including Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations,Österreichisches Archiv für Recht und Religion (Austria), Gosudarstvo, religia, tserkov(Russia), and Religiina panorama (Ukraine).

4. POLICY FORMATION AND AGENDA SETTING

A key role of NGOs promoting freedom of religion is to educate and influence policy-makers. As suggested by the spiral model described previously, human rights NGOs,to have maximum effect, need to influence not only norm-violating governments, butalso countries and international bodies with influence over the norm-violating gov-ernments. All of these types of influence exist both through formal and less formalchannels. NGOs should carefully examine domestic laws before engaging in formallobbying, since in some countries extensive formal lobbying may affect the tax-exemptstatus of NGOs.

What has been referred to as “leverage politics,” or “the ability to call upon pow-erful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely tohave influence,”104 is one of the core roles of NGOs in the boomerang model or thespiral model. In trying to assert leverage, NGOs bring pressure to bear on organiza-tions or states that have some leverage—be it material or moral—over the violator

102 See the chapter by Urban Gibson and Karen Lord in this volume.103 See text accompanying note 88.104 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 16; see also Morton E. Winston, “Assessing the Effectivenessof International Human Rights NGOs: Amnesty International,” in Welch, NGOs and Human Rights, 36–43 (adopting Keck and Sikkink’s typology).


state.105 Efforts by US human rights advocates to link the Peoples’ Republic of China’shuman rights record to a US Congressional grant of most-favored-nation tradingstatus or the possibility of holding the Olympics in Beijing are clear examples of lever-age politics. Keck and Sikkink suggest other forms of perhaps less obvious leverage,such as influence over public opinion (and votes) in a democracy.106 The spiral modelalso suggests that public criticism has an effect akin to traditional forms of leverage.Success in leverage politics of any sort often, but not always, depends on links tomedia or powerful decision makers and the ability to link human rights practices withsomething else of value.

A final important element of policy formation attempts is what Keck and Sikkinkcall “accountability politics,”107 or what Risse and Sikkink refer to as the normativepractice of shaming.108 Essentially, this tactic focuses on forcing governments to publiclyarticulate human rights principles and then publicizing cases in which governments vio-late articulated principles. The spiral model suggests that, far from being mere “talk,”government recognition of the applicability of human rights norms is an integral partof the socialization of international norms. This approach should be particularlyeffective in the transition to phase three, where governments accept the rhetoric ofinternational norms, and in the fourth stage, where governments need to be heldaccountable to their newly adopted reliance on international norms.109 As Keck andSikkink point out, this can be done effectively in the United States through litigation(amicus curiae briefs as well as group and individual representation), which explainsthe large number of US NGOs that focus on litigation.110 Similar shaming roles areplayed elsewhere by the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights,the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the African Commission onHuman and Peoples’ Rights, and other regional and international organizations.111

Individual complaints may also be filed with the UN Office of the High Commis-sioner on Human Rights112 of the Human Rights Committee.113 Shaming can also beachieved through successful media campaigns or through public statements made byreligious leaders or international organizations.114

While it makes sense to separate the various roles of NGOs for analytical pur-poses, in practice the roles blur. To give only a few examples, research and scholarlywork can form the basis of norm-setting or lobbying efforts. Violation reporting canalso be used as a form of influencing policy, since effective NGOs have the “ability

105See discussion in Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 23-24.106 See discussion in ibid.107 See discussion in ibid., 24–25.108 Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms,” 15.109 Risse and Ropp provide a useful reminder that “[e]xternal actors need to be aware that different modesof socialization are at work during different phases of the ‘spiral model’” (Risse and Ropp, “InternationalHuman Rights Norms and Domestic Change,” 276).110 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 25.111 See discussion of NGO relations with these and other international bodies in section II.B.1.112 For information and instruction on filing complaints, see <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/ex_conv.htm>.113 Information on filing complaints with the Human Rights Committee is available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/oppro.htm>.114 See, e.g., the attempts to prevent passage of the French antisect law as described by Fautre, Garay, andNiedigger in their chapter in this volume.


to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information and move it to whereit will have the most impact.”115 Effective policy formation depends not only onaccurate and timely information of violations, but also clear articulation of domesticand international standards and relevant technical advice. Attempts to remedy indi-vidual injustices through courts or petitions may also have shaming and norm-cre-ation effects.

