Case Study-Mexican Tomatoes

5
Case 4.2. Mexican Tomatoes In 1969, the US Department Of Agriculture put a set of minimum size restrictions on all tomatoes sold in the US market. The regulations provided that mature green tomatoes (those that ripen after they are picked) could not be sold unless they measured more than 2-9/32" in diameter. Vine ripened tomatoes were required to measure at least 2-17/32" in diameter. Mexican tomato farmers were outraged because the regulations barred almost 50 percent of their crop from the US market. Florida growers contended that the regulations were not discriminatory because they applied to both the Mexican and the US crops. But the Mexicans pointed out that the regulations were more lenient on green than ripened tomatoes. Green tomatoes accounted for approximately 85 percent of the Florida tomato crop and only 10 percent of the Mexican crop. While US consumers saw prices rise as much as 30 percent, Mexican tomato framers were enraged while they watched tons of their tomatoes being fed to cattle or simply rotting in heaps along the highway. Rod Batiz, president of the 20 thousand member Confederation of Agriculture Association, was quoted in the "Wall Street Journal" as saying, "The whole of Mexico feels stabbed in the back". The example illustrates how difficult it is to deal with non-tariff barriers to trade. The Mexicans could protest the decisions of the US Department of Agriculture, but the Florida growers who were competing

description

Case study

Transcript of Case Study-Mexican Tomatoes

Page 1: Case Study-Mexican Tomatoes

Case 4.2. Mexican Tomatoes

In 1969, the US Department Of Agriculture put a set of minimum size restrictions on all tomatoes sold in the US market. The regulations provided that mature green tomatoes (those that ripen after they are picked) could not be sold unless they measured more than 2-9/32" in diameter. Vine ripened tomatoes were required to measure at least 2-17/32" in diameter. Mexican tomato farmers were outraged because the regulations barred almost 50 percent of their crop from the US market. Florida growers contended that the regulations were not discriminatory because they applied to both the Mexican and the US crops. But the Mexicans pointed out that the regulations were more lenient on green than ripened tomatoes. Green tomatoes accounted for approximately 85 percent of the Florida tomato crop and only 10 percent of the Mexican crop. While US consumers saw prices rise as much as 30 percent, Mexican tomato framers were enraged while they watched tons of their tomatoes being fed to cattle or simply rotting in heaps along the highway. Rod Batiz, president of the 20 thousand member Confederation of Agriculture Association, was quoted in the "Wall Street Journal" as saying, "The whole of Mexico feels stabbed in the back".

The example illustrates how difficult it is to deal with non-tariff barriers to trade. The Mexicans could protest the decisions of the US Department of Agriculture, but the Florida growers who were competing with the Mexican growers, in effect, wrote their own regulations. They maintained that the regulations worked for the benefit of everyone: growers on both sides of the border and the consumer. A strong case could be made for the harm done by these regulations to Mexican growers and US consumers, but the mechanism for hearing this case did not really exist. The Mexican growers could influence this decision by pressuring the US government through diplomatic channels, or try to appeal directly to consumers and thereby influence legislative and administrative action in government.

An important test of a ruling or regulation is whether it has a greater impact on foreign producers. If this is the case, and there is no apparent social benefit for consumers, the ruling is a non-tariff barrier.

Russian

Page 2: Case Study-Mexican Tomatoes

There appears a growing dangerous similarity between Russian oligarchs and many Indian business houses who have gained through their proximity to corrupt politicians, a concern highlighted by IMF former chief economist Raghuram Rajan. India has the second-largest number of billionaires per trillion dollars of GDP, after Russia. While Russia has 87 billionaires for the $1.3 trillion of GDP it generates, India has 55 billionaires for the $1.1 trillion of GDP. Germany on the other hand has the same number of billionaires as India with four times its GDP.

The common perception is that these are software billionaires, a class whom Rajan welcomed. But IT billionaires are not many in number, he confirmed. “Three factors — land, natural resources and government contracts — are the predominant sources of the wealth of our billionaires. And all of these factors come from the government,” said Mr Rajan, who was in Mumbai on Wednesday to deliver an address at the foundation day of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

To many people have gotten rich based on their proximity to the government, he said: “We have extremely efficient private banks and telecom companies that obtained their start from a government contract or licence,” added Mr Rajan. “If Russia is an oligarchy, how long can we resist calling India one?,” he asked.

While in the pre-reforms era, corruption used to be about sale of permits, reforms have created new sources of rents for the establishment, he pointed. “Land can be expropiated from those who do not have connection or formal title. Public land can always be disposed off to favoured parties. Contracts can be assigned to chosen friends despite a sham of public bidding. In all this, the public exchequer is defrauded, while the rents are shared between the politician and corrupt businessman,” Mr Rajan added.

He highlighted how the status quo prevails as every constituency is tied to the other in a cycle of dependence. “The poor need the savvy politician to help them navigate through rotten public services. The politicians need the corrupt businessman to provide the funds that allow him to supply patronage to the poor,

Page 3: Case Study-Mexican Tomatoes

who are numerous enough to assure him re-election,” he said. Though there are many upstanding politicians and businessmen outnumbering the corrupt, oligarchies do not require many participants to flourish, he pointed. “They only require silence and complacency among all of us,” said Mr Rajan.

He suggested that trade bodies can play a role and apply its influence to break the nexus of corruption and improve governance. Underscoring the importance of transparency and bidding in all government contracts, he called for reforms in land-titling and registration system so that titles are clear. Another way to reduce concentration of wealth and power and of corruption is to reduce the reliance on the politician for basic public services by the poor and improve the social safety net. Many public programs targeted at the poor could be wound up.

The substantial amounts saved could be directly given to the poor and in turn would be empowered to command services from the private sector. This practice is known to be successful in Mexico and some Latin American countries, he added. In India we have the capacity to identify the poor, create unique biometric identifiers for them, get them bank accounts, and make government transfers into those accounts. Money will give the poor respect as well as the services they had to beg for in the past, he concluded.

CANADIAN

Laws and regulations are a consequence of what the government wants to control, which is a consequence of politics - meaning what is the government doing, or not doing, to maintain the confidence of the people and get re-elected.

The Political Environment in this situation is influencing the Canadian Beef exporters through the new regulations that the Japanese government has established. These Japanese regulations (which are a consequence of the Sociocultural Environment - people in Japan fear Mad Cow) will mean that U.S. beef producers cannot send beef products to Japan if some of that beef came

Page 4: Case Study-Mexican Tomatoes

from cattle they imported from Canada. Example - frozen hamburger patties manufactured in the U.S. for export to the McDonald's outlets in Japan.

Germany

Psu