cases for constitutional law

8/9/2019 cases for constitutional law

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009WHITE IGHT CORPOR!TION, TIT!NIUM CORPOR!TION an" ST!. MES! TOURIST #$E%EOPMENT CORPOR!TION, Petitioners,vs.CIT& O' M!NI!, r()r(*(n+(" y $E C!STRO, M!&OR !'RE$O S. IM, Respondent.D E C I S I NT-na, J.:!ith another cit" ordinance of Manila also principall" involvin# the tourist district as sub$ect,the Court is confronted ane% %ith the incessant clash bet%een #overn&ent po%er andindividual libert" in tande& %ith the archet"pal tension bet%een la% and &oralit".In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., ' the Court affir&ed the nullification of a cit" ordinance barrin#the operation of &otels and inns, a&on# other establish&ents, %ithin the Er&ita(Malate area.)he petition at bar assails a si&ilarl"(&otivated cit" ordinance that prohibits those sa&eestablish&ents fro& offerin# short(ti&e ad&ission, as %ell as pro(rated or *%ash up* rates forsuch abbreviated sta"s. ur earlier decision tested the cit" ordinance a#ainst our sacredconstitutional ri#hts to libert", due process and e+ual protection of la%. )he sa&e para&etersappl" to the present petition.)his Petition under Rule - of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, %hich see/s thereversal of the Decision0 in C.A.(1.R. S.P. No. 000'2 of the Court of Appeals, challen#es thevalidit" of Manila Cit" rdinance No. 333- entitled, *An rdinance Prohibitin# Short()i&eAd&ission, Short()i&e Ad&ission Rates, and !ash(4p Rate Sche&es in 5otels, Motels, Inns,6od#in# 5ouses, Pension 5ouses, and Si&ilar Establish&ents in the Cit" of Manila* 7therdinance8.I.)he facts are as follo%s9n Dece&ber 0, '::, Cit" Ma"or Alfredo S. 6i& 7Ma"or 6i&8 si#ned into la% the rdinance. - )he rdinance is reproduced in full, hereunder9SEC)IN '. Declaration of Polic". It is hereb" the declared polic" of the Cit" 1overn&ent toprotect the best interest, health and %elfare, and the &oralit" of its constituents in #eneral andthe "outh in particular.SEC. . )itle. )his ordinance shall be /no%n as *An rdinance* prohibitin# short ti&ead&ission in hotels, &otels, lod#in# houses, pension houses and si&ilar establish&ents in theCit" of Manila.SEC. 0. Pursuant to the above polic", short(ti&e ad&ission and rate ; sic>>.>>Pesos or i&prison&ent for a period of not e?ceedin# one 7'8 "ear or both such fine andi&prison&ent at the discretion of the court@ Provided, )hat in case of ;a< $uridical person, thepresident, the &ana#er, or the persons in char#e of the operation thereof shall be liable9Provided, further, )hat in case of subse+uent conviction for the sa&e offense, the businesslicense of the #uilt" part" shall auto&aticall" be cancelled.SEC. 2. Repealin# Clause. An" or all provisions of Cit" ordinances not consistent %ith orcontrar" to this &easure or an" portion hereof are hereb" dee&ed repealed.SEC. 3. Effectivit". )his ordinance shall ta/e effect i&&ediatel" upon approval.Enacted b" the cit" Council of Manila at its re#ular session toda", Nove&ber '>, '::.Approved b" 5is 5onor, the Ma"or on Dece&ber 0, '::.n Dece&ber ', '::, the Malate )ourist and Develop&ent Corporation 7M)DC8 filed aco&plaint for declarator" relief %ith pra"er for a %rit of preli&inar" in$unction andor te&porarestrainin# order 7 )R8 %ith the Re#ional )rial Court 7R)C8 of Manila, Branch : i&pleadinas defendant, herein respondent Cit" of Manila 7the Cit"8 represented b" Ma"or 6i&. 2 M)Dpra"ed that the rdinance, insofar as it includes &otels and inns as a&on# its prohibitedestablish&ents, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. M)DC clai&ed that as o%ner andoperator of the ictoria Court in Malate, Manila it %as authoried b" Presidential Decree 7P.No. : to ad&it custo&ers on a short ti&e basis as %ell as to char#e custo&ers %ash uprates for sta"s of onl" three hours.n Dece&ber ', '::, petitioners !hite 6i#ht Corporation 7!6C8, )itaniu& Corporation 7and Sta. Mesa )ourist and Develop&ent Corporation 7S)DC8 filed a &otion to intervene anad&it attached co&plaint(in(intervention3 on the #round that the rdinance directl" affectstheir business interests as operators of drive(in(hotels and &otels in Manila. )he threeco&panies are co&ponents of the Anito 1roup of Co&panies %hich o%ns and operatesseveral hotels and &otels in Metro Manila.: n Dece&ber 0, '::, the R)C #ranted the &otion to intervene. '> )he R)C also notified tSolicitor 1eneral of the proceedin#s pursuant to then Rule 2-, Section - of the Rules of Coun the sa&e date, M)DC &oved to %ithdra% as plaintiff. '' n Dece&ber , '::, the R)C #ranted M)DCs &otion to %ithdra%.' )he R)C issued a)R on Fanuar" '-, '::0, directin# the Cit" to cease and desist fro& enforcin# therdinance.'0 )he Cit" filed an Ans%er dated Fanuar" , '::0 alle#in# that the rdinance isle#iti&ate e?ercise of police po%er.'-

n =ebruar" , '::0, the R)C issued a %rit of preli&inar" in$unction orderin# the cit" to desfro& the enforce&ent of the rdinance.' A &onth later, on March , '::0, the Solicitor1eneral filed his Co&&ent ar#uin# that the rdinance is constitutional.Durin# the pre(trial conference, the !6C, )C and S)DC a#reed to sub&it the case fordecision %ithout trial as the case involved a purel" le#al +uestion. '2 n ctober >, '::0, tR)C rendered a decision declarin# the rdinance null and void. )he dispositive portion of tdecision reads9!5ERE=RE, in vie% of all the fore#oin#, ;


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)he R)C noted that the ordinance *stri/es at the personal libert" of the individual #uaranteedand $ealousl" #uarded b" the Constitution.*' Reference %as &ade to the provisions of theConstitution encoura#in# private enterprises and the incentive to needed invest&ent, as %ellas the ri#ht to operate econo&ic enterprises. =inall", fro& the observation that the illicitrelationships the rdinance sou#ht to dissuade could nonetheless be consu&&ated b" si&pl"pa"in# for a '(hour sta", the R)C li/ened the la% to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v.Intermediate Appellate Court,': %here the le#iti&ate purpose of preventin# indiscri&inateslau#hter of carabaos %as sou#ht to be effected throu#h an inter(province ban on thetransport of carabaos and carabeef.)he Cit" later filed a petition for revie% on certiorari %ith the Supre&e Court.> )he petition

%as doc/eted as 1.R. No. ''-3'. 5o%ever in a resolution dated Fanuar" 2, '::-, the Courttreated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court ofAppeals.'

Before the Court of Appeals, the Cit" asserted that the rdinance is a valid e?ercise of policepo%er pursuant to Section - 7-87iv8 of the 6ocal 1overn&ent Code %hich confers on cities,a&on# other local #overn&ent units, the po%er9;)o< re#ulate the establish&ent, operation and &aintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,hotels, &otels, inns, pension houses, lod#in# houses and other si&ilar establish&ents,includin# tourist #uides and transports.

)he rdinance, it is ar#ued, is also a valid e?ercise of the po%er of the Cit" under Article III,Section '7//8 of the Revised Manila Charter, thus9*to enact all ordinances it &a" dee& necessar" and proper for the sanitation and safet", thefurtherance of the prosperit" and the pro&otion of the &oralit", peace, #ood order, co&fort,convenience and #eneral %elfare of the cit" and its inhabitants, and such others as benecessar" to carr" into effect and dischar#e the po%ers and duties conferred b" this Chapter@and to fi? penalties for the violation of ordinances %hich shall not e?ceed t%o hundred pesosfine or si? &onths i&prison&ent, or both such fine and i&prison&ent for a sin#le offense. 0 Petitioners ar#ued that the rdinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the ri#ht toprivac" and the freedo& of &ove&ent@ it is an invalid e?ercise of police po%er@ and it is anunreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.)he Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the R)C and affir&ed the constitutionalit" of therdinance.- =irst, it held that the rdinance d id not violate the ri#ht to privac" or the freedo&of &ove&ent, as it onl" penalies the o%ners or operators of establish&ents that ad&itindividuals for short ti&e sta"s. Second, the virtuall" li&itless reach of police po%er is onl"constrained b" havin# a la%ful ob$ect obtained throu#h a la%ful &ethod. )he la%ful ob$ectiveof the rdinance is satisfied since it ai&s to curb i&&oral activities. )here is a la%ful &ethodsince the establish&ents are still allo%ed to operate. )hird, the adverse effect on theestablish&ents is $ustified b" the %ell(bein# of its constituents in #eneral. =inall", as held inErmita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, libert" is re#ulated b" la%.)C, !6C and S)DC co&e to this Court via petition for revie% on certiorari. In their petitionand Me&orandu&, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions the" &ade before the Court ofAppeals. )he" contend that the assailed rdinance is an invalid e?ercise of police po%er.II.!e &ust address the threshold issue of petitionersG standin#. Petitioners alle#e that as o%nersof establish&ents offerin# *%ash(up* rates, their business is bein# unla%full" interfered %ith b"

the rdinance. 5o%ever, petitioners also alle#e that the e+ual protection ri#hts of their clienare also bein# interfered %ith. )hus, the cru? of the &atter is %hether or not theseestablish&ents have the re+uisite standin# to plead for protection of their patrons e+ualprotection ri#hts.Standin# or locus standi is the abilit" of a part" to de&onstrate to the court sufficientconnection to and har& fro& the la% or action challen#ed to support that part"s participatioin the case. More i&portantl", the doctrine of standin# is built on the principle of separation opo%ers,2 sparin# as it does unnecessar" interference or invalidation b" the $udicial branch the actions rendered b" its co(e+ual branches of #overn&ent.)he re+uire&ent of standin# is a core co&ponent of the $udicial s"ste& derived directl" fro&the Constitution.3 )he constitutional co&ponent of standin# doctrine incorporates concepts

