Chapter 3 The Site Security Design Process 3 The Site Security Design Process Introduction 71...

Chapter 3The Site Security Design Process 3

Chapter 3The Site Security Design Process

Introduction 71

Overview of the Site Security Design Process 72

Phase 1Project Start 74

Site Security and Project Development 74

GSA Design Excellence Program 76

Risk Assessments and Security Recommendations 76

Communication and Information Sharing 78

Team Assembly and Responsibilities 78

Phase 2Multidisciplinary Assessment 80

Collaborative, Comprehensive Approach 80

Risk Assessment 83

Design Assessment 86

Phase 3Site Concept Investigation 90

Phase 4Site Concept Selection (Conceptual Strategy Plan) 95

Phase 5Design Studies for Project Areas 97

Phase 6Final Concept Development 100

Phase 7Final Design and Construction Documents 102

Phase 8Project Completion and Operations 102

Conclusion 102

GSA Site Security Design GuideGSA Site Security Design Guide

The Site Security Design Process

INTRODUCTION

Successful site security design is particularly process dependent because countermeasures can be resource intensive, controversial, or ancillary to a project’s original purpose. A careful and calculated process ensures that security concerns receive early and informed consideration and are integrated throughout planning, design, and construction. Such a process puts the Project Team in a strong position to achieve effective risk reduction while meeting budget, schedule, and public space design objectives.

Previous chapters discussed the underlying principles that guide every security design project and the elements and tools available to the designer. This chapter describes how to apply these principles and tools. A hypothetical test case illustrates the recommended process throughout the chapter.

This test case, “Building Renovation/Urban Location: Single Building,” involves typical issues and opportunities arising during the planned security renovation of a large mid-20th century era federal building, located on a compact downtown site, but the procedural steps addressing the conditions of this case are similar to any site security design project. Chapter 4 presents additional test cases of other federal building types.

The process discussion includes detailed descriptions of the unique nature of security decision-making, how security decisions fit into the capital funding process, the roles and responsibilities of Project Team members, and the principles that guide the entire site security design process.

Chapter 1 described the hallmarks that must form the foundation of a successful and well-balanced security project:

Strategic Reduction of Risk Comprehensive Site Design Collaborative Participation Long-Term Development Strategy

At every stage of the process, team members are expected to consider identified risks, operational requirements, and local impacts, to balance safety with cost, aesthetics, public use, and accessibility. Although each person on the Project Team brings unique technical skills, perspectives, and interests to the table, everyone should understand each of the hallmarks and their role in achieving them.

Creative problem solving —and successful projects—are the result when Project Team members share the responsibility to achieve each and every hallmark: when the blast expert understands how his or her recommendations affect comprehensive site design strategies, when the designer understands how his or her scheme supports long-term development of the area, and when the community stakeholder understands how his or her actions can support risk reduction at the federal facility.

GSA Site Security Design Guide Chapter 3 Process Introduction 71

OVERVIEW OF THE SITE SECURITY DESIGN PROCESS

Successful site security design comprises eight phases, each an important step toward a design that exceeds the hallmarks of a great project. These phases are summarized below:

1. Project Start focuses on the roles and responsibilities of the Project Team, communication and information sharing, and the decision-making process. The team begins this stage with a sound understanding of the completed risk assessment and its outputs.

2. Multidisciplinary Assessment involves the Project Team using the zone approach to assess existing conditions on-site, including security vulnerabilities, context, and design opportunities.

3. Site Concept Investigation involves the Project Team developing, studying, and refining multiple alternative concepts for the entire site, in response to their findings from the Multidisciplinary Assessment. For large projects, the team may hold a peer review at this stage to help evaluate the alternatives.

4. Site Concept Selection (Conceptual Strategy Plan) entails the Project Team forming a single alternative for the entire site, which comprises the best elements from the Site Concept Investigation. The team may hold a peer review in order to help select the site concept.

5. Design Studies for Project Areas involve the Project Team performing more detailed design work on key elements of the Site Concept, whether or not the entire Site Concept is implemented in a single project. The Design Studies begin the detailed design work that produces the final design of the immediate project.

6. Final Concept Development entails the Project Team developing a detailed Final Concept for the project that will proceed forward into construction. At this stage, as part of the Design Excellence process, the team makes its Final Concept presentation to the stakeholders.

7. Final Design and Construction Documents involve the Project Team developing Site Concepts and Design Studies, culminating in the completion of construction documents. The Project Team conducts any testing of security measures at this time. Team members review final drawings and specifications to ensure that agreed-upon security elements are properly represented in the Final Design.

8. Project Completion and Operations entails the Project Team remaining involved, as needed, to respond to unforeseen conditions during construction and to alter the project design if necessary. As the project is completed and put into use, building management and security operations must continually evaluate the function of the physical countermeasures over time and remain committed to the operational security measures that help to form the complete solution.

72 Chapter 3 Process Introduction GSA Site Security Design Guide

Exhibit 3.1: Capital Program Delivery Process

FISCAL YEAR 0 FISCAL YEAR 1 FISCAL YEAR 2 FISCAL YEAR 3 FISCAL YEAR 4 FISCAL YEAR 5 FISCAL YEAR 6+

CALENDER YEAR 1 CALENDER YEAR 2 CALENDER YEAR 3 CALENDER YEAR 4 CALENDER YEAR 5 CALENDER YEAR 6 CALENDER YEAR 7

Pre-Planning and Ongoing GSA Management

Facility Need/ � Agency Request

Feasibility Study (FS)

Site/Design Prospectus

Site/Design Prospectus to OMB

Site/Design Authorization to Congress

Site/Design Appropriation to Congress

Site Directive Allowance Document

Planning Call

Program Development Study (PDS)

Planning Call

Construction Prospectus

Construction Prospectus to OMB

Construction Authorization � to Congress

Construction Appropriation to Congress

Construction Allowance Document

General Contractor Selection

Building Construction

� � �

G/C Award

Security Charrette

Decision Support Tool

A/E Selection

A/E Concepts

A/E Construction DocumentPredesign

A/E Design Development

A/E Award A/E Design CompleteDecision Support Tool Security Specs + Details

Test Security Measures (if necessary)

Supply Security Equipment Construct Security

Operations & Maintenance

FEASIBILITY STUDY

DESIGN

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT STUDY

CONSTRUCTION

Decision Support Tool

GSA Site Security Design Guide Chapter 3 Process Introduction 73

Phase 1 Project Start

It is important to lay a solid foundation for effective collaboration before the design starts. This step should begin with a sound understanding of team communication, roles and responsibilities, and the security decision process itself.

Key Points Within Phase 1: Project Start

Coordinate site security design with the existing project development

processes for large and small projects

Consider previous building risk assessments and recommendations within

the context of the present project and all objectives, including both secu

rity and design

Carefully choose team members based on project needs and promote

open channels of communication across specialties

SITE SECURITY AND PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

Developing site security within the context of GSA’s project development process requires an understanding of the capital funding process, the design and construction process, and the security and risk assessment process (see Exhibit 3.1).

This chapter applies to large, Prospectus-level capital projects (i.e., projects that must be authorized by Congress), as well as smaller projects that are authorized and funded locally. Regardless of size, it is critical that all projects establish a comprehensive planning approach that views the site, the building, and the neighborhood as fundamental parts of an integrated fabric.

Large, Prospectus-Level Projects Due to the federal funding process, large non-court projects work with design budgets, and court projects work with design and construction budgets, that the Project Team establishes in a Feasibility Study as early as two years before design begins. Construc- tion budgets for non-court projects are later scoped as part of a Program Development Study (PDS), while courthouse construction budgets are sometimes adjusted through special studies. In either case, the construction budget typically is set two or more years before construction begins.

The budgeting stages can be considered as an expanding cycle. Each considers similar aspects, but the amount of analysis and specificity increases as the project gets closer to construction.

Smaller, Non-Prospectus-Level Projects For smaller projects, on the other hand, GSA’s Regional Offices can scope and fund a project rather quickly, as part of the annual renovation budgeting process. Unlike Prospectus-level projects, the construction budget for smaller projects is generally finalized after design is complete.

One distinction between large and small projects is the effort to ensure effective, multidisciplinary input into the design process. Because budget parameters for large projects are set years before design and construction begin, Project Teams must make special efforts to include in-house design and security expertise at the budgeting stage, even before designers are hired. At the other end of the spectrum, because small projects can be shaped and changed so quickly, the Project Team must be careful to ensure that multidisciplinary input occurs at the very beginning and is maintained throughout the project’s development.