Individual NGOs may choose to focus on a particular type of activity, but it be-comes clear that work by differing NGOs can be mutually reinforcing. Indeed, tocreate effective transnational networks, NGOs depend on other NGOs, governments,international organizations, epistemic communities, and the media. As a close exami-nation of the spiral pattern might suggest, NGOs and other transnational actors canwork effectively together and reinforce each other’s efforts even without agreement orclose cooperation. An NGO or government with ties to a rights-violating state maydislike and disapprove of the public rhetoric and criticism voiced by other states, NGOs,and intergovernmental actors against the rights-violating state, feeling that quiet di-plomacy is more effective. Nevertheless, the leverage of public criticism at the otherend of the “boomerang” may place the issue on the international agenda and increasethe willingness of a rights-violating state to engage in just such quiet diplomacy. In asimilar vein, actors that engage in high-profile shaming or threats may not themselvesbe able to negotiate with rights violators or enter into discussion of specific abuseswith them, but are clearly the beneficiary of NGOs and other actors who help per-suade rights-violating states to make tactical concessions or liberalize.

Reference to the spiral model would also suggest, however, that not all approachesare effective at all stages. Leverage politics may be the only way to force the worstrights-violating countries to change, but it may be too blunt an instrument for coun-tries at the later stages of the spiral.

III. HOW DO NGOS PROMOTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

OPERATE?

Information on the practical side of running a religious freedom NGO could itself fillmany chapters. Of necessity this chapter will only give a brief overview of a vital issuein running NGOs: developing the material resources to maintain an NGO.

Funding, along with volunteerism, is the lifeblood of NGOs. Before examiningpotential sources of funding, however, a cautionary note is worthwhile. NGO fundingis primarily a result, not a cause, of successful programs: “Although the greater accessto funding for their work undeniably helps such groups to be effective and have greaterimpact, few would deny that superior organisational capacities and successful execu-tion of their programmes are the starting point. The finances come as a result.”116

Obtaining any outside resources depends on the NGO’s having a clear mission, strongorganization, and demonstrable effectiveness. With a clear identity and purpose, NGOs

115 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 16.116 S. Bruce Schearer et al., “A Strategic Guide to Resource Enhancement,” in Sustaining Civil Society:Strategies for Resource Mobilisation, ed. Leslie M. Fox and S. Bruce Schearer (Washington, D.C.: CIVICUS,1997), 15.


promoting freedom of religion or belief have the potential to draw on a variety ofresources: foundation grants, private donations, corporate donations, and govern-ment or multigovernment grants.

Foundations, including the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, theRockefeller Brothers Fund, the Pew Charitable Trusts, George Soros’s Open SocietyInstitute, and many others, have become a major source of funding for human rightsNGOs.117 From 1977 to 1993, grants from US foundations for international humanrights work rose from less than one million dollars per year to nearly twenty-threemillion dollars per year.118 Larger, more established NGOs may also provide grants,internships, partnerships, and other forms of capacity-building opportunities to NGOsin developing countries and countries in transition.119 Funding is also often availablefrom official human rights foundations, international organizations, and other gov-ernmental or semipublic organizations.120 Some NGOs avoid directly receiving fundsfrom governmental sources or limit government grants and contracts to specificprojects in an attempt to avoid charges of partiality.121 Similar issues may arise inreceiving funding from religious organizations or coalitions or associations of reli-gious organizations.

Resource contributions from individuals or foundations can take many forms:volunteered labor, counsel, or goods; one-time monetary gifts; endowments; or regu-lar donations to name a few. By partnering with other NGOs, individual NGOs canleverage their resources and increase their effectiveness. A high level of volunteerism isparticularly vital for the success of new NGOs. Challenges involved in all forms offundraising and resource development include providing up-to-date and honest infor-mation to donors and limiting overhead fundraising costs (one author suggests a ruleof thumb that fundraising costs should never exceed twenty percent of generatedrevenue).122 Grass-roots fundraising, or fundraising of small amounts from a largenumber of individuals, is extremely costly—aside from Amnesty International, few ifany human rights NGOs depend on membership dues or small contributions; mostcontinue to rely on volunteer efforts, large private donations, and grants.123

117 See, e.g., Makau Mutua, “Human Rights International NGOs: A Critical Evaluation,” in Welch, NGOsand Human Rights, 154; William D. Carmichael, “The Role of the Ford Foundation,” in Welch, NGOs andHuman Rights, 248–60.118 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 99.119 For example, Freedom House has various grant and training programs for NGOs, particularly those inthe former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS. See Freedom House’s websiteat <www.freedomhouse.org>. Freedom House also runs a newsletter for NGOs, NGO News, that containsinformation on other grants and training programs (see <www.ngonet.org>). Two websites designed to helpprovide information on European partnerships and grants for NGOs in the former Eastern Bloc are<www.visegrad.ngo.pl> and <www.eupraxis.com>.120 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 98. Despite the oxymoron, these groups are often referred toas “GONGOs” (governmental NGOs), or “QUANGOs” (quasi-NGOs). For example, information on NGOfunding from the EU is available at <www.europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgc/ong/en>. Seealso Open Society Institute’s Guide to Funding and Participation in European Union Programmes (2001)(available from the Open Society Institute at <www.osi.hu>), and Euro Citizen Action Service’s A Guide toEU Funding Sources in the Candidate Countries (2001) (available from Euro Citizen Action Service at<www.ecas.org>).121 Welch, NGOs and Human Rights, 270–71.122 Alan Fowler, The Virtuous Spiral: A Guide to Sustainability for NGOs in International Development(London: Earthscan Publications, 2000), 114.