%hich concededl" are not susceptible of precise definition. In this $urisdiction, the e?tanc"*a direct and personal interest* presents the &ost obvious cause, as %ell as the standard tefor a petitioners standin#.: In a si&ilar vein, the 4nited States Supre&e Court revie%ed anelaborated on the &eanin# of the three constitutional standin# re+uire&ents of in$ur",causation, and redressabilit" in Allen v. rig!t .0> Nonetheless, the #eneral rules on standin# ad&it of several e?ceptions such as theoverbreadth doctrine, ta?pa"er suits, third part" standin# and, especiall" in the Philippines, doctrine of transcendental i&portance.0' =or this particular set of facts, the concept of third part" standin# as an e?ception and theoverbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In "o#ers v. O!io,0 the 4nited States Supre&e Cour

%rote that9 *!e have reco#nied the ri#ht of liti#ants to brin# actions on behalf of third partprovided three i&portant criteria are satisfied9 the liti#ant &ust have suffered an Hin$ur"(in(fathus #ivin# hi& or her a *sufficientl" concrete interest* in the outco&e of the issue in disputethe liti#ant &ust have a close relation to the third part"@ and there &ust e?ist so&e hindrancto the third part"s abilit" to protect his or her o%n interests.* 00 5erein, it is clear that thebusiness interests of the petitioners are li/e%ise in$ured b" the rdinance. )he" rel" on thepatrona#e of their custo&ers for their continued viabilit" %hich appears to be threatened b"the enforce&ent of the rdinance. )he relative silence in constitutional liti#ation of suchspecial interest #roups in our nation such as the A&erican Civil 6iberties 4nion in the 4nitedStates &a" also be construed as a hindrance for custo&ers to brin# suit.0- A&erican $urisprudence is replete %ith e?a&ples %here parties(in(interest %ere allo%edstandin# to advocate or invo/e the funda&ental due process or e+ual protection clai&s ofother persons or classes of persons in$ured b" state action. In $ris#old v. Connecticut,0 th4nited States Supre&e Court held that ph"sicians had standin# to challen#e a reproductivehealth statute that %ould penalie the& as accessories as %ell as to plead the constitutionaprotections available to their patients. )he Court held that9*)he ri#hts of husband and %ife, pressed here, are li/el" to be diluted or adversel" affectedunless those ri#hts are considered in a suit involvin# those %ho have this /ind of confidentiarelation to the&.*02

An even &ore analo#ous e?a&ple &a" be found in Craig v. %oren,03 %herein the 4nitedStates Supre&e Court held that a licensed bevera#e vendor has standin# to raise the e+uaprotection clai& of a &ale custo&er challen#in# a statutor" sche&e prohibitin# the sale ofbeer to &ales under the a#e of ' and to fe&ales under the a#e of '. )he 4nited States 5

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Court e?plained that the vendors had standin# *b" actin# as advocates of the ri#hts of thirdparties %ho see/ access to their &ar/et or function.*0

Assu&in# arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship %ith their patrons for the for&erto assert the ri#hts of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine co&es into pla". In overbreadthanal"sis, challen#ers to #overn&ent action are in effect per&itted to raise the ri#hts of thirdparties. 1enerall" applied to statutes infrin#in# on the freedo& of speech, the overbreadthdoctrine applies %hen a statute needlessl" restrains even constitutionall" #uaranteed ri#hts. 0: In this case, the petitioners clai& that the rdinance &a/es a s%eepin# intrusion into the ri#htto libert" of their clients. !e can see that based on the alle#ations in the petition, therdinance suffers fro& overbreadth.!e thus reco#nie that the petitioners have a ri#ht to assert the constitutional ri#hts of theirclients to patronie their establish&ents for a *%ash(rate* ti&e fra&e.III.)o students of $urisprudence, the facts of this case %ill recal l to &ind not onl" the recent Cityof Manila rulin#, but our ':23 decision in Ermita-Malate &otel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. &on. City Mayor of Manila.-> Ermita-Malate concerned the Cit" ordinancere+uirin# patrons to fill up a prescribed for& statin# personal infor&ation such as na&e,#ender, nationalit", a#e, address and occupation before the" could be ad&itted to a &otel,hotel or lod#in# house. )his earlier ordinance %as precisel" enacted to &ini&ie certainpractices dee&ed har&ful to public &orals. A purpose si&ilar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila %hich sou#ht a blan/et ban on &otels, inns and si&ilar establish&ents in theEr&ita(Malate area. 5o%ever, the constitutionalit" of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate %assustained b" the Court.)he co&&on thread that runs throu#h those decisions and the case at bar #oes be"ond thesin#ularit" of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances %ereenacted %ith a vie% of re#ulatin# public &orals includin# particular illicit activit" in transientlod#in# establish&ents. )his could be described as the &iddle case, %herein there is no

%holesale ban on &otels and hotels but the services offered b" these establish&ents havebeen severel" restricted. At its core, this is another case about the e?tent to %hich the Statecan intrude into and re#ulate the lives of its citiens.)he test of a valid ordinance is %ell established. A lon# line of decisions includin# City ofManila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it &ust not onl" be %ithin the corporatepo%ers of the local #overn&ent unit to enact and pass accordin# to the procedure prescribedb" la%, it &ust also confor& to the follo%in# substantive re+uire&ents9 7'8 &ust notcontravene the Constitution or an" statute@ 78 &ust not be unfair or oppressive@ 708 &ust notbe partial or discri&inator"@ 7-8 &ust not prohibit but &a" re#ulate trade@ 78 &ust be #eneraland consistent %ith public polic"@ and 728 &ust not be unreasonable.-' )he rdinance prohibits t%o specific and distinct business practices, na&el" %ash ratead&issions and rentin# out a roo& &ore than t%ice a da". )he ban is evidentl" sou#ht to berooted in the police po%er as conferred on local #overn&ent units b" the 6ocal 1overn&entCode throu#h such i&ple&ents as the #eneral %elfare clause.A.Police po%er, %hile incapable of an e?act definition, has been purposel" veiled in #eneralter&s to underscore its co&prehensiveness to &eet all e?i#encies and provide enou#h roo&for an efficient and fle?ible response as the conditions %arrant. - Police po%er is based upon

the concept of necessit" of the State and its correspondin# ri#ht to protect itself and itspeople.-0 Police po%er has been used as $ustification for nu&erous and varied actions b" thState. )hese ran#e fro& the re#ulation of dance halls, -- &ovie theaters,- #as stations-2 andcoc/pits.-3 )he a%eso&e scope of police po%er is best de&onstrated b" the fact that in itshundred or so "ears of presence in ou r nationGs le#al s"ste&, its use has rarel" been denie)he apparent #oal of the rdinance is to &ini&ie if not eli&inate the use of the coveredestablish&ents for illicit se?, prostitution, dru# use and ali/e. )hese #oals, b" the&selves, auni&peachable and certainl" fall %ithin the a&bit of the police po%er of the State. et thedesirabilit" of these ends do not sanctif" an" and all &eans for their achieve&ent. )hose&eans &ust ali#n %ith the Constitution, and our e&er#in# sophisticated anal"sis of its#uarantees to the people. )he Bill of Ri#hts stands as a rebu/e to the seductive theor" ofMacchiavelli, and, so&eti&es even, the political &a$orities ani&ated b" his c"nicis&.Even as %e desi#n the precedents that establish the fra&e%or/ for anal"sis of due process e+ual protection +uestions, the courts are naturall" inhibited b" a due deference to the co(e+ual branches of #overn&ent as the" e?ercise their political functions. But %hen %e areco&pelled to nullif" e?ecutive or le#islative actions, "et another for& of caution e&er#es. If Court %ere ani&ated b" the sa&e passin# fancies or turbulent e&otions that &otivate &an"political decisions, $udicial inte#rit" is co&pro&ised b" an" perception that the $udiciar" is&erel" the third political branch of #overn&ent. !e derive our respect and #ood standin# inthe annals of histor" b" actin# as $udicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of la%, and there no surer %a" to that end than throu#h the develop&ent of ri#orous and sophisticated le#alstandards throu#h %hich the courts anal"e the &ost funda&ental and far(reachin#constitutional +uestions of the da".B.)he pri&ar" constitutional +uestion that confronts us is one of due process, as #uaranteedunder Section ', Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. - )hpurpose of the #uarant" is to prevent arbitrar" #overn&ental encroach&ent a#ainst the life,libert" and propert" of individuals. )he due process #uarant" serves as a protection a#ainstarbitrar" re#ulation or seiure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected b" the#uarant" insofar as their propert" is concerned.)he due process #uarant" has traditionall" been interpreted as i&posin# t%o related butdistinct restrictions on #overn&ent, *procedural due process* and *substantive due processProcedural due process refers to the procedures that the #overn&ent &ust follo% before itdeprives a person of life, libert", or propert".-: Procedural due process concerns itself %ith#overn&ent action adherin# to the established process %hen it &a/es an intrusion into theprivate sphere. E?a&ples ran#e fro& the for& of notice #iven to the level of for&alit" of ahearin#.If due process %ere confined solel" to its procedural aspects, there %ould arise absurdsituation of arbitrar" #overn&ent action, provided the proper for&alities are follo%ed.Substantive due process co&pletes the protection envisioned b" the due process clause. Itin+uires %hether the #overn&ent has sufficient $ustification for deprivin# a person of life,libert", or propert".> )he +uestion of substantive due process, &oreso than &ost other fields of la%, has reflected"na&is& in pro#ressive le#al thou#ht tied %ith the e?panded acceptance of funda&entalfreedo&s. Police po%er, traditionall" a%eso&e as it &a" be, is no% confronted %ith a &ore