74 Chapter 3 Process Phase 1 GSA Site Security Design Guide

Site Security Design Process: Non-Prospectus-Level Project Timeline (9-15 months)

1. Project Start 2. Multidisciplinary Assessment

6–12 Weeks

3. Site Concept Investigation

4 Weeks

4. Site Concept Selection 4 Weeks

5. Design Studies for Project Areas

4 Weeks

6. Final Concept Development

4 Weeks

7. Final Design and Construction Documents

3–6 Months to bid package

8. Project Completion and Operations

Predesign, Site Analysis, Risk Assessment

Concept Design

Design Development, Construction Documents, Construction

Site Security Design Process: Prospectus-Level Project Timeline (6-7 years)

1. Project Start 2. Multidisciplinary Assessment

6–12 Weeks

Concept Design

3. Site Concept Investigation

4 Weeks

4. Site Concept Selection

4 Weeks

5. Design Studies for Project Areas

4 Weeks

6. Final Concept Development

8 Weeks

7. Final Design and Construction Documents

DD 9 Months, CDs 6 Months

8. Project Completion and Operations

Master Plan, Feasibility Study, Risk Assessment

Design Development, Construction Documents

Design Development, Construction Documents, Construction

“Project start” can occur

anytime during the 2- to

3-year time frame, although

important project scope,

strategy, and budget

decisions will be made

during planning and

pre-design activities.

Timeline can extend 2–3 years

Note: Security Charrette during Feasibility Study phase.

GSA Site Security Design Guide Chapter 3 Process Phase 1 75

For detailed guidance on Prospectus-level project development and funding, see GSA’s Project Planning Guide.

Designers on GSA projects must follow the standards dictated in GSA’s Facility Standards for the Public Buildings Service (P-100). This document is updated regularly and contains detailed design provisions that impact many aspects of site security projects.

Past risk assessments are never the final word in a site security project. GSA seeks to accommodate all project goals, but retains the right to not implement a recommended countermeasure when doing so would have a significant adverse impact. Such decisions require close consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Regardless of project size or budget, teams should consider aesthetic, functional, and security-related issues in the development process simultaneously. At a minimum, this comprehensiveness keeps security aligned with other project parameters.

There are quantitative reasons, as well. Security elements can represent a significant portion of a project’s budget. Leveraging their functionality with other goals is necessary to maximize the investment in a facility. Additionally, funding realities may call for phased implementation of security and other improvements over several smaller projects, perhaps over several years. A flexible approach is necessary to ensure that each phase accomplishes some of the major goals outlined for a site. All changes to the site must be implemented as part of a larger vision that supports its desired use and overall attractiveness.

GSA DESIGN EXCELLENCE PROGRAM

Through the Design Excellence program, GSA produces quality public buildings that reflect the dignity of the federal government. Design Excellence emphasizes the following goals, which have a significant positive impact on the success of site security design projects, both large and small:

Determine the best architect/engineer (A/E) selection for each project, maximize the potential for architectural design excellence, and provide peers of national renown to review project progression;

Ensure compliance with project budget and schedule mandates and the analysis of critical building systems; and

Support community development goals, effective sustainable design strategies, and current security standards.

The security and design needs of a project should be integrated into all Design Excellence activities, from selection of the A/E team through design charettes and peer reviews, to achieve the highest-quality outcome.

RISK ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

DHS’s Federal Protective Service is responsible for conducting risk assessments of all federal buildings on a regular basis. DHS conducts its risk assessment based upon the actual or perceived threat to the building (the events that must be defended against), the vulnerability of that building (the susceptibility to the threat), the consequences if an event should occur, and the probability of that event based upon a variety of factors. Then, with stakeholder input, DHS provides a final report with recommended countermeasures.

Depending on the nature of the project, the detailed security analysis process may include representatives from the U.S. Marshals Service (for courthouses) and specialized security contractors to conduct more technical studies. GSA representatives and members of the Building Security Committee are also included in the process.

Since such important and influential security assessments are made before design begins, without reference to any information about the project, Project Teams should revisit such assessments in this phase and plan to update them in Phase 2: Multidisciplinary Assessment.

In doing so, Project Teams should remember that GSA reserves the right to not implement a recommended mandatory measure as per the GSA/DHS Memorandum of Agreement, June 2006. Such a decision would be made only after consultation with DHS and only after written notification to DHS of the final decision. The final authority in this case rests with the appropriate GSA Assistant Regional Administrator (ARA) for the Public Buildings Service. Ideally, and far more often, DHS and GSA can reach consensus regarding the appropriate countermeasure as part of an effective design process.

GSA has created a number of tools to help Project Teams navigate the tradeoffs inherent in site security design projects. The GSA Security Charrette (described in detail on page 85) is a new tool created to support the multidisciplinary approach envisioned in the ISC criteria. Recommended for initial use during the Feasibility Study, it can also culminate the Multidisciplinary Assessment phase. The ISC Implementation Checklist, the Decision Support Tool for


GSA Security Analysis Tools

GSA and its partner agencies have developed many tools and techniques

to support better security for GSA buildings, as well as the expertise

to apply these tools to GSA projects.

The following tools are available through GSA’s Office of the Chief Architect

to those involved with appropriate projects. The use of these tools requires

the input of security consultants, including representatives from DHS’s

Federal Protective Service (FPS) and blast consultants.

ISC Security Charrette Guide The ISC Security Charrette Guide is intended to assist GSA Project Managers and the Building Security Committee in

planning and conducting a Security Charrette. It is intended to be of greatest assistance for the Feasibility Study phase,

but is useful throughout the project development process.

ISC Security Design Criteria Implementation Checklist This checklist assists GSA Project Managers in the implementation of the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Security

Design Criteria during the project planning and design phases of all new U.S. courthouses, new federal office buildings,

and major modernization projects.

Decision Support Tool for the ISC Security Design Criteria (DST-ISC) DST-ISC is a GSA computer program designed to aid decision-makers in the application of the ISC Security Design

Criteria. The program contains questions on target attractiveness, collateral damage, and impact of loss, which it

uses to determine the required Level of Protection of a facility. The DST-ISC encourages judgment calls and a strategic

approach to risk reduction, including acceptance of some risk in light of tradeoffs. It is important to note that the

DST-ISC does not replace or supersede the DHS-produced risk assessment, but is a tool by which GSA decision-makers

can evaluate countermeasures.

Computer Modeling of Hazards and Impacts GSA and its consultants employ a variety of proprietary computer programs to assist in security assessments and

countermeasure analysis. Two of the most prominent for GSA projects are WINGARD (WINdow Glazing Analysis

Response & Design) and STANDGARD (STANDard GSA Assessment Reporter & Database), which determine potential

hazards from explosions and assess vulnerability.


Though sensitive information is a reality in site security projects, it should never pose a barrier to true collaboration. Most information designated “For Official Use Only” can be shared with project stakeholders. Indeed, such cooperation is essential where projects will significantly impact their surroundings.

The ISC Security Design Criteria Implementation Checklist (found in Table 2, Section 401000-A/E Selection Process of the ISC Security Design Criteria) is an excellent resource when developing a scope of work and selecting an A/E consultant. This tool is available from the Office of the Chief Architect.

the ISC Security Design Criteria (DST-ISC), and computer modeling tools are also available to support the process. The GSA Project Manager should become familiar with these tools and endorse their use by the Project Team.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

As asserted throughout this Guide, a collaborative process is fundamental to good decision-making. Of course, security experts, designers, and other stakeholders cannot provide meaningful input without comprehensive information sharing. Due to the sensitive nature of security assessments, however, this does not always happen.

While it may be inappropriate to share some sensitive security-related data with all parties, this should never get in the way of true collaboration. Information that is designated “Law Enforcement Sensitive,” for example, would be available only to those with the proper clearances. But on most federal projects, the information sufficient to weigh various alternatives would be designated “For Official Use Only (FOUO).” This information should be available to all of those involved in project decisions, including tenant agencies, consultants, and local officials.

In fact, the responsibility to share information with outside stakeholders increases where the envisioned countermeasures would have significant impacts on the surrounding neighborhood. For example, it is crucial to include outside stakeholders in discussions about setback distances, road closures, site amenities, and perimeter security. In these cases, sensitive building engineering studies or information about specific threats may be withheld, but the stakeholders must have enough information to understand the vulnerability that the team is addressing and the recommended countermeasures.

The GSA Project Manager must ensure that sensitive information is not released inappropriately, while supporting meaningful collaboration with effective information. This is necessary both to make good decisions and to gain buy-in on decisions that may be controversial.

TEAM ASSEMBLY AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Selecting the right team members and consultants based on a project’s scope of work and particular characteristics is key to a successful project. This requires some homework. Although the design community has focused attention on security for several years, there remains a relatively limited number of completed projects that illustrate best practices. As a result, most firms do not have the background needed to lead successful, well-balanced security projects. Project leaders must be selective to ensure that the chosen consultants possess the right expertise.

As shown in Project Start: Team Roles and Responsibilities, each team member brings a focused area of expertise to the project and accepts the corresponding responsibilities. Beyond the technical skills that each party contributes to the process, however, it is their participation in the rigorous, deliberative, design process with each other that yields the greatest value.

In order to deliver successful, holistic projects, each team member should share a sense of responsibility to meet each and every goal for the project. For example, blast experts should seek to provide a flexible range of alternatives that can support various site design concepts and daily use of the site. Designers should develop schemes that support a long-term vision for the site, beyond their immediate project. And local stakeholders who are responsible for neighborhood development should accept the need to reduce risk at the federal facility so that they can offer supportive solutions.