Many NGOs face a crisis as they attempt to move from project-based funding tofinancial autonomy. Financial self-sufficiency requires a strategic plan, the developmentof reserves, and resources or methods of ensuring dependable independent income.Such permanent self-sufficiency may be obtained through, for example, the creationof an endowment, or an invested capital reserve fund, sufficient to allow core budget-ary functions to be covered by the interest.124

Another form of economic self-sufficiency is reflected in the current trend forNGOs, particularly development NGOs, to be involved in “development enterprise”or “social entrepreneurship.”125 Under these models, NGOs become hybrid public–private entities that both raise outside money and independently generate revenue.This model is similar to that used by many hospitals in the United States or churchesin various parts of the world.126 In the freedom of religion or belief sphere, this mightbe reflected in an NGO simultaneously representing religious clients for profit andbeing involved in not-for-profit activities such as violation reporting, conflict preven-tion, or policy formation. While a model of this sort has the advantage of generatingindependently controlled funds for NGO activities, a hybrid entity may encounterlegal, accounting, and managerial pitfalls and damage the NGO’s public image.127

Specific advantages and difficulties will depend on the cultural and legal requirementsof individual countries. One option that might work in some countries would be tohave separate legal entities for for-profit and not-for-profit activities, and use the profitstream from the for-profit entity to finance the NGO.

IV. CONCLUSION

NGOs have vast potential to promote freedom of religious belief. This chapter hasonly touched on some significant ways in which they can assist in establishing thissignificant right. While this chapter’s focus has been on NGO influence on violatorstates and recent developments in the social sciences that provide additional supportand understanding for the unique roles that NGOs can play in this arena, this is cer-tainly not the only the area in which NGOs can promote religious freedom. As is wellillustrated by other chapters in this volume, NGOs can have significant influence in

123 See Welch, NGOs and Human Rights, 271.124 See the discussion in Fernand Vincent and Piers Campbell, Towards Greater Financial Autonomy: AManual on Financing Strategies and Techniques for Development NGOs and Community Organizations(Geneva: NGO Management Network, 1989), 41–55.125 See, e.g., Horacio R. Morales Jr., “Earning Income Through Trade and Exchange,” in Fox and Shearer,Sustaining Civil Society, 21–41.126 See, e.g., Fowler, The Virtuous Spiral, 80–98.127 See discussion in Fowler, The Virtual Spiral, 81–98. Vincent and Campbell give the following sugges-tions for NGOs with profit-making centers: “The [for-profit] enterprise must be managed separately, i.e.,the directors must be free to take decisions, to hire people, to build up reserves . . . the NGO should retainpolicy-making control, particularly over major financial decisions; very competent managers should be hired,with the relevant entrepreneurial experience; there must be sufficient capital reserves to ensure that theenterprise can expand, invest in new equipment, allow for depreciation, survive in ‘low’ periods. . . . Thismeans that the profits from such activities must initially be re-invested in the enterprise and hence that thesurplus for the NGO will be relatively small, if not negligible, during the first few years” (Vincent andCampbell, Towards Greater Financial Autonomy, 69).


promoting education, dialogue, interfaith cooperation, and other important ventures.One important idea flowing from the spiral model, however, applies to these groups aswell. Simply put, NGOs need each other and need each other to fill different roles.Success in promoting socialization of human rights norms requires a combination ofcompliance monitoring, shaming, moral persuasion, use of leverage, academic research,policy-making efforts, and many other activities. While a view of the spectrum ofhuman rights NGOs seems to reveal a multiplicity of organizations and perhaps merechaos, I would suggest that the natural disorderliness inherent in the independentordering of NGOs can prove to be extremely effective when they work together alongthe lines suggested by the spiral pattern.

CHAPTER 38 · · 2017-02-13ates the support of Wade Sewell and the research assistance of Justin...

Documents

Transcript of CHAPTER 38 · · 2017-02-13ates the support of Wade Sewell and the research assistance of Justin...