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ri#orous level of anal"sis before it can be upheld. )he vitalit" thou#h of constitutional dueprocess has not been predicated on the fre+uenc" %ith %hich it has been utilied to achieve aliberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should so&eti&es "ield to the prero#atives of theState. Instead, the due process clause has ac+uired potenc" because of the sophisticated&ethodolo#" that has e&er#ed to deter&ine the proper &etes and bounds for its application.C.)he #eneral test of the validit" of an ordinance on substantive due process #rounds is besttested %hen assessed %ith the evolved footnote - test laid do%n b" the 4.S. Supre&e Courtin 4.S. v. Carolene Products.' =ootnote - of the Carolene Products case ac/no%led#ed thatthe $udiciar" %ould defer to the le#islature unless there is a discri&ination a#ainst a *discreteand insular* &inorit" or infrin#e&ent of a *funda&ental ri#ht.* Conse+uentl", t%o standardsof $udicial revie% %ere established9 strict scrutin" for la%s dealin# %ith freedo& of the &ind orrestrictin# the political process, and the rational basis standard of revie% for econo&icle#islation.A third standard, deno&inated as hei#htened or i&&ediate scrutin", %as later adopted b" the4.S. Supre&e Court for evaluatin# classifications based on #ender0 and le#iti&ac".- I&&ediate scrutin" %as adopted b" the 4.S. Supre&e Court in Crai#, after the Courtdeclined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 2 !hile the test &a" have first been articulated in e+ualprotection anal"sis, it has in the 4nited States since been applied in all substantive dueprocess cases as %ell.!e ourselves have often applied the rational basis test &ainl" in anal"sis of e+ual protectionchallen#es.3 4sin# the rational basis e?a&ination, la%s or ordinances are upheld if the"rationall" further a le#iti&ate #overn&ental interest. 4nder inter&ediate revie%,#overn&ental interest is e?tensivel" e?a&ined and the availabilit" of less restrictive &easuresis considered.: Appl"in# strict scrutin", the focus is on the presence of co&pellin#, rather thansubstantial, #overn&ental interest and on the absence of less restrictive &eans for achievin#that interest.In ter&s of $udicial revie% of statutes or ordinances, strict sc rutin" refers to the standard fordeter&inin# the +ualit" and the a&ount of #overn&ental interest brou#ht to $ustif" there#ulation of funda&ental freedo&s.2> Strict scrutin" is used toda" to test the validit" of la%sdealin# %ith the re#ulation of speech, #ender, or race as %ell as other funda&ental ri#hts ase?pansion fro& its earlier applications to e+ual protection.2' )he 4nited States Supre&e Courthas e?panded the scope of strict scrutin" to protect funda&ental ri#hts such as suffra#e, 2

$udicial access20 and interstate travel.2- If %e %ere to ta/e the &"opic vie% that an rdinance should be anal"ed strictl" as to itseffect onl" on the petitioners at bar, then it %ould see& that the onl" restraint i&posed b" thela% %hich %e are capacitated to act upon is the in$ur" to propert" sustained b" the petitioners,an in$ur" that %ould %arrant the application of the &ost deferential standard J the rationalbasis test. et as earlier stated, %e reco#nie the capacit" of the petitioners to invo/e as %ellthe constitutional ri#hts of their patrons J those persons %ho %ould be deprived of availin#short ti&e access or %ash(up rates to the lod#in# establish&ents in +uestion.ie%ed c"nicall", one &i#ht sa" that the infrin#ed ri#hts of these custo&ers %ere are trivialsince the" see& shorn of political conse+uence. Concededl", these are not the sort ofcherished ri#hts that, %hen proscribed, %ould i&pel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still,the Bill of Ri#hts does not shelter #ravitas alone. Indeed, it is those *trivial* "et funda&ental

freedo&s J %hich the people refle?ivel" e?ercise an" da" %ithout the i&pairin# a%areness their constitutional conse+uence J that accuratel" reflect the de#ree of libert" en$o"ed b" thpeople. 6ibert", as inte#rall" incorporated as a funda&ental ri#ht in the Constitution, is not a)en Co&&and&ents(st"le enu&eration of %hat &a" or %hat &a" not be done@ but rather aat&osphere of freedo& %here the people do not feel labored under a Bi# Brother presencethe" interact %ith each other, their societ" and nature, in a &anner innatel" understood b"the& as inherent, %ithout doin# har& or in$ur" to others.D.)he ri#hts at sta/e herein fall %ithin the sa&e funda&ental ri#hts to l ibert" %hich %e upheldCit" of Manila v. 5on. 6a#uio, Jr . !e e?pounded on that &ost pri&ordial of ri#hts, thus96ibert" as #uaranteed b" the Constitution %as defined b" Fustice Malcol& to include *the rito e?ist and the ri#ht to be free fro& arbitrar" restraint or servitude. )he ter& cannot bed%arfed into &ere freedo& fro& ph"sical restraint of the person of the citien, but is dee&eto e&brace the ri#ht of &an to en$o" the facilities %ith %hich he has been endo%ed b" hisCreator, sub$ect onl" to such restraint as are necessar" for the co&&on %elfare.*; 2


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b" the %ill of others, he ceases to be a &aster of hi&self. I cannot believe that a &an nolon#er a &aster of hi&self is in an" real sense free.Indeed, the ri#ht to privac" as a constitutional ri#ht %as reco#nied in Morfe, the invasion of

%hich should be $ustified b" a co&pellin# state interest. Morfe accorded reco#nition to theri#ht to privac" independentl" of its identification %ith libert"@ in itself it is full" deservin# ofconstitutional protection. 1overn&ental po%ers should stop short of certain intrusions into thepersonal life of the citien.3>

!e cannot discount other le#iti&ate activ ities %hich the rdinance %ould proscribe or i&pair.)here are ver" le#iti&ate uses for a %ash rate or rentin# the roo& out for &ore than t%ice ada". Entire fa&ilies are /no%n to choose pass the ti&e in a &otel or hotel %hilst the po%er is&o&entaril" out in their ho&es. In transit passen#ers %ho %ish to %ash up and rest bet%eentrips have a le#iti&ate purpose for abbreviated sta"s in &otels or hotels. Indeed an" person or#roups of persons in need of co&fortable private spaces for a span of a fe% hours %ithpurposes other than havin# se? or usin# ille#al dru#s can le#iti&atel" loo/ to sta"in# in a&otel or hotel as a convenient alternative.E.)hat the rdinance prevents the la%ful uses of a %ash rate deprivin# patrons of a product andthe petitioners of lucrative business ties in %ith another constitutional re+uisite for thele#iti&ac" of the rdinance as a police po%er &easure. It &ust appear that the interests ofthe public #enerall", as distin#uished fro& those of a particular class, re+uire an interference

%ith private ri#hts and the &eans &ust be reasonabl" necessar" for the acco&plish&ent ofthe purpose and not undul" oppressive of private ri#hts. 3' It &ust also be evident that no otheralternative for the acco&plish&ent of the purpose less intrusive of private ri#hts can %or/.More i&portantl", a reasonable relation &ust e?ist bet%een the purposes of the &easure andthe &eans e&plo"ed for its acco&plish&ent, for even under the #uise of protectin# the publicinterest, personal ri#hts and those pertainin# to private propert" %ill not be per&itted to bearbitraril" invaded.3 6ac/in# a concurrence of these re+uisites, the police &easure shall be struc/ do%n as anarbitrar" intrusion into private ri#hts. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the e?ercise of police po%er issub$ect to $udicial revie% %hen life, libert" or propert" is affected.30 5o%ever, this is not in an"

%a" &eant to ta/e it a%a" fro& the vastness of State police po%er %hose e?ercise en$o"s thepresu&ption of validit".3-

Si&ilar to the Co&elec resolution re+uirin# ne%spapers to donate advertisin# space tocandidates, this rdinance is a blunt and heav" instru&ent.3 )he rdinance &a/es nodistinction bet%een places fre+uented b" patrons en#a#ed in illicit activities and patronsen#a#ed in le#iti&ate actions. )hus it prevents le#iti&ate use of places %here illicit activitiesare rare or even unheard of. A plain readin# of section 0 of the rdinance sho%s it &a/es noclassification of places of lod#in#, thus dee&s the& all susceptible to illicit patrona#e andsub$ect the& %ithout e?ception to the un$ustified prohibition.)he Court has professed its deep senti&ent and tenderness of the Er&ita(Malate area, itslon#ti&e ho&e,32 and it is s/eptical of those %ho %ish to depict our capital cit" J the Pearl ofthe rient J as a &odern(da" Sodo& or 1o&orrah for the )hird !orld set. )hose still steepedin Nic/ Foa+uin(drea&s of the #randeur of ld Manila %ill have to accept that Manila li/e allevolvin# bi# cities, %ill have its proble&s. 4rban deca" is a fact of &e#a cities such as Manila,and vice is a co&&on proble& confronted b" the &odern &etropolis %herever in the %orld.