In light of this, it is important to remember that the Guide’s recommended security design process might be a new experience for most team members. Designers and local stakeholders are likely to have limited experience with federal security decision-making, while experienced security professionals may have limited experience making these decisions as part of a collaborative design process. For the Project Team leader, it is important to understand this and to lay out clear roles and responsibilities.


Project Start: Team Roles and Responsibilities

ROLES PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES

DHS Security Experts

Security Consultants

Building Security Committee (BSC)

Conduct building risk assessments for all GSA buildings, on a cyclical basis, prior to Project Starts.

Advise design teams on ISC criteria.

Perform technical blast, glass fragmentation, and progressive collapse analysis to support risk assessments

and analyses.

Conduct modeling and special studies, as needed, to support design efforts.

Provide technical expertise to prevent overscoping of countermeasures and unnecessary costs.

Represents each agency in a federal building.

Considers DHS risk assessments and has decision authority over “optional” countermeasures.

At this point in the project, the team is small. It will expand over time as the project develops. Keeping a clear record of project decisions will minimize unnecessary repetition of work between phases and as participants come and go over the life of the project.

GSA Project Manager Leads Feasibility Study and Program Development Study teams to set scope and budget for large projects.

Leads the Project Team (both GSA staff and contractors) for design and construction phase work.

GSA Property Manager Identifies general facility needs and functions, as well as maintenance and operations impacts of proposed

countermeasures.

Occasionally leads projects for small, temporary countermeasures.

GSA Subject Matter Experts (including Office of the Chief Architect staff)

Advise development of scope, project schedule, and budget.

Provide design expertise prior to procurement of consultants.

Design Firms Lead landscape, architectural, and urban design efforts to design effective, balanced countermeasures.

Lead efforts to develop the Multidimensional Assessment and Site Concept Plan early in the design process.

Local Stakeholders Identify neighborhood plans, opportunities, and concerns related to urban design and countermeasures.

Provide desired or required support for some countermeasures.

All Support the assessment and design evaluation.

Review the construction documents.

Collaborate and communicate.


Collaborative, Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Approach

Key Points Within Phase 2: Multidisciplinary Assessment

Analyze security vulnerabilities, site context, and opportunities throughout

the entire site, using the zone approach to ensure a comprehensive view

Assess security needs while heeding design opportunities, assess design

needs while keeping in mind security opportunities; this is the foundation

of the Multidisciplinary Assessment

This phase is the most fundamental in shaping a creative, comprehensive, balanced design solution. And, it is often the longest.

Phase 2 Multidisciplinary Assessment

The Multidisciplinary Assessment phase has the most significant, lasting impact on the overall success of a site security design. It lays the foundation for the entire project, including both security strategies and all other potential site improvements that are necessary to create a high-quality public space. The activities that compose the Multidisciplinary Assessment begin during the Feasibility Study and Program Development Study (PDS) stages.

In this stage of a project, security experts complete their risk assessments as design experts and others complete their assessment of project opportunities and constraints. During this phase, all Project Team members frequently share and discuss their findings and progress both formally and informally.

This Guide emphasizes the importance of the Multidisciplinary Assessment because many types of expertise are required to fully understand existing conditions, constraints, and opportunities. Throughout this process, it is especially important that each team member shares the responsibility to meet all project goals, in all zones.

COLLABORATIVE, COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The zone approach provides a common framework to assess existing conditions, including security vulnerabilities, site context, and opportunities. As described in Chapter 2, Project Teams consider each site in terms of six different zones (see Diagram 3.1), each of which plays a particular role in overall security design. Solutions that consider the importance of each zone can meet the required level of protection creatively and comprehensively. Team members should keep in mind that a successful site security solution never exists solely in one zone and must function across all zones.

With Prospectus-level projects, there may be a significant amount of time between when the information used for the Multidisciplinary Assessment is collected and the start of design. Meanwhile, risk assessments are performed on a cyclical basis, independent of capital improvements. Similary, GSA portfolio evaluations, facility assessments, master plans, and other studies may be conducted independently of the site security project.

Project Teams must be vigilant to ensure that the information they use is complete and current. The benefits of previous assessments, whether of risk, facility condition, or other project aspects, should not be lost, but should be examined in the context of their purpose and date. All information should be assessed for current relevance as the project moves forward.

Team members on large projects should meet frequently during this stage to ensure adequate discussion across disciplines so that consultants are up to date and informed when they join the project and begin work. Project managers play an instrumental role in supporting such collaboration and sharing. Projects that fail to achieve


a comprehensive assessment risk incorrect scopes, insufficient budgets, and design solutions that lack imagination and innovation.

Smaller projects below Prospectus level may have an advantage in this regard. Their typically tight time frames ensure that the knowledge gained during a Multidimensional Assessment more easily stays with the project. Yet they present their own unique challenge to the goal of creating a comprehensively designed site.

Since this type of project typically deals with a smaller scope and, perhaps, a smaller portion of the site, Project Teams must ensure that the Multidimensional Assessment evaluates such a project in light of its impact on the entire site, and as one step toward a greater, holistic solution. Previous and future projects should build upon each other in an evolutionary way, developing a better facility according to a long-term vision. As Project Team members assess security and design, they must consider smaller projects as an integral part of a long-term development strategy.

ZONE 1 NEIGHBORHOOD

ZONE 2 STANDOFF PERIMETER

ZONE 3 SITE ACCESS AND PARKING

ZONE 4 SITE

ZONE 5 BUILDING ENVELOPE

ZONE 6 MANAGEMENT AND

BUILDING OPERATIONS

Whatever a project’s size, the Project Team must begin by looking at the many aspects that directly and indirectly impact overall design of site security. An example is shown in Diagram 3.2, in which the site’s existing conditions are analyzed and documented graphically on a site plan. This information is shared among the team members. To aid in visualizing the example, photographs of buildings of a similar scale and architectural style have also been provided (see page 82).

The activities in this phase include site visits, preparation and review of risk assessments, review of existing GSA studies and documents, and collection of information from other sources, as well as meetings with stakeholders to understand the broader opportunities and requirements for the project. This section provides a checklist to guide this assessment process (see page 87), plus a list of team roles and responsibilities (see page 89).

Diagram 3.1: Site Security Zones

FEDERALBUILDING

Teams should use the zone

approach discussed in Chapter 2 as

a framework for the Multidisciplinary

Assessment. Each zone may

contribute to overall site security,

while providing opportunities to

enhance the site’s function and

appearance.

OPTIMAL STANDOFF DISTANCE


ALLE

Y

MIXED-USE OFFICE OFFICE BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING

AVEN

UE

A

BU

S ST

OP

2 SECOND STREET

GUARD HVAC VENTS

5 STAFF

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

INGENTRY

FEDERAL RESERVE 1BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

EXISTING TOELEVATED

LOADINGFEDERAL DOCK

PLAZA

MAI

N

ENTR

Y

BUILDING 4

DESIGN STUDY PROJECT AREA

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

LIM

ITS

OF

GAR

AGE

BEL

OW

OFFICE BUILDING


PARK

TO PARKING

RAMP 3STREET-LEVEL PLAZA 50-FT. (15.24-m) STANDOFF

6 GUARD GUARD

FIRST STREET

OFFICE BUILDING

HOTEL MIXED-USE BUILDING

Diagram 3.2: Existing Conditions/Site Context Plan

Test Case Assumptions1 The Federal Reserve building on Avenue A desires enhanced security

because of the vulnerability of its lobby area.

2 An alley with one-way vehicular circulation dead-ends into the site, across

from the north entry to the loading dock.

3 The loading dock and the underground parking garage servicing the building

both have access from First Street.

4 The main entry to the building is not clearly delineated, and crowding occurs

at the elevated plaza, as visitors wait to pass through security screening.

5 There are exposed HVAC vents/air intakes accessible from the elevated plaza.25’ 100’25’ 100’

0 50’ 0 50’ 200’ 200’

10’ 50’10’ 50’

0 25’ 0 25’ 100’ 100’

6 During a heightened security alert, temporary barriers were placed on the

street-level plaza and have not been removed or replaced with permanent The building used to illustrate the

security fixtures.15’ 75’15’ 75’ site security design process in

0 35’ 0 35’ 150’ 150’

this chapter is an urban high-rise50’ 200’50’ 200’

0 100’ 0 100’ 400 400 built between 1955 and 1975. Its

N N N

KEY: KEYKEY:

BUILDING ENTRYBUILDING ENTRYBUILDING ENTRY

EMERGENCY EXITEMERGENCY EXITEMERGENCY EXIT

ADJACENT BUILDINGADJACENT BUILDINGADJACENT BUILDING

HIGH-RISK BUILDINGHIGH-RISK BUILDINGHIGH-RISK BUILDING

LANDSCAPE AREALANDSCAPE AREALANDSCAPE AREA

TREE TREETREE

site plan shows conditions typical

to many federal buildings now

undergoing site security planning.

The building sits upon a plinth, with

stairs leading from the sidewalk toGUGUARD BOOTHARD BOOTHGUARD BOOTH STANDOFF50 FT. STANDOFF PERIMETER50 FT. STANDOFF 25 FT.

