Constitutional Law (Art 2 Cases)

7/31/2019 Constitutional Law (Art 2 Cases)

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This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus on the grounds of "The Filipino First Policy

enshrined in the 1987 Constitution i.e., "in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions coveringthe nationaleconomy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos."

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued andoutstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," isto provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, andfinancial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.In a close bidding, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm edged Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino firm by amargin of P2.42 per share for 15,300,000 shares. Prior to the declaration of the winning bidder, the

petitioner matched the offer of Renong Berhad and sent a manager's check as bid security whichthe respondent GSIS refused to accept. Petitioners herein invoked Sec 10, par 2, Article XII of the1987Constitution and argued that the respondent hotel is part of the national patrimony as part of thetourism industry and is thus part of the national economy.Respondents on the other hand argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitutionis merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requiresimplementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws"to lay down conditions under which business may be done."Among other things, that even if such is the case, Manila Hotel does not fall under the termnational patrimony. That, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, theconstitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of theoutstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the buildingstands. That, submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad couldstill very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of theprivilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place. And finally, the prayer for prohibitiongrounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise itsdiscretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not sopatent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a dutyenjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legalright to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the actrequired of them by petitioner.

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executingprovision requiring implementing legislations.2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony.3. Whether or not the matching bid is premature4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusingthe matching bid of the petitioner.

In their resolution of the case, the Supreme Court held that, "Since the Constitution is thefundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute andcontract." A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the1987 Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself andbecomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies

sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred andthe liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an


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examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject isreferred to the legislature for action.Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutionalmandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If theconstitutionalprovisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would havethe power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

The SC further acknowledged that such provision is mandatory. And thus the petition is granted.

Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army andCommanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before thePhilippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during suchperiod of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocitiesand other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of theJapanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war.

Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law thatcreated it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis theHague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committedcannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention.Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the twoUS prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War CrimesOffice and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is alignedwith Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as aninstrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law aspart of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of international law include thoseformed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudenceestablished by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, whohave been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission ofcrimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In thedoctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abide by these principles and therefore have a right to trypersons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed against its citizens. Itabides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of suchprinciples in the constitution.The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if notmore greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue ofExecutive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules asto parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions ofthis special law.

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with theCourt of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued byGeneral Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of

the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to takecognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of thePhilippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).


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1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupationwere valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared thatall laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the saidCommonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemyoccupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could

continue hearing the cases pending before them.Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de factogovernment are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of thePhilippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported bythe military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed bythe conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state ofinsurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or theregular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have beennecessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any

other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicialproceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de factogovernments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then itcould not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violationof international law.A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate thelaw of nations if any other possible construction remains.Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction or greatmischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that suchconstruction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocalwords.Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets andviolate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean thatjudicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use bythe occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of thePhilippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courtsof Japan.It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues untilchanged by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OFSOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws

and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating andconferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courtsmay continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration ofthe Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdictionupon them are repealed by the said government.

Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no.3012.

1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue evenduring occupation unless repealed.

2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicialproceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.


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***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession andcontrol through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightfulgovernment) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade andoccupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a countrywho rise in insurrection against the parent state).

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporationsand partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this actionto obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretaryof Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, fromenforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending among othersthat: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their libertyand property without due process of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of theRepublic of the Philippines; and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail

business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for acorporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizesthe retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, notcitizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital ofwhich are no t wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly inthe retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged insaid business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein unless their licensesare forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of naturalpersons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case ofjuridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the UnitedStates; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation ofthe laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other lawsrelating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or openingby aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business,(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registrationwith the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among othermatters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal officesof juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retailbusiness who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It has beensaid that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its

sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need tobe expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-protection and survival,and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential,insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where thedemands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; thefield and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interestand public welfare have become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight.Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare inthis constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent orscope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve publicinterest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power

of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these arethe due process clause and the equal protection clause.


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The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, aswell as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibitlegislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which itis to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires thatall persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privilegesconferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation whichapplies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within

such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall withinsuch class and those who do not.The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance ofthe police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Actreasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matterinvolved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceivedbe achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest?These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equalprotection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees

are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable meansfor the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be noabsolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absoluteliberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, libertyand property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classesand groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, asalways, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest andwelfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction andclassification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. The disputedlaw was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by aliendominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominanceand control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thruwhich and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the lawdoes not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist forthe distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the dueprocess of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege ofaliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdomand efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matterof fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matterfalls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicialdepartment of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearlyembraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or thesegment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with

treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the policepower may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. TheTreaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality oftreatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country."But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries,except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are allprohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon thesaid treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and thesame may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.