)he solution to such perceived deca" is not to prevent le#iti&ate businesses fro& offerin# ale#iti&ate product. Rather, cities revive the&selves b" offerin# incentives for ne% businesseto sprout up thus attractin# the d"na&is& of individuals that %ould brin# a ne% #randeur toManila.)he behavior %hich the rdinance see/s to curtail is in fact alread" prohibited and could infact be di&inished si&pl" b" appl"in# e?istin# la%s. 6ess intrusive &easures such as curbinthe proliferation of prostitutes and dru# dealers throu#h active police %or/ %ould be &oreeffective in easin# the situation. So %ould the strict enforce&ent of e?istin# la%s andre#ulations penaliin# prostitution and dru# use. )hese &easures %ould have &ini&alintrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other le#iti&ate &erchants. =urther, it isapparent that the rdinance can easil" be circu&vented b" &erel" pa"in# the %hole da" ra

%ithout an" hindrance to those en#a#ed in illicit activities. Moreover, dru# dealers andprostitutes can in fact collect *%ash rates* fro& their clientele b" char#in# their custo&ers aportion of the rent for &otel roo&s and even apart&ents.I.!e reiterate that individual ri#hts &a" be adversel" affected onl" to the e?tent that &a" fairlbe re+uired b" the le#iti&ate de&ands of public interest or public %elfare. )he State is aleviathan that &ust be restrained fro& needlessl" intrudin# into the lives of its citiens.5o%ever %ell(intentioned the rdinance &a" be, it is in effect an arbitrar" and %hi&sicalintrusion into the ri#hts of the establish&ents as %ell as their patrons. )he rdinanceneedlessl" restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as %ell as restrictin# ri#hts of their patrons %ithout sufficient $ustification. )he rdinance rashl" e+uates %ash ratand rentin# out a roo& &ore than t%ice a da" %ith i&&oralit" %ithout acco&&odatin#innocuous intentions.)he pro&otion of public %elfare and a sense of &oralit" a&on# citiens deserves the fullendorse&ent of the $udiciar" provided that such &easures do not tra&ple ri#hts this Court iss%orn to protect.33 )he notion that the pro&otion of public &oralit" is a function of the Stateas old as Aristotle.3 )he advance&ent of &oral relativis& as a school of philosoph" does nde(le#iti&ie the role of &oralit" in la%, even if it &a" foster %ider debate on %hich particulabehavior to penalie. It is conceivable that a societ" %ith relativel" little shared &oralit" a&oits citiens could be functional so lon# as the pursuit of sharpl" variant &oral perspectives"ields an ade+uate acco&&odation of different interests. 3:

)o be candid about it, the oft(+uoted A&erican &a?i& that *"ou cannot le#islate &oralit"* isulti&atel" ille#iti&ate as a &atter of la%, since as e?plained b" Calabresi, that phrase is &oaccuratel" interpreted as &eanin# that efforts to le#islate &oralit" %ill fail if the" are %idel" variance %ith public attitudes about ri#ht and %ron# .> ur penal la%s, for one, are foundeda#e(old &oral traditions, and as lon# as there are %idel" accepted distinctions bet%een ri#hand %ron#, the" %ill re&ain so oriented.et the continuin# pro#ression of the hu&an stor" has seen not onl" the acceptance of theri#ht(%ron# distinction, but also the advent of funda&ental liberties as the /e" to theen$o"&ent of life to the fullest. ur de&ocrac" is distin#uished fro& non(free societies not %an" &ore e?tensive elaboration on our part of %hat is &oral and i&&oral, but fro& ourreco#nition that the individual libert" to &a/e the choices in our lives is innate, and protecteb" the State. Independent and fair(&inded $ud#es the&selves are under a &oral dut" touphold the Constitution as the e&bodi&ent of the rule of la%, b" reason of their e?pression

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consent to do so %hen the" ta/e the oath of office, and because the" are entrusted b" thepeople to uphold the la%.'

Even as the i&ple&entation of &oral nor&s re&ains an indispensable co&ple&ent to#overnance, that prero#ative is hardl" absolute, especiall" in the face of the nor&s of dueprocess of libert". And %hile the tension &a" often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possiblefor the #overn&ent to avoid the constitutional conflict b" e&plo"in# &ore $udicious, lessdrastic &eans to pro&ote &oralit".WHERE'ORE, the Petition is GR!NTE$. )he Decision of the Court of Appeals isRE%ERSE$, and the Decision of the Re#ional )rial Court of Manila, Branch :, isREINST!TE$. rdinance No. 333- is hereb" declared 4NCNS)I)4)INA6. Nopronounce&ent as to costs. MM$! %. TR!C/WOR/SR E S O U T I O N ERS!MIN, J.

)his case concerns %hether the Metropolitan Manila Develop&ent Authorit"7MMDA8 could unilaterall" dis&antle the billboards, si#na#es and other advertiin# &edia inthe structures of the Metro Rail )ransit 0 7MR)08 installed b" respondent advertisin# co&pan"b" virtue of its e?istin# contract %ith the o%ner of the MR)0.

)he trial and appellate courts ruled that MMDA did not have the authorit" todis&antle. MMDA is no% before the Court to assail such adverse rulin#.

!n+(("(n+*

In '::3, the 1overn&ent, throu#h the Depart&ent of )ransportation andCo&&unications, entered into a build(lease(transfer a#ree&ent 7B6) a#ree&ent8 %ith MetroRail )ransit Corporation, 6i&ited 7MR)C8 pursuant to Republic Act No. 2:3 7%uild, Operateand (ransfer La# 8, under %hich MR)C undertoo/ to build MR)0 sub$ect to the condition thatMR)C %ould o%n MR)0 for "ears, upon the e?piration of %hich the o%nership %ouldtransfer to the 1overn&ent.

)he B6) a#ree&ent stipulated, a&on# others, that MR)C could build and developco&&ercial pre&ises in the MR)0 structures, or obtain advertisin# inco&e therefro&, vi)9

'2.'. Details of Develop&ent Ri#hts. D)C hereb" confir&s and a%ardsto Metro Rail the ri#hts to 7a8 develop co&&ercial pre&ises in the Depot and the airspace above the Stations, %hich shall be allo%ed to such hei#ht as is le#all" andtechnicall" feasible, 7b8 lease or sub(lease interests or assi#n such interests in theDepot and such air space and 7c8 obtain an" advertisin# inco&e fro& the Depot andsuch air space and 6R)S Phase IK.

L6R)S Phase I &eans the rail transport s"ste& co&prisin# about '2.: line/ilo&eters e?tendin# fro& )aft Avenue, Pasa" Cit", to North Avenue, ueon Cit",occup"in# a strip in the center of EDSA appro?i&atel" '>. &eters %ide7appro?i&atel" ' &eters %ide at or around the Boni Avenue, Santolan and BuendiaStations8, plus about >.' to >. line /ilo&eters e?tendin# fro& the North AvenueStation to the Depot, to#ether %ith the Stations, 30 6i#ht Rail ehicles and allancillar" plant, e+uip&ent and facilities, as &ore particularl" detailed in theSpecifications.

'2.. Assi#n&ent of Ri#hts. Durin# the Develop&ent Ri#hts Period, Metro

Rail shall be entitled to assi#n all or an" of its ri#hts, titles and interests in theDevelop&ent Ri#hts to bona fide real estate developers. In this connection, MetroRail &a" enter into such develop&ent, lease, sub(lease or other a#ree&ents orcontracts relatin# to the Depot and the air space above the Stations 7the space notneeded for all or an" portion of the operation of the 6R)S8 for all or an" portion ofthe Develop&ent Ri#hts PeriodK.

In '::, respondent )rac/%or/s Rail )ransit Advertisin#, endin# O Pro&otions, 7)rac/%or/s8 entered into a contract for advertisin# services %ith MR)C. )rac/%or/sthereafter installed co&&ercial billboards, si#na#es and other advertiin# &edia in thedifferent parts of the MR)0. In >>', ho%ever, MMDA re+uested )rac/%or/s to dis&antle tbillboards, si#na#es and other advertiin# &edia pursuant to MMDA Re#ulation No. :2(>>:

%hereb" MMDA prohibited the postin#, installation and displa" of an" /ind or for& ofbillboards, si#ns, posters, strea&ers, in an" part of the road, side%al/, center island, posts,trees, par/s and open space. After )rac/%or/s refused the re+uest of MMDA, MMDAproceeded to dis&antle the for&erGs billboards and si&ilar for&s of advertise&ent.

n March ', >>, )rac/%or/s filed a#ainst MMDA in the Re#ional )rial Court7R)C8 in Pasi# Cit" an in$unction suit 7%ith pra"er for the issuance of a te&porar" restraininorder ;)R< and preli&inar" in$unction8, doc/eted as Civil Case No. 22-.

n March 2, >>, the R)C 7Branch '8 issued a )R, en$oinin# MMDA fro&dis&antlin# or destro"in# )rac/%or/sG billboards, si#na#es and other advertiin# &edia. nMarch , >>, the R)C issued a %rit of preli&inar" in$unction for the sa&e purpose.