SITE LIGHTINGSITE LIGHTING ATIONATIONSITE LIGHTING PEDESTRIAN CIRCULPEDESTRIAN CIRCULPEDESTRIAN CIRCUL ATION a large plaza at the building’s entry. 0 50 FT. 100 FT.

BOLLARD VEHICULAR CIRCULVEHICULAR CIRCULATIONATIONBOLLARD BOLLARD VEHICULAR CIRCULATION Buildings of this era often have SECURITY BARRIERSECURITY BARRIERSECURITY BARRIER 3 SITE SECURITY ZONESITE SECURITY ZONESITE SECURITY ZONE

unattractive temporary barriers inCAMERA SURVEILLANCECAMERA SURVEILLCAMERA SURVEILLANCE ANCE SITE SECURITY DESIGNSITE SECURITY DESIGNPROJECT AREAPROJECT AREA place and large public plazas in

need of general improvement.

N

The Project Team uses photos of existing conditions and an annotated site plan to document their initial site analysis.


RISK ASSESSMENT

A DHS physical security specialist performs the risk assessment and analyzes threats (actual or perceived), vulnerability of sites and buildings, consequences, and probability of occurrence. This risk assessment considers Design Basis Tactics and Levels of Protection in making recommendations for Design Criteria. Other stakeholders provide additional considerations and contribute to the definition of protective measures. The activities and the products of this process guide all subsequent site security design.

On some projects, especially smaller ones or modernization projects, a completed risk assessment may already be available; Project Teams should ensure that this assessment is current. For other projects, a new risk assessment is prepared or a completed risk assessment is updated. In every case, security experts in conjunction with the larger Project Team examine the risk assessment within the broader project context. In every case, the analysis of security issues must heed the latest ISC criteria.

There are three key outcomes of every DHS risk assessment:

1. Design Basis Tactics identify the specific acts and methods that the building and site’s countermeasures must protect against and form the basis for the site security design. The ISC criteria define the specific Design Basis Tactics for a particular building, as part of the overall risk assessment. Typical Design Basis Tactics may include an explosion of a defined intensity at a defined distance from the facility (impacting the building’s envelope and structural system) or a vehicle of a defined mass and speed that may be used to ram the facility (impacting the building’s perimeter barrier system).

2. Level of Protection defines the performance that each affected building system requires. These performance levels are defined as Minimum, Low, Medium, or High and pertain to all affected systems, including glass, structure, and other components. The required performance may vary from one system to another within the same building, based on the specifics of each building.

3. Design Criteria define the design direction that emerges, based on inputs from the risk assessment, consideration of the Design Basis Tactics, and the required Level of Protection. These Design Criteria are very cursory and defined without consideration of other factors, such as cost, impacts on their surroundings, or creative alternatives. It is the responsibility of the design team to consider the Design Criteria, understand the Design Basis Tactics and Levels of Protection that shaped them, and provide effective and balanced design solutions that respond to them.

Diagram 3.3: ISC Security Decision-Making Process

This flow chart illustrates the main inputs and outputs in the security decision-

making process, as outlined by the Interagency Security Committee. These

outputs serve as the basis for additional analyses by the Project Team and the

subsequent design of protective measures.

RISK ASSESSMENT DESIGN CRITERIA PROTECTIVE MEASURES

CONSEQUENCES

THREAT

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

DESIGN BASIS TACTICS VULNERABILITY

LIKELIHOOD LEVEL OF PROTECTION

Teams must analyze all information through a multidisciplinary approach so that the interactions and impacts of various aspects of the project are well understood and addressed from the beginning. In past projects, separation of security specialists and designers during the assessment stages has resulted in less-than-ideal solutions, delays, or increased costs.


The Security Charrette initiates the kind of well-informed discussion and give and take needed to develop a good solution that balances all of the competing facets of a project.

Risk assessments also include two types of recommendations for As a result, the perimeter barrier system could achieve the required protective measures: performance level of the bollard system with a less robust con

struction. This more creative approach offers more design options Optional Countermeasures. Actions that the risk assessment with significant opportunities to improve cost, compatibility, and

designates as “optional” are those addressing low or moderate effectiveness. risks where the ISC does not establish minimum performance requirements. These can be approved or rejected at the discretion The Security Charrette (described in detail on page 85) is an of the Building Security Committee (BSC), typically with each important step in developing such innovative solutions. This is agency housed within the building casting one vote. a recently developed process that is intended to support the

Mandatory Countermeasures. Where the risk assessment Multidisciplinary Approach envisioned in the ISC criteria. Some identifies high-risk conditions that must be addressed, it defines projects may warrant a standalone Security Charrette that is “mandatory” countermeasures. The DHS inspector briefs the devoted solely to security issues and countermeasures. This parties involved and offers a range of alternatives, where possible. standalone approach allows for candid discussion of the most The appropriate party, subject to funding availability, must take sensitive security issues and for highly technical engineering these recommended actions. To encourage resolution, DHS problem solving, which may not be appropriate for the entire tracks the status of mandatory measures until they are complete. Project Team. For less complex projects and issues, or at later

stages of design, the Security Charrette should be combined Understanding the relation between Design Basis Tactics and protec with a more comprehensive design workshop. tive countermeasures is crucial to creative problem solving. This is because design can be used not only to respond to the required Levels of Protection, but also to modify the Design Basis Tactics. In turn, this can open up new options to achieve the required performance.

For example, the Design Basis Tactics might assume that a vehicle of a certain size and speed has the potential to ram a perimeter barrier system. In response, the initial Design Criteria may recommend that the perimeter barrier be designed to allow no penetration into the site by that design basis vehicle. The design team could choose a perimeter barrier system to withstand a head-on strike by the design basis vehicle and ensure no penetration into the site. However, this response to the design basis vehicle’s mass and speed likely would require a very robust system, and site context, budget, or underlying conditions may make this solution undesirable for non-security reasons.

Alternately, the team may choose to design the site and its surroundings in such a way that addresses the underlying assumptions of the Design Basis Tactics and modifies the Design Criteria. The design could prevent the design basis vehicle from reaching the perimeter of the site or from reaching the design basis speed.


The Security Charrette

The ISC criteria direct that security decision-making should be

a multidisciplinary effort. The use of a Security Charrette, as part of the

Multidisciplinary Assessment, is a technique to encourage collaboration.

A Security Charrette brings together the Project Team in a structured forum

to develop reasonable, holistic, and conscientious security decisions. The

Security Charrette is appropriate for projects of all sizes. At a minimum,

it should first occur before a project budget is established (i.e., during the

Feasibility Study for large projects). Charrettes may be repeated at other

key stages in the project development, whenever important decisions arise.

The typical Security Charrette is a full one-day event, but complex projects

or issues may require more time.

In order to support a meaningful discussion of alternatives, the Charrette

makes use of already completed technical studies and special tools.

In addition to the DHS risk assessment, these may include other DHS

analyses, blast and related studies provided by contractors, and GSA’s

Decision Support Tool for the ISC Security Design Criteria (DST-ISC). During the Charrette, the Project Team considers study findings, reconciles

differences, and begins to form an overall security strategy for the site.

If at the time of the Security Charrette the Project Team has not yet

completed comprehensive design concepts, the findings from the Charrette

should be thought of as general directives and performance requirements.

Creative solutions and detailed alternatives analysis will occur during the

Site Concept Investigation Phase. As suggested above, additional Security

Charrettes may be held during this phase to aid in decision-making.

Regardless of the Security Charrette’s timing, the discussion should include

consideration of wider design issues and facility needs, beyond security

alone. It should incorporate information from the design assessment,

discussed later in this section, as much as possible.

This multidimensional aspect is what sets the Security Charrette apart

from the initial risk assessment and is why it is important to include

a broad range of participants. Among them should be the following

representatives:

GSA Project Manager

GSA Property Manager

GSA design resource (from OCA or GSA Regional Office)

GSA Regional Historic Preservation Officer (when applicable)

Design consultants (architect/landscape architect/engineer), if hired

at this stage

DHS representative

Building Security Committee members

Local law enforcement official

Local fire/HazMat official

Local building code official

Local city and neighborhood planners

Feasibility Study team members

Security/safety consultants, specialists, and engineers (if not included

on the Feasibility Study team), such as

Blast consultant

Security consultant

Cost estimator

Electronic security and communications specialist

Engineers: structural, mechanical, and electrical

Fire protection consultant

Chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) consultant

Recorder/DST-ISC operator


Design Assessment DESIGN ASSESSMENT

During the Multidimensional Assessment, be sure to look at the site in relation to its neighborhood and the city as a whole.

GSA’s guide to public spaces, Achieving Great Federal Public Spaces: A Property Manager’s Guide, provides a comprehensive audit tool useful for site assessment at existing buildings.

Just as the security-focused aspects of the Multidisciplinary Assessment weigh the role of design, Project Teams must keep security functionality in mind as they assess the site’s everyday use and the facility’s relationship to its neighborhood.