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Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to bepurchased from private sources. Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of Iloilo palay andcorn planters association filed and averring that in making or attempting to make importation offoreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207, explicitlyprohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration or any governmentagency.

Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

The power of judicial review is vested with the Supreme Court in consonance to Section 2Art. VIII of the constitution. The alleged consummation of the contracts with Vietnam and Burmadoes not render this case academic. RA 2207 enjoins our government not from entering contractsfor the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under conditions prescribed in said act.A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our government todefault in the performance of such obligations as it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice inquestion because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing thesaid commodity into the Philippines., the proposed importation may still be legalized by complyingwith the provisions of the aforementioned law.

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines withoutsubmitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, thathe is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished inSpain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the"Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied andfinished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed topractice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on AcademicDegrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the lawprofession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar.The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees

and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Saidtreaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and thecitizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizendesiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his owncountry and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in thePhilippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expresslysubject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired toexercise the legal profession.The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended tomodify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, forthe reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative ofthe Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, thepower to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of thePhilippines.

Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraskastatute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed theeighth grade.

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislationthat restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable stateobjective.


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Robert T. Meyer, an instructor (teacher) at Zion Parochial School taught Raymond Parpart,a ten year old boy, how to read in the language of German. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching achild German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages tostudents that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld theconviction.

Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteedby the Fourteenth Amendment?

The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of theplaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. Thestate argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the nativetongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends tothose who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must beprotected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded asharmful.Discussion: Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference isarbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate.

The court reversed the state supreme court's judgment, holding that the Nebraska

statute was arbitrary and infringed on the liberty guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment tothe United States Constitution.

B . Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminaryrestraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents andguardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the order.

The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents orguardians right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may not usurp thisright when the questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.

Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintainacademies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting anelementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restrainingorders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act. The Act requiredall parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. Theappellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct theupbringing and education of children under their control?

The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interestsand has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of theappellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians havethe right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14thAmendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode inwhich their children are educated.

In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and

Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known asthe National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and havingreached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military


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service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had beenrequired to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by thecorresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for militaryservice in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had notregistered up to the date of filing of the information.The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered inthe military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight

years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings,and does not wish to kill or be killed.Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Bataan to one month andone day of imprisonment, with the costs.In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced,is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional.The Constitutionality of said law was upheld.

The appellants do not deny the facts, but they alleged in defense that they have not registered inthe military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother tosupport and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does

not wish to kill or be killed.Under Sec. 2 of Article II of the Philippine Constitution, The defense of the State is a prime duty ofgovernment, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to renderpersonal military or civil service. The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsorymilitary service, does not go against the constitution, but in the contrary, in faithful compliancetherewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through anarmy, and to leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make thisduty of the Government excusable should there would be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlisttherein.It was also held by the court that the right of the Government to require compulsory military serviceis a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life,liberty, and property of the citizen.Citing the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, the court said that, without violating theConstitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniaryinterests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take place in the ranks of thearmy of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In US vs. Olson, it wasalso said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of the law since in its justsense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. These justify thatcompulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation tomake it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependentfamilies to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before theAcceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complyingwith their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these

family responsibilities.

In 1936, Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 ofCommonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do sobecause he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or bekilled. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.

Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through

an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this dutyof the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not


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go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty allcitizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Postsfrom issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International EucharisticCongress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating thatno public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc.This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose ofavoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to furthertheir ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052,providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postagestamps as would be advantageous to the government.

1. Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.2. Is the sale of the stamps in support of a particular sect hence unconstitutional?

What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religioustoleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of itsinfluence inhuman affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds andelevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purestprinciples of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance ofthe stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination.They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead ofshowing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines andthe location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focusof the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of thatcongress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merelytook advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance andsale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propagandaincidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on thestamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seatofsuch event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to areligious event. It merely said that the director of posts may use such fund in a manner as often asmay be deemed advantageous to the government. It is duly noted however that the elevatinginfluence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where weimplored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. Religious freedom as aconstitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommendto the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications thatanimal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from PlazaCalderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street toEchague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening ofthe Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940,

recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in theresolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Directorof Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to


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promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first endorsement to the Secretary of PublicWorks and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation madeby the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of RizalAvenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from therailroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of PublicWorks and Communications, in his second endorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works,

approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to trafficof animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and theActing Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulationsthus adopted.Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought beforethe Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of theNational Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as ActingSecretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila;and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe uponthe constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being andeconomic security of all the people?2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power?