!ithout filin# a motion for reconsideration to challen#e the R)CGs issuances, MMbrou#ht a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals 7CA8, doc/eted aC.A.(1.R. SP No. 3>:0, but the CA denied the petition and affir&ed the R)C on Au#ust 0'>>-. )he CA ulti&atel" denied MMDAGs motion for reconsideration throu#h its resolutionissued on March '-, >>.

6

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jan2009/gr_122846_2009.html#fnt81http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jan2009/gr_122846_2009.html#fnt81


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)hence, MMDA appealed to this Court 71.R. No. '23'-8, %hich denied MMDAGspetition for revie% on ctober , >>. ';'<

Ru3-n o +5( RTC

In the &ean%hile, on ctober '>, >>, the R)C 7Branch '8 rendered its decision

per&anentl" en$oinin# MMDA fro& dis&antlin#, re&ovin# or destro"in# the billboards,si#na#es and other advertiin# &edia installed b" )rac/%or/s on the interior and e?teriorstructures of the MR)0.;<

Ru3-n o +5( C!

MMDA appealed the R)CGs decision to the CA. n April 0>, >>3, the CA denied the MMDAGs appeal,0;0< holdin# that )rac/%or/sG

ri#ht to install billboards, si#na#es and other advertiin# &edia on the interior and e?teriorstructures of the MR)0 &ust be protected b" a %rit of per&anent in$unction@ and that MMDAhad no po%er to dis&antle, re&ove or destro" )rac/%or/sG billboards, si#na#es and otheradvertiin# &edia.-;-<

MMDA &oved for reconsideration, but the CA resolution denied the motion forreconsideration on Septe&ber 0, >>3.;<

5ence, this appeal b" petition for revie%.

I**u(*

MMDA clai&s that its &andate under its charter 2;2< of for&ulatin#, coordinatin# and&onitorin# of policies, standards, pro#ress and pro$ects for the use of thorou#hfares and thepro&otion of safe and convenient &ove&ent of persons and #oods pro&pted its issuance ofMMDA Re#ulation No. :2(>>:, %hich reads in part9

1

2

3

4

5

6

h. 8 It is unla%ful for an" persons, private or public corporations, advertisin#and pro&otions co&panies, &ovie producers, professionals and service contractorsto post, install, displa" an" /ind or for& of billboards, si#ns, posters, strea&ers,professional service advertise&ents and other visual clutters in an" part of the road,side%al/, center island, posts, trees par/s and open space.

MMDA avers that the conversion of the center island of Epifanio Delos SantosAvenue 7EDSA8 into the carria#e%a" of the MR)0 line did not e?e&pt the EDSA center islafro& the covera#e of the MMDA re#ulation@3;3< that the 1overn&entGs #rant of develop&eri#hts to MR)C %as not an abdication of its ri#ht to re#ulate, and, therefore, the develop&eof the MR)0 re&ained sub$ect to all e?istin# and applicable national and local la%s,ordinances, rules and re#ulations@;< that MMDA %as &erel" i&ple&entin# e?istin# andapplicable la%s@:;:< that )rac/%or/sG advertisin# &aterials %ere placed indiscri&inatel" and

%ithout due re#ard to safet", and as such &i#ht be classified as obstructions and distractionto the &otorists traversin# EDSA@ '>;'>< and that the interests of a fe% should not prevail ovthe #ood of the #reater nu&ber in the co&&unit" %hose safet" and #eneral %elfare MMDA

%as &andated to protect.'';''<

)rac/%or/s &aintains, on the other hand, that MMDAGs petition %as defective for failure to raise an" #enuine +uestion of la%@ and that the CAGs decision dated April 0>, >>3

%as valid and correct.';'< Ru3-n o +5( Cour+

)he petition has no &erit.

)hat )rac/%or/s derived its ri#ht to install its billboards, si#na#es and otheradvertiin# &edia in the MR)0 fro& MR)CGs authorit" under the B6) a#ree&ent to developco&&ercial pre&ises in the MR)0 structure or to obtain advertisin# inco&e therefro& is nolon#er debatable. 4nder the B6) a#ree&ent, indeed, MR)C o%ned the MR)0 for "earsupon the e?piration of %hich MR)C %ould transfer o%nership of the MR)0 to the 1overn&e

7

8

9

10

11

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Considerin# that MR)C re&ained to be the o%ner of the MR)0 durin# the ti&e&aterial to this case, and until this date, MR)CGs enterin# into the contract for advertisin#services %ith )rac/%or/s %as a valid e?ercise of o%nership b" the for&er. In fact, inMetropolitan Manila *evelopment Aut!ority v. (rac+#or+s 'ail (ransit Advertising, ending "romotions, Inc.,'0;'0< this Court e?pressl" reco#nied )rac/%or/sG ri#ht to install thebillboards, si#na#es and other advertisin# &edia pursuant to said contract. )he latterGs ri#htshould, therefore, be respected.

It is futile for MMDA to si&pl" invo/e its le#al &andate to $ustif" the dis&antlin# of)rac/%or/sG billboards, si#na#es and other advertisin# &edia. MMDA si&pl" had no po%er onits o%n to dis&antle, re&ove, or destro" the billboards, si#na#es and other advertisin# &ediainstalled on the MR)0 structure b" )rac/%or/s. In Metropolitan Manila *evelopment Aut!ority v. %el-Air illage Association, Inc.,'-;'-< Metropolitan Manila *evelopment Aut!ority v. iron(ransportation Co., Inc.,';'< and Metropolitan Manila *evelopment Aut!ority v. $arin,'2;'2<the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDAGs po%ers %ere li&ited to the for&ulation,coordination, re#ulation, i&ple&entation, preparation, &ana#e&ent, &onitorin#, settin# ofpolicies, installin# a s"ste&, and ad&inistration. Nothin# in Republic Act No. 3:- #rantedMMDA police po%er, let alone le#islative po%er.'3;'3<

Clarif"in# the real nature of MMDA, the Court held9

??? )he MMDA is, as ter&ed in the charter itself , a Ldevelop&ent authorit". It is ana#enc" created for the purpose of la"in# do%n policies and coordinatin# %ith thevarious national #overn&ent a#encies, peopleGs or#aniations, non(#overn&entalor#aniations and the private sector for the efficient and e?peditious deliver" ofbasic services in the vast &etropolitan area. All its functions are administrative innature and these are actuall" su&&ed up in the charter itself, vi)9

Sec.. Creation of t!e Metropolitan Manila *evelopment Aut!ority .( ???.)he MMDA shall perfor& plannin#, &onitorin# and coordinative functions, andin the process e?ercise re#ulator" and supervisor" authorit" over the deliver" of&etro(%ide services %ithin Metro Manila, %ithout di&inution of the autono&" oflocal #overn&ent units concernin# purel" local &atters.';'<

13

14

15

16

17

)he Court also a#rees %ith the CAGs rulin# that MMDA Re#ulation No. :2(>>: andMMC Me&orandu& Circular No. (>: did not appl" to )rac/%or/sG billboards, si#na#es another advertisin# &edia. )he prohibition a#ainst postin#, installation and displa" of billboardsi#na#es and other advertisin# &edia applied onl" to public areas, but MR)0, bein# privatepropert" pursuant to the B6) a#ree&ent bet%een the 1overn&ent and MR)C, %as not onethe areas as to %hich the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Me&orandu& Circular No. >: did not appl" to )rac/%or/sG billboards, si#na#es and other advertisin# &edia in MR)0,because it did not specificall" cover MR)0, and because it %as issued a "ear prior to theconstruction of MR)0 on the center island of EDSA. Clearl", MMC Me&orandu& Circular N(>: could not have included MR)0 in its prohibition.

MMDAGs insistence that it %as onl" i&ple&entin# Presidential Decree No. '>:27%uilding Code8 and its i&ple&entin# rules and re#ulations is not persuasive. )he po%er toenforce the provisions of the %uilding Code %as lod#ed in the Depart&ent of Public !or/sand 5i#h%a"s 7DP!58, not in MMDA, considerin# the la%Gs follo%in# provision, thus9

Sec. >'. Responsibilit" for Administration and Enforcement . J)he ad&inistration and enforce&ent of the provisions of this Code includin# thei&position of penalties for ad&inistrative violations thereof is hereb" vested in theSecretar" of Public !or/s, )ransportation and Co&&unications, hereinafter referredto as the LSecretar".

)here is also no evidence sho%in# that MMDA had been dele#ated b" DP!5 toi&ple&ent the %uilding Code.

WHERE'ORE, %e den" the petition for revie%, and affir& the decision dated Apr0>, >>3 and the resolution dated Septe&ber 0, >>3.