In other words, though typically led by a design firm, the site and design components of the assessment receive input from the full Project Team and outside parties, including other federal agency partners, professional peers, security experts, and local officials. The team conducts a detailed site investigation of each zone to examine the full range of existing conditions and opportunities. They also review GSA P-100; ISC criteria; and other policies, guidance, and regulations and identify requirements relevant to the project.

The team researches potential site elements that may contribute to the security design or existing elements that can be enhanced or removed to achieve the desired level of security. They also look closely at neighborhood context, building styles, materials, and local plans so that security is well integrated into its surroundings. (See the Checklist for Site Security Design Issues on page 87.)

These early investigations identify opportunities for multifunctional security elements and site improvements that enhance both the use of the site and its security. For example, if the circulation routes into and out of the site are no longer sufficient to handle current traffic volumes, they might be rethought to achieve more efficient flow, while preventing direct vehicular approach. Or, plans for improved perimeter security measures might be advanced along with an effort to improve public space amenities.

In addition to identifying opportunities to advance security and urban design interests, the assessment must flesh out underlying conditions (such as subsurface characteristics) and other site constraints that will impact implementation.

At this stage, countermeasure decisions should still be “penciled in,” to allow flexibility and communication of internal and off-site tradeoffs as these initial ideas are shared with the entire Project

Team. This enables subsequent multidisciplinary discussion to focus on tentative ideas, with the understanding that they are still in flux and should change to best balance all goals for the site.

As various subteams complete each aspect of the Multidisciplinary Assessment, a workshop or series of meetings provide the setting for the entire Project Team to review all findings and discuss how these create opportunities and constraints for the project. These face-to-face meetings enable ideas to be developed, evaluated, and refined “live” with questions, explanations, and contributions from the full team. This discussion, with all parties at the same table cooperating, is the essential aspect of a successful Multidisciplinary Assessment phase. Its outcomes, which may be represented as in Diagram 3.4 (page 88), form the basis for concept design in Phase 3.

By the end of Multidisciplinary Assessment, all Project Team members have an understanding of both the security and design opportunities of the site, and these are inherently interwoven. The products of this phase, which carry forward into subsequent phases, include the following:

Risk Assessment: Design Basis Tactics Level of Protection Design Criteria Operational and Mandatory Countermeasures

Preliminary Budget, Including Security Line Items Project Schedule Analysis of Neighborhood Opportunities and Constraints Site Analysis Summarizing Opportunities and Constraints:

Utilities Plan Transportation and Circulation Plans Existing Topography, Vegetation, and Boundaries

Analysis of Existing Building and Structures Program of Requirements for New Construction


Checklist for Site Security Design Issues

The following represents a typical list of design issues

that are examined during the Multidisciplinary Assessment.

This list should be customized for each project:

Local Context Regional Context

Neighborhood Context

Architectural and Landscape Context

Local Planning Objectives: Land Use, Transportation, Parking, Regulatory Stakeholders

Public Space Use and Improvement Opportunities for Public Space

Links to Public Transportation

Climate/Topography/Orientation

Public Process/Input

Future Planned Developments

Site Historic Issues/Significance

Circulation (pedestrian and vehicular; on and around site)

Adjacent Building Programs and Configurations

Existing Site Conditions/Use

Underground Conditions/Utilities

Existing Site Elements (e.g., parking meters, bus stops, light poles)

Easements/Setbacks

Access and Approach Vulnerability

Environmental Conditions and Opportunities/Sustainability

Site Remediation Requirements: NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) and CERCLA

(Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act)

Room for Growth/Expansion Provision

Street Character/Features

Vehicular Loading/Parking

Building Historic Issues/Significance

Existing Structural System (existing building)

Building Mass/Program Requirements (new building)

Lines of Sight

Environmental Conditions and Opportunities/Sustainability

Vehicular Loading/Parking


SECURITY BARRIER

A neighboring building with similar security concerns offers an oppor

Security and Site Design T

1

and perimeter security.

This example illustrates one way

to represent the outcomes of

Multidisciplinary Assessment so

that all Project Team members

understand the opportunities that

security and design present to

enhance both. While each project

may use a different method of

representation, any approach

should articulate the characteristics

of the site by zone and clearly

define security design topics for

further exploration. Here, the key

issues to be addressed in the

site security design are shared

security surveillance; loading

dock circulation; vulnerability of

underground parking; building

entry/queuing; HVAC protection;

opics

tunity for

partnership and sharing of security resources.

2 Direct run up to the entry point at the loading dock presents a risk; an

unauthorized vehicle could accelerate to a speed sufficient to force entry.

3 When parking is located under a building, that entry point is vulnerable.

4 Unmanaged queuing causes congestion and confusion that can make security

monitoring difficult and public space less safe.

5 Exposed HVAC vents or air intakes are vulnerable to airborne chemical,

biological, or radiological attack.

6 The temporary barriers at the street-level plaza are not rated to prohibit

vehicular approach and have negative off-site impacts on the streetscape and

adjacent local businesses.

GUARD BOOTH

SITE LIGHTING

BOLLARD

CAMERA SURVEILLANCE

BUILDING ENTRY

EMERGENCY EXIT

ADJACENT BUILDING

HIGH-RISK BUILDING

LANDSCAPE AREA

TREE

KEY

BUILDING ENTRY

EMERGENCY EXIT

SITE SECURITY DESIGN PROJECT AREA

ADJACENT BUILDING

HIGH-RISK BUILDING

LANDSCAPE AREA

TREE

SITE SECURITY ZONE

PEDESTRIAN CIRCULATION

50 FT. STANDOFF

VEHICULAR CIRCULATION

GUARD BOOTH

BOLLARD

SECURITY BARRIER

CAMERA SURVEILLANCE

SITE LIGHTING

KEY:

N

0 25’

10’ 50’

100’

035’ 35’

15’ 75’

150’

050’ 200’50’

25’ 100’

200’

0100’ 100’

50’ 200’

400

STANDOFF PERIMETER



SITE SECURITY ZONE

SITE SECURITY ASSESSMENT AREA

BUILDING ENTRY

EMERGENCY EXIT

SITE SECURITY DESIGNPROJECT AREA

ADJACENT BUILDING

HIGH-RISK BUILDING

LANDSCAPE AREA

TREE

SITE SECURITY ZONE


50 FT. STANDOFF


GUARD BOOTH

BOLLARD

SECURITY BARRIER

CAMERA SURVEILLANCE

SITE LIGHTING

KEY:

N

0 25’

10’ 50’

100’

0

15’ 75’

150’

0

25’ 100’

0

50’ 200’

400

3

100 FT.50 FT.

25 FT.

0

5

4

OFFICE

BUILDING

LOADING

EXISTING

BUILDING

3

2

1

6



BUILDING

OFFICE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

MIXED-USE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

SECOND STREET

HOTEL

BU

S ST

OP

STAFF ENTRY

PLAZA FEDERAL TO

DOCK

STREET-LEVEL PLAZA

RAMP

HVAC VENTS

LIM

ITS

OF

GAR

AGE

BEL

OW

GUARD GUARD

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

GUARD

TO PARKING

MAI

NEN

TRY

ELEVATED

OFFICE BUILDING

AVEN

UE

A

ALLE

Y

PARK

MIXED-USE BUILDING

50-FT. (15.24-m) STANDOFF

Diagram 3.4: Site Security Assessment Plan

N

N


Multidisciplinary Assessment: Team Roles and Responsibilities

ROLES RESPONSIBILITIES

Security Consultants Present building risk assessment to team

Participate in Security Charrettes and other analyses (e.g., blast, vector)

Establish Level of Protection (LOP)

Work with designers; stay creative, flexible

Designers Review existing conditions

Evaluate state-of-the-art, best practices

Create site program

Address sustainability, cultural, and historic issues

Participate in Security Charrettes

Collaborate closely with security consultants

Remain flexible and explore a variety of alternatives

Building Security Committee (BSC) Reviews potential security threats with security experts and designers

Represents tenant and provides feedback to tenant

Approaches risk management with balance and creativity

Defines appropriate risk management

Looks at cost impacts and benefits to all participants

GSA Project Manager Plans participation

Identifies issues and project requirements within schedule and budget

GSA Property Manager Represents operation and maintenance point of view

Advocates for sufficient budget

Recognizes broader opportunities for property

Consults with GSA Regional Historic Preservation Officer

Coordinates external design review

Local Stakeholders Provide local knowledge

Assist with consensus building, through a comprehensive approach and

interaction with the Project Team

Bring additional physical or operational resources to the solution


Phase 3 Site Concept Investigation

Project Teams should always consider the costs and benefits of risk reduction as they review initial concepts.

The design process is an iterative cycle that posits and tests multiple concepts in order to develop the best approach. It must be dynamic and interactive to be successful.

Key Points Within Phase 3: Site Concept Investigation

Develop multiple concepts that comprehensively address site-wide

conditions, opportunities, and constraints identified in the Multidisci

plinary Assessment phase

Collaborate with project stakeholders and peers to examine these

concepts, their ability to mitigate risk, and their impact on context

During the Site Concept Investigation, the team develops, studies, and refines multiple concepts that explore a variety of options for the site design in response to the Multidisciplinary Assessment. As in Diagrams 3.5–3.7, each concept shows different strategies to meet the diverse needs of GSA, tenant agencies, and local stakeholders.