1) The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards anygiven group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," butthe humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so thatjustice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justicemeans the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measurescalculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through themaintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members ofthe community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on thetime-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be foundedon the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a societyand of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined forcein our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of thestate of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatestgood to the greatest number."2) There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not conferlegislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and underwhich they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what

public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the NationalAssembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads andstreets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of thePresident of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic wheneverthe condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the publicconvenience and interest.The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, butmerely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law isto be predicated.To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and howlong a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic

thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative functionwhich cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of


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determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that theexercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

Equal ProtectionThese are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform

Act. Article XIII on SocialJustice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State ofan agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform programfounded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly orcollectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of thefruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress onAugust 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which waspromulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition ofprivate lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits forlandowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of thebeneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decreeas well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a

comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for itsimplementation. After which is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentionedenactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with itsprovisions.In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives thepetitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is alsoviolated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners onlyof agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of thelands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse,the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived oftheir lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, thesugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differentlytreated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agriculturallands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, thepetition for prohibition would be premature.

Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have

been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academicunder Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There isalso the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an

objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class withparticular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that therequisites of a valid classification have been violated.Classification has been defined as the grouping ofpersons or things similar to each other in certainparticulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform tothe following requirements:(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as

arbitrary and discriminatory.Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alikeboth as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they


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Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment wasdiscriminatoryWhether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidenceWhether or not Grace was illegally dismissedHELD:Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage ofa female employee.

Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker whocontracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded allwomen workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitionersassertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, therecord discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of thecompanys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merelybecause of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could notbe properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainlybecause she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was

practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status forfear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination ofemployment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by theemployee and not on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfugefor causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should besanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted temporarysuspension of Grace from work.

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal.When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete theprobationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding downclearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning securityof tenure.

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed withoutjust cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges andto full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that it strikes at the veryessence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of thefamily as the foundation of the nation.

RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This agency wassupposed to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and thesurrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act, within the context of the national and regionalplans and policies for social and economic development.PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of

Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combinedwith current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation,fisheries, and the like.


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To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumeratedthe towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinentto the issues in this case are the following provisions of EO927 which include in particular thesharing of fees:

Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the useof all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region

including navigation, construction, and operation of fish pens, fish enclosures, fishcorrals and the like.SEC 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use ofthe lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited tofisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, andwaste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharingwith other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject tothe approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority'sBoard, except fish pen fee, which will be shared in the followingmanner: 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shallgo to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the

remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementationwithin the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan thesharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fish pen fee goes to the lakeshorelocal governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall formpart of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as anexception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. Then came Republic Act No.7160. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law tomean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusivejurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160provides:Sec.149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusiveauthority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees orcharges therefore in accordance with the provisions of this Section.Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fish pen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fish pensand fish cages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fish pens and fish cagesoccupied almost one-third the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupationdrastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost 21,000 ha in 1995. The Mayor's permit toconstruct fish pens and fish cages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted bythe Authority on fish pen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. In view of theforegoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:

1. All fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which

were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed withLaguna Lake Development Authority as of March31, 1993 are hereby declared out rightly as illegal.2. All fish pens; fish cages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subjectto demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for illegal Fish pen andIllegal Fishing.3. Owners of fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall,without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 forviolation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of notexceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of thecourt .All operators of fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in

accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 toshow cause before the LLDA why their said fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structuresshould not be demolished/dismantled. One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the


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concerned owners of the illegally constructed fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culturestructures advising them todismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shallbe effected.The fish pen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss thecases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied.Meanwhile, TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from

demolishing the fish pens and similar structures in question. Hence, the present petition forcertiorari, prohibition and injunction. The CA dismissed the LLDAs consolidated petitions. It ruledthat (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to theCourt of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Lagunade Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of theaforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective local government unitsconcerned.

Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising theregion - should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuanceof permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

LLDA. Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927,specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or allsurface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation,construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the otherhand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority togrant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges toerect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone ofthe municipal waters.The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting thelatter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categoricallyexpressly repeal the charter of the Authority.It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic ActNo. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to beconceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. It isbasic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a generallaw cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdictionthat "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by asubsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal oralter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include thecases embraced in the special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a specialstatute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly thatthe general statute. The special law is to betaken as an exception to the general law in the absence

of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, given to all enactmentsof the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent generallaw by mere implication.Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmentalprotection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that thelegislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single bodyof water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the 8 major rivertributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 n2 basin or watershedthe boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem

that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims ofattaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource-a very limited one-whichrequires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its