Costs a#ainst the petitioner.!CEE$O OPTIC! COMP!N&, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONOR!E COURT O'!PPE!S, Hon. M!MIN$I!R! M!NGOT!R!, -n 5-* a)a-+y a* Pr(*-"-n Ju"( o +5RTC, 12+5 Ju"--a3 R(-on, r. 1, I3-an C-+y S!M!H!NG OPTOMETRIST Sa PIIPIN!I3-an C-+y C5a)+(r, EO T. C!H!N!P, C-+y (a3 O-(r, an" Hon. C!MIO P. C!IIC-+y Mayor o I3-an, respondents.$ E C I S I O NPURISIM! , J .At bar is a petition for revie% under Rule - of the Rules of Court see/in# to nullif" thedis&issal b" the Court of Appeals of the ori#inal petition for certiorari , prohibition and&anda&us filed b" the herein petitioner a#ainst the Cit" Ma"or and Cit" 6e#al fficer of Ili#and the Sa&ahan# pto&etrist sa Pilipinas ( Ili#an Chapter /O"I, for 0revity1.)he antecedent facts leadin# to the filin# of the instant petition are as follo%s9

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Petitioner applied %ith the ffice of the Cit" Ma"or of Ili#an for a business per&it. Afterconsideration of petitionerGs application and the opposition interposed thereto b" localopto&etrists, respondent Cit" Ma"or issued Business Per&it No. 0- sub$ect to the follo%in#conditions9'. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but onl" a co&&ercialstore@. Acebedo cannot e?a&ine andor prescribe readin# and si&ilar optical #lasses for patients,because these are functions of optical clinics@0. Acebedo cannot sell readin# and si&ilar e"e#lasses %ithout a prescription havin# first been&ade b" an independent opto&etrist not its employee1 or independent optical clinic. Acebedocan onl" sell directl" to the public, %ithout need of a prescription, Ra"(Ban and si&ilare"e#lasses@-. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and e"e#lasses, but can advertise Ra"(Ban andsi&ilar #lasses and fra&es@. Acebedo is allo%ed to #rind lenses but onl" upon the prescription of an independentopto&etrist.':;'<n Dece&ber , ':, private respondent Sa&ahan n# pto&etrist Sa Pilipinas /O"I1,Ili#an Chapter, throu#h its Actin# President, Dr. =rances B. Apostol, lod#ed a co&plainta#ainst the petitioner before the ffice of the Cit" Ma"or, alle#in# that Acebedo had violatedthe conditions set forth in its business per&it and re+uestin# the cancellation andorrevocation of such per&it.Actin# on such co&plaint, then Cit" Ma"or Ca&ilo P. Cabili desi#nated Cit" 6e#al fficer 6eo). Cahanap to conduct an investi#ation on the &atter. n Ful" ', '::, respondent Cit"6e#al fficer sub&itted a report to the Cit" Ma"or findin# the herein petitioner #uilt" ofviolatin# all the conditions of its business per&it and reco&&endin# the dis+ualification ofpetitioner fro& operatin# its business in Ili#an Cit". )he report further advised that no ne%per&it shall be #ranted to petitioner for the "ear ':: and should onl" be #iven ti&e to %indup its affairs.n Ful" ':, '::, the Cit" Ma"or sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation ofBusiness Per&it effective as of said date and #ivin# petitioner three 21 &onths to %ind up itsaffairs.n ctober '3, '::, petitioner brou#ht a petition for certiorari , prohibition and &anda&us

%ith pra"er for restrainin# orderpreli&inar" in$unction a#ainst the respondents, Cit" Ma"or,Cit" 6e#al fficer and Sa&ahan n# pto&etrists sa Pilipinas(Ili#an Cit" Chapter /O"I1,doc/eted as Civil Case No. '-:3 before the Re#ional )rial Court of Ili#an Cit", Branch I.Petitioner alle#ed that 31 it %as denied due process because it %as not #iven an opportunit"to present its evidence durin# the investi#ation conducted b" the Cit" 6e#al fficer@ 41 it %asdenied e+ual protection of the la%s as the li&itations i&posed on its business per&it %ere noti&posed on si&ilar businesses in Ili#an Cit"@ 21 the Cit" Ma"or had no authorit" to i&pose thespecial conditions on its business per&it@ and 51 the Cit" 6e#al fficer had no authorit" toconduct the investi#ation as the &atter falls %ithin the e?clusive $urisdiction of the ProfessionalRe#ulation Co&&ission and the Board of pto&etr".

19

Respondent SPI interposed a Motion to Dis&iss the Petition on the #round of non(e?haustion of ad&inistrative re&edies but on Nove&ber -, '::, Presidin# Fud#eMa&indiara P. Man#otara deferred resolution of such Motion to Dis&iss until after trial of thcase on the &erits. 5o%ever, the pra"er for a %rit of preli&inar" in$unction %as #ranted.)hereafter, respondent SPI filed its ans%er.n Ma" 0>, '::>, the trial court dis&issed the petition for failure to e?haust ad&inistrativere&edies, and dissolved the %rit of preli&inar" in$unction it earlier issued. PetitionerGs &otiofor reconsideration &et the sa&e fate. It %as denied b" an rder dated Fune , '::>.n ctober 0, '::>, instead of ta/in# an appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari ,prohibition and &anda&us %ith the Court of Appeals see/in# to set aside the +uestionedrder of Dis&issal, brandin# the sa&e as tainted %ith #rave abuse of discretion on the partthe trial court.n Fanuar" -, '::', the Ninth Division>;


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local #overn&ent units, as a#encies of the State, in order to effectivel" acco&plish and carr"out the declared ob$ects of their creation.;-


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ulti&atel" resolved therein is e?actl" the sa&e issue posed for resolution b" this Court en0anc.In the said case, the Acebedo International Corporation filed %ith the ffice of the MunicipalMa"or an application for a business per&it for the operation of a branch of Acebedo ptical inCandon, Ilocos Sur. )he application %as opposed b" the Sa&ahan n# pto&etrists saPilipinas(Ilocos Sur Chapter, theoriin# that Acebedo is a $uridical entit" not +ualified topractice opto&etr". A co&&ittee %as created b" the ffice of the Ma"or to stud" privaterespondentGs application. 4pon reco&&endation of the said co&&ittee, AcebedoGs applicationfor a business per&it %as denied. Acebedo filed a petition %ith the Re#ional )rial Court but thesa&e %as dis&issed. n appeal, ho%ever, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courtGsdisposition, pro&ptin# the Sa&ahan n# pto&etrists to elevate the &atter to this Court.)he =irst Division of this Court, then co&posed of 5onorable Fustice )eodoro Padilla, FosueBellosillo, Fose itu# and Santia#o apunan, %ith 5onorable Fustice Re#ino 5er&osisi&a, Fr.as ponente, denied the petition and ruled in favor of respondent Acebedo InternationalCorporation, holdin# that *the fact that private respondent hires opto&etrists %ho practice theirprofession in the course of their e&plo"&ent in private respondentGs optical shops, does nottranslate into a practice of opto&etr" b" private respondent itself.*;'>>, it is si#nificant to note that there is no prohibition a#ainst the hirin# b" corporationsof opto&etrists. )he Court concluded thus98All told, t!ere is no la# t!at pro!i0its t!e !iring 0y corporations of optometrists or considerst!e !iring 0y corporations of optometrists as a practice 0y t!e corporation itself of t!e profession of optometry.8In the present case, the ob$ective of the i&position of sub$ect conditions on petitionerGsbusiness per&it could be attained b" re+uirin# the opto&etrists in petitionerGs e&plo" toproduce a valid certificate of re#istration as opto&etrist, fro& the Board of E?a&iners inpto&etr". A business per&it is issued pri&aril" to re#ulate the conduct of business and theCit" Ma"or cannot, throu#h the issuance of such per&it, re#ulate the practice of a profession,li/e that of opto&etr". Such a function is %ithin the e?clusive do&ain of the ad&inistrativea#enc" specificall" e&po%ered b" la% to supervise the profession, in this case theProfessional Re#ulations Co&&ission and the Board of E?a&iners in pto&etr".It is si#nificant to note that durin# the deliberations of the bica&eral conference co&&ittee ofthe Senate and the 5ouse of Representatives on R.A. >> 7Senate Bill No. ':: and 5ouseBill No. '-'>>8, the co&&ittee failed to reach a consensus as to the prohibition on indirectpractice of opto&etr" b" corporations. )he proponent of the bi ll, for&er Senator =reddie!ebb, ad&itted thus9S(na+or W( ??? ??? ???)he focus of contention re&ains to be the proposal of prohibitin# the indirect practice ofopto&etr" b" corporations. !e too/ a second loo/ and even a third loo/ at the issue in thebica&eral conference, but a co&pro&ise re&ained elusive.*:;''<=or&er Senator 6eticia Ra&os(Shahani li/e%ise voted her reservation in castin# her vote9