Project Team members discuss these concepts, their impacts, and their costs with GSA representatives, the BSC, security experts, other stakeholders, and peer reviewers. As these strategies are evaluated, Project Team members refine the best pieces and parts into new concepts. Project Team members may reevaluate their approach to security a number of times. In doing so, the team develops the most efficient and cost-effective approach to meet the needs of the project. Though the concepts become more refined and specific, they remain dedicated to the original site design strategy.

During this stage, fundamental strategies begin to take shape. For example, insufficient standoff distances may require significantly more hardening at a facility than would be required at a comparable facility where more standoff is available. It is important that

Project Teams discuss such matters and options with the blast and security consultants before and during concept development. Spending time and money at this stage can save millions later in the project.

The Project Team must continue to look at the site overall, to ensure that the final design supports comprehensive, long-term site goals. Even where the project itself consists only of a specific area within the site (e.g., a high-priority perimeter), the Project Team must continue to address all aspects of the site. The Project Team will focus on the specific project area only in the last phases of the site security design process, when designers prepare final design and construction documents.

Once the important elements and issues are captured, the design team moves into the next phase of design, incorporating the information gathered from the concept investigations into a single concept for the site.


Diagram 3.5: Site Concept Investigation/Scheme 1

30-FT.-HIGH WALL AROUND HVAC VENTS/AIR INTAKES

BOLLARDS ALONG CURB LINE

BUS STOP REMOVED FROM IN FRONT OF BUILDING

SHARED CAMERA SURVEILLANCE WITH FEDERAL RESERVE

BUILDING ACROSS THE STREET

NEW SECURITY PAVILION TO REGULATE ENTRY POINT

HARDENED SITE WALL

BOLLARDS ALONG BUILDING YARD LINE

VEHICLE INSPECTION POINT OUTSIDE THE 50-FT. STANDOFF TO SCREEN VEHICLES

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING


TO PARKING

TO LOADING

DOCK

HVAC VENTS

LIM

ITS

OF

GAR

AGE

BEL

OW

GUARD

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

OFFICE BUILDING


OFFICE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

MIXED-USE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

PARK

MIXED-USE BUILDING OFFICE BUILDING HOTEL

AVEN

UE

A

FIRST STREET

SECOND STREET

SECONDARY PLAZA

GUARD

RAMP

EXISTING FEDERAL BUILDING

STREET CLOSURE TO ELIMINATE RISK OF AXIAL APPROACH

AUTOMATIC EXIT GATE

FENCE AT ADJACENT BUILDING

HARDENED WALL AT ADJACENT PARK

VEHICLE INSPECTION POINT OUTSIDE THE 50-FT. STANDOFF TO SCREEN SERVICE ENTRY

In Phase 3, the Project Team

designs three concepts (pages

91–93) addressing the site and

security needs of a single building

in an urban location. Each scheme

proposes different strategies, based

on the Multidisciplinary Assessment.

Stakeholders, team members,

and peers review and revise these

strategies, leading to a single

concept in Phase 4.

In the first scheme, the proposed

security improvements concentrate

on establishing a physical standoff

barrier at the perimeter of the site.

Bollards are suggested as a simple

off-the-shelf solution. A site wall is

proposed around HVAC vents/air

intakes. This scheme also proposes

a new security pavilion to regulate

entry, provides a queuing area, and

shares CCTV surveillance with the

Federal Reserve building across

Avenue A.



ADJACENT BUILDING PROVIDES ADEQUATE STANDOFF

BOLLARDS AT STAFF ENTRY

CANOPY OVER QUEUING AREA

TRANSIT STOP/INFO CENTER CREATES MORE EYES ON THE STREET

RAMP SYSTEM ALLOWS UNIVERSAL ACCESS AND MANAGES QUEUING

NEW ENTRY STAIR AT CORNERS

SITE WALL AND PLANTING AROUND HVAC VENTS/AIR INTAKES

HARDENED PLANTER WALL

HARDENED SITE FURNITURE AND PLANTER WALLS AT ADJACENT PARK

VEHICLE INSPECTION POINT OUTSIDE THE 50-FT. STANDOFF TO SCREEN SERVICE ENTRY

SERVICE ENTRY/EXIT CLOSED

HARDENED SITE FURNITURE AND PLANTER WALLS

COMBINED GUARD BOOTH FACILITY


GUARD

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING


TO PARKING

TO LOADING

DOCK

HVAC VENTS

LIM

ITS

OF

GAR

AGE

BEL

OW

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

OFFICE BUILDING


OFFICE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

MIXED-USE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

PARK

MIXED-USE BUILDING OFFICE BUILDING HOTEL

AVEN

UE

A

FIRST STREET

SECOND STREET


RAM

P

The second scheme utilizes security

measures to improve the site’s

existing vehicular and pedestrian

circulation. Physical standoff barriers

are multifunctional, serving as site

landscape amenities and pedestrian

improvements. Structurally hardened

existing planter walls visually

integrate security measures with the

site’s landscape architecture. New

stairs at the street corners eliminate

the potential for a vehicle to climb

the wide, central stair. A landscaped

ramp system with a canopy cover for

weather protection provides universal

access and manages queuing in

an orderly and pleasant manner. In

addition, a combined guard booth

facility oversees the entrances to

both underground parking and the

loading dock.



AUTOMATIC EXIT GATE

HVAC VENTS/AIR INTAKES RAISED ABOVE 30 FEET

BOLLARDS AT NEW ENTRY STAIR

FENCE ALONG ADJACENT BUILDING AND PARK

GUARD ARM AT 50-FT. STANDOFF TO SCREEN SERVICE ENTRY

TO SCREEN VEHICLES

STAFF ENTRY CLOSED

DEPRESSED WATER BASIN


GARDEN WALK

GUARD ARM AT 50-FT. STANDOFF


RETAIL FRONTAGE ALONG STREET EDGE WITH PLANTING

AT PLAZA LEVEL

HARDENED SITE WALL AT NEW RAMP


OFFICE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

PARK

MIXED-USE BUILDINGHOTEL

OFFICE BUILDING


MIXED-USE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

AVEN

UE

A

FIRST STREET

SECOND STREET

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING


TO PARKING

TO LOADING

DOCK

LIM

ITS

OF

GAR

AGE

BEL

OW

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

WATER GARDEN

RAM

P

GUARD GUARD

HVAC VENTS

In the third scheme, a structure

at both the street and plaza levels

incorporates retail uses and a new

security pavilion, while providing

standoff. Retail at the edge of

the site provides neighborhood

amenities, such as shopping and

food service, while reducing the

impact on the streetscape of a

security setback. The retail structure

also includes CCTV to provide

surveillance around the building.

The security pavilion regulates

access to the relocated main

building entry. This scheme replaces

temporary barriers with a

water basin. This moat provides

a secure perimeter, while acting as

the centerpiece for a public water

garden at the sidewalk-level plaza.


GSA’s Design Excellence program includes peer review during the Site Concept Investigation phase of the project. This offers an excellent opportunity to explore alternatives and gather feedback on how to integrate security requirements with other project needs.

Site Concept Investigation: Team Roles and Responsibilities

RESPONSIBILITIES

Critique concepts, introduce best practices, and provide information and

research as needed

Collaborate on solutions

Explore options (push the envelope) to find the best solution

Advocates creative and realistic solutions

Brings tenant point of view

Analyzes operational solutions to balance reduction of risk with cost

Reviews recommended changes

Ensures that designers and security experts provide creative input

Organizes peer reviews to help develop a single, focused concept from the

initial concepts

Review project, as required, and provide critique to help develop single,

focused concept from the initial concepts

Review project for Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act

(NHPA) compliance

Participate in concept review

ROLES

Security Consultants

Designers

Building Security Committee (BSC)

Project Manager

Other GSA Resources Center for Design Excellence (appropriate peers) Center for Historic Buildings

Stakeholders


Phase 4 Site Concept Selection (Conceptual Strategy Plan)

This phase should proceed seamlessly from the previous phase. Here, the design team develops a single alternative for the entire site, which comprises the best elements from the Site Concept Investigation.

Combine best results from site concept investigations into a “hybrid”

concept (a Conceptual Strategy Plan)

Key Points Within Phase 4: Site Concept Selection

Reach consensus on basic strategies for security countermeasures and

site improvements

Begin consideration of budget and phasing to bring the design into

built form

The selected Site Concept should be a hybrid, balanced solution that incorporates and refines the most appropriate strategies and design elements from the many site concept studies (see Diagram 3.8). It should consider the entire site to ensure that solutions contribute to its overall improvement. In subsequent stages the Project Team will focus only on the specific project areas defined by the scope.

On smaller projects, the preferred concept can be chosen through informal peer reviews with GSA Regional experts and informed discussions among Project Team members. On larger projects, it is helpful to hold a formal peer review with design peers selected through GSA’s Design Excellence program. They can provide an informed critique and foster discussion of costs and benefits.