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ecological integrity and balance. Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of anational policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainabledevelopment of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by theinhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act4850 have foreseen this need whenthey passed this LLDA law-the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna deBay lake resources. Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts ofmanagement policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over

specific portions of the lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lakewater resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainablydevelop Laguna de Bay."The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This isevident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering localgovernments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs.On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages and otheraqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in theLaguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the natureof police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State

powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly the charter of the Authority which embodiesa valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on mattersaffecting Laguna de Bay.There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culturestructures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the propersharing of fees collected.In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is ourholding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850and Section 4 ofExecutive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna LakeDevelopment Authority vs. CA, there is no question that the Authority has express powers as aregulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease adesist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and otheraqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal tothe Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court ofAppeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting thepowers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as theLocal Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA,Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issuepermits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalitiessituated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

Political Law Harmony in NatureA taxpayers class suit was initiated by

the PhilippineEcological NetworkIncorporated (PENI) together with the minors Oposa and theirparents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the fullbenefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the countrys rainforests. They prayed that ajudgment be rendered ordering Honorable Factoran Jr, his agents, representatives and otherpersons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country andcease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenseagreements.

Whether or not petitioners have a cause ofaction?Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all

Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrainfrom impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrysforests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of


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that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the samegivesrise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.

the instant case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner to

contest the constitutionality of joining the WTO which was concurred upon by majority of theSenate. Petitioner contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, specificallyArticle 11 Sec. 19 and Article 12, Sec. 10.

Whether or not such affiliation is prohibited by our constitution.Article 2 of the constitution, the principles stated herein are not self-executing. They are

used by the judiciary as aids or as guidelines in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and bythe legislature in its enactments of laws. They are not sources for causes of action.Furthermore, the treaty is in harmony with the generally accepted principles of international law aspart of the law of the land and the adherence of the amity with all nations. The deliberation andvoting of the senate, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO agreement,thereby making it a part of the law of the land.

The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Land Titles and Deeds IPRALaw vis a vis Regalian Doctrine

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous

Peoples RightsAct on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the

States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources

therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over

ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an

all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include

private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private

landowners.

Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote.

They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote,

Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may

include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Prefatory Statement:

Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known

presidentiables include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a
http://abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/01/09/comelec-receives-record-number-presidential-aspirantshttp://abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/01/09/comelec-receives-record-number-presidential-aspirants


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six-star general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated

elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are

supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included?

No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio

deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a

candidate should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.

Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities

for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidatesviolate this constitutional provision?

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. RespondentCOMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage anationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by aregistered political party with a national constituency.Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELECviolated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II ofthe 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can affordto wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELECsupposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential

candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of thepresident, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous nationalorganizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaignsince he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege

subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege tothe level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision whichsuggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally

considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatmentto the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provisiondoes not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline forlegislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause ofaction before the courts.Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that wouldaccommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as writtenleaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult tointerpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reachare not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under thisrubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"

"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to theirinherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people anoperative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Somevalid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of theOmnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybodyequally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is notsacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any onewho is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that anyperson is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification ofcandidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The Statehas a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical


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confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for theelection. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. Toadd into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaignwould actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which arepalpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevantminutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of thesenuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. Thebasis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for thereception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception offurther evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is anuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thusmore qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under theConstitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-borncitizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years ofage on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately

preceding such election.At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by theGovernment of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia.This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition

with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.The agreement mentions "Bangsamoro JuridicalEntity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority andjurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority andjurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of twolocal statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the IndigenousPeoples Rights Act (IPRA).

Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on publicconsultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD andWhether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional.

GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the rightto information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional becauseit is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national andlocal levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation ofpeoples participation in the peace process.

Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to officialrecords and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as wellas to government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen,subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implementsa policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No projector program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus beobtained.


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Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by atleast two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippinesare the province,cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall beautonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao andthe Cordillera as hereinafter provided.

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillerasconsisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common anddistinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevantcharacteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well asterritorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomousregions to ensure thatlaws are faithfully executed.Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of thevotes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that onlyprovinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included inthe autonomous region.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution andnational laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:1. Administrative organization;2. Creation of sources of revenues;3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;4. Personal, family, and property relations;5. Regional urban and rural planning development;6. Economic, social, and tourism development;7. Educational policies;8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of thepeople of the region.The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or2. A constitutional convention.Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be validwhen ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixtydays nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitutionand laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting thenecessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing

constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendmentswill eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents theneed to amend therein.

Constitutional Law (Art 2 Cases)

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