28

29

S(na+or S5a5an- Mr. President)he opto&etr" bills have evo/ed controversial vie%s fro& the &e&bers of the panel. !hilerealie the need to uplift the standards of opto&etr" as a profession, the consensus of both5ouses %as to avoid touchin# sensitive issues %hich properl" belon# to $udicial deter&inat)hus, the bica&eral conference co&&ittee decided to leave the issue of indirect practice ofopto&etr" and the use of trade na&es open to the %isdo& of the Courts %hich are vested %the prero#ative of interpretin# the la%s.*0>;'<=ro& the fore#oin#, it is thus evident that Con#ress has not adopted a unani&ous position the &atter of prohibition of indirect practice of opto&etr" b" corporations, specificall" on thehirin# and e&plo"&ent of licensed opto&etrists b" optical corporations. It is clear thatCon#ress left the resolution of such issue for $udicial deter&ination, and it is therefore propefor this Court to resolve the issue.Even in the 4nited States, $urisprudence varies and there is a conflict of opinions a&on# thfederal courts as to the ri#ht of a corporation or individual not hi&self licensed, to hire ande&plo" licensed opto&etrists.0';'0<Courts have distin#uished bet%een opto&etr" as a learned profession in the cate#or" of la%and &edicine, and opto&etr" as a &echanical art. And, insofar as the courts re#ard opto&eas &erel" a &echanical art, the" have tended to find nothin# ob$ectionable in the &a/in# asellin# of e"e#lasses, spectacles and lenses b" corporations so lon# as the patient is actuae?a&ined and prescribed for b" a +ualified practitioner. 0;'-<)he pri&ar" purpose of the statute re#ulatin# the practice of opto&etr" is to insure thatopto&etrical services are to be rendered b" co&petent and licensed persons in order toprotect the health and ph"sical %elfare of the people fro& the dan#ers en#endered b"unlicensed practice. Such purpose &a" be full" acco&plished althou#h the person renderinthe service is e&plo"ed b" a corporation.00;'<=urther&ore, it %as ruled that the e&plo"&ent of a +ualified opto&etrist b" a corporation isnot a#ainst public polic".0-;'2


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sellin#, tradin# and barterin# of e"e#lasses and spectacles as articles of &erchandise do notconstitute the practice of opto&etr". 03;':<In the case of *vorine vs. Castel0erg Je#elry Corporation,0;>


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SO OR$ERE$.HIIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., or an" -n (5a3 o 19 :(:(r*, r()r(*(n+(" y-+* Pr(*-"(n+, !:a"o P. Maa*a(+ an" -+* E;(u+-


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)he ffice of the Solicitor 1eneral filed its Co&&ent on behalf of respondent Co&elecalle#in# that Co&elec Resolution No. 33 does not i&pose upon the publishers an"obli#ation to provide free print space in the ne%spapers as it does not provide an" cri&inal orad&inistrative sanction for non(co&pliance %ith that Resolution. Accordin# to the Solicitor1eneral, the +uestioned Resolution &erel" established #uidelines to be follo%ed in connection

%ith the procure&ent of *Co&elec space,* the procedure for and &ode of allocation of suchspace to candidates and the conditions or re+uire&ents for the candidates utiliation of the*Co&elec space* procured. At the sa&e ti&e, ho%ever, the Solicitor 1eneral ar#ues that evenif the +uestioned Resolution and its i&ple&entin# letter directives are vie%ed as mandatory ,the sa&e %ould nevertheless be valid as an e?ercise of the police po%er of the State. )heSolicitor 1eneral also &aintains that Section of Resolution No. 33 is a per&issiblee?ercise of the po%er of supervision or re#ulation of the Co&elec over the co&&unication andinfor&ation operations of print &edia enterprises durin# the election period to safe#uard andensure a fair, i&partial and credible election. 2 At the oral hearin# of this case held on April '::, respondent Co&elec throu#h itsChair&an, 5on. Bernardo Pardo, in response to in+uiries fro& the Chief Fustice and otherMe&bers of the Court, stated that Resolution No. 33, particularl" Section thereof and the March ':: letters dispatched to various &e&bers of petitioner PPI, %ere not intended toco&pel those &e&bers to suppl" Co&elec %ith free print space. Chair&an Pardo representedto the Court that Resolution and the related letter(directives %ere &erel" desi#ned to solicitfro& the publishers the sa&e free print space %hich &an" publishers had voluntaril" #iven toCo&elec durin# the election period relatin# to the '' Ma" ':: elections. Indeed, theChair&an stated that the Co&elec %ould, that ver" afternoon, &eet and adopt an appropriatea&endin# or clarif"in# resolution, a certified true cop" of %hich %ould forth%ith be filed %iththe Court.n Ma" '::, the Court received fro& the ffice of the Solicitor 1eneral a &anifestation

%hich attached a cop" of Co&elec Resolution No. 33(A dated - Ma" '::. )he operativeportion of this Resolution follo%s9N! )5ERE=RE, pursuant to the po%ers vested in it b" the Constitution, the &nibusElection Code, Republic Acts No. 22-2 and 3'22 and other election la%s, the Co&&ission onElections RES6ED to clarif" Sections and of Res. No. 33 as follo%s9'. Section of Res. No. 33 shall not be construed to &ean as re+uirin# publishers of thedifferent &ass &edia print publications to provide print space under pain of prosecution,

%hether ad&inistrative, civil or cri&inal, there bein# no sanction or penalt" for violation of saidSection provided for either in said Resolution or in Section :> of Batas Pa&bansa Bl#. ',other%ise /no%n as the &nibus Election Code, on the #rant of *Co&elec space.*. Section of Res. No. 33 shall not be construed to &ean as constitutin# prior restraint onthe part of publishers %ith respect to the printin# or publication of &aterials in the ne%s,opinion, features or other sections of their respective publications or other accounts orco&&ents, it bein# clear fro& the last sentence of said Section that the Co&&ission shall,*unless t!e facts and circumstances clearly indicate ot!er#ise . . . respect t!e determination0y t!e pu0lis!er and?or editors of t!e ne#spapers or pu0lications t!at t!e accounts or vie#s pu0lis!ed are significant, ne#s#ort!y and of pu0lic interest .*)his Resolution shall ta/e effect upon approval. 7E&phasis in the ori#inal8

!hile, at this point, the Court could perhaps si&pl" dis&iss the Petition for Certiorari andProhibition as havin# beco&e &oot and acade&ic, %e consider it not inappropriate to passupon the first constitutional issue raised in this case. ur hope is to put this issue to rest anprevent its resurrection.Section of Resolution No. 33 is not a &odel of clarit" in e?pression. Section ' ofResolution No. 33(A did not tr" to redraft Section @ accordin#l", Section of Resolution 33 persists in its ori#inal for&. )hus, %e &ust point out that, as presentl" %orded, and inparticular as interpreted and applied b" the Co&elec itself in its March ':: letter(directives to ne%spaper publishers, Section of Resolution No. 33 is clearl" susceptible the readin# that petitioner PPI has #iven it. )hat Resolution No. 33 does not, in e?presster&s, threaten publishers %ho %ould disre#ard it or its i&ple&entin# letters %ith so&ecri&inal or other sanction, does not b" itself de&onstrate that the Co&elecs ori#inal intenti

%as si&pl" to solicit or re+uest voluntar" donations of print space fro& publishers. A %rittenco&&unication officiall" directing a print &edia co&pan" to supply free print space,dispatched b" a #overn&ent 7here a constitutional8 a#enc" and si#ned b" a &e&ber of theCo&&ission presu&abl" le#all" authoried to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effectupon the co&pan" so addressed. )hat the a#enc" &a" not be le#all" authoried to i&pose,cause the i&position of, cri&inal or other sanctions for disre#ard of such directions, onl"a##ravates the constitutional difficulties inhearin# in the present situation. )he enact&ent oaddition of such sanctions b" the le#islative authorit" itself %ould be open to seriousconstitutional ob$ection.)o compel print &edia co&panies to donate *Co&elec(space* of the di&ensions specified Section of Resolution No. 33 7not less than one(half pa#e8, a&ounts to *ta/in#* of privapersonal propert" for public use or purposes. Section failed to specif" the intended fre@uency of such co&pulsor" *donation9* onl" once durin# the period fro& 2 March ':: 7o' March '::8 until ' Ma" ':: or ever"da" or once a %ee/ or as often as Co&elec &direct durin# the sa&e period )he e?tent of the ta/in# or deprivation is not insubstantial@ this not a case of a de minimis te&porar" li&itation or restraint upon the use of private proper)he &onetar" value of the co&pulsor" *donation,* &easured b" the advertisin# ratesordinaril" char#ed b" ne%spaper publishers %hether in cities or in non(urban areas, &a" bever" substantial indeed.)he ta/in# of print space here sou#ht to be effected &a" first be appraised under the rubric e?propriation of private personal propert" for public use. )he threshold re+uisites for a la%fta/in# of private propert" for public use need to be e?a&ined here9 one is the necessity forta+ing@ another is the legal aut!ority to effect t!e ta+ing. )he ele&ent of necessit" for theta/in# has not been sho%n b" respondent Co&elec. It has not been su##ested that the&e&bers of PPI are un%illin# to sell print space at their nor&al rates to Co&elec for electiopurposes. Indeed, the un%illin#ness or reluctance of Co&elec to 0uy print space lies at theheart of the proble&. Si&ilarl", it has not been su##ested, let alone de&onstrated, thatCo&elec has been #ranted the po%er of e&inent do&ain either b" the Constitution or b" thele#islative authorit". A reasonable relationship bet%een that po%er and the enforce&ent anad&inistration of election la%s b" Co&elec &ust be sho%n@ it is not casuall" to be assu&ed)hat the ta/in# is desi#ned to subserve *public use* is not contested b" petitioner PPI. !enote onl" that, under Section 0 of Resolution No. 33, the free *Co&elec space* sou#ht b"the respondent Co&&ission %ould be used not onl" for infor&in# the public about the