Although the Project Team will still refine the selected concept further after this phase, at this point the team should reach consensus on the appropriate balance between security, aesthetics, and functionality. In addition, the team must agree on the fundamental strategy with regard to risk, including consensus about risk acceptance.

Remember that risk can be mitigated and managed, but it can never be eliminated. Since it is not always possible to reduce risk through physical solutions alone, a successful Site Concept may depend on operational strategies, as well. These strategies should be considered an integral part of the risk management strategy and should also be agreed upon at this stage.

Site Concept Selection: Team Roles and Responsibilities

ROLE RESPONSIBILITIES

All Team Members Collaborate to develop a Conceptual

Strategy Plan

Ensure that goals, requirements, and

hallmarks (including comprehensive

site design and long-term develop

ment strategy) are satisfied


Diagram 3.8: Conceptual Strategy Plan

The Project Team combines the This concept reflects the specific The site security design elements

most successful elements of the expertise that each team member incorporated from the three

three site concept investigations in provided regarding the tradeoffs conceptual design schemes comprise

an overall Site Concept. In this case, inherent in each strategy. The the following:

the hybrid scheme balances security elements in the Site Concept

measures with site circulation achieve a balance of security, Zone 1: Operational improvements,

improvements through the use of multifunctionality, and appropri including a partnership with the

multifunctional landscape elements. ateness to site and budget. Federal Reserve building across

Avenue A, provide shared CCTV

surveillance.

SITE WALL AND PLANTING


SHARED CAMERA SURVEILLANCE WITH BUILDING ACROSS THE STREET

NEW ENTRY STAIR AT CORNERS


COMBINED GUARD BOOTH FACILITY DEPRESSED WATER BASIN


AROUND HVAC VENTS/AIR INTAKES

RAMP SYSTEM ALLOWS UNIVERSAL ACCESS AND MANAGES QUEUING

HARDENED SITE WALL AT NEW RAMP AT ADJACENT PARK

STAFF ENTRY CLOSED


OFFICE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

PARK

MIXED-USE BUILDINGHOTEL

OFFICE BUILDING


MIXED-USE BUILDING

OFFICE BUILDING

AVEN

UE

A

FIRST STREET

SECOND STREET

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING


TO PARKING

TO LOADING

DOCK

LIM

ITS

OF

GAR

AGE

BEL

OW

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

RAM

P

GUARD

HVAC VENTS AUTOMATIC EXIT GATE

ADJACENT BUILDING PROVIDES ADEQUATE STANDOFF

EXISTING FENCE TO REMAIN

VEHICLE INPECTION POINT OUTSIDE THE 50-FT. STANDOFF TO SCREEN SERVICE ENTRY

96 Chapter 3 Process Phase 4

Zone 2: Structurally hardened planter

walls provide increased protection

from vehicles, while blending into

the site’s landscape architecture.

Physical standoff barriers function as

security elements, site amenities,

and streetscape improvements.

Zone 3: A combined guard booth

facility oversees the entrances to both

underground parking and the

loading dock simultaneously, reducing

the number of required guards.

Zone 4: Existing, wide central stairs

are divided and relocated to the street

corners; a new axially located

security pavilion regulates entry and

facilitates queuing; and a landscaped

ramp system provides universal access

and allows queuing in an orderly

and pleasant manner. In addition,

a depressed water basin increases

standoff, while providing a center

piece for a public water garden.

Zone 5: Plantings, grates, and

filters screen HVAC vents/air intakes,

thereby restricting access.

Zone 6: A strategic plan is developed

to replace temporary barriers that

were placed in haste and have

remained for years. The plan includes

the removal and disposal of the

temporary barriers and replacement

with multifunctional barriers. The

plan also establishes operations and

maintenance requirements for future

use of temporary barriers, if necessary.

GSA Site Security Design Guide

Phase 5 Design Studies for Project Areas

After reaching agreement on the preferred Site Concept, the design team continues with more detailed design work on key elements of the Site Concept. These may involve the more complex or high-priority areas of the overall site. Also, in cases where the entire site concept will not be implemented in a single project, these Design Studies may begin the detailed design work that the team will carry through to final design as part of the immediate project.

Perform a series of studies exploring different ways to achieve the goals of

the Conceptual Strategy Plan

Key Points Within Phase 5: Design Studies for Project Areas

Consider team expert input regarding the detailed approach for key areas

Revisit budget and schedule goals and long-term maintenance and operations

Using perspective sketches and renderings, the Design Studies further explore the ideas generated by the Conceptual Strategy Plan (see pages 98–99). The designers must test the Conceptual Strategy Plan against real site constraints and unseen obstacles, such as utility lines or underground vaults, which prevent barriers from attaining the structural foundations necessary to act as effective deterrents. Project Team members may contact additional consultants, such as structural engineers, to confirm site survey information and test assumptions.

The team reviews the Design Studies together and concentrates on important design details, with the larger site goals in mind. For example, in the Site Concept there may be a proposed perimeter wall along a portion of the site. During this stage, the security experts may comment on the likely performance of the proposed wall’s construction or anchoring. Urban designers or local officials

may advise on how the wall’s details would impact neighborhood design goals.

Project designers provide a range of input on these issues and more, including material choices and information about cost and constructability. Ideally, as part of the discussion, security experts suggest alternatives that meet their performance requirements, while responding to the urban designers’ concerns, and vice versa.

Larger strategy decisions are made during concept development in Phases 3 and 4, but this detailed design study phase is necessary to integrate countermeasures into the particular fabric of the site and its surroundings.

Design Studies for Project Areas: Team Roles and Responsibilities


All Team Members Ensure that the design meets site

security hallmarks

Obtain consensus from all

stakeholders on a realistic approach

to budget, schedule, maintenance,

and operations considerations


Elevation View

FEDERAL BUILDING

LAY-BY SPACE FOR TRUCKS AWAITING

CLEARANCE

CONTROLLED COMBINED GUARD BOOTH CONTROLLED ENTRY ENTRY TO MONITORS ENTRY TO TO LOADING DOCK

UNDERGROUND BOTH PARKING GARAGE PARKING AND LOADING DOCK

Existing Conditions Plan

FEDERAL BUILDING

TOUNDERGROUND

PARKING

TO L

OAD

ING

DO

CK

50-FT. STANDOFF PERIMETER

GUARD ARM

TEMPORARY GUARD BOOTH BARRIER

Design Solution Plan

FEDERAL BUILDING

TO L

OAD

ING

DO

CK

TO UNDERGROUND

PARKING

50-FT. STANDOFF

EXIT PERIMETER

LAY-BY SPACE

SECTION CUT

GUARD BOOTH INSPECTION AREA HYDRAULIC BARRIER

GUARD ARM

HARDENED SITE WALL

Zone 3: Site Access and Parking The concept of combining three

guard booths into one saves on

operational and staffing costs, while

centralizing security oversight.

The placement of the guard booth

supports clear views of all vehicles

entering the loading dock, as well

as the underground parking entrance

off First Street.

Project Area Design Studies: Zone 3

Security Design Problem Regulation of vehicular access to the site requires a combination of security

elements to stop and screen cars and trucks prior to passing inside the

perimeter. Ideally, access to on-site parking should be separated from service

access because the screening process is different for each. A tenant with

daily access requires a lower level of screening than a delivery truck. Multiple

entry points require high operational overhead in terms of facilities and

staffing. When parking is located underneath the building, that entry point is

particularly vulnerable. An explosive-laden vehicle could penetrate the standoff

perimeter and gain access to areas beneath the building.

Proposed Security Design Solution To reduce operational costs and consolidate security oversight, a shared guard

booth regulates access to both the underground parking garage and the loading

dock. Guard arms designed as vehicular barriers control entry prior to security

screening. Hydraulic barriers prevent a vehicle from backing into the street in

the event that it needs to be detained. If possible, vehicles should be stopped

outside the 50-foot standoff perimeter for inspection. Due to the constraints

of this site and the space required for a truck to pull off the street completely to

avoid stopping traffic, the guard arm at the loading dock is located slightly

within the standoff perimeter. A lay-by space enables trucks that are waiting for

security clearance to pull to the side, allowing other vehicles to pass.


Bird’s-Eye View

PLANTING AND SEATING AT PLAZA LEVEL

FEDERAL BUILDING

NEW SECURITY PAVILION

COLLAPSIBLE STAIR

RAMP SYSTEM

HARDENED SITE WALL

Design Solution Plan


CCTV CAMERAS MONITOR THE PLAZA AND THE STREET

NEW SECURITY PAVILION

MAIN FEDERAL BUILDING ENTRY

COLLAPSIBLE STAIR

NEW RAMPS

HARDENED SITE WALL

Existing Conditions Plan


EXISTING ENTRY STAIR

FEDERAL BUILDING MAIN ENTRY

QUEUING OCCURS OUTSIDE MAIN ENTRY

BOLLARDS

Project Area Design Studies: Zone 4

Security Design Problem Existing buildings often have main building entries and lobbies that were not

designed for current security processes and equipment and are difficult to

reconfigure. A typical modernist building with a curtain wall façade may have

multiple main doors and few visual cues to direct visitors to the appropriate

entry for screening. This can cause confusion, especially if the building has a

high degree of public use. Crowding may occur as visitors wait to be processed

through the security checkpoint. If not properly controlled, queuing can create

disorder and make security oversight more difficult.