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identities, +ualifications and pro#ra&s of #overn&ent of candidates for elective office but alsofor *disse&ination of vital election infor&ation* 7includin#, presu&abl", circulars, re#ulations,notices, directives, etc. issued b" Co&elec8. It see&s to the Court a &atter of $udicial noticethat #overn&ent offices and a#encies 7includin# the Supre&e Court8 si&pl" purchase printspace, in the ordinar" course of events, %hen their rules and re#ulations, circulars, noticesand so forth need officiall" to be brou#ht to the attention of the #eneral public.)he ta/in# of private propert" for public use is, of course, authoried b" the Constitution, butnot %ithout pa"&ent of *$ust co&pensation* 7Article III, Section :8. And apparentl" thenecessit" of pa"in# co&pensation for *Co&elec space* is precisel" %hat is sou#ht to beavoided b" respondent Co&&ission, %hether Section of Resolution No. 33 is read aspetitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authorit" to re+uire ne%spaper publishers to*donate* free print space for Co&elec purposes, or as an e?hortation, or perhaps an appeal,to publishers to donate free print space, as Section ' of Resolution No. 33(A atte&pts tosu##est. )here is nothin# at all to prevent ne%spaper and &a#aine publishers fro&voluntaril" #ivin# free print space to Co&elec for the purposes conte&plated in Resolution No.33. Section of Resolution No. 33 does not, ho%ever, provide a constitutional basis forco&pellin# publishers, a#ainst their %ill, in the /ind of factual conte?t here present, to providefree print space for Co&elec purposes. Section does not constitute a valid e?ercise of thepo%er of e&inent do&ain.!e %ould note that the rulin# here laid do%n b" the Court is entirel" in line %ith the theor" ofde&ocratic representative #overn&ent. )he econo&ic costs of infor&in# the #eneral publicabout the +ualifications and pro#ra&s of those see/in# elective office are &ost appropriatel"distributed as %idel" as possible throu#hout our societ" b" the utiliation of public funds,especiall" funds raised b" ta?ation, rather than cast solel" on one s&all sector of societ", i.e.,print &edia enterprises. )he benefits %hich flo% fro& a hei#htened level of infor&ation on andthe a%areness of the electoral process a re co&&onl" thou#ht to be co&&unit"(%ide@ theburdens should be allocated on the sa&e basis.As earlier noted, the Solicitor 1eneral also contended that Section of Resolution No. 33,even if read as co&pellin# publishers to *donate* *Co&elec space, * &a" be sustained as avalid e?ercise of the police po%er of the state. )his ar#u&ent %as, ho%ever, &ade toocasuall" to re+uire prolon#ed consideration on our part. =irstl", there %as no effort 7andapparentl" no inclination on the part of Co&elec8 to sho% that the police po%er Q essentiall"a po%er of le#islation Q has been constitutionall" dele#ated to respondent Co&&ission. 4 Secondl", %hile private propert" &a" indeed be validl" ta/en in the le#iti&ate e?ercise of thepolice po%er of the state, there %as no atte&pt to sho% co&pliance in the instant case %iththe re+uisites of a la%ful ta/in# under the police po%er. =

Section of Resolution No. 33 is a blunt and heav" instru&ent that purports, %ithout asho%in# of e?istence of a national e&er#enc" or other i&perious public necessit",indiscri&inatel" and %ithout re#ard to the individual business condition of particularne%spapers or &a#aines located in differin# parts of the countr", to ta/e private propert" ofne%spaper or &a#aine publishers. No atte&pt %as &ade to de&onstrate that a real andpalpable or ur#ent necessit" for the ta/in# of print space confronted the Co&elec and thatSection of Resolution No. 33 %as itself the onl" reasonable and calibrated response tosuch necessit" available to the Co&elec. Section does not constitute a valid e?ercise of thepolice po%er of the State.

!e turn to Section of Resolution No. 33, %hich needs to be +uoted in full a#ain9Sec. . >ndue 'eference to Candidates?"olitical "arties in e#spapers. B No ne%spaperpublication shall allo% to be printed or published in the ne%s, opinion, features, or othersections of the ne%spaper or publication accounts or co&&ents %hich &anifestl" favor oroppose an" candidate or political part" b" undul" or repeatedl" referrin# to or includin# thersaid candidate or political part". 5o%ever, unless the facts and circu&stances clearl" indicaother%ise, the Co&&ission %ill respect the deter&ination b" the publisher andor editors ofthe ne%spapers or publications that the accounts or vie%s published are si#nificant,ne%s%orth" and of public interest.It is not eas" to understand %h" Section %as included at all in Resolution No. 33. In ancase, Section should be vie%ed in the conte?t of our decision in ational "ress Clu0 v.Commission on Elections. 6 )here the Court sustained the constitutionalit" of Section '' 7b8R.A. No. 22-2, /no%n as the Electoral Refor&s 6a% of ':3, %hich prohibits the sale ordonation of print space and airti&e for ca&pai#n or other political purposes, e?cept to theCo&elec. In doin# so, the Court carefull" distin#uished 7a8 paid political advertisements %hare reached b" the prohibition of Section '' 7b8, fro& 7b8 the reportin# of ne#s, commentarand e6pressions of 0elief or opinion b" reporters, broadcasters, editors, co&&entators orcolu&nists %hich fall outside the scope of Section '' 7b8 and %hich are protected b" theconstitutional #uarantees of freedo& of speech and of the press9Secondl", and &ore i&portantl", Section '' 7b8 is li&ited in its scope of application. Anal"sis/ection 33 01 sho%s that it purports to apply only to t!e purc!ase and sale, includin#purchase and sale dis#uised as a donation, of print space and air ti&e for campaign or ot!e political purposes. /ection 33 01 does not purport in an" %a" to restrict the reporting 0yne#spapers or radio or television stations of ne#s or ne#s-#ort!y events relating tocandidates, their +ualifications, political parties and pro#ra&s of #overn&ent. Moreover,/ection 33 01 does not reac! commentaries and e6pressions of 0elief or opinion 0y reporteor 0roadcaster or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, t!eir@ualifications, and programs and so fort!, so lon# at least as such co&&ents, opinions andbeliefs are not in fact advertise&ents for particular candidates covertl" paid for. In su&,Section '' 7b8 is not to be read as reachin# an" report or co&&entar" or other covera#e thain responsible &edia, is not paid for b" candidates for political office. e read /ection 33 0as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.)he above li&itation in scope of application of Section '' 7b8 Q that it does not restrict eithethe reportin# of or the e?pression of belief or opinion or co&&ent upon the +ualifications anpro#ra&s and activities of an" and all candidates for office Q constitutes the critical distinct

%hich &ust be &ade bet%een the instant case and that of /anidad v. Commission onElections. . . . > 7Citations o&itted@ e&phasis supplied8Section of Resolution No. 33 appears to represent the effort of the Co&elec to establis#uideline for i&ple&entation of the above(+uoted distinction and doctrine in ational "ressClu0 an effort not blessed %ith evident success. Section of Resolution No. 33(A %hilepossibl" helpful, does not add substantiall" to the utilit" of Section of Resolution No. 33)he distinction bet%een paid political advertise&ents on the one hand and ne%s reports,co&&entaries and e?pressions of belief or opinion b" reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. the other hand, can realisticall" be #iven operative &eanin# onl" in actual cases orcontroversies, on a case(to(case basis, in ter&s of ver" specific sets of facts.

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At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to alle#e an" specific affir&ativeaction on the part of Co&elec desi#ned to enforce or i&ple&ent Section . PPI has notclai&ed that it or an" of its &e&bers has sustained actual or i&&inent in$ur" b" reason ofCo&elec action under Section . Put a little differentl", the Court considers that the preciseconstitutional issue here sou#ht to be raised Q %hether or not Section of Resolution No.33 constitutes a per&issible e?ercise of the Co&elecs po%er under Article I, Section - ofthe Constitution tosupervise or re#ulate the en$o"&ent or utiliation of all franchise or per&its for the operation ofQ &edia of co&&unication or infor&ation Q ;for the purpose of ensurin#< e+ual opportunit",ti&e and space, and the ri#ht of repl", includin# reasonable, e+ual rates therefore, for publicinfor&ation ca&pai#ns and foru&s a&on# candidates in connection %ith the ob$ective ofholdin# free, orderl" honest, peaceful and credible elections Qis not ripe for $udicial revie% for lac/ of an actual case or controvers" involvin#, as the ver" lismota thereof, the constitutionalit" of Section .Su&&ariin# our conclusions9'. Section of Resolution No. 33, in its present for& and as interpreted b" Co&elec in its March ':: letter directives, purports to re+uire print &edia enterprises to *donate* freeprint space to Co&elec. As such, Section suffers fro& a fatal constitutional vice and &ust beset aside and nullified.. )o the e?tent it pertains to Section of Resolution No. 33, the Petition for Certiorari andProhibition &ust be dis&issed for lac/ of an actual, $usticiable case or controvers".!5ERE=RE, for all the fore#oin#, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is 1RAN)ED inpart and Section of Resolution No. 33 in its present for& and the related letter(directivesdated March ':: are hereb" SE) ASIDE as null and void, and the )e&porar" Restrainin#rder is hereb" MADE PERMANEN). )he Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the e?tent itrelates to Section of Resolution No. 33. No pronounce&ent as to costs.

'OR'OM $E%EOPMENT CORPOR!TION, petitioner,vs.PHIIPPINE N!TION! R!IW!&S, respondent.$ E C I S I O NCHICO7N!?!RIO, J.Before us is a Petition for Revie% on Certiorari under Rule - of the Rules of Court %hichsee/s to set aside the Decision' of the Court of Appeals dated - April '::2.Petitioner =orfo& Deve

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