Proposed Security Design Solution A security pavilion outside the main building provides the additional space

required to accommodate the security equipment and guards needed to screen

visitors prior to entry. The pavilion clearly delineates the “front door” to the

building and provides cover for visitors waiting for entry. Due to the size of the

pavilion, the elevated plaza is reconfigured. The main approach is rebuilt to

incorporate a new collapsible stair and accessible ramps. The collapsible stair

incorporates a compressible fill that supports pedestrian traffic, but will fail

under the weight of a vehicle. A reinforced knee wall built into the stair prevents

further approach. The ramps, which provide universal access, also offer

additional area for queuing overflow. The walls alongside the ramps guide

queues and offer room to sit and wait. The elevated plaza provides open space

for casual seating and a large area for public programs or demonstrations.

Zone 4: Site Hardened site walls and ramps

create an invisible perimeter barrier

and generous standoff distance.

The ramps provide universal access

to the main entry. The security

pavilion on the plaza level offers a

comfortable enclosed queuing area,

while positioning visitor security

inspection outside the building

envelope (Zone 5). The centrally

located pavilion complements the

existing building’s design. Shade

trees in hardened planters provide

pleasant seating areas on the plaza.


Phase 6 Final Concept Development

At this stage, the team completes the detailed final concept for the project that proceeds forward into construction. Note that if the entire Site Concept from Phase 4 will not be implemented ROLE RESPONSIBILITIES as part of the immediate project, this Final Concept Development All Team Members Collaborate to develop Final Concept may concentrate on only the portions of the project that will move

Final Concept Development: Team Roles and Responsibilities

Finalize concept budgets forward into planned construction.

Address issues of phasing

(if necessary) As part of GSA’s Design Excellence process, at the conclusion of this stage the team makes its final concept presentation to stakeholders.

Key Points Within Phase 6: Final Concept Development

Complete Final Concept for planned project

Develop implementation and phasing plan (if necessary)

The team chooses the products, materials, and methods of implementation for the entire project scope, beyond the special areas that might have received more detailed design study in the previous phase. The Final Concept Plan should be true to the overall Site Concept (Conceptual Strategy Plan) from Phase 4 and responsive to the input received during the detailed Project Area Design Studies in Phase 5 (see Diagram 3.9).

If the project is to be implemented in phases, the timing must be finalized for the most efficient use of materials and labor. Similarly, if the project is a renovation of an existing building, the Project Team must analyze the logistics of working on and around an occupied building.


ARD BOOTH

SECURITY BARRIER

SITE LIGHTING

Diagram 3.9: Final Concept Plan

Security and Site Design Solutions

ALLE

Y

MIXED-USE OFFICE OFFICE BUILDING BUILDING BUILDING 1 Cameras mounted on the façade of the Federal Reserve building monitor

AVEN

UE

A

BU

S ST

OP

RAM

P R

AMP

2 activity in front of the existing federal building, while cameras placed at key After the site security design

concepts have been examined in

detail, the team refines, integrates,

or redevelops the best concepts and

creates a Final Concept Plan. The

Final Concept Plan is a package

of plans, sections, elevations, and

details for the proposed design.

The plan may be constructed in its

entirety or divided into phases.

SECOND STREET locations on the elevated plaza monitor activity along Avenue A to create

shared surveillance of the street. HVAC VENTS 5

2 Traffic into the loading dock area is limited to entry from First Street, and anELEVATED1

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

PLAZAFEDERAL RESERVE automatic security gate regulates egress onto Second Street. The risk of axial BUILDING

25’ 100’25’ 100’

0 50’ 0 50’ 200’ 200’

OFFICE 10’ BUILDING50’10’ 50’

0 25’ 0 25’ 100’ 100’

OFFICE BUILDING approach from the alley into the standoff perimeter is deemed negligible.

TOEXISTING 3 A sensitively designed guard booth efficiently controls access to both theFEDERAL LOADINGSECURITY

DOCK PAVILION

BUILDING garage and the loading dock and adds “eyes on the street” to the rear of the

MAI

N

ENTR

Y

4

building, adjacent to the park.

4 A security pavilion at the plaza level creates space outside the existing federal

DESIGN STUDYPROJECT AREA

RES

ERVE

D P

ARK

ING

LIM

ITS

OF

GAR

AGE

BEL

OW

DESIGN STUDY PROJECT AREA building to screen visitors and manage queuing.PARK

TO PARKING 5 Planting areas, grates, and filters protect the HVAC vents/air intakes from

3 50-FT. (15.24-m) STANDOFF unregulated access.WATER

GARDEN GUARD

6 6 The temporary barriers are removed and replaced by security elements, such

as site walls and a moat that is also a water garden at the street-level plaza.

Multipurpose features minimize risk and improve the quality of public space.MIXED-USE

HOTEL BUILDING

Key elements in the Final Concept Plan include surveillance cameras operated in conjunction with a neighboring federal building, a custom-designed guardbooth, hardened site furniture, and anew security pavilion. The solution isintegrated into the site and compatible with the building’s architecture.

STANDOFF50 FT. STANDOFF PERIMETER 25 FT50 FT. STANDOFF .

ATIONATIONPEDESTRIAN CIRCULPEDESTRIAN CIRCULPEDESTRIAN CIRCUL ATION 0 50 FT. 100 FT.

VEHICULAR CIRCULVEHICULAR CIRCULATIONATIONVEHICULAR CIRCULATION

3 SITE SECURITY ZONESITE SECURITY ZONESITE SECURITY ZONE

SITE SECURITY DESIGNSITE SECURITY DESIGNPROJECT AREA

ANCE PROJECT AREA

N

15’ 75’15’ 75’

0 35’ 0 35’ 150’ 150’

50’ 200’50’ 200’

0 100’ 0 100’ 400 400

FIRST STREET

N N N

OFFICE BUILDING

KEY: KEYKEY:

BUILDING ENTRYBUILDING ENTRYBUILDING ENTRY

EMERGENCY EXITEMERGENCY EXITEMERGENCY EXIT

ADJACENT BUILDINGADJACENT BUILDINGADJACENT BUILDING

HIGH-RISK BUILDINGHIGH-RISK BUILDINGHIGH-RISK BUILDING

LANDSCAPE AREALANDSCAPE AREALANDSCAPE AREA

TREE TREETREE

GUGUARD BOOTHGUARD BOOTH

SITE LIGHTINGSITE LIGHTING

BOLLARDBOLLARD BOLLARD

SECURITY BARRIERSECURITY BARRIER

CAMERA SURVEILLANCECAMERA SURVEILLCAMERA SURVEILLANCE


Project Teams must incorporate careful review at this phase to ensure that security design features are not inadvertently modified as the team finalizes the project details. Likewise, teams must ensure that significant site amenities or finishes are not stripped out of the project while fine-tuning the construction documents and budget.

Phase 7 Final Design and Construction Documents

After the team reaches consensus on the design studies, final concepts, and implementation strategies, the process moves into the Final Design and Construction Documents phase.

Key Points Within Phase 7: Final Design and Construction Documents

Continue collaboration during this phase to ensure that the design and

specifications stay consistent with concepts, materials, and budgets

Coordinate site security elements with other aspects of the project

In this design-intensive stage, designers play the lead role. Other team members play an important role in reviewing drawings and specifications to ensure that agreed-upon elements are properly represented in the Final Design.

The development of design and construction documents may not require as much team involvement as other phases of the project. This may make coordination more challenging, as not every team member is needed at every meeting.

Final Design and Construction Documents: Team Roles and Responsibilities


All Team Members Collaborate to develop Final Design

and Construction Documents

Ensure that all elements of the

Final Concept are represented in

Construction Documents

Finalize budgets and schedules to

prepare for construction

Address issues of phasing

(if necessary)

Phase 8 Project Completion and Operations

Once construction begins, the Project Team should stay involved, as needed, to respond to unforeseen conditions during construction and alter the project design to respond to such conditions. Moreover, as the project is completed and put into use, building management and security operations must continually evaluate the function of the physical countermeasures over time and remain committed to the operational security measures that help to form the complete solution.

Key Points Within Phase 8: Project Completion and Operations

Collaborate to resolve last-minute concerns during construction

Sustain commitment to security operations and maintenance after completion

Project Completion and Operations: Team Roles and Responsibilities


All Team Members Collaborate to resolve any final issues

Maintain commitment to

comprehensive site security plan

throughout its working life

CONCLUSION

A successful site security design process carries a project from initial conception to final completion, incorporating the elements and hallmarks described in the Guide thus far. This integration is the subject of the following chapter, in which illustrative test cases portray successful implementation in five realistic scenarios.

102 Chapter 3 Process Phases 7 and 8 GSA Site Security Design Guide

Chapter 3 The Site Security Design Process 3 The Site Security Design Process Introduction 71...

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